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Per. 3977 a. $\frac{62}{34}$



THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

IMPARTIAL INQUIRER:

ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A SUITABLE MEDIUM FOR
THE DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN
RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIAL
ECONOMY, ETC.

"DIAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

Some may take exception to the form of these writings, because they are chiefly controversial: but no objection can be more futile. Our land has become glorious through controversy, and there has the mind of England put on more of might than on the battle-field of truth. The greatest works our country can boast of take this very form. What were left to us of our Hookers and Barrows, our Taylors and Miltons, if their controversial works were excepted? The truth is, whoever would have knowledge respecting doctrines and principles that are still unsettled, whether in religion or in science, must seek it through this form, or be altogether disappointed."

VOLUME III.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY HOULSTON AND STONEMAN,
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1852.

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J. AND W. RIDGE, PRINTERS,
11, Bartholomew Close.

PREFACE.

TIME, with his steady but noiseless step, has well nigh completed another annual round, and the old man, with a genial smile, seems to intimate that we must make up this volume if we would allow him to place it in one of the niches reserved in the great temple of literature for the intellectual products of the present year. In order to secure his proffered services we cheerfully take the hint, and in a few brief sentences mark the termination of our labours for this year, with anticipatory references to their resumption in the next.

Of our controversial department much need not be said. In this volume, as in the preceding ones, great questions of deep and absorbing interest are calmly and philosophically discussed; every subject taken up is presented in various phases, by which a spirit of pure eclecticism must be imbibed by every thoughtful reader. The novel experiment, commenced in 1850, of establishing a magazine, "open to all, but devoted to *truth*," has been continued to the present time with unvarying success. We have proved by the forceful evidence of fact that it is possible for earnest men of every party to meet upon one common platform, and to discuss, in a spirit of kindness, their various opinions. In doing this we have not only established a great principle, but we have worked out details, and thus we believe we have served the great cause of truth, and promoted the highest interests of humanity.

We can also point with pleasure to the other departments of our work, and particularly to those which are specially devoted to the service of those who are pursuing a course of self-instruction and mental culture. The leading articles on "Rhetoric" are eminently adapted to such; and, with the preceding ones on the "Art of Reasoning," they will be found to constitute a body of thought and information which must be regarded as doubly valuable to all who desire to influence their fellows by their voices or their pens. The "Prolegomena" on European Philosophy will show how extensive is the field over which the projected series of papers will range, and how varied, and yet, withal, how rich, are its products, as well as the sterling ability with which the topics announced are likely to be treated. "The Inquirer" still increases in the number and importance of its queries, and in the value and appropriateness of its responsive "words of wisdom." "The Young Student and Writer's Assistant" has occupied its new positions of usefulness with great success. Having through the Logic Class and extensive communication with our readers ascertained that we had gathered around us a very large number of self-instructors, and being anxious to render them additional aid in the best possible form, we commenced with the present year two new classes for regular courses of instruction in Grammar and Mathematics. In these we immediately enrolled nearly 300 members; the majority of whom have continued steadily to pursue their studies with the most satisfactory results. We review these labours with pleasure, and rejoice in the thought that we have been able to contribute no insignificant quota to the cause of popular education and intellectual enlightenment—a nation's surest guarantee for freedom and progress.

There are circumstances connected with the history of this volume to which we may here refer, as otherwise, perhaps, no notice might be preserved of them. We mean the special efforts which have been made to bring our magazine under more general attention,

and thus to aid in increasing its circulation. In the month of August last we expressed a wish, in contemplating a northern tour, to meet our subscribers and friends in some of the towns through which we should pass. This course was novel, but not unwise. The old Lydians had a tradition which stated that one of their kings had the good fortune to discover, in the bowels of the earth, a ring which had the marvellous property of rendering him who wore it invisible to the eyes of his fellows. Such a ring all editors consider themselves privileged to wear; and we, although one of our number was contented to leave his ring in the sanctum, and appear amongst our readers in proper person, are not indifferent to the occasional advantages of this privilege. The meetings thus attended were of the most interesting and stimulating character. Mutual interest was felt and increased, and in every case energetic measures were spontaneously resolved upon for furthering the interests of this work. These meetings suggested others, and now, in nearly all the large towns in the kingdom, there have been earnest conferences amongst our friends. If it be inquired, what is the object of all these? we answer, to place the *British Controversialist* in a position of greater strength and safety, by securing for it at least the desiderated monthly circulation of 10,000 copies. That this is quite attainable we firmly believe, although the thoughtful and impartial character of the magazine may render considerable effort for it necessary. We are fully aware that we might have been more popular had we aimed at being less useful; but we do not desire to widen the range of our influence by decreasing its depth and beneficial power. We believe that there is a very large and rapidly increasing class of persons who are prepared to appreciate our journal, and we ask for its introduction, under favourable auspices, to them. We are desirous of this and its attendant results, that we may be enabled to continue our work, in all its sections, with renewed vigour, and to pursue with energy those fresh paths of usefulness that lie before us.

We are desirous, in January, 1853, of opening an Elementary Mathematical Class, a new Logic Class, with Sections for *Tyrones*, *Protectiores*, and *Seniores*, and subsequently Classes for General History and Geography, &c., and to award prizes and certificates of merit in connexion with each. The expense incurred by these improvements will be very considerable, and we cannot, of course, meet it without adequate returns. In the spirit, therefore, in which we first offered our services to the public and awaited their decision, we now submit these projects to our friends, and leave it for them to say whether we shall carry all of them out or not. We have confidence in the interest and zeal of our readers, and we leave the cause of *their own* magazine in their own hands.

But we must not lose ourselves in the contemplation of the future, nor fail to express our soul-felt gratitude for the favours of the past. Never was this more justly due, or more cheerfully and sincerely rendered. Friends, subscribers, and contributors, we thank you all! And while we solicit the continuance of your support, we promise honestly to endeavour to be still more worthy of it. We shall use our utmost efforts so to elevate the mind of society—

“That truth no more be gagged, nor conscience dungeoned.

But that all men may have due liberty
To speak an honest mind in every land,
Encouragement to study, leave to act
As conscience orders.”

INDEX.

	PAGE.
REHETORIC:—	
Introduction	1
The Nature and Origin of Language	41
The Growth of Language	81
Causes of the Diversity of Language.—	
Classes of Words	121
A Grammatical Outline	161
The History and Structure of the English	
Language	201
Style	241
Directions in the Use of Language	281
Sentences, with Directions respecting	
them.....	321
Perspicuity.....	361
Conciseness—Unity.....	401
Strength—Vivacity—Harmony.....	441

RELIGION :—

Can Christians, consistently with their Principles, render Support to the British Stage ?

Affirmative Article, 1	128
Negative Article, 1	132
Affirmative Article, 2	170
Negative Article, 2	173
Affirmative Article, 3	211
Negative Article, 3	214
Affirmative Article, 4	246
Negative Article, 4	247
Affirmative Article, 5	287
Negative Article, 5	289
Affirmative Reply.....	292
Negative Reply	294

PHILOSOPHY:—

Is Homoeopathy True in Principle and Beneficial in Practice ?

Affirmative Article, 1	7
Negative Article, 1	8
Affirmative Article, 2	47
Negative Article, 2	49
Affirmative Article, 3	87
Negative Article, 3	89
Affirmative Article, 4	133
Negative Article, 4	136
Affirmative Reply.....	175
Negative Reply	180

PHILOSOPHY:—(Continued.)

Is Woman Mentally Inferior to man ?

Introductory Article.....	
Negative Article, 1	
Affirmative Article, 1	
Negative Article, 2	
Affirmative Article, 2	
Negative Article, 3	
Affirmative Article, 3	
Negative Article, 4	
Affirmative Article, 4	
Negative Reply	
Affirmative Reply.....	

HISTORY:—

Can the Apostolic Origin and National Independence of the British Church be Proved ?

Negative Article, 1	
Affirmative Article, 1	
Negative Article, 2	
Affirmative Article, 2	
Negative Reply.....	
Affirmative Reply.....	
Neutral Article	

Were the Effects of the Crusades Favourable to the Civilization and Moral Elevation of the People ?

Affirmative Article, 1	
Negative Article, 1	
Affirmative Article, 2	
Negative Article, 2	
Affirmative Article, 3	
Negative Article, 3	
Affirmative Article, 4	
Negative Article, 4	
Affirmative Reply.....	
Negative Reply	

POLITICS:—

Ought the Jews to be Admitted to Parliament ?

Affirmative Article, 1	
Negative Article, 1	
Affirmative Article, 2	
Negative Article, 2	

and thus to aid in increasing its circulation. In the month of August last we expressed a wish, in contemplating a northern tour, to meet our subscribers and friends in some of the towns through which we should pass. This course was novel, but not unwise. The old Lydians had a tradition which stated that one of their kings had the good fortune to discover, in the bowels of the earth, a ring which had the marvellous property of rendering him who wore it invisible to the eyes of his fellows. Such a ring all editors consider themselves privileged to wear; and we, although one of our number was contented to leave his ring in the sanctum, and appear amongst our readers in proper person, are not indifferent to the occasional advantages of this privilege. The meetings thus attended were of the most interesting and stimulating character. Mutual interest was felt and increased, and in every case energetic measures were spontaneously resolved upon for furthering the interests of this work. These meetings suggested others, and now, in nearly all the large towns in the kingdom, there have been earnest conferences amongst our friends. If it be inquired, what is the object of all these? we answer, to place the *British Controversialist* in a position of greater strength and safety, by securing for it at least the desiderated monthly circulation of 10,000 copies. That this is quite attainable we firmly believe, although the thoughtful and impartial character of the magazine may render considerable effort for it necessary. We are fully aware that we might have been more popular had we aimed at being less useful; but we do not desire to widen the range of our influence by decreasing its depth and beneficial power. We believe that there is a very large and rapidly increasing class of persons who are prepared to appreciate our journal, and we ask for its introduction, under favourable auspices, to them. We are desirous of this and its attendant results, that we may be enabled to continue our work, in all its sections, with renewed vigour, and to pursue with energy those fresh paths of usefulness that lie before us.

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INDEX.

	PAGE.
RHETORIC:—	
Introduction	1
The Nature and Origin of Language	41
The	81
of Language.—	
.....	121
.....	161
The	
d Structure of the English	
Language	201
Style	241
Directions in the Use of Language	261
Sentences, with Directions respecting	
them	321
Perspicuity.....	361
Consistency—Unity.....	401
Strength—Vivacity—Harmony.....	441

RELIGION —

Can Christians, consistently with their Principles, render Support to the British

1	136
.....	139
2	170
.....	173
3	211
.....	214
4	246
.....	247
5	297
.....	299
.....	302
.....	304

PHILOSOPHY:—

True in Principle and

1	7
.....	8
2	47
.....	49
3	87
.....	89
.....	133
.....	136
.....	173
.....	180

PHI

Is

Inferior to man?

.....	216
.....	221
1	225
.....	251
2	252
.....	296
3	299
.....	320
4	331
.....	354
.....	359

HISTORY:—

Can the Apostolic Origin and National
British Church be

.....	11
1	14
.....	52
2	54
.....	92
.....	92
.....	94

to
the

Favourable
Elevation of

1	336
.....	339
2	373
.....	375
3	408
.....	410
4	440
.....	450
.....	453
.....	455

POLITICS:—

Ought the Jews to be Admitted to Par-
liament?

Affirmative Article, 1	6
Negative Article, 1	19
Affirmative Article, 2	56
Negative Article, 2	6

POLITICS:—(Continued)

	PAGE.
Affirmative Article, 3	97
Negative Article, 3	99
Affirmative Reply	139
Negative Reply	141

Ought Money to be Intrinsic or Symbolical?

Intrinsic, 1	182
Symbolical, 1.	184
Intrinsic, 2	227
Symbolical, 2	231
Intrinsic, 3	243
Symbolical, 3	256
Intrinsic, 4	300
Symbolical, 4	301
Article	341
Article	344

and Industry to be Enactments?

Negative Article, 1	378
Affirmative Article, 1	381
.....	419
2	421
.....	457
3	459
.....	483
.....	405

SOCIAL ECONOMY:—

Would	Promote the Happi-
ness	ness
.....	20
1	24
.....	62
2	64
.....	100
3	103
.....	144
4	145
.....	186
5	187
.....	239
6	263
.....	265
.....	268

I in Harmony with Intellectual and Moral Freedom or Social Well-Being?

.....	304
1	306
.....	347
2	319
.....	343
3	346
.....	423
.....	427

SOCIETIES' SECTION:—

Advice to Students	105
Education—its Province and its Instru-	
ments	389
Essay on History	424
European Philosophy	66, 191, 309, 351

SOCIETIES' SECTION —(Continued.)

	PAGE.
.....	389
.....	106
and Projects for	467
.....	147
.....	270
.....	38
.....	150
.....	251
to Study	72
tion of the	
.....	30

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES:—

Bridge Mutual Im-	74
.....	152, 434
So-	434
en's	111
.....	31
.....	409
.....	273
Chipping	434
Society	153
Mutual Improve-	391
.....	31
ual Im-	197, 470
.....	434
Improve-	75
.....	112
.....	435
.....	236
Society	434
Society	74
lution	391
Kilmarnock Young Men's Biblical Asso-	32
ciation	71
.....	31
Improve-	153
ment	197, 439
M	439
d Mutual Im-	431
provement Society	434
.....	434
ual Im-	236
.....	74, 235
.....	31
ual Im-	392
ual Im-	312
Society	31
Society	236
Improve-	110
.....	111
St. Mary Gray Christian Association	111

	PAGE.
SOCIETIES' SECTION:—(Continued.)	
Walthamstow Mutual Improvement Society	110
West Indies—British Guyana Mutual Improvement Association	435
Demerara—Smith Church Mutual Improvement Association	31
Wotton-under-Edge Mutual Improvement Society	470
Yeadon Mutual Improvement Society ..	32
Yevil Mutual Improvement Society	312
THE INQUIRER:—	
Questions requiring Answers:—33, 75, 112, 154, 194, 237, 274, 313, 356, 392, 435.	
Answers to Questions:—	
An Actuary	157
Admission to the English Bar	33
Alliterative Verses	198
Anecdote of O Connell	394
Bloomfield's and Alford's Greek Testaments	156
Botany	113
Cambridge University	396
Carthaginian Names	237
Chivalry, the Crusades, and our Colonies	238, 275
Common-place Books	277, 313
Conveyancing	114
Diary	304
Dissenting Colleges	436
Electro-Biology and Braidism	34
Elocution	276
English Composition	157
Facility in Composition	76
Grammar	77
Herbariums	357, 395
Hereditary Insanity and Matrimony	436
Homœopathy	276
How to Cultivate the Habit of Attention .	471
How to Cultivate the Voice	276
How to Keep a Diary	357
How to Study Euclid	76
Incentation	358
Latin and Greek without a Master	277
Laughing Gas	357
Literary Eminence—how to attain it	274
London University Matriculation	278
Manchester Engineering	275
Mental Arithmetic	35
Mercator	438
Mind, in its Relation to Matter	237
Ministerial Works	199
Monmouthshire not in Wales	393
Music	155
Musical Advice	33
On entering the Ministry of the Church of England	395
Panteism and Rationalism	112
Photography	471
Phrenology	114

	PAGE.
THE INQUIRER:—(Continued.)	
Scotch Law Conveyancing	471
Sermon in favour of Homœopathy	155
St. Bees College, Cumberland	392
Style and Punctuation	305
The Amount of Gold in Circulation	155
The best Method of Studying Mathematics, with Advice to Students	437
The Fabled Hebrew Wanderer	76, 113
The French Language	314, 394
The German Language	315
The Italian Language	238, 276
The Law—Solicitors	34
The Origin and Nature of Manors	395
The Pharmaceutical Society	438
The Port-Royalists	198
The Study of Language	356
The Temperature of Water from a Pump .	394
The Welsh Language	393
Transparent Painting on Glass	199
Ventriloquism	155
Works for Seamen	198
THE YOUNG STUDENT AND WRITER'S ASSISTANT:—	
LOGIC CLASS:—Exercises on the "Art of Reasoning," 37, 78, 115, 157, 199, 238, 278, 315, 359, 398	
GRAMMAR CLASS:—Exercises in Grammar, 78, 110, 158, 199, 239, 278, 316, 359, 397, 439	
MATHEMATICAL CLASS:—Questions for Solution, 37, 79, 117, 159, 199, 240, 279, 317, 360, 399, 439	
Solutions, 116, 158, 199, 239, 278, 316, 359, 398, 439, 472	
NOTICES OF BOOKS:—	
A Lecture on the Civilizing Influence of Christianity	117
A Manual of Universal History	400
Autobiography of William Jerdan, Vol. 1.	399
Vol. 2.	440
Dictionary of Domestic Medicine	79
English Synonymes	120
Every-Day Astronomy	400
Lehahn's Practice of German	118
Little Henry's Holiday at the Great Exhibition	39
Logic for the Million	39
Munro's Manual of Logic	240
Old Eighteen-Hundred-and-Fifty-One ..	280
Reason and Faith	39
Self-Education	40
Supplement to Etymological Dictionary ..	118
The Diffusion of Knowledge	38
The Foundation, Construction, and Eternity of Character	79
The Life of Edward Baines, late M.P., 159,	319
The Life of Lord Jeffrey	319

CONTRIBUTORS' SIGNATURES.

	PAGE.		
A.	383, 464	J. B.	16, 5
Albus	157	J. E. H. D.	
A. C.	34, 37, 76, 393	J. E. P.	
Adelphos	59, 250	J. F.	
An Undergraduate	278	J. G. R.	276, 315
Aristides	100, 133, 295, 306, 420	J. H.	180
Aristotle	214	J. S. J.	
A. S.	138, 358, 436	J. M. S.	
A. T.	453	J. N.	64
A Trinity Man	397, 438, 472	J. N. C.	
B. W. P.	19, 141, 375	Junior Sophistes	
C. C. F.	386	Justinian.	
C. E. R.	304	L. G. G.	
C. J. H.	358	L. I.	
Confessarius	309, 428	Non Nobis Solum	
C. W., Jun., 24, 49, 113, 132, 136, 156, 224, 235, 268, 277, 294, 339, 369, 381, 455, 466		Philomathos	
D. H.	115, 262, 289	Rembrandt	
D. J.	394	R. L. G.	
E. B.	78, 272	S. A. J.	
E. G. S.	180	Scrutator	
F. F.	103, 231	Senoj	227
F. J. L.	410	S. M. F.	
G. B.	96, 191, 265	S. N.	
G. N.	341, 456	T. F. O.	
G. P.	199	T. W. I.	
G. V., M.D.	8	U. M.	27
Harold.	450	Veritas	2
Homo	105	Vinclum.	1
H. P. H——s.	459	Vir	
H. S. W.	306, 472	W. T.	1
H. T.	173, 247, 256, 421	W. G.	
Irene	89, 259	X.	

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. I.

THAT "the *manner* of speaking is as important as the *matter*," is a maxim as false as it is superficial, and as detrimental to the cultivation of true Eloquence as it is false. For what purpose is it that man fashions the subtle and delicate air into wise and melodious words, and gives them wings, as angels, of persuasion or command? It is that he may express Thought. We have no objection to the mere act of elaborating a cunning web of bright and exquisite words, but let these words at the same time embody and contain something that will not only charm the sense of harmony, but captivate and gratify the intellect. Let Language be constructed so as to give the greatest possible amount of pleasure and delight, but let it also furnish the mind with something that will instruct, amuse, and exalt it. Thought—thought that is the grand desideratum of our age; let that be but gained, and then it may be draped in words as lustrous as star-gleams—a lustre which will not only adorn but illumine the thought. To *think* is our first duty, to express our thoughts is the second.

We know full well, that in laying down the proposition that there is a Science of Rhetoric, we expose ourselves to the questioning of objectors. What! we shall be asked, do you wish to circumscribe, restrain, and curb Genius—that glorious inspiration and semi-divine madness? What Rhetorical art gave Homer instruction before he improvised the "Iliad"? Who taught him the principles on which the "Odyssey" should be constructed? Do not those two poems rise up like twin-born stars amid the darkness of an intellectual chaos? Before these, was not all gloom? Whence, then, gained he his light? "The thousand-souled Shakspeare," too, has he not built himself "a livelong monument" in the profoundest depths of human hearts, and when did he study Rhetoric? Where is the heart-string which he has not touched—where the passion which he has not represented—what recess of that "mighty mystery," the heart of man, has he not unlocked without its aid?

"Rise, hallowed Milton, rise, and say"

by what sage Rhetorician's rules thou wert informed how to ride

"Sublime

Upon the seraph wings of ecstasy,"

and what "*principles of composition*" did he impress upon thy glory-visioned soul? And

there is Burns, likewise, the bard who sung the homely joys, the simple loves, the keen-felt sorrows of the humbler ranks—

“ And rustic love and poverty
Grew beautiful beneath his touch ”—

pray tell us, if thou canst, from whom did he acquire the art of thought-expression? Is not Nature the best teacher, and are not her pupils better fitted

“ To snatch a grace beyond the reach of art,”

than those who are

“ In outward show
Elaborate, in inward less exact ? ”

It would be easy, indeed, to answer all these queries by others, which would bear the appearance of—ay, and possess—as much accuracy and point. One, however, will be sufficient for our present purpose, viz.:—Who are those who compare themselves with Homer, Shakspeare, Milton, and Burns, and demand equal exemption from the bondage of law and rule, upon the ground of possessing a genius of an equally lofty character? But we prefer to reason the matter, and hence we look at the subject in the following points of view:—There is a certain power of persuasion possessed by the generality of men, and exerted by them with a greater or less degree of efficacy in their every-day walk and conversation. If, then, we believe that no effect can happen without a cause, we must believe that there are causes in operation which coincide in producing this efficacy of persuasion. If these laws are discoverable—and that they are, few will, we presume, be inclined to deny—there is a possibility of constructing a system of the laws of expression; and having a knowledge of these laws, we might elaborate from them an art which would enable us to express our thoughts in such a manner as should at the same time please and instruct; at least we shall have a greater likelihood of being able to do so than if we trust to mere random and impulsive promptings; for if there are laws of Nature which declare that such and such modes of expression are expressly adapted to the production of certain effects, to know these laws, and to follow them, must be the best method of gaining these ends. A carefully-digested science, whose principles have been culled from a clear, judicious, accurate, and cautious interpretation of experience and observation, is regarded by all men as a fundamental point in any art; a systematic study of the laws by which phenomena are producible, is generally considered as indispensable to every one who desires to labour in the production of such effects; a well-defined series of canons, together constituting a theory, is admitted to be necessary to the success of any course of procedure having for its object the accomplishment of certain ends; and there is no good reason why it should not be so in the case of Rhetoric. It is true that we may be told that Genius is self-sufficient; that its intuitions are the best guides it can have; that it is possessed of a noble daring which enables it to burst the fetters of rule, and to gain a higher excellence than that produced by the careful and elaborate study of sciences and arts. If this be truth, then it is in opposition to the universal experience of mankind, which asserts, that true excellence is only attainable by painstaking laboriousness, frequency of repetition, *and acquired accuracy, skill, and aptness.* The acquirement of the happy choice of terms, *the severe economy and selectness of phraseology, the exquisite accuracy and precision, as*

well as forceful brevity of expression, the melodious harmony and pointed appropriateness of diction for which all great authors are remarkable, must be, in a great measure, the result of patiently-conducted toil, carefully-directed and assiduously-pursued study. It is not Genius but Mediocrity that finds restraint galling; and the reason of this especial disgust which Mediocrity affects for the trammels of system, may be found, in some instances, in the self-sophistry of the idler and the sloven; in others, in the mistaken idea that whatever is unintelligible is necessarily profound; in all, however, the chief reason is, that scientific systematicity is the sworn foe of ambiguous, incongruous, and mystically oracular phraseology, of carelessness and extravagance of diction, and of opacity and disjointed expression, and is distinctly hostile to the inflated and jejune conglomeration of words which Mediocrity would fainly believe to be "fine writing." Such writers do not believe that "the greatest art is shown in concealing art," but that the greatest art is shown in having no art at all. There cannot be a greater mistake. The great thoughtsman must do with his ideas what Domenichino is reported to have said he did with regard to his pictures, "I am continually painting them within myself." If

"Speech is the golden harvest that followeth the flowering of thought,"

it must only come when thought is in its highest state of cultivation, maturity, and perfection; and it must require patient toil, perseverance, and self-denial so to cultivate and mature it. If, however, it require these, it must needs be the result of art, and every art implies a method or science. Just as the painter, by the close and vigorous application of his mental powers to the drawing of geometrical figures, in order that he may gain correctness, readiness, and accuracy of touch, fastidiously rejects even the slightest deficiency between the ideal and the art-executed, and by the minutest and most painstaking exactness, gradually acquires such harmony and naturalness of expression, that the whole appears to the uninitiated eye, simple, easy, unconstrained, and artless; so ought the world's thought-painters to exercise, to educate, and to habituate themselves. "*La véritable éloquence suppose l'exercice du génie et la culture de l'esprit.*" *

We are not admirers of "that glib and oily art"—that studious aiming at the production of prettinesses and pettinesses—that exhibition of the gift of fluent speech,

"And how to talk about it and about it,
Thoughts briak as bees, and pathos soft and thawy,"

at which some affectationists aim; nor yet of that bare, bleak, barren style of writing, in which there is no play of the imagination or the fancy, but where all is as plain, as unornamental, and as dry as a series of mathematical demonstrations; but we do admire that mode of composition which, while it instructs the intellect, warms the heart, and calls the ideal into life and being—which is clear, precise, unambiguous, easy, and expressive,

"With here and there a violet bestrewn"—

which is the result of the action of Genius disciplined by Taste and cultured by Common Sense—of the conjoint and concurrent exertion of the deliberative understanding, the

* "*True elegance implies the discipline of the taste and the culture of the mind.*"—Boswell.

intuitive perceptivity of the mind, and the emotions of the beautiful and the sublime. But although this is the style of thought-expression which we admire, we may be permitted to remark, that we are not by any means desirous of insinuating that our own style is an example of what we would wish others to acquire; so far is this from being the case, that we eagerly, and as an act of justice to the science of which we are about to become the expounders, seize this opportunity of disavowing such egotistical arrogance. We are perfectly sensible of the peculiar vices of our own style, and exceedingly anxious to improve, refine, and chasten it; but a long course of reading and of study, which involved a characteristic mode of thinking, has so entwined this method of expression around our mind, as a habit, that we find our thoughts so irresistibly fashioning for themselves the vesture in which they desire to appear, that we are but faintly able to modify and alter it as we could wish. Now, though we know that there is a common proverb which asserts that "Example is a superior instructor to Precept," yet we humbly hope, that as we shall bring forward specimens and illustrations culled from the most eminent of the world's thoughtsmen, the "conjunction and the mighty magic" of their names will far out-balance the example offered by such humble, though earnest, Wisdom-worshippers as we. At the same time, and once for all to dismiss personality, allow us to say, that it is not absolutely necessary that an instructor should be in himself a perfect and unimpeachable master of the art or science which he professes to teach; his duty is rather to have a power of perceiving the perfect, understanding why it is so, explaining the *rationale* of that art or science, and leading the mind to contemplate and admire the labours, discoveries, and doctrines of the chief cultivators of that branch of knowledge or taste. Although, therefore, we shall assert with Horace, that with regard to style

"Omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit utile dulci,"*

and though the spirit of our teachings shall be similar to that of Lucian, who says, "Let your style be neither vulgar nor pedantic, but such as the unlearned may comprehend, and the scholar admire," yet we hope we shall not be considered as at all implying that our own manner of composing is faultless, but that our strictures may be applied to ourselves as well as to others, and that no defects of ours should be considered as evidence of the incompetency of such a systematic body of principles and rules as the science of Rhetoric supplies to aid, direct, restrain, improve, refine, and exalt. There is another objection urged against the study of Rhetoric, which it behoves us to notice in an introductory paper like the present, viz., that which regards Rhetoric as an ensnaring and insidious art, whose object is, not to convince, persuade, or win the intellectual assent, but to stimulate the affections or passions, captivate the taste, and by mere artifices of diction and arrangement, by mere embellishments of manner, to distract the mind, and disturb the equilibrium of the intellect,—which considers Rhetoric as calculated to be of use when we wish

"To dash maturest counsels, and to make
The worse appear the better reason."

Now it is true, that when the teachings of Rhetorical science are made the guides of our

* "*He has effected every point who has combined the useful with the agreeable.*"

practice, it becomes an instrumental art, and, like all other arts, it may be employed for the accomplishment of deleterious purposes, and the gaining of improper ends. This admission, however, instead of being regarded as a satisfactory reason for neglecting this study, ought rather to make us determine to

“Smack of observation;
Which, though I will not practise to deceive,
Yet to avoid deceit, I mean to learn.”

This is a wise resolve; for to understand the fraudulent arts which may be employed, is the best way of guarding against being misled, cajoled, or deluded, at the same time that such a knowledge will enable us to detect and expose the party who makes use of words which are merely *clothed* in Reason's garb, which are merely the spurious counterfeits of truth and wisdom.

Expression is a power—a power which all should strive to make their own. There are men whose reason can scan the wide-spread hemisphere of truth; who can feel the rapture and the joy of thought-conception; who can for a time imagine themselves emancipated from their prison-house of clay, but who are unable to give an account of the thoughts which stir within them, of the mighty joys which they have felt. These are dumb prophets—non-conductors of the sacred electricity of thought; idea-recipients, whose lips have been sealed by the finger of Silence; men who can read the oracles of heaven, but are incapable of translating them into the dialect of this nether earth. Thus the great mission of their being remains unaccomplished, simply because of the want of that self-training by which Genius is enabled to bring from the mount of inspiration the burden of the celestial harmonies, and make them audible to our “unpurged ears.” But though thought-expression is a power worthy of being anxiously striven for, and sedulously cultivated when attained, yet, it must be admitted, that there is a seductive influence frequently brought to bear upon those who have attained a masterful skill in this splendid art, which ought carefully to be avoided, viz., the likelihood of loving, thirsting after, and pursuing, present applause and honour, unmindful of the true dignity and utility of the art, of the true glory of one who devotes his powers, energies, and acquisitions, to the elevation and ennoblement of humanity. Such *ought* to be the object which every student of Rhetoric should have before him in his study of the subject; at the same time, we must admit that this is not one of the essential characteristics of Rhetorical art; *in itself* it has no moral nature. The object of speech is to express thought so as to convince, persuade, and bend the minds of others to purposes of our own; the application of this power for good or evil depends, therefore, not on the science of expression, but on the nature of the mind which makes use of this instrumentality. If that mind be subdued to truth, if it be suffused with a sense of moral duty, it will be sincere, virtuous, and truth-loving, and this instrument will be mighty and powerful for good and virtuous results. If, on the contrary, the mind be under the dominion of falsehood, if it be not under the guardianship of the moral sense, then it will be insincere, hypocritical, and disregardful of truth or righteousness, and the knowledge which this science yields will be artfully employed in the subversion of the good and the true, in the propagation of error, falsehood, and wrong. But how will this be attempted? Not by the unblushing avowal of its purpose, but by the borrowing of weapons and dress from the arsenal and wardrobe of Truth; and in this

hypocritical semblance—a demon in the disguise of “an angel of light”—going forth on a warfare in which Truth is attacked and impugned by one who represents himself as the devoted servant of Truth. That Eloquence may be prostituted to an improper end—that it may be employed in the service of vice and of falsehood—that it may be degraded to act as the advocate of injustice—that it may rouse, inflame, and agitate the passions, and add the tremor, the delirium, the madness, and the imbruted fury of the evil principles of human nature, to the misguided and misinformed intelligences of certain classes of men—are no arguments against the study of Rhetoric, but rather motives to spread more widely and generally a knowledge of the subject, so that art may be met by art, and hence the evil influence of art be rendered of “none effect.” But the chief and paramount reason for the study of Rhetoric is, that by applying principles of philosophical observation to the objects which impress and influence the finer, the nobler, the more exalted faculties of the mind, we may learn the laws which they follow, and employ similar means to produce similar phenomena. By having a knowledge of these laws, we are enabled to conform our own compositions, to a certain extent, to their dictates, as well as to use them as means of judging of the performances of others; to habituate the mind to the artistical execution of its aims, and to the analyzation of the principles upon which the mind feels, judges, and decides; and thus we impart to our own endeavours the accuracy and elevation of philosophy, while to philosophy we add the fluency, the attractiveness, and grace of the fancy and imagination, and both are gainers by the interchange. In this point of view it seems one of that series of studies which is implied in mind-culture, and which it is absolutely necessary that every one should study, whose object it is to employ language accurately in the expression of thought, and to employ the chief instrument which he has for conveying the ideas which arise in him to the intellectual and immortal spirits by which he is surrounded.

Rhetoric, according to the view of it which will be presented in the following papers, may be defined as the SCIENCE which instructs us how we may best impart information, effect conviction, induce persuasion, and communicate delight, as well as the ART of employing language most efficiently for the accomplishment of these purposes.

Grammar is the science which informs us how to inflect words correctly, collocate them properly, and arrange them methodically. Logic teaches us how to reason accurately; and Rhetoric enables us so to exhibit our thoughts to others as shall most certainly effectuate the end which we purpose to ourselves in speaking.

It will appear from the above-given definition, that there are several activities of the mind to be operated upon and excited, viz., the Intellect, the Imagination, and the Emotions, and that the excitative agencies which are to be employed in the accomplishment of these purposes are words—

“The passion-winged ministers of thought.”

Our attention, therefore, in our next paper, will be directed to the consideration of the instrument of Thought-intercommunication and Language—that agency by which the transient thoughts and words of men are preserved, embalmed, and treasured up in *imperishable signs*.

Philosophy.

IS HOMŒOPATHY TRUE IN PRINCIPLE AND BENEFICIAL IN PRACTICE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

HOMŒOPATHY is the name by which we understand the discovery of a law of nature, by the application of which, not only actual diseases can be radically cured, but the predisposing cause of disease detected and eradicated, so that its *active* development may be prevented. I say a *discovery*, but by this I only understand that a fixed principle, already known and applied in a limited sphere, was discovered to possess a universality, and was brought to bear upon all phases of disease. Homœopathy, by rejecting means and substances which act detrimentally upon the nervous system, and tend to exhaust the essential energy, without which vitality sinks; by regulating the provision of aliment, from which it discards all medicinal and stimulating substances; by attending to the general hygiene, and by employing specific remedies against the disorders already in active progress, has the power of obviating and of eradicating the predisposing cause itself, and of effecting the ultimate cure and emancipation of mankind from bodily ills, and consequently from mental disorders which arise out of them as sympathetic results. Indeed man was ordained by nature to suffer. His ills were acquired through *ignorance*, that original sin. Science, however, it is felt, will free him eventually from those sufferings, to which his own folly and superstition have hitherto made him the martyr. I have already fully explained these things in my paper on the Predisposing Causes of Disease, published in the "Pioneer," No. 14, and the "Hahnemannian Fly Sheet," Nos. 18, 20, and 21.

Homœopathy, besides the benefits above stated, has the merit of making the physician more attentive to the exact consideration of the symptoms of disease (hitherto somewhat neglected in the investigation), by which diseases are more systematically distinguished. It also leads him to insist upon his patients attending more particularly to the rule of diet. It has already shown many physicians the non-necessity of

such immense doses of promiscuous drugs as were heretofore given, to the great detriment of all constitutions, and more especially of those whose natural weakness rendered them more constantly the subjects of such treatment, whilst it deprived them of the energy to expel the mischief thus incurred. It leads to a more certain testing and acquaintance with the specific properties of medicine, and it has promoted much valuable investigation into the province of the *Materia Medica*. It avails itself of numerous agents, which are, when comminuted, all-powerful for good, but which were hitherto believed to be *inert*. It introduces more simplicity in the dispensing of prescriptions. It directs more attention to the preparation of medicine, and keeps a strict watch on the apothecaries. *Homœopathy will in no case do positive injury*; it gives the system more time to rest, and recover itself undisturbed; and both from the definite nature of its treatment, and the security and the brevity which characterizes it, it immensely decreases the expenses of cure.

The founder of this beneficial method of cure raised himself by his genius and benevolence to the highest eminence as a benefactor of mankind. Samuel Christian Friedrich Hahnemann was born at Meissen; was educated at Leipzig and Vienna; took the degree of Doctor of Medicine at Erlangen in 1799; discovered and published his method in 1810; translated *Latin, English, French, and Italian* works of science; wrote in *Latin* and his own (the *German*) language seventy-nine scientific works. He had an immense practice, and ended his useful and glorious life on the 2nd of July, 1843, in full possession of powerful intellect, and at the advanced age of eighty-nine. The principle of cure proclaimed by him, "*Similia similibus curantur*," signifies, administer for the purpose of cure the medicine which produces on the healthy subject the group of symptoms the most similar to those produced by disease. The era of this bril-

liant discovery is scarcely forty years distant, and it has already ceased to be a novelty. None of the medical schools number so many conscientious adherents; it is practised in all civilized countries; it has its representatives in every part of the globe, and its dispensaries and hospitals in most of the capitals and larger towns of Europe and America. The works treating of Homœopathy are sufficient to fill libraries; and the most remarkable feature in them is, that they are all the development of the same principle, and have nothing common with those sad and fatal debaucheries of imagination which have rendered the medical profession an object of ridicule for philosophers, and of deception and distrust for the community. Homœopathy has no theory but the logic of facts—no principle but the law of nature; it is as evident as an axiom in geometry, and as certain as the law of gravitation and rotation of the globe. Homœopathy has rendered all dangerous disease amenable to the salutary action of its remedies. It is now well tested, and constitutes the only real method of effectually treating all disorders to which the animal organism in general is subject. Homœopathy has the power, not only of curing, but of effectually

preventing, by its *specifics*, many disorders called Epidemic, namely, small-pox, scarlatina, measles, typhus fever, cholera, hydrophobia, &c. Homœopathic practitioners, endowed by Hahnemann with the knowledge of the origin of chronic diseases, and the mode of treatment to which they are specifically subject, possess the means to eradicate and to prevent them; they make use of the same remedies that other schools do, and differ from them only in their method of preparation, dose, and application. All the so-called *separate* systems for the cure of diseases, namely, Hydropathy, Mesmerism, Galvanism, &c., are all subservient to the same law of nature upon which Homœopathy is based; and it is worthy of remark that they are all only effectual when applied according to that law. Homœopathic practitioners reject no *reasonable* method of treatment—no method of treatment by which they incur no *risk* of *unforeseen mischief*; they use all these medical auxiliaries when they are Homœopathically indicated. As to the proofs of the efficacy of Homœopathy, these are now a mere matter of statistics; our hospitals, dispensaries, private establishments, and our books, are all open to inquiry.

G. V., M.D.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

PUBLIC attention has, of late, been much arrested by a serious commotion in the medical world; the convulsive throes which agitated the community, like the periodical ebullitions which disturb nations, served to betoken the advent of some great revolutionary movement. But, alas! it was only a verification of the old quotation—“*Parturiunt montes, et nascitur ridiculus mus.*” Like the frogs in the fable, the wonder and respect early developed for the new comer, speedily yielded to feelings of most undisguised contempt. Upon investigation, it was discovered that a German apothecary, named Hahnemann, had introduced a new method of treating diseases; after consulting popular taste, and finding it decidedly prejudiced against the nauseous draughts and boluses which the old-fashioned medical men so liberally administered, he professed to *have invented what he* denominated the *Globular Theory*; that is, instead of giving *pills by the dozen, like Morison and Co.,*

and the other champions of quack systems, he prescribed infinitesimal doses, treating cases of the most complicated character by the employment of the trillionth or decillionth of a grain of substances which previously had been considered utterly inefficacious.

There is no doubt that the great anxiety which many members of the profession have evinced to crush the new system has mainly contributed to bring it more openly before the notice of the public. Had a more judicious course of proceeding been adopted, had Legitimate Medicine stood undaunted upon her own truthful basis, instead of having to treat the nuisance as a sturdy opponent, it might have been introduced still-born into the world, and forthwith consigned, with its most illustrious progenitor, to that most appropriate domain in the regions of space—the limbo of fools. Yet, notwithstanding, we cannot but be astonished at the progress which the heresy has made, and we believe

that the readiest mode of accounting for it is in the following manner:—

The science of medicine has always been in advance of the age; indeed, hitherto it was impossible it could have been otherwise: the empirical approximations of our forefathers to the true light, only led them more carefully to veil from vulgar eyes, by mystic processes and cabalistic combinations, the wondrous knowledge they professed to have acquired. But latterly it has been different. The partial insight into the working of nature's laws, which the many now acquire as part of an every-day education, has produced its inevitable consequences. They have been awakened to the realization of the possession of a power, and that power they are determined to exert to the fullest extent in criticising both men and principles. A man feels ill, a little of what he calls biliousness; he is not going to send for a physician; no, he'll "physic himself." If he has a grain of common sense he takes a purging draught, and gets well; but, perhaps, he dabbles a little in science, and thinks he has a right to exercise his own judgment; he has heard of some specific, some nostrum with a wondrous long name, to which the usual appendage of *pathy* is affixed; he inhibits the dose, whatever it may be, and if cured well and good, another testimonial for the efficacy of the remedy; if it prove of no avail, there are five hundred good reasons which can be produced to account for its failure, and he goes the round of advertisements again, in hopeful expectancy of discovering the true panacea.

Now, we have pictured no uncommon case. Look at the columns of our papers and periodicals; there are few, if any, well-certified chronic cases of cure, and even these may be easily accounted for by the very simplest causes. But to the point. Homœopathy is our subject for the present, and we will deal with it as plainly and concisely as possible.

There are three fundamental methods of cure—the Allopathic, the Antipathic, and the Homœopathic. The two first of these are constantly employed by every practitioner in the kingdom; the last is a system which, on many accounts, deservedly ranks apart from all others.

The aphorism, "*Similia similibus curantur*," is the basis of the whole fabric. "*Like cures like*," explains the anomalies in the

action of complex medicaments, no less than in the use of the simpler therapeutic agents: to reduce a plethoric constitution, prescribe rich viands, and plenty of them; to cure the dropsy, drown your patient with water! These are obviously fair deductions; a great principle, if correct in a single enunciation, may be under the same circumstances applied, without fear of error, to more than one. But the Homœopathist may answer, "You acknowledge this truth in many of the common affairs of life; the application of snow to frost-bitten parts restores the circulation, and in burns or scalds we relieve the pain by exposure to the affecting cause, or heat." Doubtless we do; but who would immerse a snow-nipped member in spirit, or submit to the dull cold of an evaporating moisture, and expect relief? Are there not other remedies to be applied to a scalded hand of a more soothing nature than to hold it by a scorching fire?

But even granting all this, are we to adopt uncompromisingly an hypothesis founded upon imperfect deductions from a few simple facts, when the every-day experience of the commonest practitioner is directly at variance with its fundamental laws? Some of our most potent medicines are far from being Homœopathic in their action or character; agents which destroy the *Acacus Scabiei*, or itch insect, are incapable of developing that disease. Medicines which cure intermittent fever, if taken in sufficient quantity, will develop, not remitting, but constant fever—forms of disease, it must be remembered, differing considerably from each other. We could multiply cases of the same description without number, but the inaccuracy is evident. The claim to originality in the treatment set up by the Homœopathists is no less unfounded than their other assumptions; it has been practised to a certain extent from the earliest times, and is suggested by the common sense of every person who gives the subject a moment's consideration. A man has a tendency to vomit; by tickling the fancy the object is attained, the stomach is relieved. Excessive stimulus, either of meat or drink, produces internal irritation; we combat the disease by increasing that irritation to assist the expulsion of the offending matter.

But even admitting their therapeutic treatment to be feasible, or perhaps advis-

ble, we must protest most emphatically against the globular part of the business, and refuse our credence to a theory which would fain persuade us that the effect is in an inverse ratio to the cause; that though an atom too small for estimation will work the most wonderful results, dozens of such atoms would pass through the system without effect. Is it not the acme of absurdity for one moment to suppose that substances which even when administered in copious doses hardly prove efficient, when diminuted beyond the perception of our most refined senses, produce cures more than miraculous? Fancy the ignorance of the man who will assert that he can empirically prognosticate the action and effects of an agent, which but the nicest analyses of a Herapath could detect, and of whose actual presence the prescriber himself could give you not the faintest shadow of a proof! We do not despair some day of lighting upon an advertisement offering to feed large union or convict establishments upon the Homœopathic principle (pity they could not include the clothing too!); or provision packets for searching squadrons, warranted not to weigh more than a few ounces!

A medical man may carry the whole Pharmacopœia about in his pocket; nor do we see any reason why a patient should not make assurance doubly sure, and swallow all of it in a single dose, diluted to the x^{th} —1 extent. We beg to adduce a few specimens of the Homœopathic doses:—

Charcoal, 2 decillionths of a grain!

Opium, 2 decillionths of a drop of a spirituous solution!!

Nutmeg, 2 millionths of a grain!!!

Our readers may think that we are joking; we were never in more sober earnest. Any one who has a spare half hour to throw away in perusing the treatises on the system* may satisfy himself of the truth of our assertions. In the French edition of Hahnemann's *Materia Medica*, no less than 45 octavo pages are devoted to the statements of 720 symptoms produced by the one-millionth of a grain of vegetable charcoal! Among the many effects ascribed to this agent we find, "*itching of the internal angle of the left eye*;" "*itching of a wart on the*

left finger;" "*repugnance for butter*;" "*speedy loss of appetite by eating*," &c., &c. Many of its observations are filthy and obscene.

Shades of Hippocrates and Galen! if ye could but re-visit the degenerate followers of your mighty selves, and view the unfathomable abyss into which they have madly plunged the science whose birth ye cherished, and whose cradle ye rocked, would not your venerable old faces flush with resentment at the arrogant presumptions of the motley crew, and hasten to sever, in an agony of disgust, the links which connect your great names with a profession which despises and rejects your teachings?

The ordeal of experiment, no less than the tribunal of theory, has demonstrated the utter fallacy of the globulistic views; some of the members of the *Academie de Medecine* experienced, after repeated attempts, nothing but repeated failures. Andral tried it on 130 or 140 patients, in the presence of the Homœopathists themselves, yet in but a single case was he successful. The claims of imposture were unable to stand the searching test of science.

But we have a more serious charge to prefer against the supporters of the system, and one which we would in truth believe to be applicable only to a contemptible minority. When the sacred office of the pastor is debased by the introduction of the things of time and sense; when the inspired words of the Deity are invoked to sanctify the claims of a question purely scientific, the duty of the literary questor is then past; uncompromising rebuke is the only resource. We allude to a recent sermon preached with the direct object of explaining and substantiating by proof from holy writ the views of Homœopathy, and published in a medical journal of the day. We feel that the demands of our duty are satisfied by the mere notice of the subject; it is unnecessary to shock the feelings of our readers by delaying longer upon it.

The true means of resistance to the onward progress of Homœopathic and other absurdities are in the hands of the profession itself: ignorance of the laws of Physiology and Pathology clings like the gloomy mantle of night around the opening path of medical science. The existence in its ranks of men exercising its mysterious art, and wielding

* *Hahnemann's organs*; Dr. Guin's "*Pharmacopœia Homœopathica*," &c.

its weapons potent no less to destruction than to salvation, to whom its fundamental truths are as enigmatical as the riddles of the Sphinx, amply account for the rapid strides of sedition so recently manifested amongst its adherents. We firmly believe, that until the unclean thing is weeded out root and branch, and the cautery be applied to the affected parts, the contagion will spread, and gather as it goes. We may con-
 sider in the words of the most eminent physiological chemist* of our day, who writes: "How differently would the treatment of diseases be conducted if we had perfectly

* Liebig's "Letters on Chemistry," p. 13.

clear notions of the processes of digestion, assimilation, and secretion. Without just views of force, cause, and effect—without a clear view into the very essence of natural phenomena—without a solid physiological and chemical education, is it to be wondered at that men, in other respects rational, should defend the most absurd notions; that the doctrines of Hahnemann should prevail in Germany, and find disciples in all countries? Reason alone will not prevent whole nations from falling into the most abject superstitions; whilst even a child, whose mind has been duly developed and instructed, will repudiate the fear of ghosts and hobgoblins." VINCLUM.

History.

CAN THE APOSTOLIC ORIGIN AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE BRITISH CHURCH BE PROVED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

In choosing this side in the present discussion, we cannot be deemed guilty of acting from an impulse of bitterness or hostility against the English Church, because we love that communion, and our name is enrolled among its members. But those who know most of men and things, know how often it happens that great societies contain numerous individuals, who arrogate for their peculiar institution such proud titles and claims as would be instantly rejected by the more sober members. We rejoice, then, to have the opportunity to record our verdict against the proud assumption which many Churchmen have claimed for our beloved church. Nor are we deterred from recording our humble conviction by the remembrance that many great and good men have thought against us. No assumption can ever be substantiated by the number of men, however great, that may have supported it: if it were thus, then would all the lying devices of Romanism be established upon an unassailable foundation. The assumptions of societies, as well as those of individuals, must be taken to the one unerring test, that it may be proved whether they be legal or vain. When an individual

assumes kingly airs, his compeers ask him to show his credentials, and make known his antecedents. So is it with churches. When any one church arrogates to herself a proud pre-eminence above all kindred churches, she at once challenges all reflecting minds to inquire into the authority upon which she pretends to establish her claims. Thus has the harlot of Rome been hurled from the proud pinnacle of her mundane glory. Her besotted assumptions led inquiring minds to ask after her credentials; those credentials could not be found in the word of God, and they indignantly rejected that foul system of lies, and stamped Rome—"Babylon, the foredoomed of God."

The proud claims now put forward by High Churchmen lead us to inquire, where are the proofs that the English Church is the only apostolic church in this land. Comparisons are generally invidious, but when we find one set of professing Christians striving to unchristianize every professing sect who do not think with them, our duty—nay, our interest—requires that we should examine the proofs such men adduce to substantiate their assertions. We proceed, then, to notice a few of the most salient and most

frequently-adduced arguments brought forward by those who promulge these claims.

The bishops are a favourite pillar upon which this proud pretension rests. "See," say these men, "here are the veritable successors of the apostles, and how can our church be any other than apostolic?" But may not the Romanist use the same argument with the same effect? If bishops alone form a proof of apostolicity, then verily the Church of Rome is no apostate. But we must examine the bishops to find out if they are worthy of being called the apostles' successors. We are well aware, that individual abuse is no argument against a system; but a system may be examined to see if it bears the marks which justify its pretensions. Compare the English bishops and their pompous titles, their almost regal splendour, and the palaces they inhabit, with the estate of the twelve lowly men whom they profess to succeed. Or read the following, and then determine whether the English bishops give an apostolic essence to the British Church:—"The elders which are among you I exhort, who am also an elder, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and also a partaker of the glory that shall be revealed: feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly; not for *filthy lucre*, but of a ready mind; neither as being *lords over God's heritage*, but being ensamples to the flock," 1 Pet. v. 1—3. Do the English bishops present this picture? Have they ever done so? Where, then, is this apostolic conduct? Must not a man have the spirit of Christ to be one of his? and must not a man have the spirit and power of an apostle to be apostolic?

Again, is there anything apostolic in beholding a bench of bishops filling the seats of a legislative hall? Is it following the pattern of him who determined to know nothing save Jesus and him crucified? Are these remarks made in an invidious spirit? They are not. We are now speaking of a system which is put forward by High Churchmen as a proof that their church is the only apostolic church in England. Our readers must determine whether such proof be *worthy of their reception*: for ourselves, we see as much apostolic proof in the lowly meeting-house, where no mitred-one ever

enters, but where the word and sacraments are duly ministered, as is to be found in the whole bench of bishops, with their appended palaces and gorgeous cathedrals. They, and they alone, are apostolic who worship that Jesus whom the apostles preached, and who draw their doctrine from the Book of Life.

Again, much stress is laid upon the interminable chain of bishops there has been in England; but the same argument is as good for Rome as for England. When were there no bishops in the Romish Church? And are we to believe that church to be apostolic because she can point to a line of bishops? Surely, surely, something more than a line of bishops is needed before we can account the horrors of the inquisition and the iniquities of the confessional holy and apostolic! The Church of Rome has her interminable chain of bishops, but she has, for ages, lost any claim to be called apostolic; consequently, a line of bishops does not impart an apostolic character—*ergo*, the English Church cannot found her claim upon her succession of bishops.

That the Church of England has no right to an exclusive title of apostolicity may be seen by her departure from apostolic usage. We are not going to determine whether the primitive Christians had bishops or not; of this we are certain—if they had, they were as unlike the bishops of the present day as two things can well be. But we shall show that, if they had bishops, our present system of creating bishops is altogether unapostolic. In the first chapter of Acts we find, that when the place of the traitor apostate had to be filled up by another apostle, he was not selected at the will of a few, but the whole church had the electing of the same: and this was ever the custom when a christian church assembled, until spiritual tyrants raised their head in the militant church of Christ. "In those early times, every christian church consisted of the people, their leaders, and the ministers and deacons; and these, indeed, belong essentially to every religious society. The people were, undoubtedly, the first in authority; for the apostles showed, by their own example, that nothing of moment was to be carried on or determined without the consent of the assembly,* and such a method of proceeding was both prudent and neces-

* Acts i. 15; vi. 3; xv. 4; xxi. 22.

sary in those critical times. *It was, therefore, the assembly of the people which chose their own rulers and teachers, or received them by a free and authoritative consent, when recommended by others.* The same people rejected or confirmed, by their suffrages, the laws that were proposed by their rulers to the assembly; excommunicated profligate and unworthy members of the church."—*Vide Mosheim, 1st Cent.* "A bishop, during the first and second centuries, was a person who had the care of one christian assembly, which, at that time, was, generally speaking, small enough to be contained in a private house. In this assembly he acted, not so much with the authority of a master, as with the zeal and diligence of a faithful servant."—*Mosheim, 1st Cent.* Such was the usage in the apostolic times. Compare the present practice of selecting bishops by the ruling authority, and the utter want of authority by the laity in the Church of England, with the usage of some of the sects, and determine which is nearest to the apostolic.

Some injudicious Churchmen fancy that their cathedral pomp, and their form of prayer, stamp their church with an apostolic impress; no words are needed to prove the fallacy of such an argument.

The way by which a cure of souls is obtained in the Church of England prevents her members from supposing that she is more apostolic than her neighbours. Can it be apostolic to purchase what is termed a living? Again, can it be apostolic that some christian ministers should have their thousands, and do but little work, while numbers of earnest, devoted men hardly receive a subsistence for their dependants? Would not the apostles scorn to have their names attached to any system which would allow such an unfair distribution of this world's wealth among a community of professed brethren? Verily, Churchman as I am, I blush to think that the sects are extremely more apostolic in this very essential thing.

Again, what is there apostolic in the prohibition which prevents episcopalian ministers from preaching in unconsecrated places of worship? What part of the writings of the apostles will warrant bishops in preventing godly ministers from preaching in a diocese because they do not hold all the opinions they consider orthodox?

But the Church of England is wrong in affirming that she can trace her descent from the apostles. High Churchmen are very bold in proclaiming that the Anglo Church is not an offshoot from Rome. Thus wrote Gresley:—"We have undoubted historical evidence of the existence of a pure branch of the church universal, governed by bishops, and possessing all the marks of a true church from the earliest time. If not founded by one of the apostles, still no doubt was ever entertained that the bishops of the ancient British Church derived their order from them in a regular manner. At the time of the Saxon invasion, the British Church was much oppressed; but when the Saxons themselves had been converted by the mission of Augustin, the two churches, that is to say, the ancient British and the Saxon, gradually coalesced into one, and, whether we trace the succession of our ministry through St. Augustin, who received his orders from the Gallican Church, or through the ancient British line, the fact of their being duly ordained and descended from the apostles, and so from Christ, is undeniable."* Here we see that this writer is obliged to trace the descent of the English Church from Rome: for it is a mere sophistry to speak of the British Church after she succumbed to Rome; when she submitted to receive the dogmas and rule of Rome, she at once threw aside her identity, and ignored her existence as an independent church. What, then, is the inference? Must we not see that our English Church is only a partially reformed church that sprung from the bowels of Rome? And can anything apostolic be born from the corruptions of Rome? It is sophistry to speak of descending from the British Church, when that church became lost in succumbing to Rome. With regard to what Gresley states concerning bishops, we refer to what we have stated above in refutation of his sophistries.

It is painful to hear mere tyros in theology, who have just received episcopal ordination, vaunting about their apostolical descent, and with their childish arguments striving to unchristianize those venerable men who, for a long series of years, under Dissenting banners, have been fighting the battles of the Lord, and have been instru-

mental in gathering in many souls to the fold of Christ. Many times have we blushed for the honour of our church to hear these boys prate. What has God done by the instrumentality of Churchmen that he has not done by the instrumentality of Dissenters? Have the islands of the sea been reclaimed from the night of dark superstition; Dissenters were instrumental in effecting the same. Where is there a herald of the cross, and the sects not represented there? Look on the right hand and on the left, to the north and to the south, and there you may see the blessing of God stamped as freely upon the labours of the Dissenter as upon those of the Churchman. Would this be so if Dissenters were not as apostolic as the Churchmen? Take away the bishops from the English Church, and a few non-essential rites and ceremonies, and what does she contain that is apostolic which christian Dissenters hold not? They have the word and the sacraments and an ordained ministry—ordained more in accordance with apostolic usage than the ministers of our own church. How vain, how childish, then, it is for Churchmen to arrogate to themselves titles and powers which are not warranted in

fact! When, oh! when, will all true Christians unweave the webs of sophistry which now divide them, and mingling in one harmonious whole, determine to drop all unmeaning and senseless shibboleths, and strive only to adorn and extend the dominion of Christ?

One word only is needful to show that the Church of England is not independent. Can that be free which is held in thrall by any other power? Acts of Parliament decide for the Church of England, and by those acts she cannot, of her own free will, amend or alter any of her laws. If her sons discover the symptoms of Popery in her constitution, they cannot at once get rid of the same, but they must wait until it pleases Queen, Lords, and Commons, to permit them to expunge the same. Hence, then, the Church of England is not free.

We have now brought our article to a conclusion; and if any can point out the fallacy of our argument, or the incorrectness of our statements, we shall thank them for their service. One thing we long to see, viz., truth triumphant, and error thrown down.

W. T.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.--I.

THIS question naturally admits of a two-fold division. We shall in this article consider the first part, viz.:—"The Apostolic Origin of the British Church." In order to simplify the subject, we shall endeavour to prove, first, *That the British Church was founded, not only during the lifetime of the Apostles, but by an Apostle or Apostles in person*; secondly, *That St. Paul was its founder*.*

First, some of the evidence that the British Church was of Apostolic Origin.

That it was the case is *highly probable*, from many considerations. First, from the very easy and frequent intercourse between Britain and Rome during the lifetime of the apostles; and secondly, and more especially, from the vast number, not only of Roman, but other foreigners, *trafficking* in Britain, *settled* in Britain, and *serving in the armies* of Britain.

Some few years after the subjugation of this island to the imperial sceptre, we find that there were so many foreigners in Britain, that in one year (A.D. 61) no less than 70,000 of them perished in an insurrection of the natives. At this time, too, so populous and rich a mart was London, that it is recorded of Seneca, the philosopher, that he amassed property in the island amounting in the lowest calculation to £300,000. At this period we learn from sacred and profane history, that Christianity spread "mightily abroad" in the world. At Rome there were zealous Christians, even in the *palace*; for St. Paul, writing from Rome to the Philippians (iv. 22), says, "All the saints salute you, chiefly they that are of Cæsar's household." That Christianity must have taken deep root in Rome is a natural inference. Heathen history tells us, that in the reign of Nero, about A.D. 64, when by public decrees search was made for the Christians, "Vast, indeed, was the multitude which was apprehended of that pernicious sect," as

* The writer is indebted to many works, but particularly to Foy's "English Church."

Tacitus and others called the Christians. Now, out of the numbers of Britons whom business or other causes would bring to Rome, can we suppose that *none* of them were converted to Christianity? Can we imagine, that out of the vast number of foreigners, not only from the west, but from the east, trading and settled in Britain, there were no professors of the "glad tidings of great joy?" Surely we cannot entertain the supposition. Again, if there were Christians in our island, is it not natural to suppose, that *some* of them would have zeal and courage enough to say a word for their Master, when they saw whole families, tribes, and provinces, given to the most shocking and revolting idolatries? The mind starts at the bare idea of a denial. Thus we see that there are strong probabilities in favour of the early introduction of Christianity into Britain. But we rest not on *probabilities*, however strong, or *opinions*, however prevalent.

Gildas, our earliest historian, who flourished in the beginning of the sixth century, has left on record the fact, "*That upon this our frozen isle, while shivering with the icy cold of ignorance, heathenism, and idolatry, the cheering beams of the true Sun—the Sun of Righteousness—shone brightly out, a little before, or about the time of, the defeat of Boadicea by the Roman legions.*"

Here, then, we have direct testimony as to the precise time of the foundation of the British Church. And it must not be forgotten, that at the time when the defeat occurred (A.D. 61), the apostles were in the midst of their evangelical career.

The testimony of Gildas is strongly confirmed by a statement of Justin Martyr, one of the earliest and most learned of the christian fathers. He declares that in his time (A.D. 140) Christianity was known in every country under the Roman sway. In Justin's time, and prior to it, Britain was a flourishing province of the Roman empire—it was filled with Roman legions, officers, and citizens—and it is quite incredible that such a writer as Justin Martyr, living at Rome, should use such strong and positive language, if there were not christian churches and christian services in Britain.

By whom the Church was founded in Britain?—We must mention at the onset, that all the fathers inform us, in general

terms, that it was the apostles *personally*. For example, Theodoret, bishop of Cyprus, says, "The apostles persuaded even the Britons to receive the laws of the crucified Lord." Again: "St. Paul, after his release from imprisonment at Rome, went straightway to Spain, and thence hastening away to other nations, carried the light of the gospel to them also." And that we may not mistake the "other nations," he adds, "That he (St. Paul), after having gone into Spain, brought salvation to the islands that lie in the ocean."

Theodoret knew of no other islands lying in the ocean than the British isles; indeed, this was their classical and geographical appellation. Eusebius, bishop of Cæsarea, the friend of our countryman, Constantine the Great, says that the apostles preached to "those called the *British islands*;" and Jerome, the most learned of the Latin fathers, says, "Paul preached the gospel in the *western parts*." Venantius, bishop of Poitiers, in the sixth century, says, "That he (Paul) crossed the ocean, and landed and preached in the countries which the Britons inhabit, and in the utmost Thule." And to mention but one authority more, which ought to set the matter completely at rest, Clement, bishop of Rome (who was St. Paul's friend, companion, and fellow-labourer), whose name (Phil. iv. 3) was written in the "Book of Life"—this same Clement says, "Paul taught righteousness to the whole world, and went even to the utmost bounds of the west." It should be remembered that the ancients knew nothing west of these islands, and hence from the time of their first discovery they were designated "*utmost*." Thus Virgil and Pliny, "*the utmost Thule*;" Catullus, "*the utmost island of the ocean*"—"the utmost Britons;" Horace, "*Britain, the utmost people of the world*;" and Venantius, as quoted above.

To these examples we might add many others, all and each of which would contribute their weight and testimony to the fact, that the British Church was of *Apostolic Origin*.

Secondly, *St. Paul was the founder of the British Church*.

We have seen, from the quotations made, that some say St. Paul proclaimed the gospel to the utmost bounds of the west, others naming Britain expressly; and it is an inter-

esting fact, that none held a contrary opinion on the subject for more than a thousand years. The witnesses who testify to its truth, commence with St. Paul's bosom friend, Clement, who could not be deceived in so plain a matter-of-fact—they speak of it with such confidence as shows that they had no suspicion of their being mistaken. *St. Paul*, then, if there be any truth in historic testimony, was the founder of the church of our early fathers.

To a truth thus demonstrated from history, little confirmation from the Bible will suffice. We turn, then, to the fifteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and we find the apostle expressing his *earnest desire and long-cherished purpose* of going from Rome into the *west*. "Whensoever," says he, "I take my journey into Spain, I will come to you."—"I will come by you into Spain." To this add the following remarkable and interesting facts:—St. Paul's release from prison at Rome agrees *exactly* with the time mentioned by Gildas when

Christianity was planted here. St. Paul was a contemporary prisoner with Bran, the father of Caractacus, and was released the *same* year. Between St. Paul's first and second imprisonment at Rome there was an interval of *eight years*. This interval, say the fathers, without one contrary opinion, "he passed in going up and down and preaching in the *western parts*." "Yea," says the Jesuit Capelli ("Lives of the Apostles"), "*this was the common and received opinion of all the fathers*."

Now, putting all these facts together—considering St. Paul's long-cherished wish and purpose, leisure time, and zeal—the opportunity he had of returning with the released captives, the celebrity of the island at the time, there would be ample ground to conclude, even though ancient writers were *silent*, that St. Paul did do what all antiquity asserted and believed—preached the gospel, not only in Spain, but also in these utmost bounds of the west—even *Britain*.

J. B.

Politics.

OUGHT THE JEWS TO BE ADMITTED TO PARLIAMENT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

EIGHTEEN hundred years ago the Jewish nation, already shorn of its chief glories, severed by a single act the remaining bonds of its existence, and devoting to slaughter a portion of its people, surrendered the rest, with their unfortunate descendants, to long and universal oppression.

What they have since regained in part of the rights then lost has been wrung little by little from an unwilling world. Everywhere has the Jew been an outcast, and his claims held exceptive to the sacred law of justice. It is true, his frequent wealth has proved a most convenient resource when princes have had a fancy to be extravagant, but his liberty, his citizenship, his right to elect, or to act if elected,—these, the common gifts of God to all *men*, have been stubbornly denied, or if *acknowledged*, conceded only as the gradual *dawn of intelligence and reason* has necessi-

tated restitution. This policy of reducing the Jew to the moral leper of society and a mere cypher in the state, was not demanded by any excess of natural depravity, or by any disqualification arising from natural incapacity. The worst enemies of the Jew have not exhibited their own inferiority by asserting his. Philosophy and facts would have laughed the libel to scorn. Why, then, since he possesses equally with other men the dignity and capabilities of manhood, has he been cut off from its rightful honours? Why is it, that even now, when knowledge is every one's pretension, and freedom is lauded to the skies, that the question as to whether the Jew shall be admitted to civil rights, should remain as a question at all?

This is obviously the inquiry which Reason would make, were the matter left within her jurisdiction, as it ought to be. She

would point out that it would be about as proper and as clever a proceeding to discuss a Jew's claim to the sunlight as to other rights which are his in virtue of a common humanity. The fact is, our business lies not so much in demonstrating a truth as in dissipating objections to it. The right bears its own proof, and our position with respect to it is, that we deal chiefly with the *pretexts* upon which it is withheld. There is really no question till we get at these.

There can be no doubt but that the primary and chief objection to the Jew enjoying the full exercise of civil rights is, that *he is a Jew*—his very name full of associations evoking to Gentile feelings, rather than from any apprehension of the mischief he might do. We speak not here of bigotry in its worst forms, of persecution irrespective of principle, indifferent whether its victim be Jew, Methodist, or Mormonite; it is alike unworthy of attention and inaccessible to reason: but we refer to the practice of those persons who, like him of Tarsus, imagine they thus "do God service." These frown upon the Jew, deny him approach, shut him out from their assemblies, from a sense of duty. "Because," say they, "he is a Jew, we deem it right that he should be subjected to a particular kind of treatment. The ban of the Almighty is upon him, far be from us the arrogance which would nullify His decrees. God's plan determines ours. As nothing can be more evident than the fact that God is scourging the Jew, so nothing is clearer to us than the necessity that the punishment should be borne without human alleviation. The prophetic declaration, that he shall be 'a bye-word among all nations,' is a sufficient guide to our duty; and that while we serve our God the Jew can bring against us no charge of injustice, is manifested by his own engagement, pledging himself and his children to the chances of divine retribution."

It is an easy matter to show how erroneous is the assumption at the foundation of this doctrine. These persons assume what many of their forefathers, unfortunately for the world and Christianity, have assumed before them, that the judgments of God are in their keeping, and disposable at their pleasure. They emulate the angels, and, self-invested with the *powers of ministering spirits*, "deal damnation" around them in

the true satisfaction of duty-doing. For theirs is not a mere passive acquiescence, a leaving God to his own purposes and providences. Every denial of justice to the Jew is active in its character; every refusal of the right a perpetration of the wrong; every perpetuation of opinions, laws, tests, which obstruct the Jew in his attempts to attain to emancipation, is practically placing a barrier in the way of success, and must be regarded as a real and accountable act, since to perpetuate an evil that has come into our possession, and which we can extinguish if we choose, is just equivalent to creating it. Now, the error these people make in their treatment of the Jew is so apparent that it scarcely needs enlarging upon. Because, to carry out God's designs it is necessary they should know them, and then that they should possess authority to fulfil them. To know them, they must either have done what the mightiest angel whose powers they wield has never accomplished, unloosed the book of God's decrees, and made the Eternal mind their own, or they must have received a special revelation. The former of these means they will not pretend to, the latter they cannot, with any advantage to themselves. They will, indeed, reiterate the denunciations of holy writ; again and again will prophecy be on their lip, and be, with its long and terrible fulfilment, adduced as indicative of the divine will; but, even then, allowing, as we must, that the scourge was intended, whence comes *their authority* to administer it? Does this come with the prophecy? This is the important point. Has God left his prophecies in the hands of men, to be construed and consummated as custom, or caprice, or imbecility, may judge, or misjudge, of occasion; or, has he not rather reserved to himself the infliction of vengeance, sometimes using men, indeed, as instruments, unconscious instruments, in the execution of his judgments, at the same time justly requiring their *exclusive obedience* to certain laws which he has instituted for their mutual good? This is, undoubtedly, God's plan. He would have us keep his commandments, and not meddle with his judgments, therefore are we told that "*secret things belong to the Lord our God, but they that are revealed to us and to our children.*" He would have us "*do justice and love mercy,*" and has summed

up into one rule the *whole* duty of men to each other. Specifically has he warned the Gentiles to "boast not against the branches." How mistaken, then, the supposition which some of them cherish with so much satisfaction to themselves, that they are the faithful stewards of Omnipotence! They have misunderstood the nature of their Master's service, the terms of his commission. They have gone to prophecy, searching for precepts, when the keeping of precepts which there could be no misunderstanding about, was all the assistance that God had permitted in the accomplishment of prophecy. Their error arrives at palpable absurdity. They have actually been the creators of those very providences and judgments which they disavow interference with! *Non-intervention* in reference to God's decrees is their favourite boast; but when their application of the good principle undergoes our scrutiny, we find that God's decrees have been supplanted by Gentile intolerance, which reverence for the Almighty and the religion he has inculcated, demands that we denounce as characterized as much by impiety as it is by injustice.

Unless the treatment of the Jew be the result of the most contemptible ignorance, or, what is worse, of the vilest dispositions of human nature,—a supposition we should be sorry to entertain, inasmuch as it would be paying but a poor compliment to our opponents,—we are bound to believe that a great proportion of their opposition to the Jew is comprehended in, or is traceable to, the foregoing objection. It would, however, be unfair to insist that it has universal influence. To any of our opponents who demand it, we will readily accede acquittal, and supposing them to be free from any intention that their conduct should operate as a punishment to the Jew, we will take their own objection. The plea upon which they deny senatorial rights to the Jew is, that he would *unchristianize the senate*. They are jealous for its christian purity, for it is the element of preservativeness. Unluckily for them, the "salt has lost its savour." Coppock,—illustrious practitioner in parliamentary ethics!—what say you of the saintly purity of the English Commons? "I could *take a list* of the English boroughs, beginning with Abingdon, and ending with the last letter, and could put opposite—the

member paid so much for his seat. I state this to show *what the system is*." Mr. Coppock may have overrated his ability; he might fail in proving that every member has stooped to infamy like that of St. Albans; but he has disclosed enough to show a failing more general even than was suspected. Now, bribery and corruption are acts committed by the *member-elect*; they are not, like infidelity and private immorality, the faults of his private character, but are strictly acts of a capacity he is entering upon. Where, then, is the entirety of that christian character which is demanded for the house? It would, indeed, be the queerest sleight in the process of conversion ever heard of, if these men could be made collectively what they are not individually. Homogeneousness is the same in its particles. There is no such special talisman for the change of vicious elements into a virtuous whole. The christian oath which members take no more makes them Christians than do their christian names. But supposing this house were Christians, *i.e.*, that all its members were influenced by christian principles, how could the admission of a Jew affect its character injuriously? Christianity and Judaism are identical in all that concerns the purpose of a government. The rules which regulate the actions of men towards each other are the same in the Old Testament as in the New. It must be remembered, that the purpose of government is not the propagation of the christian religion, but *the enforcement of relative duties*, and these are taught by precepts which have descended unaltered from Jew to Christian, and which both have an equal interest in obeying. The use of the phrase "unchristianize," in the sense it is made use of in this question, is a mere trick. It means the violation, the overthrow of just principles; but a sufficient refutation of every such insinuation is the fidelity with which the Jews now discharge important public functions.

We have thus considered the objections of those who negative the inquiry, "Ought the Jews to be admitted to Parliament?" Trite enough, we may be told, our remarks are; but we ask in return, *Why* prolong so trite a question? Viewed apart from considerations of equity, as a matter depending upon *the representative arrangement*, it is a settled question. London and Greenwich has each

chosen a representative from the Jewish race. This is at once a final decision, else is our pet system of representation a sham. The Commons themselves have ratified this decision. And if two of the most enlightened constituencies of this nation, and the "collective wisdom of the empire," agree as touching the Jew's admission, shall the accidental terms of an oath, or an adverse vote of the Lords, be sufficient to keep him "below the bar?" Assuredly not. The generation which has so far cast off its ancient

prejudices as to hold out the hand of friendship to all the world, which sends through its electric wires its greeting to France; the enlightenment and love of freedom which have welcomed Kossuth, and raised Rothschild and Salomons to share in the honours as they do in the burdens of the state, will be deterred by no obstacles from securing for Rothschild and Salomons, and as many of their brethren as may be similarly chosen, a speedy and a free exercise of their parliamentary functions.

B. W. P.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE admission of the Jew into the British House of Commons is fraught with many difficulties, and involves several very serious questions, not only of a civil and political, but also constitutional and religious, nature. Indeed, the mere attempt at such an innovation is one which threatens to separate the church from the state; to infringe upon, if not destroy, the independence of the democratic part of the British constitution; and as well to bend the necks of free-born Englishmen to the rule of those who are entirely different from them, and who openly and avowedly treat the Great Head of their church as an impostor, holding up to ridicule the faith of the nation. The subject is, therefore, one which may not be stated lightly; it requires to be looked at in all its bearings and consequences. It demands the most serious consideration from those whose office it is to decide this important question, and as well of all who have any interest in the weal of this nation, and any influence left for her constitution, or gratified for the amount of freedom and happiness enjoyed by her inhabitants. The leading questions, therefore, which would suggest themselves to the mind of a thinking man, are—1st. What is the nature of the British Constitution? 2nd. What is the Parliament House of Commons? 3rd. Is the Commons House independent of, or subservient to, the Constitution? A due investigation and consideration of these several questions may throw a little light upon the subject, and tend in some measure to assist in the final conclusion to be arrived at.

These several questions we will now consider in order.

1. The constitution of England is

"Christian;" based upon Christianity; subservient to the laws of Christ; and holds as its fundamental creed the doctrine that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and God as well as Man. It is also composed, 1st, of a Monarch, who is bound to be a Christian; 2ndly, Lords *Spiritual* and Temporal, selected for their piety, their birth, their wisdom, their valour, or their property; and 3rdly, Commons, freely chosen by the people *from among themselves*, all of whom were originally obliged not only to be Christians, but also communicants in the Church of England. Such a constitution (unlike that of any other country), being neither entirely monarchical, aristocratical, nor democratic, secures the benefit of all, without infringing upon or destroying the independence of either. The three powers being brought to bear upon each other, operate as a check one upon another, and produce that liberty and happiness so fully enjoyed by the inhabitants of this land, preventing all the direful consequences which result from power resting solely on one class, which is so severely felt by other nations, both in the destruction of their liberties and rights as men on the one hand, or in licentiousness, innovation, and want of stability on the other. Touching the infringement upon the character or position of either of these three powers, Mr. Justice Blackstone very wisely says, "If it should ever happen that the independence of any one of the three should be lost, or that it should become subservient to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of our constitution. The legislature would be changed from that which (upon the supposition of an original contract, either actual or implied) is presumed to have been

originally set up by the general consent and fundamental act of the society;" and such a change, however effected, would, according to Locke, "at once effect an entire dissolution of the bands of government, and the people would thereby be reduced to a state of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative power."

2nd. The House of Commons, as before stated, is composed of persons freely chosen by the people from among themselves, and represents the democratical part of our constitution. This proposition viewed simply, would seem to imply that the Jew, being now in some sense a natural-born subject, has a right to be chosen, and also to represent a constituency. This will, however, be met by a consideration of the next question, viz.:—

3rd. Is the House of Commons independent of, or subservient to, the Constitution?

There can be no doubt that every integral part must necessarily be dependent on and subservient to the whole. The democratical part of the British constitution must, therefore, be considered as a part of, and still dependent on, and in some sense subservient to, the constitution of the country: and as that constitution is Christian, and acknowledges Christ to be the supreme Head of the church, there can be but little room for argument to show that it is not right either for the people, who are bound themselves to be of the same creed, and in subjection to Christ's laws, to elect a Jew, or for a Jew when elected (if elected he can be considered, the people's call being to elect *one of themselves*) to represent not only those who seem to desire to bend the neck of this country to

the yoke of another people, but also the faithful and liege subjects of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Besides, look at the Jew himself. Who is he? Can he be considered by Christians as one of themselves? It is true, according to the law of this country, that he is in some sort a natural-born subject, but his own creed compels him to believe himself to be driven from his own land, and doomed to wander as a stranger in the lands of other nations as a punishment for his sin; and we as Christians are led to believe that very sin to be the rejection of Jesus Christ as the Son of God and Saviour of the world; and if he is consistent with his own creed, he is daily expecting to be called back to his own land, where, and where alone, he has any right to expect to be placed in a position of rule. The admission of the Jew, therefore, into the senate-house of this kingdom, where he would be called upon not to administer but to legislate christian laws for a christian people, and those even for the regulation of the church, while he himself at the same time denies Christ altogether, appears inconsistent both with the constitution of England and every rule of common sense, unless indeed it be wished, in the words of Locke, "to effect at once an entire dissolution of the bands of government, and reduce the people to anarchy." No; the Jew must be considered as a stranger within our gates, although we may still offer for him and ourselves the prayer of the poet:—

"May England still maintain her own position
free,
And Israel's home his own dear Canaan be."

VERITAS.

Social Economy.

WOULD COMMUNISM PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WHENEVER civilization has become sufficiently developed to call into existence the reflective powers of the mind, there seems to *have sprung up alongside of it a strong belief that, whatever the then state of social happiness, there was to be attained a*

much higher gradation of earthly bliss—a state so far in advance of that then present, as to be worthy of the greatest human exertions for its attainment. The existence of such a belief is not to be ascribed to any mania, which, as in some cases, having been

ated with some peculiar sect, has con-
l rife, perhaps, for generations, but at
has died away, and is heard of no

Philosophers, statesmen, and poets,
like proclaimed this belief, and lent
names to its advocacy, while the pre-
age in this is equally believing with
ist, and perhaps even more so.

might afford some satisfaction to the
is if we were to trace the origin of this
ative belief. The task, however, would
an easy one, and, moreover, it is not
ial to our present inquiry. Suffice it,
ore, to say, that some have referred it
n's knowledge of his own deficiencies,
is consciousness that perfection, or any-
approaching to it, can only be attained
uch perseverance and longsuffering.
s have considered it as resulting from
peration of a principle of *hope* ind-
d within us.

*visions Hope! in thy sweet garden grow
hs for each toil, a charm for every woe;
y their sweets, in Nature's languid hour,
ay-worn pilgrim seeks thy summer bower;
as the wild bee murmurs on the wing,
peaceful dreams thy handmaid spirits bring!
viewless forms th' Æolian organ play,
weep the furrow'd lines of anxious thought
f."*

we ventured an opinion of our own
this subject, we should say that this
ing after more perfect happiness has
implanted within man by his all-wise
or as a means of urging him on in that
ensive scale of improvement which is
rate and ennoble his nature, and ulti-
y prepare him for those high destinies
await him.

e theories laid down for the realization
s state of "terrestrial paradise"—so
desired alike by peasant and prince—
of course, been various as they have
been numerous. Speaking of them
ally, as they range from the "Republic"
atlantis" of Plato, to the "Utopia" of
omas More, and from thence to the
ia" and "El Dorado" schemes of the
it day, they have all been "communis-
n their tendency. To constitute man-
into one common family, with common
privileges, and property, has been
ward as the first object to be accom-
d. Having reduced all to such "com-
level," they might proceed to the for-

mation and maintenance of their social fabric,
by any of the means which the ingenuity of
the propounders of these schemes has pro-
duced in abundance.

Now it cannot be denied that there is
something pleasing—yea, even enchanting—
in the idea of a community of people all
actuated by one common feeling, and that
the promotion of each other's happiness! The
poet has found in this idea a rich theme for
his poetry:—

"O happy they, the happiest of their kind,
Whom social laws unite, and in one fate
Their hearts, their fortunes, and their beings
blend."

The philosopher, after lamenting the evils
of the past, may well have been captivated
by a theory so fair and so pleasing. Or
the statesman, stepping aside from his
legislative enactments for the suppression
of vice and the promotion of virtue, might
exclaim, "My energies are no longer re-
quired; the work of my life is superseded by
the single idea, 'Let men dwell together in
unity and love;' henceforward I rest from my
labours." We admit that we have been
sometimes absorbed and led from our accus-
tomed track while contemplating such "fairy
scenes." Our imagination has, on such
occasions, carried us to some modern "Cape
Colony," where, beneath a clear blue sky,
amid rippling fountains and sylvan bowers,
dwell a people amidst whom the seeds of
discord and social strife never yet found
shelter—whose only emblems are the "dove"
and the "lamb"—whose former toils for an
existence are now changed into a "labour of
love," and who sing, with gladsome hearts,
"Glory to God in the highest, and on earth
peace, good will toward men." Such, we say,
have sometimes been the workings of our
fancy: but, alas! how soon have our "golden
dreams" been followed by glimpses of
"waking realities!" Alas! that we should
delude ourselves with hopes which can never
be realized!

But that we may come to a more practical
understanding of the subject, we purpose
briefly to notice some of the most prominent
communistic theories which have been pro-
pounded or experimented upon. We must
here make some distinction between those
who have "theorized" only and those who
have sought the practical embodiment of

their principles. In speaking of the theorists, first we may mention Plato, whose work, entitled the "Atlantis," we have before referred to; Sir Thomas More, the writer of "Utopia," a book widely known to fame, and one which should be read by every student of social progression; Lord Bacon, author of the "New Atlantis;" Harrington, author of "Oceana;" Campanella, a Calabrian friar, who wrote the "City of the Sun," which has been appropriately described "a fantastic creation full of grandeur;" Hall, author of the "Other World;" Fénelon, author of "Isle of Pleasures;" the Abbé St. Pierre, and his "Dream of Perpetual Peace;" and Morelly, author of "Basiliade," "Code of Nature," &c. Coleridge, also, in his early days, in conjunction with several of his contemporaries, was enthusiastic in his millennial scheme, "Pantisocracy," which, however, was never reduced to practice; while Southey, and Shelley in their poetical works embody frequent dreamings of social Utopias; some of those of Shelley being exceedingly resplendent with beautiful and captivating ideas. The Greek poets, also, by their frequent allusions to the "Golden Age," seem to have indulged themselves in dreamings of a like nature. The celebrated Mr. Robert Owen, some years since, attracted attention to the communistic question by the publication of his "New Moral World;" while the most popular advocate of the system in the present day is the young and talented Goodwin Barmby, who, in 1843, founded the Communist Church; and about the same time commenced publishing his "Book of Platopolis," a work (whatever else may be said against it) manifesting considerable learning and a refined taste. In France, of late days, communistic theories have sprung up almost "as thick as mushrooms" (pardon the homely phrase!), to which some of them may be not inaptly compared. The most popular advocates there are M. Cabet (author of "Travels in Icaria"), the Abbé Constant, and M. Proudhon. Louis Blanc, we suspect, belongs to the same school, only that he endeavours to apply his principles in more practical directions than some of his contemporaries, although his efforts have, at present, proved futile.

We make this lengthy allusion to the foregoing writers with a twofold object:—*First, that our readers may be induced to*

turn to their works which may be within reach, in order to read and judge for themselves; secondly, that our opponents may not charge us with judging of all from an acquaintance with one or two. Speaking, then, generally of those we have enumerated, we hesitate not to say that, however noble may have been the sentiments with which they were actuated, their theories and their principles are far too *unpractical* to be ever really useful in the promotion of men's happiness. It is pleasing to the fancy to picture the domestic felicity which might surround the inhabitants of some far remote "Arcadia," with "its sunny skies, its blue hills, its cascades, and its shepherdesses;" but if the happiness of man is to be permanently increased, it must be by something more practical in its principles. Those blessed with affluence can rear up for themselves "model Arcadias" and "halls of harmony" in abundance. But it is for the toiling millions, the masses of mankind, those whose only wealth is in the power of their arms to labour, that we should endeavour to provide new sources of social comfort; and it is to the test of their application to this class that all schemes professing to increase the happiness of mankind must be sooner or later submitted. God has decreed, yea, has engraven upon the forehead of his people, that "in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread;" and until he shall revoke this decree, it will be worse than madness to expect success for any scheme which does not fully recognise its fulfilment.

We suspect that by this time some of our readers will begin to charge us with confining our attention to Communism in theory. In order, then, to escape from this charge, we mean briefly to glance at the various communistic societies which have endeavoured to reduce their principles to practice; or which, without having any clearly defined principles to guide them, have tried the plan of communistic residences. The first society of this sort of which history gives any details, appear to be the "Essenes," a sect of Jews. Josephus informs us, that in his time they numbered almost 4,000. They were chiefly engaged in agriculture, and had no particular town, but were scattered in groups through the principal parts of Judea. In this latter respect they differ from subsequent communistic bodies. They seem to

have paid great regard to religious ordinances, and to have looked upon all men as free and equal. We do not read that they made any great progress. Shortly before the English Reformation, the Anabaptists embraced the doctrine of the community of goods, the common family, and other communistic principles; and still earlier, some of the disciples of Wickliffe, Luther, and John Huss, imbibed similar notions, and quoted apparently high authority for so doing. Next we have mention of the Moravians and the Shakers, or, as they were sometimes called, the United Brethren and the United Society of Believers. These seem to have been the most successful of all sects of communistic adventurers. Sections of the Moravians are still to be found in Southern Asia and other parts of Europe. The Shakers have chiefly settled down in America. They both adopt the principle of common rights, and educate their children in common. They do not, however, recognise the community of women; and the Moravians pay strict attention to marriage. The Shakers, however, by their religious sentiments, are restrained from marriage, and keep up their numbers by adopted children. For the most part they are exceedingly illiterate in all but religious matters; indeed the Shakers seem to have not the slightest desire for mental cultivation. It is only within the last century that they have established the community of property; and this feature seems to have succeeded with them. In 1805 they had twenty communities; in 1847 there were seventeen, but their entire population was then estimated at only between 4,000 and 5,000. America seems a favoured spot for Utopian experimenters: in addition to the Shakers, there are sects of Harmonists, Economists, and Fraternalists. Each of these are of German origin, and by hard plodding and hard living have acquired some property, but their numbers seem in no way likely to increase. They each have religious views peculiar to themselves.

The most popular, however, of all modern socialistic sects is that founded by St. Simon, the French philosopher. The originality of his political as well as his religious views attracted considerable attention, and great exertions were made to bring the scheme before the public. Numbers of workmen

enrolled themselves as his followers, and worked at their respective occupations in special houses; "but the doctrine had no substantial hold upon their minds, and the promised amelioration came not." Next to this was the scheme organized by Fourier, another French philosopher, which was preferred by many to that of St. Simon, because the views of Fourier were more moderated. Very extensive experiments were made upon this principle, both in France and America, but in most instances they have proved an entire failure.

But to come nearer home. In 1841, a community, under the direction of Mr. Robert Owen, commenced communistic operations in Hampshire. They located themselves upon 1,200 acres of land, and had a building called "Harmony Hall." Some £30,000 was expended in the experiment, and the establishment was fitted up with every regard to convenience, utility, and even elegance, where it could be had without sacrifice of the former. The community consisted of fifty or sixty persons only, and these disagreeing on some point relative to the management of their offices, and being pressed with pecuniary difficulties, the community struggled on for a time in anything but a prosperous state, and in July, 1845, became bankrupts, and all the property was sold, the occupants of course being again thrown upon their own resources.

In 1842 the Concordists established a communitive association, under the name of the Concordium, at Ham, in Surrey. The adherents never became numerous, and the community was dissolved in two or three years afterwards.—(*Vide Chambers' Papers for the People*, No. 18.)

We have now seen that in practice Communism has proved what we stated of it in theory—too *visionary* to be productive of really beneficial results. Where it has met with any success, it has been by the hard plodding of its adherents, and by their *remaining in ignorance*, which circumstances must necessarily detract from their happiness.

We have investigated the present question, not with the eye of a sceptic, but as those who would rejoice to be able to discover any plan for the amelioration of man's social condition, and who would earnestly seek to hasten the time when

"No sigh, no murmur, the wide world shall hear:
From every face be wiped off every tear.

Peace o'er the world her olive wand extend,
And white-robed Innocence from heaven
descend.

When discord, strife, and enmity shall cease,
And man meet man in amity and peace."

The conclusion at which we have arrived on this subject may be thus summed up:—

1st. That Communism, in theory, has never shown itself adequate to meet the wants of, and promote the happiness of, man.

2nd. That in practice it has proved a failure, as shown in the many attempts

which have been made under various names and circumstances, nearly all of which have been productive of disappointment and misery.

3rd. That from man's nature it is impossible for him long to remain happy in a state of Communism, unless imbued with a high sense of moral and religious rectitude, in which case he would be happy without resorting to this alternative; and, indeed, under such circumstances would be very unlikely to resign himself to such a state.

Our arguments on this last point we may present in a future paper, and in the meantime leave the whole question in the hands of our readers.

C. W., Jun.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

BEFORE entering upon the question in hand, it may be well to define the principal term used in it, lest we should be found sustaining one thing while our opponents are engaged in battling with another.

By "Communism" we understand that principle which would render common property to the entire human family the earth and all things which from time to time are produced from it, whether they be animal, vegetable, or mineral, and which would, at the same time, render the production of them common.

Communism, then, on the one hand, enjoins all to labour; while, on the other, it maintains that those who labour ought to be permitted to eat. Its texts are, "In all labour there is profit;" "He that will not labour, neither shall he eat."

In attempting to maintain the affirmative of the question at the head of this article we shall endeavour to show:—

1st. That the earth, and all that is produced from it by the labour of man, ought to be common property.

2nd. That every able-bodied man ought to perform his share of labour.

3rd. That a community of labour, and its results, would be for the happiness of mankind in general.

We say the earth ought to be regarded as common property, and for this reason:—No man can establish and maintain an equitable right in any portion of the earth. "For if one portion of the earth's surface may justly become the property of an individual,

then other portions of the earth's surface may be so held; and, eventually, the whole earth's surface may be so held, and our planet may altogether lapse into private hands. Observe, now, the dilemma to which this leads. Supposing the entire habitable globe to be so enclosed, it follows, that if the landowners have a valid right to its surface, all who are not landowners have no right at all to its surface. Hence such can exist on the earth by sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by the permission of the lords of the soil, they can have no room for the soles of their feet. Nay, should the others think fit to deny them a resting-place, these landless men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether! If, then, the assumption that land can be held as property involves that the whole globe may become the private domain of a part of its inhabitants; and if, then, by consequence the rest of its inhabitants can exercise their faculties, can exist even, only by consent of the landowners, it is manifest that an exclusive possession of the soil necessitates an infringement of the law of equal freedom. For men who cannot live, and move, and have their being without the leave of others, cannot be equally free with those others."—*Social Statics*, by Herbert Spencer.

But let us take another view of this private right in the soil; and it will be found equally indefensible. God made the earth. It has been given for the use of man. As raw material, then, it contains in itself an intrinsic value, for in it are contained all the

wealth. But men, by appropriating to their individual use, appropriate value which it intrinsically contains; that value was stamped upon it by the maker of it; and being the work of an individual, but of the race, it is the property of the persons who appropriate it for their own use, and demand compensation for the intrinsic value of their fellow-men of that which was designed for their use.

Not only has man asserted the right of dominion to the earth, but also to the products produced from it by the labour of man. Some men, in their labours, discover truths which are of the greatest importance to society at the present time, by the development of which the world is destined to be blessed to the end of time. These truths are, for the most part, of such a nature, that, if applied to the benefit of the world, they cannot permanently be kept secret. It is proved at once that they were discovered for the world, and not for the benefit of any solitary individual. Many of the mechanical truths have been discovered by various men at different times. These, however, have not been rendered the property of the discoverers for a long time, in order that they might be made available for the labour and expense of perfecting the discovery; and the considerable loss to the community which would be deterred, for the more time in which the truth until the end of time, owing to the rent which is called upon to pay for it to the holder in the form of enhanced price.

It is maintained that the mere discovery of a truth no more renders that truth the property of the person discovering it than the discovery of a planet renders it the property of the astronomer. The very fact that it is impossible for the discoverer to claim the exclusive benefit of the truth he discovers, shows that it belongs to the world; and it is not private property.

It may be asked, Ought not the discoverer of a new truth in science which is destined to bless the world to the end of time to be rewarded for his discovery? Undoubtedly he ought; and in a state he would be, by reaping, in

common with others, the advantages of others' discoveries and of others' labours. This, however, is a very different matter from claiming an absolute and exclusive right in the discovery which he has made. Columbus might justly claim to be rewarded by the parties who were benefited by his discovery, but certainly Columbus had no right to claim America as his own. The truth, like the continent, was God's work; and, as such, was designed for the race. The discovery was the reward of the man, "and the labourer is worthy of his wages." What we maintain is, that it is not proper for the individual to concentrate in himself advantages which were designed for the race. If it is not in accordance with the rules of equity for a man to reserve to his own exclusive aggrandizement a principle which, probably, after immense labour, he may have discovered, it can hardly be considered as consonant with justice that a person who has rendered no service whatever to society, and whose only recommendation is that his father or grandfather managed, by fair means or by foul, to save a large sum of money, the result of the labour of himself or of those about him, should be permitted to live from year to year on the proceeds of the labours of his fellow-men, without doing anything to add directly or indirectly to the common stock, or in any way making a return to the community for what he has received. True, it may be said, "he lives upon the interest of his money;" and "money," it is said, "begets money." We grant it, money does beget money; and in the present state of society it seems needful that it should do so. As, however, we are talking about a state which involves a radical change in society, it is but natural to inquire, Ought mere money to beget money?

What is money? Money is wealth, or its representative. How comes a large quantity of money in the hands of a single person? If he has come by it honestly, he has received it in exchange for services rendered to society, either by himself or by some of his progenitors. If dishonestly, he has merely cheated the public out of what ought to have been the reward of service. We will suppose the first to have been the case; then the question naturally comes, Was the service which he rendered to society finite or

infinite? For if the service was finite, the reward should be finite; if infinite, the reward should be infinite. But the reward in the present case is infinite; the man was rewarded in his lifetime. Suppose the services were rendered by a progenitor, he lived, and lived at the expense of the public in exchange for his services: but he is dead, and now the reward has devolved upon his children, and may be continued to the thousandth generation. There is no limit as to time; hence we say the reward is infinite: but was the service infinite? It may justly be questioned whether any service which man can render to his fellow-man is infinite. As it regards the mass of those services which one man renders to another, we think it must be conceded that they are not infinite. Here is one man who furnishes the ladies with an article of dress or ornament; another supplies people with good tea; another furnishes smokers with tobacco, &c.; it certainly cannot be said of any mere merchant or shopkeeper that he renders the public an infinite service, a service which merits luxury and enjoyment for himself as long as he lives, and for his sons through endless generations after he is dead; and yet it is to these classes of persons that, for the more part, belong the men of capital throughout the land. It is from these sources that large portions of capital have been derived, as far as individuals are concerned.

If, then, capital, like the soil and discoveries, can be shown, as above, not to be private property, i. e., according to equity, it follows that labour, too, ought to be common property. For what is capital but accumulated labour? Nay, the very fact that the truths in science which from time to time are discovered, are designed to be the property of mankind generally, when taken in connexion with the circumstance that the discovery of these truths is generally the result of immense labour, is sufficient to show that mankind are called upon mutually to aid each other. For if the scientific man is required to sacrifice the result of his labours for the benefit of men in general, it is but reasonable to suppose that men in general ought to make some return for the *boon conferred*.

2nd. Every man who is able to work ought to perform his share of labour.

Suppose there were no rich men and no poor men, as would be the case if all men laboured for, and partook of, one common stock, it is evident that one member of the community would be as much bound to labour as another, for none would be regarded as having anything that he could properly call his own, all would belong to the community; and if none worked, all must suffer want.

But even irrespective of a communistic state, this truth, that all men who are able ought to labour, appears to be written upon man's nature. Man's health and happiness are bound up with labour; hence we find that many of those persons who are too rich, or too proud, to engage in any useful employment, engage in employments which are not useful; such as hunting, shooting, riding, &c.; while those who refrain from such exercises scarcely know what it is to enjoy good health.

3rd. A community of labour and its results would promote the happiness of mankind in general. The rich *must* labour; why not, then, be engaged in some work which would be for the good of the community—something which would make the world richer? Surely it would be far better for rich men themselves if they were from time to time engaged in doing something useful rather than in merely consuming wealth and murdering time.

The poor *must* labour; he knows it; he is oftentimes oppressed with it; it would be a blessing to him to be rid of a little of it, only that unfortunately he does not know how to spare a single stiver of the small pittance which he receives in return. There is no question, then, that the passing of a portion of his load to the back of his more able friend would to him be a real blessing.

But a community of the results of labour would be for the happiness of mankind generally.

Suppose that a wealthy man were secure from want, which he would be in a communistic state, it would be in many cases a real blessing to be freed from the anxiety which his wealth entails. The cure, the corroding agitation, which attend the possession of wealth, are oftentimes as great, if not greater, than that of its collection. How is it to be invested so as to yield most, and at the same time be secure? Who is to be

trasted with the investing of it ? And, after it has been invested, the rate of interest which it produces, are questions which are for ever agitating the mind. And then, after a while, the rich man, as well as the poor one, has to die, and whatever may be the nature of his prospects for another state of existence, he must first dispose of his property, or even his own children will curse him when he is gone. A lawyer is called in, and perhaps the last thought which passes through the poor wretch's mind while standing on the confines of a state in which his single interests are of more importance than the merely temporal interests of all the world besides, is one of pounds, shillings, and pence. How happy is the death of him who has nought to leave behind compared with this ! Communism, however, would entirely dispense with such scenes, for the very good reason that no one would have aught to leave. We need not say that the change would improve the condition of the poor man : instead of an empty cupboard, he would have enough, with the only condition of doing his share of labour : and when either too ill or too old for this, he would be assured of a comfortable and ungrudging maintenance from the common store. How different would be the position of the producers of wealth under such circumstances from their position at present !

But Communism would be advantageous to all, inasmuch as there would be no object to answer by mere selfishness. Selfishness would, to a considerable extent, cease

to exist, or be held in abeyance ; and with it a vast number of those crimes which it has been the fertile source of from the earliest period. The powers, both of body and mind, which men possess would be more fully developed. Instead of children being sent into the field to labour at an age as early as possible, they would be placed under the care of suitable teachers, and well educated ; so that, when called upon to labour, they might do so with intelligence and skill. And as there would be an abundant supply of food and other accommodations forthcoming from the general stock, children might be expected to grow up, for the most part, robust and strong. Indeed, as the production of men in the highest state of perfection would then be regarded as the most important science, the fullest development of the powers of man, both physical and mental, might be anticipated.

The last advantage which we shall name is this :—Under a communistic state the increase of the productive powers would not be calculated to produce jealousy. On the contrary, whenever any discovery was made, or any useful invention perfected, all would rejoice, for all would be directly benefited. Every useful invention would *decrease* the amount of manual labour, and at the same time *increase* the amount of enjoyment of the community at large.

These, and many other similar reasons, may be adduced, all of which tend to show that Communism would promote the happiness of man.

U. M.

It is, perhaps, amazing that the strongest minds are capable of being upset in an instant. A man may have a perfect command over his features ; he may have an equally perfect command over his nerves ; but he cannot have a perfect command, nor anything like a perfect command, over his mind. He may be able to stand and walk erect ; he may be able to maintain the steadiness of his eye, and the firmness of his voice ; he may be able to suppress every show of emotion ; but he cannot suppress the emotion itself. He may have in full bloom what is technically termed "moral courage,"—for technical the term may be said to be, seeing that physical courage is hard to be defined ; he may be extremely calm and collected ; he may conceal effectually his feelings from others ; but from himself they will not be concealed. Within his own breast they are in full operation ; their influence may rack him, although the effect be unseen.—*Anon.*

There is room enough in human life to crowd almost every art and science in it. If we pass "no day without a line"—visit no place without the company of a book—we may with ease fill libraries, or empty them of their contents. The more we do, the more we can do ; the more busy we are, the more leisure we have.—*Hazlitt.*

The Societies' Section.

PUBLIC SPEAKING.

HAVING in our former volumes described at considerable length, and with a good deal of minuteness, the method of representing outwardly the several passions, feelings, desires, emotions, sensations, &c., which can affect the human mind, we now proceed to offer to our readers a few general remarks, which we hope may be found serviceable in enabling such of them as aim at the attainment of excellence in the Art of Speaking to succeed in their endeavours.

Our first remark shall be one, the attending to which you will find is all-important, viz., Be natural; feel yourself what you endeavour to enforce upon the minds of others; be earnestly zealous, and avoid affectation. If this be done, you will find that the contagion of emotions affects the mind of others by that sympathetic connexion which the expression of true passion invariably produces. The public have now learned to believe, with good old Æschylus—

“ Words are the counters which men cheat withal ;
But look—the speaking eye—the quivering lip—
The stricken heart, that sends up to the cheek
Its crimsoned flush—these only will I trust,
And these no proofs of speech can e'er gainsay.”

If a speaker is thoroughly impressed with the importance of the topic upon which he speaks—if he is really sedulous to persuade and convince, rather than to cajole and please—if his whole soul is wrapt up in the truths he is about to utter, then he need not fear, for he will be earnest, he will be natural, he will convince, and he must please.

2nd. Endeavour to correct that fluttering of the heart, confusion of mind, and ringing in the brain, which is apt to overcome young speakers, from their tendency to believe that the members of a meeting

“ Make up in number what they want in weight,”

and thus become

“ A many-headed font of wisdom.”

Men do not become preternaturally wise merely because they are “in public meeting assembled.” Each man is as strictly individual then as in his own house. To believe otherwise is to take measures to disconcert one's self—is to lay up a store of thoughts calculated to occasion absurd bashfulness, timidity, fearfulness, and consequently to produce failure. Nothing is more correct, so far as public speaking is concerned, than that “the fear of man bringeth a snare.” You must believe that you are superior to the public before you venture to instruct the public; and should you stammer through your speech in broken, abrupt sentences, through faintness of heart to fulfil your mission? It requires intrepidity of opinion and independent sturdiness of thought to tell the people home-truths; and there is nothing else of which they stand so much in need as men of such a stamp.

3rd. Study conciseness of expression, perspicuity of thought, and precision of language.

Do not learn to play with your subject, and “talk about it and about it,” but get *to the point, and keep to it*. Do not attempt to set every sentence of a speech in jewels. *To make every sentence equally sonorous, brilliant, smart, pithy, &c., is the most certain*

of causing the speech to be felt as bombastical or monotonous. It resembles a sea in a storm; a sky of continuous and never-ending blue; a trade-wind always blowing; a changeless sameness, which cannot but fall upon the sense, and weary the soul. The consecutive nature of thought, accuracy of statement, purity of expression, choiceness of use of words, are the chief points deserving of attention; gain these, and all other qualities will follow. A public speaker should possess the power of launching forth into fire, flashing, burning, sarcastic invective, but should seldom employ it; should train himself to the perception of character, and adapt his language and style to the occasion on which, and the parties to whom, he speaks; should have a vein of drollery and wit, which should be very sparingly used; but he should never condescend to be the occasion of "the laughing laugh of rude joke-catching ignorance."

Dr. "Every one must have remarked, that whatever impressions are intended to be placed on the mind of man, are always best received when addressed to his heart, through the most common associations. Whether we wish to explain, to convince, to touch, or to amuse, we must refer to something that is habitual and pleasing; and therefore the use of figures in eloquence is not so much to enrich and to deck, as to find admission to the soul of the hearer by all the paths which its own habits have rendered most easy of access."—*P. R. James's Darnley*, p. 133.

Speech was not given "to conceal our thoughts," but is, or ought to be, the expression of the mind. The mind of man, if powerful, can exercise a glorious dominion; but the most captivating sovereignty which can be offered to it is to utter its thoughts in words, and to go forth amongst men as a ministrant of gladness, instruction, and purity, an exciter of noble deeds, and high and holy aspirations;—a dominion this which rules the spirits of men, regulates their impulses, governs their thoughts, and is the real monarch of men's actions; a dominion this so grand, that man may well labour hard for its attainment. But it is remembered that a fearful responsibility lies with him who attains this monarchy of words. If his eloquence be used in the cause of truth, justice, and right, in condemnation of falsehood, oppression, and wrong; if the cause of progress, and love, and good deeds, find him an ally; and the retrogressive, the stationary, the fiendish, and the hate-engendering find in him a strong and a determined foe, it is well. But perfect eloquence may sometimes employ the deepest pathos, the mightiest agitations of thought, the fiercest torrents of invective and sarcasm against the true and the good; may use the guise of truth, and wrap itself in the garb of an angel of light, while it advocates the wrong, and insinuates calumnies as if they were sparks from the throne of heaven. It is true that the influence of this Satanic cast rules but for a moment, and that the good and the holy must ultimately triumph; but woe be to him who retards the world's progress even for a moment, who sows such tares in human souls as shall produce a harvest of distress. Let not then the seductions of present applause, the love of momentary reputation, cause you to cast dark shadows over the souls of men. Cherish in your heart the love of virtue, earnestness for the cause of truth, clearness of thought, transparency of diction, graceful and becoming delivery, a free, fluent, and ready delivery, a pure heart, a spotless character, a mind unclouded by falsehood, a soul strong in the cause of progress, unflinching in its advocacy of right; educate yourself; think, act, speak, and fear not; for attention to these things constitutes the noblest and most important part of the Art of Public Speaking.

THE IMPORTANCE OF A RIGHT SELECTION OF BRANCHES OF STUDY.

FROM the limited powers of the human mind, and the restricted time which is usually devoted to intellectual culture, it is important that a selection of objects should be judiciously made from the numerous pursuits of literature and of science. That such a selection should be made with a distinct reference to the engagements of future life, it is readily conceded; but with a view to ultimate success, those engagements should be, in the order of time, a secondary, and by no means a primary, object of attention. In a liberal education there is much which is preliminary. No superstructure should be attempted till the basis be rendered broad and firm. The first object of solicitude should be to give vigour and expansion to the faculties of the mind; and whatever pursuits are best adapted to secure this end should be selected by the instructor, and by the learner should be regarded with interest and prosecuted with ardour. Let him not imagine they are of inferior importance because he cannot discern any direct connexion with the leading object of his professional career. Let him rather inquire into their tendency to subject his mind to a salutary discipline, and to form those habits of thought and study, by which his future progress may be directed and facilitated. The student in theology, for example, may perhaps entertain doubts with regard to the utility of studies in *mathematics*, or in *the philosophy of the human mind*; yet it is not difficult to exhibit the direct and powerful tendency of these pursuits to generate habits of incalculable value to those who, in the discharge of their professional engagements, will find occasion for the exercise of accurate discrimination, and the power of conclusive reasoning. Could it even be shown that the researches of mathematical science, and of mental philosophy, would impart but little information of real value, still it might be contended, that the advantages accruing from the very efforts of intellectual energy which they call forth, must secure to the student an ample remuneration for his expenditure of time, and to the tutor a full justification of the course prescribed.

Such was the importance attached to *mathematical* studies by that able reasoner, the late Bishop Watson, that he regarded an initiation into the processes of geometrical demonstration as incalculably advantageous in promoting mental discipline. He stated it to be his deliberate opinion, that were the attention restricted even to the first book of Euclid's *Elements*, a familiar acquaintance with its reasonings could not fail to render substantial benefit to the mind of the learner.

In recommending a vigorous application of the mind to the solution of a question of difficulty in *intellectual philosophy*, the late distinguished professor of moral philosophy in the university of Edinburgh* thus urged and encouraged the efforts of the students:—

“In some former *severe* discussions like the present, I endeavoured to extract for you some little consolation from that very fortitude of attention which the discussion required, pointing out to you the advantage of questions of this kind, in training the mind to those habits of serious thought and patient investigation, which, considered in their primary relation to the intellectual character, are of infinitely greater importance than the instruction

* Dr. Thomas Brown.

which the question itself may afford. 'Generosa animus labor currit.' In the discipline of rowing, as in the training of the Athlete, it is not for a single victory which it may give to the youthful champion that the combat is to be valued, but for that knitting of the joints, and hardening of the muscles, that quickness of eye and collectedness of ear, which it is forming for the struggles of more illustrious fields."—*Durder's Mental Discipline*.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

The Shapsteadbury Society, London.—This is the title of a small society of Christian young men, and has for its object the intellectual, religious, and the improvement of its members. The ordinary business consists of discussions, essays, doctrinal and musical exercises. The meetings are held weekly in St. Dunstan's Infant Schoolroom, Fetter-lane, Finsbury.

Ordnance Literary and Scientific Institution.—The members and friends of this Institution having held their first annual meeting. The chair was occupied by Mr. Richard Walmesley, and one of the secretaries read a report, from which it appeared that the existence of the Institution was owing to the active exertions of a few gentlemen of the town. The report, on the whole, was encouraging, and showed an income of £200 for the first year. The officers and committee for the ensuing year were subsequently elected, and other business transacted.

Salisbury Mutual Improvement Society.—The society has just commenced its third session, meeting every alternate Friday. The second Friday in the month is for the delivery of lectures, and the fourth for discussions. The committee have made arrangements for the delivery of another course of public lectures. The success of former series has led them to propose a longer and more varied course, including lectures from the Royal Polytechnic Institution, London. There are about forty members present. President, Rev. G. W. Clapham, vicar; president, J. E. Bernard, Esq.

The Nelson Association, Brunswick-street, Edinburgh.—The second anniversary of the society was celebrated in their usual place of meeting, St. Stephen's School, Brunswick-street, on Tuesday, November 4th, 1861. The room was tastefully decorated for the occasion with laurels and evergreens, and at seven o'clock the members with their friends, sat down to supper of tea and coffee. The chair was afterwards taken by the Rev. Mr. Nelson, of New Ebb, late minister of St. Stephen's School, on the president and founder of this association, who delivered an interesting address on the advantages of an early religious education, and the results which flow to young men who pursue a course of religious, moral, and intellectual improvement. Addresses were afterwards delivered by various members of the association, on 'The Claims of Religion on the Education of Young Men, &c., &c.,' and the evening was enlivened by appropriate songs and recitations. The meeting closed at ten o'clock, a meeting well pleased with the arrangements. The meeting had forward with hope, that during

the coming year their exertions in carrying out the objects of the society—the religious, moral, and intellectual improvement of its members—may be attended with success, and that it may continue to be a prosperous society, advancing the cause of knowledge, virtue, and religion.

Boston Albert Improvement Club.—The first session of this society was held on Thursday, November 13th, 1861. About forty persons sat down to tea. After tea, Mr. A. Cress was called to the chair and the applause of the meeting. He said that he understood the society only came into existence during that year—a year big with important events, and he trusted that its formation would not be one of the least important events for influencing the future advancement and welfare of Boston. The society, though young, showed every appearance of strength and vigour and had elements within it which would cause it to continue to flourish, and to bear good fruit. The chairman proceeded to remark on the advantages of Mutual Improvement Societies, and called upon the secretary to read the report for the past quarter, from which it appeared that about twenty had been handed to the committee. The report had been held and the number appeared rapidly to increase. The committee intended further steps to be taken, such as the establishment of a good club reference library, a works on logic, language, science, &c. The report also mentioned the establishment of a postal communication with certain views on Lancashire with respect to an association for mutual instruction and community. The report having been read, was followed by the retiring address to be given by Mr. G. West. A number of amendments were introduced and interpreted with great and reading of "Burns' Cotter's" by D. Saunders, and an original book (president), were especially members' approbation. The off in a very agreeable manner, to a close about half-past ten, singing the National Anthem, with Burns' new and admired

Worcester.—Smith Church Association.—The celebration of the anniversary of this association took place on Friday evening, September 4th, 1861, at 11, Main-street, Worcester. The meeting was well attended, and the evening well passed with the arrangements. The meeting had forward with hope, that during

ciation, having been called to the chair, addressed the meeting (which was numerous and respectably attended) in a few words, congratulatory of the society's attaining its second anniversary, and of the amount of intellectual work done by its members during a period of *two years*; and concluded by calling on the honorary secretary, Mr. John Cook, to read the report for the past year, which stated that from September, 1850, to July, 1851, ten subjects had been discussed, viz. :—

1. Was the execution of Charles I. justifiable?
2. Has the discovery of America been beneficial to the world?
3. Was the banishment of Napoleon Bonaparte to St. Helena justifiable?
4. Has the discovery of gunpowder been beneficial to mankind?
5. Is the character of Queen Elizabeth deserving of admiration?
6. Ought Papists in a Protestant country to have the same privileges as where the Pope's authority is recognised?
7. Had William the Conqueror any right to the British throne?
8. Is war, under any circumstance, opposed to Christianity?
9. Had Charles Edward, the Pretender of 1745, any right to the British throne?
10. Was the execution of Lady Jane Grey justifiable?

Six essays had also been read by members of the association on the following subjects :—

1. On chirography, and the benefits derivable therefrom.
2. On music.
3. On the rise and progress of language.
4. On man, the superior of creation.
5. On man's happiness.
6. On decision of character.

On the 14th of August last, a lecture on astronomy was delivered to the association by the Rev. James Scott.

The report was unanimously adopted, and ordered to be placed on the minutes of the meeting.

The following resolutions were then moved, seconded, sustained, and unanimously carried :—

1. "That as our interests as intelligent beings are greatly promoted by the cultivation of the mind, the prosperity of our association ought ever to be a matter engaging our warmest consideration."

2. "That being alive to the importance of a well-disciplined and informed mind, the members of this association are determined, by God's help, to increase their efforts to secure those advantages which always result from a vigorous and persevering pursuit of knowledge."

3. "That while it is to be regretted that there is so much indifference manifested in this colony with respect to Mutual Improvement Associations, the members of this society ardently hope, that the time is not distant, when many, having the welfare of the natives at heart, but who have hitherto kept aloof from such institutions, will, by their countenance and support, give an impetus to the noble work of mutual improvement."

4. "That while the cultivation of the mind is a duty incumbent on all men, it is especially so with Christians, who are the servants of that God, one of the principal features of whose character is intelligence."

5. "That this institution, being based on christian principles, is an innocent, a lawful, and yet a powerful means of advancing the intellectual and moral welfare of young men in general."

The business of the association being now brought to a close, the rev. patron vacated the chair, which was taken by the vice-patron, the Rev. Charles Rattray, and a cordial vote of thanks to the former was passed unanimously. The friends invited and members of the association then sat down to a richly-furnished repast, after which they separated, highly gratified with the proceedings of the evening.—J. C. D., Jun.

Yeadon Mutual Improvement Society.—On Wednesday, November 5th, the members of this society held their sixth annual soiree, on which occasion upwards of 400 persons took tea together in the old chapel schoolroom. The room was tastefully decorated. After tea, the chair was taken by the Rev. Robert Holmes, Baptist minister. The report of the society was read by Mr. J. K. Brown, secretary, and addresses were delivered by the Rev. Jos. Shaw, Independent minister, Rawden, Mr. A. Dick, W. E. Forster, Esq., Mr. P. Slater, and several other members of the society. It appeared from the report that the society was in a very flourishing condition. During the past year twenty-four members had been enrolled, making a total of ninety-six *bona fide* members. Ten lectures had been delivered during the year, and the attendance had been very good. During the year seventy volumes had been added to the library, making a total of upwards of 300, while the number of issues during the year amounted to upwards of 1,300. The treasurer reported a balance in favour of the society.

The Kilmarnock Young Men's Biblical Association.—In the beginning of last month, fifteen young men in this town met for the purpose of forming a society for the moral and intellectual improvement of its members, by means of essays and extracts on subjects connected with scripture. Rules were drawn up, for some of which we are indebted to your "model rules," which were introduced to their notice. The society is formed on principles similar to those of "The London Young Men's Christian Association." The opening lecture was delivered by the president, John Stewart, Esq. The second lecture was delivered the following week by Mr. William M'Whirter on the subject—"The claims of the Bible upon our careful and prayerful study." It was a rich treat; learned, beautiful, neat, and elaborate address. The members then began to give an essay, or extract, each week in rotation. The first was on "The present condition and future prospects of man." The second was read last night; its subject—"Timothy." The essays are restricted to twenty minutes; and then the members are allowed ten minutes each to make remarks upon them, and upon the subjects of which they treat. Our society now numbers about thirty members, and all seem well pleased with what has already been accomplished, and are full of hope for the future, anticipating a rich harvest of lasting good in the developing and expanding of their intellectual powers, and in purifying and elevating the moral natures. I am sure you will be highly gratified to hear of another society having been formed for the improvement of young men, to whom you feel so deeply interested.—R. K., Jun.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

65. Would some of your correspondents kindly inform a "Subscriber" what would be the expense of being articulated to a solicitor, and what would be the relative proportion of time spent at the desk and at study?

66. I am desirous of becoming proficient in Mental Arithmetic, and should esteem it a favour if any of your numerous readers would direct me to the best method for attaining this object.—C. Y.

69. Remembering the answer given by a learned man as to how he became possessed of so much knowledge, "by not being afraid to ask," I venture to solicit a reply to the following:—What are the peculiar doctrines of Pantheism and Rationalism?—REPUBLICAN.

70. *Carthaginian Names*.—The Phœnicians and Carthaginians (and indeed all the great nations of antiquity) gave names to persons partly formed of the names of their several divinities; hence, *Abibal* signifies *Beal* is my father, or my father is *Beal*; *Ethbeal*, with *Baal*; *Asdrubal*, help or assistance of *Beal*; *Hannibal*, grace or mercy of *Beal*. These examples have been collected from Gesenius, &c., and the following two names, mentioned in C. Crispi "Sallustii Jugurtha," cap. vi. sect. 5, are evidently of the same class, viz.:—*Adherbal* and *Mastanabal*. What is the composition and meaning of each name?—G. W. H.

71. In Lord Byron's lines to Inez, in the first canto of his "Childe Harold" occurs the following verse:—

"It is that settled, ceaseless gloom,
The fabled Hebrew wanderer bore;
That will not look beyond the tomb,
But cannot hope for rest before."

Could any of your correspondents kindly inform me to whom Byron referred in these lines?—FIDELIS.

72. Will any of your correspondents inform me of the best method of acquiring facility in the execution of Pianoforte Music? I have been in the habit of practising for three or four hours a day for the last two years without attaining skill above mediocrity.—T. A.

73. How should a person begin and pursue the study of Botany, who is entirely ignorant of it? and can he hope to succeed without the aid of a teacher?—A. B. M.

74. Will any of your correspondents inform me of the best method of studying Euclid, and whether it is necessary to draw all the diagrams, or merely to read and understand the propositions?—C. M.

75. "Clericus" is engaged in the scholastic profession, and is very anxious to gain admission into St. Bees College, Cumberland, with a view to his entering the ministry; but, unfortunately, he lacks the necessary pecuniary qualification, and would, therefore, feel greatly obliged to any correspondent who can demonstrate to him the *vanity of the stage*, "Where there's a will there's a way," by suggesting to him some plan

of effecting a project so very desirable to him, under existing circumstances.

76. I am quite unaccustomed to composition, and for that reason may express myself obscurely in endeavouring to make known my wants. 1st. How shall I attain fluency of language? Cicero and Pliny, I perceive, advise the translation of good works from one language to another. Greek and Latin I do not understand; French and German I do a little. 2nd. How shall I secure a systematic arrangement of ideas? 3rd. Would the study and committal to memory of the finest orations of Cicero or Demosthenes in their English garb be of service, or would the attentive reading of some of our own poets be more so? If it is thought that composition would be preferable to translation, I shall enrol myself as a subscriber to your "Young Student and Writer's Assistant."—H. T. M.

77. Will some of your correspondents inform me of the best work by which I may obtain a sound and true theory of Mental Philosophy, based on the physical nature of man, and embracing the subjects of life; mind, its dependence on, and independence of, organization; sanity of mind; morbid impulses; thoughts, and feelings. I have seen Johnson on "Life, Health, and Disease"; Combe on "Physiology"; and Knight's edition of Southwood Smith's "Philosophy of Health." In the preface and end of this last work it is stated, that it is intended to be introductory to an account of the physical and mental powers of man: can you inform me if this work is published? In Chambers's "Wonders of Human Folly," Upham's "Outlines of Imperfect Mental Action," and Sampson on "Criminal Jurisprudence," are recommended: would either of these aid me in attaining the object I have in view?—P. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

61. *Musical Advice*.—Should H. W. H. be able to avail himself of a good master, and devote several hours daily to practice, he might no doubt arrive at great proficiency in playing the pianoforte, as he must possess an ear for music, otherwise he could not keep in time and tune in joining in singing.—H.

64 and 66. *Admission to the English Bar*.—Having seen the question of D. G. B., I beg to offer a few suggestions, such as he may find of use. As I am in the legal profession he may depend upon what I say as actually true.

D. G. B. should have specified which Bar he desired to know about, the Chancery or Common Law; but as I am thoroughly acquainted with the first-named, my remarks will bear upon that division only.

D. G. B. may, perhaps, be aware, that a good college education is nearly indispensable for a young advocate; and, besides, if he has not been to one of the universities, his course of reading with an admitted barrister must be of much longer duration.

The first step, then, is to become a member of one of the Inns, by entering your name on the books of the society you select. There is Lincoln's Inn, Middle and Inner Temple; Gray's Inn is nearly an obsolete one now.

You then become pupil to an equity draughtsman, with whom you stop six or twelve months. If you think by hard study (which all embryo lawyers must practice) that you will be tolerably proficient in the technicalities of the profession at the end of six months, you pay the gentleman you read with fifty guineas. If you require double that time, you must also double the fee.

The expense of entering your name on the books of a society, "eating your terms," &c., is about 120 guineas. The Society of Lincoln's Inn requires you to enter into a formal bond.

It is, of course, obvious, that only a moneyed man can become a barrister, because there is much expense—the expense of entering your name, of eating your terms, of paying your pupillage fees, of taking chambers, and of purchasing a library.

I forgot to say, that after eating your terms for about eight months, you are "called to the bar," and this irrespective of your legal acquirements.

Next, as to the "plan of study." This is all-important. The really good lawyer should aim, not only at a perfect knowledge of the English law, but also tolerably to understand that of old Rome, and especially that of Scotland; for when the advocate goes before the House of Lords, a knowledge of the latter is frequently required.

The art of preparing bills, answers, demurrers, exceptions, pleas, &c., will all be taught him by the gentleman D. G. B. reads with. The standard work here used, is Van Heythusan's "Equity Draughtsman;" but this chamber business has been much abridged by the last orders of Lord Chancellor Cottenham, by which short claims are now used instead of bills in many instances.

The very best books that D. G. B. can purchase are the following, to be read in the order they are placed:—Sydney Smith's "Chancery Practice," two volumes, last edition; Sydney Smith's "Hand-Book"; Bowyer's "Lectures at the Temple"; Bowyer's "Constitutional Laws of England"; Shelford on "Mortmain"; Roper on "Legacies"; Roper on "Husband and Wife"; Mr. Justice Williams on "Executors"; Sugden on "Vendors and Purchasers" (Dart's Abridgment is a very good one); Spence's "Principle of the Court of Chancery"; these and many more will D. G. B. require.

In conclusion, I beg to say, if D. G. B. would furnish any address where a letter could be sent, I would willingly forward to him a more explicit letter of suggestions than this; and having a practical knowledge of the law myself, my hints might show him the shortest method of acquiring its rudiments.—JUSTINIAN.

65. *Electro-Biology and Braidism*.—Electro-Biology is a designation recently applied to the mesmeric phenomena by Dr. Darling and other lecturers, and means, literally, the electric doctrine of life. This doctrine they infer from the means they use to produce the hypnotic or mesmeric state; viz., fixing the attention of each patient upon a small disc of zinc and copper, which he is made to place on the palm of one of his hands. Mr. Braid, of Manchester, maintains that a similar effect would be produced by lengthened gaze upon any object, and that, therefore,

there is nothing of an electric nature connected with it. He says, "The true cause of this 'vigilant phenomena,' is not a physical influence from without, but a mental delusion from within, which paralyzes their reason and independent volition, so that, for the time being, they are as mere puppets in the hands of another person by whom they are irresistibly controlled, and can only see, or hear, or taste, or feel, or act, in accordance with his will and direction. They have their whole attention fixed upon what may be said or signified by this superior power; and, consequently, perceive impressions, through the excited state of the organs called into operation, which they could not perceive in their ordinary condition." After detailing a number of experiments made by himself on patients in the waking position, he adduces the following:—"In like manner, several other patients whom I took into the dark closet could see nothing, until told to look steadily at a certain point, and they would see flame and light of varying colours proceeding from it, which predictions were speedily realized, whilst they were wide awake, and with nothing but bare walls toward which to direct their eyes. Not only so, but I have, moreover, ascertained that, even in broad daylight, a strong mental impression is adequate to produce such delusions with certain individuals of a highly imaginative and concentrative turn of mind. This fact is beautifully illustrated in the case of a gentleman, twenty-four years of age, who had suffered severely from epilepsy for eleven years. When taken into the above closet, and tested as the latter, he likewise saw nothing, till I suggested that he would see flame and light; after which prediction he very speedily saw it accordingly, not merely where the magnet was, but also from the other parts of the apartment. Now this patient, and the two last referred to, when taken into the closet after the magnet had been a long time removed to a distant part of the house, still saw the flames—a clear proof that the whole was a mental delusion, arising from an excited imagination, on the point under consideration, changing physical action."—A. C.

67. *The Law—Solicitors*.—In answer to a "Subscriber," the first and certain expense of his being articulated to a solicitor is £120 for the stamp upon which the articles are engrossed. The premium to be paid for instruction, &c., varies in nearly every case. If you wish to be articulated to a solicitor of good standing, and to board and lodge in the house during the five years of articles, £500 would not be out of the way. If you have taken a degree at either of the universities your term of articles will be three years only; and during the last session of parliament an act was passed extending this privilege to certain students therein enumerated. In such case your premium would be proportionately less. With respect to the relative proportion of time at the desk and at study, this will depend, first, upon the arrangement made at the commencement; secondly, upon the extent of business in the office; and thirdly, upon your own inclination. If you desire to understand not merely the theory, but the practical and mechanical branches of your profession, you will not mind sitting pretty closely at the desk, at least during the first year or two of your term. You will still find time for your studies, and will understand them better for seeing some-

thing of the practice. As a general rule, with
to divide your time almost equally between
two impositions would be unprofitable. On
any circumstances much depends upon your
On your estimation as whether you will be
some collection of cheap duty but this will
required by the particular courts in which
have to qualify as a practitioner. You may
draw £40 under this head. At present there
further annual duty payable for removal of
filings—on conveyance returns £2 on these
landed, £12 per annum. For the first three years
of practice, half these sums. If you will allow
your of gratuitous advice assuming that you
young are desirous of having a thorough know-
ledge of the law, and your resources are not large
you will endeavour to enter a respectable ad-
vocate's chambers, at a nominal, or even, at first,
remuneration. He industriously endeavours
to obtain everything you are and do and at
the same time you have resorted to your simple
case to justify it, apply to him for your advice
and if he be a gentleman he will meet you at
the library your services have deserved. If
if he be not, there of course, you will
desire to stay with him, but will seek for
any desirable engagements. It is no disgrace
to profess that many of its brightest men
than have thus entered the ranks. Why then
I've not made another?—C. W. Jan.

(3) *Mental Arithmetic*.—Allow me to direct attention of C. Y. and others who participate in same, to the following valuable remarks mental arithmetic by Professor Lieberman.

There are two sorts of special arithmetic. The first consists in the actual performance of a manner different from that which used in the paper and more fitted to the use in which computation and manual version are put together. It should never be forgotten if the question is the thing to be principally obtained. The second consists in the substitution of some rules in particular cases (such as carrying in the particular numbers to be used in the method) when the above rule is an error. The paper rule for the paper process is for a third case, but, in essence of being slightly performed, which the common rule is not, it is the character of belonging to special arithmetic. As an example of the first sort, take the addition of 45 and 47. In doing this correctly the 10 and 00 should be added first, and 100 retained, 25 and 7 should be then added and 120 and 25 together. Or else, 45 and 50 should be first added together, giving 100, and 7 then added, giving 107. This process put down on the paper would cause more writing than the common one. As an example of the second sort, take the rule of subtracting the price of a pound from that of hundred-weight, — or two-pence and one-half for every pound owing to the price of a hundred weight. Thus 2 lb per cwt. is instantly 39s 6d, 3 lb per lb. 2 lb 10s per cwt. is 37s 9d, 4 lb per lb. This process is as much of a substitution on the matter as it is in the method.

The first mark of spiritual enlightenment has been to this question, and it would seem as if what the man of it is to the catholic returned to were the men of the people's own thoughts applied to a clear perception of the meaning of what he is about. If, as probability, the catholic which is most easy to be said and not done is to be done, it is to be done.

people are, when instructed in an intelligent manner, free persons for themselves, many workers know the following to the evidence of Mr. Wood, in his "Account of the Edinburgh Agricultural School," though it would have been more satisfactory if the same previously given to the subject had been stated — "They will multiply such a line of figures as

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

by 9, 8, or any other figure, in less than the sixth part of a minute. From such a line they will subtract another of the same length in the ordinary way in about seven seconds, and if allowed to perform the operation from left to right while the question is under discussion, though it should be directed with a rapidity which would not permit ourselves to take down merely the original figures, they will present the whole operation both question and answer in scarcely one second from the time of announcing the two figures. In addition, they will work up or on lines of eight figures each, in the ordinary way, in less than one third of a minute, and if allowed to perform the operation while the question is dictating in about three seconds. All other calculations they perform with proportional celerity. These modes of working during dictation (where allowed, are suggestions of their own, in their zeal to surpass each other, and not taught by the master.

We turn to the second sort of mental arithmetic : that to which the processes are only mental as being more easy and therefore being better on paper than the usual ones as well as possible without it. Of all the aids to abbreviated computation there is nothing like the ready knowledge of decimal fractions, and of all the advantages of decimal fractions, none is so conspicuous in commercial arithmetic as the use of the decimal parts of a pound. It will be worth while to re-arrange and extend this mode of operation, which sets the advantage of a decimal currency in a strong light, showing that it is better on our savings banks to have a rule by which to go out of it into decimals and working the question in decimals, to return the answer into ordinary denominations than to remain in those ordinary denominations and work the question by them.

[illegible]

For the fourth and fifth places of decimals, fill both with 0 for every further place the last answer and 1 space for every 99 in the result, or, if found more easy, for every three halfpence in the things used. Thus for $\frac{4}{9}$ the fourth and fifth places are $10 \div 9$ or $79 \div 9$ or 73 for $\frac{4}{9}$, $10 \div 1$ or 99 for $\frac{4}{9}$, 32 for $\frac{1}{3}$ of $\frac{4}{9}$.

For all decimal places after the 9th, let the number of nines show the last three halves of a centimeter. Let 0 be a denominator and use its figure in this fraction reduced to a decimal. These can be turned to the head, and will then be remembered, easily —

1 - 10000, No.	1 - 10000, No.
1 - 10000, No.	1 - 10000, No.
1 - 10000, No.	1 - 10000, No.

It is not often, perhaps, that more than five decimals are wanted, and three will most frequently be sufficient; but those rules are valuable by which, in case of need, approximation can be extended. A very little practice would enable any one to use the preceding rules so as to write down at once, to any extent required, any decimal of a pound; instead of £176 13s. 10½d., for instance, to put down £176.6947916666, &c. Considering the very great facilities afforded by this rule, which are more than those who have not tried it have any idea of, it would be worth while to save trouble yet further by learning the multiples of 4 up to 23 × 4 or 92, and those of 1½d. up to one shilling.

The inverse rule, to turn a decimal of a pound into money, is as follows:—A pair of shillings for every unit in the first place; a shilling for 50 (if so much) in the second and third places; a farthing for every unit left in the second and third places, after abatement of 1, if what is left be 25 or upwards. Thus £.477 is 9s. 6½d., and £.217 is 4s. 4½d.

The labour of questions in commercial arithmetic is much more than halved by the use of the preceding rule, and the risk of error reduced in proportion. It is not easy to make those believe this who have grown up in the use of the ordinary methods. We shall point out a few of the advantages attending the transformation, in rendering questions capable of being solved mentally, with ease and dispatch.

The two great modes of estimating fractions of a sum, namely, the number of shillings, &c., in the pound, and the per centage which the part is of the whole, can be reduced to one another, or either mode compared with the other, almost instantaneously. Suppose, for example, it is required to know how much per cent. of his debts he can pay whose assets are 8s. 7½d. in the pound. The regular book-arithmetician would proceed as follows:—

As £1	:	8s. 7½d.	::	100
20		12		415
<hr/>				
20		103		960)41500(43½ per cent.
12		4		384
<hr/>				
240		415		310
4				288
<hr/>				
600				22

The one who is used to shorten his rules will say that 8s. is 40 per cent., and 8s. 6d. 42½ per cent., and will perhaps rest satisfied with that approximation. But the method we advocate enables us to write down at once .432 as the fraction which 8s. 7½d. is of a pound, and thence to name 43½ per cent. as the proportion required. If still greater precision be demanded, the advantage is still greater; for .43229 gives £43 4s. 7d. per cent.

With regard to most rules of abbreviation there is this to be said, that however convenient they may be, each in its place, they will be so seldom required that they will be forgotten: so that, when an occasion for the use of any one of them arises, one person will have finished the question in the ordinary mode, while another is recovering the abbreviated rule. It is only with respect to processes which are sure to be often wanted that such rules are therefore worth their trouble: each kind

of business has its own cases, which need only be learned by those who are to attend to that business. In the books of arithmetic there is the fault of presuming that every person is to learn every variety of commercial rule *by rote*; compound interest and the determination of the price of a mixture from that of the materials are supposed to be equally necessary to all, though the subdivision of business makes it as certain as any thing which can be predicated of two rules of arithmetic, that no one who requires one of the above rules will require the other. A mistake of the same kind is very likely to be committed in teaching rules of abbreviation.

The time is not yet come for a very extensive use of tables in mercantile affairs; nor can it come until a decimal coinage is established. When the present coinage has become matter of history, it will not be the least amusing anecdote connected with it, that the great financiers of the nation were so much afraid of the fractions of their own money, that they preferred to lose eight pounds out of three hundred in the collection of a tax, that it might be *exactly* seven pence in the pound, rather than let it be three per cent. It is obvious enough that the income tax was meant for the nearest approximation to three per cent. which would give an exact number of pence in the pound; and it was supposed, for example, that in calculating the tax on £587, the first of the following calculations being the easier would be substituted for the second or more difficult:—

587	587
7	3
<hr/>	
12)1109	17,61
	20
20)342-5	
	12,20
£17 2s. 5d.	12
<hr/>	
	2,40
	4
<hr/>	
	1,60

Answer £17 12s. 2½d.

But, in truth, had the rule for procuring the decimal parts of a pound been well known, it would have been easier to do the second than the first, as follows:—

587	
3	
<hr/>	
1761	17610 = £17 12s. 2½d.

If any person not much accustomed to computation, and feeling its difficulty, should endeavour to mend his habits by the practice of the foregoing recommendations, we warn him that he will have his period of difficulty, during which he will not be able to see that he gains anything. He has to acquire what he probably never aimed at before, quick and ready habits of doing a few simple things. Without resolute determination he will do nothing; if he feel that he is not of the nature of those who face difficulties and conquer them, he had better not proceed to the trial. There is no use in disguising the fact that persons of ordinary memories never become good computers without hard work and steady perseverance; but, on the other hand, it must be allowed that long

practice is not necessary. As far as mere computation goes, there is no reason why excellence should not be attained in six months. Almost any person may become such an arithmetician, that his figures are as steady as the laws of the Nile and Persians, years and years before an active student in algebra will attain as great a chance of uniform correctness in the use of the

signs + and —. And as a quaint Hindoo writer sets off thus, "He who distinctly and severally knows addition and the rest of the twenty logistics, and the eight determinations, including measurement by shadow, is a mathematician;" so we will end by saying—He who can easily, rapidly, and accurately add, subtract, multiply, and divide, is a computer.—A.C.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XI.

1. With what is the Mind of Man naturally filled?
2. What is Observation?
3. What is Hypothesis?
4. What is the part which Induction occupies in Ratiocination?
5. What is Theory?
6. How do these unitedly operate in the investigation of Truth?
7. Give examples of their united action.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

Design of Class.

It may be well to state at the outset that this class is especially designed for the benefit of young men and others who are desirous of obtaining a knowledge of mathematics, but who have not the advantage of a living teacher. If, therefore, the exercises and solutions are found to be of a character so simple as to yield comparatively little pleasure or profit to the advanced mathematician, he will have the kindness to bear in mind that the class has not been opened for his especial benefit.

The plan which the teacher of this class intends to pursue is as follows:—

1. To prepare, from time to time, a number of questions in Arithmetic, Algebra, Geometry, and Mechanics, which involve important principles.
2. To receive from the members of his class solutions to the questions; which solutions, if correct, and provided they come within certain rules of correspondence (given on the wrapper of the present number), will be acknowledged.
3. To publish, from time to time, the best solutions which he may receive, with such notes as he may think calculated to render the solution more perspicuous.
4. It will be his privilege annually to award certificates of merit, printed on beautifully embossed cards, in gilt frames, to the three best in each of the following divisions:—
 1. Arithmetic and Algebra.
 2. Geometry.
 3. Mechanics.

In order that members may be the better able to judge of their own proficiency as compared with that of other members, the teacher proposes, when acknowledging correspondence on the wrappers, to connect the numbers of the propositions which each person is successful in solving with his initials.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—I.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

1. There are said to be 1,500,000 tons of iron smelted per annum in Great Britain; the specific gravity of cast iron is 7.248. Required the side of a cube that would contain that quantity.
2. There is a rectangular field, the length of which is 950 links, and the breadth 870 links; included, however, in this admeasurement is a ditch which equals one-twentieth of the whole, and extends half round the field. Required its width.
3. A certain man found gold coins of the respective values of 27s. and 21s. each. Now, for every two that he found of the greater value he found three of the lesser value; and the entire worth of what he found was 64l. 7s. How many did he find of each?
4. A general distributed to 9 captains, 12 lieutenants, and 135 common soldiers, the sum of 1,799l. 17s. To every lieutenant he gave twice as much as to a private soldier, and to every captain three times as much as to a lieutenant. How much did each receive?

Geometry.

1. The sides of a triangular field are 1,290, 1,390, and 555 links respectively. Required the perpendicular, and an explanation of the principles upon which the operation is founded.
2. The area of the Exhibition building is 1,848 by 408 feet. Required the diameter of a circle containing an equal area.

Mechanics.

1. Required the units of work necessary to turn a block of granite in the form of a cube on to its edge, supposing its side to be 7 feet, and a cubic foot of it to weigh 170 lb.
2. How many feet of water will an engine of 70 horse power raise per hour from a depth of 120 fathoms? Explain the operations in both cases.

Notices of Books

The Degrees of Knowledge By Thomas
Dun. L.L.D. Dunbar & Allen

This is the first of a series of lectures to young men in connection with the Dundee Literary Bazaar. I wish and it is well worthy of the publicity which, by the aid of the printing press, has been given to it. The venerable lecturer dis- cusses upon the progress of literature and science in past ages, and takes a glorious though not always truthful view of their position in the present. He next dwells upon the means to be used to reap the great mass of quality from their present state of intellectual degradation and dis- cusses in a suggestive and somewhat conservative manner the importance of making intellectual efforts through institutions and young men a condition for national improvement.

We considered the following argued to the effect that of those who say that the objectives of the people is accomplished, so that there is no more will be effect contributed to the matter.

There is perhaps no country in the world, excepting Switzerland and the States of America, where the body of the people are better educated or more intelligent than in Scotland yet we need not go far either in the one or in the country to be convinced that the most advanced and improving notions and the general ignorance respecting many important subjects continually diminish with human improvement and progress among the great majority of the population. Of the millions and a half of inhabitants who constitute the population of this part of Great Britain there are not perhaps 11,000 of the enlightened part of the whole whose knowledge extends to any subject of importance beyond the range of their daily avocations. With respect to the remaining 1,070,000 it may perhaps be said with propriety that of the five hundred millions of the world they live in, of the same human constitution and needs which demand no culture and the vigorous action of men and animals by which it is interested of the nature and properties of the atmosphere which surrounds them, of the diseases which have been made suggestive by light, heat, electricity and magnetism, of the general laws which regulate the existence of nature, of the various combinations and effects of chemical and mechanical powers, of the machine and workshop of the planetary and the every where of the principles of legitimate management of just arrangements of the earth and man's power, even of the Supreme Being, of the genuine principles of moral action and of many other subjects interesting to a rational and immortal being they are almost as entirely ignorant as the wandering Tartar, or the nomadic Indian.

(1) (b) (3) (ii) of human beings which people the globe we inhabit, there are not perhaps 5 (b) (3) whom words are truly enlightening in that ought to be the province of natural persons for their own sake or from a pure love of wisdom. Independently of the knowledge required for their domestic professions and employments, let us their conduct from the mind of rational creatures for knowledge of those who have acquired a mastery of learning with no other aim than to

give a substitute, or to apply distinctions and points. And if this rule be admitted, I am afraid that a greatly mistaken view of human physiology, chemistry, literature, and even some natural and political sciences, and metaphysics would be applied to give the list of errors of science and natural sciences the truth. Assuming this statement, it will follow that there is not any intelligent act of the human race that passes his life as a rational creature being, employing his faculties in those trains of thought and action systems which are worthy of an intellectual nature. For us to be so the attention of mankind is universal anxiety to improve mankind to greater sublimity, and in gratifying the universal appetite of their nature they can be employed as little exposed to dignity to the lowest orders of animal existence.

The doctor does not share with those glowing expectations, but gives wing to his imagination, and presents at least a dazzling prospect of future glory. He says:—

"I beheld in the prospect of future ages the most magnificent changes in the improved lands of the hemisphere and of the physical world. I beheld the surface of the earth as no distant period situated with vegetation and architectural beauties: our deserts transformed into fruitful fields; our mountain dreariness our gardens producing the fruits of every clime; our highways broad and spacious; and at the distance of every quarter of a mile furnished with arms and towers; not the shadow and rudeness of the passing traveller; our electromagnetic lines and towers; the cities of pyramids and towers; our streets and our land open to the light of heaven; and our customs streets expanding into spacious squares; channelled with the solar beams and with pure, prosperity, and compassed with the refreshing breeze; our densely crowded cities almost completely demolished and new cities arising from their ruins, on noble and expansive plains corresponding to the extensive state of the human mind."

I behold the dominion of the earth transferred by the hand of groves and industry by the rolling down of torrents the driving of machines, and the universal cultivation of the soil the thousand batts of hedges wound by the plough, the ships and the forest-lightnings directed by the hand of art, to play in harmonious correspondence in the region of the clouds I behold locomotives, steamships, steam railways and all brilliant thoughts in production transporting multitudes of human beings from one city to another, from one ocean to another and from one continent to another with a degree of velocity which has never yet been attempted I behold the age devoted to the dignity of his intellectual nature no longer running the desert wild and uncultivated like the harem of gipsy throwing aside his scuffle-bow and his knife and directing his faculties to the improvement of his spirit, and to the most sublime arrangements I behold men of all nations and conditions cultivating a harmonious and friendly intercourse the sons of New Holland, America, Germany, and Madagascar, visiting the British Isles with the greatest

lets of their respective countries, and holds literary correspondence with the directors of philosophical and missionary institutions on the subjects of christian and scientific instruction.

"I behold the scenery of the heavens fully explored, and new prospects opened into the vision of the stars, the geography of the sun brought to perfection, and scenes of the eastern and western of its inhabitants exhibited; see the nature of comets ascertained, the origin of the various phenomena which appear on the surface of the planets explained, the constitution of the sun, and the nature of its spots defined, and the sublime scenes connected with new and variable stars, double and triple stars, or the thousands of nebulae dispersed throughout the system of boundless space more fully displayed."

"I behold the ministers of religion expounding to thousands of intelligent worshippers: higher themes and more elevated subjects than those to which they are now accustomed; instead, not confining their attention to a few fragments of the christian system, and a few points of religious contemplation, but taking a whole of divine revelation for their text-book and drawing their illustrations of it from all kinds of history, and from all the diversities of the universe."

"In fine, I behold the human soul elevated and refined, and endowed with multifarious knowledge, dropping its earthly tabernacle in the dust, and in another and a happier region of existence, pronouncing celestial investigations: a new empire opens, contemplating the creation of other worlds, exploring the wonders of divinity and omnipotence throughout the infinity of universes, rising nearer and nearer to deity, expatiating amidst objects of love and transcendence, and beholding new scenes of grandeur and sublimity rising to view in boundless prospect, while ages, numerous as the drops of rain, are rolling on."

Logic for the Million, a Familiar Exposition of the Art of Reasoning. By a Fellow of the Royal Society. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.

We have never been favourable to writing down to the people, and we are always inclined to look on any eye of suspicion at the thought of "tailoring" which issues from the press. We have faith in the possibility of acquiring knowledge cheap through hard labour, diligent efforts, and constant perseverance. "Lightly come, lightly go" is no true education as in other every-day matters. Were we inclined to admit of any exception to this rule, the work before us would make our exception. It is not a regularly digested and scientific treatise on the subject, nor is it a popularized view of the science, but a series of original and selected remarks upon a few of the chief aspects of argumentation. Should any scholar of guiding a class, peripatetic, and a similar view of the objects of the science of reasoning take up this book, he will be grievously disappointed, but to any one who has acquired a knowledge of the methods and forms of logic the work will be found valuable. It is a very large collection of the very best specimens of argumentative discourse, and as a sequel to the

study of any of the more rigid and abstract works on the subject, would be of much service. As such we can recommend it to our readers. A logic in the sense of a systematic and classified series of directions upon "the right use of reason" and the "conduct of the understanding" is certainly in, but in the more strict and legitimate signification of the term viz. an exposition of the form and manner of all true thinking it certainly is not. To each of our readers we have studied the series of papers on the "Art of Reasoning" which have appeared in this periodical, the examples contained in them will form an agreeable and useful process upon the accuracy of the rules laid down for their guidance.

Reason and Faith, their Claims and Conflicts. By Henry Rogers. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans.

This is one of the books suited to the wants of the times. Learned, acute, philosophical, and popular in its style, it is a treasure which demands the attention of every sincere inquirer into the truth of Christianity. We recommend every reader to purchase and study this most excellent little treatise. It deals in a most lucid and masterly manner with some of the prominent kinds of modern unbelief especially with the self-styled rationalism of the mythic school of the christians. The following beautiful little epigrams will illustrate the position which the author occupies.—"We should represent Reason and Faith as twin born; the one, in form and features the image of manly beauty,—the other of feminine grace and gentleness, but to each of whom is allowed a red privation. While the bright eyes of Reason are full of piercing and restless intelligence her ear is closed to sound and while Faith has an ear of exquisite delicacy on her sightless eyes she like them towards heaven, the sunbeam plays in vain. Hand in hand the brother and sister in all mortal love pursue their way through a world on which like ours, day breaks and night falls alternately. By day, the eyes of Reason are the guide of Faith, and by night, the ear of Faith is the guide of Reason. As it went with those who suffer under each privation respectively, Reason is apt to be eager, impatient, impatient of that instruction which too inflexibly will not permit him readily to apprehend, while Faith gentle and docile, is ever willing to listen to the voice by which alone Truth and Wisdom can effectually reach her."—Pp. 2, 3.

Little Henry's Holiday at the Great Exhibition. By the Editor of "Pleasant Pages." London: Heinemann and Bohn.

The Great Exhibition is now closed, but its distinguished wonders will long remain the topic of frequent fire-side conversations, and in *choix d'expressions* will become as familiar as household words. The young who were privileged to visit it will delight to be able to talk of it intelligently and those who did not see it will be glad to get a good description of its contents. To both of these classes the little book before us will be very acceptable, and we shall be disappointed if "children of a larger growth" do not read it with anxiety and pride. It has already been highly honoured by Her Majesty having directed it to be placed in the hands of the youthful members of a royal family.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. II.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

MAN is not only a thinking being, but also a thought-utterer. The union of ideation and speech completely differentiates him from all the other animal species, and constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of human nature. "Without speech, knowledge would have little value; and without knowledge, speech would have but little weight." Thus Reason and Language are mutually reactive. "*Credunt enim homines rationem suam verbis imperare; sed fit etiam ut verba rim suam super intellectum retorqueant et reflectant.*" * "Speech is the great instrument by which man becomes beneficial to man; and it is to the intercourse and transmission of thought by means of speech, that we are chiefly indebted for the improvement of thought itself. Small are the advances which a single unassisted individual can make toward perfecting any of his powers. What we call human reason is not the effort or ability of one so much as it is the result of the reasoning of many, arising from lights mutually communicated, in consequence of speech and writing." † Without Language,—Society, Civilization, Government, Science, Philosophy, Art, Literature, Friendship, Love, Home, and Country, with all their advantages, associations, pleasures, and relation links, would be blotted from the category of human experiences. Animal gregariousness, isolation, and barbarism, would be the unpleasant destiny of humanity. To Language and Reason combined man is indebted for his progressiveness and refinement. By this man imparts knowledge to his fellow-man—communicates pleasure—awakens hope—excites to action—elicits aspirations—transports with joy, and electrifies the soul in all its manifold powers and capabilities. By it man receives a multiplied existence, and is enabled to live in the society and enjoy the converse of the illustrious of all ages and countries.

How mighty, also, are the powers of speech when wielded by intelligence and moralism! We need not listen to the Orphic fables for illustrations of the power of speech, when

"Words are with the love of truth and hues of grace
Arrayed."

Demosthenes, by the utterance of "words which were weapons," exciting the ardour and patriotism of the Grecian people, and rousing them to arms against the invading Philip—Cicero, in the senate and on the forum, swaying all intellects and governing all hearts—Peter the Hermit, kindling with frenzied enthusiasm the populations of Europe, and calling them forth to the Crusadic wars—Luther, "the solitary monk who shook the world," causing the flood-tides of passion to rush across the souls of men until they snapt asunder the fetters of the all-potent church like stubble-withes, and became free from the soul-

* "For men believe that their reason governs words; but it also happens that words retort and reflect their force upon the intellect."—*Bacon's Nov. Org., Aph. 60.*

† "*Bair's Lectures on Rhetoric and the Belles Lettres,*" p. 1.

tyranny which bound them—Fox, Sheridan, Burke, Chatham, Chalmers, Hall, Wilberforce, and Peel—are historic examples known to all. When the gigantic intellect, the flashing eye, the enthusiasm-knit frame, the living voice, and the rugged, vigorous, passion-filled periods are all united, how grand the effect—how great the influence! And even when the voice is dumb in death, Language secures to man a semi-immortality. “Language is the instrument by which Socrates brought wisdom down from heaven to earth; and Newton made the heavens themselves, and all the wonders they contain, descend, as it were, to be grasped and measured by the feeble arm of man. But its noblest benefit is the permanent transmission of thought, which gives to each individual the power and wisdom of his species, or rather—for the united powers and wisdom of his species as they exist in myriads at the same moment with himself upon the globe would be comparatively a trifling endowment—it gives him the rich inheritance of the accumulated acquisitions of all the multitudes who, like himself, in every preceding age, have inquired and meditated and patiently discovered; or, by the happy inspiration of genius, have found truths which they hardly sought, and penetrated, with the rapidity of a single glance, those depths of nature which the weak steps and dim torchlight of generations after generations had vainly laboured to explore. By that happy invention which we owe indirectly to the ear, the boundaries of time seem to be at once removed. Nothing is past, for everything lives as it were before us. The thoughts of beings who had trod the most distant soil, in the most distant periods, arise again in our mind with the same warmth and freshness as when they first awoke to life in the bosoms of their authors.”—*Brown's Lectures*, xx. Men's transient thoughts are by it enshrined in the page of Literature, and his soul still operates on the destiny of his race. To Language the historic narrative owes its precision and attractive grace, Philosophy its delicate distinctions, Argumentation its point and subtilty, and Poesy its beauty and refinement. It cannot be unimportant, then, to investigate “the Philosophy of Language.” This includes two primary questions—What is the nature of Language? and What its origin? To each of these we shall endeavour to present brief and intelligible replies. Let it be understood, however, that we do not profess, in this article, more than to compress into small space the essence of the labours of the most eminent men, by whose diligence such inquiries have been prosecuted.

THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE.—Language—a term derived, through the French “*Langue*,” from the Latin “*Lingua*,”—in its original acceptation signified the power of employing *the tongue* in the production of speech. It is now, however, more generally applied to *the whole means by which men intentionally express their ideas and emotions*. These may be thus classified:—

Language	{	Natural	{	Cries, Gestures, and Modifications of Countenance and Voice.
		Artificial		
			{	Speech.
				Painting, Sculpture, Hieroglyphics, Writing, Mute Signs, Telegraphs, Emblems, Writing, Symbols.

Language being the sign of the thoughts and emotions which pass and repass through the human mind, it becomes us to understand well the use of the representative *media which are devoted to the expression of our ideas*. This cannot be done unless we are *acquainted with their nature*. To understand this, then, we must endeavour to discover

the peculiar office and duty which it has to perform. But as speech is the most useful and necessary system of idea-signs, we shall, for the present, confine ourselves to the consideration of Word-Language.

Words have been variously defined; by Aristotle, as "sounds rendered significant by compact"—by Priscian, as "the least part of a properly-constructed sentence, understanding a part to be such in relation to the meaning of the whole sentence" in which it is employed—by the Port-Royalists, as "sounds distinct and articulate, which men have taken as signs to express what passes in their minds"—by Hobbes, as that "which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had or had not before in his mind"—and by Harris, as "the smallest parts of speech." In all these we observe this great fact presented to the mind—that words are idea-symbols, the indications of impressions made upon a thinking essence; thus—

"As the vapours lie
Bright in the outspread radiancy,
So are men's *thoughts* invested with the light
Of Language."

But though the *sense* of any single word is the *idea* which it symbolizes, the *sense* of two or more words collocated syntactically is not that of the two or more ideas indicated by the terms employed, but of the ideas involved in these terms *and a relation*. "Language is not a simple collection of isolated words; it is a system of manifold relations of words to each other." It is not, therefore, the mere exponent of thought, but is at the same time, as Lord Bacon remarks, "the sensible portraiture or image of the mental processes."

The ultimate analysis reduces Language to idea-signs; but each idea is acted upon by the mind in the process of naming; therefore Language *implicitly* contains the true representation of the operations of the mentality and the development of thought. It is semi-spiritual, semi-material—at once a transient agitation of the air, and the incarnation of the human spirit in its noblest moods. The nature of Language, then, informs us, that—

- 1st. It is a system of idea-symbols.*
- 2nd. It is the product and representative of the active intelligential faculties.†
- 3rd. It is in a great measure arbitrary, and consequently depends on the will.
- 4th. Words are not reasoning, but the instruments of thought-development.
- 5th. Without power to comprehend Language—i.e., intelligence—signs would be valueless.
- 6th. The mind is qualified to make the minutest distinctions, and is capable of increasing the significancy of terms by connecting together a number of ideas and feelings in the same idea-image.

* "Seeing names (i.e., words) ordered in speech are signs of our conceptions, it is manifest they are not signs of the things themselves; for that the sign of the word stone should be the sign of a stone cannot be understood in any sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces thinks of a stone."—Hobbes's *Computation, or Logic*, chap. 2.

† "Parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of Language. Besides *articulate sounds*, therefore, it was further necessary that man should be able to use those sounds as signs of internal conceptions, and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind."—Locke's *Essay*, book iii. chap. 1.

7th. The rapidity and ease with which the mind seizes upon the significance of all these abbreviations, and combines them, is evidence of the wondrous speed of thought, and the influence of the suggestive faculties of the mind.

8th. The power of distinguishing most accurately between the nicest and most delicate shades of sensation is possessed by the sense-powers.*

THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.—Few questions have been agitated more frequently among philosophers than "The Origin of Language," and few have been debated with more acrimony and warmth. Happily, the age of uncharitable debate is fast fading "into the sere and yellow leaf," and the honest advocacy of opinion is being respected. "Truth is militant, and can only establish itself by means of conflict. The most opposite opinions can make a plausible show of evidence while each has the statement of its own case; and it is only possible to ascertain which of them is in the right, after hearing and comparing what each can say against the other, and what the other can urge in its defence."† We are happy that our readers, in a recent and ably-conducted discussion in this serial, have had the question of the Origin of Language so placed before them as to enable them to form a judgment for themselves. As, however, it has been heretofore the custom, among writers on Rhetoric, to treat upon this topic, we shall, even although we may run the risk of appearing presumptuous in doing so, proceed to give a succinct analysis of the chief arguments which have been, or may be, employed, in the *pro* and *con* of this *questio vexata*—"Was Language of Human Origin?"‡

* We do not mean to say that all these several observations have been formally proven in the foregoing remarks; we merely mean that they may be legitimately deduced from them. We could have made this article less of a *rudis indigestaque moles*, had we not hesitated to employ the thoughts and illustrations which we had formerly placed before our readers—Art of Reasoning, Nos. III. and XII., to which we beg to refer, as also to the debate on "The Origin of Language," in Vol. II., in which many judicious remarks will be found.

† Mill's "Logic," Preface.

‡ For further information and more extensive inquiry upon the Origin of Language, the following list comprises, so far as we remember, the most useful works, viz.—HUMAN ORIGIN: "Lucretius' *De Rerum Naturæ*," book v.; Cicero, "*De Inventione*"; Aristotle and Plato, *passim*; Lord Burnet of Monboddo's "Dissertation on the Origin and Progress of Language"; Horne Tooke's "Diversions of Purley"; Harris's "Hermes"; Kaime's "Sketches of the History of Man," book i.; Adam Smith's "Dissertation on the Formation of Language"; Dr. Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric and the Belles Lettres," vi.—x.; Dr. Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric"; Professor Barron's "Lectures on the Belles Lettres," i.—vi.; James Dunbar's "Essays on Man," i. and ii.; Shuckford's "Connexion of Sacred and Profane History," vol. i.; Priestley's "Lectures on Language and Grammar," Works, vol. xxiii.; Locke's "Essay," book iii.; Smart's "Rhetoric"; President Des Brosse's "Traite de la Formation Mechanique des Langues"; Rousseau's "Discours sur l'Origine, l'Inegalité parmi les Hommes"; Condillac's "Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines"; Ghibilini's "Monde Primitif"; Cousin's "Histoire de la Philosophie au 18me Siècle," lecture xx.—DIVINE ORIGIN: Winder's "History of Knowledge," vol. i.; Beattie's "Theory of Language"; Warburton's "Divine Legation of Moses"; Dr. Samuel Johnson's "Dictionary"; Webster's "Dictionary"; Archbishop Magee "On the Atonement," vol. ii.; Bishop Williams's "Boylean Lectures," vol. i.; Dr. Whitby's "Sermons on the Attributes," vol. ii.; Dr. Ellis "On the Knowledge of Divine Things"; Macgill's "Lectures on Rhetoric and Criticism"; Ripley's "Sacred Rhetoric"; Donaldson's "New Cratylus," book i. chap. 3; Chevenix Trench "On the Study of Words," Sect. i.; Bonald's "Recherches Philosophiques."

PRO.

Man may exist without the power of speech.
Men have a natural language of signs and gestures.

Man is an imitative and inventive being.
Profane history uniformly represents man as existing in the savage state.
Words appear to be arbitrary signs.
The symbolization of ideas is differently conducted in different countries.

Articulate sounds arising from irregular vibrations, variously interchanged and frequently interrupted, are easily producible, and the associative powers of the intellect could easily co-link sounds and ideas.

Man is a progressive being, and all the elements of his progress result from the exercise of his natural powers.

Gregariousness does not necessarily presuppose language, for other animals congregate together who have not verbal language.

Language being a collection of *signs*, although man possessed these signs by divine inspiration, yet he would be unable to conjoin the thing signified without Reason and Invention, and incapable of remembering the sign, seeing that the idea with which it was intended to be connected had not yet impressed the mind.

New words and new compounds, as well as new applications of words, are at present of quite common invention.

Having thus placed before our readers the chief considerations, except such as are strictly *Ethnographic*—e.g., the unity of the human race, the oneness of the original Language, &c.—we will now proceed to show how the truth seems to lie between the two extremes, and by an *eclectic* process endeavour to show the point of junction to which we may bring both opinions, and thence arrive at the most probable solution of the question at issue.

The mind of man is so framed that it must obey certain necessary laws which are by the very constitution of his nature impressed upon it. When therefore objects, whether sensationally or reflectively, make themselves distinguishable by the consciousness, they must necessarily be classified according to these mental laws. The mind, however, is not a mere passibility, but a self-energizing activity—each law, therefore, operates in producing a definite result upon a *given excitant being applied* to it. The will has the power of compelling the organs of the body to obey its behests. Let it be granted, then, that this

CON.

Language is not an accidental property of man.
The savage state is not the natural condition of man.

Language is necessary to human existence.
History presents no example of a whole nation destitute of the power of speech.

The want of Language would have made man an incongruity on the earth, as every other animal has had the proper powers necessary to its existence bestowed upon it.
The relation of words to each other—Universal Grammar—is the same in all languages, and is unprogressive.

To invent speech is a physical impossibility, as it necessarily presupposes the pliability of the speech-organs to remain till the age at which reason begins to operate.

“The Development Theory” is opposed to the “Logic of Facts.”

Man is gregarious, and a societarian compact, and even a compact regarding the significance of words, presupposes the possession of Language.

Man in the early ages of the world is displayed in profane history as being in so rude a state, as to be destitute of the power of inventing agricultural and other implements; it is not, therefore, likely that he could have invented the intricate and complex machinery of speech.

The power of expressing emotions of pain and pleasure exists in man, whether he has had occasion to exercise it or not.

All new words are compounded of, or related to, other words, either belonging to the same or another Language.

excitant is given, it must be equally evident that the articulative organs would as necessarily operate to express thought as the other portions of the body on the appearance of danger exert themselves in self-preservation. It is no valid argument against this theory, that Language is a complex and intricate system of idea-signs, apparently implying great intellectual acuteness and discrimination. It is perhaps one of the most extraordinary facts in our nature, that the most difficult things are practically perfectly familiar to us long previous to our scientific knowledge of them. Think of the "Philosophy of sight," how accurate and precise is the adherency of the visual organs to the laws of Optics!—and yet how ignorant are we of those very laws upon which the mind in exercising sight judges and acts! Is it anything more strange that the speech-organs should act in obedience to the laws of their nature, than that the sight-organs should do so? Such things become so habitual in their performance, that we act upon them without reflecting upon the reasons why we do so, and consequently we become insensible to their operations until by a more subtle and accurate analysis we are enabled to trace the processes by which our minds perform their functions.

That we possess powers and capacities for speech cannot be doubted; that we were intended to employ these powers admits of as little question; and if we believe, as we think must be done, that the laws by which these powers operate, are fixed and definite, then we cannot but conclude that upon the proper stimuli being applied they must have spontaneously developed themselves. The world, with all its magnificences, beautiful sublimities, and conveniences, lay around Man, soliciting him to become acquainted with their secrets; his co-mates in existence invited him to companionship; could he fail, under such propitious circumstances, to fill the air with music, and laden it with the sweet burden of his thoughts? As naturally as the eye distinguishes distance, or the eye-lid close to avoid a too great glare of light—as naturally as the ocean-waves rock to and fro by the agitation of the wind—as naturally as the sun mirrors itself in the streamlet—mineral and saline bodies, in certain circumstances, assume the crystalline form—so naturally do the vocal organs, in obedience to the laws impressed upon them, produce the thought-signs called sounds. This latent power, the sufficient excitancy being supplied, necessarily manifested itself. In the sense, therefore, of adaptation and adjustment—pre-arranged and pre-established creation-interwoven law, "Language is of divine origin. A God-furnished and all-adequate lexicon, at least, there is good reason for believing was not; but rather that as man's idea-receptive power increased, so did his stock of verbalisms, and that in this sense "Language is of human origin."

This seems to be the view taken of this subject in the following exquisite sonnet Hartley Coleridge, with which we beg leave to conclude this dry, rambling, and discursive article:—

"What was 't awakened first the untried ear
Of that one man who was *all* human kind?
Was it the gladsome welcome of the wind
Stirring the leaves that never yet were sure?
The four mellifluous streams that flowed so near,
Their lulling murmurs all in one combined?
The note of bird unnamed? The startled hind
Bursting the brake in wonder, not in fear

(Of her new lord? Or did the holy ground
Send forth mysterious melodies to greet
The gracious pressure of immaculate feet?
Did viewless seraphs rustle all around,
Making sweet music out of air as sweet?
Or his own voice awake him with the sound?"

Philosophy.

IS HOMŒOPATHY TRUE IN PRINCIPLE AND BENEFICIAL IN PRACTICE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

We have on more than one occasion, in the pages of this magazine, expressed our disapproval of the system, still prevalent, of condemning new theories *merely because they are new*, and without any regard to their real claims to merit. We consider such a course unworthy of any one pretending to be an earnest inquirer after truth.

On the occasions to which we refer, we have generally made more particular allusion to discoveries in mechanical science—as the steamboat, locomotive engine, and electric telegraph—all of which brought their inventors into ridicule, and were, so long as disbelief and prejudice could hold out, designated “absurd impossibilities.” But mechanical inventors have not been the only recipients of such abuse. HARVEY, who, after laborious investigation, propounded his theory of the circulation of the blood; and JENNER, who, after equal painstaking, discovered vaccination to be a preventive of that direful scourge, the small-pox, were equally scouted as “vain enthusiasts,” and by members of their own profession too! How true it is that great men are ever in advance of their age! The medical profession, by reason, we suppose, of some strange infatuation, notwithstanding their known intelligence, seem to be remarkably incredulous. Look at their treatment to the *Phrenologists*, and their dogmatic opposition to the *Mesmerists*, neither of whose sciences can they disprove! Ought they not rather, by virtue of their profession, to be the first to avail themselves of all new curative agents, when proved to be such beyond the shadow of a doubt, and give the public the benefit? Instead of which, they allow, by their neglect

and prejudice, these advantages to be seized upon by inexperienced and uneducated persons, who impose upon the public, abuse the science they advocate, and finally discourage scientific discovery! After what we have said of the past, we are not surprised, although we may regret, to find that the profession (taken as a body) are equally deadly and determined in their opposition to Homœopathy as they have been to the sciences before enumerated. But let us proceed to look a little into the merits of the question for ourselves.

Homœopathy, as your medical correspondent stated in the last number (and we welcome him to our ranks), is comparatively a new science. Its primary claims seem to lie in its advocacy of the adoption of simplicity in the place of complexity; moderation in the stead of useless profusion; and comparative certainty in the place of almost proverbial uncertainty.

By simplicity we mean that the Homœopathic theory embraces some settled line of action—its principle of cure (*similia similibus*) applies to all bodily disorders—for that being to administer to the suffering person what would be most likely to produce similar symptoms in a healthy person, the energies of the practitioner become concentrated in one object, although the means by which he may accomplish it are not, as some would have us believe, restricted, because he is perfectly at liberty to select from all known means that most likely to suit his purpose, and directly he succeeds he will have visible proof of his success by the relief afforded to the patient. Under the old system of medicine no such immediate certainty of result exists.

By moderation in the stead of profusion, we mean that the Homœopathic practitioner applies only just so much of his remedy as is absolutely necessary to *create the test*—he being always careful that in the event of his judging wrongfully and administering a non-curative agent, it shall not be in sufficient quantity to do further injury to the patient; and knowing, on the other hand, that when he has once discovered the proper agent, he can administer it in any quantity desired. How different is this from the *sluicing system* now in fashion!

We are aware that after the long prevalence of the old system of drugs and drafts, pills and doses, “to be taken every four hours”—all of which have to be *paid for* in the same extravagant style as they are supplied—it is only natural that some times should pass before the heads and the *pockets* of the profession would become reconciled to such a radical change as that which must follow the general adoption of the Homœopathic system. The English public, however, are not niggardly, and would, we think, be more disposed to pay well for speedy and pleasant cures, than for long tedious and unpleasant ones.

We are far from seriously believing that the profession are actuated alone by selfish motives. The public would be too discerning to tolerate a combination on such grounds. The plan heretofore pursued has been rather to cast ridicule and discredit upon the system. They cannot, *dare not*, say that no cures have been effected under its treatment—but do ascribe the cures to change of diet, change of air, &c.; while, as it has been amusingly remarked, some of the patients *could not eat*, and others never left their room while under Homœopathic treatment!

But to think of cures being effected by medicine administered in any other mode than that which has descended from Hippocrates and Galen! Oh, foul and miserable slander! Yes, it is the minuteness of the doses administered that has formed the stronghold for Homœopathic opposition, as if healing medicines were to be administered in *pailfuls* or not at all! But is the Homœopathic practitioner bound down to administer “so much and no more?” We think not. The principle is to test with the *smallest possible quantity*, and then to administer *as the particular case may require*. We have

no direct authority before us on this point, but we have one on which we place considerable reliance, because it comes from an impartial source. The “National Cyclopædia” (Art. Homœopathy) says hereon:—“The extremely minute quantities of which the remedies are administered seem to form a marked difference between the Homœopathic and all other schools of medicine. *The Homœopaths, however, assert that this is merely a point of practice to be determined by the physician at the bed-side of his patient*, and that, in the application of the Homœopathic principle to the treatment of disease, it was soon found that remedial agents given in the doses usually employed, acted too energetically upon a frame already predisposed to their influence, by the affinity existing between their medicinal effects and the morbid signs of the disease; and hence a gradual diminution was made in the quantity of the medicine exhibited, in order to approximate to that amount which might exert its full curative power, without aggravating the sufferings of the patient by an excess of medicinal action. The result has been the general adoption among Homœopaths of the minute dose at present in use, which perhaps more than any other cause, from its discrepancy with generally received opinions, has prevented any impartial investigation into the principles of the new system by the profession at large.” It may be so. But where is the reasonableness of such a course? Why not reject the indication of the mariner’s compass because of the minuteness of the indicator—the needle? Or why not denounce as absurd and impossible the working of the electric telegraph, because of the minute and invisible nature of the agent employed in effecting its operations? Surely one would be as reasonable as the other! Do our opponents forget that even the slightest touch, or still more remarkable, even a breath of air, is sufficient to convey and spread the direst contagion? Why, then, should not an equally minute application supply a remedy? It may be that the exact “why and wherefore” is not yet fully understood; but is this any reason for an unqualified disbelief or denial? We believe it is not yet understood what it is that affords to the hound the extraordinary power of tracing the footsteps of his master for miles and hundreds of miles, and even for

many days after the journey was accomplished; but there stands the fact, alongside with many others no less remarkable, and also no less true.

The medical science itself, in the every-day practice of that principle for the propounding of which we have said Jenner suffered abuse and persecution—we mean vaccination—affords a far more powerful illustration of the truth and efficacy of the homoeopathic mode of treatment than any other we could furnish. The merest particle of matter conveyed in the needle point is sufficient to affect the whole system, and produce the desired result. "A little leaveneth the whole lump."

We shall not hunt over the whole cyclopædia of medicine to rake up cases to submit to our opponents, who are in fact themselves better acquainted with them, but we would ask, Is it not a well-known fact that mercury, which produces a certain kind of dysentery, will remove a similar kind? That Peruvian bark will cure a kind of intermittent fever, by virtue of its tendency to produce a similar kind? Also that arsenic, and many other medicinal agents, effect like results?

Let such facts be well considered. The aries reflect before they condemn.

C. W., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

PERMIT me, gentle reader, to inform you that I was much pleased with the announcement of the intended discussion of the merits of Homoeopathy in this journal, and that on receiving the January number, I turned with some aridity to the affirmative article, in the hope of there finding a case satisfactorily made out in favour of the tasteless, infinitesimal globules. Though gifted with a pretty robust constitution, I have, in my time, been forced to swallow many a nauseous dose of "rhubarb, senna, and other purgative drugs," the bare mention of which bring up to the mind anything but pleasant associations. Coming, therefore, to the discussion of this question with a bias in favour of the system I was glad to recognise, in the writer of the affirmative article, a Doctor of Medicine, or to mean standing in the Homoeopathic world, judge, however, of my disappointment, in going through his article, to find that it left the matter precisely where it previously stood. But if disappointed at the arguments there brought forward in favour of Homoeopathy, I was not a little astonished at its claims as there put forth. I was aware that it professed to cure diseases on an improved principle, and I had been accustomed to think that its collateral advantage would be to render medicine pleasant, making the bitter sweet, and thus lessening the sorrow of infancy and age; and further, that it would so reduce the bulk as to render a snuff-box capacious enough for a medicine chest, and thus save the poor apothecary the trouble of displaying

"About his shelves

A beggarly account of empty boxes,
Green earthen pots, bladders, and rusty seeds,
Remnants of packthread, and old cakes of roses,
So thinly scattered, to make up a show."

This much I expected; but in my simplicity I never even dreamt of being told that this said Homoeopathy was capable of "effecting the ultimate cure and emancipation of mankind from bodily ills, and consequently from mental disorders which arise out of them as sympathetic results." That the present is an age of progress we have been assured by "a thousand and one" voices; but how shall we designate that age in which Homoeopathy is to be universally practised? It would seem, if these things be so, that there is, indeed, "a good time coming" to suffering humanity; but, alas! it is still to come. I happen to number, among my friends, many warm adherents to the system which I feel bound to oppose, but I can discover in them no symptoms of an approach to an Edenic state of "emancipation" from the pains and penalties of nature.

That "*Homoeopathy will in no case do positive injury*" is not saying a great deal in its favour; and yet it is this plea that commends it to the attention of many. That in many cases its do-nothing globules are harmless, I believe; and this is admitted by many Allopathic physicians. Dr. Cross says,* "The instances in which it can be practised with impunity, are those imaginary

* "*The Physiology of Human Nature.*"

maladies wherein it cannot do harm, either through its own feeble efforts, or by taking the place of more efficient means. In such cases it may, indeed, be designated the art of amusing the patient, while nature cures the complaint, if complaint there be beyond the mere fancy of complaining. Whenever active and urgent disease, however, is to be dealt with, any dependence upon such fallacious means is not only unavailing, but mischievous; inasmuch, as being powerless itself to contend with any serious malady, it yet usurps the place of any really efficient medicinal treatment."

That the principle of "*Similia similibus curantur*" is not a sufficient basis for any system, has, I think, been satisfactorily shown by "Vinculum." If Homœopathists object, let them at once submit their system to the test suggested some time ago by a respectable journalist:—"We offer a method of satisfying us, which we doubt not will be at once as successful with the public as ourselves. Let the Homœopathists select fifty healthful men, and in the use of fifty given medicines, let them *produce* in each of these fifty the separate malady of which that medicine is the professed *cure*; let this be done, and we shall at once believe that such medicines can cure the fifty individuals upon whom the said maladies have come from natural causes. Let this course be followed, and it will command our entire confidence, and we think that of mankind generally, in the soundness of the principle that 'like is cured by like.'" Now what say Dr. V. and his friends to this? Is not the course recommended a fair one? and if fair, ought it not to be carried out? Now, no shuffling, gentlemen; bring your system to the test, or we shall be compelled to believe the reports of the failure of your experiments, when conducted by impartial men, and shall say, *You do not, because you dare not.*

But then we are pointed to "the proofs of the efficacy of Homœopathy" which are said everywhere to abound. Indeed! then you ascribe many wonderful cures to the application of your system; but are you quite sure that they result from it? You have not forgotten the important law in philosophy, not to assume a new cause when *known ones* will explain a fact. May not *the cures that you attribute to Homœopathy result merely from the efforts of nature to*

recover her lost ground? If this is *never* the case with other means, or how do you account for the wonders said to be wrought by Morison's pills, Holloway's ointment, and much more, by the olive oil and "laying on of hands" of the Mormonites? If, then, this is the case with other *methods*, may it not be sometimes the case with yours? especially as one of its principal characteristics is—to use your own words—that "it gives the system more time to rest and *recover itself undisturbedly.*" And if, then, it be confessedly thus *sometimes*, may it not be thus *frequently*?

Another plea urged for Homœopathy, suggests a *rationale* of many of its "cures." It is said to lead the physician "to insist upon his patients attending more particularly to the rule of diet." Ah! how many disorders arise from neglect here. The way to many a man's head is, in more senses than one, through his stomach. Yea, further, from disarrangement in the said organ go forth many prejudicial influences to *every* part of the system. Let the cause be removed, and then the effects will either cease or be weakened. Hence the importance of dietary regulations, and the beneficial effects of their due observance, which Homœopathists know how to appreciate. I may adduce here a case in point. Dr. Jennings was a physician of transatlantic celebrity, and being convinced of the importance of attending to regimen, dispensed with all medicine throughout a very extended practice, but nevertheless amused his patients with bread pills and bottles of good spring water coloured. He was successful to an amazing extent, and outstripped all his competitors. "Fever in all its forms, and whatever else came in his way, he met and battled with a bread pill and coloured water, and the region rang with the praises of Dr. Jennings!" I hope my Homœopathic friends will forgive me if I place their potent globules and bread pills on a par. A strong argument in favour of the belief that the Homœopathic "cures" depend more upon regimen than anything else, may be drawn from some of those statistics to which Dr. V. refers to with such satisfaction.

It is curious to notice the proportion between the "in" and "out" patients reported as cured in the Hahnemann Hospital, London. Upon the in-patients a strict dietary is of

course enforced, while to the out-patients it can only be recommended. That it is not generally adopted I have had many opportunities of ascertaining. How this affects the proportion of cures we shall see. The following is an extract from the first report of the above-mentioned institution, which was presented to a meeting of subscribers held April 3rd, 1851:—

During the five months it has been in operation the patients have amounted to 1,569 persons, viz.:—

Out-patients (since 16th Oct.).....1,485
In-patients (since 1st Nov.), chiefly only
with twenty beds ready..... 84

1,569

Of whom—

	Out.	In.
Have been discharged, Cured ...	347	40
" " Improved	206	18

Total..... 553 58

Unaltered.....	33	7
Under treatment	529	14
Result unknown	252	
Died.....	17	2

The number, then, of in-patients (or persons upon whom a strict dietary has been enforced) reported to have been "cured," is nearly *one-half* of the whole, and those reported as "improved" nearly *one-fourth*; while the number of out-patients (or persons to whom a strict dietary has only been recommended) reported to have been "cured," is not *one-fourth*, and those "improved" not *one-seventh*. These are significant facts, and speak volumes.

The large number of cases reported as only improved, and significant of the slow progress of Homœopathic patients, is favourable to the hypothesis that their cures are the result of nature's unaided and gradual operations.

But if, after all, it can be shown that *bona fide* cures have been effected by medical practitioners of this school, the question may be put, Have they been effected on Homœopathic principles? For while Dr. V., in one part of his short paper, declares his pet system to be "*the only real method of effectually treating all disorders to which the animal organism in general is subject*," he a

few sentences further on admits that "Homœopathic practitioners reject no *reasonable* method of treatment—no method by which they incur *no risk of unforeseen mischief*; they use all these medical auxiliaries," viz.: "Hydropathy, Mesmerism, Galvanism, &c." Do they not in acute cases frequently apply to Allopathy? It is reported that they do; and a writer in *Tait's Magazine* for December asserts that he knows an eminent Homœopathic physician who always has his children treated Allopathically.

These are difficulties that must be removed, and apparent inconsistencies that must be cleared away, before I can be at one with my Homœopathic friends.

Perhaps I cannot better conclude this paper than with the following pungent extract from the *London Medical Examiner*:—

Faith and proper diet will remove many disorders. We knew a blacksmith who sometimes cured ague by making his patients swallow a piece of paper upon which he wrote some "dog's latin" a few hours before the expected paroxysm. But our Homœopathic friends would probably attribute the cure to the gallate of iron in the ink. Hohenloe miracles, Morison's pills, Animal Magnetism, and Hydropathy, are on the decline, and infinitesimals are in the ascendency; like other quackeries it will have its day, and then give place to some fresh delusion. Dr. S. Johnson used to say, "that if a man were to get upon a tree and preach with his head downwards, he would have a large congregation." And as with theology so with physic, the more absurd the doctrine the more numerous are its disciples. But how useful this science of Homœopathy would be if fully carried out: let a man try the ten-millionth part of a mutton chop for his dinner, or the billionth part of a bottle of wine, and then consult his feelings. Dr. James Johnson, we think, suggested when Homœopathy was first on the tapis, "that if a bushel of Epsom salts were put into the Thames at Richmond, all the inhabitants of London might be physicked." We should like to see the effect of the infusion of a grain of common sense into 500 members of the House of Commons; we might then get efficient medical reform, and our legislators might agree to the axiom, "That next to a man's spiritual welfare, his bodily health is of the most importance."

L. G. G.

History.

CAN THE APOSTOLIC ORIGIN AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE
BRITISH CHURCH BE PROVED?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

MR. EDITOR,—The introduction of discussions of historical questions in the pages of the *British Controversialist* is, in my opinion, a very important feature; and I doubt not that it will prove a source of much interest and instruction to all, and especially to the young.

That it was the privileged lot of Great Britain to receive Christianity, and some of her attendant blessings, at a very early period, we are all agreed, but as to who was the first publisher of the "glad tidings" is a matter of dispute. J. B., in the affirmative article, maintains that it was one of the apostles; and, further, that St. Paul was the individual. We purpose, then, briefly to examine the testimonies which he brings forward in evidence, and to show how far they fall short in substantiating his position. The assertion that "the fathers inform us, in general terms, that it was the apostles personally" who founded the church in Britain, if admitted, would not prove that Britain was ever favoured with their presence. In popular language, leaders and employers are said to accomplish objects, when those objects are secured mainly by their adherents or servants. On this principle, a few months ago, the air was rent with the cry, that the Pope had introduced a Romish hierarchy into England, although no one understood by that that we had been honoured by a personal visit from "his Holiness!"

Far be it from us to attempt to undervalue, in historic researches, the testimony of contemporary writers, whether friends or foes, but we cannot place much reliance upon the record of events made some centuries after the events themselves had transpired, and a knowledge of which could only have been preserved by tradition—and mark, that kind of tradition which all true Protestants believe to be eminently untrustworthy. And is not this the kind of testimony upon which J. B. builds his theory? Jerome flourished in Palestine in the fourth

century; Eusebius was bishop of Cæsarea in the fourth century; Theodoret was bishop of Cyprus in the fifth century; and Venantius bishop of Poitiers in the sixth century. These, then, are J. B.'s witnesses living thus far distant from the event concerning which they are supposed to testify, and far distant from the place where the event was supposed to have taken place. But what, after all, do these witnesses assert? Nothing very definite. Theodoret, we are told, asserts, that "the apostles persuaded even the Britons to receive the laws of the crucified Lord;" and Jerome says, that "Paul preached the gospel in the western parts." Well, with the consideration of these statements, conflicting ones should be taken, as well as popular belief. "The first publication of the gospel in Britain has been attributed to James, the son of Zebedee, whom Herod put to death (Acts xii. 2); to Simon Zelotes, another apostle; to Aristobolus (mentioned Rom. xvi. 10); to St. Peter &c., by some few legendary writers, who are cited by Ussher, *Eccl. Britann. Primordiales* cap. 1. But, rejecting these accounts, William of Malmesbury, and after him many other monks, maintained that Joseph of Arimathea, with twelve others, were sent from Gaul by St. Philip into Britain, A.D. 43; that they were successful in planting Christianity; spent their lives in England, had twelve hides of land assigned to them by the king at Glastonbury, where they first built a church of hurdles, and afterwards established a monastery. By maintaining the truth of this story the English clergy obtained the precedence of some others in several councils of the fifteenth century, and particularly that of Basil, A.D. 1434."*

J. B. quotes the intention of the apostles

* "Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History," Second Century, chap. i. note 4.

Paul "to journey into Spain," recorded *Eccl. iv.*, to give plausibility to his opinion. But is our friend not aware that it has been a disputed point with bible students, as to whether the country there referred to is the same as the one known to us by that name? Without entering upon that dispute, it should ever be remembered that there exists no evidence to prove that the apostle was ever able to carry out his intention! Further remarks here would therefore be unnecessary.

But, Mr. Editor, had every position taken by J. B. proved unassailable, I maintain that he would have failed in making out a case sufficiently strong for his purpose—he might have shown that the Apostolic Origin of the British Church was *probable*, but he would not, as required by the question, have "*proved*" it actual.

Here I might lay down my pen, but wishing to upbuild as well as destroy, I would suggest, for the consideration of J. B. and your readers generally, the following, as a more *probable* account of the introduction of the gospel to Britain, than the one on which I have been animadverting. There is an ancient British history, called the *Triades*, of the Isle of Britain, and written in the Welsh language. These British records are of undoubted credit, and state, that the famous British king, Caractacus, and his father, Bran, after a war of nine years in defence of their country, were defeated; and in the year A.D. 52 or 53, were carried captive to Rome, where they were detained seven years. At that time the gospel was preached in the imperial city, and Brân, with others of his family, were made converts to the faith of Christ. After seven years, they were permitted to return to their native land, and were instrumental in the early preaching of the gospel among their countrymen. On this account Brân was long distinguished as one of the *three blessed sovereigns*, and his family as *one of the holy lineages of Britain*. Christians from Rome actually accompanied the royal liberated captives. They are supposed to have been all preachers. They were the means of turning great numbers of the Britons from paganism to Christianity. Their names are

preserved. One was called ILID, it is supposed an Israelite; and the other two were CYNDAY and ARWYSTLI ILEN, probably Gentiles.

One cannot help asking, What is the object of J. B. in introducing these views? Seeing that he lays his foundation with such care, surely he must have an important superstructure to rear. What, then, is that superstructure to contain? Are we not right in surmising that one of its "holy things" will prove to be the doctrine of the apostolic succession of the clergymen of the Established Church of England, and the consequent scripturality and authority of that church? If so, we would remind him and his friend, in the words of an *Edinburgh Reviewer*, that "It is impolitic to rest the doctrines of the English Church on an historical theory, which, to ninety-nine Protestants out of a hundred, would seem to be more questionable than those doctrines. Nor is this all. Extreme obscurity overhangs the history of the middle ages; and the facts discernible through that obscurity prove that the church was exceeding ill regulated. We read of sees of the highest dignity openly sold—transferred backwards and forwards by popular tumult; bestowed sometimes by a profligate woman upon her paramour; sometimes by a warlike baron on a kinsman, still a stripling. * * In our own island it was the complaint of Alfred that not a single priest, south of the Thames, and very few on the north, could read either Latin or English. And this illiterate clergy exercised their ministry amidst a rude and half heathen population, in which Danish pirates, unchristened, or christened by hundreds, on a field of battle, were mingled with a Saxon peasantry, scarcely better instructed in religion. The state of Ireland was still worse: '*Tota illa per universam Hiberniam dissolutio ecclesiasticæ disciplinæ—illa ubique pro consuetudine Christiana sæva sub introducta barbaries*,' are the expressions of St. Bernard. We are therefore at a loss to conceive how any clergyman can feel confident that his orders have come down correctly."

Waiting the further development of J.B.'s theory, I remain, Mr. Editor, yours faithfully,
SCRUTATOR.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE "National Independence" of the British Church now claims our attention. We have already seen that the church in our favoured island was founded by St. Paul, and now our object is to show that this was the commencement and nucleus of that church, which, although it has experienced many vicissitudes, continues to the present day. That the foundation thus laid did not decay, but that a glorious superstructure was raised upon it, we have the undoubted testimony of the christian fathers from the apostolic age downwards.

Tertullian, a celebrated Carthaginian of the second century, in his tracts against the Jews, when enumerating the nations which had embraced Christianity at that time, thus refers to *Britain*:—"In whom else but that Christ, who is already come, have all these nations believed? all the borders of Spain, the divers nations of Gaul, and those places of *Britain* into which the Roman arms have not yet been able to penetrate, but which are subject to Christ." An obvious inference from these words is, that Christianity must have been well established in the more civilized and accessible portions of Britain, ere her influence could be felt in the wildest regions. In the next century, Origen, A.D. 230, triumphantly sums up the victories of Christ in these words:—"The power of our Lord and Saviour is both with those who, in *Britain*, are separated from our coast, and with those in Mauritania, and with all who under the sun have believed in his name." There is concurrent witness that during this century the church in these isles was not only existing, but highly flourishing.

In the fourth century (A.D. 303), under the emperor Diocletian, commenced that fiery trial, the last of the ten persecutions. Gildas, and Bede, after him, tell us, in glowing language, of the havoc it made in Britain. "Then it was," say they, "that Britain enjoyed the highest glory by her devoted confession of God, and great was the number of her martyrs." This persecution terminated with the accession of our christian countryman, Constantine, to the empire. "Now," say our authors whom we have just quoted, "the persecuted Christians return from the

woods and mountains and dens of the earth, re-establish the faith, build again the demolished churches, erect basilicas of the saints and martyrs, and, setting up again in triumph their victorious standards, celebrate their sacred rites with clean hands and hearts."

The empire had now become christian; general councils were common; and it must not be forgotten, that three of the bishops from the principal cities then in England, representing their brethren and the church of the island at large, had seats in, and subscribed to the canons of, the councils held in Europe and Asia during this century. At one of these (Nice) we must bear in mind that the independence of all national churches was settled, and all foreign jurisdiction excluded, by canon law.

When the church was freed from persecution, she was soon exposed to the desolating ravages of heresy. Early in the fifth century the British Church was assailed by the fatal heresy of Pelagius, who is generally called a Welshman, but was probably Scotus, i.e., a native Irishman. This called forth the energies of native bishops; but it was not until the commencement of the sixth century that the "heresy was utterly dissipated and destroyed," and then chiefly by the eloquence of St. David, bishop of *Minevia*, afterwards primate of the church in Wales. At this period, St. Jerome, speaking of the purity of the faith of the British Church, puts it on a par with that of Jerusalem. St. Chrysostom refers to the British Church in several places, and in such a way as shows that the faith received by it from the apostles continued not only pure and sound, but flourishing, in his own time, the fifth century.

We now arrive at the sixth century. Britain had become independent. The Caledonians, celebrated in the wars of Agricola, disappear, and their place is supplied by the Picts and Scots. The Romans had not taught our ancestors the art of warfare, and Vortigern found it necessary to call to his aid a band of predatory Saxons. These pirate savages soon succeeded in repelling the attacks of the Picts and Scots, and then turned their arms against their employers.

was misery and desolation on many fleeing to the mountains.

In the year 587, within ten arrival of Augustin, the bishops and York occupied their respective 96 St. Augustin landed in Kent, and Ethelbert's permission to preach at the church of St. Martin's, Canterbury, of the Romans. The king of Kent chief of the Saxon sovereigns at whom all were in some measure here he found a *christian* congregation among its members no less than Ethelbert's *queen*. Dr. Lins that *Ethelbert* was not ignorant of the christian religion. His — "Ethelbert could not be unacquainted with the christian religion. It is by the belief of the *majority* of the *peoples* in his dominions." This is a mission from a Roman Catholic

altogether bears out our statement is flatly contradictory to the of many Romish authors, who say the people were *Pagans*. After consecration at Arles, he held a council with a view of accomplishing a union of the British bishops; but he was refused. We must remember they were not to act *with* him, not *under* him.

His last words on separating with the bishops were:—"I foresee that you will have peace with *brethren*, you shall have peace with *foes*; and if you will not take this way of life to the English, you shall have *deadly vengeance at their hands*."

His prediction had a bloody fulfilment. Some years afterwards, 1,200 priests and monks of Bangor were slaughtered. We hope Augustin was true to this design, in order to be true to the British bishops for refusing to submit to his authority. The learned

and the authority of Bede ("who tells as he well could that tendeth to the honour of the *British Church*"), and many writers, prove that the extent of Augustin's preaching in the conversion of the Saxon and other inhabitants, was very

comparisons to that of the *native*. At the time of Augustin's arrival, the island of Britain was divided into four speaking different languages, viz., the *Welsh*, *Picts*, *Scots (Irish)*, and *Angles*,

including under that common term the *Saxons* and *Jutes*. Of these, the Britons, as we have already seen, had embraced the christian faith in the times of the apostles; and at the very time of Augustin's mission, seven bishops, and a proportionate number of clergy, with an archbishop, presided over the church of Christ in this island. If Augustin brought the christian faith to any of the German settlers in England, it was the Jutes, who inhabited the kingdom of Kent; but even among them he cannot be said to have laid the foundation, for Queen Bertha had her bishop *before* his arrival. All must confess that he "*built on another man's foundation*," and *watered the seed already planted*.

We have thus shown that the British Church declared her independence, and that Augustin acknowledged it with a *threat*. We will now take a hasty glance at her protesting character onwards to the Reformation. In 794, Charlemagne summoned a great council of *British* and other bishops, at Frankfort, when the decrees of the second council of Nice, notwithstanding Pope Adrian's countenance, were "rejected," "despised," and "condemned." During the Danish invasion, which spread over 200 years, the British Church experienced sad oppression. The Danish monarchs occupied the throne for twenty-eight years, after which the ancient family were restored in the person of Edward the Confessor. He resisted "Pagal aggression." We have now arrived at the *darkest* of the "dark ages." The Norman rule lasted eighty-eight years. Each and all of its sovereigns, more or less, protected the *British Church*. Henry II., being resolved to establish his independence of the Pope, called a council, A.D. 1164, which agreed to the sixteen articles called the "Constitutions of Clarendon." The "fathers of liberty" were excommunicated by the Pope for compelling John to sign the *Magna Charta*. The barons, in the reign of Henry III., sent ambassadors with a letter to lay the grievances of the *British Church* before the council of Lyons; this letter concluded with the following bold and resolute expressions:—"We can no longer, with any patience, bear the aforesaid oppressions; which, as they are detestable to God and man, are intolerable to us, neither will we any longer endure them." Edward I.

resisted the authority of the Roman see; and although he was threatened with excommunication, he carried his point.

Edward II. positively refused to do homage to the Pope for his kingdom. These several facts plainly show that Englishmen *never* lost sight of their *independence* in church or state. The reign of the third Edward was ushered in by the "morning star of the Reformation." It has been stated by some writers, that the zeal which this great man displayed was occasioned by nothing else than the loss of the warden-ship of Canterbury Hall, Oxford, of which, they say, he was first deprived by Archbishop Langham, and finally by Pope Urban V. Light, however, is thrown upon these matters by the discovery of the fact, that the warden of Canterbury Hall and the Reformer were *two distinct individuals*! The *statute of premunire*, passed in 1393 (reign of Richard II.), gave such a blow to the Church of Rome in this land, that it daily decayed till its final destruction. The *first Tudor*, in consequence of the rapacity

of the Papal see, her doctrines, errors, and corruptions, commenced the Reformation which Wickliffe had prepared the way for. God frequently causes good to come out of evil. This is exemplified in the character of Henry VIII. A Romanist writes of him:—"The last eighteen years of his reign was one continued scene of rapine, of insult, sacrilege, of bloodshed, and oppression. Under the tortures of a guilty conscience and a rotten constitution, he died, in 1546. Yes, he died a Roman Catholic, and left, by his will, an amount equal to £600 per annum for the recital of masses to get his soul out of purgatory! Thus, then, by throwing together these testimonies, we find that the British Church was in turn a *prosperous* and *independent* church; a persecuted church maintaining her *independence*; a church *disseminated* in councils; a church continually *protesting* against all usurpations and encroachments, until the period of the Reformation, when she succeeded in casting off every shackle, and broke forth in fresh beauty and splendour. J. B.

Politics.

OUGHT THE JEWS TO BE ADMITTED TO PARLIAMENT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THIS is a question continually agitating the minds of the people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. All men, of all religious sects, and of all political opinions, take an equal interest in this much controverted question—Ought Jews to be admitted into the legislature of these realms? Twice has a Jew (Baron Lionel de Rothschild) been returned by an enlightened London constituency to represent its views in Parliament; and upon the last contest for the representation of the important borough of Greenwich, Alderman Salomons, a Jew, was returned by a very considerable majority. Four times have the House of Commons sent up a bill to the House of Lords, for the removal of the disabilities which prevent the Jews admission into Parliament, and four times have the House of Lords rejected that bill; by these means nullifying the elections

of two large constituencies, and stultifying the opinions of the great body of the British representatives.

We are naturally led to inquire into the cause of what, at first sight, seems a curious circumstance, viz., that a body of British subjects in one house should, upon four different occasions, decide upon the propriety of emancipating the Jews from their present remaining disabilities, and that another body, assembled under another roof, should as many times assert its conviction of the impropriety of so doing. But the anomaly ceases when we take note of the different classes which constitute the two assemblies. The Lower House is chiefly composed of country gentlemen, retired military and naval officers, barristers, and merchants, together with a fair sprinkling of the scions of nobility; but this latter class forms only a small

section of the whole house. No clergyman of the Church of England, or priest of the Roman Catholic Church, is found within its walls. While on the other hand, the Upper House is composed of peers of the realm, and of the lords bishops and archbishops of the Established Church. Can we be surprised such an assembly as the House of Lords should throw out a bill for the admission of Jews into Parliament? The Jews have ever been regarded as an alien and degraded race. Can we be astonished, then, that the peers, so fond of their hereditary honours and titles, should wish to exclude the Jew from Parliament? They have the foresight to perceive, that if once the doors of the Lower House of Parliament are thrown open to the Jew, the time will not be far distant when he will be able to rank with, and take his seat by the side of, the noblest of the land; that their own hereditary titles and coronets will no longer grace alone christian heads, but adorn the hitherto degraded Jew, who has deserved sufficiently well of his sovereign and of his country. Can we be surprised again that the spiritual lords of the Upper House, the heads and rulers of a christian church, should be opposed to the admission of the Jew into Parliament—the infidel Jew, who denies their religion, and regards it as an imposture, a cunningly-devised fable? Like the temporal lords, they too anticipate the time when the unbelieving Jew shall be permitted to oppose them on church questions, not only in the House of Commons, but also face to face on the floor of the House of Lords. And their religious prejudices naturally incline them to deny the policy and the propriety of allowing such men to join in legislating for a professedly christian community.

We must admit these prejudices are very natural, but at the same time we deem them groundless and unreasonable, and ought not to be allowed to interfere with justice. Perhaps these remarks may be deemed a digression from the immediate subject of inquiry; yet we think they are not entirely so. They at least hint at some of the grounds of objection against the Jew, and in a measure prepare the reader for the consideration of the question. We will now, however, proceed more systematically to *prove that the Jew has a right to be admitted into Parliament.*

The Jews, as we all know, were a people inhabiting the land of Judea, the remnants of whom, when Jerusalem, their chief city, was taken, their temple destroyed, and their territory laid waste by Titus, the Roman emperor, A.D. 70, departed from their native country and distributed themselves over the then Roman empire, penetrating also to the Ganges on the east, and into Gaul on the west; and who finally settled, not only in every European state, but spread themselves nearly over the whole habitable world. Among other European states they found their way into the British isles, where they were treated with the greatest cruelty and degradation; they were banished in the reign of Edward I., and were not again re-established in this kingdom until about the time of the Restoration. During the latter part of the last century, the condition of the Jews in Europe began to engage public attention, and plans for their moral and political improvement were discussed and carried into execution. In our own country, a bill enabling Jews to prefer bills of naturalization in Parliament without receiving the sacrament, was passed in 1753, but repealed the next year. In May, 1830, an attempt was made in Parliament to remove the civil disabilities affecting the Jews, but was opposed by the ministry, and the question was lost. But an act was passed, and received the royal assent, on the 31st July, 1845, entitled, "An Act for the relief of persons of the Jewish religion elected to municipal offices," 8 and 9 Vic., c. 52, by which a declaration, to be taken by the Jews upon admission into municipal offices, is substituted for that prescribed by 9 Geo. IV., c. 17. And in the following session of Parliament another act was passed, entitled, "An Act to relieve her Majesty's subjects from certain penalties and disabilities in regard to religious opinions," by which, among other statutes, so much of an Act of Parliament of Ireland (23 and 24 Geo. III., c. 38) which excepts out of the benefit of that act (namely, the naturalization of all such foreigners as shall settle in that kingdom) persons professing the Jewish religion, is repealed. Thus all the disabilities preventing the naturalization of such Jews as were not natural-born subjects, and hindering them from conscientiously holding any municipal offices, are now removed. But the same

kind of impediment which stood in the way of their holding any municipal offices, still prevents their acceptance of any civil or military offices under the crown, and excludes them from Parliament, and from the possibility of being raised to the peerage. It is necessary before entering into any of these offices, or taking a seat in Parliament, that a person should take one or more of the oaths of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, which are made "upon the true faith of a Christian"—oaths, therefore, which no conscientious Jew would on any account take.

We have to inquire, then, on the present occasion, whether the Jews are proper persons to sit in Parliament, so as to justify the alteration of the oath of abjuration, that it shall no longer stand in the way of their admission?

Now although, as we have already seen, the Jews were a distinct people, and were long regarded by the people of these kingdoms as aliens; and although they may perhaps even now be considered a distinct race (European sects being believers in and observers of some particulars in the ordinances of the Talmud, which requires of them the strictest separation from other people)—yet, by long residence among us; from living in subjection to and participating in the benefits of the laws of the land—from having lost their native tongue for colloquial purposes and adopted our own—from having become naturalized, and their descendants consequently natural-born subjects, they have in a great degree lost their distinctive characteristics as a people. They are probably a distinct race, from non-alliance in marriage with our own races, but still their interests are bound up with that of the state; and an English Jew is as much an Englishman, as a French Jew is a Frenchman. And again, an English Jew is as much an Englishman as an English Protestant or Roman Catholic is. The difference between an English Jew and an English Protestant or Roman Catholic is a religious difference; all are Englishmen in thought and in feeling, and equally interested in the well-being of the state. And if the races *are* different, what then? The Jew born within the dominions of the crown, *of parents not at enmity with the sovereign, is by law a natural-born subject, and as such should in natural justice have the same*

rights as other natural-born subjects. If the Jew were necessarily an alien, owing allegiance to another sovereign, he would very properly be excluded from Parliament; and even if he were naturalized, could not take his seat in the legislative halls of the kingdom. But the Jew is not necessarily an alien, or a mere naturalized subject. He may be, and most generally is, a natural-born subject. If a Frenchman were to settle in this kingdom, with his wife, and have a child born to him while resident here, and France was at peace with the sovereign of these realms, the child would be a natural-born subject as much so as any child born of English parents; and though that child were brought up in and professed the Roman Catholic faith, yet he would be entitled to all the privileges of an Englishman. If, when of age, he was ambitious of a seat in Parliament, if he possessed the requisite property qualification, and was duly elected to serve in Parliament, there would be nothing to hinder him from taking his seat. In the name of justice, then, why should not the natural-born Jew—he whose ancestors have for many generations dwelt among us, be excluded? Not, surely, on the ground of his being descended from a distinct people?

Is the Jew a bad citizen? Is he fond of disturbing the peace of the kingdom? Is he rebellious and traitorous? Has he been unfaithful to the trust already reposed in him as sheriff, alderman, justice of the peace, &c.? Is he eminently notorious for dishonesty in his mercantile and business transactions? No! he is a good citizen, a peaceful and loyal subject, a faithful and upright magistrate, an honest and thriving merchant, and an industrious and painstaking man of business. Is he not, therefore, still further entitled to our confidence? We have every reason to believe, that as he has already proved himself to be a good municipal magistrate and administrator of the laws, that he would exercise a just discretion in the capacity of legislator. On what grounds, then, would you exclude him from Parliament, if a laudable ambition should stimulate him to seek the emancipation of himself and his brethren from the incapacities under which they lie, and from the stigma which, while those incapacities exist, will ever attach to his name? Alas! he professes a different faith from your own.

And so, because his conscience will not permit him to think as you do upon spiritual matters, you would suffer him to bear the reproach of unworthiness and untrustiness; you would deny him the full privileges of a British subject, and have him remain under disabilities which render him less free than the child, born upon our shores, of some poor negro slave. "Is it right," it is urged by those opposed to his admission into Parliament, "that a man avowedly averse to the christian religion, should be admitted into an assembly of professing Christians, legislating for a professedly christian community, which in the Upper House contains the heads and rulers of a christian church—is it right to admit such a one into its councils, a man who is bound in conscience to oppose all measures proposed for the welfare of that church, and who would naturally give utterance to views antagonistic to those of the right reverend prelates in the House of Lords, in all matters pertaining to the governance of that christian church of which they are the chief pastors?" This argument sounds plausibly; let us see if it be so in reality.

Although there is an Established Church for England and Ireland, and another for Scotland, yet all religious sects are tolerated in the United Kingdom. Roman Catholics, Dissenters, and Nonconformists of all grades, have free toleration to worship God in the manner and according to the doctrines which they deem most in accordance with scripture. And the Jews form no exception. By the act before referred to (9 and 10 Vic., c. 59, § 2), "her Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish religion in respect of their schools, places of religious worship, education, and charitable purposes, and the property held therewith," are "subject to the same laws as her Majesty's Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England are subject to." The Jews, then, who number only about 12,000 in the United Kingdom, have free toleration allowed them. What more in this respect could they desire? Is there any probability of their ever attempting to impose their own religion upon the people? What motive could they have, then, in interfering in church questions? What object would be gained in interfering with the various christian sects? Is it probable they would aid in overthrowing the present established churches, in order to set

up the Roman Catholic or any other christian church in their place? The Roman Catholic is an intolerant church, and they would have far more to fear than hope if that were the dominant church in these realms. It is not probable, then, that the Jews would assist in supplanting the established churches of England and Scotland with the Roman Catholic or any other church. They could have no motive in interfering with church matters, and would therefore refrain from so doing, and accordingly absent themselves from the debates upon such questions. But supposing they were to express their views upon church matters, views repugnant to the well-being of christian churches, would their words carry any weight with them? We cannot expect there would be many Jews in Parliament at any one time; they would ever be reckoned by units in the house, and therefore powerless to effect any great influence in the national councils. Thus our bishops, and the zealots of the various christian sects, have nothing to fear from their religious views. Why, then, in the name of common justice, suffer the Jews to be persecuted for their harmless religious opinions, simply because they differ from your own?

I have endeavoured to prove that the Jew, as a natural-born subject, and as a citizen, is as fit a person as any other natural-born subject of these realms, to hold a seat in Parliament. And I have further endeavoured to show that his religious opinions can in no wise injuriously affect the deliberations of that august assembly. I humbly submit, therefore, that I have shown there can be no reasonable objection to his admission into Parliament.

As to the dislike the nobility may have to number among them Jews, I think the objection scarcely worth a moment's notice. I do not see why a Jew should not as gracefully, and with as much dignity, wear a coronet, and become as faithful and judicious an hereditary adviser of his sovereign, as a Protestant or a Roman Catholic.

One word more. Neither the present form of the oath of abjuration, nor any other form of oath, is sufficient to exclude atheists or infidels, or men void of conscientious feelings, from entering Parliament and attaining to the highest dignities in the state. Why, then, should there be a form of oath to weigh heavily and odiously upon the conscientious Jew?

ADELPHOS.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE Jew was always beloved of God for the fathers' sake; and the especial and peculiar character of the mission of Jesus Christ proves, beyond the possibility of doubt, that in the purpose of the great scheme of redemption by the man Christ Jesus (who is the link between the Godhead and manhood, being himself both God and man), the Jew stood first and foremost. We find the Saviour affirming that he was sent *only* to the lost sheep of the house of Israel; and with reference to the blessing of the gospel being bestowed on us, we find it stated "to the Jew *first*, and *afterwards* to the Gentiles." Now, it is declared in holy writ that Jesus Christ came to take away the first (the Jewish and shadowy) dispensation, that he might establish the second, viz., the christian and substantial dispensation; but in such change the Jew was not to be lost sight of. Enough has already been said to prove that he was to be the first called to embrace the truth, and be placed in his proper position, not in the Jewish dispensation, then about to be abolished, but in the christian dispensation, then about to be established.

The Jew, unhappily, refused to obey the call, and not only rejected the Son of God, but refused to believe in his mission. This was, we presume, the act to which B. W. P. refers in the January number of this publication, and for which, he says, the people were dispersed, and no longer suffered to exist as such. This judgment of God has not, however, left the Jew altogether without hope; for had B. W. P. gone a little further in his quotation, that "the Gentiles are not to boast against the branches," he would have proved, not only that the branches (the Jews) are actually broken off, but also that there is *one, and only one*, means whereby they can be grafted in again; for the scripture goes on to say, that "they also, *if they abide not in unbelief*, shall be grafted in again."

So long, therefore, as the constitution of England remains christian, and holds for its fundamental doctrine, the fact that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and God as well *as man, or the christian church* (which not *only* believes this fundamental truth and *national faith* but also acknowledges him as

her eternal and supreme Head) remains a component part of the British constitution, she necessarily places herself under the christian dispensation; and so long as the Jew refuses to embrace the faith of this nation, and tender himself to the bar of the House of Commons as a Christian, ready and willing, not only conscientiously and sincerely to take the necessary oath, but also to legislate for this nation upon the true faith of a Christian, we would humbly submit it is absolutely necessary for those whose office it is to decide such matters, to reject him, not only in order to act consistently with the British constitution, and their own consciences and faith, but also because it may still be open to considerable doubt whether his even election is worth anything in itself, the call of the people being, as laid down by Blackstone, to elect one "*from amongst themselves*," which, in a christian constituency, cannot mean a Jew.

We trust the foregoing remarks will suffice to prove that, upon every rule of principle and constitutional consistency, it must be *morally* wrong to receive the Jew as such into the senate-house of this kingdom, and wrong for him to offer himself as a candidate to a constituency.

It is perfectly true that to attempt to add affliction to another's bonds, or deal harshly towards those who are suffering under the judgment of the Almighty, is far from our duty as Christians. We would not for one moment allow ourselves to act upon such a principle, or thus oppress the Jew. It is, however, on the other hand, desirable that we should consider what we are doing when we endeavour to raise the Jew from his present subordinate position to that of a ruler over ourselves, until at least he has renounced his present creed, and become a subject of the christian dispensation with ourselves, lest we should thereby be made partakers of his sin, and subject ourselves also to the like judgment of God; for B. W. P.'s quotation, with reference to the Gentiles boasting against the branches, goes on to say, "lest thou also be broken off." The laws of Christianity will justify such a view; and the law of this country also recognises the same principle, when it declares that he who harbours a felon, knowing him to have

committed a felony, is himself a partaker of his offence, and punishable criminally as an accessory. The Jew may not know the extent and nature of his sin, but we as Christians cannot plead this ignorance.

Besides, it is submitted that to attempt to raise the Jew into the position of a legislator of a christian nation in his present state of unbelief, would be only to add affliction to his bonds, and injure his own conscience, and possibly thereby increase his punishment, as we should place him in a position where he would be called upon, not only to deny his own faith *in toto*, but to enact christian laws for the regulation of a christian church and community, and also to uphold the faith of this nation, which he not only despises in his heart, but openly and avowedly denies and holds up to ridicule.

The Jew is not to be despised because he is a Jew, nor refused a place in the senate-house of this nation because he lacks capacity, wisdom, rights of manhood, or even morality, much less that affliction may be added to his bonds, but simply because he refuses to be a Christian, to become a member of the christian community, and conform to the rules of the nation. Surely as we are a christian community, and the Jew (who acknowledges himself to be a stranger) desires to participate in our legislation, it cannot be considered hard that he should be called upon to submit to the rules of the society to which he desires to belong; common etiquette demands this, to say nothing of inflexible justice.

We confess we are somewhat surprised that the advocates of the Jews should plead as an argument the fact that there is already corruption in some of our boroughs, and imperfection in some of our representatives. The corruption of boroughs tends greatly to show the evil which may arise from too

great a liberality in these days, for bribery was scarcely heard of till the franchise was extended; and if boroughs are so corrupt, how much greater the necessity for a sound and wholesome check upon them. We are not prepared to admit the application of the expression made use of by B. W. P., with reference to the present members, viz., that the "salt has lost its savour;" and we think it would not go far to substantiate the claim of him who cannot be compared to salt at all. Nor do we think the fact of the present admission of Roman Catholics and others (originally denied a seat), whether proper or not, does in the least justify the admission of the Jew; for however erroneous may be the faith and opinions of these several sects, still they are in some sense acknowledged to be members of the christian community, and claim admission as such; whereas the Jew comes boldly forth with the denial of our faith on his lips, and a positive refusal to submit to the rules of our nation and parliament house.

While we would contend for the purity and exclusive Christianity of the senate-house, we would refrain from offering any opinion upon the strict right of all its present members to their seats, but would only add, should there happen to be any there who ought not to be, we cannot perceive how one error should justify another; nor do we see any *political* reason why the Jew (whatever may be his rights as a man, or even a citizen), *as a Jew*, should take his seat in a *christian* senate-house. We think we have already said sufficient to prove such a course to be *morally* wrong; and we will therefore simply close our remarks with Bentham's most valuable and truthful maxim—"What is *morally* wrong cannot be *politically* right."

VERITAS.

The advantage of living does not consist in length of days, but in the right improvement of them. As many days as are spent without doing some good, are so many days entirely lost.

In narrative, as well as in description, objects ought to be painted so accurately, as to form, in the mind of the reader, distinct and lively images. Every useless circumstance ought to be suppressed, because every such circumstance loads the narration; but if a circumstance be necessary, however slight, it cannot be described too minutely.—Keames.

It were to be wished, *as that which would make learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active men would or could become writers.*—Bacon.

Social Economy.

WOULD COMMUNISM PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“Man never is but always to be blest.”

THROUGHOUT the entire course of recorded time this characteristic of human nature obtains a verification. Dissatisfied with his condition, at whatever period in his history we pause, we find man propounding new theories of life—new systems of society; we find him struggling to realize some ideal republic—a “city of the sun,” in the hope that there man with man in “peace and mild equality might dwell;” that there the intellectual aspirations of his being might have a more complete development than was admissible in the then present state. This inextinguishable longing after a happier condition of existence seems to be the impelling element—the incentive to progress implanted by our Maker.

Although these speculative theories have been found inadequate to the end proposed when attempted to be reduced to practice, and although the good which it was fancied would result from them has been vain and illusory, still we would not say that they have been altogether useless to the world. The bare enunciation of the ideas, suggestive as these have at all times been of abuses requiring to be reformed, has checked the growth of that apathy which too many feel regarding all interests of any other than a strictly lucrative nature. These ideas have contributed to enlarge man’s views of social relationship; they have shown him that the well-being of one portion of the community cannot be sacrificed to that of another without endangering by convulsions the system which admits of such injustice.

Communism comes to us recommended by its antiquity. It professes to remove every evil incident to the social state, provided we adopt the principles it submits, which are, equality of goods, equality of labour, and equality of enjoyments. Be it our task to show that the realization of these principles in practice would plunge us into difficulties *tenfold more harassing than the evils complained of in our present state.*

Without a cotemporaneous change in the

natures of men, it is useless to seek to equalize their fortunes. The Communists, without seeking to effect that change, attack private property, as if a new apportionment of that could be efficacious in checking the inherent disposition to acquire.

The fundamental principle of Communism is, that the earth and its produce are the common inheritance of the race, and, as a consequence, that private appropriation is an infringement of the common claim. This principle is endorsed by U. M., and exhibited by him with a deal of plausibility. We concede at once that all men, in virtue of their common nature, have an equal title to the earth, but let it be specially marked that that title is only to the earth in its natural state. There never was a graver misconception than that the earth in its present cultivated condition is common property. No; so soon as man individually expended labour on the soil, so soon did that portion of the soil on which such labour was expended merge from common to private property. Labour constitutes the right to ownership. Labour is the original title to property. This title has hitherto been recognised; but the Communists, fearing that no corner is to be reserved for them, announce the doctrine, that “the earth and its usufruct are common property, and cannot justifiably be subject to private usurpation.” Such fears, to say the least, are premature. The globe is extensive enough to afford room for private appropriation for centuries to come, if not as long as it shall continue to be the theatre of human existence. Land may be obtained in unoccupied territory for the toil of subduing it; but if land be sought in countries already occupied, then it is subject to a burden or rent, which represents the expenditure of labour in its reduction from a state of forestry—in rendering rivers navigable, in forming roads, in constructing railways, and in securing the manifold advantages of a well-regulated state. No one can expect these various advantages secured to him without compensating the doers. It

may be insisted, that although it is perfectly just to exact rent for improvements effected, yet, as there is an intrinsic value in the soil, to hold land in perpetuity is a fraud committed on succeeding generations. We have already shown that there is scope for all, and that, at least, there exists no immediate cause of fear; so long as this is the case, every inducement should be presented for the occupation of the world; the more it is possessed, the greater guarantees have we for its cultivation and productiveness, and the more serviceable is it to man. It is only by securing to individuals unmolested possession, that sufficient inducements are presented.

But Communists see in private wealth the germ of every evil incident to the social state. They do not see that the possessors of wealth are few, and that the constitution of society is such that those stand out prominently; that their station serves as a stimulus to an intenser application to labour on the parts of those who are not wealthy; that, but for that wealth which they so much deery, those extraordinary manifestations of mechanical skill which have so astonishingly augmented production, would have had no existence save in the minds of the ingenious projectors. Communists mistake regarding the transmission of wealth, and on this point C. M. lays particular stress. They imagine that wealth is a perpetual inheritance; now no position can be more erroneous: every day's experience tells us that fortunes are in a continual flux, and it can be shown that, on an average, land even changes from family to family every three or four generations. Ten years hence—ay, less—the nobleman may be little better than a pauper, and ten years hence the plodding youth may be a respected esquire. Ours is a state in which labour having its appropriate reward, all the energies of mind are developed to their utmost limits. It is by the uncontrolled exertion of man's faculties that property has attained its growth. Opulence serves a wise end in the general economy; it admits of leisure for study, and attracts to itself hosts of literary aspirants, whom it generously fosters. But we have already said, to the effect, that as all inheritors are not alike prudent, it is impossible that wealth can continue in the same families for a long series of generations. *Wealth is diffusive.*

But prior to the cultivation of the soil,

riches had no existence; riches are merely accumulated labour. To seek to deprive me of the results of my own or of my ancestor's labour, is a species of justice which, as yet, has happily had no honourable precedent. It must be from an inadequate perception of the functions which wealth performs in society, that the Communists' objections originate. The wealthy are a necessary existence in the body politic.

Supposing Communism was a practicable scheme, we should hope for its realization, not from the influence of any institutions, but from an increasing intellectuality. The fact is, reason as we may, from infancy to age, man clearly manifests his attachment to private property.

We must, whatever social form we adopt, accept human nature as it is. The Communists, however, seek to remove the fear of want, forgetting that that is one of the strongest motives to our activity. The fear of want is the chief source of the civilization to which we have attained. If that motive to action be withdrawn, what shall secure us against a relapse into barbarism? The wind that tosses the ocean is that to which we are indebted for its salubrity.

The upholders of Communism take a too favourable view of human nature. They imagine man a being inspired by the most exalted sentiments, the most sublimated disinterestedness, the most heroic abandonment of self. Such godlike qualities do gleam out at rare intervals, but their duration is transient. One can scarcely bring himself to the belief that man, as pictured under the Communists' regime, is the same being which we find in our state cavilling about every little discrepancy between his own and his fellow-labourer's remuneration. We do not say this deprecatingly, but we repudiate the ideal which Communists create. We believe, that were Communism attacked on this one point, the remuneration of labour, its unworkableness could easily be made apparent. While we are on this subject we shall submit one or two remarks for the consideration of those who support the affirmative.

In order to secure the honest co-operation of each member of the community, it will be necessary that the common workshop be adopted; this is the only security against idleness, for to each the idea that he shall enjoy or want just as the common stock is

in a prosperous or in a depressed condition, is too remote to awaken active interest. Each member would loiter, in the belief that his neighbour was performing his full complement. Without the common workshop Communism could not exist. But a difficulty arises. One man can, in the same space of time, do a third more work than another; will the knowledge that he is a participator in the common benefit resulting from that increased amount of labour satisfy him? Assuredly not, if his nature retain the characteristics which it has at present. The swifter worker should either labour a shorter period, or should obtain an increase of remuneration; but if he labour a shorter period, that will beget disquiets, and if he obtain an increase of remuneration, private property will reappear.

Communism is open to another objection: the equality it presupposes is inimical to the generous culture of the mind, inasmuch as it offers no special encouragement to skill. The illiterate clown and the cunning

artificer share the like fortune; this equality is refuted by nature, for the baser own a servitude to the nobler minds.

Communists err in making their calculations respecting men only as masses, only as so many units who shall fall into the different positions assigned them, without any more ado. Nothing can be less philosophical; there is an individuality in every man, and some men stand out in bold relief from all other men. Those require a separate legislation. Napoleon-like, they would convert the community into an army.

Communism is a system from which our sympathies revolt. The insipidity of its routine—the total want of stimulus to energetic action—the non-existence of that intercourse which in our social state contributes so materially to educate the man;—these, over and above those we have adduced, form valid objections to the system. We have no faith in its practicability, and of course no faith in its capability of promoting the happiness of man.

J. N.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SIR,—I observe an able article on the negative side of this question, in the late number of your valuable periodical, from the pen of C. W. Jun., on which I design to found a few remarks. The first of the conclusions to which this writer appears to have come is, "That Communism in theory has never shown itself adequate to meet the wants, and promote the happiness, of man."

Is this conclusion a correct one? If so, how comes it about that the idea, even according to his own account, has been ever and anon making its appearance from a very early period? How was it that so large a portion of the Communistic element was introduced by God himself into the laws and constitution of the Israelitish nation? for it must be acknowledged that their land was not private property in the same sense in which land is at present held; so far from this, it was inalienable from the family to which it was at first allotted, so long as that family existed. Nor was money held altogether as private property; for usury, in all its forms, is most emphatically condemned, while the man who retained as a pledge the poor man's garment was cursed. That the institutions of the Mosaic economy

were not altogether Communistic we grant; the reason they were not is probably to be found in the people themselves. How entirely so is the spirit of their scriptures is evident from the summary of the Lord himself—"Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets."

Further, if the theory of Communism be so defective, how was it that the apostles were Communists, and exemplified their sentiments by forming the first christian church into a community? and when this community was in straits, from various causes, how was it that they urged upon other churches the importance of assisting them, not as an act of charity, but as an act of duty? And how is it that, even now, surrounded as we are by individual cares, that when we are enabled for a few moments to forget things as they are, and think upon them as they ought to be—and would be, were all men influenced by Christianity as Christianity is intended to influence men—we dwell for ever upon a happy Communistic state? Surely it is that the principle contains within it something vital, even though men may at present be in an unfit state for its general adoption.

The second conclusion to which C. W. has arrived is, that Communism has proved a failure in practice.

Suppose that all that our friend has advanced on this point be admitted, it certainly would not prove that the principle of Communism is incapable of practical application, or that, if fairly and practically applied, it is incapable of benefiting the race. It may only prove that the persons who have attempted to carry out the principle have not been adapted to the work, or it may prove that the world has not been sufficiently advanced to carry out the principle. Many schemes have become possible of late years which, ages ago, would have been impossible; and many things, we have reason to believe, will be possible in ages to come, which, in the present age, are not so. According to our friend's own account, these two latter would appear the more probable reasons for failure.

If a principle of so sacred a nature is to be carried out successfully, it must be carried out by persons who have faith in it. Now it is not certain that all the leading parties who have hitherto superintended experiments of a Communistic character have believed in the principle. The probability is, that it has been adopted in more cases than one from mere selfish motives, to answer selfish or party purposes. Who, for instance, would answer for the fairness of the late experiments in France?

But the principle has at least *partially* succeeded in the case of the Moravians, even according to our friend's account—"These seem to have been the most successful of all sects of Communistic adventurers." If, then, these sects, the Moravians and others, have been in some measure successful, it is but natural to ask, has their success in any measure tended to promote the happiness of man? If it has, then the principle of Communism, if generally adopted in a similar form, would be likely to promote a similar result; if not, it may be well to ask whether this arrangement has done anything to promote their own happiness as a body? Perhaps the best method of answering this question will be by asking and answering another, viz.—Has the fact of the Moravians living in a Communistic state done anything to promote their usefulness in the world? If it has, then it has promoted

their own happiness; for Christians are, for the more part, happy in proportion as they are useful. "It has been remarked," says the Rev. T. Smith, "as a fact worthy of observation, that when the United Brethren first undertook to send out the word of salvation to the benighted and perishing heathen, their own congregation did not exceed 600 persons; and of these the greater part were exiles from their native land, who after and during the most cruel persecutions on account of their religion, found a tranquil and hospitable asylum on the estate of Count Zinzendorf." "So ardent was the zeal, however, which glowed in their bosoms, and so abundantly were their unostentatious attempts owned and blessed by the Great Head of the church, that, within the short period of ten years, their heralds of salvation erected the banner of the cross in various distant parts of the earth, and, through their instrumentality, it may be confidently hoped that many who were formerly sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death are now standing before the throne of the Most High."

Now the question arises, Would these people have been of as much use if the Communistic element had not been introduced among them. This question would perhaps be best answered by comparing the numbers of this body with the numbers of other bodies, and the benefits which have accrued from their missionary efforts, with those which have resulted from the efforts of anti-Communistic bodies; our space, however, would not admit of any very extended comparison. We shall therefore content ourselves by giving the result of such a comparison as given in Buck's "Theological Dictionary," by Dr. Henderson:—"But the Moravians have exceeded all in their missionary exertions. They have various missions; and by their persevering zeal it is said that upwards of 23,000 of the most destitute of mankind, in different regions of the earth, have been brought to the knowledge of the truth. Vast numbers in the Danish islands of St. Thomas, St. Jau, and St. Croix, and the English islands of Jamaica, Antigua, Nevis, Barbadoes, St. Kitts, and Tobago, have, by their ministry, been called to worship God in spirit and in truth. In the inhospitable climates of Greenland and Labrador they have met with abundant success, after under-

going the most astonishing dangers and difficulties. The Arrowack Indians, and the negroes of Surinam and Berbice, have been collected into bodies of faithful people by them. Canada and the United States of North America have, by their instrumentality, afforded happy evidences of the power of the gospel. Even those esteemed the last of human beings, for brutishness and ignorance, the Hottentots, have been formed into their societies, and upwards of 700 are said to be worshipping God at Bavians Cloof, near the Cape of Good Hope." Such is a specimen of the labours which have been accomplished by a comparatively insignifi-

cant body of Christians, labours which, but for their adoption of the Communistic element, would have been impossible. If a few hundreds of persons have, by the adoption of this principle, been able to accomplish so much, what might not have been the state of the world at the present moment if the entire christian church, during the last 1,800 years, had pursued a similar course? From such facts as these we conclude that Communism, if properly carried out by persons who are imbued with its spirit, is well calculated to render important service to the family of man.

L. I.

The Societies' Section.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

PROLOGOMENA.

THE mind of man cannot long remain unagitated by the troublings of great thoughts—cannot long remain unstirred by the promptings of a pangless, solemn curiosity—cannot long refrain from inquiring, What am I?—Whence came I?—Wherefore am I here?—Whither am I bound?—and do no rocks bestud this life-sea on which I am embarked? There seems to be a necessity inlying in the soul to cast its eye forth towards the infinite and the absolute, that it may snatch a glimpse of that Omniscient One who sits enthroned amid creation's amplitudes—to wonder at the busy play of thought, emotion, and reason with which its consciousness is being continually impressed—to watch the process of thought-evolution in order to learn the genesis thereof—and to engage in the attempt to solve the problems of the reason regarding the mystery of being. Is there a criterion of truth—a test of evidence—an absolute touchstone by which verity may be discovered? is a question which must frequently disturb the mind. Man cannot restrain the speculations of the reason regarding his essence and his destiny, when it attempts to ascertain whether he is a merely passive recipient of concatenated and sequential impressions—a mere educt of some stupendous system of causation-linked phenomena—a partner in the irreversible fate of the atoms and automata with which the dreary uniform and monotonous whirl of law-governed antecedence and sequency has surrounded him—or a self-motived being—an independent and differentiated existence, subordinated only to the over-mastering authority of a Creator-God, continent of an investigative power *capable of making a calculus of the laws of matter and of being, and of consorting these to the production and attainment of his own ends and aims*—"the interpreter of nature," *fall of intuitions, faiths, volitions, and desires.* Who has not felt such thoughts?

"They seize upon the mind, arrest, and search,
 And shake it—bow the tall soul as by winds;
 Rush over it like rivers over reeds
 Which quiver in the current—turn us cold,
 And pale, and voiceless—leaving in the brain
 A rocking and a ringing—glorious,
 But momentary."

If any, in him have been planted the first germ-seeds of philosophic thought. Such ideas it is the business of the Mind-analyst to steady before conception's eye, and by a severe bracing and persevering ratiocinative struggle, to attempt to become the discernor and demonstrator of their real significance. This is the mission of Philosophy.

Whence come such thoughts, and wherefore? Are they the primal throbbings of the consciousness awakening into energy and vital power, and eagerly inquiring for a chart which may become the soul's guide on its life-journey? We think so. We think that in such thoughts Nature speaks — speaks to call man's higher, nobler being into ardent and active vitality. They are the soul's protest against the "dull, flat, stale, and unprofitable" utilitarianism and inglorious self-case to which mere physical studies incline the mind. They are silent, yet eloquent, monitors regarding the duty, necessity, and advantages of acquiring self-knowledge.

Let us not be misunderstood. There are no sincerer admirers of human skill—no more hopeful spectators of human progression—no more devoted co-workers for man's advancement than ourselves. We look with pride upon that positive science, the gradual growth of centuries, by which those worlds which, to the sensuous eye

"Seem but as specks of tinsel fixed in heaven
 To light the midnight,"

are weighed and measured, have their orbits gauged, and their progresses and perturbations subjected to mathematical skill—by which pages of God-written history have been dug from the depths of our planet—by which creation's elemental atoms have been analyzed and rendered subservient to human use—by which the laws of "life, health, and disease" have been discovered—by which the lightnings are already, and the winds seem about to become, the winged messengers of human purposes and thoughts. We think with ecstasy upon that Titanic effort of human genius, the application of steam to practical purposes. We admire the perfection of the fictile, the textile, and the plastic arts. "The products of the arts and industry of all nations" have excited in us astonishment, surprise, and awe. Our commercial, trading, civil, and governmental relations, so accurately adapted, so sedulously cultivated, so almost perfectioned, have made us marvel at the extent of human ingenuity. All these have made us sensible of the vastness of human knowledge. But they have done more. They have rendered us cognizant of the fact of man's comparative ignorance. Of the universe much is known—of its Creator how little! Of the method of producing effects man's knowledge is vast—of the *Self* by which effects are produced, what know we? In the amassing of facts, the colligation of ideas, the upbuilding of theories, the ransacking of nature, arranging, categorizing, utilizing, we are wise. But is there *no higher wisdom, no more glorious progression, than this? Is the ultimate destination of man concerned only with buying and selling—the state of*

things on 'Change—the prices current of cottons, silks, corn, leathers, furs, &c.—the preparation of dye-stuffs—the printing of calicoes—the production of apparel—the tillage of the earth—the manufacturing of steam-ships, steam-looms, and other artfully-constructed enginry and mechanisms? Or is there a progression more consonant to, and more intimately connected with, the nature, duty, destiny, and character of the thought-agency by which these are produced? To such questioning does not every human soul exclaim with mighty-minded Fichte?—

“Not for its own sake, but for the sake of that *for which it prepares us*, can I support this world, esteem it, and perform my part in it with joy. My mind can take no hold on it, but my whole nature rushes onwards with irresistible force towards *a future and a better state of being*. Shall I eat and drink only that I may hunger and thirst; and eat and drink again, till the grave, which yawns beneath me, shall swallow me up? Shall I beget other beings in my own likeness, that they too may eat, drink, and die, and leave others behind them to follow their example? To what purpose this perpetually revolving circle, this everlasting repetition, in which things are produced only to perish, and perish only to be again produced?—this monster continually swallowing itself up, that it may again bring itself forth, and bringing itself forth only that it may again swallow itself up? Never! Never can this be *my* destiny, or that of the world! Something that is to endure must be brought forth in all these changes of the transitory and the perishable—something which may be carried forward safe and inviolate upon the waves of time.”

It was a sublime saying of Kant's, “That there are two infinities displayed to every human being—the infinity of the universe, in which he is a dweller, and the infinity (speaking it not impiously) which is contained within us.” But the infinitude of the outward universe—the gorgeous pavilion of the sky—the world-gems deep in midnight's azure set—the presidential day-orb—the heaven-piercing hill—the steep-falling cataract—the broad prairie—the circumvolving ocean, shall fade from the eye which beholds it. The mind, however, that other and more glorious infinity, created in the image of the All-wise, shall endure, when the sun, amid cloudy masses of intensest splendour, shall abdicate his presidency—when

“Dimly uplifting her belated beam
The blank unwelcome round of the red moon”

has shown itself, then vanished in the smoke of earth's entire destruction; for

“Death's at work,
And one by one shall all yon wandering worlds,—
Whether in orbit path they roll, or trail
In an inestimable length of light
Their golden train of tresses after them—
Cease;

* * * * *
* * And thou and I shall live as now.”

If, then, the study of the beautiful delight—if inquiries regarding the sublime captivate—if physical discoveries excite admiration, and win an easy power over the soul—if the wonders of nature and of art, which are but the educators of the mind, interest and excite

—how much more ought we to feel enthusiasm in the study of that immortal power which dwells within, and is ourselves?

Were studies chosen on account of their intrinsic (not their apparent) value and utility, which could for a moment compare with Speculative Philosophy! One of man's earliest and most important duties, for instance, is self-examination; but how can this be effectually entered upon and accomplished without the keenness of intellect and accuracy of thinking—the clear-thoughted, skilful discriminativeness, and the capacity for thought-anatomization which results from a study of “the Science of Mind?” By this study we learn the various powers of the mentality, their relative duties and importance, our own deficiencies of intellectual power or culture, the most effectual remedies for such deficiencies; and in the very act of studying the mind, we elevate, refine, and improve our nature. But, it may be objected, that men have thought worthily, acted nobly, and improved themselves marvellously, to whom the very name of speculative science was unknown, and into whose hands no treatise on the human mind had ever found its way. True and undeniable, indeed! But even so men lived, moved, their blood circulated, and their bodies performed all the functions of life before Hippocrates, Galen, Harvey, &c., and their disciples, had ascertained the laws of life, the modifications and diversities of disease, and the few remedial agencies which they employ; and if it is of high moment that men should study the laws and conditions of bodily health, and should conform to their injunctions, is it not of far greater importance that they should learn the laws and conditions of mental health, in order that hereafter they may be enabled to labour intelligently in the accomplishment of those noble duties of humanity—self-elevation, self-control, and self-reform?

Turn we now to another phase of this “many-sided” topic, namely, its influence on, and connexion with, Education. In this point of view Philosophy has been denominated by Rome's greatest orator, Cicero, “the parent of life—the medicine of the mind—the mother of good deeds and sayings.” If it be of great importance that man should be educated—that his moral and mental nature be educed—then the study of Philosophy partakes of that importance; for, unless we know what is within—unless we understand the powers which are enclosed—how can we lead them out? If it be necessary that the agriculturist should know the properties of the seed on which his culture is to be expended before he applies that culture, it is surely much more necessary that the educator should possess a knowledge of the faculties of the soul. How true are the words of Dr. Thomas Brown! “The true science of education—that noble science which has the charge of training the ignorance and imbecility of infancy into all the virtue, and power, and wisdom of mature manhood—of forming of a creature the frailest and feeblest, perhaps, which heaven has made, the intelligent and fearless sovereign of the whole animated creation, the interpreter, the adorer, and almost representative of the Divinity—is the Philosophy of the human mind applied practically to the human mind; enriching it, indeed, with all that is useful or ornamental in knowledge, but at the same time giving its chief regard to objects of yet greater moment; averting evil, which all the sciences could not compensate, or producing good, compared with which all sciences are as nothing.”

But this knowledge of Philosophy is necessary to all, inasmuch as we are all educators.

Friendship, affection, paternity, filiality, association, are all processes of education, which, to conduct aright, require an acquaintance with the human soul, its faculties, its aspirations, and its tendencies. Each man is the educator of his brother man. Mighty truth, how easily spoken, how difficult of full realization! Oh, that we could rightly estimate our responsibility, and accurately calculate the influence for good or evil which we scatter through the world! Music, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, History, Conversation, Business, Debate, &c., can only exercise themselves well as educational agents when directed by a mind carefully and elaborately acquainted with the results of speculative science. From this remark it will be perceived, that we do not think that education fulfils its duties correctly or adequately when it stores the passive mind with the chief facts of those branches of knowledge most in request, but when it excites the germinating powers of the soul to the productions of new thoughts, new conceptions, new imaginations and ideas. With all due deference, then, to the positivism and utilizing spirit of "the present age"—despite of the prevalent disposition of men in our own day to reiterate the questions, "*cui bono?*" and "how much *per cent.*?"—we would most respectfully depone, that, merely in consequence of our inertitude and carelessness regarding the problems of Psychology, mighty truths which might set the world astir, and move the deep stagnation of men's souls, are slumbering in the oblivion caused by our deficiency of skill so to develop and educe the mental faculties as to enable men to bring forth their latent-lying thoughts in such a manner as must impress and penetrate the world. We do not believe that all investigations except such as regard mere sensuous appearances are impracticable and absurd. We do not believe that no solution can be found for the problems of the Reason. We do not admire the protracted apathy of this gold-adoring time to the momentous queries which the soul is necessitated to propound. We do not look with complacency on the practical contempt which men entertain concerning the irrepressible instincts of their nature—that forth-goingness of soul which implicitly asserts the unsatisfactory nature of the present, and is the *substratum* of the thoughts and speculations in which metaphysicians are engaged. Well, but—it is argued against us—if it be true, as you assert that the soul of man is naturally and irrepressibly urged on to desire a reconciliation between the perplexing anomalies amid which it finds itself placed, how account ye for the fact which you yourself admit and lament, viz., that there is a manifest disinclination in the public mind to occupy itself with Philosophical speculations? One answer to this is obvious. Man is a dual being; there is within him a contention of natures—strife between mind and matter—a conflict between the outer and the inner world—an man has become embondaged in the present, the practical, the utile, the positive, the sensuous. Reason and Faith—the intuitional and the external—man's state and his desires—human nature and the material world, are at variance, and man has acquiesced in the materialistic, and oppugned the spiritual, instead of striving after their consensuous union and agreement. The slave cannot remain ungalled, so neither can the mind long refrain from exerting that aggressive and progressive energy which inclines it to ponder on the mystery of cognition, to reflect upon the nature, powers, and designs of Him who setteth the mechanisms and spiritualities of creation in motion, and muse upon the after-destiny which awaits it. Positivism, it is true, replies that all things are passive and enduring—that nowhere is there anything possessed of a self

motive force, but everywhere an inherited and inviolable mobility—that antecedence and sequency are bound together by an invincible and irrefragable law—that change succeeds change in unalterable consecution—that force after force whirls its gigantic waves athwart the universe irrevocably and indissolubly interlinked. Positivism becomes thus the negation of Philosophy, and denies the possibility of our ever attaining any higher knowledge than that which relates to Law. Thus whispers she to the human soul—The ponderous orbs which circle amid the dark-blue sublimities of heaven—the comets which traverse the immense vastitudes of the universe—the storm-maned ocean—

“Dark-heaving, boundless, endless, and sublime,”

which appears to us as if, in very wantonness of spirit, it tumbled tumultuous in its fierceness—the wind, the poet's image of inconstancy, which to human eye “bloweth whithersoever it listeth,” move not but under the governance of Law, and why shouldst thou,

“Poor thing of doubt and clay, whose faith is built on reeds,”

imagine that thou art free to will—that thou art not also one of the legion of dependent and passive beings—a slave of “circumstances that unspiritual God”—a link in the uninterrupted chain of sequentiality—an *item* in the muster-roll of effects? Wherefore thinkest thou that on the circumference of the giddy wheel of Fate thou art not also swept onward to thy destiny? Why dost thou suppose that will, purpose, or action, are more controllable by thee than the orbital on sweep of the comet—the measured march of the midnight constellations—the ragings of the upsurging ocean—the outbursting of a volcano fire, or the howlings of the tempestuous wind? Let me assure you, that as the forest-leaf is borne resistlessly away on the wings of the Arabic simoom, so also art thou driven along in the unpausing circuit of phenomena-governing Law. Philosophy attempts to lead us out of this “house of bondage”—to free us from the prison-withes of passion and of circumstance “wherewith we are darkly bound”—to burst the fetters of the fatalistic Logic with which physical science is apt to enthrall us. It offers to lead us out of the region of sophistication, uncertainty, and apparency, into the territory of the true, the certain, and the absolute. It denies that the laws of man's being are given only in his organization—that he is a powerless agent in the flux and reflux of circumstances—that his present nature is the measure of his powers—that his inclinations are the visible handwriting of the invisible yet resistless power of Law—that it is vain to resist our impulses, and sinless to pursue the ordinances of Destiny. It professes to be able to satisfy the yearnings of the soul—to be capable of unfolding to the mind of man those high thoughts and principles which ought to regulate the conduct, govern the reason, overrule the passions, elevate the nature of man, and teach him to—

“Adore with steadfast, unassuming gaze
Thou Nature's essence, mind, and energy,
And gazing, trembling, patiently ascend,
Treading beneath their feet all visible things
As steps that upward to their Father's throne
Lead gradual.”

Coleridge's “*Religious Musings*.”

It professes to have the power of informing man regarding Destiny, Nature, the Soul, God, and all that interesting series of truths which are involved in these mystery-enshrouded

In our next we shall inquire what is the *genesis*, or birth-source, of philosophic thought—what is the nature of the queries originated in the philosophic intellect. These things we think it necessary to consider briefly previous to our proceeding to unfold to our readers the several solutions which have been given to “The Problems of the Reason.” Such a consecutive and concatenated view of “European Philosophy” as we then purpose to present, cannot fail of being useful, gratifying, and mind-improving; for there is much truth in the words of Buffon, “How much useful knowledge is lost by the scattered forms in which it is ushered into the world! How many solitary students spend half their lives in making discoveries which have been perfected a century before their time, for want of a condensed exhibition of what is known.”

THE IMPORTANCE OF APPLICATION TO STUDY.

It is by dint of steady labour—it is by giving enough of application to the work, and having enough time for the doing of it—it is by regular painstaking, and the plying of constant assiduities—it is by these, and not by any process of legerdemain, that we secure the strength and the staple of real excellence. It was thus that Demosthenes, clause after clause, and sentence after sentence, elaborated, and that to the uttermost, his immortal orations;—it was thus that Newton pioneered his way, by the steps of an ascending geometry, to the mechanism of the heavens—after which he left this testimony behind him, that he was conscious of nothing else but a patient thinking, which could at all distinguish him from other men. He felt that it was no inaccessible superiority on which he stood, and it was thus that he generously proclaimed it. It is certainly another imagination that prevails in regard to those who have left the stupendous monuments of intellect behind them—not that they were differently exercised from the rest of the species, but that they must have been differently gifted. It is their talent, and almost never their industry, by which they have been thought to signalize themselves; and seldom is it averted to, how much it is to the strenuous application of those commonplace faculties which are diffused among us all, that they are indebted to the glories that now encircle their remembrance and their name. It is felt to be a vulgarizing of genius that it should be lighted up by any other way than by a direct inspiration from heaven; and hence men have overlooked the steadfastness of purpose, the devotion to some single but great object, the unweariedness of labour that is given, not in convulsive and preternatural throes, but by little and little as the strength of the mind may bear it, the accumulation of many small efforts, instead of a few grand and gigantic, but perhaps irregular, movements, on the part of energies that are marvellous—men have overlooked these as being indeed the elements to which genius owes the best and the proudest of her achievements. They cannot think that aught so utterly prosaic as patience, and painstaking and resolute industry, have any share in the upholding of a distinction so illustrious. These are held to be ignoble attributes never to be found among the demi-gods, but only among the drudges of literature; and it is certainly true that in scholarship there are higher and lower walks, but still the very highest of all is a walk of labour. *It is not by any fantastic jugglery, incomprehensible to ordinary minds, and beyond their reach—it is not by this that the heights of philosophy are scaled.* So said he who towers

so far above all his fellows; and whether viewed as an exhibition of his own modesty, or as an encouragement to others, this testimony may be regarded as one of the most precious legacies that he has bequeathed to the world.

Let me endeavour to guard you against this most common error of the youthful imagination, and into which you are most naturally seduced by the very splendour and magnitude of the work that you contemplate. The "Principia" of Newton, and the "Pyramids of Egypt," are both of them most sublime works; and looking to either as a magnificent whole, you have a like magnificent idea of the noble conception or the one mighty power that originated each of them. You reflect not on the gradual and continuous, and I had almost said creeping, way in which they at length emerged to their present greatness, so as now to stand forth, one of the stateliest monuments of intellectual, and the other of physical, strength that the world ever saw. You can see, palpably enough, how it was by repeated strokes of the chisel, and by a series of muscular efforts, each of which exceeded not the force of a single arm, that the architecture was lifted to the state in which, after the lapse of forty centuries, it still remains one of the wonders of the world; but you see not the secret steps of that process by which the mind of our invincible philosopher was carried upward from one landing-place to another, till it reached the pinnacle of that still more wondrous fabric which he himself has consummated. You look to it as you would to a prodigy sprung forth at the bidding of a magician, or at least of one whose powers were as hopelessly above your own, as if all the spells and mysteries of magic were familiar to him. And hence it is that nought could be more kind, and surely nought more emphatically instructive, than when he told his brethren of the species wherein it was that his strength lay—that he differed not in power, but only differed in patience, from themselves; and that he had won that eminence from which he looked down on the crowd beneath him, not by dint of a heaven-born inspiration that descended only on a few, but by dint of a home-bred virtue that was within reach of all.

There is much of weighty and most applicable wisdom in the reply given by Dr. Johnson to a question put to him by his biographer relative to the business of composition. He asked whether, ere one begin, he should wait for the favourable moment, for the afflatus which is deemed by many to constitute the whole peculiarity of genius? "No, sir; he should sit down doggedly," was the deliverance of the great moralist. And be assured, gentlemen, that there is much of substantial truth in it. Whether it be composition, or any other exercise of scholarship, I would have you all to sit down doggedly; for if you once bethink yourselves of waiting for the afflatus, the risk is that the afflatus may never come. Had your weekly or your monthly essay not been forthcoming, I should scarcely have deemed it a satisfactory excuse that you were waiting for the afflatus. With this doctrine of an afflatus I can figure nothing more delightful than the life of a genius, spent as it would be between the dreams of self-complacency and those of downright indolence. For I presume, that during the intervals between one attack and another of this mysterious affection, he may be very much at ease, living just as he lists; and for all his rambles and recreations abroad having this ready explanation to offer, that he had no visit this day from his muse to detain him at home. Existence at this rate were one continued holiday; be very sure, gentlemen, that it is *not the existence* by which you will ever be guided to *ought that is substantial in the acquirement of philosophy*. It would be a life of illusion—

an airy and fantastic day, that should terminate in nothing. And we again repeat, that if at all ambitious of a name in scholarship, or what is better far, if ambitious of that wisdom that can devise aright for the service of humanity, it is not by the wildly, even though it should be the grandly, irregular march of a wayward and meteoric spirit that you will ever arrive at it. It is by a slow, but surer path—by a fixed devotedness of aim, and the steadfast prosecution of it—by breaking your day into its hours and its seasons, and then by a resolute adherence to them; it is not by the random sallies of him who lives without a purpose and without a plan—it is by the unwearied regularities of him who plies the exercise of a self-appointed round, and most strenuously perseveres in them. It is by these that mental power, I will not say is created, but it is by these that mental power is both fostered into strength, and made tenfold more effective than before; and precise, and methodical, and dull as these habits may be deemed, it is to them that the world is indebted for its best philosophy and its best poetry.—*From an Address by Dr. Chalmers to the Students of St. Andrew's ; Memoirs, vol. iii.*

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Milngavie Mechanics' Institution.—The present session of the above institution was opened on Monday evening, December 1st, with an introductory lecture by Professor Eadie, D.D., LL.D., Glasgow. Mr. H. Ross, president of the institution, occupied the chair, and in a brief address introduced the learned professor, who delivered a most eloquent and high toned oration on "Man's connexion with the circle of the sciences." The lecture was listened to throughout with marked attention by a crowded audience.

It was truly cheering to recognise and experience in so eminent a divine a warm friend of mechanics' institutions; and from his masculine recommendation of their design and tendency, we have experienced an infusion of new life into our institution, which is happily in a flourishing condition. The committee have secured the aid of many talented and respectable gentlemen to lecture during the winter, and there can be no doubt but that these lectures will, in every way, prove very beneficial and instructive to all who avail themselves of the advantages of the institution. The library belonging to the institution contains about 760 volumes, among which are to be found many of the recent, popular, and standard works of our most celebrated authors in every department of literature and science. The terms of membership are such, that it places within the reach of the humblest artizan an inexhaustible supply of those mental enjoyments and benefits, without which life is but the shadow of existence.—H. C., Sec.

Bankfort.—Hebden Bridge Mutual Improvement Society.—The members of this society held their fourth anniversary meeting in the Wesleyan schoolroom, on Christmas-day. Mr. Thomas Smith occupied the chair. The secretary read the report, which stated that lectures had been delivered during the past year on History, Chemistry, Natural Philosophy, Phonography, Botany, &c., and discussions held on several important subjects. The meeting was afterwards

addressed by several of the members and friends of the society.

The following resolution was adopted at a committee meeting held the previous night:—"That the two volumes of the *British Controversialist* be purchased forthwith, and that next year it be taken in monthly."

Leith Young Men's Society.—The seventh annual soiree of this society was held in Mr. Kay's class-rooms, on the evening of Friday, 26th ult. Mr. George T. M. Inglis, president, occupied the chair, and after tea made a few excellent remarks on "The literature of the present day." Mr. Richard Fotheringham, secretary, then read the annual report, which showed that in the course of the year 121 young men had been in connexion with the society; 30 of these, however, having resigned in consequence of removal, &c., left as the present numbers on the roll, 91 members; or an increase of 24 over last year's report. The following addresses were afterwards delivered in the course of the evening:—Mr. Jas. Brown, on "Freedom;" Mr. George Smith, on "The Head and the Heart;" Mr. Neil Jamieson, on "Motives to action, drawn from the character of St. Paul;" Mr. David Small, on "Ambition's noblest aim." The speakers did ample justice to their subjects, and the company separated at a late hour, all highly delighted.

Kelvedon Mutual Instruction Society.—In the rural, although somewhat superior, village of Kelvedon, situate not far from the centre of Essex, there exists a band of young men, who, although "far remote" from the excitement of more mercantile and wealth-getting districts, have yet devoted their energies to the cause of the onward progressiveness of human nature, and are beginning to make themselves felt as well as known. The outward manifestation of their operations is a mutual instruction society, where all the usual advantages which belong to such societies are made easily accessible. This society

has been in existence for several years, and perhaps one of its most interesting features is the meeting which annually takes place, not only of those who act in the management of the society, but also of those who take in its advantages, but also of those who see and hear and know what it is doing, or have been done—spectators from without, who come to testify their approval of the objects sought, and the modes adopted for their attainment. One of these gatherings took place on the evening of the 14th. The proceedings commenced by about seventy persons sitting down to tea. This over, the more immediate business of the evening was proceeded with. Mr. C. Walford, jun., of Witham, was invited to preside, and on taking the chair addressed the meeting, remarking more especially on the progressiveness of the age—the increased, and constantly increasing, facilities for the acquisition of knowledge. Schools and institutions were now everywhere to be found. Literature was extending itself at a rate hitherto unprecedented, addressing itself alike to the cottage and the palace. Science was equally progressive and unbounded. No previous age had possessed such advantages. The grand point therefore to be remembered was, that with these increased advantages came an increased responsibility for their proper use in furthering the progress of humanity. Mr. Wm. Braddy, the secretary, read a satisfactory report of the society's proceedings during the past year. Mr. Godfrey and Mr. Crane severally moved and seconded the adoption of the report. Messrs. J. Moss, J. Beaumont, and W. Braddy, delivered eloquent addresses. The following gentlemen also addressed themselves to a series of animated resolutions, prepared by the committee:—Messrs. Hicks, Walford, sen., Willshire, W. Braddy, and Matthews. The whole of the speakers appeared animated by one common object, that of promoting the objects of the society, and extending its advantages. Some excellent recitations were given by several of the gentlemen present. Another pleasing feature was the number of ladies present, who seemed fully to join in the spirit of the meeting. We wish the society many of such happy gatherings.

Glasgow Young Men's Literary Improvement Society.—Mr. Editor,—Circumstances of a strictly private nature having brought us to Glasgow, and this fact having become known to the members of the GLASGOW YOUNG MEN'S LITERARY IMPROVEMENT SOCIETY, we received the honour of a kindly invitation to a soiree held in Lennox's Temperance Coffee-house, in that city, by the members of that society, on the evening of the 14th November, 1851. Mr. Donald Mills occupied the chair, and in an excellent speech took a rapid glance at "things as they were, are, and ought to be." The company then proceeded to take tea, and a few other substantialities which accompanied it. The chairman again addressed the meeting on "the advantages of knowledge." Mr. A. Forsan spoke upon the "Tendency of Mutual Improvement Societies." Mr. Robert Paton, "On the cultivation of the mind." Mr. Robert Scott very gallantly complimented "The Ladies." "Education" was treated of by Mr. Alexander Thomson; and Mr. Duncan West took a survey of "The characteristics of the last half century." These addresses generally displayed marks of careful study and considerable literary power. (Did your space afford it, you might introduce the following critical remarks. *) Singing, recitations, and instrumental music, were excellently interspersed with the addresses, and "all went merry as a marriage bell." Towards the close of the evening we were unexpectedly called upon to address the members, and made a few remarks upon "Self-duties." The meeting was most harmonious, and from the report of progress which was read at the meeting, this society appears to be most successfully conducted. +—THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

* We think it unadvisable to do so, not only on account of want of space, but also of the delicate nature of some of the remarks made by our able correspondent.

+ The lengthy though valuable remarks with which this notice finishes we have been obliged to retrench, but shall reserve them for use on a future occasion.—ED. B. C.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

78. Suppose A. bequeathed to B. an annuity for ~~as~~ and B. is still living, is it grammatical in making such a circumstance to say that "A. bequeathed the annuity to B. as long as he *should* live" or ought it to be "as long as he *shall* live?"—Vide Lennie's Grammar: Syntax, rule 5. Again, Lennie says, "Sentences that imply contingency and futurity require the subjunctive mood, but when contingency, and futurity are both implied, the indicative ought to be used."—Syntax, rule 10. Now, there is scarcely a day passes but I meet with sentences which appear to be irreconcilable to this rule. I should therefore feel much obliged either by you or one of our correspondents informing me whether or not I misapprehend the rule? References to Lennie's Grammar preferred.—H. H. F.

79. Will "Vinclum" inform a constant reader of the *British Controversialist* how he may obtain the sermon referred to in the first negative article on Homœopathy, also the price?

80. As I am desirous of gaining a practical knowledge of the science of Phrenology, perhaps some one of your kind correspondents will inform me how I should pursue its study, and what books I should obtain. I love the science, and wish to persevere in studying it.—G. G.

81. Without wishing to re-open the discussion of the question respecting the Trinity, I would direct attention to that passage in the negative reply on page 456 (Vol. II.), commenting with line 27, first column, and would respectfully solicit from "E. D. R." and "B. W." replies to the following question, grounded upon it:—If the Son was ~~necessary~~ to ask of the Father deliverance from his infirm humanity, does not such

necessity imply, not only a dependence on a Superior Being, but a recognition of that Being's will as independent to his own? If so, there is an admission, not merely of the Father's independent and superior will and power, but no attempt to claim the title to the Godhead. For God in his inmost essence or being is a unit, and can have but one infinite will, and as his esse is the only life in itself, and he cannot therefore delegate that only life to another—he cannot give away himself!—KIDDER.

82. Can any of your experienced correspondents point out to me the best method of acquiring a knowledge of the principles of conveyancing?—ORION.

83. Will you, or any of your correspondents, be good enough to inform me, through the medium of your excellent periodical, what is the probable amount of gold, in sovereigns and half sovereigns, at present in circulation throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, irrespective of what may be held at the Bank of England? The question being in dispute, an answer in an early number will oblige.—W. T.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

71. *The Fabled Hebrew Wanderer.*—Byron doubtless refers in the lines quoted to the fabled Ahasuerus, who is thus described in a German fragment preserved by Shelley:—"Ahasuerus, the Jew, crept forth from the dark cave of Mount Carmel. Near two thousand years have elapsed since he was first goaded, by never-ending restlessness, to roam the globe from pole to pole. When our Lord was wearied with the burden of his ponderous cross, and wanted to rest before the door of Ahasuerus, the unfeeling wretch drove him away with brutality. The Saviour of mankind staggered, sinking under the heavy load, but uttered no complaint. An angel of death appeared before Ahasuerus, and exclaimed indignantly, 'Barbarian! thou hast denied rest to the Son of man; he it denied thee also, until he comes to judge the world.' A black demon, let loose from hell upon Ahasuerus, goads him down from country to country: he is denied the consolation which death affords, and precluded from the rest of the peaceful grave.

"Ahasuerus crept forth from the dark cave of Mount Carmel—he shook the dust from his beard—and taking up one of the skulls heaped there, hurled it down the eminence: it rebounded from the earth in shivered atoms. 'This was my father!' roared Ahasuerus. Seven more skulls rolled down from rock to rock, while the infuriate Jew, following them with ghastly looks, exclaimed, 'And these were my wives!' He still continued to hurl down skull after skull, roaring in dreadful accents, 'And these, and these, and these were my children! They *could die*; but I! reprobate wretch! alas! I cannot die! Dreadful beyond conception is the judgment that hangs over me. Jerusalem fell—I crushed the sucking babe, precipitated myself into the destructive flames. I cursed the Romans, but alas! alas! the restless curse held me by the hair, and I could not die! Rome, the giantess, fell—I placed myself before the falling statue—she fell, and did not crush me. Nations sprang up and disappeared

before me; but I remained and did not die. From cloud-encircled cliffs did I precipitate myself into the ocean, but the foaming billows cast me upon the shore, and the burning arrow of existence pierced my cold heart again. I leaped into Etna's flaming abyss, and roared with the giants for ten long months, polluting with my groans the mount's sulphureous mouth—ah! ten long months. The volcano fermented, and in a fiery stream of lava cast me up. I lay torn by the torture snakes of hell, amid the glowing cinders, and yet continued to exist. A forest was on fire: I darted, on wings of fury and despair, into the crackling wood. Fire dropt upon me from the trees, but the flames only singed my limbs; alas! it could not consume them. I now mixed with the butchers of mankind, and plunged in the tempest of the raging battle. I roared defiance to the infuriated Gaul, defiance to the victorious German, but arrows and spear rebounded in shivers from my body. The Saracen's flaming sword broke upon my skull: balls in vain hissed upon me: the lightning of battle glared furiously around my loins; in vain did the elephant trample on me, in vain the iron hoot of the wrathful steed! The mine, big with destructive power, burst upon me, and hurled me high in the air—I fell on heaps of smoking limbs, but was only singed. The giant's steel club rebounded from my body; the executioner's hand could not strangle me, the tiger's tooth could not pierce me, nor could the hungry lion in the circus devour me. * * * I now provoked the fury of tyrants: I said to Nero, Thou art a bloodhound! I said to Christum, Thou art a bloodhound! I said to Muley Ishmael, Thou art a bloodhound! The tyrants invented cruel torments, but did not kill me. Ha! not to be able to die—not to be able to die! Not to be permitted to rest after the toils of life—to be doomed to be imprisoned for ever in this clay-formed dungeon—to be for ever clogged with this worthless body, its load of diseases and infirmities—to be condemned to hold for millenniums that yawning monster Sameness, and Time, that hungry hyena, ever bearing children, and ever devouring her offspring! Ha!—not to be permitted to die! Awful avenger in heaven, hast thou in thine armoury of wrath a punishment more dreadful? then let it thunder upon me, command a hurricane to sweep me down to the foot of Carmel, that I may there lie extended; may pant, and writhe, and die!"—A. C.

74. *How to study Euclid.*—We will not undertake to inform C. M. what is the *best* method of studying Euclid, but only suggest what we conceive to be an *effective* method.

1. He should make himself familiar with the definitions.

2. Commit to memory every proposition as he arrives at it, in order that he may be able, without the aid of the book, to repeat it in support of any subsequent one.

3. He must not rest satisfied until he can draw the diagram upon a black board, and demonstrate the proposition to which he has come without the aid of the book. Unless he is able to do this, he will never effectively understand Euclid.—G. N.

76. *Facility in Composition.*—In answer to H. T. M., we do not think that translating languages, of which you say you know but little, would be a ready means of improving you in the art of composition; for in translating, all inex-

and their attention so concentrated, that they generally adhere to their own diction. We may use many more desirable methods. A little time and pains bestowed in imitating the thoughts of other men, by copying their orations, *not* well, but in preference, if you have your attention to the expression of your thoughts, by clothing them in different languages, selecting and adopting the best, and therefore the best. We have read the reading of some of our best authors, attended with great advantage, or noting down their ideas as they occur, afterwards endeavouring to express them in our own words, is good exercise. You are already conversant with the plan of Franklin (who succeeded in nearly everything he undertook); if you are not, it may be known, and if you are, it may be known by others. In his *genuine autobiography*, which may be obtained for a shilling, and read by every young man, in his early days, having fallen in love with a friend, he speedily acquired facility of style, and determined then to proceed to say: "About the year 1723, I had an odd volume of the Spectator, and never before seen any of them. I read it over and over, and was much

I thought the writing excellent, and if possible, to imitate it. With some of the papers, and making up sentences in each sentence, I copied them day after day, and then, without looking at the original, tried to complete the papers, using each limited sentiment as fully as it had been expressed in the original. I copied the able words that should occur to me, compared my Spectator to the original, and noted some of my faults, and corrected them afterwards. I took some of the Spectator, and turned them into my own words, to increase his stock of words; and when he had pretty well forgotten them, I turned them back again. I myself had also a desire to write, and of systematically arranging his words, sometimes jotted down his words, and after some weeks endeavoured to put them into the best order before me, and then wrote the full sentences, and compared them, by comparing his work with mine, and recovered, he says, many faults. I was not, however, but he sometimes had the good fortune, that in certain particulars of his style, he had been fortunate enough to have hit upon the method of the language." This

and with what success his method succeeded, the singular clearness of his style affords abundant evidence. If you practice in any of the methods mentioned, you may make considerable progress in your power of composition of thoughts. Do not expect to express at first. That which is at first a little difficult of attainment, the testimony of many of our best authors fully applies to composition, in his correspondence with

Sir James Mackintosh, says, "A style which is truly good, must always, more or less, be the result of effort and art." Dr. Johnson expressed himself equally clear—"What we hope ever to do with ease, we must first learn to do with diligence." Young has immortalized in poetry his conviction of the same truth:—

"Write and re-write, blot out, and write again,
And for its swiftness ne'er applaud your pen.

Time only can mature the lab'ring brain;
Time is the father, and the midwife pain."

We could adduce many other similar testimonies were it necessary; but first reflect upon what we have already said. You will find this magazine a ready medium for obtaining further assistance; and as you progress, you may, through its pages, speak to the world. We bid you God-speed, and ask you to reflect upon the words of a living author:—"How senseless must appear all efforts at excellence which are not made in the spirit of laborious application."—C. W., Jun.

The translation from one language into another is an excellent method of obtaining a knowledge of words, and the faculty of copiousness or variety of expression. Careful, very careful study of the classical works of our own language will also in time ensure the earnest student elegance and propriety of expression. But it is not in much *writing* nor in much *reading*, that H. T. M.'s chief hope of success lies, but rather in much *thinking*; and therefore we would recommend him to *digest* what he reads, never to lay a book aside until its whole meaning is understood. (Of course we speak only of such works as will repay this concentration of the mental powers, *others* are better left alone. Readers of this magazine will find it an excellent employment to peruse carefully all the articles, affirmative and negative, upon any one of the many subjects here debated; and, having taken note of the omissions, misstatements, &c., upon each side, to write articles embodying their own views of the matter. The works of Shakspeare will afford boundless scope for the exercise of the thoughtful mind. Let the student take up the best of his plays one by one, and study them in the thorough manner here indicated—revivifying those old historical characters once more, and sharing with them those soul-stirring scenes, not as they are *represented* on the pitiful stage, but as they *were*—analyzing their acts, and judging of their intentions—and then let him write a critique upon them. Such essays as these will show H. T. M. where he is deficient, and also teach him how to remedy his defects. We have not spoken of the great utility of correspondence, nor of many other means of obtaining the object of his ambition. We have simply shadowed forth one or two, and will leave him, like the alchemist, to turn to gold whatever opportunities of improvement he may meet with while engaged in the attainment of his wishes. Practice—yes, persevering practice—that is the secret of it all!—S. M. F.

78. *Grammar*.—In answer to the first question, the sentence should read—"A. has bequeathed the annuity to B. so long as he shall live."

With regard to the subjunctive, or elliptical form of the verb, we are no great advocates for its continuance in writing; more so as few who thus

use it would have the hardihood to do so when speaking. In the instances cited it is decidedly incorrect. The word "if" comes from the Saxon "gif," from which also our present verb, *give*, and *given*; and is synonymous with the latter; hence the sentences quoted would, if rendered properly, read so—"Given that such is the character of this historian," &c.—"Granted that," &c. Again, "Given that the assertion is true,"—"Granted that,"—"Acknowledge that,"—"Admit that it is," or simply,—"*Grant* that such is the case," then will such another circumstance take place, or be added.

When speaking of future contingent events it were (would be) better to use the proper auxiliaries, as—"If it *should* rain to-night, we shall not go home;" not "If it *rain* to-night," &c.

If H. H. F. look, or will look, a little above his quotation from sect. 2, col. 1, p. 459, he will find this sentence:—"If 'Justitia' means that the parliament was first to appeal to arms, I *deny* it."

Let him place the first-quoted sentence from this writer by the side of it, and he will find them to disagree, because "*can expect*" is in the present tense, as well as "*deny*" in the last.

We would advise our correspondent to put "Lennie" on the shelf a little, as we have done, and take to "Connon" and "Lathan." We used "Lennie" while in small clothes, but we wanted *tucks* to let down when we grew a little, but could not get them from the short-kilted Scotchman.

H. H. F. will not accuse us of knowing nothing of Lennie's works for saying this, when we tell him we used it for some years constantly; and consider it not the worst text book for rules in the language, but there is nothing of the philosophy of language to be found in it—no reasons given; it is simply a book of technicalities, to be swallowed whole, and digested at leisure.

Perhaps H. H. F. for the future will give not only column and page, but section and line; it will save much trouble.—E. B.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XII.

1. What is meant by "the doctrine of the Syllogism?"
2. Point out the difference between Language and Logic.
4. Enumerate the classes into which Objectivities may be arranged, and give illustrations of them?
5. What is a Syllogism, of how many parts does it consist, and how are these parts designated? Give illustrations.
6. Point out the difference between knowledge and reasoning, and state what would be man's condition without the power of reasoning.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Design of Class.

This class has been established with the design

of assisting young men and others to a knowledge of the English language.

The plan which it is proposed to adopt is:—

- 1st. To furnish from time to time a succession of exercises, to be written by our students.
- 2nd. To receive and acknowledge the written exercises, taking care to note the success of each.
- 3rd. To keep a regular account of the progress made throughout the year, at the end of which the teacher will award certificates of merit to the ten most successful students.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. I.

1. Make out a form like that given below, and arrange the words of the following sentences in columns: placing the words of the same part of speech in the same column:—

PARTS OF SPEECH.

INFLECTED.				UNINFLECTED.			
Noun.	Adjective.	Pronoun.	Verb.	Adverb.	Preposition.	Interjection.	Conjunction.

Practice in parsing will in time produce perfection. If you practise parsing you will in time become perfect. The young man had many friends, but, alas! he heeded not their counsel. That humane person leaped courageously into the stream, but, alas! he was almost drowned. Attend diligently to your business and your business will repay you. "O my son," says an Arabic proverb, "take care that your mouth

breaks not your neck." The results of deep research or extravagant speculation, seldom provoke hostility when meekly announced as the deductions of reason or the convictions of conscience. As the dreams of a recluse they may excite pity or call forth contempt; but, like seeds quietly cast into the earth, they will rot or germinate according to the vitality with which they are endowed. But if new and startling opinions

are thrown in the face of the community—if they are entered in triumph or in insult—in contempt of public opinion, or in derision of cherished errors, they lose the conciliableness of truth in the manner of their propagation, and they are like the seed scattered in the hurricane, which only whips and blinds the husbandman.—*Sir David Brewster.*

MATHEMATICAL CLASS. QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—II.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

5. Three boys, aged 16, 14, and 12, respectively, went nutting, and found 126 nuts in all, which they divided as their ages. Required each boy's share, and an explanation of the process.

6. A cistern has four cocks, two of which are adapted to fill, and two to empty it. If it be empty, No. 1 alone will fill it in six hours, or No. 2 alone in five hours. When full, No. 3 alone will empty it in four hours, or No. 4 in eight hours. In what time will the empty cistern be filled if all the cocks are set open at the same time—supposing the weight of a column of water in the cistern and the pressure of the atmosphere to be uniform during the time.

7. A ship worth £30,000 is damaged at sea to the extent of £17,000. A friend who owns $\frac{1}{4}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$ of her, desires to know the extent of his loss, and the present worth of his share?

8. Given $x+y=16$, and $xy=65$, to find the value of x and y .

Geometry.

3. The diameter of a spherical piece of wood is 15 inches. Required the side of the largest cube that can be made out of it; and an explanation of the process.

4. The side of an equilateral triangle is 10 inches. Required its area, also the area of two circles, one inscribed, and the other constructed about the triangle.

Mechanics.

3. A stone is $7\frac{1}{2}$ seconds falling freely through the atmosphere to the bottom of a pit. How deep is the pit?

4. At what rate would the stone in Exercise 3 be falling at the end of 7 seconds, and what would be its momentum when it reached the bottom of the pit, supposing it weighed 1 cwt., the resistance of the atmosphere being unaccounted for?

Notices of Books.

The Dictionary of Domestic Medicine and Household Surgery. By Spencer Thompson M.D., L.R.C.S. London: Groombridge and Sons.

Although no admirers of the maxim, "Every man his own doctor," we must confess to having perused the first part of this work with interest. It seems designed to disseminate sound information respecting "the house we live in," about, the body, and for this reason we recommend it.

The Foundation, Construction, and Eternity of Character. By J. A. James. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

This little tractate forms the substance of a lecture recently delivered in the town-hall, Birmingham, to an assembly numbering some 4,000 individuals, the majority of whom are said to have been young men. It is an able and eloquent production, and calculated to benefit every young man who thoughtfully peruses it. The following extract will be read with interest:—

"It is recorded of Francis the First of France that after his disastrous defeat in the battle of Pavia, by the Emperor Charles the Fifth of Germany, he announced the catastrophe to his mother in the following terse and magnanimous manner:—'Everything is lost, but my honour.' I was a saying worthy of a greater and a better man. Similar to this has been the reflection on oppression of others, amidst the calamities of human life—of men who, sitting down amidst the ruins of their fortunes, their prospects, and their hopes, have wiped away their tears, and, nobly rising in the consciousness of integrity, have said, 'I have lost everything but my character:' and with that

consciousness, such men are less, far less, to be pitied, than they who have risen to wealth upon the ruins of their reputation. No man can be said to be in abject penury who is rich in whatsoever things are lovely and of good report, while, on the other hand, neither wealth, nor learning, nor science, can dignify a man without character. This is the best capital with which to begin life—which affords the most reasonable hope of success in passing through it—and will yield the sweetest reflections at the close of it.

"If it were granted you, at your own expense and under your own directions, to lay the foundations and to raise the walls of some magnificent structure, which should attract the admiration of the world, defy the assaults of time, and hand down your name to future ages, what an object of ambition would be thus placed within your reach. But how much nobler in itself—how much more valuable to you—and how much more enduring—is that which is actually proposed to you by the will of God, and which is to be set before you this evening, in the lecture to which you are now called to listen.

"By CHARACTER we mean the prevailing and habitual qualities or dispositions of the mind, which express themselves in appropriate conduct, and distinguish their possessor from other men. The word character is therefore expressive of a genus, of which there are many species: such as the literary, scientific, heroic, and very many other varieties. In common parlance, however, the word is usually employed to designate moral qualities, for this is the meaning of the expression, 'He has lost his character.' In this sense we consider it in the present lecture, as indicative of moral and religious habits.

"If our description be correct that it consists of

prevailing and habitual qualities or dispositions—then, of course, a mere occasional act, however splendid an instance of good conduct it may be, does not constitute character—even though it should be also repeated occasionally at long intervals. A miser, for instance, may, under some very peculiar circumstances, be induced to perform an act of even munificent liberality, but it is not his *character* to be liberal. Acts are sometimes done by men so unlike their prevailing disposition, that we are astonished at them as phenomena which exceedingly perplex us when we make inquiry into their cause. Even good men, under the power of temptation, occasionally do things which are very unlike themselves, and contrary to their character, which, however, still survives the shock of these aberrations. General uniformity, consistency, and perseverance in good conduct, then, are essential to character. We have known cases in which some single acts of a bad man, have, to all outward appearance, excelled in magnitude and splendour, any of the single acts of a good one—but the former was only a diseased and spasmodic virtue, which exhausted at once all the strength of the actor; while the latter was the continued and natural action of sound health: or to change the metaphor—the one was the rare but imposing splendour of the comet or the meteor, which appears but for a little while and then vanishes away; while the other is the steady, continuous, and directive, though it may be less imposing, light of the pole-star. A fitful virtue is of little value, and yet it is all that some men have, who may not be totally abandoned to *bad* habits. Their minds seem to be ever in an intermittent fever, in which their cold and hot fits are in constant alternation.

“Having, then, endeavoured to show what we mean by character, and what kind of character we intend in this lecture, we proceed,—

“To speak of its **FOUNDATION**. This word is suggestive. The foundation of a building is laid in the earth. How much labour is bestowed in digging and throwing out the soil, and getting a trench ready to receive the materials which are to compose the fabric! How much material is lodged out of sight, that is totally forgotten by the ignorant observers of the structure? Who, for instance, in passing St. Paul's Cathedral, and admiring its lofty dome and gilded cross, dreams of the masses of stone on which the whole rests, and without which the building must soon have been a heap of ruins? Yet there is the foundation, vast and deep, though buried, hidden, and nearly forgotten. So must it be with character. The foundation must be laid in the mind, and heart, and conscience, and memory. There must be a digging into the soul—a throwing out of much that is in the way of what must be introduced—a making room for much material to be laid there—and a careful and laborious deposit of a suitable substratum. Something strong, broad, firm, must be buried and hidden in the soul. A lofty superstructure of character can no more be raised, which shall stand and be permanent, without this, than a towering building can be a permanent one, that is erected *upon* the surface of the ground, and not *beneath* it. The soul—not in its intellectual aspect and capacity merely, but in its moral and immortal one; the soul with its

affections, passions, and propensities; the soul as the seat of will and conscience; the soul as the ground in which the basis of character is laid; must be the subject of serious consideration. Many men carry about their minds with less solicitude than they do their watches: knowing and caring almost as little of the faculties and powers of the one as they do of the mechanism of the other. This must not be with those who would form a good character.

“Of what materials then must the foundation of character be formed? What are the mighty and granite stones which must be deposited, for a character that is to stand for eternity? Science? Literature? The arts? No. These may do for the intellectual, but not for the moral character. It is **PRINCIPLE, MORAL PRINCIPLE**. Moral character cannot rest on astronomy, geology, chemistry, electricity, magnetism. These things are admirable, useful, noble, sublime: but they can no more do for the basis of character, than jewelry, or diamonds, or the telescope, or the galvanic battery, or the magnet, would do for the foundation of a pyramid or a temple. By principle I mean not opinions only, but convictions: not speculative theories on morals, but practical conclusions: not sentiments floating in the judgment, but rooted in the heart. To attempt to form a character without established principles, is like erecting a building without a foundation.

“There are *decorations* of character to be studied and acquired. To advert again to the construction of a building, it may be made of substantial materials, and may have many good rooms, and answer well enough the purpose of a habitation, but all the while it may have a barn-like appearance. There are none of the tasteful ornaments of architecture—no Ionic grace—no Corinthian elegance, nor even Doric chasteness. Or to refer to the human form, there may be symmetry, strength, even beauty, but the bearing may be low and vulgar, the manners repulsive, and the address unprepossessing. Is it not sometimes thus with character? There may be the possession of sterling integrity, and great moral worth; in short, all the things that are true, and honest, and pure, and just; but not the things that are lovely. There is wanting the amiable temper, the courteous address, the attraction of kindness. It is a fine body in an uncomely dress; it is a lump of gold, but amorphous and unburnished; it is a diamond not cut and flashing with all the hues of the rainbow, but dull and covered with all its earthly encrustations. Character is the best thing on earth; why not then invest it with all the charms of which it is susceptible, and compel men to love and admire it as they do a jewel; both for its own sake, and for the sake of its beautiful setting also. The character of every man, far more than his wealth, is public property—and should be so exhibited as not only to attract attention, but to excite admiration and emulation. We must endeavour to make virtue loved as well as esteemed.”

We had marked other passages for extracts, but space forbids us giving them on the present occasion: the above will be sufficient to indicate the important character of the lecture, and the impressive style of its author.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. III. — THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

In our last paper we endeavoured to show that the wondrous system of thought-symbols which we denominate Language, and which is to us at once the interpreter and embalmer of our ideas, is the result of a conjoint exertion of celestial and humanitarian agencies—that it springs forth from the human soul as gradually and mysteriously, yet as surely and naturally, as a flower, in fitting circumstances, is developed from its germ-origin—and that

" Man's soul the Almighty to the future set
By secret and inviolable springs."

"Thought is quick." Consciousness is continually impressible, and the soul is unceasingly voyaging into new regions of inquiry, and is constantly engaged in surveying provinces of Nature which have been hitherto unexplored. Farther, deeper, higher, man's adventurous spirit proceeds, his knowledge-thirst is unquenchable, his excitable intellect is unresting. In these excursions of the mentality—in this *exodus* of the "inquiring spirit"—new modes of being are discovered, fresh acquisitions of knowledge are made, strange appearances become mirrored in the mind, and novel conceptions are originated in it. Language becomes the custodier of such information. Thought is the bullion of the intellect, and words are the conventional paper currency which represents it.

" Each giving each a double charm,
Like pearls upon an Ethiop's arm."

Strange that words—the mere vibrations of that "thin air" which is the very image of transitoriness, should be the media of communicating that durable, yea, eternal, reality—Thought, and that these faint impulsions on the atmospheric enwrapment of the earth should be emblematic of the idea-products of our "inner life." But "it is not words only that are emblematic." Everything in existence *speaks* to the cultured intellect. Whewell truly observes, "Man is the *interpreter* of Nature; not the spectator merely, but the interpreter. The study of the Language, as well as the mere sight of the characters, is requisite, in order that we may read the inscriptions which are written on the face of the world." It is in striving to decipher these inscriptions, and to read off their teachings, that men of science are continually employed. Before, however, this dead Language of Nature can be understood by all, it requires to be translated into the lexicography of humanity, and hence these representative embodiments of thought—words. It is true that the imperfection of our knowledge may cause us to translate inefficiently, as the terms "vertices" and "vacuum" demonstrate; but Nature still continues to teach us by means of her own God-given though inarticulate Language. With our mental growth, however, the fidelity of our "rendering" increases, and our knowledge of the context enables us to

attach more accurate verbalisms to the exposition of what is written in the creation-phenomena around us. If Language is a collection of idea-emblems, the copiousness of Language will be in a ratio with the multiplicity of ideas possessed by a people. The want of a word could not be felt till a thought demanded expression for which man had no cognomen; or if words existed prior to the eduction of thoughts, then we should have the incongruous difficulty of having many signs previous to possessing a capacity to apply them properly to denote our newly-developed ideas. All Languages, therefore, must have been, in their earlier stages, scanty. As our ideas became more numerous, words would become more copious. As we became more accurately acquainted with the relations of objectivities, Language would become more complicated. "Because of this radical correspondence between visible things and human thoughts, savages, who have only what is necessary, converse in figures. As we go back in history, Language becomes more picturesque until its infancy, when all is poetry, or all spiritual facts are represented by natural symbols. The same symbols are found to make the original elements of all Language;" * for the organs of speech and of hearing are very nearly similar in their structure in all men—the same laws govern their understandings, and control the formation of their ideas—the purposes for which speech is employed are nearly alike in all, and the objectivities around them have a very considerable amount of resemblance; while at the same time it should be observed, that wherever natural phenomena or products, and social habits or instruments, differ in one country from those of another, the words significant of these phenomena, products, habits, or instruments, are always imported from the language of that other country, *e.g.*, Simoom, geyser, llanos, &c.; ennui, roué, incivism, sans-culotte, suttee, gong, soirée, slick, gutta percha, caoutchouc, &c. Each new discovery in science, each new phase of social existence, each new educt of human ingenuity, each new process of thought, each new practical art, each new relation of objects, requires either the invention of a new name, or else a new application of an old one; and hence, too, we deduce the inference, that *no sooner is a new thought implanted in the mind, than it germinates into a name.*†

Little evidence corroborative of the accuracy of this inference can be expected from

* Emerson's "Nature," p. 18.

† Illustrations of the accuracy of this inference may be found in the words employed to denote any discovery, invention, or custom, *e.g.*, *Isomorphism*—a term rendered necessary by the discoveries of Guy Lussac and Mitscherlich, as a sign of the fact that some bodies possess the quality of assuming the same crystalline form, though composed of different proximate elements, yet with the same number of equivalents. *Bilobate*—a botanical designation for a leaf which is divided into two parts by a notch. *Momentum*—the symbol, to the scientific intellect, of that quantity of motion in a body which is always equal to the quantity of matter multiplied into its velocity. *Barometer*—an instrument for measuring the weight of the atmosphere. *Tariff*—a term well known in commercial and political society as denoting a fixed rate of duty levied upon imports. *Tarifa* is the name of a promontory in the south of Spain, which, running into the Straits of Gibraltar, was in olden times employed by the Moors as a watch point of the Mediterranean Sea, from which, as any merchant vessel entered or passed out, they issued, and enforced a definite proportion of the cargo, according to the amount and kind of goods with which the vessel was laden. *Assassin*, which is derived from the Arabic words *Ahash-shash*, a smoker or eater of hemp; by this smoking or eating, intoxication is produced. During the Crusades some Arabian soldiers were in the habit of administering these intoxicating drugs, in order to render their enemies insensible, so that they might the more easily make them their victims.

historic annals. The want of written records—the all-absorbing influence which pressing wants and necessities, new circumstances and occupations, must have exerted—the novelty, anxiety, and uncertainty of man's new state of being—the stern need which they must have felt of staring real difficulties in the face, and adopting the readiest means to overcome them—afterwards the stirring fermentation of passion, which made the earth seem as if it were one vast cauldron of fierce, relentless, and unconquerable hate; then the migratory and predatory habits of the earth's early inhabitants, are all reasons why no account of the intellectual progress of our race could have been transmitted. We are thus left with little else than analogy to direct our inquiries. But man is naturally an analogist; he generalizes as instinctively as he specializes; and wheresoever the torch of history grows dim, or the light of ascertainable fact fails, he is irresistibly compelled to avail himself of the lamp of Reason and the clue-threads of analogy in traversing the mazy labyrinths of speculation.*

"Necessity is the mother of invention;" and it is seldom that the full force of the intellect is put forth, except under the pressure of this sombre step-dame. We have every reason to believe, therefore, that as man's nature and circumstances necessarily made inter-communication requisite, that immense efforts would be made to discover and invent some conversation-medium. We must recollect, too, that the human mind was at this time, so far as man's nature admitted, perfect, fresh from the mint of heaven, with the image of God superinscribed on it—that exertion was as delightful as it was new, and that the capacity of invention was unimpeded by any obstacle; no step had been taken, the mind had not been misled by dubious and tentative trials; there only remained, therefore, for the mentality to unfold the divine idea-germs which were enwrapped within it. And how could these fail to bud and blossom into speech, when new, varied, and attractive scenes everywhere met his eye—while Adoration, Love, and Friendship—a triad of paradisaical angels—quickened the growth of the soul! But we must beware of looking upon Language as it is now—a complex and intricate mechanism of idea-symbols—and then speaking of the difficulty of such an invention being an educt of human skill. How stately and majestic does the oak of a thousand years appear! how wide-spread its branches! how complicated its root-fibres! and yet it was once but an apparently insignificant acorn, divinely endowed, indeed, but wanting the due conjunction of place and circumstance to aid its becoming a venerable

To them the term was first applied, and it is now the cognomen of any one who basely attempts to kill his enemy by stealth. *Aburd* is primarily derived from *ab surdo*, i.e., from a deaf man; but as in a conversation the remarks which proceed from a deaf man are generally foreign to the subject, a notion of incongruousness arises in the mind, and hence anything superlatively foolish is likened to the conversation of a deaf man. Electricity, gravitation, angle of incidence, communism, calamity, imbecility, pagan, knave, villain, &c., may form a *praxis* for the same sort of exposition.

* In speaking thus, let it not for a moment be imagined that we impugn the sacred record; on the contrary, we, in common with the best biblical commentators, look upon *that* as decidedly favourable to our opinions, although we have no desire to draw down the oracles of God from their sacred height into the midst of contentious, and perhaps irreverent, disputationists. It has other and higher uses to perform—to instruct men as to the manner of the inner life—to unveil the moral laws of the Deity—to reveal the God-man, Christ-saviour to men—to open the gateway of immortality—and to make certain the doctrine of the after life, which is but faintly indicated in the book of nature. Spiritual Truth can never gain anything by descending from her own God-built temple to wrangle in the common market-places of the world.

forest-king ! So has it been with all man's earlier invention-achievements. The discovery of metals, and the invention of instruments of labour, home construction, the fine arts, social polity, &c., are equally enveloped in the vagueness of time-distance. Were we ignorant of the successive steps which had been taken towards the perfection of the steam-engine from the days of Hero of Alexandria (120 B.C.) to our own, how mysterious would the invention of such an agency appear ! Egypt's eternal pyramids, which have outbraved "a thousand storms, a thousand thunders," how were they up-reared ? By what unknown and marvellous mechanisms were these "piles stupendous" of massive masonry built in the world's young prime ? If obscurity can hang its shadow-clouds over topics such as these, can we expect to pierce the veil of age-accumulated darkness which encompasses the origin of one of man's earliest necessities ? Assuredly not ; nor is it needful. All that is requisite is to gain an analogical explanation sufficiently exact to guide our footsteps in the probable path. If, when we have followed out our analogy, we find that it complies with all the requirements of the case, we may have good reason to believe that our view has been correct. Let us tread this pathway circumspectly, taking "caution" as our watchword, and making the attainment of truth our only object. To eliminate the point of the probability that speech is semi-celestial and semi-humanitarian in its origin, it seems to us necessary to inquire what faculties possessed by man are capable of assisting in the origination of idea-representative sounds, i.e., speech. This point may, to some, appear unimportant, and they may feel inclined to cut "the gordian knot," by exclaiming, "Tush ! we have language now ; teach us rather how to use it as it is, than torture our minds with speculations as to what it was, and whence it proceeded. The practical—the practical—that is the pre-eminent want of our age." We have no hesitation in asserting, that properly conducted speculation must always, in the end, lead to important practical results. The laws of Theory justly deduced must be re-applicable to the facts of Experience ; and if Experience, when honestly and carefully interpreted, refuses to ratify the inferences, she is justly held to have refuted Theory ; but there cannot be any real and valid disconnexion between the speculations of the philosophic theorist and the truths of practice. Theory teaches the nature and use of the instrument with which practical skill operates ; a proper acquaintance with the nature of Language cannot, therefore, be foreign to practical and experimental purposes. It is not merely as a matter of curious philosophic speculation, but also as a point of considerable practical importance, that we proceed to lay before our readers one or two brief observations upon the faculties of man, which may be legitimately supposed to have conjointly co-operated in the production of those thought-exponents—words.

1st. *Perceptivity*. This faculty is the primary element in all human thought, and is, consequently, an essential co-worker in the production of speech. "All objects of all thought," whether resulting from a consciousness of internal powers, or of extraneous impressions, must become so by being brought before this—the mind's eye. Truths, i.e., impressions from within and without, impinge upon the mind without regard to order, regularity or sameness. Occurring thus indifferently, they form a mazy and undistinguishable mass until Perceptivity, contemplating the similarities of the impressions, classifies them accordingly, and thus renders them subdivisible. This chaotic series of impingements on the human consciousness being thus reduced into manageability by the perception of

identity, the mind acquires a capacity of forming classes of objects, and general ideas of such classes. Thus do *ideas* originate—thus are they individuated; each internal and external sense has brought its offering into the treasure-house of thought; but there is yet required a mental *form* in which to contain them—a registrative mark in Memory's tablets. "If we want to render a particular combination of ideas permanent in the mind, there is nothing which clenches it like a name specially devoted to the purpose." Words serve "to give a point of attachment to all the more volatile objects of thought and feeling. Impressions, that when passed might be dissipated for ever, are, by their connexion with language, always within reach. Thoughts, of themselves, are perpetually slipping out of the field of immediate mental vision, but the name abides with us, and the utterance of it restores them in a moment."

2nd. Societarian Instincts. We have seen in the last paragraph that thought-exponibles are necessary to man, even in an isolated state, as the recorders and mementoes of experience; when, then, we regard man as a gregarious animal—as being specially adapted for the interchanging of "the gentle offices of patient love"—as possessed not only of the power of being mutually helpful, but also of the desire of being so—how much more necessary—how much more essentially requisite—to him will it appear! How powerfully do love, friendship, and all the delicate emotions of the human mind stir up the intellect! The sameness of feelings, wants, &c., all minds being nearly similarly impressed, all hearts being agitated by nearly identical desires, would naturally produce a readiness of apprehension, and easiness of early intercourse, of which we, at this day, can form little idea. Every day we observe how readily ideas are communicated between parties of reciprocal sentiments. We need only mention "the language of the eyes" as an illustration.

3rd. Analogical Faculties. "The elements of the natural language of mankind, or the signs that are naturally expressive of our thoughts, may, I think, be reduced to these three kinds—modulations of the voice, gestures, and features. By means of these, two savages, who have no common artificial language, can converse together; can communicate their thoughts in some tolerable manner; can ask and refuse, affirm and deny, threaten and supplicate; can traffic, enter into covenants, and plight their faith. This might be confirmed by historical facts of undoubted credit, if it were necessary."* The way in which this communication would take place must be accounted for in some such way as the following:—Self-consciousness reveals to us the fact that when we are mentally affected in a given way, that mental affection produces certain changes in our bodily frame; when therefore we see any party displaying any external bodily change, similar in its general aspects to that produced in us by any mental excitation, we immediately conclude that the internal feeling of that party corresponds with that felt by us when the external man was affected in that particular manner. The natural language of children, who denominate animals by names indicative of the sounds which they emit—the method of communication between the deaf and dumb—pantomimic performances—the significance of oratorical gesture—are all so many instances of this exercise of the analogical faculties, so many keys to the understanding of the process by which the interchangeability of thought was managed in the prelingual age, so many indexes to the method in which the analogical

* Reid's "Inquiry into the Human Mind," chap. iv. sect. ii. p. 55.

faculties would operate. Again, we should recollect that the greater part of human language is analogical: thus we say lion-hearted, chicken-souled; thus we speak of the depth and acuteness of the mind, the hardness of the soul, the sweetness of one's temper, cold-blooded, hot-headed, &c. We speak of storms, tempests, &c., as denotative of states of mind. The early language of all countries is figurative—the early literature of every country is poetical; but poetry and figurative language are products of the analogical faculties. We have every reason to believe, then, that in the primeval ages of the world, the resemblance-perceptive powers of the mind were more powerfully active, were more energetically stimulated, than now, and consequently that they were more capable of originating audible thought-signs than now. And even now how expressive may Language be made when moulded by the imitative power of genius;* *e. g.*:—

“ *The precipice abrupt,
Projecting horror on the blackened flood.*”—*Thomson's Summer.*

“ *Seen from some pointed promontory's top.*”—*Ibid.*

“ *The huge round stone, resulting with a bound,
Thunders impetuous down.*”—*Pope's Essay on Criticism.*

4th. The Colligating Faculties. The phenomena of outward nature impress the mind, each class of objects possesses the power of making specific impingements on the mentality, and to these the intellectual faculties would first give names. When, however, the mind perceived that some objects possessed the properties of two different classes, or when it was under the necessity of conjoining two different thoughts together, it would do so by colligating the two thought-emblems by which these had been individually indicated in the mind. We have examples of such colligations of two thought-signs as the expositives of new ideas formed by the conjunction of two different objectivities or ideas, in the terms, *steam-engine, sky-blue, table-land, rail-way, self-taught, matricide, rock-bound, &c.*

It must be evident, from our foregoing remarks, that we believe that the power of embodying ideas in words, and thus enabling the thought-possession of one man to become the property and inheritance of the whole human race, is one of the divine germ-seeds which has been implanted in the human mind, and which, like the powers of perceptivity, judgment, and reasoning, is bestowed upon man in order that he may by

* We abstained from quoting in the text any examples from other languages; the following lines, however, are exceedingly expressive:—

“ *Βῆ δ' ἀέων παρὰ θινὰ πολύφλοισβον θάλασσαν.*”—*Iliad*, book i.

“ *Illi inter sese magna vi brachia tollunt.*”—*Georgics*, book iv.

“ *Quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum.*”—*Æneid*, book vi.

“ *Français, Anglais, Lorrains, que la fureur assemble,
Avançaient, combattaient, frappaient, mouraient ensemble.*”

Voltaire's Henriade, chant. vi.

“ *L' horror, la crudeltà, la tema, il lutto
Van d'intorno scorrendo: et in varia imago
Vincitrice la morte errar per tutto,
Vedresti, et undeggiar di sangue un lago.*”

Tasso's Jerusalem Liberata, canto ix.

culture and industry adapt it to useful purposes, and apply it to the upbuilding of his soul in knowledge. So far forth it is an emanation of the Creator's omniscient wisdom and all-prevalent benevolence. We can have no faith in the opinion that a number of the members of the human family—feeling the want of a medium by which barter, interchange, and business, might be facilitated, principles of government adopted, and inter-fraternal laws discussed and definitively agreed upon—in solemn convocation assembled, laboriously upplied a series of thought-representatives called words. The principles of the human mind, and the history of social life, both seem to us to present full warrant for deciding that such a method of procedure is exceedingly improbable. Men cannot invent signs for thoughts until they have them; they cannot have them anterior to experience; and ever as a want makes itself pressingly felt, the specific remedy is never long in being invented. Now, experience can only be attained gradually, wants can only be felt after experience; therefore the supplying of man's wants can only be gradually accomplished. In Language, as in every other object of speculation, no forces are to be assumed except such as are in present operation, or of whose operations there remain palpable evidences; and wherever an interpretation can be found in accordance with laws or forces now operating, that interpretation is to be preferred to any other in which assumptions are made. We believe that our solution of the question at once accords with the forces or laws now in operation, explains all the phenomena involved in the question, is in harmony with the teachings of the divine record, and in agreement with the laws of speculative human reason. In the early stages of human progress, when men speak from their emotions rather than their reason, few words are necessary, for the light of imagination flashes its illuminating radiance on all things, and makes even the hidden links of thought visible. This accords with the facts, that the ancient languages are less copious than the modern, and that poetry is the earliest species of literature which is evolved from the mind—and we humbly presume that our remarks have been sufficient to prove that Language is at once of semi-celestial and semi-humanitarian origin.

Philosophy.

IS HOMŒOPATHY TRUE IN PRINCIPLE AND BENEFICIAL IN PRACTICE ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HOMŒOPATHY must die—"Vinclum" hath declared it. The defenders of the system may now prepare their weepers; for though there are more truly eminent men amongst them than there are hairs on "Vinclum's" head, yet is the system doomed to destruction. Has not "Vinclum" proved to the satisfaction of every one who knows nothing about the subject, that Homœopathy is a delusion and a snare? and that its supporters are fit only for the "limbo of fools?"

Even its founder, who was justly considered to be a man of learning and experience in his profession, is politely and reverently called an aged simpleton by this learned champion of "*Old Mortality*."

But, to be sure, we are taught that lessons of wisdom may be learned from even the errors of others; and we will therefore set ourselves to discover how much of this honey we can gather from the carcass before us.

What, then, says "Vinclum" on the demerits of the system under debate? Why, just this:—1st. That Homœopathy is an absurdity and an outrage on common sense; 2nd. "That the claim of originality in the treatment set up by Homœopathists is no less unfounded than their other assumptions:" for "it has been practised to a certain extent from the earliest times, and is suggested by the common sense of every person who gives the subject a moment's consideration." How consolatory to know that we shall not be the sole tenants of that dreary place, the "limbo of fools!" "Vinclum" and Co. will not only accompany us, but actually have a prior claim to possession: to which we resignedly submit. For "Vinclum" first says our system is absurd; and then in the same breath contradicts himself, by saying that the system, or the mode of treatment (which is an integral part of it), has been practised since the earliest times, and commends itself to the common sense of every one who gives the subject a moment's consideration. Was any man ever so inconsistent! Surely "Vinclum" is but playing a practical joke upon us.

"Vinclum" proceeds to say—"But even admitting their therapeutic treatment to be feasible, or perhaps *advisable*, we must protest most emphatically against the globular part of the business." Now, we notice this simply for the purpose of telling "Vinclum" that he has surrendered his position; and that, having admitted that the Homœopathic treatment is "feasible," and "even advisable," he has forfeited his right to protest, either emphatically or otherwise, against the "globular part of the business." For, be it known to our friend, that what he calls their "therapeutic treatment" is, and what he calls the "globular part of the business" is *not*, an essential part of the system, as C. W., Jun. has shown:—"The fact is, that Homœopathists themselves are not yet quite agreed on the subject, though they all agree that in most cases *some* good effect may be expected from the *smallest* doses, provided that a really suitable Homœopathic remedy be used." "That they are not agreed concerning the *magnitude* of the doses is not surprising, for it is probable that by the habit of taking medicine on the ordinary plan, some persons become peculiarly unsusceptible to Homœopathic doses. It is also possible

that different individuals, and yet more, different nations, vary in sensitiveness. For all these reasons it seems necessary, at least at present, that Homœopathists should adapt the strength of their doses to the constitution of their patients."* It is added, that Hahnemann at first used doses of the ordinary quantity, but finding them very highly to aggravate the complaint, without any corresponding advantage, he made them smaller and smaller, till, after innumerable experiments, he found himself forced to reduce them to a minuteness such, that, for want of a better name, they have been called infinitesimal.

But, in fact, what care we at all about the *a priori* absurdity of the system, if its practically beneficial character be susceptible of proof? Every new system has been assailed with the same cry. Even Harvey and Jenner were voted very absurd characters, till men grew a little wiser. But much as "Vinclum" has to say respecting the absurdity of the system, he has not one word to spare on the statistics of mortality, as regards either the wise old system or the absurd new one. At the risk of making an actually too long an article an unconscionable length, we will endeavour to supply the omission. Our authority is Dr. Epps, of London:—"Professor Henderson, of the Edinburgh University, has shown that in nine hundred and nine cases of inflammation of the lungs, treated upon the established system, no fewer than two hundred and twelve died; that is, nearly one out of every four: whereas, in two hundred and ninety-nine treated on the Homœopathic system, only nineteen died, or one out of every fifteen cases. In one hundred and eleven cases of pleurisy treated upon the old plan, fourteen deaths ensued, or about one in eight; whereas, out of *two hundred and twenty-four* cases of the same malady treated Homœopathically, there were but *three deaths*, or little more than *one in one hundred cases*. Again, in twenty-one cases actually occurring in the Edinburgh University, upon the old plan, there were six deaths, or more than one in four; whereas, in one hundred and five cases of the same malady treated Homœopathically, there were but five deaths, or *one in twenty-five*

* S. C. Davids, M.D., Graduate of the University of Glasgow, and Licentiate of the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh.

ses! In Cincinnati, Ohio, the patients treated for Asiatic cholera, by the Homœopathic practitioners, in 1849, were two thousand four hundred and ten, and they lost only eighty-five, or *three and a half per cent*: whereas the average loss under the allopathic system was *one in three* patients, and sometimes the loss was greater."

Now, I contend that these statistics prove the beneficial tendency of the system; and I wish to ask "Vinclum" how he will recon-

cile with these results his assertion that the system "is founded upon imperfect deductions from a few simple facts," and "that the every-day experience of the commonest practitioner is directly at variance with its fundamental laws?" If it be so, "Vinclum" can prove it by showing vastly superior results; and, failing his ability to do that, he must acknowledge that Homœopathy is both "true in principle" and "beneficial in practice."

IRENE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It was our intention, subsequently to writing one of the opening articles on the above question, altogether to abstain from any future interference in the debate which might ensue; but the inaccuracies with which the first affirmative paper teems, no less than the thread-bare fallacies by which C. W., Jun., endeavoured to substantiate his position, compelled us, though unwillingly, to attempt a refutation.

The flimsy analogy which the latter writer attempted to draw between the illustrious discoverer of the circulation of the blood and the notorious founder of the Homœopathic system; the hacknied reference to the peroration of great minds and great ideas in times bygone—times of ignorance, delusion, and superstition; have contributed to lower considerably in our eyes a cause which even previously had fallen far below zero.

Shall the touching incident of the aged philosopher, who on his bended knees was compelled, by the dictatorial power of a religious tribunal, to abjure the sublime law which had cost him his life to investigate; the cruel opposition of an interested clique of professional brethren to the author of the execution, be cited as parallelisms to the success of a system which, after having shirked, as long as it was able, the decisive tests which have at length unveiled it, would now sink away from well-merited contempt beneath such a cloak as this, and nestle like an incubus on the bosoms of those whose ignorance exposes them to its impositions and absurdities, from which their superiors and education are better able to defend themselves? No; though the antagonism which must always be developed contemporaneously with the germination of the seeds of error has caused the medical profession to be on

the *qui vive* with regard to Mesmerism, Hydropathy, and the legion of other heresies to which these latter days have given birth, and which, from the small amount of truth they contain, are only the more dangerous, it is otherwise with the Infinitesimal theory.

We remember hearing a clever Romish priest endeavouring to inculcate on his audience the idea that the Church of Rome must be the only true one, as she was the most persecuted of all churches. "Brethren," said the doctor, "men" (referring more especially to the Church of England) "have always hated us as the devil only can hate truth. It is not so with the other sects, with the Dissenters, with the Baptists, the Unitarians, or with the disciples of Johanna Southcote; *they are simply despised*." So it is with Homœopathy; we treat it not as we do the other systems, which our opponents could claim as of cognate origin with themselves: we simply despise it. *They* ignore in their statements the plainest laws of science and the dictates of common sense; can we do otherwise than view it in the light with which its followers have illuminated it?

We must confess that there are some sentences in G. V.'s paper that have completely staggered us; the farrago of bad logic and coarse science which he has succeeded in concocting is rather more than we could have conceived possible of any man, last of all of a Doctor Medicinæ.

He tells us that Homœopathy emancipates mankind from ills unnumbered, "by regulating the provision of aliment, from which it discards all medicinal and stimulating substances," &c. How, in the name of all that is incongruous, does he define a stimulant, and how medicine? We always thought that all aliments were more or less stimulating.

Surely G. V. will not deny this property to articles of which it is to be supposed he often partakes, viz., roast beef and plum pudding? For ourselves, to our cost have we often regretted the excessive stimulating qualities of viands in which we have been tempted to indulge above measure. But perhaps he may fall back on the quibble, that these are natural stimulants, and he refers to artificial ones. Granted: but is not medicine in all its forms a stimulant, and an artificial one too, whether it be administered Allopathically or Homœopathically? And it is useless to allege the excuse, that given on the former principle it is much more injurious than on the latter, on account of the increased quantity of the dose; because, according to their own showing, it is the very minuteness of the Homœopathic globules which constitutes their efficiency; *ergo*, the reckless manner in which we administer our remedies is a sure safeguard against any ill effects accruing from them. If medicine be discarded, what, we should like to know, are the innumerable tinctures, powders, &c., which are comprehended in their pharmacopœia? Non-stimulating aliment, we suppose!

"Man was ordained by nature to suffer," (we very much doubt it,) therefore Homœopathy "was designed to free him from all those sufferings to which his own folly and superstition have hitherto made him a martyr." If ignorance had been the original sin, our first parents would, in all probability, never have been expelled paradise; but, unfortunately for our writer, Adam sinned, not through a deficiency of knowledge, but from an unholy thirst for more.

So, after all, the real prop of the Homœopaths seems to be that they pay *especial attention* to the diet of their patients. We do verily believe that these globules are only a pleasant subterfuge, under which they expect to escape from the charge of not giving their patients any medicine at all. They have at last arrived at the great secret, that the repair of nature's organism must, to a considerable extent, be left to nature herself: but, unwilling to abandon that superstitious enthrallment in which a medical man holds the majority of his patients, the immense influence which he exerts over their minds by the mere prescription of anything in the shape of physic, they have resorted to this—we must say unworthy—plan of preserving

what may be deemed their hereditary caste. Ah, gentlemen! take a friend's advice; show your true colours; enlist yourselves with the Hydropathists and Vegetarians, and you will stand a much better chance of succeeding than you do at present.

We had intended to draw our readers' attention to the fallacy, that "Homœopathy will in no case do positive injury;" but it has been so well handled by the writer of the last negative article on the subject—whose paper, by the way, is to our mind a carefully-written digest of most of the facts connected with the case—that we do not feel it necessary to do so.

Our opponents are very fond of insisting on showing their hospital books, and other such-like testimonies to the number of their cures, as a proof of the successfulness of their plan of treatment. But there is one thing which must never be lost sight of (laying aside the fact that the nature of the organism to be acted on, the varied character of the symptoms of a disease, the purity of the medicines, which in no case can be absolutely guaranteed, together with other collateral circumstances, render any inquiry of this kind so complicated as to make it of little or no practical value), that the tendency of most acute diseases, the class more likely than any other to come under inspection at Homœopathic hospitals, is to recover. Besides, *post hoc* is not necessarily *propter hoc*; if it were, what marvellous effects might not in justice be attributed to agents which we know possess of themselves no intrinsic value, but only so far as they help to bring about a combination of favourable conditions.

G. V. lays great stress upon the importance of Homœopathic medicines as *specifics*. We need hardly call the attention of the scientific reader to so palpable an error. Every person knows that one rational cure is worth half-a-dozen empirical ones. What is a specific but an agent empirically used to produce an effect, which, up to the time of so using, it has been more or less successful in producing? But how can we ensure its success in this, it may be the hundredth time of employing? True, it has been successful in ninety-nine cases, but may it not fail in the last? In this it differs from rational medicines, that the latter are uniformly constant in their action and certain in their effects. The word is a remnant of bygone days, and recalls the

darkness of the early dawn of our profession; but who would not wish to see it expunged from the medical glossary? There is no denying that we have specifics even now, and that we use them as such; but it is only a proof of how far we yet are from a perfect insight into the working of nature's machinery. When the qualities and action of therapeutic agents shall have been more thoroughly investigated, then may we hope to see some light shed upon a subject, where, as yet, every additional footstep only leads to a more inextricable confusion. Till then we must remain content; but let us not invite back the genius of bygone superstitions, by reintroducing terms which are only expressive of her former reign amongst us.

As to that display of grandiloquence with which G. V. finishes up, it is worth nothing; not absolutely worth the pen, ink, and brains which have been squandered on its production. It is worse than worthless, for it levels its writer to the grade of those penny-a-liners who dignify, by similar compositions, the Pantechmetheca or the Eureka shirt. If G. V. really wishes to advance Homœopathy, or any other pet system, we would advise him to enunciate propositions which have something more tangible about them, than such as the most wretched caterer for literary tradesmen could rival, if not surpass.

We had intended to have alluded to many more perversions of truth which, "thick as leaves in Vallombrosa," are plentifully woven 'mid our opponents' arguments: but lack of time, and worse still, want of space, authoritatively forbid our entering further upon the subject. With one more reference we must conclude, and it is to the uncharitable sentence in which C. W., Jun., charges us with a mercenary motive in rejecting Ho-

mœopathy. Like other writers whose wit outruns their wisdom, he has been led into an error which we will venture to say the veriest tyro in such matters could not avoid discovering. We know, and the public know too—at least it ought to know, only it shuts its eyes blindly to the fact—that under the old system, and too often under the improved state of things, medicine is sent and charged for which is not absolutely necessary. This has been, and will be, until affairs are better managed, the opprobrium of the profession. But can people grumble at a practice which they alone are instrumental in retaining? If they will not pay a medical man for his time, which is inestimably precious, for his health, which is equally so, and for an expensive education, can they complain if the fee which is so fairly due for professional advice, is grudgingly extorted by means of unprofessional bills for unnecessary items? The lawyer, and all other servants of the public, charge for their time, and why should not the medical man do so as well? He must be paid, and if John Bull will not loose his purse strings to the claims of a gentleman, he must "come down," and to the cost of his wretched stomach too, with his gold to the debtor and creditor account of the tradesman for "value received." When the English public shall have been imbued with a more liberal spirit, and shall have learned to treat with becoming confidence men who hold, not the political rights, but the lives of its members, in their hands, then, and not till then, will the bond be severed, and one long peace arise, to the emancipation of the physician from the trammels of the apothecary, and the surgeon's scalpel from the druggist's mortar.

VINCULUM.

PURSUIT IN LIFE.—No life can be happy, but that which is spent in the prosecution of some purpose to which our powers are equal, and which we, therefore, prosecute with success; for this reason it is absurd to dread business, upon pretence that it will leave few intervals for pleasure. Business is that by which industry pursues its purpose, and the purpose of industry is seldom disappointed; he who endeavours to arrive at a certain point, which he perceives himself perpetually to approach, enjoys all the happiness which nature has allotted to those hours, that are not spent in the immediate gratification of appetites by which our own wants are indicated, or of affections by which we are prompted to supply the wants of others.

History.

CAN THE APOSTOLIC ORIGIN AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE BRITISH CHURCH BE PROVED?

NEGATIVE REPLY.—III.

IN availing myself of the right of replying in this discussion, I must express myself at a loss to find matter to fill a page, inasmuch as our friend, J. B., has left me little or nothing to refute. He has adduced no argument or proof to show that the present Church of England is constructed after the apostolic model; but has simply contented himself with bringing forward certain very unsatisfactory statements, said to have been written by certain fathers in the second and following centuries. And what would those statements prove, if admitted as satisfactory evidence in this discussion? Why, simply this:—that some of the apostles did preach in Britain—a fact that requires much more proof than J. B. has been able to produce, before it can be believed by an inquiring mind. But, for the sake of argument, let us admit that J. B. has shown that St. Paul or some other apostle did preach in Britain; of what use is such an admission in determining that the present Church of England is more apostolic than her compeers in this realm? Merely the fact of an apostle having preached in England, can be no warrant for our supposing that the arrogant claims of the Anglican bishops, and the would-be-called Anglican priests, are derived by descent from the apostles. Such an idea is too preposterous to be entertained, and J. B. has studiously avoided putting it forward. Why, then, try to dazzle our minds with long statements about the bare probability that an apostle did honour this island with his presence? Did our friend wish to draw us away from facts, to amaze us with religious fictions? Let him show us that the parent Church of

England is apostolic in her constitution, her forms and her ceremonies, and that she approves of nothing but what the apostles themselves taught and sanctioned, then, and not till then, shall we be inclined to allow that he has made out a case which in any degree militates against the arguments which have been already advanced.

So long as such a proceeding as that lately enacted at Frome can be tolerated in the English Church, and so long as the English bishops usurp all power in our church, so long must we contend that she is far less apostolic than the majority of the sects.

The simple criterion of the apostolic character of any church is not profane history, but the word of God; and so long as any church countenances, by her usage and her laws, customs at variance with the New Testament, it is futile for her members to arrogate for her the proud title of the one apostolic church.

Doubtless the Church of England holds all the doctrines the apostles taught, but, alas! some of her formularies sanction matters the apostles would have scorned to allow. And too many of her sons hold doctrines which are diametrically opposed to the truth; consequently we contend that she cannot substantiate the claim of being more apostolic than the Dissenting churches.

Her freedom is the freedom of a serf; she is governed by the Queen and Parliament; and so long as she receives all her pay from the state, so long will she be under the power of the state.

It remains for J. B. to prove the contrary.
W. T.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.—III.

A FEW words in reply to the view taken by W. T., in anticipation of the affirmative article in No. 21, and to the letter of "Scrutator," in No. 22, will bring my remarks to a conclusion.

W. T. says, "The proud claims now put forth by High Churchmen lead us to inquire, where are the proofs that the English Church is the only apostolic church in this land?" He seems, by this remark, not to be aware

that the view I took in my first article is held by many Low Churchmen: in fact, to my knowledge, by several clergymen who rank high among the "champions of Protestantism." This being the case, the "High Churchmen" merit a moiety only of W. T.'s castigations. The question has no connexion whatever with "apostolic succession," and therefore I shall only make a passing remark upon what W. T. adduces in opposition.

That the government of the Primitive Church was episcopal I firmly believe. Of course, it does not come within my present purpose to offer my grounds for that belief: nor do I see that the article of W. T. bears at all upon the fact, which I endeavoured to prove in my first article. How does it happen that, during all the heresies and divisions in the first *fourteen* centuries, not one was found to deny the authority of the bishops? What can we imagine to be more likely than, when an heresiarch failed to obtain the sanction of a bishop, he should proclaim that the episcopal government was not apostolic? We do not, however, find that one did so; but, on the contrary, the utmost anxiety was shown for their concurrence in all matters. That the present state of our episcopate does not disprove the doctrine of apostolic succession, is, I think, evident. If the argument be good, what was to have prevented a Jew of the time of our blessed Lord denying the authority of the chief priests and scribes, who then bore authority in his church? The injustice and malevolence they displayed in their treatment of the Son of God—their hypocrisy—their practical neglect of the most positive commands of Jehovah, by demanding obedience to traditions which rendered these commands of no effect, would surely have justified a conscientious servant of the Almighty in disregarding their authority. Yet what is the language of Christ himself on this point? Matt. xxiii. 2, 3. "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works: for they say, and do not." The injustice of the high priest Ananias, in commanding the bystanders to smite the "great Apostle of the Gentiles" in the mouth, was surely a sufficient crime for the reproof which was administered to him. Yet St. Paul deems it necessary to make the apology that "he wist not" . . . "that he was the high

priest." No conduct could be more in opposition to the law, or to the example of the great Lawgiver—"the meekest of men"—of their nation, than this; but, even in such an extreme case, the law, "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people," was strictly applicable.

The Jewish Church was, in every respect, a type of the Christian Church. Our blessed Saviour came into this world purposely to establish the latter. "He taketh away the first," says the apostle, "that he may establish the second." He has taken away the law and the legal priesthood, that he may establish the gospel and the evangelical priesthood. The authority of the former, which was only "a shadow of good things to come," all acknowledged, and I cannot entertain the idea, reasoning from analogy, that the christian priesthood was to be less privileged. Will W. T., then, affirm that because our bishops are not so many "lowly men," that the *church* is not apostolic? It would not be difficult "to point out the fallacy" of W. T.'s argument with reference to the independence of our church; but he will have learned, since his article appeared, that he misunderstood the meaning of the term as I used it.

We next proceed to notice "Scrutator's" article. He finds fault at the onset with our witnesses, and calls exactly similar testimony to his aid. I shall not be deemed presumptuous by your readers, if I direct their attention to the works of Inett, Stillingfleet, Barrow, Mason, Beveridge, Lloyd, Hales, Owen, and Burgess, for the purpose of examining this important part of our early church history; and I think they will find in them the following position established, viz., that the arguments in favour of the preaching of St. Paul in Britain are so strong, as not to admit of a doubt in the minds of those who have duly studied the question, aided by the researches of the *Welsh archaeologists*; whilst the claims in favour of Joseph of Arimathea and Aristobulus, as advanced by Cressy and others, are now generally deemed unworthy of notice. With reference to Joseph of Arimathea, we may mention that Bishop Stillingfleet, in his "*Origines Britannicæ*," chap. i., has ably examined all the circumstances connected with tradition, and has satisfactorily proved the improbability of his mission to this country at all. No mention

is made of it by Gildas, Bede, Asserius, Scotus, Marianus, or any of the early writers. Sancto Paulo, in his Sacred Geography—Great Britain—treats the story of Joseph of Arimathea as a complete fable.

When speaking of St. Paul's visit to Spain, "Scrutator" says,—“But is our friend not aware that it has been a disputed point with bible students, as to whether the country there referred to is the same as the one known to us by that name?” I must confess my ignorance, and feel proud that in doing so I agree with such men as Dr. Adam Clark, Dr. McKnight, and others: in fact, there seems to be no doubt in the minds of our best commentators on this point. “Scrutator” directs my attention to the Triades. I have before me a book on the British Church, written by a Welsh clergyman, a thorough Welsh scholar, who maintains the same view as I have put forth. He often mentions the Triades, but still believes in the apostolic origin of the British Church. It is highly probable that Brân invited St. Paul to visit Britain (he being his contemporary prisoner at Rome), and that he afterwards consecrated Aristobulus a bishop for the Britons.

“Scrutator” will know, ere this, that the superstructure I have reared on the carefully laid foundation does not contain, because it was unnecessary, what he ironically calls a “holy thing.” My only object was to put forward, in a tangible shape, what I had been led to believe, after long and careful study. I will just close the question by briefly recapitulating the chief points I wish to impress on the minds of those who have read my articles in Nos. 21 and 22.

The church in our favoured island was planted by St. Paul, shortly before A.D. 61. That she flourished in the second and third centuries. “In the fourth century some of her faithful children received the crown of martyrdom, during the Diocletian persecution; and, on the accession of Constantine to the throne of the Cæsars, we find her recog-

nised as a portion of the great christian community by all other churches, her prelates regularly attending her councils, and subscribing their decrees and canons. In the fifth century, owing to the sanguinary devastation of Britain, first by the Picts and Scots, and subsequently by the Saxons, the church for a time became partially obscured, and shrunk before her enemies within the remote fastnesses of Wales and Cornwall.”

Augustin, on his arrival, found a christian church, possessing, as we do at present, an apostolical priesthood. The bishops and clergy would not acknowledge his authority, for which some 1,200 priests and monks were cruelly murdered. At the Council of Frankfort, A.D. 794, the Pope's commands were rejected. The British Church lived during the 200 years of Danish invasion. Edward the Confessor resisted the Pope's claims. William I. and II. protested against the Papal power with natural sternness; Henry I. with intelligence and firmness. In fact, there is no period of our history when the Papal jurisdiction existed as a right. Occasionally some sovereign or prelate, bolder or more learned than his fellows, would resist this usurpation: among these champions we find Robert Groslète, bishop of Lincoln, and John Wickliffe. The *Statute of Praemunire*, A.D. 1393, gave the Church of Rome in this land a fatal blow, from which it never recovered. The victory at Bosworth Field placed the house of Tudor on the British throne, and before that house was displaced, bad as some of its sovereigns were, the Reformation was carried on and completed.

My reply is finished. The reader who ponders the subject will see some of the conclusive evidence which early authentic records afford us of the apostolic origin, the orthodoxy, the vigour, the independence, and we may add the primitive virtual, indeed literal, Protestantism of the church of our forefathers, the church still of the “British Isles.”

J. B.

NEUTRAL ARTICLE.

ANOTHER element can be introduced in the discussion of this subject, which for want of a truer term we may perhaps call Neutral.

Strange it is, that in this discussion the existence of the ancient British Culdee

Church should have been so little alluded to! Let me first, then, give its history, from which afterwards we may derive some views bearing upon the question in debate.

Whoever may have been the first individual promulgators of Christianity in our

live land, the Culdee Church, as the oldest Christian ecclesiastic establishment in the British isles, ranks in precedence above the Pope's Papal Church in this country: and though its remaining records, brief as they are, presents a bold protestation against its usurpations in the name of Peter. It was thus founded. About the year 563, Columba, with twelve of his followers, left his native Ireland, as the Venerable Bede records, "to preach the word of God to the provinces of the Northern Picts." After converting them to the faith of Christ, by his precepts and example, he received from them the island of Iona, for the purpose of founding a religious community, of which he was the first abbot—his companions forming a college of apostles and elders. Thus they received the name of Culdees, from the Gaelic word *cuil*, signifying a cell, the individual apartment in a convent. In Iona they thus lived as a religious community, "having all things in common," like the early disciples at Jerusalem; and in that island, thus hallowed by sacredly ancient associations, was the centre of their operations for the conversion of their forefathers to the gospel. Bede gives a brief account of a mission sent from Iona to Northumbria, under Aidan, a monk or overseer ordained for that purpose. Aidan, he tells us, always had "for its government a presbyter abbot (or patriarch), whose authority both the whole province, and even the bishops themselves, by an universal constitution, ought to be subject, after the example of their first teacher, who was not a bishop but a monk."—"From this island," he adds, "and from this *collegio sanctorum*, was Aidan sent, having received the degree of a bishop." The king, Oswald, he further tells us, "sent to the elders of the Scots, among whom, during his banishment, he had been baptized, that they might send him a bishop, by whose doctrine and ministry the nation of the Angles, which was governed, might be instructed in the Christian faith." Sergenius, then patriarch of Iona, held a council with his elders upon his communication,—“the faces of all that sat there were turned to Aidan;” and “they determined he was worthy of the bishop's office, and thus, making him bishop, they sent him forth to preach.” To this apostolate of Aidan's, the great and venerable establishment of Landisfarne, or Holy Island,

owed its foundation. After his death, Bede further reports, that “Finan, in his stead, received the degree of bishopric, being ordained and sent by the Scots.” The progress of the Culdee Church, however, is involved in much obscurity. The Romanists, when they arrived at power, probably destroyed their records. The chief college of Iona was burnt several times by the Danes and other enemies, and had its martyrs in an abbot and fifteen disciples. Notwithstanding these disasters, northern learning was greatly indebted to its institution. It was for a long period the great European school of theology and science. Its library was famous, and its piety without imputation. Many other were the collegiate establishments which branched from it, although we know but little of their history. Those in Scotland gave to that country its early European reputation for learning. Certainly also, at the time of the Roman Pope Gregory, when Augustin was sent by him to the heathen Saxons of Britain, who were then even the most numerous part of the population, the ministry of the primitive Culdee churches was in full activity. In doctrine, also, the Culdees sided with our illustrious countryman, Pelagius. The Romish party thence, on their introduction to England, attacked them as heretic, gained or bribed the ears of the princes against them, and, assisted by the arm of flesh, seized upon their bishoprics. Hundreds were slaughtered at the Culdee convent of Bangor, under the swords of the Romish Saxons—newly converted, as Rome converts. Several centuries after Augustin, nevertheless, establishments of “the old religion,” as it was well called, still remained in obscure parts of Britain. Giraldus Cambrensis refers by name to the Culdee churches, as existing in his day. Bede further informs us, that the members of their colleges, “according to the example of the venerable fathers,” lived by the labour of their own hands. Lingard informs us, after Bede, that “the little property they enjoyed was common to all.” Thus they were orthodox to the custom of the church at Jerusalem, although heretics to the usurping bishop of Rome. The Romanists attacked them on their time of keeping Easter, and on their mode of tonsure. They also accused them of not instituting the confessional. It may also be inferred from Bede, that the Culdee Church baptized “in any

water they came to," without any ceremonies similar to the Romish rites; and Lanfranc reports also that the Irish Christians baptized infants by immersion, without the use of a chrism. The "real presence," and image-worship, formed also no part of the Culdee creed. The war between Rome and Iona was, therefore, one of life and death. In this Rome came forth the conqueror, through her money, her arms, her skill in intrigue, and, not least, the easy nature of her conversions. Her idolatry was more likely to gain Pagans, than the pure Christianity of the Culdee colleges. Still the old religion of Britain fell not without a sacred struggle. Buchanan informs us, that Boniface, an agent of Rome, upon a visit to Scotland, was opposed openly by two learned Culdees, Clemens and Samson, who told him freely, that he, and those of his party, studied to bring men to the subjection of the Pope and slavery of Rome, withdrawing them from obedience to Christ; that they were corrupters of Christ's doctrine, establishing a sovereignty in the bishop of Rome as the only successor of the apostles, to the exclusion of other bishops; that they used and commanded clerical tonsure; that they forbade marriage to priests, and extolled celibacy;* that they caused prayers to be made for the dead, and erected images in their churches; that they had introduced into the church many tenets, rites, and ceremonies, unknown to the ancient and pure times, yea, contrary to them. For this, Clemens and others suffered martyrdom. Even as late, however, as 1176, Gilbert Murray, a young Scotch clerk, chivalrously asserted the claims of the Culdee Church, in the face of a cardinal legate from Rome. Now, desolate and in ruins, are Iona and its colleges. "The

* It might thus be inferred, that the Culdee convents were not oelibitary, and that their ministers were not monks except in the sense of cœnovices—partakers in a collegiate form of life.

island, which was once the metropolis of learning and piety, has now no school of education, or temple of worship." Yet, "perhaps in the revolutions of the world, Iona may be some time again the instructress of the western regions." In history, at least, though dead she still speaketh.

Having thus sketched her history, let us ask, What does the past existence of the Culdee Church say in proof or disproof of the apostolic origin and national independence of the British Church? It declares to us the fact of an ancient church, existing in these islands, as purely apostolic in principle as possible, and thus utterly at variance with churches claiming to be apostolic, only by successive impositions of hands. It informs us, that that church asserted its independence bravely against Roman usurpation, but evidently also, that it was neither state established nor generally received. It declares to us, that it was subdued by Rome—therefore that the church which in this country had the most ancient claim to apostolic origin, lost its independence, and ceased to be "the British Church." The present state Established Church of England derived its ordination from Rome—not from the Culdee Church. It is a branch, therefore, from the Roman, and not from the British Church. The confusion increases. Let it do so. Inward things are assuredly superior to outward; and an apostolic spirit to an episcopal ordination. I throw, then, this sketch of the Culdee Church, with its purposely crude conclusions, as flax to the flame, satisfied simply to add another element to an important controversy.

G. B.

[We insert the foregoing article on account of the interesting information which it contains, and from a desire not to restrict our contributors in every instance to affirmative and negative positions—Eds.]

The world would be more happy, if persons gave up more time to an intercourse of friendship. But money engrosses all our deference; and we scarcely enjoy a social hour because we think it unjustly stolen from the great business of our lives.—*Shenstone*.

Thou mayest make thyself more learned by reading, but wiser only by acting; spend not all thy vigour in discipline, in the dressing-room of the soul, but step out into the world, and live as well as think.

Politics.

OUGHT THE JEWS TO BE ADMITTED TO PARLIAMENT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THIS is a question of two sides, and each thought to possess sufficient plausibility to adapt it for the *British Controversialist*. It is so; but it is, at the same time, an instance of native right obscured, of the very simplicity of plain, unmistakable self-evidence mystified—all thanks to the darkness and cruelty of the past, and the conventionality and world-lug Christianity of the present! But this is not the only interest which has been so acted upon by misconception, mistaken zeal, vicious tendencies, and traditional influence. Distrust, scorn, and malevolence,—these, as the foster children of sordid interests, and the vicious germinations of race-bounded sympathies, have had to do inimically with the varied interests and the temporal relationships of humanity.

Traditional influences and the petty predilections of race do not confine themselves to oral expressions, for they have had the hardihood and energy to manifest themselves in some three or four pages of negative matter in the present discussion, assuming to themselves the formidable appellation of "Veritas." "Veritas" does, indeed, bring before us some vague apprehensions and mysterious hints as to the direful results of a practical recognition of the eligibility of the Jews for parliamentary duties, but that is all. The separation of church and state, which he regards as a consequence, and from which he apprehends so much evil, is anticipated by an increasing number amongst Episcopalians themselves as something very desirable. Again, how the co-operation of the Jews with the legislature can seriously affect the democratic interests of our country, we can scarcely conceive. They might, possibly, prove antagonistic to illiberal, sectarian, and class legislation, and in this we should rejoice. We can scarcely imagine "Veritas" to be extraordinarily grave when he speaks of the probability of national servility ensuing from this concession to the Jews. Imagine England with her attainments, her onward impulses, and her political position,

crouching beneath a nation scattered and feeble! The Anglo-Saxon fire is to pale before the self-invoked faintness of the Israelite life! A nation receptive and reflective of the illuminations of "the Sun of righteousness," left to the mercy of those that court a worse than Egyptian darkness, rather than receive the "true light!" And then think of these results flowing from our yielding to the Jew that which we believe to be his right, and which we cannot, without moral injustice, withhold! The writer, having bent the necks of the "free-born English," should have placed the feet of Salomons or Rothschild upon them, to have completed his caricature of a possibility. We may point out a calamity he appears to have forgotten; not that we have any design of adding to the intensity of his apprehensions, but that his intelligent patriotism may induce him to rouse the country immediately to its danger, for we have the enemy in our camp and in our counsels—Disraeli,—shorn it may be of some of the most obnoxious antecedents of a Jew, yet still sufficiently connected with that nation to be its "friend at court." And if capacities and intentions be exerted so mischievous to our nation as "Veritas" believes to attend the Jew, as a necessary consequence of his religious peculiarities, Berkshire ought quickly to look for some other representative, and London and Greenwich will shrink back—the one into its fogs, the other into its park seclusion—abashed at their infatuation, under the consciousness of which they will doubtless, with yet more profound humility, unconditionally accept the guidance of those "lords spiritual" who, with their compeers of kindred interests, and like sentiments, have shown how they intend to deal with innovation upon *their* constitutional inheritance.

We would now deal with "Veritas" incidentally, as to the remainder of his antagonistic positions.

The Jew is looked upon by many as a stranger and sojourner amongst us; but this

is not so much his own view, for the national relationships most obvious to the Jew are such as connect themselves with his present and personal history. The land of his birth has manifold and every-day associations, vieing in their minutiae and power with that of the Gentile. His interests—commercial, social, and political—are those of the country he inhabits. He is a loyal subject, a peaceful citizen, and, in some cases, is high and active in municipal office. But although he may be everything that a citizen, a subject, and a neighbour should be; and though, by virtue of his merits, he is invested with municipal authority; yet his religious peculiarities cause his repulsion from a theatre of action where questions of sect and creed ought never to be met with.

To dispute the rights of a Jew to a legislative position, of course involves an interference with the rights of a people; and, therefore, if the presence of a Jew in our legislative assemblies be a contravention of the sectarian and accidental phases of our laws, to prohibit such presence is to do despite to the broader, more sacred, and essential principles of our constitution. To withhold legislative rights from the Jew is also an interference with the electoral rights of a general constituency, and a government which does this not only inflicts simple and individual wrong, but violates the rights and dignity of the English people, and performs an act of unconstitutional power.

The Jew is the Christian's compeer and co-equal in regard to all those rights and dignities incident to the organization of government amongst a people. They both are similarly affected by the dependent nature of a national administration, are similarly related to its honours and powers, and their interests being equally involved in its operations, their influence is equally legitimate, and the performance of duties is equally the business of both. Their creeds are at issue, but these relate to their God. Their rights are mutual, identical, and inter-dependent; their social interests are common; the machinery of government is the property of the community, and of every individual of that community.

In considering this question of the Jews' admission into Parliament, there are many who never think of going back to the true principles of civil polity and government,

but they take that compound idea "Jew," and see how it will agree with our church and state constitution; and finding that it will by no means adapt itself, they (if somewhat philosophically disposed) search deeper, and find that the results of its artificial introduction would be the dissolution of the incongruous components in the constitution itself, and they summarily conclude that reason, and wisdom, and religion, are all against the Jew being treated as another man. But are such actually ignorant, or obstinately unmindful, of the truth, that an administration, free of all ecclesiastical elements, mindful of the community, unmindful of the sect, is the only government legitimate, equitable, and impartial, and therefore the only one adapted to man? Cæsar and Cæsar's government have to do with man socially, not religiously; with man politically, not ecclesiastically; with man temporally, not eternally; and with man as related to his fellow-man, not as related to his God. All arguments gathered, then, from ecclesiastical connexions are worth nothing, and it is only such as come from legitimate and logical sources that can at all affect the Jew's right to take part in the counsels of the land of his nativity; and such, we believe, to be entirely wanting. It is his religious peculiarity that precludes the Jew from the legislative department of our government. But the religious peculiarity of the Romanist is quite as obnoxious to our Protestant constitution; that of the practical and intelligent Dissenter is opposed to its ecclesiastical character; and the Infidel is consciously and boastingly antagonistic to all its religious tendencies. The known Infidel, the Dissenter, and the Romanist, occupy their seats, but the Jew is not allowed his. Their positions are similar, but the force of public opinion has obtained liberty for the first three, but tyranny and injustice still do violence to the fourth.

Although the chosen medium of incalculable blessings to the Gentiles, the Jewish people were expatriated, denationalized, and forced to seek a refuge amongst the stranger nations of the earth. It is, therefore, not merely injustice, but injustice of the most abominable and despicable nature, to deny their descendants the common rights of a community. Their national antecedents are a powerful plea for their generous wel-

opportunities of advancement, to of dignity and influence, a to offer. Their long association, sequent identity of their interest hies with the people amongst lwell, constitute their authorita- to all privileges of the nation. s came amongst us as oppressors lera, but we do not deny the ir descendants. The Jews came as peaceful and honourable men, ts of *their* children, as English- s fellow-members of this social have been withheld from genera- ration, and are now most tena- ited.

, solitary slave; Mordecai and ized captives; all of a hated e yet, on the knowledge of their , and on the conviction of their pacities, raised by idolatrous e most important positions of

power and trust. The Jewish religion had always the over-shadowing of a terrible omnipotence about it, which made men fear for themselves and their gods; and their idolatrous faith had nothing to fall back upon against the religious influence of an Israelite prime minister, except apprehension and uncertainty; yet they put all real power, all weighty national interests, into the Israelite's hands. We, conscious of the new-born might of the phoenix Christianity, and intelligent respecting the absolute weakness of the God-forsaken Judaism, do yet make our apprehensions one ground for refusing the Jew a place amongst our national councils; we refuse him on the ground of certain accidents in our constitutional embodiment, the presence of those accidents being palpably an enormous iniquity. We exclude the Jew, although the chosen representative of two of the most important and enlightened constituencies in the kingdom. W. G.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

d simply ask "Adelphos," the e affirmative of this question in ry number, whether the sole between an English Jew and

Protestant or Roman Catholic s difference?" If it is so, what s of that separate, yet not sub- ationality, which constitutes the culiar people?" There is incor- h that religious difference a ference also, and it consists in r faith necessitates them to look any country save their own, as for the time being merely, and hich they are in daily expecta- g recalled. They believe, that to which they belong shall yet, now not how soon, be re-estab- r the personal governance of the Their sympathies hover round wever lightly we may esteem

in a religious view, politically it assumes a large measure of for the patriotism of a Jew, land of his adoption must be indeed; this bond of union can r unite him to that country only s ultimate hopes are centred. s of English Protestants are n England; so, too, are those of

Roman Catholics, although they do abcrate slightly towards the pontificate.

We should like to be very brief, and yet we should like to place this question on the broadest basis of which it is susceptible. We submit the following statements towards this end.

1st. The stronger and more numerous the ties which unite a nation and its legislators, the greater probability there is that these legislators will act with fidelity to the people.

2nd. The ties by which men are most closely allied in civil relationship, are common descent, common faith, frequency of intercourse, similarity of interests, and kindredness of feelings and habits.

The Jew, belonging to a distinct race and a different country, professing an adverse faith and avoiding marital alliances, have not—cannot have—that sympathy with the people, that attachment to the country and its customs, which would justify us intrusting him with parliamentary privileges. These are defects which are not surmountable, except by a renunciation of his religion, his habits, and the aspirations natural to a Jew regarding country—terms clearly impossible, and yet terms, his acquiescence in which is essential before senatorial dignities

can be claimed for him as a right, for without such a radical change he cannot stand on the same footing as our own candidates, and it would be displaying an unbecoming partiality for foreigners, as well as be insulting to the genius of our own countrymen, to give the precedence to the Jew, unless there exists an equality on his part, not to speak of a superiority, though one might very properly do so. To counter-balance these defects, the Jew ought to possess qualities outshining those of Englishmen.

The writer already referred to proposes a series of questions ending with the following as an appropriate climax:—Is he (the Jew) eminently notorious for dishonesty in his mercantile and business transactions? “Adelphos” must have laughed to himself while penning this sentence, knowing well that no one feels at ease in dealing with a Jew. We confess great deference to the aphoristic wisdom of the nation which pronounces the Jews to be a people prone to overreach. The specious queries of “Adelphos” are completely answered by asking antithetically, Is the Jew a *better* citizen? Has he been *more* faithful to the trust reposed in him as sheriff, alderman, justice of the peace, &c.? If not, then no superiority has been established; but superiority must be established, else the objections urged

are not overcome—a satisfactory reason has still to be adduced for preferring a Jewish legislator.

“Adelphos” further says, “They (the Jews) would absent themselves from debates on church questions.” If their religious tendencies are likely to have this effect, better retain the disabilities. Englishmen are not wanting who can deliberate on such questions without being under any necessity of shirking their duties. We are not illiberal. Surely it will be conceded that the candidate who can best further public business is the one who should be elected. We would infinitely rather have persons professing the most heterodox opinions to share in our national councils, than admit Jews, and this too not without reason: the former being allied to the country by numerous ties, offer a guarantee that the confidence we repose in them will not be abused; but we must say we fear the malign influence of Jewish wealth.

An important trust is placed in the hands of electors, as they choose representatives, not for themselves only, but for the masses who do not enjoy the franchise privilege; it therefore becomes them to employ that trust warily, that they may not compromise the national interests by the choice of Jewish members.

ARISTIDES.

Social Economy.

WOULD COMMUNISM PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

ACCEPTING U. M.'s definition of Communism, viz., that it is “that principle which would render common property to the entire human family the earth and all things which from time to time are produced from it, whether they be animal, vegetable, or mineral, and which would, at the same time, render the production of them common,” we purpose in this article pointing out the injustice, impolicy, and immorality of that principle, and consequently its utter incapability to promote the happiness of the human family; and, in conclusion, briefly to glance at the respective articles of U. M. and L. I.

in support of the affirmative side of this interesting question.

We are first to show the injustice of the Communistic principle, which would make all animate as well as inanimate matter common property—the productions of all the property (consequently) of all.

No two men are constituted alike; with the powers of mind or body, with like energies of disposition, with the like capabilities in producing property—the effect of labour. The capabilities, and the labour, are the individual's; consequently their produce—property—should be the individual's also.

The cause is the individual's, the effect is the individual's. Upon this principle society from its very commencement has acted; this principle is sound in theory and sound in practice.

Our ears tingle with the sudden "Hold hard!" of our opponents. "We deny the soundness of the principle. The labour, say we, should be the community's; consequently the property should be the community's also." Indeed it is time for us to draw tight the reins of our onward-speeding senses; for we perceive that at this early stage of our journey lies the object we are pursuing—the chief point at issue between us, viz.—Whose property should an individual's labour be, his own or the community's?

Suppose an individual to be wrecked on an island uninhabited by man. Fortunately for him he has been able to save from the wreck a few grains of corn and an implement or two of husbandry. He tills the soil, sows his corn, and in due time reaps the harvest; living, in the meantime, upon such animal and vegetable products as he has been able to discover. He labours himself, for himself, and the product of his labour—property—is his own. After a time, a party of individuals are wrecked upon the same island. Would it be just or right for them to take possession of the plot of land cultivated by the first comer, and make it and its products common property? Would their arrival make the labour of the primary occupant any the less his own property? Not at all. The cultivated plot should remain inviolate the property of the first occupant, who had expended labour upon it; and the new arrivals should go forth and subdue the land in like manner, receiving that kindly assistance from the former which his religion and his nature would prompt him to give.

No one, we think, will deny the soundness of the principle here laid down.

Time speeds on, and the patriarch of the island is on his death-bed. But not alone. A manly youth, his eyes moist with tears, hangs over him. He is the fruit of the dying man's marriage with one of the second comers. The love of the old man beams forth from eyes soon to be closed in death; and a smile playing round his mouth betrays an inward contentment and happiness. He dies; and his weeping son stands

the possessor of that land, extended and improved, on which the old man had spent so much weary labour. A cottage, furnished, rudely indeed, is his also, likewise the effect of his father's labour. Will any of our opponents question the right of the son to this property? Can they argue that it should have devolved upon the community? Who had so good a right to it as the father's own son? Would the old man equally have delighted as much in planting those hedges, in building that cottage, in manufacturing those chairs, those tables, those platters, those drinking vessels, had he known that they would, on his death, have become the property of the community? We venture to answer, No! We venture to assert that it was a father's love that stimulated him to labour so energetically, and with such effect. Who shall dare assert that the happiness of his death-bed was not one of the rewards of his toil! Who shall say that the smile-educing agent was not the knowledge that his labour had not been in vain, for it had blessed his son whom he loved! Whose blood does not boil at the thought of a stranger's shadow hereafter darkening the doorway of that cottage, of a stranger feeding at that board off the fat of that land? And is this feeling the result simply of education? Surely not! Surely it is the result of a principle implanted in our nature; for have we not found that from the very beginning it has been so—from the very first the child has stood in its parent's shoes?

And has not this hypothetical case a parallel in reality? Is it not an example of the manner in which the soil of the earth has become the property of individuals? Yes! Occupancy gave the original right to all landed property.

We hold, then, that we have established the justice of the claim to the soil by occupancy, and to other property by inheritance; and therefore any principle, as that of Communism, which denies this right, is unjust in its effects.

We have said above that men are not constituted alike, that they do not possess equal capabilities of producing property. A. can produce such a property in ten hours as would take B. fifteen hours to produce, and yet in a society of Communists B. would be as well off as A. "Very good," answer

our opponents; "if A. possesses better capabilities than B., inasmuch as his capabilities belong to society (for, as the productions of his capabilities belong to society, so his capabilities—that is, their use—must belong to society also), so he ought to exert them to the utmost for society's benefit, in the same manner that B. exerts his as far as he is able, and yet receive only the same amount of compensation." For the sake of argument, granted. But what guarantee have you that B.'s lesser capabilities are not the result of idleness whilst learning his business, or of wilfully working in a wrong manner? Or, how know you that he does not really possess equal capabilities with A., only he is too idle to exert them? Such may be, and such undoubtedly but too often would be, a result of the Communistic principle. A., a clever and industrious man, would receive no greater remuneration for his services than B., a stupid and idle man. This our opponents must admit to be an evil, and a great injustice.

But this brings us to our next point, viz., that the Communistic principle is impolitic. This, we think, can be easily shown. It would prove a barrier to all progression, by removing that great incentive to exertion, the accumulation of property. Had not the old man of the island a right to the land he had cultivated, to the cottage he had built, and to the furniture he had made, we believe he would have cared but little to have laboured so diligently upon them. And had not society in general the same stimulus to exertion, we believe it likewise would care but little to produce anything beyond what was necessary to its immediate wants. We believe that in time society would become little more than a food, clothes, and shelter producing community; with no knowledge of science, and with no works of high art. How has the knowledge we possess of chemistry been, for the most part, acquired? By hard, close, life-devoted, non-self-supporting labour in the laboratory: and the seeker may have been rewarded by the discovery of one truth of practical benefit in a life-time. Would the community consent to support the alchemist, whose labour is of such a non-producing quality? We trow not. How, again, would it be with the astronomer, the traveller, the mechanist—*would society support them a life-time, in*

return for *the chance* of the discovery of a new planet, of a new land, of a new piece of machinery? Again our answer is, we believe not. There is no *certain return* to labours of this nature, at the same time that their pursuit costs not only labour but money and material too.

Again, as Communism compels an equality of education, would it be found that A. B. C. and D. would consent to labour, respectively, in the field, in the mine, in the dockyard, in the manufactory, whilst E. F. G. and H. laboured respectively in the office, in the studio, on the bench, in the parliament house? We think not. We believe that Communism would lead to endless heart-burnings and discontent. It would engender the feeling that I, A. B., perform labour costing much more exertion than that of C. D., and yet I am no better off. If these things be true, the impolicy of the Communistic principle is evident.

Of its immorality we will say but little; indeed it is a point upon which we dare hardly venture.

Carry out the principles of Communism to their natural and legitimate ends, and they necessitate a total overthrow of the present existing relations of man to woman. Communism would make woman common property; all children would then be common property also. This, horrible as it may be to contemplate, is but the natural effect of Communism. Let woman, as now, be the property of one man, and the offspring, during its minority at least, is their joint property, to educate to fill any station in society they may please. And should it not be so? Or should the community have the power of stepping in between the child and its parent: of saying, "thus and thus shalt thou bring it up; these religious, these social, these moral principles shalt thou instil into it?" Or worse still, should the community, with ruthless hand, crying aloud, "My property! my property!" have the power of snatching the sleeping infant from its mother's breast, or from its father's knee? Should the community have the power of thus rudely severing all those fond ties with which nature has bound together the child and its parents? Would it be better that the community should soothe the bed and close the eyes of its departing members? Or would a loving child perform the office

less tenderly? But the child knows not its parent; 'tis the community's property, the community's offspring!

Upon this point we will dwell no longer, readily believing that our friends U. M. and L. I. never for one moment contemplated the terrible idea (too horrible to be spoken of without a shudder) of woman and woman's offspring becoming common property.

We have endeavoured to show that Communism is unjust, impolitic, and immoral in its tendencies: whether we have succeeded or not, our readers will be able to judge; but if we have, it requires no argument to demonstrate that a principle which tends to so much evil cannot promote the happiness of man.

With a brief glance at the respective articles of U. M. and L. I., we will close this already, we fear, too lengthy article.

U. M. lays down three propositions, which he endeavours to substantiate. The first is, "That the earth and all that is produced from it by the labour of man, ought to be common property." In support of this he argues that God made the earth for the use of man; made it possessed of "an intrinsic value," as it contains "the elements of wealth," and as that value was given to it by God for the use of man in general, no individual can have an exclusive claim to it. In answer we say, that the inherent wealth of the soil is made available by labour. Hence the labourer causes the soil to bring

forth its treasure, and consequently that treasure should become his property, to demand a consideration, in the shape of rent, from the next occupant, for the improvement he has effected in it.

His second proposition is, "That every able-bodied man ought to perform his share of labour." Freely admitting the soundness of this principle, we humbly submit that we have already shown that this object is not obtained by Communism.

His last proposition, viz., "That a community of labour and its results would be for the happiness of mankind in general," is in fact the whole question at issue between us; and therefore we apprehend that it requires, in this place, no special answer, as its refutation has been the aim of the whole of this article.

The chief point of L. I.'s argument is that a body of Communists—the Moravians—have been able to effect a great deal of good. Whether this result can fairly be attributed to the working of the Communistic principle or not, we have not time to go into. But, we beg to remark, that the results of Communism applied to a small body of men, united in principle and object, and the result of the principle applied to society at large, would be by no means necessarily the same.

We have then, for the reasons above advanced, come to the conclusion that Communism would *not* promote the happiness of man.

F. F.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In order satisfactorily to answer this question, it will be necessary briefly to inquire, firstly, what Communism and its professed object is; secondly, what the evils are which it proposes to remedy; and, thirdly, if by its practical adoption the happiness of man would be promoted.

1st. Communism is that principle which seeks to restore the primal rights of mankind, by abrogating all claims to the possession of private property; and to secure the equal rights of all men to develop their unequal faculties, by establishing a community of goods and a concerted combination of effort amongst all classes of society. Communism being a principle of union and equality, its object consequently is to overthrow the despotic tyranny of monopoly, and,

by uniting opposing interests, to succeed in breaking down the barriers of *caste*, and in eradicating that spirit of sly distrust which now reigns paramount in society; and thus, by promoting free intercourse amongst all men, pioneer the way for the realization of that pure and loveable Christianity which it was the glorious mission of Christ to teach.

2nd. In order to elucidate our next proposition, we must briefly glance at the present condition and aspects of society.

The present age has been not inappropriately called the "buccaneer stage of labour and civilization." For are not all classes arrayed against each other by dint of opposing interests? Is not commerce, as at present conducted, a trick—a mere species of gambling? Is not wealth becoming gradually

monopolized in the hands of the favoured few, and the gulf between the richer and poorer classes every day widening? Is it not a fact, that while, by increased mechanical inventions, the power of production being thereby indefinitely increased, the labourer has gradually sunk in the scale of social degradation; and, instead of having leisure to cultivate his intellectual, moral, and religious capacities, he is engaged "in a round of toil, sleep, and animal relaxation, which presents (indeed admits of) no gleams of high and holy thought?" Again: "In Great Britain there are 70,000 persons who possess among them an annual revenue of £200,000,000, or about £2,800 a year each; on the average, our paupers, criminals, and vagrants, number 2,000,000; and 17,000,000 depend on wages; while of these there are annually about 100,000 mechanics and labourers out of employ. In the presence of a tremendous growth of evils like these, is not our position most ominous?"* To what cause may be attributed the existence of the above evils, other than to the *private property system*, which, by giving birth to a grasping spirit of selfishness, not only deprives thousands of their just rights, but threatens to undermine the social fabric? Let our opponents answer.

Keeping the preceding *facts* in view, how absurd does the following statement, from the pen of J. N., appear:—"Be it our task to show that the realization of these (Communist) principles in practice would plunge us into difficulties tenfold more harassing (?) than the evils complained of in our present state." Whether he has duly performed his *task* the intelligent reader will decide.

In making the preceding observations, we would not be understood as sounding the tocsin of alarm, by proclaiming the "decadence of England," but as simply endeavouring to show the necessity of a great social change; for we believe that the evils enumerated are to be traced rather to the operation of causes *none* of which indicate national decline; hence we conclude, in the words of an able writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, "that the world can never have been intended to be, and will not long remain, what it is."

3rd. Having shown the evils which Com-

munist proposes to remedy, we will now show how, by its practical adoption, the happiness of man would be promoted.

Its fundamental principle being that all property, all talent, all strength, all learning, all labour, is but a trust from God, to be applied for the benefit of all, it follows that the energies of all in a Communistic state would be directed and employed, not to administer to an exclusive spirit of selfishness—not to crush the weak and favour the strong—but in drawing out the kindly sympathies of human nature, by furnishing the means of physical, intellectual, and moral development, and thus promoting the happiness of man.

But, says C. W., Jun., this is "too visionary to be productive of really beneficial results." What! "can men unite to erect bridges, to construct railroads—ay, and to destroy one another in war—and yet not coalesce to make one another happy? Then, indeed, is the history of human progression well nigh closed, and the regeneration of man a vain hope!" One thing, however, is certain, that Christianity in connexion with *competition* can be but a meaningless word, the import of which can only be fully realized in that state of society where unity of interest binds man to man in the silver bond of universal brotherhood; and yet this is that state at which the "sympathies" of J. N. "revolt." Communism, in seeking to infuse a spirit of vital warmth and christian energy into the present cold, selfish, and gold-worshipping system, is by C. W. pronounced "visionary;" and J. N. has "no faith in its practicability." But, however "visionary" the Communistic principle may *appear*, by that eternal law of progress which will at last rectify every wrong, and vindicate the equal rights of men, the social dependence of one man upon another must cease, as befits the brethren of one family whose origin and destiny are the same.

Having shown that Communism would promote the happiness of man, we will now present our readers with an extract from the writings of Mr. James Silk Buckingham, to show that it is capable of being *practically realized*. After spending a day in visiting the Rappite Community, in America, in the year 1839, he says:—"Our last thought, on closing the day, was as to the contrast of happiness and virtue which this community of 500 persons presented, when compared with

* "The Age and its Architects," by E. P. Hood, p. 76;—a work to which the writer is indebted for much valuable information in relation to the present condition of society.

any other community, of the same number and extent, in any part of the world; and my conviction was, that there was nothing impracticable to prevent the formation of similar communities."

We will now endeavour to cope with one or two of the principal objections urged by J. N. He says, "Whatever social form we adopt, we must accept human nature as it is." True; but *human nature* is one thing, and its *manifestations* are another: in the one case it is ever *the same*; whilst in the other, chameleon-like, it is ever and anon assuming new aspects, the result of subjective influences, for "men are as much influenced and controlled by the social system in which they live, as a raft is by the current in which it floats."* Hence the importance of surrounding *human nature* with good social influences. He also says that "the upholders of Communism take a too favourable view of human nature." We thank him for the compliment. He also urges that, "reason as we may, from infancy to age, man clearly manifests his attachment to private property."

* G. Combe's "Moral Philosophy."

Query, Does a mere "attachment" confer a claim of possession? He also asks, "If that motive (fear) to action be withdrawn, what shall secure us against a relapse into barbarism?" We answer, that motive which induces to activity in one degree of development is inoperative in that of another. Hence, in proportion to the progressive development of human nature, so will it be influenced by higher motives to activity, until "*conscience or reflection*," to quote Butler, assume "that absolute authority which is due to it." So that a "relapse into barbarism" may be said to be impossible. In relation to the "unworkableness" of Communism, mentioned by J. N., we believe that as practice develops the advantages of the system, and exposes its weak points, the former will become increased, the latter remedied, until the principle has been carried to the greatest extent to which it can subserve human happiness.

We have now followed J. N. through his principal arguments, and not wishing to exhaust the patience of the reader, we make our bow and retire.

HOMO.

The Societies' Section.

ADVICE TO STUDENTS.

SEEK to attain the power of mastering the mind, for this is the foundation of all mental discipline. This mental exercise is the groundwork of character. He who enters upon it seriously, under a sense of its supreme importance—who trains himself to habits of close and strictly voluntary thinking—who holds a stern control over the subjects to which his thoughts are habitually directed, guiding them to the worthy, and putting away the frivolous, the degrading, and the impure,—that man among you will attain to eminence, for he is pursuing with all his might the highest of all earthly interests—the culture of the ennobling faculties of mind, and the discipline of the heart. Gather knowledge by every means in your power, and seek it in every path. Knowledge is obtained by observation: cultivate, then, the power of attention. Let nothing escape you unobserved; be all ear, all eye, all grasp. Knowledge is obtained by reading: but read wisely and well; make choice only of the best of books, read few, but all that are necessary, and make their contents your own. Knowledge is obtained by thinking: combine facts, so as to deduce principles from them; invigorate your minds by independent contemplation and reflection; learn to form sound opinions for yourselves, and train your minds to that proper self-reliance which stamps strength and character on thought. Knowledge is obtained by

experimenting: much of the instruction which you will receive from lectures and from authors, you can only rightly appreciate through personal experimentation. Knowledge is acquired by conversation: learn to converse wisely; glean in conversation the knowledge which springs from the observation, reading, and reflection of other people, and strengthen the hold of your own information by imparting it to others. Knowledge is acquired by recording: keep your knowledge from perishing; make it infallibly correct by recording your facts and thoughts. Knowledge is acquired by the practice of composition: learn early to fix, regulate, and multiply your ideas, by writing; increase the retentive power of your minds, and acquire perspicuity and correctness by this exercise; arrange all your professional knowledge in manuscript, so that you may know exactly the amount of your store, and the more easily weed out your errors. You will get knowledge in vain unless you combine facts so as to draw from them general principles. Cultivate good principles as long as you live; be never weary of the pleasures of science. Beware of the approach of that sore delusion—that you have done enough. “*Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.*” Profit by the ancient proverb—“*Sui cuique mores conciliant fortunam;*” “manners make the man;” and wipe away every fault in your demeanour. Acquire right principles, generous sentiments, and an uncompromising adherence to truth; and by good examples acquire the essential rules of good breeding—“in honour preferring one another.” Adopt the feelings and bearing of gentlemen; and, as good manners are better taught by example than by precept, associate with those distinguished by elevation of mind, sound principle, and good behaviour. Acquire a ready sense of the *quod decet* and *decorum est*, and indulge in no unseemly peculiarity. The student for whom I have the most hope, who, in my opinion, will attain honourable distinction in his profession, is the youth who enjoys a satisfaction altogether independent of immediate reward or of prospective advantage, in passing through the arduous paths of science; who possesses that sound and healthy condition of the mental faculties which enables him to take for his motto—“*Labor ipse voluptas.*”—*Extract from a Lecture by Dr. Watts, of Manchester.*

ON LEARNING LANGUAGE.

IN studying language, it is important to remember that words are but the outward expression of what passes in the mind; and though the things which the mind can busy itself about are innumerable, the ways in which it can deal with them and put them forth in speech are few and limited. Language, in fact, may be compared to a wood with innumerable trees, but one well-trodden broad path through it, which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred will lead the traveller right; there are also bye-paths leading to particular spots, and the pathless wood with plenty of scope for wandering and being lost. Suppose, then, a stranger brought into this wood, and desiring to pass through it. The only sensible advice that could be given him would be, “Keep to the main road, beware of the thickets, avoid entangling yourself in bye-paths or short cuts, till you are thoroughly acquainted with the general features and bearing of the country.” Can any way, then, of teaching language be right, which is not analogous to this? Ought not all the curiosities and exceptions to be passed over unexplained, until the common every-day framework of

ordinary sentences, the beaten path that is, be well known? It will be time enough then to explain and point out the apparent deviations and inconsistencies. But this is the exact contrary of the method usually pursued. The mind of the unhappy learner is stuffed with all manner of exceptions long before he clearly knows what they are exceptions to; and with idioms countless, long before he is aware what is the general type from which they seem to depart. His bewildered brain is set floating amongst numbers of isolated cases, and unconnected facts; there is only one omission, unfortunately rather an important one, no chart or compass is given him for his guidance.

Let every teacher (who knows such things himself) boldly resolve to notice nothing till his pupils are thoroughly acquainted with the common principles of all language. There will be less show for a time, but more safety. Men with a certain reputation as scholars not unfrequently cannot give the principle of the simplest step in their parrot-like knowledge. How often, for instance, it is said, he is a very clever man himself, but he cannot teach others. In plain English, he has never been taught the principles of his knowledge, he has not thought them out for himself. The result is obtained by unceasing practice, and as that is incommunicable, others cannot benefit by it. Blind men can *feel* their way along familiar paths, but are unable to give directions to others' sight.

Now the study of language may be looked at in two points of view; first, what language itself is; and, secondly, how we ourselves should behave with respect to it. The one being as it were the road to be travelled—the other, directions for travelling on it well. A few observations on this second point will not be out of place here. First, then, let no teacher or learner pass beyond a technical or general term, such as *subject*, &c., until it has become his own natural way of expressing the thing signified by it. It would be no more absurd to have daily lessons about the *Ornithorynchus*, those engaged in such lessons being totally ignorant of the sort of animal meant, than it is to use such terms as *subject* daily, with a similar ignorance. Very often a careful examination would detect some foolish after-mistake, or even habitual mental confusion, as having arisen from the practice of using technical and general terms without realizing their full meaning. No time is misspent which clears the general terms and first steps. Probably, few National school classes would thoroughly master those two terms, Subject and Predicate, without at least a month's careful training. To give such training without being wearisome is in itself an art. My own method was, when the short reading lesson was ended, to select an easy sentence to be written down by one of the boys on the black board; then the writing and spelling was criticised by the class; after that, the subject and predicate of that sentence were required, with the reasons for the answers; then we left it, and proceeded to build up the sentence on which we were regularly engaged. Every lesson having *one special point as its main object*; this one point, with the summing up at intervals the chain of argument, and recapitulating day by day the former links, being quite sufficient to occupy the whole time, and as much as could be done with profit to a class; the first maxim of good schooling being, not to sacrifice the good of the many to the quickness of a few.

Having cleared the terms made use of, the next great aid in difficulties will be to observe the principle on which the words of *every* sentence are *arranged*. Now in *every* sentence without fail this is certain, that the words which will most *clearly* and *forcibly* introduce to notice what the speaker wishes to make known, *will come first*; and the rest follow, according to its relative importance. It is *probable*, therefore, in any sentence that the

subject stands first; because what the speech is to be about must generally be mentioned first for *clearness*' sake; and without *clearness* nothing can be *forcible*. Viewed separately, the predicate, or what is intended to be said, is generally the principal notion; and, therefore, if *force* alone were the question, to put the predicate first would generally be the most *forcible*. But care must be taken, lest the apparent gain in *force* of this arrangement be more than counterbalanced by the loss of *clearness*. This brings out the value of *formal cases*. When a language has *formal cases*, it gains the power of varying the arrangement of a sentence almost infinitely, without confusion, according to the relative importance of the thoughts to be expressed. Thus in the sentence, "Cæsar killed Pompeius," if the notion required to be expressed most strongly was, that it was *Pompeius* who was killed, a Latin boldly put it first:—

Pompeium Cæsar interfecit,
Pompey Cæsar killed;

and no confusion ensues. In English this can seldom be, unless the predicate consists of the verb of existence, and an adjective; as, "*Great is Diana of the Ephesians*;" where any one can see the increase of force resulting from the position of the predicate. The English language, however, has a plan for getting the predicate first in some instances. The words "*It*," and "*There*," at the beginning of sentences, are often *false subjects*, mere subterfuges for getting the predicate first in the arrangement. Thus—

Subject.

"It is a good thing—to save a man," equalling, "To save, &c., is."

Subject.

"There is no hope—that he will do it," equalling, "*His* doing it is hopeless."

Therefore the words "*It*," and "*There*," are as it were sign-posts, pointing out that the predicate follows immediately, whilst the subject comes last. In English, then, if the first word is *It*, or *There*, or an adjective with the verb of existence, the predicate is generally first in the arrangement, and the subject last. It is obvious that when pronouns occur, as they have formal cases, there is much more liberty of arrangement, as no confusion can ensue. Any dependent noun, however, can be put first as the subject, by casting the sentence into a passive shape; as, "Pompey was killed by Cæsar." This is a common way in English of getting the emphatic word first.

Again, in examining a sentence, if there is any difficulty, whatever conjecture on the point appears most probable, it can be tested in the following manner. Let the learner instead of the word or words which are difficult, substitute others easier, which certainly are, what he conjectures the expression he doubts about to be. Thus, in the sentence "*Will he come fast?*" say he thinks "*fast*" an adverb, but is in doubt; let him substitute an unmistakeable adverb; for instance, "*quickly*:" if that which is substituted exactly fills the grammatical place of the original expression, the conjecture is probably right; if it does not, it must be wrong.

Again, there is a difficult sentence to be mastered; how many let their minds float about at random over it; and unless they find it out by some sudden flash, do nothing. Instead of this, let the learner seize at once on some point he is certain, or nearly certain, about, say the subject, or the principal verb of the predicate; and try whether the rest agree

with this, and makes sense. It is very seldom, indeed, that both subject and predicate are difficult to unravel in the same sentence. At all events, let him examine whether there is more than *one* word that can be a predicate, or more than *one* word that can be a subject; let him decide as to which shall be his certainty; say the subject is, then what verb can possibly form the predicate? Is it transitive? If so, where is the case? Is the case qualified? and so on; adding, by degrees, the rest till all coheres. This, then, is a rule. Let all uncertainties be tried as to their agreement with some certainty. If there is no certainty, let the most probable guess be assumed as certain for the experiment.

Again, it is a great thing to know what the difficulty really is, and where. When this is found, let all words, or clauses, be put out of sight for the time, excepting the word, or combination, that is puzzling. This often clears the matter. As an assistance in doing this, let it be borne in mind, that whenever a relative occurs, it is certain that the clause, in which the relative is, is a complete sentence in itself, as far as grammatical construction goes; and therefore will not influence grammatically any other part of the sentence. In any difficulty then, that clause may be set apart, and shut out from the rest, and examined separately.

Very often the difficulty arises from some part of a sentence not being before the eye, but understood. Let every clause therefore, when this is the case, be written out with its full complement of words. This often clears the matter.

Again, much ignorance arises from rules being allowed to lie about in the mind as mere dry statements. This should never be permitted. Let the learner always frame *for himself* an actual speech or formula, the easiest possible, which is an *example* of the rule, to try his doubtful cases by. Thus, if the rule is: Every pure supposition will have both clauses subjunctive with past tenses of the auxiliary verbs, or verb of existence, let him give it life by having a model supposition to refer to; as, "*If I were foolish, I should learn the rules like a parrot.*" Or if a question is asked on any point, let him at once make a sentence which represents the required instance, and examine that; this plan will marvellously tend to the producing an answer. Thus, say the question is asked: "Explain the arrangement of a sentence which begins with the word *There*." Let him at once write down such a sentence, and examine it; and so on.

Let, therefore, all uncertainties be tested by some certainty, real or assumed.

Let the difficulty be hunted out, and everything else put aside till that is cleared.

Let the suppressed words of a sentence, if needful, be filled in.

Let all rules have reality given them by being embodied in the form of single examples.

Never let technical, or general terms, be passed over until they are completely understood.

Never let the mind float about at random; but let it be fixed at once on some *one thing* to start with.

These rules, regularly acted on, will carry the learner through most labyrinths securely.

—*Rev. Edward Thring, M.A.*

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Spalding.—Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The members of this useful and valuable institution celebrated their seventh anniversary by a public soiree in the Town Hall, on Friday evening, January 9th. There was a very large attendance, the hall being crowded in every part. The orchestra was occupied by several professional and amateur instrumentalists, whose performances contributed much to the cheerfulness of the meeting. After tea the chair was taken by Mr. George F. Barrell, the president, who gave a slight sketch of the early history of the society, and stated that the first two annual meetings were held in private houses, and that the total expense of the first one was only 3s. 6d. He referred to the fact that each individual was the centre of a circle of social influence that was most powerful in influencing the minds and hearts of his friends. Man was essentially a social being; and therefore, intuitively seeking friendship, he was adapted for the interchange of sentiment by his various faculties; but, as the common intercourse of every-day life was not fitted to be the medium of all kinds of conversation, various means had been adopted to supply this defect. In the earlier ages of the world there were the "wise men," who were consulted upon every occasion, and whose extensive knowledge was, in those dark ages, looked upon as supernatural; as society advanced, books partially supplied the place of the wise men; but it was not until the invention of that triumph of man's ingenuity—the press—that their influence became sensible, and when, as if to invest the mighty machine with double importance, the Bible blessed it in being the first book printed. As society progressed, so the means became inadequate to the end, when, as a bright sun to illuminate the world, the newspaper arose to dispel the mist of exclusiveness, and, by its powers of discussion and criticism, to confine to its proper sphere the arrogance of authorship, and show to the people not only one, but many views of the same thing; but in these days newspapers had been found insufficient to supply the growing demand for information, and to quench the burning thirst for knowledge. Other means had therefore been added in clubs, athenæums, mechanics' institutions, and last, but we hope not least, mutual improvement societies; and on behalf of the one whose anniversary they had met to celebrate, he made an earnest appeal. Addresses were afterwards delivered by Messrs. Foster, George, Brown, Walden, Pepper, Locke, Johnson, South, Woods, &c. It is worthy of notice that all the speakers were members of the society, and all under twenty-four years of age. This fact does the society great credit, for, so far as we can judge from the report which has reached us, all the addresses were excellent. We subjoin as a specimen an outline of that given by Mr. George:—At the time Athens was at the highest point of her power—her walls unbroken, her glory untarnished—when her citizens were honest, truthful lovers of freedom—they were remarkable for one particular trait of character, viz., their love of knowledge. Men from all parts of the world might be found at Athens, mingling and associating with their wise men, seeking after know-

ledge. Since that time eighteen hundred years had rolled away, and a mighty change had come over the world—a change which had pulled down from the highest point of prosperity and power nations which were once the glory and the terror of the world; while, on the other hand, it had raised up other countries from darkness and ignorance, and caused them to shine forth most gloriously. But, not only had this spirit of change affected material things, crumbling to dust as well the walls of palaces as the poor man's cot, but it had led men to entertain fresh thoughts, hold new ideas, and see things in a fresh light, so that they who lived in the present day had found that many things which were esteemed by the ancients as the highest wisdom, had proved to be but real folly, while, on the other hand, many of those theories which they rejected with disdain, treating them as wild chimeras of heated imaginations, had proved to be great and glorious truths; yet, notwithstanding all this change, the same love of knowledge—or curiosity, if he might so call it—might be found in the men of the nineteenth century, as distinguished those of early times. But what he wished to draw their attention to was—the advantage of a steady, determined progression. If they wished to know what progression could do, let them go into the forest, survey the giant oak, and reflect that there was a time when any little boy could have snapped that oak asunder—when any schoolboy, with his knife, could have cut it in twain; or go across the Atlantic, to New York, and remember that that city, now the dwelling-place of hundreds of thousands, was but a little while ago no city at all. They need not cross the sea for illustrations—England was the noblest monument of progression in the world. There was a time when her flag was not unfurled on every sea—when, instead of being the first, she was the last of the nations. Let those who were ever dreaming of the past—who looked with disdain upon all present things—who would wish to bring back that "golden age," encompass themselves on every side with darkness, ignorance, and superstition, bring back the time of tyranny and despotism, fill their hearts with fears on account of wars and internal discord, and then they would have a picture of the "good old times;" but as for them, in the name of young men he answered they would not spend their time in dreaming of the past, but would live in the present, and prepare for the future, and a glorious future was before them. Never was there a generation whose privileges had been so great. A period there was when only the rich and the noble of the land could have wise men to teach them; but, thanks be to God, they had a glorious band of tutors—the great and noble of every land, philosophers of every age, statesmen of every clime, poets of every tongue. He exhorted them to be up and doing—to be determined to progress, whatever difficulties might stand in their way. If they learnt but a little every day, they would soon have a goodly stock.

Walthamstow Mutual Improvement Society.—This society was established in January, 1851, for the purpose of assisting all who were desirous

of becoming members in intellectual and mental culture; and in improving them in general branches of literature. We resolved to hold meetings every Monday evening during the winter season; at which meetings essays were read, and lectures delivered, by some of the members; and, upon the whole, our proceedings were conducted in a very orderly and creditable manner. A few of the subjects chosen were as follow:— "Astronomy;" "The Importance of Mental Culture;" "The Steam Engine;" "A Lecture on Music, with characteristic illustrations;" "The Lives and Character of the Apostles," and on "Education." We discontinued our meetings in May, with the intention of renewing them in September, which was effected on the first of that month, when the society was reorganized, and founded on a surer basis. A committee and other necessary officers were elected, and a code of rules, principally selected from those published in your pages, was agreed upon for the regulation of our transactions. Debates were introduced, and essays and lectures continued to be read and delivered on various subjects; all our proceedings being totally unsectarian. "Freedom of thought and expression" is our motto.

On Monday evening, January 27, 1852, we held our first annual meeting; which was, on the whole, very satisfactory and cheering. The enjoyments of the evening were considerably enhanced by the introduction of tea and coffee, of which about thirty-five persons partook; after which several of the members addressed the meeting on subjects suitable for the occasion. May this example act as an incentive to young men in other localities to "go and do likewise," and they will find that, though they be few in number, their labours cannot fail to be productive of results beneficial to themselves and to others. We have at present about thirty-two members.—J. W.

St. Mary Cray, Kent.—*Christian Association and Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.*—This society was formed on the 9th of December, 1851, by a few earnest, right-minded individuals, who had at heart the attainment of knowledge, that they might be the better able to aid in the dispersion of ignorance, error, and crime, and the diffusion of light and happiness. After three or four weeks were spent in arranging to work the society, Mr. J. S. Featherstone, superintendent of the Educational Institute, was requested to give an opening address; which request he complied with, taking for his subject, "Self-Education, its Helps and its Hindrances;" at the close of this address ten more young men gave in their names, desiring to become members. Our rules differ very little from those given in Vol. 10 of the *British Controversialist*; where you adopt the penny-a-week system, we have taken the voluntary principle, and believe it will prove satisfactory to the members, and advantageous to the society.—J. H.

Blackburn.—*James-Street Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.*—The motto, "Union is strength," has been well illustrated in connexion with this society. For some years past, efforts have been made to establish a "Young Men's Society." This object was partially attained by the formation of two week evening classes, in connexion with the select classes in

the sabbath school, and conducted chiefly by their respective teachers.

These two classes have, however, been merged into one, and received the above designation. Thus from small beginnings has arisen a society definite and substantial in its constitution, and flourishing in its condition; and we believe that, by wisely-directed efforts, it will prove a blessing to the town at large. With a view of bringing this society into greater notice, its members, with their friends, held their first annual tea-meeting in the schoolroom of James-street Chapel, on Saturday evening, February 7th. The room was beautifully decorated with evergreens, interspersed with flowers.

The Rev. Edward Jukes, president of the society, was in the chair. Several excellent speeches and recitations were delivered by various members. A selection of suitable songs, &c., was given with great effect by Miss Lewis and Miss Bulcock, Messrs. H. Grime, W. Riley, R. Sanderson, J. Bullon, and J. Wallacey (members of the Blackburn Choral Society). "Woodman, spare that tree!" sung by Mr. Sanderson, and "Home, sweet Home," sung by Miss Lewis, were much applauded. The meeting altogether was of a pleasant and instructive character, and all present appeared much pleased with the whole proceedings.—L.M.

Glasgow Literary Institute.—The annual festival of the Glasgow Literary Institute was held in Messrs. M'Lauchlan's rooms, on Tuesday evening, 10th of February, when a large company assembled to do honour to the occasion. Mr. E. W. Henry, the founder of the society, occupied the chair. After tea, the chairman gave an eloquent opening address, in which he ably combated the idea that such societies give rise to a merely superficial knowledge, which is dangerous in its tendencies, or that they induce a partiality for discussions of a whimsical or absurd nature; and urged upon young men the importance of cultivating their whole mental faculties, and the degree to which literary and debating societies might be made subservient to such an end. Mr. Robert Bryson followed, on "The Merits and Advantages of cultivating a Taste for Reading;" Mr. Hurst on "The Cultivation of the Moral Feelings, in union with the Intellectual;" Mr. Robert Dalzell, on "The Pleasures derivable from the study of the Sciences," in which the speaker took occasion warmly to oppose the anomalous idea of the works of God leading to a dislike or repugnance to the word of God; Mr. Andrew Anderson, on "The Characteristics of our Age," which he demonstrated to be mainly progress and individuality, or the onward progressive motion of the whole mass, as individuals in the first place, and consequently, also, in their conjoined capacities, and showed the necessity of so bestirring ourselves as to keep abreast with the spirit of the age.

Wines and fruit were then handed round to the company, and the chairman gave in succession, each prefaced by appropriate remarks—"The Queen"—"The Prince Consort and Royal Family"—"Houses of Parliament"—"The Glasgow Literary Institute," which were received with all the honours—"The Corresponding Members," responded to by Mr. Bryson, the corresponding secretary, who proposed the health of

the old members of the society, who, though not now of the society, were to-night with them. A succession of toasts, literary and otherwise, interspersed with songs and recitations, continued to enliven the proceedings of the evening. A few minutes before eleven, Mr. John Robb proposed, in a highly eulogistic speech, the health of the chairman, the founder of the society, which

was rapturously received; immediately after which the company broke up, highly delighted with the proceedings of the evening. We understand the enthusiasm of the meeting is likely to result in a large increase to the membership of the society. We earnestly hope it may be so, and wish them a large amount of success in their undertaking.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

84. Can any of your readers give me information respecting the art of Venuliloquism, and say whether there are any treatises published on the subject?

85. Being desirous of becoming proficient in the science of Navigation, and not feeling satisfied to take things as laid down in works written on the subject without knowing the *why* and the *wherefore*, I shall feel greatly obliged if you, or any of your contributors, will kindly inform me whether there are any elementary spherical trigonometrical works applicable to navigation published? by whom, and at what price? Your reply, in "The Inquirer," will oblige,—A SAILOR.

86. Two works of high character having been, by different friends, strongly recommended to me as a theological student, both of which I cannot afford to purchase, but wish to get that one which in the opinion of competent judges possesses the most merit, displaying alike the soundest reasonings, from acknowledged premises and acutest theological criticism, may I request from those of your readers whose studies may have led them to become acquainted with and compare the two together, the favour of their opinions upon their respective merits? The works I allude to are Dr. Bloomfield's "Greek Testament, with English Notes," in 2 vols.; and the Rev. H. Alford's "Greek Testament," in 2 vols., of which only vol. i. is yet published.

From the little I have seen of Mr. Alford's work, he appears to me to be deeply imbued with Rationalism (falsely so called), allowing the gospels no more weight or authority than what we should allow to mere memoirs of our Lord's actions on earth—notes of a bystander on his discourses; and doing his best to undermine their claims to inspiration, according to the ordinary interpretation of that term. But I do not wish to prejudge Mr. Alford's performance; all that I desire is the decision of some person capable of forming a correct one, upon his merits as a theologian, compared with Mr. Bloomfield.—FIL.

87. Is the study of the classics and foreign languages indispensably necessary to a young man who has not got much spare time, and who intends gaining efficiency in the force of language and expression as a literary man and public speaker?—T. G.

88. Perhaps one of your correspondents will inform me of a good work on English composition. I have Cornwell's "Young Composer," but if I can obtain a better work I shall be glad to do so.—H. C. D.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

89. *Pantheism and Rationalism.*—We are pleased to observe that "Republican" recognises the fact, "that much knowledge comes of humility." Those who desire to *know*, wrong themselves by curbing the spirit of inquiry. We have consulted some of the most modern and best authorities within our reach on the points of inquiry now before us. Pantheism is defined to be "the doctrine which teaches that the universe is the supreme God," or more fully, "a philosophical species of idolatry which maintains that the universe is the supreme God. Some persons, however, have also applied the word Pantheism to that doctrine of theology according to which God's spirit not only pervades everything, but everything lives through him and in him, and there is nothing without him," Acts xvii. 27, *seq.*; Ephes. iv. 6. *Pantheistic*—confounding God with his works. These are from Maunde Craig (author of the "New Universal Dictionary" defines thus:—Pantheism (*pan*, all; and *Theo*, God, from the Greek). In metaphysical theology, the theory which identifies *nature*, or the universe in its totality, with God. *Pantheist*—one who adopts the theory of Spinoza, that the universe is God. *Pantheistic*—in sculpture a term applied to statues and figures which bear the symbols of several deities together, the meaning of which has been a subject of much dispute among antiquaries. **RATIONALISM**—a system of theology which began to be developed in Germany during the latter half of the last century. The followers of the system deny the divine origin of the scriptures. They differ from the Deists (who maintain that the Bible is the product of fraud), and allege that notwithstanding all the apparent incongruities of the Bible, it is based on historical foundations, and ascertain which is the problem of reason. The authors of the biblical books, according to the Rationalists, were not impostors, but men of moral purity, who, being deluded by their imagination, considered things to be miraculous which were only natural occurrences. Other portions of the Bible, they say, which have hitherto been considered as recording supernatural events, need only to be divested of the figurative mode of expression peculiar to all eastern nations, in order to appear as the records of ordinary occurrences. The theologians who first came forward as advocates of this new system were Semler, J. D. Michaelis, and J. G. Eichhorn, who were considered its chief supporters, until Paulus joined their ranks. The Rationalistic system of interpretation has been chiefly confined to the Old Testament, although many passages in the New

outlined as open to be tested in all passages so marked, it is considered as figurative expression, thus a happy chance is being seized as a verbal play on an object, as for Harry in the branch occurred among the ends of which was the springing hypermetabolite. These theory considered a several form of nature remain for its role quick structural revision. The only one it shows the tabular records witnesses and manifestations, the conclusion that it is study a from these persons which are all of mythical stories, anything—thereby in fact, fully denying all as its sacred origin. To be the "National Lycopodium" of Naturalism had been applied a study to portions of the old has lately been carried out in the reference to the books of the y. Dr. de Vries, Harry, Thomas, and, "Das Leben eines Botanik" reads. This work the profound great learning produces self-sufficiency, has called forth a host of but the best efforts against it by the hypermetabolite school, its first term, seems to have arisen from new work and the verbal wranglings of Strauss and but between this school and the is still going on. Both parties enough to give way whenever solid points have been proved to be in manifest from the "Life" of a few years ago by Haeckel. Second editions of the work of C. W. Jan.

of Helmer Wenderer—Your Filolia, quotes from "Chilids" using lines—

that, careless glances
I Helmer Wenderer here,
a look beyond the dark,
a hope for rest before

now, I am convinced that the old style, in her old, concrete wonder— who in gloomy death, yet finding no consolation on them he who first of Helen now of's blood—the ancient Cain.

T. H. H.

a question of "Filolia," I think of it. Byron refers to the wild game but, the French novelists, and still has novel called "It runs then (as near as I can see) before, where he was about what his own, and then as he was a very young he wished to rest the door of a Jew. The great would not permit him to do so. He on, then about not rest here as required. "Then with not a, further doubt than ever rest upon him the outcome of branch (all the day of judgment).

ANTI-SCIENCE.

72. History—We do not know what amount of education Harry and previously well-digested information A. H. H. has at command to aid him in his work to enter on the study of Botany, but, certainly, he will need them both for in no branch of scientific research are the qualities of order in thought and methodical arrangement of information so thoroughly or indispensable as in the prosecution of botanical researches.

The distributors that meet the student of this subject at the outset will be found in exact ratio to the state of preparation he brings to the task. If accustomed to passive study and continuous observation the student of the physiology of plants will not present insuperable toil. And, if acquainted with the course from whence scientific nomenclatures are drawn, the terminology of history will be deprived of that formidable appearance it wears to the novice.

But if the student does not possess these preliminary substrata of knowledge he will find it necessary to proceed with caution and severity of application, which if he be courageous, will work a valuable result in strengthening his perceptions and enlarging his views.

The branch of natural history is usually divided into three sections of Systematics, Physiology and Economic Botany, the meaning of these terms is sufficiently obvious.

Before any system of classification can possibly be constructed whether natural or artificial, the various parts of which a vegetable body consists must be clearly defined. It is therefore of paramount importance that the student should thoroughly acquaint himself with the external form and appearance of the stem, roots, stalks, buds, leaves, appendages, flowers, and fruits of plants.

Having obtained a competent knowledge of the several component parts of vegetable bodies the inquirer will perceive the reasons of the principles that form the basis of a natural system of classification. The outline of which is here subjoined.

Matter composing vegetable bodies takes generally one of two forms—either that of a cellular substance which may be said to bear a resemblance to the flesh of animals, or a vascular tissue, analogous in its appearance to a system of nerves and veins.

Of these two classes the vascular are by far the most numerous and varied in their development, and have been divided into subclasses according to the number of the vascular tubes in each individual. Monocotyledonous plants having one vascular tube or cylinder, and dicotyledonous plants which have two or more cylinders, to these has been added the tribe of acotyledonous plants destitute of any tubes though most plants of this class, it should be observed, living in the wilderness.

The divisions thus marked by the preliminary appearance of plants is still further developed in the leaves and arborescence. In a comparison between the leaves of a monocotyledonous and dicotyledonous plant, it would be found that the principal veins of the former arrange themselves into nearly parallel lines of equal thickness; whilst in the latter there will be found a large vein up the centre of each leaf, from which smaller veins proceed on each side, branched by still smaller veins, and presenting a reticulate appearance.

The ligneous portion of a dicotyledonous plant consists of pith, wood, and bark, which the sap increases every year by a fresh deposit of fibrous matter just within the bark; presenting the well-known appearance in timber cut transversely of concentric rings. From the manner in which dicotyledonous trees are increased by successive layers on the outside, they are also termed exogens, signifying to increase externally.

The trees belonging to the order of the monocotyledons are all natives of the tropics, and the germinating principle goes on in the centre of the trunk, which, pressing against the outer cuticle, causes its densest wood to be found at the bark; these trees have neither concentric rings nor medullary rays, and when cut sectionally present a mass increasing in porosity, from the above-mentioned reason, as it approaches the centre. These trees are also called endogens, signifying to increase internally.

These two orders have all visible flowers, and are called phanerogamæ; but the inflorescence of the acrogens being invisible, they are termed cryptogamæ, or hidden flowering plants. The most remarkable of the cryptogamous plants are the aborescent ferns of the tropics, which attain a height of forty feet, and present from their finely indented fronds a beautiful appearance.

Beside these primary divisions, the dicotyledonous plants have been divided into the dichlamydeæ, or those having both calyx and corolla; and the monochlamydeæ, or those having only a calyx. The monochlamydeæ are not subdivided; but the dichlamydeæ are again divided into the thalami-floræ, calyci-floræ, and the corolli-floræ, divisions dependent upon the position of the petals and stamens.

The monocotyledons have also been subdivided into the petaloid, or those with regular flowers, like the bulbous plants and the orchidacæ; and the glumaceous plants, or those that have scales or glumes, as the gramina.

The acotyledons are divided into the soliacæ, or those with leaves, and the aphyllæ, or those without leaves.

Each of the sub-classes before mentioned is divided into numerous orders, differently arranged by different botanists. They will be found enumerated in any elementary work on the subject, and to such we refer A. B. M.

From the above rapid resumé it will be seen that the principles involved in a natural system of botany are very simple, and easily to be comprehended, when once a competent knowledge of the anatomy of vegetable bodies is attained.

Indeed the whole range of natural sciences furnishes no pursuit of such a variety and beauty of development as the study of botany; for, when the grammar of the subject has been studied and conquered, and the anatomical detail and classification of plants has been overcome, and each part and order is clearly understood, sources of investigation open themselves to the eye of the student, in numbers and novelty, of which the uninitiated or incurious have little or no conception.

The vestments of beauty that the hand of God has flung with such profusion and splendour over the entire globe, offer boundless fields of research to the diligent investigator. And whether *his operations are conducted amidst the gorgeous and singular richness of the tropical plant life,*

or the more delicate beauties of the temperate zone, or even the scanty and amorphous vegetation of the polar latitudes, he cannot fail of his reward, and with wonder and devotion will be constrained to say, "What has God wrought!"

T. W. I.

The most economic, and perhaps the best, way for A. B. M. to acquire a knowledge of Botany, will be to procure, first, Lindley's "Introduction to Botany," price 18s. (Longman and Co.); then, the first part of Hooker's "British Flora;" and much assistance will also be rendered by Lee's "Botanical Looker-out"—a work which informs you what to search for each month of the year, and how and where to search. One thing you should understand, and this is, that none of the works named pretend to give you insight into the nomenclature of garden plants: the most of these are of artificial origin, and can only be fully understood by practical research and observation.

A. P. C.

80. *The Study of Phrenology.*—For the study of Phrenology, G. G. cannot procure a better work than Dr. G. Combe's "System of Phrenology," in two vols., which may be procured, second-hand, for a mere trifle—or for beginning the study, the "Elements of Phrenology," by the same author, will perhaps answer as well. With the help of one of these, and a phrenological bust (to be had of almost any chemist), he will be able in a very short time to fix in his memory the relative position and size of the various organs, a task absolutely necessary to ensure a ready application of his knowledge to the discovery of character. There is nothing, however, which will so effectually aid his progress as a careful and discriminating examination of the craniums of living subjects (himself, his relatives and friends, &c.), taking care to form no hasty conclusions at first, as the most skilful phrenologists are liable to mistake, from their losing sight of the principle that one organ, bad or good, if largely developed, may be balanced by the equally large development of another of opposite character. For instance, the organ indicating benevolence may be large, and its beneficial influence nevertheless imperceptible, owing to the undue development of acquisitiveness.

F. J. L.

G. G.—The determination at which you have arrived will materially assist you in obtaining a knowledge of the science of Phrenology. We had occasion to speak last month of the necessity for *determination* in the acquisition of knowledge. We need therefore say nothing more on this point now. The works you may consult with most advantage, are—first, George Combe's "Elements of Phrenology," price 3s. 6d.; then, "A System of Phrenology," by the same author, price 1l. 1s.; and afterwards, "Functions of the Cerebellum," by Drs. Gall, Vimont, and Broussias, translated from the French by Geo. Combe, price 8s. Also "Selections from the Phrenological Journal," edited by Robert Cox, price 5s. 6d. These are all published in London, by Simpkin and Co. and Longman and Co. There are many other works upon the science, both English and French, but the foregoing will furnish you with the "sum and substance" of all.—C. W., Jun.

82. *Knowledge of Conveyancing.*—Orion.—The first step you should take in order to acquire a knowledge of the principles of Conveyancing, is to make a careful perusal of the second volume of

se's "Commentaries," and the first volume of Williams's "Commentaries;" also Williams's "Principles of the Law of Real Property," and "Principles of Conveyancing." From these books you will derive much information and the perusal (that is, the careful reading and consideration) of them all will make you a good conveyancer, or at least might do so, as we presume you to be, in an attorney's office. I think of becoming a member of the legal profession, we would call your attention to the "Law Student's Magazine," published monthly, No. 13, Carey-street, Lincoln's Inn. In your preliminary studies you will derive full and sound practical information from it: at the present moment, however, it is peculiarly adapted to your purpose, and it happens to know that its editors have entered into an arrangement for the publication of a series of letters on conveyancing, devoid of technicalities which too often obstruct the student; and written by a gentleman in the conveyancing department. These letters will, we believe, appear in the "Magazine" this day, March 1st.—C. W., Jun.

As I do not come within the designation to whom "Orion" directs his inquiry, as a "reviewed correspondent," having only entered upon the study of Conveyancing, and it being my practice, when I come to a new subject, to have the advice of as many experienced persons as possible, I have in this had the opinion of many clever and experienced men in the profession on this subject (through their writings), and, therefore, I think it will not be thought presumptuous in me to say only, like the inquirer himself, a "blind leading the blind," for me to make a few remarks on the subject, as in thus doing I am only expressing the practical of really experienced persons on this subject. The first book, and easiest to be understood by the young student, is Williams's "Principles of the Law of Real Property," published by Chancery-lane. This work I have read with great profit, and, therefore, I can be said to have an experienced decision on it, though I have not read any of those which come after. The second volume of Blackstone's "Commentaries" should be taken up. This book contains authorities that I have seen highly recommended by them; they advise even three or more careful readings of it. Sergeant Stephen's "Commentaries" might be used in lieu of Blackstone's.

Then follows Burton's "Compendium of the Law of Real Property." This is a masterly and practical treatise. To use his own words in his preface, "It has been the author's endeavour to adapt his work (though intended to be as complete as possible in itself) principally to such readers as, being already acquainted with Blackstone, are desirous of further progress." Afterwards the following works may be advantageously read—Sugden's "Powers;" Sugden's "Vendors and Purchasers;" Haye's "Conveyancing;" Coote on "Mortgages;" Sanders' "Uses and Trust" ("the doctrines of uses and trusts," says Sheppard, in his "Touchstone," "is of the first importance to a correct knowledge of the law of title"); and Woodfall's "Landlord and Tenant." Then, to use the words of the author of one of the treatises on this subject, "Having mastered these works, the student will be prepared for all ordinary transactions. He may safely add any other modern treatises which are considered of authority." He should also take up reports, but here he must use discretion. "He may, we think," says one of my works, "safely leave the elder reporters, and keep them merely as works of reference; but he should read all the cases upon the law of property in the more modern reports, beginning with Atkyns in the courts of equity, and Lord Raymond in the courts of common law. This, of course," it continues, "will be a work of time, and must be necessarily disturbed by business, but we should advise its steady pursuit if time will allow." If the inquirer is a student intending to enter the ranks of the profession, there is a work, published monthly, which I would especially recommend to him, viz., the "Law Student's Magazine," price 1s. 7d. It contains really valuable information, being totally devoted to the wants of the student. Any information you may require on legal subjects, the editors, as I know by experience, will kindly give; and although you can generally get advice on such questions as the one now proposed by you, through the kindness of the editors of this periodical, yet such a question being entirely of a legal nature, more properly belongs, and is more fit for, the "Law Student's Magazine" than the "British Controversialist." I hope that the above remarks on the study of conveyancing, which I have culled from different authors, will contain the information that is required on the subject; but should more be required, I shall do all that lies in my power, with the aid of my books, to give it, and for that purpose forward my address.—D. H.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XIII.
Describe the state of Greek Philosophy and Aristotle.
Give a brief abstract of the Aristotelic Logic.
Explain the Categories.
Define the following terms into their regularities, and state why:—65, Pater-

noster-row — Turkey-red — twenty-six — circulatory — queen — bolt upright — was inflated — parallel-logram.

5. Distinguish between Extension and Comprehension, and give examples.

6. Define and exemplify Quantity and Quality.

7. Define and exemplify Subalternation and Opposition.

8. What is Conversion?

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. II.

1. Construct a form similar to that given below, and arrange the following nouns in their proper columns:—London, being, book, affliction, whiteness, house, Liverpool, seeing, John, highness, multitude, slavery, manhood, friendship, congregation, laughter, Southampton, pen, son, knowledge, paper, parliament, hearing, feeling, committee, affection, belief, hope, Louis, nation, man, concourse, heart, intentions, king, revolution, America, seed, herd, bloom, shadow, maid, flock, trammel, queen, prince, Victoria, Albert, gardener, Henry, rector, executrix, affinity, region, crasure, attendance, acrimony, fallacy, ardour, animalcule.

NOUNS.

PROPER.	COMMON.		
	Collective.	Verbal.	Abstract.

2. Supply definitions of the various parts of speech, and give examples of each.
3. Explain the difference between abstract and verbal nouns.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—I.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

1. As the weight of a cubic foot of water is 1000 oz., and cast-iron is 7.248 times heavier, the weight of a cubic foot of iron = 1000×7.248 oz. = 7248 oz. Therefore the number of cubic feet in the whole mass equals the number of times that 7248 oz. is contained in it. Thus—

$$\text{No. of c. ft.} = \frac{1500000 \times 20 \times 112 \times 16}{7248} = 7417218.543$$

$$\therefore \text{Side of the cube} = \sqrt[3]{7417218.543} = 195.02$$

H. E. D.

$$2. \text{Area of field} = 950 \times 870 = 826500$$

$$\text{Area of ditch} = \frac{950 \times 870}{20} = 41325$$

Let x = the width.

Length of ditto = $950 \times 870 - x$ by quest.

Area of ditto = $x(1820 - x) = 1820x - x^2$

Another expression for area.—Change all the signs and transpose:—

$$\text{Then } x^2 - 1820x = -41325$$

Complete the square, and we have

$$x^2 - 1820x + 910^2 = -41325 + 826100 = 786775$$

$$x - 910 = + \sqrt{786775} = 887.03$$

$$\therefore x = 22.97, \text{ or } 1797.03.$$

The width of the ditch, therefore, is 22.97.

J. B.

3. Let $2x$ = the number of coins of the greater value.

$2x$ = the number of the lesser. Then by the question—

27 ($2x$) and 21 ($3x$) are their respective values.

$$\therefore 54x + 63x = 1287 \text{ shillings.}$$

$$\therefore 117x = 1287$$

$$\therefore x = 1287$$

$$\frac{117}{117} = 11$$

$$2x = 2 \times 11 = 22 \text{ number greater.}$$

$$3x = 3 \times 11 = 33 \text{ number lesser.}$$

$$\text{Proof:—} 22s. \times 27s. = £29 \text{ } 14s.$$

$$33s. \times 21s. = £34 \text{ } 13s.$$

$$\text{Total.....} £64 \text{ } 7s.$$

W. R. C.

4. Suppose 1s. given to each common soldier; then each lieutenant had 2s., and each captain 6s., and the total amount given would be $135 + 24 + 54 = 213s.$ But the actual total amount we find to be 35,997s., or 169 times the supposed sum: therefore the sum given to each will be 169 times the supposed sum.

\therefore Each private received £8 9s.; lieutenant, £16 18s.; captain, £50 14s.

C. D. S.

Geometry.

1.—First Solution.—Let ABC be the triangle of which the side $AB = 1290$, $BC = 555$, and $AC = 1390$. It is required to find the perpendicular, BD falling upon the greater side AC . Bisect the base AC in E . Then (Euc. 47, 1 Cor.) $AB^2 - BC^2 = AD^2 - DC^2 = (AD + DC)(AD - DC)$ (1). For the difference of the squares = the rectangle under the sum and difference. Now $AD - DC = AC - 2DC = 1390 - 2DC$. Substituting this value in (1)

$$E D = \frac{AB^2 - BC^2}{2(AD + DC)} = \frac{1290^2 - 555^2}{2(1390)} = 487.79.$$

$$\text{But } DC = EC - ED = \frac{1390}{2} - 487.79 = 207.21$$

$$\text{And } BD = \sqrt{BC^2 - DC^2} = \sqrt{555^2 - 207.21^2} = 514.86.$$

W. S. G.

1.—Second Solution.—Conceiving the two sides of the triangle to be 1390 and 1290 links respectively \therefore we have per trigonometry $555 : (1390 + 1290) :: 1390 - 1290$, or $555 : 2680 :: 100 : 483.9$, nearly \therefore for one of the segments, we shall have $(555 + 483.9) \div 2 = 519.45$, and for the other segment of the base $555 - 519.45$, or 35.55. Hence (Euc. b. I. Prop. 47) $\sqrt{1290^2 - 35.55^2} = \sqrt{1664100 - 1263.80} = \sqrt{1662836.20} = 1289.5$ links nearly.

The above process may be proved as follows:—Let ABC be a triangle, and from centre C with the distance of the greater side AC , describe the circle GAF , and demit CD perpendicular to AE . Now it is clear that GB = the sum of the sides AC and CB and BF = their difference. But $AD = DE$ (Euc. iii. 3) $\therefore AB$ = the sum, and BE the difference of the segments of the base, whereas GB = the sum, and BF the difference of the sides of the triangle. (From Euc. iii. 35, $AB : GB :: BF : BE$.)

POOLLEY.

2. 1848×408 = area of the building. Let x = the diameter of the circle of equal area.

$$\text{Then } x = \frac{\sqrt{1848 \times 408}}{7854} = \sqrt{900000} = 979.79. \text{—Ans.}$$

J. B.

Mechanics.

1. To answer this question it is necessary to find—1st. The weight of the stone; and—2nd. The space through which the centre of gravity would be moved to turn it on its edge. These two things will enable us to find out the units of work necessary to do it:—

1st. The weight of the block, or stone = $7^3 \times 170 = 58310$.

2nd. The distance through which the centre of gravity must be moved to turn it on its edge.

Let A B C D represent a section of this stone. The distance of c from A, the edge, B C =

$$\sqrt{3.5^2 + 3.5^2} = \sqrt{24.50} = 4.949$$

When the cube is on the point of being turned, the c will be at a in the direction A B, and will therefore be elevated in the perpendicular direction a.

$$r a = 4.949 - 3.5 = 1.449.$$

\therefore Units of work necessary to overcome gravity = $58310 \times 1.449 = 84491.19$. J. E.

2. A horse is calculated to perform 33,000 units of work per minute: multiply by 70 the number of horse power, and 60 the number of minutes in an hour = the number of units of work done per hour. The weight of a cubic foot of water = 62.5 lb.; this multiplied by 120×6 the number of feet that the water has to be raised = the total work in raising the water. \therefore Number of feet

$$\text{raised per hour} = \frac{33000 \times 70 \times 60}{62.5 \times 120 \times 6} = 3060$$

R. J.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—III.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

1. There is a field containing 10 acres, which

the proprietor intends to cover with clay to the uniform depth of 4 inches: the clay is to be taken from a pit to be dug in one corner of the field, 14 feet deep. Supposing 12 feet of this to be clay, what will be the area of the pit?

10. The value of standard gold at the Mint is £3 17s. 10½d. per ounce. Its specific gravity 17.629. Required the content of a lump which would pay the national debt, supposing it to be £780,000,000 sterling.

11. Extract the square root of 9781.21, and explain the principle of the operation.

12. Find the least common multiple of 7, 11, 19, 26, 104, and 180, and explain the process.

Geometry.

5. A cubic inch of glass is blown into a sphere of uniform thickness, capable of containing a gallon of water. Required the thickness of the glass.

6. Divide a given right line (A B) so that the square of one part shall be equal to the sum of the squares of the other two.

Mechanics.

5. The height of a waterfall is 10 feet; the quantity of water which falls over per minute, 350 cubic feet; the modulus of the wheel, .6. Required the horse power.

6. The long arm of a lever of the first kind is 4 feet; the short arm 6 inches. What power must be applied to lift a weight of 2 cwt., supposing the lever to be without weight?

Erratum.—In question 6, Arithmetic, instead of "empty cistern be filled," read "full cistern be emptied."

Notices of Books.

A Lecture on the Civilizing Influences of Christianity. By Rev. W. Shepherd, B.D. London: Hall, Virtue, and Co.

Notwithstanding that there are some dark clouds in our social horizon, it is still admitted by all impartial observers that there has never before been a civilization more complete in all its bearings than that of the present day. Other ages and countries may have possessed a civilization more captivating, and in a certain sense more brilliant, but never has civilization been so deeply rooted and so lasting in its character, as it is now. Various causes have been assigned for this: for on so interesting a matter, of course there has been much speculation. That religion has a powerful influence upon the present state of society, no one can for a moment doubt; and to trace out and shew us how this religious influence is exerted, is the object of the present lecture. That such a subject is worthy of the most careful investigation all will admit; and we are glad that it has been handled by a writer of Mr. Shepherd's ability. Such subjects are generally considered to be

"When unadorned, adorned the most,"

and hence, with a clear arrangement and appropriate language, Mr. Shepherd has advanced plain truths, and left them to strike home to the hearts of his readers. But let the writer at once speak for himself:—

"I said I would consider the subject as a citizen of the world, but I can scarcely realize the existence of such a character in a christian country; for we are so surrounded by the influences I would speak of—their effects have become so interwoven with all our habits of body and reasoning of mind—we have associated them so entirely with our outward walks and private paths of life, that we scarcely know how to disengage ourselves from their spell, so as to become conscious of their existence and importance, because we cannot form any distinct conception of what would have been the effect of their absence or non-existence. Indeed it is not too much to say that in this happy land of ours—this home of refined elegancies and domestic enjoyments—this abode of civil peace and systematic order—where although the highest and lowest ranks of life are placed at an almost immeasurable distance apart the various intermediate grades of society are so

fully expressed that they appear to amalgamate in one consistent and harmonious whole—the obdurate influence of Christianity form the vital momentum of public greatness and private happiness, irradiating the palace, illumining the mansion, smiling on the family hearth, and brightening sunshine on the cottage.

Again —

“For if the influence of Christianity have done and accomplished as much—as I trust to make it apparent to you by a few broad and simple facts that they have done—and that too in defiance of powerful obstacles courageously arrayed against them, is not this an evidence how excellent they must be in principle—how beneficial in operation—how valuable in possession. The evidences of this fact are not confined to one spot or epoch—neither shall we rest satisfied with one proof only—for they who would establish a great principle or evolve from their obscurity the operations of a beneficial system, must be prepared with something more than assertion—they must surround their argument with proofs—and make their proofs not only easily tested, but not only easily with their argument. . . . It is one of the most striking benefits of the influence I am speaking of that it confers not its operation to this or that individual class, but some class and affects alike all ranks and conditions of men shining not by contrast of merit but by comparison with itself, neither by the displacing of a rival, nor the humiliation of a competitor, but made evidently by its magnitude of purpose expanding into one equal and comprehensive circle of action.”

Lastly —

“In these and many other respects I believe I have proved itself a more efficient refiner of public morals and private discernment than the studies of philosophy or the controversies of reason. Its distinction is of a nobler, a more authoritative and more diffusive character. It does not give the bare moral as we to give it a spurious reality, but it rather stamps the refined one with the impress of sterling value unadulterated worth. For as a writer long since well remarked. All those things which relate to moral knowledge, taken in its widest extent, were understood by the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, in as great perfection as the things themselves are capable of. The art of governing kingdoms and families, of managing the affections and tames of the untamed multitude, of ruling these passions, and discerning concerning these several ways of working, of making prudent laws and laying down wise methods by which they might be the more easily and effectually obeyed, of conversing with each other, of giving and paying all the respect which is due to them several qualities, in short, all that is commonly meant by knowing the world and understanding mankind, all things necessary to make man wise in counsel, cautious in business, and agreeable in conversation, seem to have been in former ages thoroughly understood and successfully practiced. . . . But after all, how weak the knowledge of the ancient heathens was, even here will appear by comparing the writings of the old philosophers with those moral rules which Solomon left us in the Old Testament, and which Christ and his apostles laid down

in the New. Rules so well suited to the reason of man, so well adapted to civilize the world, and to introduce that true happiness which the old philosophers so vainly hoped to find; that the more they are understood the more they will be valued—and accordingly they have attracted even from those who did not believe the Christian religion just applause which were certainly unearned because not being led by the rewards which it proposes, nor deterred by the punishments which it threatens, they could have no motive to recommend them but their own native excellence.”

The lecture is neatly got up, and is published at a price which places it within the reach of all.

Supplement to Etymological Dictionary of Scripture Names. By W. & H. M. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

We are glad to perceive that Mr. Hird is busily pursuing his self-selected branch of labour for the time which he seeks to explore in rich in interest and instruction. This Supplement to his “Dictionary” contains some valuable information, but above all, a general index, according to the suggestion we gave a few months ago, which suggestion, it appears, after critical revision, and he grandfully acknowledges.

Præter in German, adapted for Self-Instruction. By Felix Leblin. London: Whittaker and Co.

This is a useful work, especially for those who wish to study German “without a master.” The author successfully aims at enriching his learners with simplicity and interest. Remembering that to most persons grammar seems dry and difficult, he has selected for his illustrations such gems of thought and useful and interesting information as are likely to impress the memory with worthy sentiments, and relieve the dulness of minute instruction. Believing that the best instruction is that which ultimately gives the greatest facility and shall be positive and that a thing is most easily learnt by that process which brings it most directly home to the habit and thought of the learner, Mr. Leblin proceeds on the principle of working German through its affinity to English. In various instances where the two idioms differ now he adduces examples to prove that a similar construction or expression actually exists or once existed, in English. Some of the examples quoted are given merely to show the affinity of the two languages with a view to render the German expression more familiar to an English ear or perhaps to interest the inquiring student. From the numerous inquiries which we have received respecting the study of the German language, we feel sure that we have said sufficient to direct our readers’ attention to this work.

The Characteristics of the Age, Viewed in Relation to the Position and Responsibilities of Young Men. By Rev. Ledy Buren. Dundee: F. Shaw.

This is one of that series of lectures to the “Dundee Literary and Scientific Union,” which was commenced by Dr. Duff, whose production we noticed in our January number. The present lecturer has chosen an important subject, and has

handled it in a masterly manner. He seizes upon the following characteristics of the age, and brings them practically to bear on the position and responsibilities of young men:—1st. Its immense facilities of communication, and consequent opportunities of influence between man and man. 2nd. Its gigantic social evils, and its noble struggles for their amelioration. 3rd. Its industrial activity and vast commercial expansion. 4th. Its matured science. 5th. Its diffused information. 6th. Its moral earnestness. We append an illustrative extract from his remarks under the first head:—

"Here we need no elaborate induction of particulars, but simply to bid you look around to what is going on everywhere before your eyes. In three simple facts—the railway line, the ocean steamer, and the electric telegraph—there is wrapt up the history of centuries. Here is no ordinary step in the onward progress of human things, but a vast revolution, an unmeasurable stride in the providential development of our race, introducing us at once into a new world. Just try to realize the significance of this one plain matter of fact, that thought now travels through thousands of miles on its iron pathway more quickly than the words that express it are pronounced! The time taken to utter the sounds and to indicate them on the electric dial-plate is measurable, but not the time they take to fly from London to Paris. The Queen's speech is printing in Edinburgh, while still the royal cortege is wending its homeward way to Buckingham Palace. The French *coup d'état* is known in London, while still the placards that announce it are wet on the walls of Paris. The fights of the faubourgs and the barricades are known to us while still in progress, as though the very winds conveyed to our ears the booming of the cannon, and the sharp rattling of the musketry. And this state of things will increase more and more. The new system of communication, already in such active progress, will proceed apace, and soon pervade the whole civilized world. St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, Constantinople, Calcutta, Peking, possibly even Washington and New York, will soon be practically as near to us as Paris is now. Every civilized state—the whole continental part of both hemispheres, will inevitably be, ere long, one network of railway lines and electric wires; and the great ocean steamers will complete the communication between the most distant shores. Already the Mediterranean—that ancient high-street of the world—has become but as a side street, and the great Atlantic is the crowded thoroughfare of nations; arrangements are in progress for spanning by steam transit the vast interval between Southampton and Australia; and the scheme has been hopelessly thrown out of a great eastern line running along the Mesopotamian valley, straight into the very heart of the oriental world. Strange to think of express trains rushing over the very road which erewhile Abraham traversed with his pilgrim staff—of the railway whistle echoing along that very valley of Shinar, where, when the world was young, Nimrod wound his hunter's horn! These are not flights of the imagination, but the sober realities of the age we live in. Think of it as we may, and draw from it what inferences we may, the fact is plain and indisputable. The ends of the earth are coming rapidly together; the different nations of mankind are

fast becoming one community; time and distance, hitherto the great barriers of nations, are passing away, and permitting the different races and tribes of men to meet and blend together as one people—as one brotherhood.

"Nor do men in general seem backward in availing themselves of this increased and increasing means of communication. They seem quite ready to strike hands and exchange thoughts freely with their brethren. Never were the minds of men more busy and prolific, pouring forth their thoughts through all the channels of the press into ears of their fellows. Twenty years ago Menzel reckoned the yearly tide of volumes issuing from the German press at ten millions—the number of new works at six thousand. Since that time the rate of production, which was then rising by two thousand every five years, must be very largely increased. Add to this the teeming authorship of France, Britain, America, and other less productive nations, not to speak of the incessant snowstorm of lighter literature from the newspaper and periodical press, and you will have some faint notion of that mighty tide of thought, that is unceasing pouring forth from the human mind, and flowing through all the ducts and channels of communication to the ends of the earth. Verily, in our day many run to and fro, and knowledge—knowledge such as it is—knowledge good and bad—knowledge ranging from the highest and holiest truth to the most vile and poisonous error—is inconceivably and most portentously increased.

"The bearing of all this on the duties and responsibilities of our young men is manifest enough. An age of vast influence is necessarily an age of vast responsibility. Now if ever, it is, that a man may on a great scale benefit his fellows, and live to signal purpose in his day and generation. Now, if a holy energy fire our breasts, and great and worthy ends are set before us, the beneficent influence of our career may be not only imperial, but world-wide. Now, surely, is the time for our generous and devoted youth to be up and doing; to be essaying noble deeds, and quitting themselves like men, in the great struggle of truth and of humanity that is at stake."

Selection of English Synonyms. Second Edition. London: John W. Parker and Son.

The fact of this little volume being ushered into the world under the editorship of Archbishop Whately, is sufficient to raise high expectations of it, especially when we find him declaring that "though far from presuming to call it perfect, it is very much the best (work) that has appeared on the subject." This coming from such a man is no mean praise. The subject here treated upon is interesting to those who covet the power of using the "gray-goose quill" with ability and precision, and, indeed, to all who desire an accurate knowledge of the English language. The author evidently possesses that exactness of discrimination and chasteness of judgment so essential to the right performance of the work which he has undertaken. An example or two will be sufficient to convey to our readers an idea of the value of the volume now under review.

"Also, Too, Likewise, Besides.—'Too' is a slighter and more familiar expression than 'also,' which has something in it more specified and

formal. This is the only difference between the two words. 'Likewise' has a rather different meaning. Originally it meant 'in like manner;' and it has preserved something of that signification: it implies some connexion or agreement between the words it unites. We may say, 'He is a poet, and likewise a musician;' but we should not say, 'He is a prince, and likewise a musician,' because there is no natural connexion between these qualities; but 'also' implies merely addition. 'Besides' is used rather when some additional circumstance is named *after* others, as a kind of after-thought, and generally to usher in some new clause of a sentence, as, 'Besides what has been said, this must be considered,' &c.

Again:—

"*Sincere, Honest, Upright.*—'Sincerity' may be used in two senses; and this leads to much ambiguity in reasoning. It may either mean, on the one hand, reality of conviction and earnestness of purpose; or on the other, purity from all unfairness or dishonesty. Many people overlook this; they will speak of a man's being 'sincere,' when they mean that he has a real conviction that his end is a good one, and imagine this must imply that he is 'honest;' whereas he may be 'sincere' in his desire to gain his end, and *dishonest* in the means he employs for that purpose. 'Honest,' on the other hand, is not an ambiguous term; it implies straightforwardness and fairness of conduct. 'Upright' honesty and dignity of character; it is the opposite of 'meanness,' as 'honesty' is of 'cunning.'"

Recollections of a Literary Life; or, Books, Places, and People. By Mary Russell Mitford. 3 vols. London: Richard Bentley.

The authoress well says that the title of this book gives a very imperfect idea of the contents; and it would be difficult to find a short phrase that would accurately describe a work of so miscellaneous a character. Its object is "to make others relish a few favourite writers as heartily as the writer has relished them herself;" and for this purpose she has associated notices of various authors and extracts from their writings, with personal reminiscences and local scene painting; and has thus produced a very readable and even an interesting work. Many of the extracts are valuable, as comprising the best bits of neglected authors: we select the following, from the writings of Abraham Cowley (who lived in the 17th century), although we scarcely know what some of our young and ardent readers will think of it.

"The pleasantest condition of life is in *incognito*. What a brave privilege it is to be free from all contentions, from all envying, or being envied, from receiving or paying all kind of ceremonies! It is, in my mind, a very delightful pastime for two good and agreeable friends to travel up and down together in places where they are by nobody known, nor know anybody. It was the case of Æneas and his Achatas, when they walked invisibly about the fields and streets of Carthage. Venus herself—

"A veil of thickened air around them cast,
That none might know or see them as they pass'd."

"The common story of Demosthenes' confession, that he had taken a great pleasure in hearing a basket-woman say, as he passed—'This is that Demosthenes,' is wonderfully ridiculous from so

solid an orator. I myself have often met with that temptation to vanity (if it were any), but am so far from finding it any pleasure, that it only makes me run faster from the place, till I get (as it were) out of sight-shot. Democritus relates and in such a manner as if he gloried in the good fortune and commodity of it, that when he came to Athens, nobody there did so much as take notice of him: and Epicurus lived there very well, that is, lay hid many years in his gardens, so famous since that time, with his friend Metrodorus; after whose death, making in one of his letters a kind of commemoration of the happiness which they two had enjoyed together, he adds at last, that he thought it no disparagement to those qualifications of their life, that, in the midst of the most talked of and talking country in the world, they had lived so long, not only without fame, but almost without being heard of. And yet, within a few years afterwards, there were no two names of men more known or more generally celebrated. If we engage into a large acquaintance and various familiarities, we set open our gates to the invaders; most of our time, we expose our life to a quotidian plague of frigid impertinence, which would make every man tremble to think of. Now, as for being known much by sight, and pointed at, I cannot comprehend the honour that lies in that. Whatever it be, every mountebank has it more than the best orator, and the hangman more than the lord chief justice of a city. Every creature has it, both of nature and art, if it be anyway extraordinary. It was as often said, This is that Bucephalus, or This is that Incitatus, when they were prancing through the streets, as This is that Alexander, or This is that Domitian; and truly for the latter I take Incitatus to have been a much more honourable beast than his master, and more deserving the consulship than he the empire.

"I love and commend a true good fame, because it is the shadow of virtue; not that it do any good to the body which it accompanies, but it is an efficacious shadow, and like that of St. Peter, cures the diseases of others. The best kind of glory, no doubt, is that which is reflected from honesty, such as was the glory of Cato and Aristides; but it was painful to them both, and seldom beneficial to any man while he lives."

Having given a specimen of Cowley prose, append one of his poetry:—

"A mighty pain to love it is,
And 'tis a pain that pain to miss;
But of all pain the greatest pain,
It is to love, and love in vain.
Virtue now nor noble blood,
Nor wit by love is understood.
Gold alone does passion move,
Gold monopolizes love!
A curse on her and on the man
Who this traffic first began:
A curse on him who found the ore:
A curse on him who digged the store:
A curse, all curses else above,
On him who used it first in love!
Gold beget in brethren hate;
Gold in families debate;
Gold does friendship separate;
Gold does civil wars create;
These the smaller harms of it!
Gold, alas! does love beget!"

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. IV.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

In order to substantiate the opinion regarding the cognation or twin-birth of Thought and Speech advocated in our preceding paper, it might, at a casual glance, appear requisite to prove the original identity of all languages; it might seem that, if thought necessarily and inevitably seeks to be envestured in words—if all men are endowed with essentially similar powers of intellect—if common and universal mind-laws preside over and influence the development of thought—and if Language, which is but the expression of thought, is formatively regulated by the same laws which govern the evolution of ideas—the same or essentially similar phonic syllables should appear in the root-forms of the verbalisms of every human tongue. Our opinion, however, does *not* necessitate such an advocacy of the absolute fitness of certain sounds to express certain ideas. We are *not* compelled by the view which we have taken to establish any natural connexion between sounds and the ideas of which they are denotative. All that it is necessary for us to substantiate is, that in speech-formation men uniformly follow the same course, and consequently that all languages coincide in their generic characteristics. To accomplish this, however, it is far from being necessary that we should trouble our readers with elaborate details regarding the not-similarities of different tongues—with erudite disquisitions on speech-derivation, or lengthy abstracts of the teachings of Ethnography concerning the affinities of Language; we shall sufficiently fulfil our duty if we prove that all languages consist of the same parts—proceed upon the same general principles—emanate from the same mind-laws, and effectuate the same general results. If we show that, amid much seeming diversity, there exists an essential sameness—that similar classes of idea-symbols exist in every language—that coincidence in all the great essentials of structure is observable—that the differences which exist are only in the minor accidents of thought-expression—that little that is capricious or rule-free, and much that is law-functioned, appears in speech, and that the marks of a generic union between ideation and expression are distinctly and obviously apparent—we shall surely be warranted in inferring that Thought and Speech are twin educts of the mentality.*

In order, however, that the principle upon which our theory of Language is constructed may be clearly and definitely evolved, and lest even the shadow of a supposition that we have any desire of shirking the difficulties of the speculative position which we have assumed should enter the mind of any one, we may be allowed to allude, briefly, to one or two of those causes which we regard as having been instrumental in the production of

* Although insisting upon the truth of this proposition as involving many philosophical consequences in our further study of Rhetoric, let it not be for a moment imagined that we retract, modify, or repudiate in any way the remarks made formerly in "The Art of Reasoning," vol. ii. p. 123, *on the distinction between Language and Logic.* Language is the *painting* of thought, and is entitled to employ occasional and accessorial embellishments; Logic is *sculpturesque*, and permits the embodiment of thought only in the beauty, distinctness, and accuracy of *formal* abstractions.

those diversities of Language which confessedly exist upon the face of the globe, and which apparently offer so formidable an argument against the accuracy of our opinion.

1st. Causes influencing the Perceptivity. We have asserted that Perceptivity is the primary element in human thought; but if the objectivities presented to the perceptive organs are different, that difference ought surely to appear in speech. But how diverse are the objects which present themselves to the denizen of the boreal regions from those which offer themselves to the view of the inhabitant of tropic climes! The one dwells amid the accumulated and unmelted snows of many winters—in a land which the sun-rays seldom visit—where miles of ice stretch far away in unchanging continuousness, intervariegated only occasionally by a stunted, sober-tinted vegetation—with a dull, leaden sky hanging overhead, supported on the summit of enormous ice-crag, which rise up everywhere, ruptured, irregular, and jagged, half-curtained with perpetual fogs—where the glacier, the avalanche, and the frosted snow are ever present—where organic and vegetable life dwindle, and at last become extinct;—the other inhabits a region

“Dipped in the orient hues of heaven,”

where the choicest gifts of nature are lavished in profusion—a cloudless sky envelopes the nations—the most beautiful carpets of moss and flowers are annually woven by the rosy-fingered goddess of summer—the trees are festooned with golden and ruby fruits—the animal creation attains its most gigantic development—and all things

“Interpenetrated lie
With the glories of the sky.”

How different in their characteristics, and in the objectivities which impress the human mind, are the lands which border on the ever-rolling sea, from those whose hills are fervid with the beams of heaven—the stormy vitality of the ocean, with its wild liberty and endless change, and the calm majesty of the cloud-piercing mountain, how diverse! The trackless deserts of Africa, which no foliage colours and no moisture bedews—the shingly plains of Patagonia—the forest-valleys of the Amazon—the treeless pampas—the verdure-clad llanos—the Asiatic steppes,—how opposed in feature and in idea-educing elements to the fiery outbursting of the Catopaxi—

“Where Andes, giant of the western star,
Looks from his throne of clouds o’er half the world!”—

the peaks of the Dwalaghiri—the snowy mountains of Sirinagur—and the compressed scenery of Europe, where rock and wilderness, lake, river, cataract, pastoral plain, and inland sea, are heaped and piled together in rude, bold, and savage grandeur! Can men, having such diverse objectivities presented to their gaze, employ the same vocables, or apply the same terms to the innumerable diversities of perceptions with which they are impressed? *

2nd. Causes which influence the Societarian Instincts. From the geographical differences noticed in the preceding paragraph result in a great measure the varieties of national occupation—husbandmen, shepherds, huntsmen, commercialists, &c. The human mind has a natural power of adapting itself to the circumstances in which it is placed, and is peculiarly susceptible of impressions resulting from climate, employment, mode of obtaining a livelihood, &c.; the growth of habits, and of the continued operation of the

same influences conjoined with these, serve to imprint upon the mentality a peculiar type. Hence the character of a maritime nation differs widely in the cast of its thoughts from that of a pastoral people; both differ from the dwellers in the mountain lands; while the occupant of the desert or the forest possesses characteristics distinct from each of these formerly mentioned. Such diversity of habits must originate distinctions of thought, and such differences of thought must produce dissimilarities in Language.

But variety of geographical position, while it changes the occupations, alters the manners, differentiates the thoughts, and diversifies the languages of men, necessitates at the same time a dissimilarity in their social state, their amusements, and their laws; these again re-act upon the thoughts, originate societarian peculiarities, and introduce neologisms into common use.

3rd. Causes influencing the Analogical Faculties. In the earlier periods of society all intercourse is figurative and poetic—poetry is essentially harmonic: whatever tends to display the likeness of the thing spoken of by the sound spoken, not only adds to the readiness with which Language is understood, but also contributes pleasure. The imitative faculties would therefore be early called forth in man; his analogical faculties would lend him to the perception of similarities; and thus Language would be improved and polished by every attempt to give expressiveness to thought.

4th. Causes influencing the Colligating Faculties. War, conquest, and colonization, by bringing nations into contact, would tend to the interfusion and amalgamation of languages. Commerce, by introducing new products with their native name-signs, would add to the copiousness of speech. Discoveries and inventions, by the production of new objects—the eliciting of new ideas—new processes of labour—new combinations of material, and new modes of life, would demand new verbalisms, through the instrumentality of which these new notions and conceptions might be conveniently characterized and readily discoursed about. Words would also lose their primary significations, and by their connexion, real or imaginary, with any important event, would receive a new denotation; while the use of certain verbalisms in figurative senses would also cause a diversity and dissimilarity in the languages spoken by the several nations of the human race. This dissimilitude would be still further augmented by the want of a literature which might form a standard—prevent the formation of dialects—and fix and determine the true and proper use of the national tongue—and might become the referee and controller of discourse.

Having thus shown that certain actively operative causes may have had an influence in the production of the diversity of the languages which men employ, we shall now proceed to inquire what are the several classes into which words may be divided—the offices which they respectively perform—and the mode of their origination in the mind.

Let us suppose a reasonable being placed upon our globe: it is quite evident that the earliest action of his mental powers would lead him out of himself—would make him acquainted with the phenomena of the external universe. But here all is apparently confusion and concreteness—an intertangement of objectivities and their relations—

“A mighty maze—a world without a plan”—

In general and the particular are intermingled—complexity and combination are on every side. The passivity of the intellect, however, cannot long endure. It becomes sensible that

nearly similar phenomena convey impressions to the mentality—the complexity of the primitive facts of perceptivity begins to disappear—the analytic faculties commence to resolve the particular and the concrete into the general and the abstract—sameness of phenomenal power is observed to reside in objectivities which differ slightly in their minor accidents—the rude germs of generalization are sown in the mind—and classification sets itself to the arrangement of all those bodies which meet its view, and are possessed of common qualities, and thus general ideas are eliminated. These ideas must have representative mind-signs appropriated to them. This is a copious source of words, and forms a class of verbalisms which must exist in every language. But we have only as yet supposed the mind to have become sensible of the *objective*; gradually it must awaken to a knowledge of the *subjective*, and then

“Desires and Adorations,
Winged Persuasions and veiled Destinies,
Splendours and Glooms, and glimmering incarnations
Of Hopes, and Fears, and twilight Phantasies;
And Sorrow, with her family of sighs,
And Pleasure, blind with tears, led by the gleam
Of her own dying smile, instead of eyes,
• • • • •
Like pageantry of mist on an autumnal stream,”

must slowly arise all “moulded into thought.” The class of thought-signs thus elicited are called *Nouns*, and may be concisely defined as *the names of any existences, real or imaginary*.

In attaining a knowledge of existences sufficient to enable it to classify and name them, the mind could not avoid perceiving that the conceptions which it had formed were the result of similar combinations of qualities inhering in some *substrata* or *substans*, and that by these qualities alone were the objectivities around rendered cognisable; it must have observed, too, that some were variable and some invariable; that some belonged essentially to the object, and could not be removed from it without causing an alteration in the nature of the idea resulting from it, while others were subject to increase or diminution, and occasionally were capable of being absent altogether without materially changing the generic notion of the object—were, in short, accidental. Hence arises a demand for a new series of idea-symbols—symbols indicative, not of substantial or essential objectivities, but of those attributes or qualities by which they impress the mind, and are distinguishable from each other. Such words are called *Adjectives*, a term which signifies that class of words which *indicate any quality, property, or accident, of objects*.

When the mind has exerted its natural activity thus far, and has gained an acquaintance with objectivities and their qualities, another and further process of thought becomes necessary. Perceptivity has furnished the mind with ideas—has placed before it an account of his observations on the universe without and within, and presented to the intellective faculties the results of the operations of analysis, abstraction, and generalization. The primitive presentations which met the mind's eye in its earlier incursions into the domain of knowledge have been reduced to their elemental parts. Every single word has now become the sign of abstract thought—is the combined effluence of an impression on the mind, and an action of that mind upon that impression. When our notions of things *have been* so analyzed and decomposed that we have attained name-signs for each

specific objectivity, and each specific quality of objectivities, and our Words have become the symbols of separate and abstract ideas, we are able so to conjoin these abstraction-significant terms together, that each word shall lose its individual signification in the formation and conveyance of some idea of greater specialization; for "words do not communicate thought by their separate power and effect only, but infinitely more so by their connexion." Indeed, individual words are to our thoughts what letters are to words—mere elements—whose proper power and efficacy are only fully evidenced when employed connectedly. Thus the term *knowledge*, is the name-sign of one separate abstract idea; the word *power*, a symbolism for another special notion; the thought-sign is,* also possesses its own specific signification; but when all these three are colligated and conjoined, the special individual signification of each is partly lost to the view of the mind, and is merged in the more specific idea which is sought to be unfolded by the junction of the three terms, thus—"knowledge is power." That part of speech which thus re-synthetises ideas by the appropriate colligation of their symbols, and thus expresses the simple act of judgment, is denominated the *Verb*, and may be defined as that thought-sign whose principal use is to express the affirmations of the intellectual faculties—that word which denotes the energy of the mind, which connects two or more conceptions by an assertive or affirmational process. We have said "whose principal use is to express the affirmations of the intellectual faculties," because, that from the difficulty which the mentality experiences in reducing the concrete and synthetic notions which appear upon the stage of the mind, it has seldom succeeded in wholly disengaging and disjoining really separate and distinct ideas from each other, from which circumstance it happens that the verb, although in reality it derives its very birth from the assertive power, i. e., the judgment, is very frequently employed to co-express other and clearly different ideas, viz.:—

1st. An attribute or quality, as, I think = I am a *thinking* being.

2nd. A connexion between that quality and the objectivity to which it belongs, as, I think = *I* and *thinking* are conjunct, or *thinking* is a property belonging to *me*.

3rd. An assertion, either directly or indirectly, of the connexion which the judgment perceives.

There are besides several minor accidental properties, such as are technically denominated voice, mood, tense, number, person, &c., generally incorporated with the verb, but assertion is undoubtedly the generic connotation of the verb—that by which it is essentially distinguished from every other part of speech. The *Verb* is distinctly that term by which several special words are conjoined into one logical expression or compound WORD, and hence its name.

The three preceding classes of verbalisms may be regarded as the most necessary signs requisite for thought-expression. But the activity of the mind permits it no rest, and it "goes on refining," feeling new wants and supplying them, making a luxury even of language, by exerting its æsthetic powers to render language musical, harmonious, and melodious. Man begins to feel fatigued with repetition—sameness jars harshly on his ear; it observes that nouns, while they enable him to express his thoughts regarding objectivities,

* See "Art of Reasoning," vol. i. p. 142, First Edition.

do not possess the capacity of indicating the presence or absence of the object, and that their use frequently leads to periphrastic tediousness; hence his inventive powers are called into action to supply a sign which might fulfil the following pre-requisites, viz.:—

1st. Be a substitute, or that which stands *for* a noun.

2nd. Denote the presence or absence of the objectivity.

3rd. Indicate the *gender* of the objectivity.

4th. Distinguish the *person* of the objectivity.

All these ideas he has endeavoured to amalgamate in that class of words called *Pronouns*, or those words which stand as the representatives or substitutes of nouns.

As both adjectives and verbs are expressive of attributes or qualities, and as those qualities generally admit of modification, it is necessary to have a class of words adapted to express such modifications. The circumstances of an action, the place in which it occurred, the manner in which it was performed, the time at which it was begun or ended; the mutations and varieties of the qualities of objects, cannot be denoted with sufficient minuteness and accuracy by any modal change which it is possible to incorporate with any of the afore-mentioned classes of words; yet the circumstances of society, the happiness of man, the ultimate results of the most important negotiations of men and nations, or the most serious investigations of philosophers, frequently depend upon the accuracy or inaccuracy of the information conveyed regarding *time, place, manner, circumstance, or modification of quality*. The words which express these modifications are technically denominated *Adverbs*.

One important purpose of speech is to communicate information regarding the relations which the objectivities which surround us bear to each other. These relations are various, *e. g.*, instrumentality, causation, space, motion, time, accidental connexion and separation, procession, &c. Objectivities, as they are viewed in different lights, or for different purposes, occupy to the minds thus engaged in observation, certain relations in reference to each other, and these peculiar relationships depend upon the particular view taken of objectivities by the perceptive agency. The earlier notices of relation would be confined to sensible objects; but when men began to look, with the eye of consciousness, within, they would observe many analogies between the external world and the universe of mind, and would hence apply those terms metaphorically to the mind which they had previously employed only in the expression of relations perceptible in the sense-impressing world. All such words as express the relation which objectivities bear to each other are called *Prepositions*.

When, however, we have attained a clear conception of the relations of objects, we cannot long continue insensible to the fact that sentences, or thoughts, also have their relations, *e. g.*:—

1st. Simple or accidental connexion, as, and, both, &c.

2nd. Connexion of cause and effect, as, therefore, wherefore, that, hence, &c.

3rd. Connexion of effect and cause, as, because, for, since, &c.

4th. Simple or accidental contrariety, as, but, either, or, neither, nor, &c.

5th. Coincidence, or co-existence, as, although, likewise, also, as, so, though, yet, &c.

6th. Essential contrariety, as, unless, else, neither, nor, &c.

7th. Contingency, as, if, lest, &c.

It is of the utmost importance in discourse to be capable of conjoining the sentences in which our thoughts are expressed, in such a manner as shall exhibit the proper and mutual relations which these thoughts bear to each other; and hence the necessity of a class of symbols indicative of the connexion of thought with thought. This office is fulfilled by the *Conjunction*.

Man cannot become wholly an artificial being; remnants of his natural, or at least of his less cultivated, state still cling to him; and, under the influence of his passions and emotions, when his nature is excited to such a degree as to hold the intellect for a moment in abeyance, the natural ejaculations of pain, pleasure, surprise, &c., rise upon his lips. Such emotional or passionate signs hold no place in intellectual forms, and are, properly speaking, incognoscible by grammar or logic, although among the minor elements of Rhetoric they doubtlessly hold a place—1st, as the signs of being moved by certain feelings; 2nd, as conveying a sudden judgment in a brief, expressive, and emphatic manner; 3rd, to give a command, communicate a desire, or crave a benefit, in such a way as shall indicate the conjoint operation of the intellect and the emotions. They are, in general, however, merely thrust into sentences by the force of feeling, and do not modify, in any degree, the flow of the intellect in the expression of our ideas. Such *sounds*, therefore, as are significant of passion, and symptomatic of emotion, and hold no syntactical connexion with the other thought-symbols in a sentence, are denominated *Interjections*.

The following formula will, we hope, give a clear and comprehensive view of “the parts of speech,” and be serviceable to our readers as a “reference table” and a Mnemonic guide.

		Designation.	Definition.	Species.	Mode of Inflection.
Essential and Inflected.	1st. The Noun.	{	The name-sign of any existence, real or imaginary.	1st. Proper. 2nd. Common.	Number, Gender, and Case.
	2nd. The Pronoun.			real, ideal, collective, verbal, and abstract. 1st. Personal. 2nd. Relative. 3rd. Adjective.	
	3rd. The Adjective.	{	The name-sign of any quality, &c., of an existence.	1st. Proper. 2nd. Common. 3rd. Participial. 4th. Numeral.	Degrees of Comparison. Positive. Comparative. Superlative.
	4th. The Verb.			1st. Active-Transitive. 2nd. Active-Intransitive. 3rd. Passive. 4th. Neuter.	
		Designation.	Definition.	Species.	
Accessorial and Uninflected.	1st. The Adverb.	{	The name-sign of any modification of an attribute or assertion.	1st. Time; 2nd. Place; 3rd. Manner; 4th. Quality; 5th. Circumstance, &c. N.B. Some adverbs admit of inflexion by comparison.	
	2nd. The Preposition.			1st. Time; 2nd. Place; 3rd. Motion; 4th. Causation; 5th. Connexion; 6th. Separation; &c.	
	3rd. The Conjunction.	{	The name-sign of the relations by which sentences are connected.	1st. Connective. 2nd. Disjunctive.	Causative. Agreement. Contingency. Diversity. Alternation. Contingency.
	4th. The Interjection.			1st. Emotional. 2nd. Intellectual. 3rd. Mixedly Emotional and Intellectual.	

We subjoin an extract from Coleridge's Hymn in the Valley of Chamouni, in which the parts of speech are indicated by figures, in the following order—Noun, Adjective, Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, and Interjection:—

4 3 * 1 4 * 2 1
Hast thou a charm to stay the morning star
6 3 2 1 7 2 3 4 4
In his steep course. So long he seems to pause
6 3 2 2 1 8 2 1
On thy bald awful head, () sovran Blanc!
* 1 7 1 6 3 1
The Arvé and Arveiron at thy base
4 5 7 3 2 1
Rave ceaselessly; but thou, most awful form!
4 6 6 3 2 1 6 1
Risest from forth thy silent sea of pine
5 5 6 3 7 6
How silently! Around thee and above
2 4 * 1 7 2 2 2
Deep is the air, and dark, substantial, black,
* 2 1 4 3 4 3
An ebony mass; methinks thou piercest it
5 7 * 1 7 5 3 4 5
As with a wedge! But when I look again
3 3 3 3 2 1 3 2 1
It is thine own calm home, thy crystal shrine
3 1 6 1
Thy habitation from eternity!
8 2 7 2 1 3 4 6 3
O dread and silent mount! I gaze upon thee,
5 3 5 2 6 * 2 1
Till thou, still present to the bodily sense,
4 6 3 1 2 6 1
Didst vanish from my thoughts; entranced in prayer
3 4 * 2 5
I worshipped the invisible alone.†

† "A" or "An," and "The," are usually denominated Articles, although, in our opinion, "An" is a numeral adjective, and "The" a demonstrative adjective pronoun.

Religion.

CAN CHRISTIANS, CONSISTENTLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPLES, REN- SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH STAGE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Pictured morals charm the mind,
And through the eye correct the heart."

In our path through life, what a strange
contrariety of opinions spread themselves
out before us! What conflicts of ideas and
sentiments prevail around us! And how
often are we called upon to select from the

maze thus created, the path most like
lead us to right and sound conclusion
But comes there no good of this?
think we may answer in the affirmative
By the wholesome exercise of the reason
powers thus occasioned, we become
prepared for the great conflict of life. 2

over, whilst learning to respect the opinions of others, we become accustomed to form opinions of our own—and what is equally important, we hesitate not, when occasion requires, fearlessly to assert them. But we must change the scene of our musings.

The "British Stage" is the subject before us. What pleasing associations rush upon our memory ! What a long line of illustrious names presents itself to our mental gaze ! Among them men who have long since passed from the troubled stage of earthly existence, but whose lives were no less an honour to their calling than to their country. How forcibly we are reminded—

"There was a period when the stage
Was thought to dignify the age,
When learned men were seen to sit
Upon the benches of the pit ;
When to his art and nature true,
Garrick his various pictures drew,
While ev'ry passion, ev'ry thought,
He to perfection fully wrought—
By nature's self supremely taught."

And how the additional fact stands recorded before us, that—

"In those good times none went to see
The mere effects of scenery :
The constant laugh, the forced grimace,
The vile distortions of the face.
In those good times none went to see
Pierrots and clowns in comedy.
Men sat perfection to discern,
And learned critics went to learn."

But we must come still closer to the matter of inquiry, and before arriving at a conclusion, two previous questions present themselves for solution. First—What is the purpose of the stage ? Secondly—What are the principles of Christianity ?

The purpose of the stage we shall best understand by tracing it to its origin. What, then, do we find to have been the origin of the English drama ? Was it with a view to the promotion of vice and immorality that it took its rise ? We have no proof of it. Were its promoters men of base and depraved habits, possessing all the vices, and but few of the virtues, of mankind ? History fails to proclaim such a fact. Was it in its early tendency antagonistic to the spirit and purposes of Christianity ? We have been unable to discover any such record. What, then, does history say ? It says that the clergy were the first persons who in this country introduced dramatic

entertainments ; that cathedrals, monasteries, and not unfrequently parish churches, were selected for their performance ; that the representations they embodied were chiefly taken from the supernatural events recorded in the Old and New Testaments, and from the lives and histories of the saints. These facts are not recorded on doubtful authority, but are based upon the best historic proofs. Win. Fitz-Stephen, a monk of Canterbury, in a work written between the years 1170 and 1182, whilst contrasting England with various parts of the continent he had visited, says:—"London, instead of common interludes belonging to the theatre, has plays of a more holy character ; representations of those miracles which the holy confessors wrought, or of the sufferings wherein the glorious constancy of the martyrs did appear." We see nothing particularly unchristian about this, considering the age ! These "miracle-plays" continued for several centuries, accompanied by another description of entertainment, called "moralities," in which the senses, passions, affections, virtues, and vices, were personified, and constituted the characters. But these, too, were of a *moral turn*, and contrived to "entertain as well as instruct." Thus saith history.

We arrive, then, at this result, that the English drama originated in the attempts of the early ecclesiastics to impart religious and moral instruction to the people, and that this attractive form of instruction was selected upon the principle, that "pictured morals" do "charm the mind, and through the eye correct the heart."

Next, let us inquire, What are the principles and practical aims of *Christianity* ? We speak of Christianity here in its highest and purest sense, and as distinct from all sects and parties—these too often resulting in its misunderstanding or abuse. The true basis of all christian principles and precepts must be in the acknowledgment that man is an immortal but responsible being, endowed with the highest faculties, destined for the most noble ends, and formed for the enjoyment of the most perfect bliss ; but that the perfect attainment and enjoyment of all these is dependent upon the manner of his own life and actions. Hence he should cultivate virtue for its own sake, and abhor vice and all wrong-doing. The practical

aim of Christianity is to keep these truths constantly before the mind, and therefore a Christian could not consistently countenance anything which he believed to have a contrary effect.

So far we shall all probably agree. But having seen what are the objects of each, we have next to inquire, how far they are compatible with each other, whether there exists any harmony between them, or whether they are necessarily antagonistic. We say necessarily, because we prefer adhering to first principles when there is nothing implied to the contrary. If we view things in the position they come to assume when *abused*, we shall often err in judgment. The present question is one particularly liable to wrong construction unless the principles involved be kept steadily before us.

It may greatly simplify our position if we here look both at Christianity and at the stage in a *representative* form. Taking the *prophet* as the representative of Christianity, and the *poet* as the representative of the stage—which he clearly is,—how stand these personages in relation to each other? It is the mission of the prophet to bring mankind generally into closer communion with heaven; it is the mission of the poet to *prepare* mankind for such communion. Various methods may be and are employed. Can the stage fairly claim to be one of them? We assert that it can, and therefore that Christians can consistently render it their support.

Perhaps we can give no more correct definition of the instrumentality of the stage in this country for the purposes we claim for it, than when we say, its tendency is, and ever has been, "To show Virtue her own feature, Scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure." Nor shall we err when we say that the result of such teachings must be

"To raise the genius and amend the heart."

We know of no method of instruction yet devised which embodies so largely the elements of success as dramatic representations. It has been truly and eloquently remarked, that what we *read*, often fails to produce a lasting impression upon the mind; what we *hear of*, finds no permanent abiding place in the memory; but that which we *SEE*, becomes

engraven upon the recollection—it survives all the vicissitudes and changes we may encounter, its image is ever at our call, and not unfrequently accompanies its possessor down to the last hours of his earthly sojourn. Many, no doubt, have in themselves observed this fact. Those who have not may apply a simple test. Let them take one of Shakespeare's plays—*Macbeth*, if they please; read it carefully until they *think* they understand it; afterwards let them see it acted by one of the masters of his art—for instance, as Macready would act it; and then apply the test. In the first case, he would have understood the character and the plot only in accordance with the narrow limits of his own conception. In the latter, he would see it as it presented itself to the imagination of the great bard, who, with his "eye in a fine frenzy rolling," distributed, through the point of his pen, that immortal genius with which the Great Author of our being had inspired him. Which impression, think ye, would be the more lasting?

It is not for us to trace the cause of this additional force of impression made through the medium of the eye. The fact exists, and has existed in all ages. The *action* thrown into dramatic performances has no doubt much to do with the impressions created. Cicero was evidently of this opinion, for he says, "It does not so much matter *what* an orator says, as *how* he says it." Horace also clearly made allusion to the known sympathy which good actors create with their auditors, for he says—

"With those who laugh our social joy appears,
With those who mourn we sympathize in tears
If you would have me weep, begin the strain,
Then I shall feel your sorrows, feel your pain."

We know that some of our argument may be probably used against us. It may be said, for instance, that that which is potent for good may, in the hands of evil and designing men, be made potent for evil. Such reasoners would eagerly remind us that they are not *all* lessons of virtue which are inculcated from the stage. That sometimes men whose virtues are few, compare with their vices, both represent and are represented. We cannot deny the fact. We have no particular desire to do so. For as well as to show "Virtue her own feature

it be also the object of the stage to shew "Satan her own image," how can she better than by the occasional introduction of characters whose lives most forcibly portray the necessary and certain results of wrongdoing? Besides, what do such objects say to the poetic declaration, that

"Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen?"

The same power which can so successfully plead the cause of virtue, can with equal force depict the miseries which are the certain concomitants of long-practised vice. It is only a variation of means, leading to the same end.

It is always difficult to estimate with a thing like certainty the result of *indirect influence*. But we may at least judge their general tendency for good or for evil. We should hold it more than probable that the lessons so forcibly delivered from the stage—whether in doing honour to the good and great, the noble and the brave, or holding up to censure the profligate and debased—have struck home to many a heart which had remained unmoved under mild and perhaps more christian teachings. We have heard old men repeat with great enthusiasm the impressions produced upon them in their youth by witnessing the performance of the piece entitled *George Barnwell*, or another under the title of the *London Apprentices*, both of them exhibiting sound moral lessons, and especially adapted for young men starting in life.

But there is a class of persons who they assert, conscientiously object to the application of *fiction* for any purpose whatever, whether good or evil. Of such we would first inquire, what interpretation they put upon that portion of the script called "Parables," and then we would direct their attention to the true purpose of *fiction*, as thus described by poet:—

"True *fiction* hath in it a higher end
Than fact; it is the possible compared
With what is merely positive, and gives
To the conceptive soul an inner world,
A higher, surpler heaven than that wherein
The senses can themselves. In that bright
Are met the mental creatures of the men
Whose nature are with highest on the soul
Of man's triumphal arch."—*Pope*.

How many of the brightest human thoughts have been ushered into existence to serve the uses of fiction or minister to the poetic enjoyment of fancy? And are they to be deemed less valuable on this account? The drama is instructing our hearts, leads us into the far regions of heroism, and relieves us of our burden of mental depression:—

"Sweet airy spirits, that can heatow
Pleasuring respites to our woe,
That can corroding care beguile,
And make the woe-worn face to smile."

Whatever aspect we view the stage, it makes a large claim upon our sympathies, and it is with considerable satisfaction that we quote a modern author, who gives noble sanction to the feelings we entertain:— "The moral influence of dramatic representations on the manners of a people is far greater than may generally be supposed; and in opinion there is no class of persons more deserving of public esteem than those who are of histrionic performances, who sit in judgment on them, and conscientiously deliver their praise or censure. *Both dramatists and managers who endeavour to improve the character of the stage, cannot be highly commended or rewarded; while those who as ignobly study to gratify a depraved taste, are fit objects for the severest reprobation.*"

It will be observed that we have more particularly addressed ourselves to the origin and spirit of the British stage or drama, and to its present position. We do not shut our eyes to the fact that it is now in many respects far different from what we would like it to be. But we attribute this state of things to the almost entire neglect, or even contemptuous indifference, of those who should be its chief supporters and directors. A reaction commenced about the time of the Reformation, when puritanic zeal, or tantic pride, placed its iron barriers upon former pastimes and usages of the people, and caused even religion itself to assume the garb of sackcloth and ashes; it has continued thus, in some particulars, to the present day. We deem such austerity of manners as impolitic as it is absurd. It is directly contrary to the harmonising precepts of Christianity, and utterly opposed to the spirit of the age.

"Virtue, like the dew of heaven,
Upon the heart descends,
And draws its hidden sweetness out
The more as more it bends."

The stage is the mirror with which every age will reflect back its own "form and pressure," if only properly held. The reason of the stage being what it *now is*, instead of what it *should be*, is that those who ought to have directed it have neglected to do so; and, as a natural result, it has been seized upon by less scrupulous persons, and perverted from its original designs. Let the blame fall in the right quarter.

We contend that in principle the stage may be as consistently supported as it ever was. It has undergone no change by which it forfeits its former claims. "The very head and front of its offending hath this extent, no more"—it has suffered from neglect! When a better understanding of its use, and a more correct appreciation of its influence, become general, it will again rise and flourish in all its wonted splendour, saying unto man as it once said,

"Let all the ends thou aim'st at be thy country's,
Thy God's, and truth's."

C. W., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It seems that to secure the harmonious working of our nature, recreation is necessary—that the mind, jaded by the ceaseless round of daily toil, loses its elasticity unless relieved by amusement of some sort; gravity must, now and again, give place to light-someness. Among the various means of public pastime, the theatre occupies a prominent place. But as it is looked upon by many christian men with feelings of the strongest aversion, the question has arisen—Can they, consistently with their principles, render it their support? No opinion ever obtains the assent of any considerable body of intelligent men unless there is at least a substratum of truth in it. It would be somewhat anomalous if the hostility towards the stage, manifested by Christians of all denominations, were causeless. We shall endeavour to prove in this, and in a subsequent paper, that their aversion is well founded, and that their principles forbid that they should countenance even the British stage.

The stage is not a representation of society, as is frequently insisted. It has no counterpart, except in the mind of the author. From its nature it cannot be a representation, for on the stage that is set forth elaborately, openly, and offensively, which in society is done covertly. The workings of tragedy do not transpire till its completion, and hence none are demoralized; but in the theatre the plan is seen evolving, and the consummation of the crime is introduced to the beholder's view. The stage is, in this way, the abettor of crime; the plotting and *scheming* which in real life are unknown to

all save the criminal, are rendered quite familiar to the playgoer. We forbear to expatiate on this, though we discern in it the germ whence springs much of the criminality which afflicts society. In the theatre there is, on the part of the actresses, a wanton display of limbs and bosoms; this practice, it will be allowed, must have a disastrous influence on the minds and morals of spectators. Dr. Johnson stigmatizes it; his deliverance on the subject is to the effect, that although he felt pleasure in being present, he felt that in this respect dramatic representations were exceedingly dangerous. When a man of his moral calibre felt himself endangered by the lasciviousness of such displays, let no one fancy himself superior to their insidious influence. Let him recall to mind, that "the devil best fisheth for the souls of men when his hook is baited with a lovely limb." One may feel gratified, but the tendency of such exhibitions is to give an unhallowed stimulus to the imagination, which surely is at all times servid enough without such stimulus.

Whatever may be the element by which those who attend are attracted, one thing is certain, that the general audience do not present a fair specimen of the moral worth of society,—there is a preponderance of the inferior orders. We do not say that no religious persons attend the playhouse; but we do say, that the bulk of those who closely attend are persons of disreputable character; and from that we maintain, that as the Christian is commanded to avoid even the appearance of evil, he cannot, consistently with his principles, attend a place in which

he is brought into collision with men whose habits are diametrically the opposite of his, as by that his own is placed in jeopardy; and whether or not theatricals in themselves are bad, the fact that he there mixes with those from whom his habits may possibly sustain detriment, is sufficient of itself to deter him.

It is true that a chamberlain controls the literature of the stage; but when we recollect how much may be done by dress, by the modulations of the voice, the twinkling of the eye, and the motion of the hand, to give an unchaste turn to an expression or sentiment in itself faultless, little confidence need be placed in the guarantee which such an official can give for the morality of the stage when actors have the desire to transgress, and have an interest in transgressing. Evasion is easy to the ingenious caterer for public amusement; he may adhere to the letter of the authorized drama, and yet so travestie it by levity of manner as to reverse its original tendency. When we recollect the motives by which managers are actuated, and the irregularities of the players' lives, it will be seen how much is to be feared from this source. The rivalry between managers is not which shall produce such plays as shall lash public vices or elevate public morals, but which can produce such as shall attract "bumper houses," and secure them the largest returns. In this we do not cen-

sure managers; they merely look to their own interest, as other men do; their better judgment is kept in abeyance. We censure the stage, as it is open to be prostituted to the interests of managers; the evils resulting to the community from the interference of private interest are, in this case, of more than ordinary magnitude, and are, of course, the more to be deprecated. We are debarred from having that higher order of theatricals which might be beneficial; and so long as theatres are directly dependent on the public for support, so long must inferior theatricals prevail, for the few only can appreciate intellectual theatricals.

Meanwhile the British drama, including as it does the works of Wycherly, Congreve, Farquhar, and a variety of others of doubtful morality, cannot be homologated by the Christian; as he must witness the successes of high-handed ruffianism, set forward in the most alluring colours; as he must witness so much of craftiness and intriguing in the ascendant, so many painful exhibitions of human frailty flauntingly paraded, for the little that may be gathered, he cannot, he dare not, countenance it. Its tendency is to relax rather than to strengthen the moral nature: it is incapable of disciplining the heart, but potent to wean the mind from the momentous concerns of the life after life.

ARISTIDES.

Philosophy.

IS HOMŒOPATHY TRUE IN PRINCIPLE AND BENEFICIAL IN PRACTICE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

In a recent number of a popular publication,* a writer of manifest ability remarks—"The world would be spared a chaos of controversy and contention, difficulty and doubt, if those who profess to be students of natural science would but adhere to the seemingly easy and obvious rule of ascertaining facts before they adventure upon argu-

ment:" and then makes allusion to the predicament into which the "Merry Monarch" led the members of the Royal Society, by the question, "Why is it that a live salmon weighs more than a dead one?" The question was solemnly debated, and a multitude of astute reasons were adduced as accounting for the fact. It seems for a time never to have entered the learned heads to try the experiment; and when it was tried, it turned out to be a delusion altogether! The writer then proceeds to remark—"Even down to

* "The Critic: London Literary Journal"—reviewing a work by J. C. Colquhoun, Esq., "A History of Magic, Witchcraft, and Animal Magnetism."

our own day, men of science have persisted in *talking* when they should be *trying*, and in proving by unanswerable arguments that things which are *cannot be*, and those *must be* which are *not*. Obviously science is a question of fact. *It is useless to assail asserted facts by reasons for their non-existence. There is but one way of disproving them, and that is by trying the experiment. Nothing less than the experiment, carefully made by himself, will justify any man in denying the existence of a fact in nature which is asserted by some other man of equal ability and integrity.* Plain as this rule would appear to common sense, the history of science shows us that it is systematically neglected. Almost every science has been met with denials, founded upon some reasons why it *could not be*; and even honest and able men have continually so far forgotten themselves as to fight a new fact with argument instead of experiment.

"The writers do not say, as they should do, 'I have *tried* and find them to *fail*. I have put the asserted experiment to the proof, and it has *not* yielded the results.' But they say only, 'For the reasons following I assert that it *cannot be true*' Now, would it not be far more satisfactory if, instead of such an interminable form of discussion, those who *deny* the asserted fact would make a fair trial of it, not with instruments supplied to them by the other side, but in their own families, among their friends, their children, their servants, in circumstances in which collusion is impossible, and with persons whom they know to be incapable of imposture." Now we have put ourselves to the pains of making this rather lengthy extract with an especial object in view—it is, that having been consigned to everlasting oblivion by the overpowering diatribes of "Vinclum" and his clique, we wish, before taking a final farewell of this world and all its vanities, to follow the footsteps of the immortal Cobbett—who, as everybody knows, left a very enduring, and we may say well-merited, "legacy to parsons"—so far as to bequeath to the writers before referred to the said extract, together with all the moral lessons and sound reasoning therein contained, for their own especial use and benefit; and, in token of our sincerity, we set our hand—nervous though it be, by reason of our melancholy *late—to the foot or end of this our present*

paper, as will be seen when we thereunto arrive.

Having thus relieved our conscience, we feel better prepared to make the best use of the few moments still allotted to us. Assuming, then, that the same rule which applies to natural science also applies to medical science—namely, that its claims should not be met and refuted by mere assertion, but, if at all, by *experiment* and *proof*—how, then, stand our opponents with regard to ourselves? We, as supporters of the claims of Homœopathy, assert its theory to be sound—that there are numerous proofs to be adduced in support of the principle, *similia similibus*, several of which we have pointed out—that in practice Homœopathy has proved itself worthy of the claims made in its behalf, in proof of which "Irene" adduced statistics, in the last number of this magazine, which must sorely puzzle our opponents, and which, if they can, let them refute. How have these propositions been met? Do the anti-Homœopaths come forward and say, "We have, by cool and careful experiment, tried the principles you laid down, and find them erroneous?" Oh, no! Such a course would be far too simple and commonplace for such learned, and withal such self-confident, personages. Does the sun err in the performance of his daily mission? Does the moon depart from her accustomed track? Wherefore, then, should these profound reasoners err? Alas! for the vanity of human greatness! See how L. G. G. endeavours to impose a task upon us which he knows belongs to his party, and not to ours. Quoting the words of another, he says, "Let the Homœopaths select fifty healthful men, and in the use of fifty given medicines, let them produce in each of these fifty the separate malady of which that medicine is the professed cure; let this be done, and we shall at once believe that such medicines can cure the fifty individuals upon whom the said maladies have come from natural causes." Such a requirement is as contrary to all known rules of debate, as it is to common sense. We are content with our remedy. We put faith enough in it to try it; we are satisfied with the result, for we find benefit. What do we want more? It is for those who *do not* believe in it to adduce proofs of its fallacy. Let not L. G. G. think to find us tripping in this particular. We

a debate to be caught by such a staff.

the next species of "hocussing" been resorted to by our opposing that all mere arguments turn the fact that cures have been

Homœopathic treatment, they it certainly could not have been administered—it must have many regulations imposed which cure." What think you, reader, does it not sound like this?—"If deprive you of actual existence, east undermine and ruin your

Generous promptings of the t! But if our cures only came of the treatment imposed, why is faculty the common honesty in patients to adopt at least this "curative art"? Which are

—that our Homœopathic practice more honest than the haughty

Hippocrates and Galen, preferring to give their patients something new; or that they are more skilled, better knowledge of the human body therefore enabled at least to cure—by what means we need not say. The position assumed by our opponents is then open to either or both objections. This is a point we shall here answer. If dietary regulation a cure for one class of disorders, why not for another? It is at the patient wants, and he will not be likely to dispute about the means

to the present moment we had met the wrath which "Vinclum" sent us in his last paper was

sound and fury, signifying—nothing."

we wrong! Both our wit and our wits to "Vinclum" for giving us the possession of both) were at the time, and we confess it. How are we so blind as not to see that in our we struck the right nail upon

We felt, when we made allusion to a set of medical charges, that we were ourselves open to the accusation of blindness, and we were disposed to strike the offensive paragraph; but our wit or our wisdom (we won't say

which) prompted us to let it remain, and behold the confirmation it has received at the hands of "Vinclum"! After dismissing us with a few lashes, he turns, scourge in hand, upon that important personage, the PUBLIC, and hearken:—"We know, and the public know too—at least it ought to know, only [mind!] it shuts its eyes blindly to the fact—that under the old system, and too often under the improved state of things, medicine is sent and charged for which is not absolutely necessary." What think you, reader, of the fact thus boldly proclaimed, that the faculty DO plunder the public? "But," seriously adds "Vinclum," "can people grumble at a practice which they alone are instrumental in retaining?" Does "Vinclum" mean that people should patronize Homœopathy, and thus rid themselves of the old practitioners altogether? He does not say, therefore we may adopt what inference we please. But he further adds, "If they (the public) will not pay a medical man for his time, which is inestimably precious, for his health, which is equally so, and for an expensive education, can they complain if the fee which is so fairly due for professional advice, is grudgingly extorted by means of unprofessional bills for unnecessary items?" Thus speaketh "Vinclum;" need we say more upon the point? We were right, and "Vinclum" has proclaimed the fact to the world!

The position of the inquiry stands thus:—We assert that Homœopathy is sound in theory, and we adduce our reasons for arriving at such a conclusion. We assert that Homœopathy is beneficial in practice; we base this assertion on actual experience, and produce statistics in support of it. And until equal powerful testimony—that is, proof—be adduced to the contrary, we shall have no cause to alter our opinion.

There is one other point to which we wish to make a passing allusion. It is to the attempt made by one of the negative writers to cast a slur upon the character of Hahnemann, the original propounder of the Homœopathic theory. This is as mean as it is unjust. We have consulted several of the best authorities upon such matters, and find it admitted on all hands that he was decidedly talented. That he manifested his ability early in life, which led to his being placed to the study of medicine; that "he

gained a high reputation in the hospitals as a judicious and skilful practitioner;" and that, so far from wishing to build up his fame at the expense of his reputation, his fame was established before he advocated, or had even discovered, Homœopathy.

One word by way of conclusion. If it should so happen that we have found favour in the sight of any of our readers during the period we have had the pleasure of addressing them, it may be of interest to them to learn that, after having carefully noted our symptoms during the past few hours, we begin to have some hope for ourselves. We find—and we should wish to do the justice to state that we can only attribute the fact to the mirth we have enjoyed at the

expense of our energetic opponents—that after the old maxim of "laugh and grow fat," we do really fancy ourselves a little plumper, and a tinge of scarlet has even ventured to trespass again upon our worn cheeks, so that we may say we are in a fair way for doing well, even yet; and if a few days' quietude does not completely restore us, we shall have immediate recourse to our "pet cure," Homœopathy; should we derive no positive benefit therefrom, our only hope will be that we may suffer no more inconvenience from it than we have suffered from the "sluicing dose" administered to us by the "drug-and-bottle men," in whose favour we have made the bequest with which we commenced.

C. W., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I HAVE frequently felt great satisfaction in reading the articles on the different subjects brought forward in your valuable journal. A journal has long been required, as a medium through which truth and error could meet on fair grounds, without the comment, the prejudice, and the bias of the editor, so that the gold may be separated from the dross, and that which is of great price from the worthless and pernicious. Such a medium is now to be found in the *British Controversialist*, where subjects are discussed on equal grounds—a boon unprecedented. A journal, thus started, I firmly believe, cannot fail to accomplish the objects for which it was born, and to be of incalculable benefit to that most important class of society—the young men. It is well calculated to transform the thoughtless, indifferent, and barren mind, into the thoughtful, intelligent, and fertile intellect; in fact, it will be one of the great and noble instruments in producing our future Peels, Russells, Disraelis and Cobdens; our Herschels and Rosses, our Lyalls and Bucklands, and our Humphrey Davys. But to the subject:—"Is Homœopathy true in principle and beneficial in practice?" I have read the affirmative articles, and have been exceedingly surprised to find how shallow they are of argument. They seem rather to have set up the barricade of sarcasm, so that they may escape being brought out to the test of true science. Whilst in the dark it will remain, and perhaps prosper, or rather have

an increased number of adherents; like the skeleton of man, if put under ground and covered with the earth, so that not a globule of air or moisture is allowed to touch it, whilst there in this dry condition, without a particle of light being permitted to beam upon it, will continue in the same form; but dig it up and bring it forth to the light, and it will crumble to dust. Just so with Homœopathy; as soon as its followers are unable to shrink behind some barrier, or keep back from the searching test of science, they must fall, a natural consequence. "*Similia similibus curantur*" is the basis of the whole system called Homœopathy; i.e., treat your patient by those remedies which are most calculated to produce the morbid state in which you find him.

Let us suppose a person attacked with hydrothorax, or water in the cavity of the chest, between the layers of the pleura. and that the cause of this disease was not from acute pleuritis, but from *great debility*. This is a well-known fact in medical science, that a constitution suffering from great debility produced by various circumstances, as impoverished blood from excessive depletion by any means, hard study, great anxiety, no air, cold, check of general secretion, neglect of health by irregular habits, and that there is a great tendency for the effusion of fluid in some cavity. What would Homœopathy do with such a patient? Surely he would deplete the patient still; perhaps he might feel inclined to advise the m

by which that state of debility was brought about, viz., what I have already mentioned. Is it not absurd on the very surface?—yet surely it is a fair deduction, and to me (according to their principles) appears to be the acme of treatment. I myself had the misfortune to be attacked by the disease I have described, and which was caused by debility. As soon as my condition was found out (for it crept upon the constitution very insidiously) all hope of my recovery had vanished; death seemed inevitable. How would my case have terminated, had I called in some disciple of Hahnemann?—the little hope, which every man is possessed of while he lasts, would certainly have been swept to the four winds of heaven: but I was *unwise* enough to call in one or two practitioners in legitimate medicine, and, to my surprise, I was soon enabled to watch and to experience the beneficial effects of those remedies which were judiciously administered—not under the like principle of “*similia similibus curantur*,” but my recovery is due to the opposite principle, a principle which is founded on scientific facts. Gratitude and joy flow forth from my soul to my fellow-medicals, who have thus by their skill, under a *true* principle, renovated my constitution. Nothing has more wedded me to the profession which I follow; and I shall consider myself honoured by still associating with men whose theory is borne out by true science, and who need not shrink (as our opponents have done) from the scrutinizing test of the scientific world.

Again. The Homœopaths profess to administer remedies in infinitesimal doses, and they state that, if applied in larger doses, the efficacy is lost. Now this is against all law, experience, and the common sense of man. I can imagine some Homœopath, being rather loquacious, called in to attend a very fidgety patient, who fancies she has all imaginable ills, and, at night-time, is honoured with ghosts, hobgoblins, &c., calming her spirit, and obtaining her faith, by these almost invisible globules, giving express directions with regard to *diet* and to out-door exercise, and assuring her, by all that is great and true, that her recovery will at once commence, and perfect health speedily follow. And so it may, there being nothing the matter, or no morbid condition but what *diet*, and *exercise*, and occupation of mind could eradicate; the latter being managed by her attention to the

novel, tasteless, and (forgive the expression) harmless globules. His name is spread abroad among all her friends, and she unhesitatingly declares that her life has been saved by those precious little spherules given to her by Mr. —, the Homœopath; and in the same breath declares, with the usual perseverance and zeal of her class, that the old system of medicine is murdering the people by hundreds, and even thousands. I happened to be brought in contact with a maiden lady, who occupied much of her time in praising Homœopathy to the skies, and in aiming her invectives against Allopathy. After a little conversation, I found that she suffered frequently from a periodical pain over her left eyebrow, which commenced in the morning as soon as she arose, and, by the beneficial tendency of the Homœopathic globules of china, the pain would depart about dusk; however, it used to return in the morning, and, by a few more china globules, would cease in the evening as before, and so on, continuing for a fortnight, three weeks, a month, or even longer. Now the merest tyro at the hospital would know at once the nature of her complaint—it was of the intermittent or ague type, which promises intermissions of alternate health.

A man of any knowledge and acumen could see through this absurd chicanery of the Homœopathic system, and *this* doubtless forms the basis by which the Homœopaths have raised their popularity. Such a basis must shortly dissolve, vanish, and “leave not a rack behind.”

The Homœopaths (for the want of something better to say) talk much about the conversion of medical men from the old to the new system. I have certainly heard of some medical practitioners, who possess *small* practices, and are not of very great note, considering it a good opportunity to become popular and busy, for the sake of the loaves and fishes, have (laying aside all integrity and principle) practised the new globular theory with great satisfaction to their purses. An instance of this I read a short time since. Some Homœopathic chemist sent a box of globules to Dr. Simpson, of Edinburgh, anonymously, who, on receiving them, gave them to his little boy to play with: the little child was in ecstasies with his new playthings; the globules attracted much attention, and caused great delight.

He would empty one bottle of globules and put them into another bottle, and so exchange places; afterwards he seemed desirous to know how many little balls he had, so he emptied every bottle, and put the globules together in a mass, and mixed them for some time, after which he filled each bottle with the mixed globules. About this time a medical man called on Dr. Simpson, and seeing this box of globules on the table, asked whether he might take them away? The reply being in the affirmative, he put them into his pocket, and left. Some time having elapsed, Dr. S. met this young medical practitioner, who told him that the box of globules he gave him had been of incalculable benefit, and in fact produced such a revolution as to cause him now to practise Homœopathy. Dr. S. smiled, but said nothing; but, meeting with him a short time after, told him the fact that his little boy had often played with them, and mixed them over and over again!

G. V. talks of *specifics*; the mere term brings up in my mind, with feelings the very reverse of admiration, the names of Holloway, Morison, Widow Welch, Parr, and a host of other quacks. Shall the educated and scientific medical practitioner be told to receive, as truth, that a certain remedy is a specific for a certain disease, irrespective of the cause and constitution of the patient? Has not the medical man, who examines his patient with a scientific eye, to obtain knowledge of the cause of the disease, of the constitution, temperament, idiosyncrasies, and many other conditions, before he is in a position to prescribe? And for an M.D. to talk of specifics for diseases, appears to me to be a perfect solecism, and the very essence of incongruity; he must either be entirely ignorant of the laws of medicine, or we must attribute it to dishonesty and hypocrisy. What are these globules composed of? I remember a young lady, who was rather in a mirthful mood, taking two of these globules for a dose, irrespective of remedy, and, to the great merriment of those around her, she was as well the next day as if she had taken nothing extraordinary—a great argument for the harmless

effect of these globules, and certainly bearing out G. V., where he says that “Homœopathy will in no case do positive injury.” In every view, and in every aspect, has the Homœopathic system the characteristic and prominent features of imposition. G. V. tells me something new, and I am no less astonished than “Vinclun” and L. G. G. to hear that “Homœopathy emancipates mankind from bodily ills.” This is startling! and certainly a blessing, if true. So we are likely to disappoint Cowper, who says—

“Man always is, but never to be blest,”

even while this world lasts, and that at a time not very distant, judging from the progress of this blessed system. The best thing the Homœopaths can do is, to organize and collect all their forces together in some of the golden regions, as the followers of Joe Smith have done. “Union is strength.” By inviting their converts to combine with them, doubtless before very long they would secure a perfect paradise on earth.

C. W., Jun., disapproves of the condemnation of new theories and systems; so do I, if they can be proved to be true. But new systems and theories are divided into two classes—1, Those which are true; and, 2, Those which are false: and it is my conscientious conviction that Homœopathy belongs to the latter class. C. W., Jun., appears to receive everything *new* as *true*; approving of Mesmerism, Phrenology, Hydropathy, &c.; and is, I presume, also a follower of Joe Smith. If the Homœopaths would allow me to suggest a president for their settlement, C. W., Jun., appears to be just the man; for he embraces all new theories, and consequently must be the most perfect man as yet found, ever progressing towards that state of perfectibility and goodness which he will doubtless very soon attain; for, being a Homœopath, the disciples of Hahnemann will emancipate his body from disease, and the followers of Joe Smith will give the correct tenets of the most recent—*ergo*, the true—religion.

A. S.

Chelsea.

Live not on opinions; but think for thyself and act with reason, and shun carefully the contagion of the mind, which communicates itself by the ways and manners of those we converse with.

Politics.

OUGHT THE JEWS TO BE ADMITTED TO PARLIAMENT?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It is, perhaps, one of the commonest causes of our misapprehensions and disagreements, that we are content to argue from contestable premisses, when a right principle is the true touchstone of the subject.

Our friend "Veritas," in assuming the spiritual element to be a necessary part of the British constitution, has given the use and consequence of first principles to mere notions which he must be aware are at issue with the views of a great body of the British people. They have a painful conviction that, sound and excellent as that constitution may be in its essentials, there are, nevertheless, defects and disfigurements which, having surrounded themselves with the halo of antiquity, and the respect which was due to the normal institution alone, are powerfully mischievous in their influence on the interests of society, and the progress of the human mind in its approach to truth. Were there no other proof of this, it would be sufficient to show how the "Church and State" idea, unlawfully incorporated by lust, power, chicanery, sincerity, in fact, by every species of motives and means, and by the same, both good and bad, perpetuated, till it had become a real part of the contour of the national system, has operated to the great detriment and distortion of justice, and also to the contracting of minds, otherwise sensible and capable of impartiality. In the present instance these results are seen—first, in the mind of "Veritas" finding its fundamentals in such simplicities as the following: "*monarch bound to be a Christian*"—"lords spiritual"—"commons originally obliged, not only to be Christians, but also to be communicants in the Church of England;" and then, in the ignoring of righteous claims, because they and the prior conception cannot tally.

May God forbid that Britain should ever be without national religion, and that the christian religion; be it still our bulwark and glory: but let us remember that the kingdom of God is within, not without; that

it is the adornment of the soul, and not the mere investings of the state; that it dwells in the highest and holiest of inward principles, and not in arrangements of parliaments; that there is really no religion at all if there be not individual religion, though you accommodate, in a wholesale way, Queen, lords, commons, and people with its name and reputation; and that it abhors, above all things, semblances, Pharisaisms, narrownesses, and unjust behaviour; and there will then be little fear that we shall cheat the Jew under the pretence that our "constitution" requires it, or our religion either.

If "Veritas" had based his reasoning on broad, immutable principles, had he taken his start but from even one natural truth, how great the advantage he had possessed. He could not be argumentatively strong upon anything short of it. He should have gone back, as W. G. says, to "the true principles of civil polity and government," and he would then, perhaps, not only have bettered his cause, but his arguments would have commanded careful consideration. As it is, viewing them as drawn altogether from a false source, we add nothing to what W. G. has said, save a simple denial of their applicability; but in bidding adieu to "Veritas," commend to a second reflection his favourite maxim, that "what is morally wrong cannot be politically right."

Passing on to the article of "Aristides," we readily acknowledge the general soundness of the propositions he has laid down in support of his views. A degree of identity in certain particulars is essential to the utility of any organization. There is this also to be observed in these positions and subsequent remarks of "Aristides," that they are free from that disposition to exclusiveness and unnatural jealousy which too frequently characterize the words and writings even of the most sincere of those who will not concede the claims of the Jew. Belonging to no class of intermediate, policy-spun accommodations, these come nearer the mark of

rationality and fairness; and if there really existed those differences, those oppositions of sentiment, interests, and sympathies between ourselves and the Jew to the extent which "Aristides" supposes, or, if good government, unity of purpose for the weal of a nation, were altogether dependent upon complete unity in sentiments, or interests, or sympathies, or in all of them combined, then might we fear the Jew, and, with some show of reason, suspect his right to our councils. But are not these differences greatly misapprehended, over-rated? "Descent:" equally distinct, as races, are the Celt and Saxon. "Faith:" equally adverse, if not more, must he who holds the christian faith, and the Atheist, who has no faith at all, be "Frequency of intercourse:" on 'Change, on the bench, on the rail, and in the mart is the Jew the daily companion of the Gentile; and if their social intercourse be not particularly familiar, equally unaccustomed are different grades of society to mingle their hearths and homes. "Similarity of interests." Has the Gentile an "interest" in the preservation of the state? Equally so has the Jew, for its fall could avail him nothing. He is prepared with no monarch to fill the vacated throne; his polity is a ruin; besides, according to "Aristides," his anticipated kingdom is elsewhere. Has the Gentile an "interest" in a flourishing state of commerce, healthy funds, national confidence, and contentment? So has the Jew, whose monetary "interests" are of equal magnitude, and equally at stake. Has the one an "interest" in the life of mutual obligations, and their due performance, in the activities of right precepts, and even in the common kindness and courtesies which go to make up the sum of happiness on earth; and has not he, the victim of the world's deridings and uncharitableness, an equal desire for the reciprocation of justice and manly kindnesses? And what amazing difference is there between the feelings and habits of the two? Their interests identical, so, variously modified by constitutional differences and circumstances, must their impressions, motives, and habits, be also identical. The difference between us, then, is not so alarming, after all. It is insufficient to justify a total subversion of moral duty. Then, again, necessary as may be identities in certain respects where a pur-

pose is contemplated, there are differences which are found to be no drawbacks in the attainment of the purpose, but are rather held to have a wholesome influence. All those we have been considering, differences of descent, antagonisms of faith and no faith, varieties of individual temperament and character, exist in our present parliaments, and the people of Britain are rather pleased than otherwise with the sundry nature of the composition, and think there are attendant advantages, while a portion of them have so high an opinion of this model of amalgamated contrarieties, that they would not alter it—not they, though all the virtues should entreat on behalf of a single Jew.

We trust that, in thus expressing ourselves, we are not actuated by the spirit of mere partisanship, or any unworthier motive than that which springs from conviction alone. We have considered the subject again and again, but cannot discover a distinction commensurate with the exception contended for. Why, we have all but made the Jew one of ourselves; there needs but a single clause to complete his charter of naturalization; and we hold that this much having been done, we have yielded the point of "peculiarity," and our "political difference" is peculiar in nothing but diminutiveness. If we err in making the last concession, we have greatly erred in our former liberality; but this view is not maintainable, because what we have done we have been compelled to do entirely by the force of rectitude, against the domination of our wary, hard prejudices, and Gentile haughtiness. And if we needed invitation to future duty, we have it clearly in the experience of the past, that, so far as we have shared with him the rights of citizenship, so far has the Jew been a worthy subject and servant of Queen Victoria. It will not do to shelve the remaining responsibility upon the plea of his slight patriotism with respect to his adopted country. This we take to be perfectly gratuitous. Based on such grounds duty would soon become indescribable confusion. Nay, "Aristides;" the Jew himself, by service already rendered, by interests co-extensive with your own, and by overtures of further devotion, protests against your assumption, and we dare not allow you the benefit of so convenient an excuse.

In conclusion, we remark, that whether or not there be truth in the popular apbhorism to which "Aristides" defers, it is undoubtedly true that suspiciousness and uncharitable accusations on the one side have a tendency to induce laxity of morals on the other. Only let a man know that you are inflexibly suspicious of his character and dealings, and he will be tempted to hold

lightly the virtue you will not give him credit for. If, then, the "wisdom" which "Aristides" venerates has its warrant in facts, we may well blush that they have been fostered by our direct encouragement.

Let us be just, and deal the final meed of justice to the Jew. Albeit, finite appearances, a just course, will assuredly lead to a right end.

B. W. P.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THIS important question having been somewhat fully discussed on both sides, it becomes necessary to weigh the evidence adduced in order to arrive at a final and truthful conclusion on the subject.

The negative articles respectively published in the last three numbers of this periodical have, to a very considerable extent, effectually answered the arguments adduced in the affirmative; there are, however, several points remaining which require some little comment before the subject is closed. To these points we will now address ourselves; having done so, we shall leave the matter in the hands of the public and our readers generally.

It is stated by B. W. P., in his Article No. I., that "the christian oath which members take no more makes them Christians than do their christian names."

It cannot for a moment be supposed that any such absurd idea was or is entertained by the legislature. The oath was never used or intended as a means of conversion to Christianity, but as *the test of Christianity already in existence*. It may not be out of place here to refer to the test given by the apostles of old for the detection of the real spirit possessed by certain professed members of the christian church. It will be found, on reference to holy writ,* that the church is exhorted by the apostle John "not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits;" and the means given for arriving at their real condition is, "Whether or not they would confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh." It is submitted that the test in question goes to the same point; and in order that the legislature may remain christian, it is necessary that such a test should be retained. It is argued that this test

is insufficient to keep out the infidel. Infidels should undoubtedly be rejected as much as Jews; but who, in the name of justice, has received authority to set himself up as a judge of the infidelity of certain members of parliament? Who dare presume to assert that, in a christian community, A. or B., because they may have done certain acts or used certain expressions which C. or D. could not conscientiously do or say as members of the same community, are therefore necessarily infidels? Their admission into the house is not obtained without passing through the required test and ordeal in some shape. It is therefore submitted that the oath having been subscribed and sworn to, or declaration made by such, the only legitimate presumption is, that they are Christians, and not infidels. It is not quite so easy for a member of the christian community to become an infidel, as some seem to imagine: though many, in the wickedness of their hearts, may desire to be and even boast that they are such, they themselves find a barrier which, in their consciences, they cannot overcome. We should therefore pause before we presumptuously and boldly assert that our senate-house is the receptacle of infidels. In the admission of the Jew, *as a Jew*, there might be some ground for such an assertion, for he not only openly and avowedly denies that Jesus is the Son of God, but also shrinks from the established test of the house.

It is also stated by B. W. P., that "Judaism and Christianity are identical in all that concerns the purposes of a government, that the rules which regulate the actions of them are the same in the Old Testament as in the New, and that the purpose of government is not the propagation of religion, but the enforcement of relative duties."

In remarking upon these several points, we will notice one started by W. G., in his

* 1 John iv. 1, 2, 3.

Article No. III., "That all arguments gathered from ecclesiastical connexions are worth nothing; that Cæsar and Cæsar's government have to do with man socially."

The remarks made by W. G. of our ignorance or wilful unmindfulness of the true principles of civil polity and government, we will cheerfully forgive, but would simply refer to a few facts which appear to have altogether escaped his observation. It must be admitted by all reflecting men that the era of this and every other christian nation (so long as she remains christian) must necessarily be dated from the establishment and adoption of Christianity alone. To revert back to Cæsar and Cæsar's government would be at once to destroy the christian contract, and return, in a national point of view, to paganism and infidelity. It must also be borne in mind, that the nation, in accepting Christianity, freely, voluntarily, and *of necessity*, gave up all rights which they possessed simply as men, or as a heathen nation, which were antagonistic to and could not be confirmed by Christianity, and in return received the boon of the gospel and discipline of Christ; it therefore appears to us perfectly idle to talk of rights of manhood amongst Christians irrespective of Christianity.

A short research of the scriptures will suffice to show the manifest difference between the rules for the regulation of man under the Old Testament and those under the New. We will only refer to one or two points, and leave the public to draw their own conclusion. For instance, under the Old Testament, the rule was and still is, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." A man who accidentally killed another might be slain by the deceased's relative (the avenger of blood), if overtaken by him before he reached a city of refuge. To say nothing of the restoration of beast for beast, the Jewish limitation of a sabbath day's journey, restrictions as to diet, and numerous others. How widely different are these from our rules, and how truly oppressive would such seem to us.

It is true that the purpose of government is not the propagation of religion, but the enforcement of relative duties. The law of Christianity may not, however, be lost sight of; indeed, our relative duties can be ascertained only by reference to it. The religion and constitution of the country must

alone decide what are our relative duties, and in what way they are to be enforced.

With reference to B. W. P.'s closing remark, that the question is finally settled, simply because London and Greenwich have returned Jews, we think he might with equal justice argue that the crucifixion of our Lord was a righteous act simply because the whole Jewish nation consented thereto.

We cannot help feeling that the remarks made by "Adelphos," in Affirmative Article No. II., and the motives ascribed by him to the lords spiritual and temporal, in throwing out the Jew Bill, from time to time, go too far. In the absence of the strongest possible evidence to the contrary, we are bound to believe they are actuated alone by principles and motives purely conscientious, from a desire to do their duty, and act consistently with the constitution of the country. However justified men may feel in these days in speaking and writing against this portion of our constitution, it cannot be denied that we are materially indebted to their superior wisdom; that their wisdom and discretion alone have saved this country, from time to time, from much misery and injury which would have resulted from the demands of an excited populace, had they not received the wholesome check which such a house can alone supply.

"Adelphos," like the rest of the Jews' advocates, appears to overlook the wide difference between a judicial and ministerial office; enough, however, has already been said on this head in the former articles.

Although, as stated by W. G. in Affirmative Article No. III., many Episcopalians may, and doubtless do, desire the separation of the church from the state, still it is submitted no conscientious Christian can wish, or can indeed contemplate, such a change, in order that the state should be (as it would seem the Jews' friends wish and others desire) sacrificed to the government of Cæsar, or, in other words, driven back to paganism and infidelity. Since, however, such a desire has so manifested itself amongst the Jews' advocates, and the anti-church-and-state portion of the community generally, it is submitted it would indeed be a direful event to remove from us at the present critical moment almost the only prop left to support the constitution upon its true foundation, and the government of the nation upon the princi-

of Christianity. Such a reversion would indeed place the Jew in a position above us, and possibly give to Rothschild and Salomons a power at present unknown to this nation, and make them like Josephs or Mordecais, for we should by that act dissolve our christian contract in a national point of view. In such a position of things it is easy to conceive how the democratic interests of our country would be interfered with. The grant to the Maynooth College has interfered with the rights and privileges of this Protestant nation. If the Romanists have sufficient power to obtain such a grant, why may not the Jew obtain infringements upon our rights and liberties in this and many other ways? It was not necessary that the Jews should be a large and powerful nation in order that the necks of the Egyptians should be bent to the rule of the Jew Joseph, nor is it necessary now in order that the like event should take place here.

If the Jew acts consistently with his faith (and his friends call him a consistent character), he has no hope in this or any other country but his own, and is looking forward to the coming of the Messiah to set up his kingdom, and re-establish him at Jerusalem; he is therefore, for this reason, also an unfit person to take part in the legislation of this or any other christian country, for want of the necessary sympathy with, and attachment to, the country, as wisely argued by "Aristides," in Negative Article No. III.

We cannot see how the rights of the people are interfered with (as W. G. would have us believe) by the refusal to admit the Jew into parliament, notwithstanding his election. We trust enough has been said to prove that we have no rights antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, Christianity; besides, as we have before stated in our Articles Nos. I. and II., the call of the people, as laid down by Blackstone, is to elect one *from amongst themselves*, which, in a christian community, cannot mean a Jew. No answer whatever to

this proposition has been offered throughout the discussion.

With reference to W. G.'s concluding remarks, we would submit that no length of residence can in the least strengthen the right of the Jew to interfere with, or take part in, the legislation of this or any other christian country amongst whom he may be cast, so long as he *remains in unbelief*. Nor do we think this country has anything to fear from his rejection, so long as she remains christian and he a Jew. If, however, the sacred bond be snapped asunder, and we, in a civil point of view, be driven back to Cæsar's government, there might perhaps be some ground for W. G.'s fears and apprehensions.

Having gone through, with some little care, the whole of the points raised upon this important subject, we are constrained to conclude that, for the reasons stated on the negative side throughout this discussion, it is not only both morally and politically wrong to admit the Jew, *as a Jew*, into our senate-house, but that such a step would be both highly inconsistent with, and dangerous to, the constitution and religious position of the nation; that the Jew himself (so long as he remains in unbelief) is unfit for such an office, and could not do justice therein, either towards us or himself. It therefore appears to us that he ought not to be admitted into Parliament until, at least, he has followed the example of "his friend at court," Disraeli, viz., embraced our faith, and tendered himself to the bar of the house as a Christian.

We also conclude, in order that the nation should maintain her exalted position in the social scale, and the free exercise of all her precious (but, of course, circumscribed) rights and liberties, it is essential that she should adhere closely to her religion and constitution, and most strenuously resist all attempts at innovation and infringements thereon, from whatever source they may come. With these few remarks we close our subject.

VERITAS.

A good reader is nearly as rare as a good writer. People bring their prejudices, whether friendly or adverse. They are lamp and spectacles lighting and magnifying the page. It is not enough for a reader to be unprejudiced. He must remember that a book is to be studied as a picture is hung. Not only must a bad light be avoided, but a good one obtained. This taste supplies. It puts a history, a tale or a poem, in a just point of view, and there examines the execution.—*Wilmott*.

Social Economy.

WOULD COMMUNISM PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

L. I., the writer on the affirmative of this question in the February number, proposes the query, "If the theory of Communism be so defective, how was it that the apostles were Communists, and exemplified their sentiments by forming the first christian church into a community?" We reply, that the primitive Christians adopted that manner of life, not from choice, but from prudential considerations, enforced by the times; they adopted it for the purpose of strengthening the bond of union, for readiness of conference on spiritual subjects, and for their mutual support under the persecutions to which they were subjected—persecutions which eventuated in the dispersion throughout Judea of that godly little brotherhood. Let it be distinctly recollected that that mode of life was not adopted till they were endangered by hostilities, and that, if we except two very small sections of the christian church—the Moravians and the Shakers—it has not since been revived.

The same writer founds his defence of Communism on the superior success of missionary enterprise under the conduct of the Moravians. That success is indisputable, but it is clearly owing to the influence of numbers, not to the espousal of Communism.

We look on Communism as a protest against the abuses of our social state, but not as a remedy for them—a protest which, in the ardency of youth, is subscribed to by every lover of his species: experience, however, brings with it a perception of the expediency, if not of the absolute rightness, of every institution, and usually checks the disposition to innovate on established in favour of ideal forms. Some men, nevertheless, retain the predilections of youth long beyond the period of juvenility, and, from a superabundance of philanthropy, urge the acceptance of Communism as the least complex and the readiest cure. Though we dissent from the opinions entertained by such persons relative to the practicability of Communism, we esteem them for the expression

of sympathy with that greatest of principles—universal brotherhood—which their theory implies.

The gist of the Communist system consists in the following particulars. The government is invested with all property; it is the recognised holder and administrator of all wealth; the members labour in common, and in return the produce of all labour is given to each according to his wants. Fourierism, Owenism, all the various forms of the idea, recognise this community of interest, labour, and enjoyment. The differences which entitle these systems to be considered as distinct are of minor importance in the present debate.

Society is a reflex of the inner man; insensibly, but invariably, men modify society into exact correspondence with their own nature; gradually, as their faculties become developed, institutions of an obstructive nature yield to others of a more liberal character. The changes in our institutions since chivalric times have been commensurate in extent to the period which has intervened: then the individual will of the baron was law to his vassals, but now feudality is obsolete. Society in its present organization is the result of this principle; yet, amid all changes, the institution of private property remains inviolate, and hence we conclude that it is agreeable to man's nature. Property represents the exertion of the individual, in furtherance of his material interests, in the same way as talent represents the labour undergone in the culture of the intellect. We look upon it as the outward manifestation of the individuality in man. Its acquisition not only stimulates to labour, but, when realized, is an amelioration of that labour.

We object to the proposed equality in the distribution of the produce; that equality is repulsive to our intuitive sense of justice, inasmuch as it supposes no discrimination of the ingenuity evinced in the different orders of labour, and supposes no recognition of individual merit. This, unless the tyranny of declarations of capacity be acted upon,

directly leads to the universal adoption of that sort of labour which requires the least exertion and the smallest amount of skill; for peculiar labours are never undertaken except in the hope of gaining peculiar rewards. Equality would thus, it is obvious, operate so as effectually to repress those generous impulses of soul, the achievements of which compensate for the evils resulting from competition, and confer a lustre on our social state to which it is impossible any other than a competitive state can pretend.

We object to the overwhelming power vested in the government. Philosophers are agreed that the love of power is a passion paramount in the human soul; proof of this is afforded in every phase of life, from the petty factory overseer to the ukase-promulgating autocrat. Now, from the almost boundless power centred in the magistracy, great temptations are presented to the assumption of despotic rule; it follows as a natural sequence that the magistracy would desire, for their own advantage, to perpetuate that power. Communism is a system which reposes such unlimited confidence in individual integrity, that every facility is at the command of any one daring enough to venture such an enterprise. As designing men will exist in a Communistic as well as in the present state, it cannot be supposed that Communism will enjoy an immunity from irruptions of this nature, when society, constituted as it is, and zealous as it is of such attempts, is still the subject of them.

How erroneous is the supposition that, in the community, crime would have no existence! We would not quarrel with Communists on this point, if they could as easily

exclude it from human nature; but, as that transcends mortal agency, it would not have been imprudent to introduce some provisions for its repression and punishment. Some do, indeed, propose to expel persons convicted of crime, should any such be found; but we should say there must be something defective in that state of society which would abandon, instead of generously endeavouring to reform, the misguided. Communism is fitted only for a state in which man has so effectually subdued himself, that restraints are rendered all but unnecessary.

But when, we may ask, is Communism to be adopted? Evidently the time has not yet arrived, for, on the failure of their experiments, the Communists urge in extenuation, that those with whom these experiments were made had previously had their natures perverted in our competitive state. Shall we, then, delay its realization till men have been elevated by education, and till the religious sentiment has taken vigorous possession of the soul? Need we say, that when that happy time shall have arrived, Communism will have ceased to be desirable, for our own social state will have been pruned of its abuses? The anarchy of interests pervading society is attributable to an insufficient evangelization of the popular heart and mind. Correct, exalt, sanctify these, and simultaneously society will be regenerated. Variety is essential to happiness, but Communism presents the uninviting prospect of one continued round of sameness.

This second series of objections is, we think, sufficiently cogent to warrant us in withholding our suffrage from Communism.

J. N.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

Dr. JOHNSON remarks, "He that has no one to love or to confide in, has little to hope. He wants the radical principle of happiness." According to this statement, which we believe to be correct, "the radical principle" of man's happiness depends, in a secondary sense, upon at least one object worthy of man's love, and in whom he can confide with safety. If so, this principle and its benign effects will increase in proportion to the number and dignity of those objects which elicit, or rather which create, them.

Hence, to every honest and intelligent mind, but to such only, the term Communism involves the idea of a desirable state of things; for the noblest specimen of human greatness is a well-informed, God-fearing philanthropist. And what sight on earth can enhance the happiness of such a man's mind—comparable to that of brethren—Jew and Gentile, Greek and barbarian, Protestant and Catholic, Churchman and Dissenter, rich and poor, master and servant—dwelling together in unity? None: for such a scene would necessarily imply a cessation

of wholesale wickedness, and a total renovation of human nature and usages.

Communism, on a universal as well as limited scale, is not only desirable, but easily conceivable. By making an exertion of our imaginary powers, we can readily transfer ourselves into a state of society the members of which have all things common. Such a state of society does not necessarily imply an equalization of mind, wealth, wants, labour, and remuneration: but a willingness on the part of each of its members to contribute what he reasonably can for the benefit of the whole; and on the part of the whole to do all that is essential for the protection and support of every one of its constituent members. Were this the case, there would be, as Plato observes, no necessity for the words "mine and not thine;" for "there would be no contentions, nor lawsuits one with another, because none would have any thing proper to himself, except his own person: everything else would be common to all." A reciprocity of this kind would prove the bond of union—the safety valve—and the very life blood of Communism. Thus it is in the human body; here every member serves the whole, and the whole nourishes and serves each member, as and when necessary. There is a vast difference between the use and mechanism of the hand and those of the ear, but neither has a right to say to the other, "I have no need of thee;" nor has the whole any right to say to a part, "I can dispense with thee;" for the well-being of the whole is equally dependent upon each of its parts, and each part is dependent upon the whole. Without the hand human nature could not procure a subsistence; and without the organ of hearing, it would be the subject of endless inconveniences and jeopardies.

Here, then, we have what may be termed a perfect model of a Communistic state of society, a model in which Communism is epitomized. Without infringing the laws of analogical deductions, we may affirm that as it is in and among the members of the body, individually and aggregately, so we conceive it may be in the politic body. Though we called the human body in its healthful and perfect state a perfect model of Communism, we did not thereby wish it to be understood that the body itself was perfect. We look upon it as deficient in point of perfection,

not in mechanism but in physical education. But taking it as it is when in working order, we perceive in it the annexed features or facts which set forth the constituent elements of Communism:—1. A perfect whole—having nothing deficient, nothing redundant. 2. This whole is made up of a countless number of ingredients, parts, members, &c. 3. A power of renewing itself and maintaining its identity and aggregateness, notwithstanding the various omissions and losses to which it is constantly subject. 4. Precedency, dissimilarity, diversity, unison, sympathy, occasional refractoriness, &c., among its members. 5. Mutual and self-defence. 6. Everything essential to the health and well-being of the whole body. Now, by making a transfer of these and kindred principles to society at large, we have, hypothetically, the real Communistic state.

Again, Communism is not only desirable and conceivable, but attainable, that is, if we leave time present out of the question. But for sin, such an elysian state of things would undoubtedly have prevailed in our world throughout all ages; and though at this time unavoidably absent, it will ultimately be introduced successfully. The bitter waters of Marah are being sweetened by the cross of Christ. Christianity, the only patent Communistic leaven, is already in the meal—and ere long the whole lump of human nature will be leavened. The little stone of Daniel, which levels all before it, is now on the move. The germ of this better state of things made its appearance at the day of pentecost, and that appearance may be regarded as an earnest of what is in reversion for the future dispensation of man. And though at present we see but little of the Communistic principle, it is still in being, yet alive, and in the meal; and will, by-and-by, burst forth and shed its peace-giving influences among the nations. Lycurgus attempted to establish a system of fraternity in the Spartan republic, as appears from the following passage from his life, by Plutarch:—"Lycurgus persuaded the Spartans to make a new distribution of their lands equally among themselves; to live thenceforth as brethren together, so that none should seek to go before each other, save in virtue only: thinking there should be no difference or inequality among the

inhabitants of one city, but the reproaches of dishonesty and praise of virtue." Many French philosophers and others have made strenuous and praiseworthy efforts to found a Communistic state, in which there should be no individual or separate rights in property, and so forth: but hitherto all attempts have proved abortive. And here is the main reason, every proposed system has lacked a sufficient quantity of the principal ingredient—*religion*, the soul of the desired system. Moreover, the moral condition of man is not sufficiently pure and elevated as to admit of the most dignified system of Communism. The religion of the Bible, as couched in those ever-memorable words—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself," is to Communism what life is to the body, or what God is to the world. In a preceding article on this question, the Moravians have been alluded to as having approximated nearer to a state of Communism than any other body of men. The fact is, they have a considerable share of this essential element among them. With them charity has its perfect work. Their happiness and progress are not to be attributed to Communism—but their Communism is to be attributed to their religion. Have courage to give tribute to whom tribute is due. Hitherto our remarks have assumed an affirmative phase, but they must now take a negative one as regards the question at issue, for we verily believe that Communism is at present impracticable. It is a subject of time; and as there is a time for everything, we shall undoubtedly have it in its time. We must

till and sow before we can expect to reap. By this we do not wish to either create or strengthen a religious and civil apathy, but to provoke our fellow-men to love and good works, by holding out to them the hope of a brighter, better, happier day.

To say that Communism is attainable and practicable in the present degenerate state of society, is tantamount to saying that an effect must exist prior to its cause, or even produce its cause, which in either case is absurd. For, in our humble opinion, Communism will be the effect rather than the cause of man's happiness, or at least it will be contemporary with it. At the same time it would seem that Communism will accelerate, augment, and help to perpetuate the happiness of men when once adopted by them.

But the means which will produce Communism will, at the same time, produce human happiness—and Communism will be but one of many effects resulting from those means.

The very thing that prevents the adoption of Communistic principles is the same with that which would wither their happy influences were they adopted in the present state of society. And this is the superabundance of sheer wickedness which infects our aggregate nature. And till this be extirpated and succeeded by something purely rational and divine, "there will always be a part, and always a very large part, of every community, that have no care but for themselves, and whose care for themselves reaches little farther than impatience of immediate pain, and eagerness for the nearest good."—*Dr. Johnson's Taxation no Tyranny*, p. 9.

I. F.

The Societies' Section.

MENTAL SCIENCE.

We wish in this paper to recommend the study of Mental Science to all who are engaged in the education of the young, or who purpose to take part in this work. Perhaps it will not be too strong an assertion if we say, that multifarious as are the sciences with which an educator of youth should be intimately acquainted, there is none that more imperatively demands a persevering and careful study than this; and that other branches of knowledge should be considered as subordinate and auxiliary, commanded and directed

by this as central and paramount, as we see ridges of inferior elevation running parallel to a vast mountain chain.

The importance which we think proper to attach to the study of Mental Science stands, we are aware, in almost startling contrast with its all but universal neglect. While other subjects are pursued with a most praiseworthy vigour and perseverance, this is nearly unthought of, or, if thought of, deferred to some less active season. The claims of Grammar and Arithmetic, Geography and History, Euclid and Algebra, are so loud, that scarcely another voice can be heard: and so the student goes forth, and the teacher goes on, to prosecute his work in the dark, striking at random, often doing mischief he cannot avoid, and at the best gaining experience at the expense of his pupils.

The time will come, perhaps, when Mental Philosophy, as affording a knowledge of the material on which education has to operate, will be looked upon as an important part of the teacher's preparatory studies; but we urge its importance now, as indirectly and powerfully tending to success even in this point of view, but especially as altogether essential in the far more serious work of carrying on the education of a number of children. What would be said of a physician or surgeon who, with a good knowledge of other sciences indispensable to him, should have neglected to acquaint himself with the principles of physiology and anatomy? We should hesitate before we trusted life or limb to one who had so unaccountably omitted the chief part of his professional education. We should with reason expect him to know, not something only, but a good deal, of the machine whose disarrangement it is his business to remove or prevent. And shall it be thought a light thing, then, for one who is intended to educate the mind—to manage a machine a thousand times more intricate and difficult of control—to go forth to his task in blank ignorance of its nature and constitution?

Independently of the consideration of practical utility, there is, in the prosecution of any science, a pleasure, which forms the student's principal incentive and reward. Curiosity, "the thirst of the soul," is gratified and intensely delighted at the discovery of new truths: at the starting up of new relations unperceived before: and is set on tip-toe with eager excitement as it contemplates the long series of unexpected deductions stretching out before its view. Hence it is that Euclid is so fascinating a study,—dry indeed at first, and repulsive, but unfolding as the student advances a thousand charms which we could never have believed would evolve themselves from those few simple intuitive truths on which it rests. What a noble stream of thought flows from that meagre fountain! The student is constantly surprised with startling deductions; arguments and discoveries of new relations follow one another at times like peals of thunder, and one is hurried on impetuously to the result. For this reason Euclid is always a new book,—one of the few new books in the world; you constantly turn with pleasure to him, though for the thousandth time; the delight you receive from him is a rich reward for any labour you may have taken in your first studies.

So it is with the physical sciences. Without thinking at all of any purpose the stars may serve to the seaman, we behold with solemn gratification the hosts which are "the poetry of heaven." Their distances, their magnitudes, their motions; these very words when uttered with respect to the heavenly bodies, instantly fill the mind and set imagination on the stretch to span their meaning. So the other departments of natural science, a

those which relate to the structure of the earth, the nature of plants, or the habits and constitution of animals—all form a never-failing source of pure delight. That man has more to be thankful for, than if the wealth of Croesus were his own, whose mind can luxuriate in pleasures like these; who can sit down, in however humble an abode, and can summon knowledge to spread before him an intellectual feast, with which the intensest of sensual delights deserve no comparison.

Now, cannot pleasure of as pure a kind and of equal intensity be derived from the study of Mental Science? The world around us is rich in various objects of lofty and refined contemplation; is there not a world within teeming with greater wonders? Turn your thoughts within; you will find marvellous phenomena there. Think of Memory, Imagination, the Power with which you control your thoughts, dismissing them and recalling them at pleasure. Think of that mysterious faculty of Abstraction which the mind possesses; and ask if it is really to this power, visibly working early in childhood, that all the inventions of life owe their origin? Make your mind the subject of a little study;—you will soon find it a palace of enchantment; a universe of wonders, an entire marvel. When you sit down to this sort of study; when you introvert your thoughts, and consider the mysteries of your own spirit, you will see what Young meant when he said

“I tremble at myself
And in myself am lost.”

Moreover, by carefully and habitually observing the phenomena of your mind, you may derive interesting information from the most trivial occurrences that affect it; even castle-building may contribute its fraction of benefit, and the mad phantasies of the night may show that

“Dull sleep instructs, nor sport vain dreams in vain.”

It is an interesting occupation of the mind, while engaged in the study of the natural sciences, to mark the evidence of design exhibited each step we take. We find the construction of animals adapted peculiarly to their mode of living; and when this construction is not thus adapted, it is curious to observe, in numerous instances, how the defect is remedied. Now the evidences of skilful contrivance are no less manifest in the mind than in the external creation. We say the Judgment compares two ideas, i.e., sees whether they are alike or unlike, and whether they belong or do not belong one to another. The Judgment could not do this if Memory were not to recall these ideas for the purpose. Memory not only does this, but when conclusions have been arrived at by the Judgment, she takes charge of these also; and is able to present them to the Reason, who compares these several conclusions and deduces another from them. But simply recalling ideas, or the conclusions arrived at by the comparisons of the Judgment, is not enough; they must be kept before the mind for a time that the Judgment or the Reason may have a due opportunity of considering them. The power of so keeping these ideas fixed before the mind is that remarkable one called Attention. The power of Attention is the greatest faculty of the human mind, and the possession of it in different degrees by different individuals is the chief cause of the immense superiority of some minds over others. A prompt, retentive memory; a clear judgment; strong reason, are to a great extent attributes of a vigorous Attention. To attend is the most difficult operation of the mind, and it may be doubtful

whether it be not impossible without the signs supplied by language. It is a curious fact, too, that Curiosity should have such a tendency to quicken attention; and it is precisely in these circumstances that Curiosity is most alive. And it is observable also that this Curiosity is generally in proportion to our ignorance. The curiosity of a child in his first or second year is constantly on the alert;—a rude piece of wood, or a pebble, he turns over and over, receiving an accession of ideas at every turn;—hence probably a child in his earlier years makes greater advances in knowledge than he will ever make in any equal period of time afterwards.

As it is our purpose merely to direct attention to this branch of human knowledge, we will pursue the subject at present no further; but conclude with one or two observations. In regard to the study of this science, which, let it be remarked, may be pursued like the other sciences in accordance with the rules of sound induction—there will not only be felt the pleasure to which we have referred, but great profit will be derived in two ways:—First to the teacher, considered as being himself a learner. No teacher will succeed in his profession who is not a persevering student; and surely an acquaintance with the principles of Mental Philosophy, joined to a careful observation of the workings of his own mind, cannot but elicit useful practical rules for his guidance as a student. For instance, what we have just said about Attention, may lead him to consider whether in his studies it may not sometimes happen that the greater haste is the worst speed; and that *Sat cito, si sat bene* may be as apt a motto in study as on the panel of the Quaker's carriage. Secondly, it will prove of great benefit to the teacher in conducting the education of his children. We shall not dwell on this point, but take it for granted that a man should have some knowledge of that which has to be the subject of his daily and hourly training. "Education," says Dugald Stewart, "would be more systematic and enlightened, if the powers and faculties on which it operates were more scientifically examined and better understood."—*Papers for the Schoolmaster*.

ON SELF-DISCIPLINE.

THERE is always some danger of Self-discipline leading to Self-confidence: and the more so when the motives for it are of a poor and worldly character, or the results of it outward only, and superficial. But surely when a man has got the better of any bad habit or evil disposition, his sensations should not be those of exultation only; ought they not rather to be akin to the shuddering faintness with which he would survey a chasm that he had been guided to avoid, or with which he would recal to mind a dubious deadly struggle which has terminated in his favour? The sense of danger is never, perhaps, so fully apprehended, as when the danger has been overcome.

Self-discipline is grounded on Self-knowledge. A man may be led to resolve on some general course of Self-discipline by a faint glimpse of his moral degradation: let him not be contented with that small insight. His first step in Self-discipline should be to have something like an adequate idea of the disorder. The deeper he goes in this matter the better; he must try to probe his own nature thoroughly. Men often make use of what Self-knowledge they possess to frame for themselves skilful flattery, or to amuse themselves

in fancying what such persons as they are would do under imaginary circumstances. For flatteries and for fancies of this kind not much depth of Self-knowledge is required: but he who wants to understand his own nature for the purposes of Self-discipline, must strive to learn the whole truth about himself, and not to shrink from telling it to his own soul:—

“ To thine own self be true ;
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.”

The old courtier, Polonius, meant this for worldly wisdom; but it may be construed much more deeply.

Imagine the soul, then, thoroughly awake to its state of danger, and the whole energies of the man devoted to self-improvement. At this point there often arises a habit of introspection which is too limited in its nature; we scrutinize each action as if it were a thing by itself—independent and self-originating; and so our scrutiny does less good, perhaps, than might be expected from the pain it gives and the resolution it requires. Any truthful examination into our actions must be good: but we ought not to be satisfied with it until it becomes both searching and progressive. Its aim should be not only to investigate instances, but to discover principles.

Infinite toil would not enable you to sweep away a mist; but, by ascending a little, you may often look over it altogether. So it is with our moral improvement: we wrestle fiercely with a vicious habit, which would have no hold upon us if we ascended into a higher moral atmosphere.

As I have heard suggested, it is by adding to our good purposes, and nourishing the affections which are rightly placed, that we shall best be able to combat the bad ones. By adopting such a course you will not have yielded to your enemy, but will have gone, in all humility, to form new alliances; you will then resist an evil habit with the strength which you have gained in carrying out a good one. You will find, too, that when you set your heart upon the things that are worthy of it, the small selfish ends, which used to be so dear to it, will appear almost disgusting; you will wonder that they could have had such hold upon you.

In the same way, if you extend and deepen your sympathies, the prejudices which have hitherto clung obstinately to you will fall away: your former uncharitableness will seem absolutely distasteful; you will have brought home to it feelings and opinions with which it cannot live.

Man, a creature of twofold nature, body and soul, should have both parts of that nature engaged in any matter in which he is concerned: spirit and form must both enter into it. It is idol-worship to substitute the form for the spirit; but it is a vain philosophy which seeks to dispense with form. All this applies to Self-discipline.

See how most persons love to connect some outward circumstance with their good resolutions; they resolve on commencing the new year with a surrender of this bad habit; they will alter their conduct as soon as they are at such a place. The mind thus shows its feebleness: but we must not conclude that the support it naturally seeks is useless. At the same time that we are to turn our chief attention to the attainment of right principles, we cannot safely neglect any assistance which may strengthen us in contending against

bad habits: far is it from the spirit of true humility to look down upon such assistance. Who would not be glad to have the ring of eastern story, which should remind the wearer by its change of colour of his want of shame? Still these auxiliaries partake of a mechanical nature: we must not expect more from them than they can give: they may serve as aids to memory; they may form landmarks, as it were, of our progress; but they cannot, of themselves, maintain that progress.

It is in a similar spirit that we should treat what may be called prudential considerations. We may listen to the suggestions of prudence, and find them an aid to self-discipline; but we should never rest upon them. While we do not fail to make the due use of them, we must never forget that they do not go to the root of the matter. Prudence may enable a man to conquer the world, but not to rule his own heart: it may change one evil passion for another, but it is not a thing of potency enough to make a man change his nature.—*Essays Written in the Intervals of Business.*

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Birmingham Debating Society.—An interesting public meeting of the members and friends of this society was held on Friday evening, February 20th, at the Philosophical Institution, Cannon-street. Mr. Williams presided, and the attendance of ladies and gentlemen was numerous and highly respectable. The subject for discussion was, "Whether it is probable that the other European States will suffer from Russian Aggression." Dr. Heslop opened in the affirmative, contending that the past history of Russia, her aggressive policy, not only at remote but recent periods, her present desire for additional territory; the immensity of her empire; amount of population; strength and condition of her army and navy; the advances she had made in manufactures of every kind, and other remarkable features connected with that important country, warranted the belief that at no distant period the states of Europe would suffer by aggressions from her of a most serious character. The army of Russia numbered upwards of 700,000; her naval force consisted of about forty-five ships of the line and thirty frigates; her population was increasing much faster than that of France; her manufactures were rapidly extending; and on the whole she occupied in every respect a most important position in Europe.—J. T. Chance, Esq., replied to the remarks of Dr. Heslop, and expressed his opinion that there need be no apprehension of future aggression on the part of Russia. In the first place, the territory which she had taken was not so large as was imagined, it seemed but a speck upon the map; and even though she were disposed to add to her present almost unwieldy dominions, she did not possess the means to enable her to do so. Her revenue was limited; and, in proof, he would mention the fact that after the assistance she rendered to Austria in 1810, she was compelled to replenish her coffers by effecting a loan of upwards of five millions. The extent of her country, too, was an obstacle, and the trouble and cost of removing immense armies thousands of miles would be more than she could bear. Beyond England in Europe

they would not hear much of the aggression of Russia, nor was she styled perfidious; but they might hear a good deal about perfidious Albion, and her aggressive policy in the East. It had been said with truth that Russia had taken to herself important places from other countries, but the extension of her trade required them. She required outlets for her manufactures, and for the achievement of that object obstacles should be removed. If the mouth of the Thames were claimed and occupied by some foreign power to the injury of this country, would not England make an effort to obtain possession of it? The population of Russia might be increasing more rapidly than that of France, but it should be remembered that Russia contained a greater number of inhabitants than France, and consequently her population increased in proportion. He contended that the increase of commerce in Russia would act as a preventive against aggression, for it was not likely that, depending a good deal upon surrounding states for her trade, and hoping to still further extend it, she would risk it by acts of aggression.—Mr. Jabet, in proving the aggressive policy of Russia, related her acts for the past eighty years, and expressed his belief that she would ere long still further extend her territory. She had no proper boundaries, and was divided from other states by imaginary lines, which it was probable she would attempt to remove, and extend her own empire.—Mr. J. T. Turner contended that the states by which Russia was surrounded were obstacles to encroachment. Sweden, with her brave army and navy; Prussia, with her civilization and increased facilities for warfare; and Poland, ever remembering the wrongs inflicted upon her, would check the destructive course of the Czar.—Mr. Saunders contended that there was every reason to apprehend aggression from Russia, and concluded by quoting Napoleon's remark at St. Helena, that in fifty years Europe would be Republican or Cossack. The hour being now far advanced, Mr. R. Wright moved the adjournment of the debate, which was seconded by Mr. W. B.

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the fair sex; John Gerald Potter, Esq., was called to the chair, who said,—“In this country we can support societies like this without any fear that they will become political in their bearing or revolutionary in their tendency. These societies, although primarily intended to minister to the improvement of their members, are not necessarily confined to that object, but have within their scope the improvement of the world at large. There are people at the present day who speak of a little knowledge as a dangerous thing, and who regard these institutions as extremely dangerous and democratic in their character. But such is not my opinion, for I believe that they are conservative in their tendency and beneficial in their action; and believing so, I wish them prosperity.” The secretary, Mr. Ralph Walsh, then read the report, from which it appeared that the society originated with a few young men, who, having been called upon to speak in public meetings, found themselves unequal to the task, and, being desirous of gaining knowledge, and imparting the same to others, they resolved themselves into a society on the 1st of August, 1851. The society numbers about eighteen members, possesses a small library of its own, and takes in the *British Controversialist*, the *Working Man's Friend*, &c. During the evening the meeting was enlivened by speeches and recitations from the members. Thanks were given to the ladies for their attention

to the tea, and to the chairman, after which the meeting separated.

R. W.

Cheltenham Mutual Improvement Society.—This society was established November 20th, 1851, when a few individuals met and drew up a code of rules for its management, and elected a committee, secretary, and treasurer, from their number to act for the first half year. The object, as stated in one of the rules, is the “improvement of the mind in different branches of education and religion.” To attain this end the members meet weekly in the vestry of Salem Chapel, to hold discussions, read essays, or any other employment that is thought profitable. Its principles are entirely unsectarian. Since its commencement it has doubled the number of members, and a library of circulation has been lately established for their use. Among the subjects that have been discussed are the following:—“Is it right that Capital Punishment should be inflicted?” “Is the Sale of Books in Sunday Schools in accordance with the Word of God?” “Is Competition Injurious or Beneficial to the Community?” Several original essays have been read by the members. A very interesting and instructive lecture has been delivered by Mr. James Lang on Phrenology, and the same gentleman has promised to deliver another, on the “External and Internal Evidences of Christianity.” The *British Controversialist* is regularly taken in by the society.

H. W. L., Hon. Sec.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

89. Who were the Port-Royalists quoted in the article on Rhetoric, II.; and what were they celebrated for? I have often met with quotations from their writings, but as yet am unacquainted with the meaning of the “nomme de plume,” for such it appears to be.—S. G.

90. If any of your historical friends would inform me of a good and concise English history of chivalry, ditto of the crusades, and ditto of the British colonies, I should feel greatly obliged.

J. C. H.

91. Being desirous of studying the Welsh language, I should esteem it a great favour if some one of your correspondents would take the trouble to give me, through the medium of your excellent publication, some information as to what books are most suitable for commencing the study of that language, and where I am most likely to obtain them.—VIATOR.

92. In a missionary magazine I found the four undermentioned lines. As I have never been able to trace out their authorship, probably some of your correspondents can assist me:—

“An Austrian army, awfully arrayed,
Boldly by battery besieged Belgrade;
Cossack commanders cannonading come,
Dealing destruction, devastating doom.”

In the magazine these lines were given as an illustration of the kind of alliteration that exists in Arabic poetry.—DRUMWHANNAN.

93. Can any of your correspondents inform me

of any periodical devoted to the sole purpose of publishing sermons? Also, any commentary on the whole Bible, or parts of it, which, after affording explanation of the chapter, or passage quoted, refers for additional information by giving the names of authors who have treated of the subject at greater length? Likewise, any clerical assistant which has arranged a series of texts of scripture in the order of the different books, quoting the author who has written on each particular text?—DRUMWHANNAN.

94. Will any of your Scotch law student subscribers have the goodness to inform me what course of study is necessary to acquire a knowledge of the principles of conveyancing according to the law of Scotland? I am quite aware the inquiry, as applicable to English law, is already answered in your pages.—LEX.

95. If any of your readers would give me information on the art of transparent painting on glass, for the use of the magic lantern, they would oblige.—J. G.

96. Will any of your correspondents inform me what is required before a person can legally style himself an “actuary”?—C. L.

97. A. B. would be obliged by information as to how he can be admitted into one of the Manchester engineering firms, as learner of the trade, or art of practical engineering. Several circumstances prevent his being apprenticed. First, he is nineteen years of age. Second, he has not the “necessary pecuniary qualification” for existing a term of years independent of receiving some proportion of cash for labour. He, however, has

a general knowledge of the *theory* of mechanics and machinery, and is aware that *physical labour* is a chief requirement. This latter element he trusts to be able to supply, and bring of an inventive, constructive, or mechanical turn of mind, and of an active temperament, he would, doubtless, give satisfaction to his employer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

72. *Music*—It is impossible for us to prescribe an exact remedy for J. A. There may be some defect either in the ear for, or right perception of, music. Or it may be owing to lack of dexterity of hand, which is a more usual barrier to progress than some are ready to admit. Your best, and as it appears to us, only remedy, is to consult some good master. Get him to attend you while you go through a few of your exercises, and he will most likely discover and put you in the way of remedying your defect. ZENO.

79. *Sermon in favour of Homœopathy*.—The sermon referred to was preached on behalf of the Homœopathic Hospital, by the Rev. — Averest, and was printed under the motto:—"Heal the sick, cleanse the leper, as you preach the gospel." "A Constant Reader" will find it referred to at considerable length in Dr. Cormack's speech at the anniversary meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association, held at Brighton last August, and reported in the journal of the same name for August 20th.—VINCLUM.

83. *The Amount of Gold in Circulation*.—In reply to the question as to "the probable amount of gold, in sovereigns and half sovereigns, at present in circulation throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, irrespective of what may be held at the Bank of England," I beg to state that I have based my calculation on Sir Robert Peel's declaration in parliament some five years ago, when he declared that it was a very difficult question to answer correctly: yet by observation of the circulation, he came to the conclusion that it was from thirty to forty millions. I have, therefore, taken thirty-five millions, and have added to it the different yearly return of the Mint coinage, which makes about fifty millions. But I have bitterly blamed government for such a pitiful currency for our debled population, and in face of the infamous suppression of free coinage at the Royal Mint for the people, and withdrawing an hundred and fifty million of silver tender for an only forty shilling tender, the worst robbery that was ever perpetrated since the creation.

I have given in *their favour* in all my late publications the other five millions, and state it now as fifty-five millions, and we have only twenty-one millions of silver:—seventy-six millions for twenty-nine millions of people—or two pounds twelve shilling and sixpence per head; whereas in 1815 we had, for seventeen millions of people, a £200 joint—one-fourth gold and three-fourths silver—currency, besides Bank of England paper—or eleven pounds fifteen shillings per head. This gave two hundred millions to pay for two hundred millions yearly original labour—so both balanced, pound for pound, in just equilibrium; but the day on which the above transaction took place, under Peel's abominable bill of 1819, three-fourths of the standard measure quan-

tity were taken away, and the poor man has given four days' labour for one day of his former just pay.—E. TAUNTON.

84. *Ventriloquism*.—We cannot tell you if there be any separate treatises published on this subject—we have never seen or heard of any, and have been pretty much among books for some years. We can offer you the following information on the subject:—Ventriloquism (literally, "belly-speaking," from *venter*, the belly; and *logos*, I speak) is a vocal mimicry of sounds, by which an illusion is produced on the hearer, who supposes that the sound comes, not from the mimic, but from some other person. It is, then, the art or practice of speaking, by means of which the voice appears to proceed from different places, though the utterer does not change his place, and in many instances does not appear to speak. It has been considered that the sounds were produced independent of the labial and lingual organs, and was supposed to be a natural peculiarity, because few persons have learned it by being taught; but it is certain that practice only is necessary to carry this act of illusion to a high degree of perfection; and that the sound is not produced during inspiration, but proceeds as usual during respiration, with a less opened mouth. The art of the ventriloquist consists merely in this:—after drawing a long breath, he breathes it out slowly and gradually, dexterously dividing the air and diminishing the sound of the voice by the muscles of the larynx and the palate, moving the lips as little as possible. The "National Cyclopædia" furnishes this additional illustration:—The essence of ventriloquy consists in creating illusions as to the distance and direction whence a sound has travelled, which are thus explained:—1. *Distance*. We do not hear the distance which a sound has travelled from its source, but we judge the distance from our former experience, by comparing the loudness which we hear with the known distance and known loudness of similar sounds heard on former occasions. Near sounds are louder than distant ones. Now, by preserving the same pitch, quality, and duration, but with an accurately graduated reduction of loudness, a series forming a perspective (if the term be allowed) of sounds may be created, which, falling in succession on the ear, will suggest to the mind a constantly increasing distance of the sound's source. In this way Mr. Love (we do not think him the best modern representative of his art) produces an imitation of a receding watchman crying the hour, so perfect as to appear a reality. An effort of a similar character, but in which the source of sound is approaching, is produced at the theatre in the representation of *Macbeth*. A military band is faintly heard, which gradually increases in loudness, suggesting to the mind the approach from a great distance of the victorious army of *Macbeth*, until the ordinary degree of loudness suggests its proximity, when the army immediately comes upon the stage. The estimate, then, which is formed of the distance which a sound has travelled before reaching the ear, is a judgment of the mind formed by comparing a present perception (by hearing) with the remembrance of a former loudness in connexion with its known distance. 2. *Direction*. The direction whence a sound comes seems to be judged of by the right or left ear receiving the stronger impression, which, however, can only

take place when the sound's source is in a plane, or nearly so, with a line passing through both ears. It is familiarly known that a person in a house cannot, by the noise of an approaching carriage, judge with certainty whether it is coming from the right or left. He accurately judges it to be approaching, passing, or receding, as the case may be, by the gradations of loudness, but is unable to decide with certainty whether its approach or recession is from up or down the street. Common experience shows the judgment to be more fallible concerning the direction than the distance of sound. The actor generally, by some look or gesture, directs the attention of his auditors to the direction from whence he wishes the sound to appear to proceed. This materially aids the delusion. Finally, it is quite as easy to speak without moving the jaw, and it is the jaw's movements which disturb the features in utterance. The labial sounds, as B, P, M, when the jaw is thus fixed, can be made with a slight movement of the lips. The lips and jaws being always somewhat open during ventriloquy, a slight labial movement remains unnoticed unless special attention be directed to it, and all the modifications of voice can be produced without at all distorting the features or moving the lips.

C. W., Jun.

The art of ventriloquism has been enshrouded in such mystery, that the opinion of the public has been for many years that this wonderful faculty, as they imagine it to be, depends upon some peculiarity of organization on the part of him possessing it; and the deceptions with which some of its clever practitioners have astonished the public have been so startling, and apparently wonderful, that it is hardly to be wondered that such an opinion should have so long and universally prevailed; and they, knowing full well John Bull's love for the marvellous, always endeavour to impress upon their audience that it is an intuitive power, and cannot be taught: but let me tell your correspondent, that so far from being so, it *can* and *has* been taught. Monsieur Alexandre, whose name ranks high in the art, once essayed to come to England to teach the art of imitation, but was dissuaded from it by his friends, who told him that John Bull would sooner pay a shilling to hear one that pretended to speak with his belly, than one who taught the art of imitation. The art consists in producing sounds similar to what would be produced were there real persons in the place from which you wish your voice to proceed; *e. g.*, you wish your voice to sound as it were from a chimney, you produce a sound similar to what would be produced by a person in the chimney, and by your gestures complete the delusion. It would take too many of these pages to inform you how all those sounds from inanimate bodies are produced, such as the sawing and planing of wood, opening of ginger-bread, frying, &c. &c., but if you will inform me of your address through the medium of this work, I shall be happy to give you any information you may require. Adopt the 'Labor omnia vincit' principle, and in time you will become a ventriloquist. I do not know of any treatise on the subject, but I should think, as the art is almost exclusively in the hands of a few, it is their interest so to keep it.

A VENTRILQUIST.

Ed. Bloomfield's and Alford's Greek Testaments.—The question of "Fil" may be briefly

answered thus:—Mr. Alford's edition of the Greek Testament is by far the most elaborate that has yet appeared in this country, and, as the Edinburgh reviewer predicts, may be fairly expected in time to take precedence of all others. But the nature of the discussions introduced into it, and the conclusions come to, although conviction of their truth is in most cases enforced by the most crushing logic, are yet such as to render it extremely inadvisable to commence the study of the Greek Testament under his guidance. There is much in his work that will perplex, much that will startle, the inexperienced student. For these reasons, the Edinburgh reviewer regrets that Mr. Alford did not write his commentary in Latin, "for all," he says (I quote from memory), "who are competent to appreciate his arguments, would be also competent to do so if clothed in that garb which transfers discussion from the pages of the weekly newspaper to the treatise of the matured theologian." The latter will here find points of great interest connected with the New Testament discussed with consummate ability, but the very depth of learning displayed will be likely to confound and perplex a novice unacquainted with the grounds of the arguments.

Mr. Bloomfield's work displays considerable diligence and skill in collecting and epitomizing the labours of others. For one just entering on his theological studies, it will be preferable to Alford's, to which it will serve very well as an introduction. To render it perfect, and worthy of the reputation it has earned, has been with Mr. Bloomfield the labour of a life-time. The notes are very extensive, sometimes perhaps too much so. The fact of its being dedicated to the primate is a sufficient guarantee for the *orthodoxy* of the views advocated. I will just mention two smaller editions of the Greek Testament which appear to me better adapted than Mr. Bloomfield's to serve as an introduction to Mr. Alford's work—viz., that by Dr. Burton, in which are copious references to most theological works which divines ought to possess; and Mr. Trollope's, the most valuable feature of which is the frequent reference to passages in classical authors, chiefly Homer, which illustrate customs, ceremonies, and institutions, alluded to in scripture.

JUNIOR SOPHISTES.

Your correspondent "Fil" (86), in your March number, makes some inquiries respecting Greek Testaments, especially as to the comparative merits of Rev. H. Alford's and Dr. Bloomfield's.

With the former I am unacquainted, even by name; but if his mode of interpretation be as your correspondent states, I should think him anything but a safe guide for a theological student, and would have "no fellowship with him."

Dr. Bloomfield I can unhesitatingly recommend. He has been long known as an accomplished Greek scholar, a translator of Thucydides, and compiler of the "Lexilogus Scholasticus," and "Epitome Evangelica." As a biblical, or rather as a New Testament, critic, he stands high. His "Recensio Synoptice, or Critical Digest of the most Important Annotations of the New Testament," in 8 vols. 8vo. published in 1826-28, is a most elaborate work, and of which his "Greek Testament, with copious English Notes, Critical, Philological, and Explanatory," in 2 vols. 8vo., may be considered as the *clitè*. Your correspondent may not be aware that a "Supplemental

Volume of Annotations" to his Greek Testament was published last year, and on its completion the learned author was presented at Court to her Majesty, by, I believe, the Archbishop of Canterbury. This is a proof of the orthodoxy of Dr. Bloomfield's theology. But I can, from my own knowledge, testify that the theological tenets of D. Bloomfield are sound, having for some time studied his "School and College Greek Testament," and his "Greek Lexicon to the New Testament." The price of the two latter works is 16s. 6d. each; that of the larger Greek Testament is £2: and the Supplemental Volume thereto is, I think, 13s.—all published by Longman and Co.

Valpy's Greek Testament, 3 vols. 8vo, price £15. (published by Bohn, Covent Garden, with English Notes, is thus spoken of by Dr. T. H. Horne, in his "Introduction to the Bible:"—"After a minute examination of this edition of the Greek Testament, I consider it the most valuable of any that has yet been published with critical and philological apparatus, especially for students who wish to purchase only one edition of the Greek Testament." This critique, however, was written before the publication of Dr. Bloomfield's Greek Testament. But if "Fil" could by chance see the last edition of Dr. Horne's "Introduction," published in 1846, "he would find that the notices of the critical editions of the Greek Testament, published since that time, are replete with interest to students." ALBUS.

We thank "Albus" for the above, but as he has not seen both the works to which "Fil" refers to, he cannot of course speak to their relative merits; we have therefore, under these circumstances, additional pleasure in drawing attention to the following remarks with which we have been favoured, by that eminent biblical critic, Dr. Davidson, of Lancashire Independent College:—

"No proper comparison can be instituted between the editions of the Greek Testament published by Bloomfield and Alford. The latter is infinitely superior. The texts of both, however, are bad. As to the notes, the deficiencies of both are of different kinds. While Alford's notes are not free from some rationalizing tendencies, the notes of Bloomfield are liable to the charge of other and heavier faults. But there is little doubt that Alford's will supersede Bloomfield's. The latter is greatly behind the state of knowledge; the other is up to recent researches. Alford is acute, Bloomfield blundering and dogmatic."

95. *English Composition*.—A really first-rate work on composition is still a desideratum. This arises from the fact that it is exceedingly difficult,

indeed, either to teach composition or to write a book on it systematically. To read good authors, and then reproduce them on paper, from memory, is the best and surest exercise. There is, however, a good book on "The Art of Composition," that deserves to be better known, written by G. F. Graham, the author of several excellent educational works.

J. B.

96. *Actuary*.—In answer to C. L., as to what qualification is necessary before a person may legally style himself an actuary, we are not aware of there being any qualification necessary beyond holding some post or following some employment, in which the duties come within the generally recognised meaning of actuaryship, such as keeping the accounts of some public company, or conducting calculations of an extensive character. The word "actuary" is from the Roman "*actuarius*;" and its earlier and more common meaning was "short-hand writer," although it was used in other senses, and applied to any person engaged in keeping the minutes of a public company. The most general sense in which the term is now used is to signify the *manager* of a joint-stock company under a board of directors, particularly of an insurance company, whence it has come to stand generally for a person skilled in the doctrine of life annuities and insurances, or in the habit of giving opinions upon cases of annuities, reversions and other contingencies. It properly, therefore, combines with the duties of secretary those of a scientific adviser to the board which gives him his office in all matters involving calculation, on which it may be supposed that the members of the board are not generally conversant, or competent to form an opinion for themselves. Since the passing of the Friendly Societies Act of 1819 (59 Geo. III. c. 126), the term has also had a *legal* signification: for by that act it is provided that no justice of the peace shall allow any tables, &c., to be adopted by any friendly society, unless the same shall have been approved of by "two persons, at least, known to be professional actuaries, or persons skilled in calculations." By 9 and 10 Vict. cap. 27, this power is limited to the actuary of the national debt office, or an actuary of not less than five years' standing to a public insurance company. With a view to raise the profession to a higher standing, an institution was formed in London some few years since, called the "Institute of Actuaries," to which only those known to be well qualified in their profession are admitted. The members of this body are distinguished by the addition of F. I. A. to their names—which, by the way, they do not often forget.

C. W., Jun.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XIV.

1. What is Figure?—give syllogistic examples of its varieties.
2. What is Mood?—how many Valid Moods are there?—and why are there only so many?

3. Construct Syllogisms in Bokardo, Bramantip, Camestres, Cesare, Camenes, Dimaris, Disamis, Darapti, Ferapo, and Felapton.

4. Evolve the seven rules of Syllogism from the Mnemonic Latin verse given in the text, or the translation, p. 204.

5. What are the rules of Figure?

6. Reduce the Syllogisms given in Exercise III. to their corresponding moods in Figure 1.
7. Give syllogistic illustrations of the accuracy of the Mnemonicism on Reduction, p. 207.
- N.B. The author of "The Art of Reasoning" regards this as a most important exercise, and recommends it to the careful attention of every pupil in the Logic Class, and the editors hope that corresponding attention will be bestowed upon it.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. III.

1. Write out the plurals of the following nouns,

- arranging them in a form similar to that given below.
- Ally, abbey, calf, ass, man, child, foot, army, half, echo, wish, woman, attorney, aviary, knife, brother, goose, box, armadillo, caitiff, cliff, cargo, buffalo, beauty, life, loaf, pontiff, brief, coil, chimney, penny, tooth, pontiff, dish, grotto, folio, dwarf, fife, grief, sheaf, shelf, hoof, strife, puff, scoff, nuncio, punctilio, motto, portico, seraglio, banditto, potato, volcano, louse, ox, die, lease, focus, genus, genius, sow, hypothesis, dictum, index, penny, dogma, pea, seraph.
2. Show the difference in the application of each pair of the double plurals.
3. Supply six nouns which have no plural, and twelve which have no singular.

NOUNS.

FORMATION OF THE PLURAL.

By the addition of "s."	s, sh, ch (sounding tsh), x and o, adding "es."	y changed into "ies."	f, or fe, changed into ves.	Irregular.
			f, or fe, remaining regular.	
	Exceptions in "o."	y preceded by a vowel remaining regular.		Double plurals.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—II.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

- Question 5. $16 + 14 + 12 = 42$.
- As $42 : 126 :: 16 : 48 = 1\text{st Boy}$.
- $42 : 126 :: 14 : 42 = 2\text{nd Boy}$.
- $42 : 126 :: 12 : 36 = 3\text{rd Boy}$.

- Question 6. The cock No. 1 will fill the cistern in 6 hours, therefore in 1 hour it will fill $\frac{1}{6}$ part of the cistern; similarly, we see that No. 2 will fill $\frac{1}{4}$ of the cistern in 1 hour; therefore these 2 filling-cocks together will fill $\frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{4} = \frac{5}{12}$ in 1 hour. The cock No. 3 will empty $\frac{1}{3}$ part of the cistern in 1 hour, and No. 4 will empty $\frac{1}{4}$ part; therefore, these two emptying cocks together will empty $\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{4} = \frac{7}{12}$ in 1 hour.
- Now $\frac{5}{12}$ and $\frac{7}{12}$ brought to a common denominator = $\frac{5}{12}$ and $\frac{7}{12}$; hence we see that the 2 emptying cocks are more powerful than the 2 filling ones, by $\frac{1}{12}$ of the whole cistern in an hour; and therefore, if the 4 cocks were all set open together, the EMPTY cistern would NEVER be filled; which is the answer to the question.
- If the cistern were full, and all the cocks set open, it would be emptied in 120 hours.
- C. D. S.
- This latter is the proper answer; see *Erratum*, p. 117.
- Question 7. $\frac{1}{2}$ of $\frac{2}{3}$ of $\frac{3}{4} = \frac{1}{4}$ = friend's share in the ship.
- Value of $\frac{1}{4}$ before damage = $£1093\ 15s$.
- " " " " = $£1093\ 15s. \times 5 = £5468\ 15s$.

- But worth of ship after damage = $£35000 - £17000 = £18000$.
- \therefore Present value of $\frac{1}{5} = \frac{18000}{5} = £3600$.
- " " " " = $£3600 \times 5 = £18000$.
- \therefore Present value of share $£2812\ 10s.$, and extent of loss = $£5468\ 15s. - £2812\ 10s. = £2656\ 5s$.
- J. B.
- Question 8. $x + y = 18$ (1)
- $xy = 65$ (2)
- Sq. of 1st equation $x^2 + 2xy + y^2 = 324$
- Subtracting $4 \times (2)$ $4xy = 260$
- $x^2 - 2xy + y^2 = 64$
- Extracting sq. rt. $x - y = 8$ (3)
- But..... $x + y = 18$ (4)
- Then $x = 8 + y$
- And $x = 18 - y$
- $2y = 10$
- $y = 5\ \text{Ans.}$
- $x = 8 + 5 = 13\ \text{Ans.}$
- T. G.

Geometry.

- Question 3. $x = \sqrt{\frac{15^2}{3}} = 8.66, \&c$.

It is evident that in this case the centre of the sphere coincides with the centre of the cube, and that the greatest diagonal of the cube is the diameter of the sphere. But the square of this diagonal equals the sum of the squares of the length of one side of the cube, and the diagonal of another, and the square of this last diagonal equals twice the square of the side (Euc. b. 1, p. 47); therefore, the square of the first diagonal—that is, of the diameter of the sphere—is equal to three times the square of the side of the cube.

W.

Question 4. $10^2 - \left(\frac{10}{2}\right)^2 = 100 - 25 = \sqrt{75} = 8.66025 \times 5 = 43.30125 = \text{area of equilateral triangle.}$

And $43.30125 + 15$, half the sum of the sides = $58.8675 = \text{radius of inscribed circle, whence}$
 $58.8675^2 \times 3.1416 = 8.3333 = 26.1799 = \text{area of the same.}$

Also $\frac{10 \times 5}{8.66025} = \frac{50}{8.66025} = 5.7735 = \text{radius of circumscribed circle.}$

Whence $5.7735^2 \times 3.1416 = 33.3333 = 104.7199 = \text{area of ditto.}$ J. J.

Mechanics.

Question 3. It is ascertained that a dense or compact body, when falling freely, passes through a space of $16\frac{1}{2}$ feet during the first second. We find that the space fallen through in $7\frac{1}{2}$ seconds is determined by the following arithmetical computation, $7\frac{1}{2}^2$, or $7.5^2 \times 16\frac{1}{2} = 904$ feet $8\frac{1}{2}$ inches, the depth of the pit required. L. R.

Question 4. Since the velocity or rate at which a body would be falling at the end of any given time is equal to the time in seconds multiplied by $32\frac{1}{2}$ feet, we have $7 \times 32\frac{1}{2} = 225\frac{1}{2}$ feet = the rate at which the stone would be falling at the end of 7 seconds.

Again, since the momentum of a body is proportional to its velocity and quantity of matter, we have, firstly, $7\frac{1}{2} \times 32\frac{1}{2} = 241.25$ feet = velocity acquired by the stone at the bottom of the pit; and, secondly, $241.25 \times 1 \text{ cwt.} = 241.25 = 12$ tons $1 \text{ cwt. } 1 \text{ qr. } 0 \text{ lb.} = \text{the momentum of stone when it reached the bottom of the pit.}$

CYMBRO.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—IV.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

13. Reduce $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{5}$, and $\frac{1}{6}$, to a common denominator, and explain the process.

14. If 30 men, in 164 days of 12 hours each, build a wall 700 feet long, 12 feet high, and 2 feet thick, how many men, in 70 days of 10 hours each, can build one 900 feet long, 8 feet high, and 18 inches thick?

15. On certain goods the duty amounts to £5740, out of this a discount of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is allowed on the sum actually paid, for prompt payment. What does the discount amount to?

16. Given $x + y = 20$, and $x^2 + y^2 = 232$, to find x and y ?

Geometry.

7. The diameter of a circle is 17. Required the side of an equilateral triangle constructed about it.

8. Two circles touch externally; their diameters are 12 and 20. Find the side and base of an isosceles triangle enclosing them.

9. The chord of an arc is 490 links, its height 8. Required the area of the circle of which it forms a part.

Mechanics.

7. A well is being sunk 40 feet deep, and 17 feet in diameter; a cubic foot of the material weighs 100 lbs. Find the units of work necessary to raise the whole to the surface.

8. In what time will a man raise the above with a windlass if he perform 2600 units of work per minute, and work 8 hours per day?

Notices of Books.

The Life of Edward Baines, late M.P. for Leeds.

By his son, Edward Baines, Author of the "History of the Cotton Manufacture." Longman and Co.

The consideration of history is not merely an interesting but it is an instructive occupation, when the knowledge thus gained of the past is with wisdom applied to the present, or with prudence stored up for the future. Human nature has been the same in all ages of the world, and has developed the same properties on every habitable spot. Society may have changed its aspect, and individuals their habits, but man is the same; the same high duties rest upon him, the same menacing dangers beset him, and the same glorious destiny is placed before him. If, then, we read the historic scroll aright, we may trace, not only the course which communities have taken, but the path in which men should tread. If these remarks apply to general history, with much greater force do they to that particular portion of it termed "Biography," or the history of individuals. The former is occupied, for the most part, in recording the acts of tyrannical sovereigns, or the plots of ambitious subjects, while the latter tells us of individuals like unto ourselves; the one introduces us to the hero, the other acquaints

us with the man. To all classes, but especially to the young, biography, rightly studied, must be of vast importance. Who can peruse the life of a depraved man, marking its deceitful commencement, tracing its gloomy course, and meditating on its cheerless close, without having his hatred to vice increased? Or who can read the history of a good man, firm in great principles, consistent in righteous conduct, and happy in himself, without being encouraged to tread in his footsteps, and being strengthened for the performance of "every good word and work?" But here the exercise of discrimination is required, as no character is perfectly evil or perfectly good. The heart of humanity bears indications of great convulsions, similar to those which geologists tell us must have taken place in the crust of the earth, which have lifted to its greatest heights shells that must have been formed in ocean caverns, and cast to its deepest depths the fossil upland herb and mountain moss. It is thus with man; the loftiest spirit bears some marks of evil, and the lowest soul possesses some relics of good; and we must not admire all that we see in the one, nor condemn all that we find in the other.

We offer these words of warning on general principles, and not on account of any detracting

peculiarities connected with the individual whose biography is now before us. Indeed, so far from this being the case, it has rarely been our lot to meet with the record of a life of more consistency, or the delineation of a character of more harmonious proportions. Yea, further, such is the high estimate that we form of the late M.P. for Leeds, that we hesitate not to refer to him as a model for the young working-men of England, which it would be well for them to study and imitate. In order to induce our readers to do this, we present them with the following sketch of his life and character.

Edward Baines was born on the 5th of February, 1774, at Walton-le-Dale, a village in the beautiful valley of the Ribble, about a mile from Preston. His father carried on the business of a grocer, and afterwards that of a cotton-spinner. Edward was a healthy and sprightly child, and as he rose into boyhood he manifested more than the usual amount of mirth and mischief. He was sent to the free grammar-school of Hawkshead, the master of which was partial to his scholar, and is reported to have said that "he would either be a great man, or be hanged." He afterwards went to the Preston free-school, where he appears to have been a leading spirit in those juvenile rebellions, better known of old than at present, as "barrings out." When these boyish pranks were laid aside, and he and his companions, having been put to business, began to employ their leisure in reading, speculating, and spouting, five of them conceived the project of emigration. Having heard that in the United States there was great encouragement for every kind of talent, and especially a want of good schools, and having a comfortable conceit of their own qualifications, they planned the establishment of an academy on an extensive scale on the other side of the Atlantic. They allotted to each other their several positions; young Baines, as a matter of course, was to be the principal; one of the number was to be professor of botany, another of music, and so forth. After long deliberation, the consultation of maps, &c., they determined to set out upon the expedition. They actually left Preston one Sunday morning for Liverpool, one having in his pocket the large sum of 16s., another 13s., and the other three smaller sums. It would seem that a night of the ocean brought them to their senses, for on the following Friday they were found returning to their fathers' homes, prodigal-like, with empty pockets and hungry stomachs. Visionary as this scheme was, it was not more so than the Pantisocratical project of Coleridge, Southey, and their friends, a few years later; and perhaps not much more delusive than some of the schemes that may have flitted before the imagination of many whose eyes will fall upon these pages. But in due time the aspiring spirit of young Baines had to yield to the stern realities of life, and he was bound an apprentice to a stationer and printer. That occupation appears to have been in accordance with the intellectual bent of his disposition, and he became a diligent and expert workman.

His love of study happily preserved him from the habit then so common in Preston of spending the evening at the tavern. There was no institution in that town for the intellectual improvement of the young, but he nobly determined to establish one, and soon, with a few friends, formed

a debating society, and afterwards was instrumental in opening a news-room. Although they exercised the greatest discretion in order to avoid producing an unfavourable impression as to the nature of their discussions, yet the excitement attendant upon the French Revolution caused them to be suspected, and *they were threatened with prosecution by the magistrates!* The intellectual character of Edward Baines was now developing itself with rapidity. It was sound and vigorous, not brilliant. In all matters, personal and relative, he manifested that desire for improvement which characterized him through life. When about nineteen years of age his master undertook the publication of a newspaper called the *Preston Review*, and, though it existed only twelve months, it doubtless gave to the apprentice a bias toward that which afterwards became his own profession, and the means of his success and usefulness.

Things went adversely with his master, work fell off and Edward obtained his indentures, and, with the approbation of his parents, left his native town to seek his fortune. The brave apprentice, stout of heart and limb, set out from Preston to Leeds on foot, with his bundle under his arm. He passed on his way with no companion but his staff, and all his worldly wealth in his pocket. Wearied and wayworn he entered Leeds, and applied for a situation in the office of the *Leeds Mercury*, secretly resolving that if ever he obtained a footing there he would not lose it, and in a few years the office and the newspaper became his own. He was received into the *Mercury* office, and soon won the confidence of his employers by his industry and good conduct. He acted on the good old maxim, that whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well. He laid the foundations of future success in the thorough knowledge and performance of the duties of a workman. His biographer gives us a glimpse of the way in which he now spent his leisure time, and it was quite worthy of him. He sought the friendship of intellectual young men, and became a member of the "Reasoning Society," the object of which was to improve the mind by reading and discussions. Although political questions were excluded, they were suspected, "in the good old times," of being seditious; but, to remove this impression, four of their number (among whom was Mr. Baines) boldly waited upon the mayor, showed him their rules, and invited him to attend one of their meetings. This he did, and expressed himself satisfied. Mr. Baines was a frequent speaker at the "Reasoning Society," and it is said greatly improved by the exercise; and thus became fitted for the part which he afterwards took in the meetings of his adopted town, and the senate of his country. When he first came from Lancashire he had, with all his amiability of speech, a degree of roughness and some hesitations. Both were corrected by painful labour. The president, a penetrating man, pronounced him "a diamond in the rough." There was a feature in his conduct at this time that we give record for the benefit of our youthful readers, that he was always prudent and conciliator in debate. He never quarrelled or contradicted when strongly differing, he would reply to effect, "Do you think it was so?" He appears to have well understood the philosophy of tenacity and to have possessed the power of self-control. (To be continued.)

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. V.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

We intended to attempt the substantiation of the opinion that "Thought and Speech are the same, except that the internal and silent discourse of the Mind with herself is called *ἐπινοια*—i.e., cogitation; while the effusion of the mind through the lips is denominated *λογος*—i.e., rational speech;" that *ratio*—thought and *oratio*—thought-expression, are two different terms to denote the same thing in different states—by adducing illustrations to prove that even in very many of the *minutiae* of Language, the operation of the same generic mind-laws might be observed, and thus endeavour to establish it as a truth, that though there are striking varieties in human speech, from the barbarous guttural of the vocables of the wretched Esquimaux—the harsh Tiascalan tongue—the rude *talker-talkee* of our West Indian colonies—the broad Dutch—the monosyllabic Chinese—the unmelodious German—the majestic Spanish—the fluent French—the smoothly euphonic Italian—the copious Sanscrit—the flexible Greek—the sinewy Latin, to that Language in which, according to Camden, "substantialnesse combineth with delightfulness, and fulnesse with finenesse, seemliness with portliness, and currentnesse with stayednesse"—essentially similar necessities of thought are felt, and contrivances remarkably alike have been employed for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties thus experienced. But we have been led to abandon this design from a conviction that while it is undoubtedly a question of great philosophic importance, it is yet destitute of the practical usefulness which we desire to cultivate in our articles on this topic.

We purpose, therefore, in this article to present our readers with a succinct *resumé* of so much of the teachings of English Grammar as shall be assumed in the following articles on Style; and this we shall do, not because we think that our readers are wholly ignorant of the subject, but because we recognise it as the duty of an instructor who really desires the improvement of those who study his productions, to presume ignorance on the part of his readers, not only in order that a fair idea of the amount of knowledge desiderated in his readers may be laid before them; but also, that should any of them really be ignorant, they may have the opportunity presented to them of furnishing themselves with the precise amount of knowledge in the precise way which is thought most suitable for the future amicable co-operation of instructor and instructed. "To begin at the beginning," although apparently the most tedious method of procedure, is undoubtedly the best. It can, we apprehend, offend no one, for he who possesses the knowledge can be but little injured by having the sum of that information recalled to his mind, while he who is unacquainted with the information cannot be hurt at the offering of the very information of which he is in want. Either way, therefore, we hope to be exonerated from blame, and to be honoured by the one, as sincerely desirous of his advancement, and by the other, as endeavouring to create a good understanding between him and ourselves.

By pursuing this course two very important purposes are subserved:—1st. Those who have previously acquired the information have their memories refreshed, and their former acquirements vividly recalled, so that they are better fitted for perusing the subsequent articles intelligently, and judging clearly regarding their merits—their accuracy or inaccuracy. 2nd. Those who are unacquainted with the preliminary pre-requisites of study which the given topic demands, are made possessors of the precise amount of information required, in the order which the writer prefers, and are thus placed, during the period of their study of that subject at least, on a par with those of more varied and extensive acquirements.

The importance and necessity of a knowledge of English Grammar, and the advantages which it confers, are so obvious, that little space need be occupied in attempting to recapitulate them. Without such knowledge as it imparts, a correct and idiomatic method of expressing our thoughts—an ability to communicate our ideas in that manner which shall make them most readily comprehensible to those around us—a clear, concise, and perspicuous style—cannot be acquired. It is the foundation of elegance, refinement, and effectiveness of speech, the necessary preliminary to the precise utterance of thought, and consequently the very basis on which a true and practical Rhetoric must be constructed. Rightly did the ancients regard it as the propyleum of the temple of Wisdom, which could only be reached by passing successively through the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*. The following quaint lines will inform our readers of the topics of study which were therein comprised:—

“GRAMM. loquitur, DIA. vera docet, RHET. verba colorat;
MUS. canit, AR. numerat, GEO. ponderat, AST. colit astra.”

“Allow me, however, before I dismiss the subject, to observe that dry and intricate as it may seem to some, it is, however, of great importance, and very nearly connected with the philosophy of the human mind. For if speech be the vehicle or interpreter of the conceptions of our minds, an examination of its structure and progress cannot but unfold many things concerning the nature and progress of our conceptions themselves, and the operation of our faculties—a subject that is always instructive to man.”

In the preceding article we placed before our readers, in a comprehensive tabular scheme, the designations, definitions, &c., of the several classes of words; or, as the grammarians denominate them, “the parts of speech.” These, therefore, we shall not recapitulate, but shall proceed to offer a few observations on the Inflection and Syntax of these “parts of speech,” in the order which they occupy in that scheme. Previously, however, to doing this, we shall find it necessary to give a few

PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS.

INFLECTION is a word employed by grammarians to denote those changes which are or ought to be made in the form of words, to express any modification of meaning in these words.

SYNTAX informs us of the rules by which we should be guided in the arrangement and elocation of words in order to form sentences correctly.

* “Blair’s Lectures,” ix. vol. i. p. 195.

A Sentence is any number of words so collocated as by their combination to form complete sense—i e., in other words, to enunciate some truth, make a distinct assertion, or make known some action or passion.

Remark.—It is not, however, one of the primary duties of grammar to attend to the sense—that, properly speaking, belongs to logic; hence a sentence may be grammatically correct, while it contains no definite meaning, or may even be an incongruous and inconsistent farrago of nonsense. The following illustration we extract from “The Comic Grammar”:—“If the year consists of 365 days 6 hours, and January has 31 days, then the relation between the corpuscular theory of light and the new views of Mr. Owen is at once subverted; for, ‘when ignorance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise;’ because 1,760 yards make a mile, and it is universally acknowledged that ‘war is the madness of many for the gain of few;’ therefore, Sir Isaac Newton was quite right in supposing the diamond to be combustible.” On the contrary, however, no sentence that is ungrammatical can, in the strict sense of the term, be said to have a distinct and unmistakable meaning. We may guess at it, and believe that we have found it, or we may charitably assume that we understand it, but ungrammatical construction and unmeaningness are in reality nearly related to each other.

INFLECTION OF NOUNS AND PRONOUNS.

1. **PROPER NOUNS** are the names of individual persons or places, as James, London, Victoria.

2. **COMMON NOUNS** are generic names applicable to several species or individuals, as man, city, queen.

REAL NOUNS are names of such objects as impress the senses.

IDEAL NOUNS are names of mental conceptions.

COLLECTIVE NOUNS are names of classes of objects; they are singular in form, though referring to many.

VERBAL NOUNS are the names of assertions, as to live, reading.

ABSTRACT NOUNS are the names of qualities mentally considered as separate existences.

3. **PERSONAL PRONOUNS** are such as refer to persons.

4. **RELATIVE PRONOUNS** are such as carry back the mind to an antecedent noun, or part of a sentence used as a noun. The use of the relative pronoun is to enable us to express those compound attributes for which we have no adjectives in our language; they ought never to be used unless when this is the case.

5. **ADJECTIVE PRONOUNS** are those which indicate, at the same time, both person and quality.

POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS denote person and ownership.

DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS point out the particular persons or things to which we refer.

DISTRIBUTIVE PRONOUNS are employed when we wish to make assertions regarding the individuals of a class separately and severally.

INDEFINITE PRONOUNS are employed when we do not choose to limit our assertions to specific numbers, or are unable to do so.

6. **NOUNS** are inflected to express number and case.

7. **Nouns** have two numbers, Singular and Plural; the former denotes one, the latter more than one.

8. When the letter *s* readily coalesces with the terminational sound of a singular noun, the plural is formed by the addition of *that* letter.

9. When, however, the *s* sound does not coalesce euphoniouly, the plural is formed in one of the following manners:—

1. Those which end in *ch* (sounding *tsh*), *s*, *sh*, *x*, or *o*, preceded by a consonant, add *es*—switch, switches; glass, glasses; blush, blushes; motto, mottoes.

Note.—*Ch* sounding *k*, and *o* preceded by a vowel, as well as *canto*, *duodecimo*, *grotto*, *junto*, *octavo*, *portico*, *punctillio*, *previso*, *solo*, *quarto*, *tyro*, add *s* only.

2. Those which end in *y*, preceded by *u* or a consonant, after conforming to the usual orthographical rule—viz., words ending in *y*, preceded by *u* or a consonant, on taking any affix except *ing*, change *y* into *i*; as, *marry*, *marriage*; *merry*, *merriment*; *happy*, *happier*; *rally*, *rallied*, &c.—add *es*, as *sky*, *skies*.

3. All nouns ending in *f*—except *staff*, which has *staves*, and the following words in *f* or *fe*, viz., *brief*, *chief*, *coif*, *coof*, *fief*, *fife*, *dwarf*, *grief*, *giraffe*, *gulf*, *hoof*, *kerchief*, and its compounds, *proof*, *rcef*, *reproof*, *roof*, *safe*, *scarf*, *serf*, *strife*, *surf*, *turf*, and *wharf*, add *s*; but the following words, viz., *beef*, *calf*, *elf*, *half*, *knife*, *leaf*, *life*, *loaf*, *self*, *shelf*, *sheaf*, *thief*, *wife*, *wolf*—change *f* into *v* before adding *es*.

Note.—Some nouns derived from foreign or dead languages retain the plurals of the original tongues; some are irregular, some want the plural, some have no singular, while others have apparently plural terminations with a singular signification; but the detail of these *minutiæ* would lead us too far. See, on this subject, Latham's "English Language."

10. Case is that inflection by which the states and relations of nouns, and their substitutes, pronouns, are indicated.

11. There are three cases—Nominative, Possessive, and Objective.

12. A noun is in the Nominative when it is the subject of an affirmation.

13. The Possessive denotes proceeding from or out of, and possession.

14. A noun is in the Objective when it is the name of the object upon which an action is performed, or in which the relation implied in a preposition is exhibited.

15. The Nominative and Objective of nouns are alike in form.

16. The Possessive is indicated by the addition of an apostrophe *s* (*'s*) to the singular, and by the apostrophe (*'*) alone in the plural, except when the plural does not end in *s*, in which case the plural follows the same rule as the singular.

Note.—The Possessive is frequently formed by the use of *of* before the noun or pronoun, e.g., *The crown of the king*. *A servant of the Lord*. "Ay, and that tongue *of his* which bade the Roman mark him." "These threats *of theirs* disturb me not a jot." This may be called the Prepositional Possessive.

17. In English nouns Gender is *not* indicated by inflection, but, in general, by different words. When this is not the case, a prefix or affix, denotive of sex, is employed.

18. There are two genders, Masculine and Feminine.

19. Inanimate things and animals, whose gender it is unimportant to distinguish, are called Neuter.

20. PRONOUNS are inflected to express Number, Gender, Case, and Person.

21. As pronouns are the substitutes of nouns, Number, Gender, and Case mean precisely the same in relation to them as to nouns.

22. The person *speaking*, is called the first—the person *addressed*, the second—the person or thing *spoken of*, the third.

23. As the first and second persons are in general present while speaking or spoken to,

their gender is known, and the English Language, economically, leaves the pronouns denotive of these persons uninflected for gender. The third person, however, who is perhaps more frequently absent than present, has the representative pronoun inflected to express gender.

24. The Personal Pronouns are thus inflected:—

	SINGULAR.			PLURAL.		
	Nom.	Poss.	Obj.	Nom.	Poss.	Obj.
First Person, Masculine or Feminine	I	Mine	Me	We	Ours	Us
Second "	Thou	Thine	Thee	Ye or You	Yours	You
Third "	Masculine	He	His	They	Theirs	Them
	Feminine	She	Hers			
	Neuter	It	Its			

25. The Possessive Adjective Pronouns are derived from the possessive cases of the personals, and are—my, thy, his, her, its, our, your, their. Mine and thine—euphonic forms of my and thy—are sometimes used before words beginning with vowels; own is added to express possession more emphatically.

26. The Demonstrative Adjective Pronouns are—This, that, with their plurals, these, those; and yon, yonder.

This and yon, refer to the nearer or latter mentioned; that and yonder, to the more distant or prior mentioned.

27. The Distributive Adjective Pronouns are—each, every, either, neither; each signifies two taken individually; every, many, singly; either, one of two; neither, none of two: they are, therefore, singular.

28. The Indefinite Adjective Pronouns are—all, another, any, aught, both, certain, few, much, many, none, naught, one, other, several, some, such, whole.

29. The Relative Pronouns are—who, which, that.

Who is applied to persons, and things when personified—which, to the lower animals, and objects named by neuter nouns—that, to prevent the too frequent use of who or which.

They are declined alike in both numbers, thus:—

Nominative—Who, which, that.

Possessive—Whose.

Objective—Whom, which, that.

What, who, and which, when compounded with ever or soever, are called Compound Relatives. Who, which, and what, when employed to ask questions, are called Interrogative Pronouns. What, as a relative pronoun, is always neuter; as an interrogative, it is applicable to all genders.

INFLECTION OF ADJECTIVES.

1. **PROPER ADJECTIVES** are such as are derived from proper names. They are uninflected.

2. **COMMON ADJECTIVES** are generic terms used to express the qualities, &c., of existences.

REAL ADJECTIVES express qualities, &c., which affect the senses.

IDEAL ADJECTIVES denote the qualities, &c., of mental conceptions.

PARTICIPIAL ADJECTIVES indicate qualities, &c., combined with a portion of the assertive power of a verb.

NUMERAL ADJECTIVES express numbers. They are of two kinds—**CARDINAL**, as one, two, three, &c.; **ORDINAL**, as first, second, third, &c.

3. **Adjectives** whose signification is capable of increase or diminution are inflected by comparison.

4. There are three degrees of comparison—Positive, Comparative, and Superlative.

When an adjective merely expresses the simple quality, it is said to be in the Positive degree.

When an increase or diminution of the simple quality is indicated, it is in the Comparative.

When the greatest increase or diminution is denoted, it is Superlative.

Note.—There is no possibility of fixing with precision the meaning of adjectives, as each person's ideal differs from that of his neighbour's.

5. All monosyllabic adjectives, and those dissyllabic ones which end in *e* or *y*, form their comparative by the addition of *er* or *r*, and the superlative by *est* or *st*; *y* (as in the case of nouns) being changed into *i* before taking the affix.

6. All other adjectives remain uninflected, but adverbs are employed to express those modifications of idea which comparison involves.

7. A few adjectives are irregular in their inflections. (See Latham's "English Language.")

8. When one noun precedes another, as in *steel pen*, *morning star*, &c., it is in our opinion better to call the two collocated words a compound noun, than, as is usually done, the former an adjective.

9. A few adverbs admit of inflection, by comparison, like adjectives, as *soon*, *sooner*, *soonest*.

INFLECTION OF VERBS.

1. ACTIVE-TRANSITIVE VERBS are those which make assertions regarding actions performed by an agent upon an external object, by which the former influences the latter.

2. ACTIVE-INTRANSITIVE VERBS are those which relate to actions wholly confined within the agent, and, consequently, not influencing an external object.

3. Passive Verbs are such as indicate the enduring of some action, either pleasing or painful, by the subject; strictly speaking, however, there are no passive verbs in our language.

4. Neuter Verbs are such as make affirmations regarding attributes or states of being without expressing either action, or endurance.

5. Voice is the technical term which grammarians employ to indicate the different species of verbs; viz., Active-Transitive, Active-Intransitive, Passive, and Neuter.

6. Mood is a particular form of the verb by which the assertion contained in it is modified.

There are, it is usually said, five moods—viz., Indicative, Potential, Subjunctive, Imperative, and Infinitive; but in our opinion there are not more than three, if so many—viz., Indicative, Desiderative, and Infinitive.

The Indicative simply asserts or asks a question.

The Desiderative indicates *desire*, which may either be expressed in entreaty, command, exhortation, &c.

The Infinitive is the unlimited mention of the assertion. It is frequently, if not always, equivalent to a noun.

7. Tense denotes the time implied in the verb.

There are no other real tense-inflections in English verbs, except those which imply present or past time.

8. Number denotes whether the assertion is made regarding one or more.

9. Person refers to the subjects of the verb, whether they speak, are addressed, or are spoken about.

10. Verbs may very usefully be divided into two classes—viz., Generic and Specific.

11. Generic Verbs are such as express the necessary *categories* of the intellect regarding assertions; they are—

PRESENT TENSE.	PAST TENSE.	SIGNIFICATION.
Am	Was	Existence or being
Can	Could	Power or ability
Do	Did	Action or emphatic assertion
Have	Had	Possession
May	Might	Liberty or permission
Must	—	Necessity
Shall	Should	Duty or obligation
Will	Would	Volition or intention

and are commonly denominated auxiliary verbs.

12. All other verbs, as they assert in a more limited sense, may be denominated specific.

13. The tense-inflections of verbs may be exhibited thus—

ACTIVE VOICE.

INDICATIVE.

PRESENT TENSE.		PAST TENSE.	
Present Participle—Learning.		Past Participle—Learned.	
Singular.	Plural.	Singular.	Plural.
1st Person. I learn	We learn	1st Person. I learned	We learned
2nd „ Thou learnest	Ye or you learn	2nd „ Thou learnedst	Ye or you learned
3rd „ He, she, or it learns (or any noun)	They learn (or any noun)	3rd „ He, she, or it learned	They learned (or any noun)

DESIDERATIVE.

Second Person singular—Learn thou. Second Person plural—Learn ye.

INFINITIVE.

To learn.

14. All the other modifications of tense or mood are made through the aid of the generic verbs.

Am, when joined to the present participle, composes the progressive form of the indicative, but when connected with the past participle, it constitutes the passive voice.

Can and may, when joined to the root-form of the verb, compose the present and past of what is called the potential mood.

Have, joined to the past participle of any verb, forms the perfect and pluperfect indicative.

Do, added to the root-form of the verb, constitutes the emphatic indicative.

Must, prefixed to the root-form of any verb, makes the present potential.

Shall and will, when joined in their present tenses to the root-form of any verb, constitute the future indicative. Their past tenses, similarly conjoined, form the past of the potential.

The proper use of the auxiliaries shall and will, are exhibited in the following formula—

Futurity dependent on the will of the speaker.	I } We }	You } He } They }	Will } Shall }	Futurity independent of the will of the speaker.	I } We }	You } He } They }	Shall } Will }

For the Latinized mode of verb-inflection, see any common English Grammar.

15. The following examples may assist the reader to comprehend this modifying power of the generic verbs:—

1 He ne'er is crowned
With immortality, who fears to follow
Where airy voices lead.—KEATS.

2 White cottages were seen,
With rose trees at the windows.
BRYANT.

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>3 The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.
MILTON.</p> <p>4 His tongue
Dropt manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsel.—<i>Idem.</i></p> <p>5 A lover may bestride the gossamer
That idles in the wanton summer air,
And yet not full, so light is vanity.
SHAKESPEARE.</p> <p>6 From whose odorous boughs
My love might weave gay garlands for her brows.
COLERIDGE.</p> | <p>7 What, in ill thoughts again? Men must endure
Their going hence even as their coming hither,
Ripeness is all; come on!—SHAKESPEARE.</p> <p>8 I do love thee so
That I will shortly send thy soul to heaven.—<i>Id.</i></p> <p>9 I have lived long enough; my way of life
Is fallen into the sere and yellow leaf.—<i>Idem.</i></p> <p>10 Foul deeds will rise,
(Though all the earth o'erwhelm them) to men's
eyes.—<i>Idem.</i></p> <p>11 I shall fall
Like a bright exhalation in the evening,
And no man see me more.—<i>Idem.</i></p> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

SYNTAX.

1. Syntax is divided into two parts, Concord and Government.
2. Concord is the agreement of one word with another in inflection.
3. Government is the influence which one word exercises over another to alter its inflections.
4. The general rule of Syntax is that the parts of speech should be so colligated as best to express the relations, connexions, influences, and successions of thought, and to give accurate and adequate development to our ideas. It is, however, more practically presented under the following subdivisions:—

SYNTAX OF VERBS—THE SUBJECT AND THE VERB.

1. The subject of the verb should be in the nominative.
2. A verb should agree with its nominative in number and person.
3. The following is a classified list of the nominatives which a verb may have, with the number and person indicated, viz.:—

<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
1st. I.	1st. We.
2nd. Thou, or the name of any person addressed.	2nd. Ye or you, and the names of persons addressed.
3rd. He, she, or it; any singular noun; any collective noun signifying unity of idea; two or more singular nouns separated by <i>or</i> or <i>nor</i> ; a part of a sentence signifying unity of idea; and the infinitive mood used as a noun.	3rd. They; any plural noun; any collective noun signifying plurality of idea; two or more singular nouns conjoined by <i>and</i> ; a part of a sentence signifying plurality of idea; and two or more infinitives conjoined by <i>and</i> .

4. Active-transitive verbs govern nouns and pronouns in the objective case.
5. One verb governs another in the infinitive mood.
To, the sign of the infinitive, is not used after the verbs, bid, dare, feel, hear, make, need, see, the generic verbs, and a few others.
6. The verb *To be* has the same case after as before it.
7. The infinitive mood and the present participle are sometimes used as nouns; when the latter is so used it requires an article (*a*, *an*, or *the*) before it, and *of* after it.

SYNTAX OF NOUNS AND PRONOUNS.

1. Nouns, pronouns, and parts of sentences, when put in apposition—i.e., when they are employed to express the same thing—agree in case.

A noun or pronoun which answers a question should be in the same case as that which asks it.

2. A noun or pronoun which denotes the possessor of an object, is put in the possessive case. When two or more nouns are employed to designate the possessor, the latter or last only, takes the possessive form, but if one object or more belongs at once to two or more individuals, each of the nouns which name them take the possessive.

3. Personal pronouns agree in gender, number and person, with the nouns of which they are the substitutes.

4. A relative pronoun is the nominative to a verb when no noun intervenes between the relative and the verb.

5. Adjective pronouns are used to qualify nouns.

6. The distributive pronouns require verbs and pronouns in the singular.

7. The demonstrative pronouns agree in number with the nouns which they qualify.

SYNTAX OF ADJECTIVES.

1. Adjectives sometimes govern the infinitive mood.

2. When opposition is signified by a comparative adjective, it requires *than* after it; when distinction is indicated, *of* is necessary.

3. Double comparatives and superlatives are improper.

4. Adjectives should not be used as adverbs, nor adverbs as adjectives.

SYNTAX OF ADVERBS, PREPOSITIONS, CONJUNCTIONS, AND INTERJECTIONS.

1. Adverbs are generally placed, 1st before adjectives; 2nd, after active-intransitive and neuter verbs; 3rd, between the generic verbs and the root-form of the other verb; 4th, either before an active-transitive verb or after the object upon which their influence extends itself.

2. Prepositions govern nouns and pronouns in the objective case.

3. Certain words and phrases require particular prepositions after them. These, however, can only be learned accurately from careful reading. (See, however, a collection of such words in any grammar.)

4. Conjunction conjoins the same cases of nouns or pronouns, and the same moods and tenses of verbs, unless the sense absolutely requires that they should be changed.

Some conjunctions have corresponding conjunctions, *e. g.*—*as, as; as, so; both, and; either, or; neither, nor; so, as; so, that; though, yet; whether, or; &c.*

5. Interjections generally have no power over other words, but *O! oh! ah!* require the objective case of the pronoun of the first person, and the nominative of the second.

Such is a brief glance of the grammatical knowledge which we shall presume our readers to possess, in our future papers. The extreme length of our present article precludes further remark. In our next prelection, "On the History and Structure of the English Language," we shall resume the subject in a style less dry and formal. Meanwhile we must remind our impatient readers, that sound grammatical information is the basis of style, and is therefore deserving of some attention. This we hope they will bestow, and if they do so, they will have no cause hereafter to rue the irksome labour which it cost them; and we shall now conclude with the words which we employed in our first paper two years ago, let these things be well understood, and "let their value be accurately appreciated now, so shall we the less require to interlard our future articles with explanatory clauses and parenthetical divergences."

Religion.

CAN CHRISTIANS, CONSISTENTLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPLES, RENDER SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH STAGE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

BOUNDARIES are always perplexing. No eye can perceive the limit where the dubious shadow merges into the flickering light. The microscope unsettles the divisions of the naturalist; Oregon and Caffraria disturb the politician; theologians quarrel over the subtleties of grace; and the peccadilloes of one moralist are the damning criminalities of another. The circumference of pleasure within which a religious man may safely indulge, has always been one of those vexed questions so desirable yet so difficult to be solved. All, however, who have any right sense, deny the applicability of the third postulate of Euclid—"that a circle may be described from any centre and with any radius." But upon this, as upon every other similar subject, there might be more proximity of opinion, if candour and liberality would bring the disputants fairly together. Unfortunately, men are accustomed to quarrel violently in proportion as it is their duty and interest to enjoy one another's friendship. As religion is the dearest concern of mankind, it has disturbed the relations of society with melancholy consistency, and it will continue to do so while human nature retains its present constitution. It would, perhaps, be vain to attempt the conversion of mankind to one system of theology: men are fond of pet dogmas, and when these are harmless, neighbours would do well to consider them innocent; but it is neither vain nor unserviceable to attempt to bring the world to one way of thinking upon minor questions of practical morality. Why may not the disciples of Swedenborg, Knox, and Whitfield meet the men of the world with smiling looks upon neutral ground? It is true that evil communications corrupt good manners; but it is also true that good communications improve bad manners. As affairs at present stand, the envy which wishes to enjoy earth, yet dares not, denounces pleasure as a delusion of Satan: the worldliness which is inwardly abashed shakes off

its restraint by a sarcasm against hypocrisy. Under the excitement of rancour the breach cannot be healed; a pettish humour will not allow of a parley; so that each party continues to spite itself out of spite to its opponent.

The question proposed at the head of our article is an excellent introduction to the general dispute. Upon the decision will turn the fate of the whole tribe of these social disagreements. If plays are sanctioned, certainly there will be no prohibition of pictures, music, dancing, and other agreeable means of relieving our monotonous hours. Those who regard these inquiries as mere subterfuges to provoke a dalliance with sin, may as well lay down the page and rejoice in their possession of an intuitive excellence.

The common objections to play-going are three—the immorality and indelicacy of the performance; the loose habits into which the frequenters of the theatre are likely to fall; and the craving for excitement which is engendered in the mind.

Against the first charge of immorality it may be replied, that it is an incidental, not an essential, objection. It is allowed by critics that virtuous sentiments are the solid foundation of good writing. Vice may be pompous and gaudy, but it dares not assume the disguise of a majestic simplicity. The highest conceptions of genius are by nature devoted in the womb to the cause of truth. The drama, above all other composition, has the privilege of striking the soul with the intensity of goodness; it combines the vividness of contrast, the interest of incident, the charm of variety, and the force of reality while the feelings are yet soft with pity, warm with passion, it impresses the lesson which memory will hold with the tenacity of instinct. But to produce this wondrous effect all the faculties must be engaged; the whole being absorbed; we must forsake the closet and go to the stage; the imagination must be laid under the enchantment

action: eyes and ears must witness the earnestness of suffering, the terrible agony of guilt, and the sublime countenance of heroism. The tones and gestures of human nature must refine our sympathies, and render us sensitive to the appeals of mute creation.] While tragedy will tutor our great passions, comedy will restrain the pakey inclinations which pervert the happiness of common life. The mirror held up to nature will shock with the image of our own follies; we shall be the more inclined to correct them, because, though the wit was pointed and sank deep, we were solitary witnesses to our inward shame. In a word, the drama will educate the heart by making it familiar with excellence.

It is answered, that Christians do not emulate the task of heroes, because their duty is confined to the exercise of sober virtues. But Christians have no right to shrink from the world. Luther, Knox, Bunyan, Wesley, and Howard were brought face to face with troubles and contentions; it was the divine spirit of enthusiasm which lifted them above terror. Every man, in his station, may wish to persuade a neighbour of the benefits of religion; but the intellect will seldom be converted until the feelings are touched; there must be rapture in the preacher who would startle apathy. The fanatics who reject the aid of learning, and the quietists who repress emotion, commit faults equally fatal. A Christian must take the world as it is—not an association of varends and elders, but a rough multitude, who must be acted upon by strong influences. If he understand nature, he will know that passion is the key to the heart, and that the pathos of Orpheus must win mankind to virtue.

Lessons in the art of Propagandism could be nowhere better acquired than in the exhibitions of a talented and moral theatre. Whether the British stage of the present day can claim the merit of such beneficent influence is a question requiring details. It is acknowledged that mere theatrical entertainment has usurped the place of the drama; the stage, in fact, is no longer a stage, but a place devoted to scenic display, witticisms, buffonery, evanescent satire, and, in some instances, to smart ribaldry addressed to initiated spectators. A few hours' mere recreation is the confessed object of the

sight-seers, and it consequently depends upon the character of the individual whether or not he should run the hazard of a questionable indulgence. It is undeniable that in too many cases persons of delicate taste and severe self-respect could not witness the modern spectacle with satisfaction, while the susceptibility of youth is perilled without the compensation which works of true genius would afford.

The second objection, that the frequenters of the theatre must necessarily fall into loose habits, is not only trivial but also foreign. Every evening entertainment of a town is dangerous to those who have no moral restraint. The temptations, besides, are out of doors, and the weakness of those who fall into them is in nowise attributable to a short hour's acting, but to the neglect of responsibilities during long years, when young but strong self-will was establishing the vicious character. The Christian who cannot run the gauntlet of a visit to a playhouse, may be benefited by considering the phantasms that bewitched the saintly hermits of old in the seclusion of deserts.

The third and the strongest plea which can be objected to dramatic representations is their tendency to create a craving for excitement. This can be insisted upon with force in opposition to the light and exhilarating productions now so prevalent. Melpomene herself cannot be acquitted without examination. It may be urged that the moments of life are pre-occupied for the most pressing interests. The acquisition of heaven is a task so arduous, that it will not admit of the briefest intermission; the elevated temper of the pious mind cannot be disturbed by the violent transitions of a romance, which teaches nothing beyond a philosophic morality; and further, the demands of social Christianity occupy the leisure which is required to be "fruitful in good works." Such considerations would be unanswerable if they were admitted to represent the indispensable demands of religion. But do they present a just estimate of the duty of a Christian? Is he commanded to dwindle his life between strained efforts of mystical devotion and the stiff performance of charity? There is a grace that should accompany benevolence which enhances the service, and endears the giver. This grace is the offspring of a cultivated taste; the sensibilities

are educated in the presence of beautiful objects; the mind which is familiar with the noblest ideas of literature carries with it solace for the afflicted and strength for the desponding. Warmth of feeling and delicacy of behaviour, so far from being incompatible with religion, are calculated to support and recommend it. This sympathy is to be cultivated in the intercourse of society, or in the impressive company of great writers. So long as conscience and the curb of occasional retirement impose a due restraint, there need be no alarm that the soul will be jeopardized by a hydrophobic aversion for sacred things. Besides, all morality is akin, whether contained in Aken-side's "Pleasures of Imagination," Beattie's "Minstrel," or the Bible. There is a great difference between diverging from a path at right angles, and walking in a line parallel to it. If a love of art or an admiration of nature be sufficient to debar from paradise, alas! for thousands of Christians, whose amiable dispositions will forfeit the reward which Calvin will inherit.

When we dread a reasonable excitement, we are in effect careless of the health which is supported by activity. Stagnation is death. The exclusively pious are aware of this, and endeavour to stir their dulness with revivals and jubilees. None but the morose enthusiast or the long-habituated devotee can subdue affections within the limits of sectarian propriety. The eye will be charmed with colour and the ear with sound, notwithstanding the code of a factitious conscience; common sense has an affinity for innocence, and will not be imposed upon by the story of a lurking sin. New scenes and new associations of ideas stimulate the faculties, and the mind returns refreshed to the enjoyment of its habitual duties. And if the charms of a landscape, the grace of an exquisite statue, the harmony of light and sound, are gratifications indulged in by many serious people, how can the nobler tragic spectacle be, with any plausibility, renounced? There is nothing so terrible in human nature that it should be dangerous to regard it under the aspect of glowing sentiments. Fervent Christians live in an atmosphere of excitement; they are alternately depressed and exalted; they reflect upon miracles and anticipate glory. The occasional sympathy awakened by fictitious passion would not

weaken anxiety for their own vast expectations, but would rather benefit by checking selfishness, and by cherishing an interest in the active existence of the world. It is the great failing of what are termed evangelical preachers, that they isolate Christianity, and speak vaguely of the love of Christ and the influence of the Spirit; salvation with them appears to depend chiefly upon the personal disposition being elevated to an undefined state of communion with the divine nature. These indistinct notions float upon the brain of their hearers, who cannot afterwards reconcile themselves to the blunt presence of a matter-of-fact life. The imperative duties of citizenship and of social politics demand the respect—in fact, the honourable attention—of every member of a state. To perform these duties in a becoming manner, there is required something beyond mere pious placidity. The spirit must be roughened, or a good-natured obsequiousness will allow the defeat of an honest cause. This is a world of bustling and roguery, where good men who have the power are bound to interpose the terrors of justice in defence of the weak. The necessity for these sterner qualifications being undeniable, it remains only to decide whether they may not be in a great measure acquired, by frequent perusal of the lives of illustrious worthies, or by the discipline of the dramatic stage. If the stage be a moral one, its efficiency in this regard cannot be questioned; and it should be borne in mind, that the lessons of such a master would allow an abbreviated term of dangerous apprenticeship to the world.

It will be observed, that our arguments in favour of play-going have been placed under restrictions which must be approved by every correct judgment. The indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure is reprobated by prudence as strongly as by religion. None but the unthinking will regret that the compass of their enjoyments is to be circumscribed by a boundary that will exclude the possibility of remorse. Whether a Christian can render support to an immoral British stage, is a question that calls for no discussion. Whether the British stage is and has been a moral one, is not a translation of the term proposed for debate. We have accepted the only construction which can be put upon the words of the question. The limitations which we have enforced were obviously an

avoidable; and the conclusions at which we have arrived follow, we trust, from an impartial judgment, and not from any unworthy suspicion of those who attach higher solemnity to the purposes of life. A serious temper is the acknowledged foundation of every exalted virtue; but seriousness must be associated with cheerfulness, or Christianity will degenerate into misanthropy. Our design has been to show that there is

no necessary evil attendant upon theatrical performances. If our opinions appear unfounded, let our opponents cancel the confirmation of the irreproachable Milton:—

“ Sometimes let gorgeous Tragedy
In sceptred pall come sweeping by,
Presenting Thebes, or Pelops’ line,
Or the tale of Troy divine,
Or what (though rare) of later age
Ennobled hath the buskin’d stage.”

H. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It is our purpose in this article to prove, by fair argument and logical inference, that the drama, in its spirit and tendency, is antagonistic to the spirit and genius of Christianity: and if we succeed in proving this, the inference will be that Christians cannot, consistently with their principles, patronize the British or any other stage for dramatic representations.

The first argument we adduce in favour of our position is, that in numerous plays the holy name of God is irreverently and unceremoniously introduced, thereby setting at naught a plain but imperative command, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” We give the following as a few instances out of a great many in which this irreverent mention of God’s name occurs:—

“Much Ado About Nothing,” Act II., Scene 3; *Ibid.*, Act III., Scenes 1 and 4; “Love’s Labour’s Lost,” Act I., Scene 1; *Ibid.*, Act V., Scene 2; “Merchant of Venice,” Act II., Scene 2; “All’s Well that Ends Well,” Act II., Scenes 2 and 3; “Taming of the Shrew,” Act IV., Scene 5; “Comedy of Errors,” Act IV., Scene 4; “Romeo and Juliet,” Act I., Scene 5; *Ibid.*, Act II., Scene 4. Our friends will perceive that our selections are from the writings of the great master-mind, and that we have not noticed works of inferior men.

But not only on the stage is the third commandment impiously violated: but among the company who frequent theatres are to be found those who are ever and anon assailing the ears of the more polite and polished part of the audience by their rude, coarse, and impious vociferations, tainting the very atmosphere by their pestiferous breath.

2nd. Because it is the resort chiefly of

the immoral and profligate. “Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven,” is the exhortation of Him “who spake as never man spake.” If it be the duty of Christians to set a good example before the world, how can they be said to do this if by their presence and influence they countenance the profligacy and vice too generally to be met with in and about theatres? We may be met here by professors of religion saying, But we do not countenance vice; the very sensibilities of our nature are shocked at witnessing indecency or vulgarity anywhere. But, friends, how comes it to pass that you are found in such society? “What fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness?” It appears the same attractions drew you together; but the vicious are more consistent than you, for whilst they faithfully serve their master, *Sin*, and profess attachment to no other, you, on the contrary, while professing attachment to Christ, sanction, by your presence and influence, the deeds of darkness.

3rd. Because the stage has a tendency to inflame those passions which we are called upon in the word of God to subdue. Man comes into life with affections and susceptibilities suited to his nature, and if properly cultured and directed, they would subserve the purposes of his being, and godliness and virtue would characterize his life; but unfortunately in too many instances a bias is given to his inclinations which has the opposite effect, so that instead of a life of virtuous action, one of deleterious tendency is the result.

One or more of the irregular passions, envy, malice, jealousy, &c., form the basis of

all plays. Now, we ask, what ennobling quality is discoverable in envy? What christian grace in malice? What virtuous disposition in jealousy? Surely it is the duty and interest of every man to curb the irregular desires of his nature; but theatrical representations have the contrary effect, for they fan to a blaze those latent propensities.

4th. Because it is temporizing, and lowers the standard of moral obligation.

The wisest and safest method man can adopt is to make all his advantages subserve the good of his soul: his time, opportunities, privileges, and advantages, are all talents given, or rather lent him, by his beneficent Creator, God, to profit withal; and according to the proper or improper use of these will be his condition in time and eternity. Does the stage enforce the commands of God? Does it incite to love and obedience? Does it imbue the heart with philanthropic sentiments? Does it enable man to view with feelings of commiseration the suffering and distressed? Does it give to his heart kind and sympathetic affections? Does it prompt him to acts of piety and mercy? In a word, does it teach him his duty to God and his fellow-man?—

“Life, like every other blessing,
Derives its value from its use alone;
Not for itself, but for a nobler end,
Th’ Eternal gave it; and that end is virtue.”

5th. Because the glory of God is not the object sought by dramatic representations. The church at Corinth was thus exhorted:—“Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.” We fear that the Christian’s duties are too generally lost sight of. Christianity will not admit of any compromise. The spirit of Christ and the spirit of the world have ever been opposed to each other; and Christians are commanded to “come out from among them and be separate.” Many are the means now in operation to alleviate suffering humanity. To raise man to dignity and honour—to bring him to a state of consciousness relative to the imperishable constitution of his soul—to induce in him holy incentives to action—to lead him to God;—does the stage exhibit those features? Does it inform man as to his lost and ruined condition, and alienation from God? Does it point to the “Lamb of God, which taketh

away the sin of the world”? We know it does none of these: *ergo*, it is not a fitting place for saint or sinner. The profession of the former is incompatible with, and opposed to, the spirit of the stage; while the latter is procrastinating with the gracious invitations of heaven, and making the probability of his salvation more doubtful.

7th. Because it disqualifies the soul for devotional exercises. Communion with God is the life of the soul; it is the highest privilege enjoyed by men or angels; it brings into one fellowship the Infinite and the finite; it lights up the soul with holy ardency, and it invigorates and strengthens its powers. If, therefore, a Christian would retain a sense of God’s favour, and experience the delights resulting from communion with his Maker, he must cultivate the graces and virtues of the Holy Spirit, and keep aloof from those influences that only enervate and enfeeble his powers. When the hour of prayer arrives, will the reminiscence of the scenes he has witnessed at the theatre afford him suitable reflections—inspire him with holy confidence—or induce that calm, serene, and peaceful composure of mind so necessary on these occasions? Let conscience supply the answer.

We have thus given a few reasons why we conceive it to be the duty of Christians to withhold all support from the stage. Whether we are right or wrong, “judge ye.” But there are other weighty considerations quite in harmony with the foregoing, which, for want of space, we can only glance at *en passant*:—1st. Would Christians tolerate in their own houses, and in the presence of their families, the language employed, and the scenes exhibited, in theatres? 2nd. Would they consider the morals of their families improved by these exhibitions? 3rd. Are the advantages and pleasures derived from theatrical performances equivalent to the time spent in witnessing them? 4th. What proportion do they bear in the scale of promoting the general good of mankind? 5th. What are the motives by which the actors are influenced? 6th. What is the general character of stage players? These and other questions of a like import should be maturely weighed ere Christians give their sanction and support to the British stage.

We are here reminded of a fact we once

end of bearing on this subject: it was in substance as follows:—A lady with whom the Rev. James Hervey chanced to be traveling, took occasion, among other things, to speak in high commendation of theatrical amusements. She observed,—“There was pleasure in thinking on the play before she went: pleasure which she enjoyed when there; and pleasure in ruminating upon it when she retired to her bed at night.” Mr. Hervey (who sat and listened without interrupting her), when she had concluded, said to her, “that there was one pleasure more, which she had forgot to mention.” “What can that be?” said she, “for sure I included every pleasure, when I considered the enjoyment beforehand, at the time, and afterwards. Pray, sir, what is it?” To which Mr. Hervey, with a grave look, and in a solemn manner, answered, “Madam, it is the pleasure it will afford you on a death-bed.” The reproof was seasonable, and its effect such that she never visited the theatre again: but, becoming pious, secured those blessings which only can afford satisfaction in death. Well might the poet say—

“All hail, Religion! thou alone can'st fire
Our kindling thoughts with views beyond the
tomb,
To brighter plains by thee we dare aspire,
And snatch a foretaste of the world to come.”

We conclude by offering a word of counsel

and advice to our young friends, in whose welfare we take particular interest.—1st. Seek to realize, by faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, a sense of God's approving smile, and endeavour to keep that evidence bright, by constant watchfulness and fervent prayer. 2nd. Endeavour to subdue and conquer every unholy affection and disposition, by yielding to and encouraging the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit. 3rd. Associate with your ideas of pleasure and amusement the joys which spring from communion with your God. 4th. Let a higher, a nobler principle, actuate you in your pursuit after happiness, than the mere gratification of sensual desires. Many incautiously and inadvertently throw themselves in the way of temptation, and because they have not grace to resist, are made easy victims of the destroyer. 5th. Act upon the advice given by St. Paul to Timothy—“Flee also youthful lusts: but follow righteousness, faith, charity, peace, with them that call on the Lord out of a pure heart.” Lastly, if you think, with us, that the stage exerts a baneful influence upon society, then, in accordance with your convictions, labour to repress it.

“I venerate the man whose heart is warm,
Whose hands are pure, whose doctrine and whose
life
Coincident, exhibit lucid proof
That he is honest in the sacred cause.”

J. E. P.

Philosophy.

IS HOMŒOPATHY TRUE IN PRINCIPLE AND BENEFICIAL IN PRACTICE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

My attention had been drawn to the articles which have appeared in the *British Controversialist* on this subject, and I have been at the pains of labouring through four negative articles, in the hope of finding something more than words.

How sadly have I been disappointed! I had been led to anticipate that those who should write on the adverse side would at least be men of ordinary attainment in the various branches of physical science, and that therefore we should be exempt from

dealing with propositions at variance with *ascertained* physical principles; whilst the simple enunciation of certain definite expressions would at all events be understood in the sense in which they are *generally received and understood in all scientific schools*. But this expectation was wretchedly dispelled by the two articles of “Vinculum,” by that of L. G. G., and by that bearing the appropriate subscription of A. S.

Voltaire used to say, “Before all things, gentlemen, if we are to argue, let us define

understand, and acknowledge certain terms in certain senses:—a precaution which," he added, "is the more especially necessary when we have to argue with those who use terms without meaning." Now, after the lengthy discussion to which the present proposition has given rise, we are precisely in the dilemma which Voltaire would have obviated. We are engaged in nothing more nor less than a cavil about words, or in a dispute, to say the least of it, in which the interpretation of words is a very essential and very stupid ingredient. "Vinclum," in his first article, starts with a misinterpretation on one essential term, and continues his misconstruction of another term in the second article, which he might have spared himself the trouble of writing, had he begun by *understanding* what he had to write about. Nothing is easier than for any man to put forward the most ridiculous proposition in the world, and then to palm it off as mine, and laugh at me for my pains, whilst he plumes himself upon dispersing to the winds a dogma which has no existence except in his own misunderstanding. It is clear that such an imputation of doctrine does not make the opinion thus easily refuted the dogma which *I* really advocate.

Hear "Vinclum":—"The aphorism, *Similia similibus curantur* [which, by the way, should be *curentur*], is the basis of the whole fabric. 'Like cures like,' explains the anomalies in the action of complex medicaments, no less than in the use of the simpler therapeutic agents: *to reduce a plethoric constitution, prescribe rich viands, and plenty of them; to cure the dropsy, drown your patient with water!* These are obviously fair deductions," &c. &c.

In the first place, the veriest tyro in Latin and Greek grammar would be able to inform you that ὁμοιος does not mean the *same*, but *similar*, and that homœopathy, according to its etymology, would be applied to a method of treatment which employed not the *actual agents* inducing natural disease, but agents capable of inducing *similar* morbid manifestations (even WITHOUT an *identical* pathological state, as revealed by morbid anatomy). He would also be able to afford you as etymological a construction of the terms "*similia similibus*." As an illustration of the difficulties and perplexities induced by such confusion of terms, I may

remind the classical and historical "Vinclum" of the Arian controversy, which turned entirely upon the single syllabic difference in this very adjective, ὁμοιος:—the one sect persisting in the term ὁμωδυστος, as applied to the incarnation; the other as steadfastly adhering to the word ὁμοιωδυστος.

In the second place, a less learned investigator than "Vinclum" would have been able to ascertain that a "*plethoric condition*" is neither necessarily, nor even frequently, induced by "*rich viands*," nor dropsy by *drowning*, or by external saturation with water in any shape, unless such external saturation should operate in the same method as a draught of cold air, &c., upon a heated body, in repelling perspiration.

In the third place, it does not seem to strike our learned physiologist, how greatly his *viand cure*, as imputed to us, is at variance with the taunt fulminated by one of his colleagues, that the "*rationale of our treatment consists in strict dietary regulations*." And these are all palpable inconsistencies, which should have been sifted from the confused ideas of our disputants before they ventured to commit thoughts to paper, in registration of the very muddy condition of their reflective faculties.

Another gross misconstruction of terms occurs in the second article which "Vinclum" has issued to the world in the first flush of pride which plumed itself of authorship. Here he falls foul of the term "*specifics*," and with his co-disputant, A. S., flies off, in a fit of transient triumph, to seek for the meaning of the word in the advertisements of Professor Holloway, the Hygeist, Widow Welch, Parr, and others.

Now, all this is by the question; because the word certainly means something definite, however it may have been hackneyed and the very hackneyed use of it would imply that it *should* convey some sense of positive capacity to cure.

A specific remedy as regards any particular disease, is clearly one (and there are such, as is well known) which possesses the property of acting in the animal economy directly to the seat of organic lesion, so as to displace or extirpate the *origo morbi*.

Associated with this term specific, comes another, which is applied by "Vinclum" and his colleagues with equal lack of discrim-

nation and no less confusion of meaning,—it is the term *quackery*, which it is fashionable in certain quarters to fulminate as a *summary refutation* of Homœopathic verity.

With due submission to “*Vinculum*,” L. G. G., and A. S., therefore, I would also come to a definite understanding as to the meaning of this term, and I humbly conceive that the word *quackery* may be appropriately applied to the following therapeutic methods.

1. The employment of a medicine which is really specific to some phases of the disease against which it is employed, but *without a knowledge of the rationale of its operation*, and consequently without any definite idea of the means of accommodating its application to the variable conditions of idiosyncrasy, constitution, temperament, age, sex, &c. &c.

2. The employment of a drug, whether really specific, against any particular morbid condition or not, as a *general therapeutic agent against all varieties of disease*, as is now the case with the popular application of galvanism.

3. The employment of one or of many drugs promiscuously, simply upon precedent, *without any idea of the abstract properties of such drug or drugs as respects the animal economy*, and notably the use of purgatives, emmenagogues, diaphoretics, astringents, tonics, &c., &c.; and the employment of *compounded* medicines, in which an indefinite number of drugs are commingled to regulate one another’s operation—as is the case with the method of prescribing adhered to by the dominant or Allopathic school of medicine.

4. An interpretation which ought not to be admissible amongst medical men in the advanced stage of our physiological, anatomical, and pathological knowledge, but which is nevertheless too generally to be included, viz., the attempt to treat disease with any therapeutic agent whatever, without any sufficient knowledge of the physical sciences, which are indispensable to the true physician.

Admitting these to be true interpretations of the term *quackery*, Hahnemann and Homœopathy must be exempted from the imputation which it conveys; for neither did Hahnemann promulgate, promote, or practise, in any of the methods which I have described,

nor does Homœopathy, properly so called, acknowledge either.

The first great aim of Hahnemann in his self-devoted career of medical reform was to obtain, by patient, persevering research, an exact knowledge of the essential property of each drug, before he ventured to employ it in the treatment of disease. His learning and assiduity, honourably acknowledged by every contemporary whose reputation gave weight to his opinion, and his uncompromising purity of character, sufficiently attest the truthfulness of so much as he has recorded of his labours. None of the great pathologists of his time have ventured to gainsay what he alleged; and Hufeland himself paid an honourable tribute of acknowledgment to some of his important discoveries. As a physiologist, he was known to be inferior to no member of the profession at the period in which he flourished; to his chemical researches, Liebig and our own distinguished chemists are indebted for valuable information; his pathological knowledge obtained for him the most respectful attention; and as an investigator of disease he was known for his patient and careful diagnosis;—and in fact in no branch of physical science was he wanting.

On the other hand, the very uncertainty and guess-work treatment which “*Vinculum*” and his friends would bid us respect and pursue, falls witheringly under the *third* denomination of *quackery* which I have particularized; whilst the enormous abuse of mercurials, which had become the destructive *fashion* of medicine until Liston exposed its dangerous fallacies, is as seriously subject to the *first* denomination of *quackery* above mentioned.

Next, let us quit the war of words for a few minutes, and examine one or two other particulars, which are salient as absurdities palpable to the meanest intelligence, in the mis-named reasoning of our friend “*Vinculum*.” For lack of any originality of thought, poor man! he is driven to *borrow* ridicule at *second hand*, of that universal literary and scientific borrower and beggar, Dr. Pereira.

Now, to say nothing of the *matter*, I might have wished that he had *borrowed* at least of one whose *own* investigation was a matter of record. But what does he do? He plunges into the labyrinth of clashing opinion accumulated in Dr. Pereira’s “*Materia*

Medica," and like the plum extorted by the ingenious "Little Jack Horner," he digs up the worthy *compiler's* collectanea respecting "vegetable charcoal," and lavishes vapid satire on Hahnemann for having taken the pains of devoting "forty-five octavo pages to the effects of *carbo ligni*," which he, "Vinclum," sternly maintains, with the infallible authority to whose scissors-and-paste-pot labour he is indebted for his information, is an "*inert substance*." Ay, and the joke does not end here, for "Vinclum" not only borrows the information, but the very same vein of abuse, in crying shame on Hahnemann for recording, what to our critic's too sensitive and delicate notions is "*filthy and obscene*." Poor, pitiful creatures! Verily ye must have spent a great deal of time in the branch of your medical education without which you are good for nothing—the dissecting-room, to wit—that ye have grown so lady-like in your ideas of what a physician should record of the symptoms of disease, and of what he should *suppress*, forsooth, as "*filthy and obscene*!" Why, "Vinclum," you must have a rare hand to soil when some poor creature requires the use of the scalpel and its accessories.

But to the purpose. You *allege* that vegetable charcoal is an "*inert substance*," but can you assign any physical reason why it should be so? Is there any chemical or physiological impediment in the way which should prevent its producing certain abnormal conditions, as positively as mercury, iodine, colocynth, henbane, &c.? You hear that some one gave a dog a given quantity of crude charcoal, and that it passed through the animal without any trace of alteration or decomposition whatever. And *you* are satisfied with this simple, ingenuous statement; *you* inquire no further, but record the substance in your memory forthwith as *inert*.

But although *you* perceive no reason for further inquiry, Hahnemann did not; and although *he* did not record the *reason* to which he attributed the action of *vegetable charcoal*, under certain circumstances of previous manipulation, there is a reasonable hypothesis which I may venture to adduce on this subject. I only say *hypothesis*, for the *reason* is nothing more, whereas the *actual fact* of certain effects being produced is beyond a doubt—it is positively known. And my hypothesis as to the *reason* is this:

We have found that vegetable charcoal, compounds of silicon, compounds of lime and other substances, which resist the action of any chemical agency in the stomach, or, in other words, which are incapable of decomposition or solution in the juices of that organ, are *inert* in their *crude state*, simply because they are not subject to digestion, assimilation, or absorption, and that therefore they cannot operate (except as mechanical and local irritants) upon any organic tissue. Now this is the position maintained by the Allopathic authorities on "*Materia Medica*," and in this so far we precisely coincide. But we go further; we seek for means of rendering these substances capable of absorption; we comminute them by mechanical means, until after a given degree of reduction we find definite and invariable effects produced upon the healthy organism; and my hypothesis is to the effect, that the *absence* of effect produced by the *crude* material is attributable simply to its incapability of solution, or decomposition, and thereby of *acting* upon any vitalized tissue so as to disturb the atomic arrangement; whereas the *decided effect* resulting from its *comminution* arises from its having been rendered capable of introduction into the various arrangements of important tissues, so as to induce atomic disturbance therein. And this hypothesis will be found to coincide with the facts ascertained in physiological anatomy, and with the known construction of the various tissues, as well as the proverbial *slenderness of affinity which influences the molecular arrangement of all organic structures*.

A few words more. As regards the vituperative designations or coarse ridicule contained in the adverse articles of Messrs. "Vinclum," L. G. G., and A. S., as instanced in the lavish use of terms such as "fools," "frauds," "impostures," and the like, with which they teem, I need only observe that they are beneath the notice of men of science; and one *prima facie* evidence of the lack of scientific attainment possessed by our opponents in this discussion, to my mind, was the profuse aggregation of expressions such as these. Indeed, it was with some reluctance that I joined in the discussion on that account.

As respects the challenge unguardedly repeated by L. G. G., at page 50, that we should at once proceed to operate with our

drugs upon fifty sound individuals, I have but one remark to offer, and it is this:—that in the first place we are fully prepared, in any place and at any time, to accept the challenge, the experiment being conducted in the presence or with the cognisance of an impartial and honourable committee; but that it is not for *us* to select the patients, but for the *challengers* to do so, lest we incur the risk of being assailed in success with innuendoes offensive to our honour. And at the same time it should be reserved that those who become patients in such an experiment, exonerate us fully and freely from the consequences, as these would not be of the pleasantest character.

There do not appear to be any other objections raised in the negative articles which are worthy of notice; but as I commenced by disputing the interpretation of Homœopathic doctrine as put forward by "Vinclum," I feel almost called upon briefly to repeat the real construction which it bears.

First, then, it seeks the minutest evidence of disease, and makes the most accurate observation of symptoms.

Secondly, it looks for a medicine whose ascertained action upon the healthy organism yields evidences as *nearly analogous* to the symptoms of disease observed as possible. Or if our *single* medicine does not meet all the features of the case, it chooses that *first* which embraces the most important morbid manifestations, and allows that medicine to exert its action *undisturbed*, until from the *abidence of this most important* indication, some other *feature* becomes predominant, when it proceeds in like manner with that—and so on until the cure is complete.

Thirdly, and necessarily consequent upon the second principle of the method, it employs only *one unmixed* drug at a time; it never mixes several drugs together, because there is no means of ascertaining the direction of a complex action set up in the organism. The drug employed may be a *chemically* compound or simple body:—because *chemical* combination only produces a *different simple* and not a complex physiological effect.

Fourthly, it acts directly to the part or organ in the economy which is especially affected, because that is the direct way to a safe, rapid, and perfect radical cure, and because accurate research in the proper effect

of each medicine has definitely ascertained the organ or part especially controlled by each drug in the Homœopathic Materia Medica.

The *fundamental principle*, which is now acknowledged as supreme in every branch of physical science, is, that the *primary* action produced by any disturbing agent is only *transient*, whereas its *secondary* action is permanent; and that as disease consists in the obstruction of some functional process (whether from *relaxation* or *excessive* tension of the structure upon which such function depends), the true method of restoring the equilibrium is momentarily and very slightly to operate in the same direction, so that energy be artificially conveyed to the system to overcome such obstruction. But this fundamental principle also involves—

A *secondary question*—which is, to avoid an excessive aggravation of the disease, lest serious results accrue before the functional and vital reaction has taken place; and in this secondary question *infinitesimal physic* is necessarily implicated; so that in reality the method of practical application, to which the doctrine of analogies is inevitably subject, and which is the chief source of ridicule, is in reality the simplest and most palpable part of the business.

When we speak of a medicine being *specific* to the disease, we simply mean (and I really think a child would understand it so) that it has the property of producing an *assemblage of morbid evidences* exactly analogous to *all* those of the case under treatment, and that moreover we also know that it operates directly, and with especial energy, upon the actual organ, which is the seat of the *origo morbi*. See "Vinclum's" account of Homœopathic dogmata, and they would seem as childish and ridiculous as he wishes his readers to believe they really are, and taking such an account to be the true, it might verily be alleged that all who practise after this fashion had flung aside as useless the physiological, anatomical, chemical, and pathological knowledge acquired with vast labour in the schools; but I ask any reasonable and impartial man of real scientific attainment, if, when put in its true light, the doctrine which I have been advocating, far from being at variance with physiological anatomy and other branches of physical science, is not corroborated and confirmed in

the most clear and positive manner? It is *its merits*, associated with all the physical sciences. my own opinion that Homœopathy *rests upon* sciences. EDWARD GIBBON SWANN.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE question involved in the discussion on Homœopathy, which has been sufficiently extended to give the general reader a fair idea of the value of the arguments adduced on both sides, embraces two heads—a theoretical and a practical one. Anything which may have come from our pen has always been written with a view to exhibit, in their true light, not only the reasonings upon which this so-called science is established, but also to estimate the practical value of its therapeutic agents: we have endeavoured, as much as in us lay, to avoid the extremes into which our adversaries have too often fallen—of exalting either at the expense of the other, from a conviction that imperfection in theory must necessarily react injuriously upon the working out of any idea.

It is not fair, then, to object to any arguments which may be brought against the system, on the ground that actual experiment is the only way in which its claims can be tested, especially since, were results of this description wanting, which assuredly they are not, the very nature of the investigation, if logically conducted, cannot but lead us to the conclusion, that if Homœopathy be *not* true in principle it *cannot* be beneficial in practice, or *vice versa*. If, then, we have been successful in proving that the hypotheses upon which globulism is based are not consonant with the established laws of medicine, or with the experience of the members of that faculty, our position is maintained; nor do we hold ourselves necessarily bound to substantiate the latter portion of the question. But as it is possible that an exception may be taken to this mode of arguing, in giving a brief *résumé* of the facts of the case as they may be elicited from the various papers of our allies or our opponents, we will endeavour to show that Homœopathy has failed as signally when subjected to the *experimentum crucis*, as when tested by the equally searching laws of reason.

We shall not greatly err in looking to the motto of Hahnemann, "*Similia similibus curantur*," for an explanation of the prin-

ciples on which the Homœopaths vindicate their treatment: that this is a fallacy we have already shown, when applied universally as a panacea for every species of disease; the only grounds for the statement being the action of certain drugs upon the constitution, and of certain physical agents upon the nervous system, which are really subjects upon which our knowledge is, to say the least, very limited. We have effects presented to our view, we have the agents which caused those effects in our own power, but to trace the connexion between the two is more than we are able; the existing state of science does not permit us to supply the connecting links in the chain of inductive argument from what we do see to what we do not see.

It shows a deficiency of logical acumen to say nothing of actual ignorance of the but partial truth of this law, to construe hypothesis upon such a narrow basis, much more an amount of moral culpability which we will not estimate, when this hypothesis is blazoned about, and placarded in gigantic posters, in spite of all actual evidence to the contrary, and notwithstanding the notable false conclusions to which theoretically and practically it leads.

The question of specifics brought forward by G. V., betrays so egregious a deficiency of acquaintance with the commonest laws of medical science, that we will not again revert to it, but merely hint, that if the advocates of globulism have really relapsed so far into the dark ages as to sanction such absurdities as this, they effectually exclude themselves from any sympathy in the views and conduct which we might be inclined to afford men who erred on a subject which presented some reasonable ground for differences of opinion, and they may look in that case for such treatment only those in the rear of the great intellectual march can expect from their more advanced comrades—to be driven on with about as gentle means as the whipper-in of the Russian army was wont to employ when urged on the laggards by the use of lash.

But our opponents always shirk argument as to the reasonableness of their ideas; they feel their weakness on this point, and fly to the constant resource of the defeated: "Just try it yourselves," say they to the credulous public; "never mind what an interested profession may say; suppose our hypotheses be incorrect, we can appeal to the soundness of our facts." We, too, can appeal, but not to the generality of mankind, who are unable to judge of the value of cures, from their ignorance of the nature of the extent to which those cures are effected, and of the action of the means employed. We appeal from Philip in the dark to Philip in the light—educated and capable of conviction—to the properly constituted tribunals from which alone decisions on the point at issue are to be trusted; to men who have made the science involved the study of their lives, and who are fully qualified in every respect to test the comparative merits of the two systems. "We appeal," to parody the words of a great political chief, "to God and our profession," and by their decision will we abide.

We can, then, satisfactorily unveil the duplicity of men who ignore "the *a priori* absurdity of the system," and we shall then be able to show that "its practically beneficial character is not susceptible of proof."

What shall we say of the unblushing effrontery with which they* *falsify their statistics*, and introduce into their hospital reports, under the high-sounding names of *cephalgia* and *odontalgia*, those terrific affections, *headache* and *toothache*!

Must we not come to the conclusion that there is in "the lowest depths a deeper still"—that men who violate so systematically the laws of rectitude are not worthy of the confidence which we are accustomed to repose in those who have the care of our nearest and dearest interests, the lives and health of ourselves, our wives, and our children?

For it is to a question of ethics that they have ultimately reduced the discussion, and we fear not to take up the cudgels on this count also. When worsted on the practical value of their theory, they resort to the stale expedient of crying "stinking fish," and plead the constitutional peculation of the legitimate

sons of medicine as an excuse for the re-organization of the profession. We prove that their hypotheses are false, and we are told that the public are swindled out of their money; we demonstrate the fallacy of their arguments and the failure of experimental evidence, and we are instantly cried up as persecutors, and are preached to by these would-be Jenners and Galileos, as if we treated them with the merciless rigour of the inquisition.

We have seen, then, that upon no unvarying law of nature, upon no analogy of therapeutic agents, and upon no satisfactory theoretical reasons, can Homœopathy claim our suffrages as "true in principle:" that it is neither directly nor indirectly "beneficial in practice" we have also shown; it has been tested by the experience of its proselytes, and we find it impossible to depend upon their best evidence—by its opponents, and they have uniformly found it to fail. The very assertion, "that in no case can it do harm," is sufficient of itself to damn it; for is it possible that medicines which possess the slightest efficacy when rightly administered, could under totally different circumstances, and when injudiciously prescribed, be entirely inert? It is, in fact, attributing an inherent power of change to the different agents themselves; whereas we know full well that the varied action of any single medicament depends upon the nature of the organism to which it is applied, and that it is constantly evident that what is one man's death is another's cure.

We cannot, then, but come to the conclusion, that Homœopathy is either the result of ignorance or the work of duplicity; charity bids us suppose the former, but notwithstanding we cannot acquit many of its advocates of intentional collusion: to our readers we leave it, with the firm conviction that at no distant period it will have ceased to exist except in the brains of those unhappy individuals who seem to have realized in these modern times the character which Demosthenes gave the Athenians of old, and which was subsequently reiterated by St. Luke, who εἰς οὐδέν ἕτερον εὐκαιρουν, ἢ λέγειν τι καὶ ἀκούειν κοινοτερον. VINCLUM.

[At the close of this interesting and important discussion, we cannot but express our regret that any personality should have been introduced into it. Truth is never so convincing as when calmly stated and kindly enforced.—EDS.]

* Vide an able refutation of the fallacies of Homœopathy, by Dr. Routh.

Politics.

OUGHT MONEY TO BE INTRINSIC OR SYMBOLICAL ?

INTRINSIC.—I.

AN insight into the economy of social nature is the substratum upon which all politico-economic science must be based. The true political economist is one who possesses this insight in a profound degree. No matter how near may be his point of examination—no matter how artificial and modern the practical operations which he views—he is one who can trace near points to their remote foundations, and recognise the same elementary principles, guiding alike the infancy and manhood of political society.

Nor can this insight fail him in a question such as we have at present to discuss. Money—the common medium of exchange among nations—however intricate, through commercial advancement, in its nature and use, is yet dependent upon the same elementary laws which governed the earliest commercial exchanges of antiquity. As of old, nature distributes its benefits with an unequal hand; and now, as then, nations have their different natural productions. Art, moreover, the creature of man's own advanced powers, has grown and produced differently in different countries. Both nature and art, therefore, each work unequally. But, as of old, reciprocal wants exist. Hence commerce, also, exists as irrevocably now as ever; and its whole frame-work is supported by the same social necessities as obtained at the beginning.

In thus opening the present debate, we seek not to mystify the subject. We invoke for ourselves and readers the primary insight to which we have referred. If the true political insight of such theorists as Montesquieu and Smith, or of such practicalists as Horner and Peel, is denied us, let the subject be approached, at least, in the retrospective spirit which distinguished them. For certainly the currency question is one that cannot be discussed either theoretically or practically without a previous reference to its history. And although a coincidence of opinion may not result between all our readers and the political economists men-

tioned, whose leading financial faith, that money *ought* to be of intrinsic value, is our own,—yet they cannot deny them a purer love and nearer grasp of truth than distinguished a Law, a Mirabeau, a Robespierre, or an illustrious line of czars, whose financial doctrine and practice were, that money *ought* to be and *must* be symbolical.

But, as of first importance, let our terms be clearly understood. Money is a sign representative of the value of anything vendible; and, therefore, is necessarily in a manner symbolical. But the question is—Ought this sign to have a marketable value of its own, as gold or silver; or ought it to be comparatively devoid of all material value, as paper? Or, more comprehensively, Ought a currency to be one of intrinsic value, or one whose value is based on credit alone?

Now, the historical light cast upon the question is entirely one-sided. Apart from an examination of principles, history points to a unanimous and decisive affirmation of the necessarily intrinsic worth of money. The "iron pen of history" never wrote a more imperious truth on the minds it enlightened. Commerce was no less the birth of necessity, than *equal exchange* was the inborn commercial spirit. Anterior to the institution of money, the price of one commodity was another of equal value. And the adoption of a metallic currency as the common instrument of exchange, was owing to a happy combination of convenience and intrinsic value in the materials so converted.

Thus the guiding principle of commercial exchanges from antiquity has ever been to give value for value—not the mere nominal value of symbolical money for articles of merchandise, but the marketable value of an intrinsic money common over the commercial world. Of course, in the rude infancy of commerce, neither individual nor national stability and credit were such that producers could rest faithfully contented with slips of authorized paper-money in return for what had been the fruit of their

will and skill, and expect, too, to supply their own wants by exchanging them for other commodities. Nor down to the present time, with few exceptions, has a symbolical currency been attempted to be instituted. And these few exceptions the world will not hastily forget. The "continental money" of the American War of Independence made ruinous havoc. But the assignats and mandates of French revolutionary cupidity and terrorism—money truly the symbol of national bankruptcy and anarchy, and instrument of other than commercial exchanges—left the deepest and most indelible records. And even in Russia, where the currency is of all European nations at present the most symbolical, the monetary signs afford as little encouragement for a widespread example. Indeed, iron despotism and symbolical money flourish best together, the latter being the natural sequence of the former.

But ours is a theoretical discussion. What *ought to be*, we know, is not always identical with what *has been*. Yet the true theory of the currency can only be that which practice has taught us. The world's experience in this question is immeasurably before the *beau idéal* of either theoretical or practical speculators. A symbolical currency is just such a *beau idéal*. It only exists in the impracticable minds of mere theorists, or in the sinister wishes of speculative adventurers. Theirs is not an inductive theory; it is baseless as to facts. While the theory of a symbolical currency is one anterior to practice, and independent of past commercial history, that of an intrinsic currency is posterior to practice, and is the indoctrinated reflexion of the commercial spirit from its birth. It is for our readers to adopt a theory based on political nature, or one utterly alien thereto.

And passing from the historical part of the question, we find our position none the less invulnerable. It is apparent that a credit-system of currency would be a practical denial, not merely that trade has its own natural laws, but that it ought to be regulated by those laws, and not by arbitrary state enactments. Now, the intrinsic worth of money flows from a natural law of trade—equal value for equal value; and regulated by that law, money is given in exchange for commodities. But this truth is abrogated by

the institution of symbolical money. Surely, now-a-days, the great fact, that the principles of commercial exchanges are irrelative to the principles of state government, requires no proclamation. And surely no truth-seeker can disbelieve, that the more trade is free from state control, the greater is its certainty of development. But what must be thought when money is of such a nature, that, instead of being of an equally universal intrinsic value, it has an unequal nominal value over the commercial world? Based on credit, a symbolical money is of value proportionate to the credit of issuers. Governments must ever be the real issuers, although banking corporations may be their agents and tools. Hence, as amicable foreign relations wane, the value of symbolical money must wane also; and as open hostilities between states are declared, the banking governments lose all monetary transactions with their foes, since a cessation of diplomatic relations is little else than a declaration of want of confidence. And would not trade consequently be trammelled and stunted in its development? Why, taxes on the importation of commodities by any government would far less bondage trade than the origination of an arbitrary instrument of exchange of nominal value, subject to all the fluctuations incident on the ebb and flow of state policy and the distrust of friends. Certainly, if the commodity must have free importation, the instrument for which it is exchanged ought to have a similar freedom.

But a purely symbolic money is nowhere *un fait accompli*; nor, as we have indicated, is it ever likely permanently to become so. Therefore, on the advocates of a credit-system rests the *onus probandi* as to the justice of its institution.

A symbolical money, it will content us at present to say, if ever existent, would be partly, perhaps wholly, distinguished—1, by its arbitrarily representing saleable things; 2, by its merely nominal value; 3, by that value being national or local; 4, and dependent on the credit of issuers; 5, by its fluctuating with the rise and fall of things represented; 6, by its too direct influence (proportionate to the confidence or distrust in government or corporational credit) in raising and depressing the springs of production; 7, by its being an investiture of most despotic power in governments or cor-

porations, by which public interest might be sacrificed either to political ambition or corporational greed.

We think our readers, without much difficulty, will now admit, that the first essential quality of a circulating medium must be an intrinsic marketable value. But they must not hence suppose that they are thus pledged against the use of a paper money, having apparently no such value. On the contrary, a paper currency is a useful auxiliary to a metallic currency. A paper money is the consequence of multiplicity of metallic money. It is because of its convenience as to transportable facility, its economy in preventing the wasting of coin by use, and in lessening the heavy expense of a great metallic circulation, that an auxiliary paper currency is allowed. As coins are the representatives of mercantile commodities, so notes are the representatives of coins; and as metallic money is a permanent representative of the value of those commodities, so a paper money is the temporary representative of the value of metallic money. But when once symbolical money exceeds in nominal value intrinsic money, the public are defrauded, while the banking corporations are enriched. Paper money deteriorates, or if credit is great, coin rises exorbitantly

in value. To this fact is owing the immense control acquired by government in regulating banking privileges, and their influence over the money market, not merely in controlling paper issues, but also in manufacturing promissory notes on the security of their credit, which have rarely, if ever, been redeemed. Hence arise bubbles, money panics, and national insolvency—the result of a disobedience to the law, that money must have an intrinsic marketable value. If these evils flow from a symbolical money on a small scale, how much more would they exist under an unlimited system of symbolical currency?

But we have entered far enough, at present, into the question, and will at once conclude, by predicting that the result of the present discussion will be an agreement between most of our readers and Baron Montesquieu, in the unbiassed opinion, that “the state is in a prosperous condition when, on the one hand, money perfectly represents all things; and, on the other, all things perfectly represent money, and are reciprocally the signs of each other—that is, they have such a relative value that we may have the one as soon as we may have the other.”*

R. L. G.

* “Esprit de Lois,” book xxii. chap. 2.

SYMBOLICAL.—I.

THE great difficulty of modern statesmanship is, to reconcile the rights of labour with the rights of property, and every legislative effort to solve the political and social problem has hitherto proved unsuccessful. The failure seems to have arisen from bestowing undivided attention on matters of detail, while great principles have been neglected. Remedial measures have skimmed over the surface of the troubled waters, but the plummet of reform has not yet sounded their depths. The hours of labour have been restricted, without going into the question, “Why cannot labour dictate terms to capital, instead of capital to labour?” Emigration has been systematized and encouraged, without opening the question, “Why do Englishmen and Irishmen leave their native country by hundreds of thousands every year?” Sometimes distressed needlewomen rouse the sympathies of the nation; then the tailors, then journeymen bakers,

then workers in mines, then governesses, then chimney-sweeps; but the law of cheap labour, which manifests itself in these various shapes, is not boldly met and discussed. Free trade was the last experiment; but for so energetic and revolutionary a measure to bear such small and questionable fruits, indicates that the root of political evil is not yet touched. Free trade has shown itself to be an imperfect measure, from its mixed operation of good to some interests, and evil to others; from its injurious effect on the cultivators of the soil, its *utter abnegation* of the colonial system, and from its unscrupulous disregard of a *great principle*, that *taxation must be added to price*. An intelligent body are advocating education, but these well-intentioned men would find by experience that a *previous question* must be settled before education can bear its proper fruits, viz., *the condition of England question*, or the *question of employment for the people*.

The employment of all! Why is not every man employed? Because the supply of labour is greater than the demand. Why is the supply greater than the demand? A hundred answers present themselves to the minds of your various readers. I would answer it at once, and boldly—because there is a want of *money*; because this nation is insanely tied down *illimitable* production to *limited money*, instead of allowing money to keep pace and expand with production. We have made gold, a scarce metal (the happy consequences to arise from its recent almost miraculous plenty will be touched on hereafter), our money; and *money* being *legal tender*, that is, the only instrument which the law recognises as a legal discharge of debts, taxes, and wages, and all production being resolvable into this money, such production is *dear* and arrested by money's comparative scarcity: for I lay it down as an axiom, that much production, or many commodities and little money, is cheapness, and cheapness is unremunerative price; and unremunerative price is depressed trade, languid demand, and intermittent employment of labour. Cheap commodities mean dear money: cheap money means dear commodities. I advocate cheap money: I wish to see commodities dear. Gold is a *dear money*: to it I trace all our commercial evils. I would abolish gold money, which is money of *intrinsic* value, and would substitute paper money, which is cheap money, and for the following reasons:—Because money is in its very nature *representative*, as a bill of lading is representative of a cargo. Any man holding a bill of lading, though only a piece of paper, is deemed to be the owner of the cargo worth thousands, representative, like the penny postage stamp, which in itself, though not worth the hundredth part of a farthing, is nevertheless representative of the potentiality of carrying a letter from Dover to Galway, and would be taken by any one as the representative of the copper penny.

Let me dissipate an erroneous idea which prevails the minds of all those who have not paid attention to this subject. A bill of exchange is *not* money; it is only a promise to pay money; and in times of *panic*—the touchstone of our system—is convertible only into gold, or its certificate, Bank of England paper. Panic means this—that

bills of exchange go for gold, and the gold not being in existence, perhaps having gone into a foreign country through the operation of the exchanges, the holders have to submit to *enormous sacrifices*, which means, they have to pay high premiums on gold, which means a *high rate of discount*. That money should be *symbolical*, and not have *intrinsic* value, I will attempt to prove by another argument: and here let me say, that if we are to make a *commodity* into *money*, no commodity is so convenient as gold: but my argument is, that *no* commodity can make a money; for money is merely a *shadow*, and should increase with production and disappear with consumption. As soon as a pair of boots are made, the money should come into existence; as soon as the boots are sold, the money should disappear. To make this assertion good will require another paper, and I wish it to go for no more than an assertion at present. But my argument is this:—If a commodity can make a money, then gold, being the most convenient, can make a money, and we then insist that the bullionists carry out their principle and give us a *gold* money—a money of gold (allowing silver as small change), and *nothing* but gold. Don't eke out your system by resorting to one *symbolic money*. Gold, gold, nothing but gold. If a merchant has a thousand pounds to receive, let one of his clerks follow him with a wheelbarrow; let every man see that his pocket is well sewed; let your leather bags be capacious; let the worship of Mammon be sincere and undivided. Do not recognise flimsies, put away far from you dirty rags. Above all, the *fourteen* millions of debt which the nation owes to the Bank of England, and which is issued as *paper money*, without any *base* of *gold*, must be withdrawn, and let the panic come on. If your principles be sound, adhere to them, and never fear the consequences.

Another argument against gold money is this—and if I make my case good against *gold*, I make it good against all *intrinsically* valuable money, because gold is the best of commodities, if we are to have a commodity—namely, that the proper weight of a sovereign is 5 dwt. 3 grs., and that sovereigns are coined to that weight and no more. But, unfortunately, if the sovereign, in being transferred from one bag to another, from one pocket to another, from the opera-

tions of the sweater—who is as naturally the product of gold money as vermin is of filth—from the abrasion of one coin against another; I say, if the sovereign loses one thousandth part of a grain, it is not longer legal tender; the government refuses it for taxes, the banker throws it back to you, with a supercilious air, over the counter, and you find yourself with a piece of bullion certainly, (and what is the value of bullion *now*,

after Californian and Australian discoveries!) but without money. Your only alternative is to take your piece of bullion, which was only coined last week, and with it go to the cambist and pay him a heavy per centage to find you a coin of the proper weight.

If a thing is wrong in *principle*, it is wrong in *all* its *details*. There is not a detail in gold money which is not objectionable.

J. H.

Social Economy.

WOULD COMMUNISM PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"Homo" tells us that wealth is being monopolized by the few, and that the labouring classes, from unprecedented hardships, caused by the introduction of machinery, are sinking in the scale of social being. We wonder "Homo" should have propounded two such heresies, contradicted alike by history and individual experience. Competition is opposed to monopolies of every kind; this is its prime recommendation. The guilds and corporations by which monopoly sought to perpetuate its existence are yielding to competitive influences; and our working men, so far from degenerating, are earning for themselves niches in "Fame's proud temple." Surely evils enough exist in society without resorting to fictitious ones to swell the amount.

From "The Age and its Architects," "Homo" quotes a very forcible statement of evils, which partially, at least, do exist in society; even in that statement, however, co-existents and consequents are confounded. It cannot, for instance, be proved that the two million paupers, criminals, and vagrants, are chargeable to the influence of competition. The evils which are attributable to that cause are the purchase-price of our advancement; and we hesitate not to say, that rather than endure the sluggishness to which Communism would reduce us, we would infinitely prefer the present state. What, after all, but competition, could have brought our mechanic-arts, our manufactures, and, above all, our literature, to their

present enviable condition? It is an every-day observation, that rivalry draws out the latent energies of the mind; but by removing this, the Communists would remove the very element which has contributed so signally to liberalize the intellect, and would render the community a realized Castle of Indolence.

"Homo" would have done more eminent service to his cause had he devoted himself to a refutation of our statement relative to man's attachment to private property, than by asking whether a mere attachment conferred a claim to possession. We think the inference was plain, that where all manifest attachment to private property, all, when they have a choice, will adopt it. This inborn attachment to private property must render nugatory every attempt to establish universal Communism; handfuls of men, moved by the same impulses, and actuated by the same principles, may agree to sacrifice that inborn attachment for a greater good, and may establish small communities, but the same can never be predicated of men in nations; it is impossible to inspire them with that unanimity of object and that subordination necessary to the evolving of the Communistic idea: this, in the words of I. F., would imply a "total renovation of human nature and usages." In confirmation of the opinions we have enunciated on this subject, we quote the following luminous remarks from a review in *Chambers's Journal* of one of Carlyle's "Latter-day Pamphlets." "In this essay, if he (Car-

lyle) makes any positive suggestion at all, it is, that nations should be governed by an aristocracy of wisdom, 'captains of industry,' real, not sham rulers. 'The few wise will have, by one method or other, to take command of the innumerable foolish.' Very good as a proposition in the abstract, but how are we to get at these Solomons? how to ensure their due succession, once we have begun with them? and, above all, by what practicable means are we to induce the 'innumerable foolish' to become the docile and obedient flocks of these sagacious shepherds? Until Mr. Carlyle favours mankind with a business-like recipe how to catch heroes and set them to work, and more especially how to catch masses of people and indoctrinate them with a feeling of obedience, nations to all appearance must be content to jog on with their present plans of government, and make the best of them."

But to return to "Homo." Unless he is prepared to deny that the fear of want and the desire for supremacy are the motives by which men are actuated, he makes out no case in favour of Communism. That degree of development is still a long way off in which conscience and reflection shall be the sole motive-sources; and until we reach that degree, Communism must remain an unrealizable theory: the fear of want and the desire for supremacy will clamorously interpose to prevent its adoption. But for the sake of argument, let us suppose the stage in man's progress anticipated by "Homo" attained. As that state is the very highest to which it is possible man, as man, can reach, it is clear Communism would be impotent to effect any further improvement—innovation could make no advance; besides, a system which had led to a result so happy, ought not to be abandoned for any merely problematical good. We may remark, that if the constitution of the present social form were theorized on, it might be rendered quite as attractive as Communism, and far more rational. Social theories, when reduced to

practice, lose much of their fair proportions. Its superior reasonableness is the only claim of the competitive state on our sympathies. We believe private interest to be as necessary to the existence of society, as gravitation is to the existence of the material universe. We admit that the Communist's system of social organization, on a cursory view, appears a feasible scheme; we are, however, satisfied, from a close investigation of the subject, that it is impossible for man, at his present stage of progress, so to abstract himself from his private interests as to render it practicable, and that were his nature so far perfected as to admit of its being reduced to practice, it would fail to enhance or to perpetuate his happiness. The evils of the present social state, so far from being aggravated, as "Homo" would have us believe, are being gradually eradicated; they are working their own cure; men are seeing it to be their interest so to control the competition existing among them, that it must soon assume a milder form.

As there are some points of resemblance between Communism and Louis Blanc's organization of labour scheme, we may be pardoned for alluding to it here. The cause of its failure was this. All the workmen were equally paid; the only guarantee sought to ensure their hearty co-operation being the principle of honour; but, quite in accordance with the principle laid down in Negative Article II., it was found that, for want of strict surveillance, the less skilful workmen trifled away their time—the others, exasperated at the unfairness of these loungers, abandoned the scheme in disgust.

As we are not likely to have another opportunity of writing on this subject, we take our leave of it, in the fine words of Cowper:—

"Farewell, all self-satisfying schemes,
All well-built systems, philosophic dreams,
Deceitful views of future bliss, farewell."

J. N.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

THE ability of Communism to promote the happiness of man is not necessarily connected with the question of the abstract, right or wrong, of private property. The contrary is a mistake of some of its sup-

porters, who needlessly thus open up an abstract argument, which, under the terms entitling the present discussion, might be left undecided. We are not discussing the right of private property, but the ability of

common property to promote human happiness.

What source, then, is there of human happiness so sublime and sacred as that of religion—as that of the venerative association of the will of man with the will of God—bringing heavenly harmony to earth? What form of faith, also, is so reverend in its recognition of this as that of Christianity in its purest acceptation? And what theology so established by internal evidence, so perpetually the pioneer of progress, so consonant with the highest culture, as that of the teachings of Jesus? As the religion of Christ, then, is admitted as the highest source of human happiness, temporal as well as eternal, all discussion among its disciples, as to the promotion of human happiness, should evidently commence with the consideration of how far any proposed plan for promoting the happiness of man was accordant with Christianity and sanctioned as a duty of religion, or work of piety and virtue. First and foremost, thus, we should inquire whether Communism is accordant with Christianity, and whether, therefore, it is a religious duty or worthy work, if we would truly test its claim to the title of a principle promotive of the highest human happiness.

Christianity is shown to be in accordance with Communism from the evangelic narratives. Christ himself appears to have had no personal possessions—not even a domicile of his own. He was entertained by his friends and disciples, and ministered to of the substance of others. By his precepts he proclaimed the true wealth to be that of spiritual possessions, not things for the body; and showed the impossibility of serving two masters—Mammon and God. By his actions he showed that universal love, which is the spiritual counter-part of material Communism. The whole design of his life was the individual manifestation of that which should become the example of collective humanity. That he himself might not have organized collective Communism (for we cannot absolutely say that he did not do this), is humanly accounted for by the brief period of his ministry, by the preliminary necessity of preaching his doctrines, and by the fewness of his followers previous to his death and resurrection. However this may be, that he nevertheless

preached the spirit of Communism is clearly to be inferred from its being the first form which his faith took—from its being the organized condition in which his church was originally constituted. Immediately after his ascension, we find assembling for prayer his chief male and female disciples (probably about thirty in number), and learn that they abode together in one house. That at this time all Christ's disciples dwelt thus in common, does not, however, necessarily follow. Soon after Peter addressed about 120 persons, then the number of the disciples, but with whom, of course, the degree of faith would determine the extent of duty. We gladly admit thus, that Christian Communism is not compulsory, but voluntary—not outwardly forced, but inwardly constrained. The case of Ananias and Sapphira further evidences this. That, however, which may not be physically enforced, may still remain a moral duty and pious performance. Hence the praise of Barnabas, who sold his property at Cyprus and distributed to the poor. Hence from Ananias none was required or all. Thus, after Pentecost we find some three thousand souls who continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread and in prayers; and we learn that "all that believed were together, and had all things common; and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all, as every man had need." Still later in the record we read, that "the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul; neither said any that ought that he possessed was his own; but they had all things common."—"Neither was there any among them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles' feet: and distribution was made unto every man according as he had need." Such were the acts of the apostles; and after reading these, all must surely admit that the first Hebrew Christians constituted a Communist church, and that it is so far, at least, fairly proved, that Christianity and Communism were primitively connected and accordant, and held mutual relations to each other, like those of soul and body.

It may be objected, however, that such a state was designed only to meet the peculiar

circumstances of the Jerusalem church; and that thus it was confined, by temporary and local limitation, from the practice of the church at large. This objection is evidently without the support of analogy. The commencement of a religious system is generally the pattern of its extending course. The truth is, that instead of Communism having been locally limited to the Hebrew church, it was circumstantially impossible in the first foundation of the Gentile churches. The Hebrew customs had already recognised the liberty of the Essenian communities before the coming of Christ; but the laws of the principal Gentile nations were jealously and violently opposed to the admission of the right of association, as an *imperium in imperio*. Still the spirit of Communism, although the full form was impossible, was zealously inculcated during the apostolic period among the Gentile converts as well as the Jews. The Diaconate, indeed, was instituted, to superintend a fair distribution of the common stock between the Gentile and Hebrew widows in the Jerusalem church itself. Hence, also, the frequent appeals of Paul and Barnabas on the generosity of the Gentiles, to send assistance in support of the Communist church in Judea. Thus St. Paul declares, "Let no man seek his own, but every man another's wealth. * * * For the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof." Not further to multiply extracts, let the reader especially refer to Paul's description of the members of one body in their several relations, and to his beautiful definition of equality, both addressed to the Gentiles, as evidently perfect expressions of the spirit of Communism. Well, also, both as to Jew and Gentile, does John Wesley answer the objection, that christian Communism had only a temporary character. "To say," he writes, in his commentary on the communion of goods, recorded in the Acts, "that the Christians did this only till the destruction of Jerusalem is not true, for many did it long after. Not that there was any positive command for so doing; it was needed out, for love constrained them. It was a natural fruit of that love wherewith each member of the community loved every other as his own soul. And if the whole christian church had continued in this spirit, this usage must have continued through all ages. To affirm, therefore, that Christ did

not design it should continue, is neither more nor less than to affirm that Christ did not design this measure of love to continue."—"I see," he adds, "no proof of this." In this conclusion we most cordially concur. History supports, moreover, Wesley's brief remark, that the primitive christian Communism continued long after the destruction of Jerusalem. At Pella, the christian Zoar, it was continued in practice, and from thence was received by the Nazarenes and others, with whom it may be traced downward to the fourth century.*

Leaving the apostolic age, and passing to the patristic period, we first find many testimonies to the consonance of Christianity with Communism from the writings of the fathers. St. Clement says: "Brothers, the usage of all the things in the world should be common to all men; but, alas! iniquity has caused one to say, Behold my possessions! and another, Behold mine! and it is thus among men that private property was established." In the General Epistle of St. Barnabas, a work probably of this period, it is also declared: "Thou shalt communicate to thy neighbour of all thou hast; thou shalt not call anything thy own; for if ye partake of such things as are incorruptible, how much more should you do it in those that are corruptible?"† St. Benedict, of course speaking only in reference to moral authority and doctrinal duty, thus strongly declares, "None should have property. All things, as it is written, should be common to all, nor should any one assert or presume anything to be his." Trenæus likewise writes: "Whereas the Jews consecrated a tenth, they who live under the liberty of the gospel give all to the Lord's use." St. Ambrose declares: "Nature has given all things in common to all men. Nature has established a common right, and it is usurpation which has produced a private claim." Justin Martyr writes: "We who loved nothing like our possessions, now produce all we have in common, and spread our whole stock before our indigent brethren." Tertullian adds: "We Christians look upon ourselves as one body, informed as it were with one soul; and being thus incorporated

* Consult Eusebius, Hist., iv. 4; Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 274, *et seq.*

† Horne's "Apocrypha," ch. xiv. ver. 10. 1821.

by love, we can never dispute what we are to bestow upon our own members; accordingly all things are in common excepting our wives."* The same father also writes in his address to the Gentiles:† "Brethren we are, even of your own, by the law of Nature our common mother, although ye have little claim to be called men, because ye are bad brethren. But how much more worthily are they both called and esteemed brethren, who acknowledge one Father, that is, God; who have drunk of one spirit of holiness; who from the womb of common ignorance have come forth into the one light of truth. . . . Therefore, because we are united in mind and soul, we do not hesitate to have our goods in common." The practical bearing of this teaching becomes evident in relation to the conventual life, in the words of St. Jerome, who writes: "It is apparent that the church of believers in Christ at the first was such as monks endeavour to be now; that nothing in property is any man's own, none rich among them, none poor; their patrimony is distributed to the needy." St. Bernard, likewise, in his address concerning the Templars, writes: "That nothing may be wanting to evangelical perfection, they dwell together without separate property of any kind, in one house, under one rule, careful to preserve the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace." From these testimonies, then, we may gather, that in the patristic period Communism was deemed so accordant with Christianity, as to be inculcated as a moral duty, and as a point of religious perfection. As a consequence, the conventual life arose first in the east and then in the west. With the celibitary and superstitious defects of the monastic system, however, our argument is not concerned. It has simply to regard that system, imperfect in itself, as one of the links in the chain of proof, that Communism is accordant with Christianity.

If after this period we turn and observe the condition of the eastern church, with a view to the consideration of this, we find the conventual life extensively established, a system of clerical colleges in operation, stewards appointed to manage the landed property of the church; and we read of

Basil and his Basiliade—a christian Communist city; and of the opinions of the Montanists, Circumcellions, and other non-conformist sects, on property, debts, and slavery.* We prefer, however, following the route of Rome, as the usual track to modern times.

The church of St. Peter, like the other churches of the Gentiles, though from many causes it did not practise the full communion of goods, has yet decisive circumstances in its early history which indicate a perception of the Communist constitution of Christianity. At first, by Roman law, the christian church was incapable of holding landed property in common. To this effect several statutes existed, which, like our law of mortmain, were enacted to prevent any real estate from being given or bequeathed to a society or corporate body without special licence. With the decline of the empire, however, the severity of these statutes relaxed, and before the close of the third century large estates were bestowed and possessed by the churches of Rome, Milan, Carthage, Antioch, and Alexandria. One of the laws of Constantine was especially effectual in this respect. This was a law which expressly secured to the church the right of receiving legacies. Gifts to the church were neither bequeathed nor received thus for the private purposes of ecclesiastics, but for the public use of the church in its general capacity. Thus in the Canonical Institutes of the Emperor Ludovicus Pius, A.D. 800, it is written:—"The goods of the church are the offerings of the faithful, to assist the suffering, and as the patrimony of the poor." Prosper, also, adds his testimony in these words: "Holy men did not receive the goods of the church as private property, but as given to be shared among the poor." He further writes, "Whatsoever the church hath, it hath in common with all such as have nothing." This is assuredly a proof that in the chief Gentile church the spirit of Communism at first prevailed as it had done before at Jerusalem. The causes of the decay of this spirit—chiefly the imperfect communitive constitution, and the embezzlements of ecclesiastics—are beyond our argument, which will now briefly draw to a conclusion.

* Women, no more than men, can be justly accounted property.

† "Ad Nationes," chap. xli.

* Neander, "Church Hist.," vol. iii., *passim*.

Throughout the course of our considerations we have argued that the accordance of Christianity and Communism is proved from the evangelic narratives, and from the constitution of the primitive church at Jerusalem. In support of this, we have adduced the venerable testimonies of the patristic period, and brought forward the practical traditions of the church for several centuries, as illustrative of its truth, and partaking to a considerable extent of the spirit of Communism. Thus we have generally gathered, that Communism, as related to Christianity, should be regarded as a moral obligation and meritorious work.

On these deductions, then, we base our first and foremost argument in favour of Communism, as a principle promotive of

human happiness. The richest realities of enjoyment are those of religion. The self-satisfaction of conscience, in the performance of a moral duty, is a heaven within the soul. Deeds of duty and devotion not only bloom here below, but also bear fruit on high. It is human to claim a right; it is divine to perform a duty. Communism, then, as an obligation of Christianity, as a duty of religion, must be in the highest degree promotive of human happiness, temporal and eternal. No higher name than that of Christ exists among men. Religion is our noblest, truest enjoyment. On the sacred pleasure derived thus from the performance of a religious duty, do we trace our first argument in favour of Communism as promotive of the happiness of man. G. B.

The Societies' Section.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

PROLOGOMENA—(*Continued.*)

THAT singular potency by which, through the consentaneous unfolding of their inherent and natural activities, the cognitive faculties conform to complex and intricate intelligential laws, and thread the labyrinths of involved and subtle formulary processes, unconsciously and, as it were, by the mere force of those irresistible impulses which co-exist in the structural elements of mind, is, perhaps, one of the most remarkable facts connected with the "philosophy of the intellectual powers." Man is, at first,

"The adoring child
Of Nature's majesty, sublime or wild;
Hill, flood, and forest, mountain, rock, and sea."

It is only gradually that Egoism or personality becomes developed. The externalities, which everywhere he turns impinge their impressions on his senses, monopolize all the earlier exercises of his faculties. The severance of this synthesis of the Ego and the Non-ego—the sundering of the mentality from the objectivities without and beyond—the assigning of a protensive existence to the phenomenal universe, and the realization of the idea of Self, are processes of thought requiring time for their fulfilment.

"Like the moon struggling through the night
Of whirlwind rifted clouds,"

are the early prefigurations and obscure preludes of man's conscious existence; but at length these "glances of soul-dissolving glory" become continuous, and consciousness, emerging from the cloud-haze, seems like

"Yon crescent moon, as fixed as if it grew
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue;"

the *Mind* differentiates itself from *Matter*, and man regards himself as a "nursling of Immortality."

But although we assert that the mind is thus unconscious of the intricate thought-processes through which it passes in its earlier stages, it is not to be inferred that we believe that the mind is inactive and quiescent—a mere passivity. Our minds are *not* mere note-books of facts. The human soul is not a lake in whose placid bosom are envisaged—in shadowy though slightly confused beauty—the innumerable objectivities of the phenomenal world. It is endowed with a constructive, truth-disintegrating power, by which man is enabled to become "the interpreter of nature"—the analyst of phenomena—and the co-ordinator of all the ideas derivable from the external world into one organic whole, interlinked and knit together by the formal power of the Reason. The mind-germ, which is man's birth-gift from the Creator, does not grow by the mere accretion, successive and gradual, of idea-eliciting phenomena, but by the digestion, absorption, and assimilation of the facts of phenomena into the thought-system as the nutriment of his mental energies—the constituents of Theory and Science and the elements of Truth—the immortal melody of heaven.

We know that it is one of the current "cants" of the time, that "the age of Philosophy is gone." The reign of Positivism is established, and Metaphysic is a crownless queen. The abstruse, the visionary, the impracticable, the intangible, the shadowy, "have vanished to return not." Woe unto us if it be so! Is man an insoluble problem to himself? Must humanity ever feel the burning wish to be revealed into itself and be for ever answered by negations? Must man never be released from the burden and the mystery of speculative thought? Is self-knowledge unattainable? Must it ever be a "vain endeavour" to aim at learning

"The nature and the science of our being?"

Are the sage's precept, *Γνωθι σεαυτον*—"Know thyself," and the scriptural command, "Examine your own selves," impossible tasks? Are those aspirations which have been implanted in the glorious intellect of man, stimulating him to inquiry regarding the uses of those marvellous powers with which he is endowed and the destiny which is before him, purposeless and vain?

"This intellectual being—those thoughts that wander through eternity,"

can they be ignored or forgotten? Is it supposable that man should be able to harness steam like a mechanic drudge to execute his labour—dissect the rainbow, and from that type of uncertainty and evanescence learn "the laws of light"—lay his hand upon the Ocean's mane, and bid it bear his "oak leviathans" through the mighty "yeast of waves"—measure heat, and apply it to purposes of practical utility—employ the "thunder-footed" Electricity as his tidings-bearer—cause the light of the elusive sun-rays to act as the pencil of an artist—dive to the ocean-depths amid the tumult of the boiling waters to lay the foundation-stones of stately fabrics—glean a knowledge of the laws of crystallization from the fitful snow-flakes in a winter storm—build up the splendid system of geometric truth—read the narrative of creation's early vicissitudes in the rock-masses of the Andes and the Alps—

"Unwind the eternal dances of the sky,"

and construct that vast system of experimental and positive science on which the practicalists of our era pride themselves—and yet be unable to unswathe the adjunct and the accidental from the mentality, and thus approximate to a solution of the problems of the Reason? No!

“ ΠΡ. οὐ τὰντα ταύτη μοῖρα πῶ τελευσφόρος κρῖναι πέπρωται.” *

Do we, then, believe that Philosophy is possible? Assuredly we do; and if you favour us with your attention, we shall occupy the present paragraph with an attempt to prove that it is so. Philosophy can only be possible through the objectivizing of the mind, i.e., by our being able to look upon our mentality in an experimental manner. Now, when we analyze human knowledge into its ultimate elements, we discover that Self + our perceptions, form the apparent sum. But does not this very analyzation prove the existence and reality of a power of viewing Mind as an object? Does it not necessitate the conclusion, that there is a primal cognitive power by which the impressed *Self* is revealed? If it be not so, how is our self-identity made manifest?—how are we able to differentiate the Ego impressed from the impressions made upon the Ego? No one can, we think, gainsay the accuracy of the inference, that, before the gorgeous scenery of external experiences could become cognoscible by the mind, there must exist within it an exquisite apparatus of vision which, holding, as it were, a central position in the intelligence, receives the radiations which are sent forth from “all objects of all thought,” and which is subsequently enabled, by employing the animal faculties as its agents, to go forth aggressively into the world of phenomena, and acquire a knowledge of the meaning and significance of the manifold and magnificent wonders which are observable in the protensive universe. But superadded to this, must we not also predicate of “the vision and the faculty divine,” that it possesses the more singular potency of measuring out and consecrating what of the microcosm within constitutes our personality, i.e., of forming the notion of Self? This *Selbstbewusstseyn*, as Kant calls it, i.e., the becoming aware of one’s own personality, or as our own philosophers denominate it, Self-consciousness, is the condition of all knowledge. By the eye of Consciousness alone are all our perceptions realized. The various modifications of the mind, its feelings, sensations, perceptions, thoughts, volitions, &c., are observed by it, exactly as the various members of the body and the functions they perform are seen by the eye. There can be no experience without knowledge, neither can there be knowledge without a mind, and, consequently, a knowledge-perceptual agency in that mind. It may not be easy to institute a self-inquisition so rigid and minute as shall enable us to force our way into the profoundest recesses of our soul, and gather information regarding the obscurest mysteries of our being; but we are persuaded that by a strenuous *intension* of the mental vision the fact of the existence of this self-apperceptive power will be made manifest. Not that it can see itself, any more than the bodily eye can witness its own operations, but that its existence may be legitimately inferred from the facts of which it is the revealer. It is true that it is difficult to trace out the distinct in the unical—to demarcate the definite part in an inseparable whole—to distinguish without the desire to separate and disjoin—to perceive the accurate boundaries of an element of thought, which, while it is *per se*

* *Prom.* “Fate, who accomplishes her own purposes, has not ordained this.”

differentiated from all other thought-elements, is yet never found alone and incomposite. Still, if it be a fact that not only external representations but internal modifications are envisaged in an intelligential capacity, and the idea of the *Ego* is therein elicited, we are necessitated to infer the existence of a faculty of Self-consciousness, by which mind may be beheld as an object, and by which Philosophy is rendered possible.

Man is able to attain knowledge in no other way than through the faculties bestowed upon him for that purpose; so far, therefore, as he exercises these faculties in accordance with the rules of their action, and in directions open to human investigation, will success attend his efforts. Philosophy depends for its existence upon the development of consciousness—the production of a healthy condition of the optic organ of the intellect—the acumen and invigoration of “the mind’s eye.” “In the crowded city and howling wilderness; in the cultivated province and solitary isle; on the flowery lawn and the cragged mountain; near the murmur of the rivulet and amid the uproar of the ocean; in the radiance of summer and the gloom of winter; while the heavens thunder, as well as when the breezes whisper,” the self-consciousness of man makes itself felt. Without this all nature would be a lifeless, profitless fact; for the objects which experience presents to us cannot truly be said to exist, so far as we are concerned, till the Intellect, by its volitional processes, asserts the superiority of its active energies to the passive receptivity of its nature, and by the operations of its arranging and combining powers, endeavours to reduce the presentations of experience, i. e., phenomenal knowledge, to distinguishable elements and classes, and thus, by the steadying of objectivities before the scrutinizing eye of the intelligence, aims at the acquisition of a more perfect and determinate knowledge of their properties or attributes, as well as of the capacities of its own thought-powers. The means by which Philosophy is realizable, therefore, appears to be the developments of consciousness in such a manner as shall secure the *methodicalization* of experience, the *differentiation* of the *Ego* and the *Non-ego*—the *analyzation* of the powers of the thought-agency—and the *acquisition* of clear, distinct, and accurate notions of the presentations which experience lays before the speculative intellect for examination, as well as of the various self-developed notions which originate from the mind’s perception of the operations which it performs upon these presentations. That such a power is attainable by the intellect we cannot doubt, if we reflect that the very existence of the philosophic aspiration imperatively demands such an introspective procedure on the part of the cognition, and that we have no reason for believing that any aspiration of the human soul is destitute of the means of its realization.

Having thus, in a few elucidatory and suggestive sentences, presented the reader with a slight abstract of an argument for the possibility of Philosophy, we shall proceed to mention a few of those circumstances in “the life of humanity,” which seem to us to have called forth the philosophic instinct, and to have led to the gradual though spontaneous *exurgence* of “the problems of the Reason.”

When the impressions derivable from the phenomenal world are intromitted into the intelligential sensorium—a boundless magnitude of wonders, where the magic of glorious landscapes present themselves to man’s view, and the heavenly star-worlds come out as “preachers of beauty, and light the universe with their admonishing smile”—there arises within the human soul, “as if the touch of an angel’s hand were to awaken a sleeper in

his cell," a dim, mysterious, and undefined conception, that "not for nothing" does the universe, with all its various inhabitants, exist. Every being and element of nature appears to fulfil its own determinate purpose, and each specific item seems pre-organized to accomplish its own part in the drama of reality. This idea is necessarily conditioned in the mind by the operation of the laws of its energies, called into activity by the phenomenal impressions which it receives. "Were there no sensation, there is no reason to believe there would be knowledge; but when once there is sensation, the mind, from its internal constitution, posits things altogether and essentially distinct from sensation, or from any possible transformation of sensation." It is, therefore, because man is created capable, upon the reception of impressions, of positing, *in thought*, the results of the forms of his intellectual faculties, that the idea of destiny originates in the mind. Were man destitute of reasoning power, of the undeveloped germs of such thoughts, what circumstance could so affect the mind as to elicit the cogent queries, *Why? What? How? Wherefore?* In the earlier stages of life, too, when man's nature, with all its curious diversity of feelings, thoughts, passions, and desires, begins, like an early spring blossom, to unfold itself, the world seems expressly calculated to afford scope not only for the highest development of the intellect, but also for the unlimited gratification of the sensuous emotions, and hopes beat high, and bright illusions gather, as roseate dawn-clouds smile in a mirage, in the panting bosom; but it is not long until he learns

"A truth which needs
No school of long experience, that the world
Is full of guilt and misery."

This, however, only tends to deepen the intensity of the sense of mystery which man feels. These faculties, these desires, emanate from our constitution, and seemingly point to happiness as their result. Wherefore, then, does disappointment clog enjoyment? We suffer, we revolt, we doubt, we feel aggrieved as well as surprised, at the apparent anomaly and cry out, like Festus—

"I run the gauntlet of a file of doubts,
I ask a hundred questions what they mean,
And every one points gravely to the ground
With one hand, and to heaven with the other."

What, then, can be the destiny of a being so curiously framed—a creature whose aspirations are heavenward, and whose passions tend to earth—and who feels an almost insurmountable difficulty in adding,

"The purity of heaven to earthly joys?"

Alas! that the conjunction should be, practically, so rare! And is it not an all-interesting query, what shall enable us to avoid

"The dull satiety which all destroys,
And root from out the soul the deadly weed which cloy?"

In the crowded city—in the mart and congress of the people—in the busy haunts of manufacture, man seems as if he were earth's emperor; but when he comes into the presence of nature, and becomes aware of the magnificent spectacle of creation—when he beholds, enclosed in the horizon of his own view, mansions, villages, towns, mountains

forests, lawns, the vast extent of the "most starry canopy" which night unfolds to view, and feels himself a mere point in creation, and even the earth on which he dwells a scarcely discernible speck in the vast amplitudes of space, then come forth, with greater and greater force, the soul-questions, What is man?—and his destiny, whither doth it point? While the Speculative Reason is labouring to acquire a solution of this mystery, we can conceive no "temple more divinely desolate" than is the doubt-tossed soul; but when the God-answer dawns on his intellect, with what intense rapture is his *eureka*—I have found it—uttered!

"Man is the cruellest enemy of man. Lawless hordes of savages still wander through vast prairie-lands, where man meets his fellow-man in enmity, and perhaps glories in devouring him as food. * * * Defying toil, danger, and privation, armies penetrate forests, cross wide plains, till they meet each other, and the sight of their brethren is the signal for mutual slaughter. Armed with the most potent and splendid of human inventions, hostile fleets traverse the ocean; through waves and storm man rushes to meet man in order to destroy each the other with his own hand, amid the raging of the elements, upon the lonely, inhospitable sea. In the interior of states, where men *seem* united in equality under the dominion of law and justice, it is for the most part only force and fraud that rule under these venerable though desecrated names."* Thus it is now; but shall it be thus for ever? Wherefore do men exist upon the earth?

This idea of destiny, thus forced in upon the consciousness of man, how fertile in topics of thought—how pregnant with philosophic thought! Mind, Matter, Creation, God, Time, Space, Magnitude, Power, Fate, Necessity, Contingency, Condition, Change, Cause, Effect, Intelligence, Externality, Form, Colour, Barbarism, Civilization, Morals, Law, &c., with all the problems they involve, are but so many educts of consciousness, stimulated into activity by the idea of destiny—an idea coeval in its development with man's earliest thoughts—co-extensive with the whole range of humanity, and perceptible in a higher or lower degree of intensity, wheresoever pleasure or pain have written their signatures on the human soul.

Our purpose in the projected series of articles on "European Philosophy" will be to present our readers with a brief panoramic view of the efforts of the intellect to solve its own problems; to lay before him a comprehensive outline of the labours, the speculations, the errors, the discoveries, and systematic expositions of the thought-science of the great monarchs of mind who, for a succession of ages, have been engaged in speculations regarding the various conceptions involved in the idea of the "Destiny of Man"—men who, in general, have displayed the rarest union of speculative thought, pure taste, extensive erudition, unrivalled felicity of illustration, earnest zeal, purity of character, and eloquence of style, and by so doing not only convince the reader that "philosophic ideas fulfil an indispensable office in the evolution of humanity"†—but also that there is within it a "vigorous principle of vitality." * * "It never allows mankind to wander far, nor long, without pressing its claims and obtruding its counsels and admonitions upon them. It must, therefore, have a permanent hold of our sympathies, some fixed root in our nature,

* Fichte's "Die Bestimmung des Menschen"—The Destiny of Man.

† "Les idées philosophiques remplissent un office indispensable dans l'évolution de l'humanité," E. LETTRES de la Philosophie Positive, page 3.

or it would have been obliterated long ago from the book of knowledge." * In this survey the student must not be surprised at the multiplicity of systems which he will find us chronologizing, since "the tablet of the mind is not like a chess-board, where the unfinished game may be taken up at the point where the last player left it; for the movements of thought are complicated and subtle, and our train of ideas seldom remain fixed or visible to consciousness for any length of time. The lamp of our internal knowledge is for ever passing onwards, and we can only now and then arrest its course and benefit a little from its light. Every man has to commence a new plan for himself, and is compelled to leave it, in turn, as a broken thread, to whoever comes after him." †

* "Blakey's History of Logic," Introd. xix.

† *Ibid.* xx.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Westminster Athenæum.—On Monday evening, April 5th, the members and friends of this institution assembled for the first time at the Lecture Room, Vincent-square, Westminster, for the purpose of hearing an introductory address by the secretary.

The society was established in October, 1849; from which period to the end of March, in the present year, its efforts have been somewhat restricted, owing to the limited accommodation it was in a position to afford to those desirous of attending its weekly lectures. It has now emerged into a locality more suitable, convenient, and influential in every respect. The sphere of its operations is in consequence much extended, and under such favourable auspices its future utility cannot fail to be advanced.

In opening the course of lectures for the present quarter by an address to the friends and supporters of the institution, Mr. E. Round commenced by enforcing on the attention of all present the duties and obligations devolving upon them in connexion with the work of mental and moral culture. Passing on to notice the advantages all who took an active part in such pursuits would, he briefly adverted to the effects they ultimately produced on society at large. For every encouragement he enumerated many of the eminent men of past and present times who were raised to posts of honour and distinction from the incessant diligence and persevering application. The rise and progress of literary institutions throughout the length and breadth of the country was a circumstance calculated to afford the members of this country intense gratification, and must necessarily tend to inspire them with the warmest hopes and the brightest anticipations for the future. Intelligence was the order of the day—the practical and ruling spirit of the age; and in proportion to its universal extension, they must expect error and superstition to be eradicated. The prosperity of institutions of this character depended mainly on the energy and activity of their members. Recognising this important fact, and bearing in mind the significance of the task assigned them, the lecturer concluded by exhorting them to spare neither toil nor

exertion to elevate the society, whose interests they were pledged to advance, and success would ultimately furnish their reward.

Edinburgh Temperance Mutual Improvement Association.—On the evening of Friday, the 26th March, this association held its third annual soirée, when a large number of the members and their friends were present; James Watson, president and founder of the association in the chair. After the usual edible delicacies had been discussed, the chairman delivered an excellent address, in which he spoke of the necessity of cultivating the mind, and of applying all the energies, and—if possible—undivided attention of the mind to the pursuit of knowledge. He then adverted to the excellent opportunities which were afforded by mutual improvement societies to young men for improving their minds; and believed them to be specially fitted for promoting the moral, intellectual, and, consequently, social, elevation of the working classes. The secretary read the annual report, which gave an exceedingly encouraging account of the proceedings of the past year; it concluded with the following paragraph:—"Your committee having thus given you a brief statement of the society's proceedings during the past year, cannot but express their gratitude for the pleasure experienced, and the benefit derived, by the members, both in a religious, moral, and intellectual point of view. They have also much pleasure in being able to state, that, at no period since its commencement has the society been in a more prosperous condition. In view of the foregoing considerations, they would earnestly urge upon all young men the necessity of joining similar associations, where they would not only improve their own minds, but have an opportunity of promoting the moral and social well-being of the human family." Addresses on the following subjects were delivered by several members during the evening: "The Importance of Knowledge," "Perseverance," and "Sociality." With these were interspersed a number of recitations, songs, glees, &c., thus combining "pleasure with profit," and the whole tended to produce an elevating and cheering effect on all present. "JAMES."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

98. A. A. is desirous of commencing the study of the Italian language, but cannot indulge in the luxury of a living teacher; he would therefore be greatly obliged to any of your correspondents who, through the medium of your excellent publication, would be kind enough to give him information as to what book or books are best adapted for the private study of that language, and the method of procedure.

99. As I have perused C. W., Junior's article upon Homœopathy, and presume he is well acquainted with persons treated under this system, may I venture to ask him, Whether my friends who have adopted it are exceptions to the rule, in having remarkably pale and sickly faces? Whether they are, or are not, can C. W., Jun., inform me how this is to be accounted for?

H. D. C.

100. As I wish to become a good elocutionist, I should feel grateful if you would inform me of the best method to develop and train the voice, so as to give it power and flexibility. My voice is not deficient in strength, but requires culture. What period of life is most suitable for commencing the study of this art? I doubt whether my age (which is twenty years) is not rather late to begin.—DAMON.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

85. *Works for Seamen*.—"A Sailor" is informed, that there is a work entitled "Plane and Spherical Trigonometry," by H. W. Jeans, published in two parts, price 5s. each, with which he would doubtless be pleased. Weale has also published several useful hand-books in his shilling series, such as "The Theory and Practice of Nautical Astronomy and Navigation," "Sailors' Sea Books," &c.—A. C.

89. *The Port Royalists* were an order of Jansenists. They derived their *nom de plume* from their residence, *Port Royal des Champs*. The object of their association was to procure quiet retirement and opportunity for study. The chief Port Royalists were Arnauld, Pascal, Nicole, Sacy, Lancelot. The principal works which they issued, either singly or conjointly, are—"Grammaire Générale Raisonnée;" "Elémens de Géométrie;" "L'Art de Penser;" "Traité des Vraies et des Fausses Idées;" "Théologie Morale des Jésuites;" "Pratique Morale des Jésuites;" "Pensées sur la Religion;" "Lettres à un Provincial." All these works are excellent. The Grammar, Logic, and Geometry still hold places as text-books in their departments, and are really wonderful productions, considering the age in which their authors flourished.

We forbear from answering more minutely, as we know that they are to engage the attention of the author of "The Art of Reasoning" in his articles on "European Philosophy."—S. N.

The Port Royalists, a society of Cistercian nuns, took their name from the place where their monastery was situated, viz., Port Royal des

Champs, a spot between Versailles and Chevreuse. The monastery was founded in the sixteenth century by Matthieu de Marli, and in connexion with it was the convent of the same name at Paris.

These women devoted themselves to the task of teaching the young, succouring the needy, and visiting and comforting the sick; and after a time were aided in this noble occupation by a few men, who established themselves near their monastery and assisted them in their holy work.

The history of these nuns forms one of the most melancholy, but beautiful, christian incidents in the annals of the church; the persecutions they endured during the stormy and intolerant days of Henri IV. and Louis XIII., for acts of which they were guiltless, and for cherishing doctrines the existence and purport of which they were totally ignorant; the noble actions they performed, the good they did, and the purity and christian grace which they preserved throughout their bitter trials, is well worthy the attention of all those who can properly admire and appreciate unswerving fidelity to truth and virtue, whether it be found among Catholics or Protestants.

A deeply touching and interesting account of them is given by Sir J. Stephen, in his "Essays on Ecclesiastical Biography."—K. W.

92. *Alliterative Verses*.—I have not been able to obtain the name of the author of the lines quoted by your correspondent, "Drumwhannan," in the April number. But the subjoined may be of some use to him in obtaining the required information. I met with it in the June number of "Wheeler's Hampshire and West of England Magazine" for 1828, where it states, that the lines having been incorrectly printed in a London publication, they had been favoured with an authentic copy by the author. The whole is as follows:—

ALLITERATION, OR THE SIEGE OF BELGRADE. A Rondeau.

"An Austrian army, awfully array'd,
Boldly by battery besiege Belgrade;
Cossack commanders, cannonading come,
Deal destruction's dire destructive doom;
Ev'ry effort engineers essay,
For fame, for freedom fight, fierce, furious fray.
Gen'ral's 'gainst gen'ral's grapple; gracious God,
How honours heaven heroic hardihood!
Infuriate, indiscriminate is ill,
Just Jesus, instant innocence instil!
Kindred kill kinsmen, kindred kindred kill.
Labour low levels largest, loftiest lines;
Men march 'midst mounds, moats, mountain-
murd'rous mines.
Now noisy, noxious numbers notice nought
Of outward obstacles o'ercoming ought;
Poor patriots perish, persecution's pest!
Quite quiet quakers, "quarter, quarter quest."
Reason returns, religion, right redounds,
Sawarow, stop such sanguinary sounds.
Truce to thee, Turkey, terror to thy train;
Unwise, unjust, unmerciful Ukraine;
Vanish, vile vengeance; vanish, vict'ry vain.
Why wish we warfare, wherefore welcome war,
Xerxes, Xantippus, Xavier, Xenophon?"

Yield ye, young Yaghier yeomen, yield your yell.
Zimmerman's, Zoroaster's, Zeno's zeal,
Again attract, arts against arms appeal.
All, all ambitious aims, avaunt, away!
Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera."—G. P.

23. *Ministerial Works*.—There are several serials devoted to the publication of sermons; among them we may mention "The Pulpit," "The Penny Pulpit," and "The Evangelical Pulpit;" all published in a cheap form. We know of no commentary exactly answering to "Drumwhanman's" description; the Tract Society has published one compiled principally from Henry and Scott; "Barnes's Notes" also deserve honourable mention. Styles's "Pulpit Studies; Aids to Preaching," &c., 4s., is worthy of perusal. There are numerous volumes of skeleton sermons, of which any intelligent bookseller will inform him. Dr. Cumming's "Scripture Readings," and Dr. Kitto's "Daily Bible Illustrations," are suggestive.—L. G. G.

25. *Transparent Painting on Glass*.—The art of transparent painting on glass is dependent for its success more on the taste and dexterity of the artist than on any peculiarity of the materials. I will inform your correspondent how I have successfully painted magic lantern sliders; one peculiarity of which I have never seen published. Having procured a piece of clear glass of a shape and size according to taste or circumstances, draw your design upon paper in outline, and stick it on the back of the glass; then grind some "drop black," with oil and turpentine, to the consistency of milk, or rather thicker; then with a soft steel pen draw the outline, which, of course, will be seen through the glass; you will by this

means be able to produce a much finer stroke than by a camel's hair pencil; let your colour be as thick as it will conveniently work, as the thinner you make it the less black will it be. Having drawn your subject in outline very finely, take some of the colours used by artists (they are ground in oil and sold in tubes), which must all be transparent; for blue, "Prussian blue," or "ultramarine;" for red, "carmine," or most of the "lakes;" for yellow, "gamboge;" for green, "verdigris;" for brown, "brown pink;" there are also other colours which are transparent, which our correspondent may ascertain by trial: put a small portion of each on a palette, and with fine camel or sable hair pencils shade and colour in your picture according to taste, judgment, and the rules of drawing and colouring; but thin your colours with Canada balsam; or, if that is not procurable, good mastic varnish will answer very well. Now, herein lies the whole mystery, if there be any—it is the balsam or varnish which gives it that beautiful transparent appearance. In colouring your painting, lay it on a piece of white paper, as the effect which it has on that will be nearly the same as it will have on the screen. This method of painting will answer for any kind of picture; but for simple figures they may be outlined in the manner described, and then coloured with water colours, which is much easier; but they must be afterwards varnished with the above varnish. There is a method of transferring engravings to glass, but the process is too lengthy to detail here. If our friend J. G. wishes to obtain further information upon this or anything connected with the magic lantern, by forwarding his address to the Editor, I will give him any he may require.—REMBRANDT.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XV.

1. What are the two diverse powers which the Intellection possesses?
2. What is the "use of the Syllogism" in the discovery of new truths?
3. What is the "use of the Syllogism" in the development of truths already known or newly suggested?
4. Give examples of both of these uses.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. IV.

1. Prepare a form like the subjoined, and arrange the following nouns according to their genders.

London, George, author, daughter, mistress, painter, poet, earl, father, house, ink, book, bull, cow, gender, ram, horse, goose, mother, cock, shoe, desk, cupboard.

2. What is gender?
3. How many and what methods are adopted for its expression?
4. Give the feminine of George, Sultan, Czar, and Landgrave.

5. Mention cases in which the masculine and feminine genders are applied to neuter objects, and *vice versa*.

6. Give examples of nouns which are both masculine and feminine.

NOUNS.

GENDER.

Masculine.	Feminine.	Neuter.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—III.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 9. Let x = area of pit in inches. Then 62726400 in. = x = ground that is to be covered with clay. But the ground to be covered \times by depth of clay = cub. in. of clay required to cover the field; but this must = cub. in. of clay dug out of pit.

$$\therefore 4(62726400 - x) = x \times 144 \therefore 148x = 250905600$$

$\therefore x = 1000000$ in. area of pit = 17. 3 ps. 7 yd
3 ft. 3 in. 10 in. F. D. B.

Question 10. Value of 1 oz. = 23 17s. 10½d.
23-08375.

No. of oz. in 1 cub. ft. = 17-089 × 1000 = 17089.

Val. of 1 cub. ft. = 23-08375 × 17089 = £39342-9187

\therefore No. of cub. ft. = $\frac{760000000}{39342-9187} = 19071-7003$ Ans.

J. B. L.

Question 11. $\sqrt{9781-51} = 98-9$ Ans.

Reasons of the Process for Extracting a Square Root.—The least number consisting of two figures is 10, whose second power is 100 which is the least number consisting of three figures. . . the second power of any number consisting of two figures must contain less than the figures. As before said, 100 is the least number that can be expressed by three places of figures its second power is 10000 = 100 × 100, the less number that can be expressed by five places of figures, . . . the second power of a number consisting of two figures cannot contain more than three or four figures; or which is the same thing the second power of any number of places of figures can never be more than twice that number of figures, and may be one less.

The above accounts for the usual mode pointing off the figures in periods of two and for it is clear that for one or two figures in a second power we get units in the root, and thence for three or four figures in the second power we get tens in the root, &c., so that the number periods in the second power is equal to the number of figures in the root. The method of doubling the quotient figures, &c., depends on the Four Prop. of Second Book of Euclid, by which it is proved that if a number be divided into two parts the second power of the sum is equal to the sum of the second power of the parts, together with twice their product. To illustrate this, let us take the number 40, which is made up of 40 ÷ 4 = 10; $40^2 = 40^2 + 8^2 + (40 \times 8 \times 2)$. W. E.

Question 12 7, 11, 19, 104, 180. Strike out 1 for whatever contains 104 must contain this number (since $26 \times 4 = 104$). Again, divide either 1 or 180 by 4, as $26 \times 4 = 104$, and $45 \times 4 = 180$; it is evident that $26 \times 4 \times 45$ either = 104×45 , 26×180 . Consequently, $26 \times 4 \times 45$ is divisible both by 104 and 180. Hence, for the least multiple we have $7 \times 11 \times 19 \times 26 \times 4 \times 45 = 68468$ Ans.

Geometry.

Question 3. A gallon of water = 277-274 cubic inches = contents of the sphere of water, or of 1 inside of glass sphere, and $277-274 + 1 = 278-274$ contents of the whole sphere, viz., water & glass.

Now the inside diameter of glass sphere $\left(\frac{277-274}{\frac{4}{3} \times 3.1416}\right)^{\frac{1}{3}} = 8.000388$ inches, and the outside diameter of ditto = $\left(\frac{278-274}{\frac{4}{3} \times 3.1416}\right)^{\frac{1}{3}} = 8.100111$ in and the thickness of the glass = $\frac{1}{2}$ the difference between the inside and outside diameters of glass sphere = $\frac{8.100111 - 8.000388}{2} = .004861$ inch Ans.

C. M. B.

Question 4. This question admits of an analytical investigation. Let a = the length of a

line, and assuming x , $4y$, and $3y$ to be the sides of the required squares, then per question $x^2 = 16y^2 + 6y^2 = 25y^2 \therefore x = 5y$. But $4y + 3y = a \therefore y = \frac{a}{7}$ and $4y = \frac{4a}{7}$ and $3y = \frac{3a}{7}$.

P.

Mechanics.

Question 5. The weight of a cubic foot of water is 62-5 lb.; multiply this by 350, the number of cubic feet, and by 10, the distance from which it falls; then again by 4, the modulus of the wheel, and the result will be the number of units performed by the engine per minute, this divided by 33000 will give the effective horse power of the engine.

$$\frac{62.5 \times 350 \times 10 \times 4}{33000} = 2.677 \text{ horse power. Ans.}$$

S. A. S.

Question 6. From the property of the lever, that the power and weight are inversely as their distances from the fulcrum, we have

$$P = \frac{2 \times 112 \times 6}{4 \times 12} = 28 \text{ lb.}$$

J. E. L.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—V.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

17. Three travellers, whose rounds occupy 14, 20, and 48 days respectively, met on Christmas day, 1861, at a certain inn. At what date will they meet again at the same inn, supposing they continue to go the same rounds in the same time, and use the same horses?

18. Required the weight and value of a lump of silver of the same size as that of gold in Question 10. The specific gravity of silver being 10-334, and its value 5s. 6d. per ounce.

19. Three persons, while conversing about their money, discovered that if A's were added to half the sum of B's and C's, or B's to one-third of A's and C's; or C's to one-fourth of A's and B's, it would be £100. The sum of money which each possessed is required.

20. Given $x - y = 12$, and $x^2 - y^2 = 336$, to find x and y .

Geometry.

10. (a) Required the diameter of a sphere of gold equal in size to the lump in Question 10 (Arith.) (b) Also the side of a cube of silver of equal value. The specific gravity and value of silver, as above.

Mechanics.

9. In what time will an engine of six horse power fill a tank 20 feet long, 12 feet broad, and 6 feet deep, from a well 24 feet in the section, if the level of the water in the well be 26 feet below the bottom of the tank when the engine begins to work, and no water runs in during the process?

Errors.—On page 116, Solution 11., Arith., line 4, for 850×670 , read $850 + 670$, line 10, for 700 775, read 700 775, line 11, for 807 03, read 807 503, line 12, for $x = 22 97$, or 1797 03, read $x = 22 97$, or 1797 000, and line 13, for 22 97, read 22 967. In Solution 11., at the top, for 2 s., read 3 s. In Geometry, Solution 11.,

$$\text{for } x = \sqrt{\frac{1848 \times 400}{7000}} \text{ read } x = \sqrt{\frac{1048 \times 400}{7000}}$$

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

XL VI—THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

THE dim magnificence of myth and legend generally overhangs and enshrouds the origin of nations. "Earth's mighty yesterday"—how many mysteries and uncertainties are yet unsolved regarding it!

"Ghost-like amidst the unfamiliar Past,
Dim shadows flit along the stream of Time;
Vainly our learning trifles with the vast
Unknown of ages!"

How little can we learn, with accuracy, of the annals of our race, even at periods long subsequent to the time when our forefathers trode

"The earliest furrows on the mountain side,
Soft with the deluge!"

The childhood of nations is usually permitted to glide by with few of its events enregistered in memory. The youth of humanity is passed more in action than in thought—more in an earnest struggle for "the bread which perisheth," than in intellectual endeavour. Hence, although circumstances, all-important in their consequences, may have occurred in the hot and lusty youth of our race, they have been allowed to remain so long unnoticed, that when our attention is directed towards them we find the chief evidences of their actuality

"Overgrown with black Oblivion's dust,"

and "*Fetustate nimia obscuras.*"* And even when the historian's pen or the poet's elegiac odes and elegies are called in requisition, we too frequently find that the tale or rhythm is all of heroes old arming for battle, or rushing headlong to the onslaught fierce and fell. This is most especially to be regretted,

"For in the morn and liquid dew of youth
Contagion's blastments are most imminent;"

and this warrior-worship not only withdrew the mind from more pure and utile exertions, but also rendered men careless of recording those less remarkable, though far more important, occurrences which lead to the advancement of humanity. The sources of information regarding the real state of men in the world's youth are, therefore, scant and sparse, and require to be read with all the keen minuteness of a critic. They consist, for the most part, of monumental inscriptions, art-relics, architectural remains, works of industrial skill, coins, songs, proverbs, sagas, and traditions. When we unlock the memory-treasures of "the world's gray fathers," it is true, we find some few casual and random notices of "things as they were," which, with a few other fragmentary admiralicular evidences, enable us to construct an hypothetical history which is, in its main

* "From their excessive antiquity obscure."—*Livy*.

points, probably correct, but which must of course vary in its exactness in proportion as the facts which form the groundwork are intelligently presented to the investigation of the Reason. To collate such facts as seem to us to bear upon "the History and Structure of the English Language," is the chief purpose of the present paper; let us address ourselves as briefly as possible to the task, and let us carefully notice whither the evidence indubitably points.

One remark, however, we must premise regarding the Law of Evidence, viz., Evidence is of two kinds, *External* and *Internal*. The *former* is, in general, the more obvious and distinct—it breaks upon the view more readily, is more easily apprehensible, is more superficial and more level to the general understanding; the *latter* is more obscure and intricate, farther removed from ordinary perception, and less readily attainable: the *former* may be discerned, as it were, by the naked eye; the *latter* can only be discovered by instruments of observation, skilfully adapted to the accomplishment of the given end. Neither of these species of evidence *alone*, however, can give absolute satisfaction to the mind; it is only when there is a *concursus*, i.e., a gradual tendency and convergence to the same point, that the Intellect acknowledges that our reasonings are valid and our hypotheses consistent. Our readers will please bear this remark in remembrance, in order that they may observe whether the facts and reasonings in this article fulfil the conditions above noticed.

It would lead us too far, and, indeed, would bring us to the discussion of topics very alien to the present subject, were we to attempt the unravelment of the intricacies of early European Ethnography, and endeavour to decide dogmatically regarding the circumstances, times, places, &c., of the various migrations of the different tribes who peopled what is now earth's most important continent. A slight and cursory sketch is all that we dare venture. The natural multiplication and increase of the human race—the separation of men into families and tribes—the gradual growth of nations—the selfish, predatory, and warlike habits of the populations into which the race thus becomes detached—the little care bestowed upon the culture of lands continually subject to inroad, pillage, and devastation—the exurgence of a redundant population—the occurrence of casual famine—nomadism—the hope of plunder and conquest—the thirst for stirring adventure—the irksomeness of restraint and subordination—the love of novelty—contests between oppressors and oppressed, &c., may all be mentioned as predisposing causes to the dispersion of mankind, while change of situation, climate, mode of life, state of society—the view of new objects—the knowledge of new products—the origination of new pursuits—the blending of different families and tribes by migration, or their subordination by war, &c., and the consequent introduction of new thoughts and novel forms of expression, may be mentioned as among the causes instrumental in producing changes of languages. From some of the above-mentioned causes, either singly or combinedly, that vast series of migrations, which from century to century continued to be made from the interior of Asia into the continent of Europe, most probably took its rise. As horde after horde departed willingly, or were driven off involuntarily, from that great hive of humanity, each necessarily attempted to dislodge the prior occupants in order to secure a lococation for itself. There was a further temptation to this, also, in the prospect of appropriating the dwellings, cultivated soil, &c. of the pioneer hordes to themselves. Keen, keen indeed, must have been these contests

between invaders and invaded. In general, however, the assailants succeeded in effecting a settlement, either by treaty or by conquest, until at last the whole surface of the continent of Europe resounded with the hum of busy populations. The most remarkable of these immigrational expeditions we shall now cursorily indicate:—

I. About the year B.C. 2000, the Celts* passed from Upper Asia into Europe, and peopled the territories lying south and west of the Danube.†

II. About B.C. 1800, the Pelasgi, under Inachus, proceeded, most probably, from a country bordering upon the Euphrates to the islands and coasts which lay opposite to Asia Minor; but subsequently crossed over to Italy, Crete, and the adjacent islands.

III. The Hellenes, consisting of the Achæians, Æolians, Dorians, and Ionians, who drove the Pelasgi before them and occupied their settlements upon the borders of the Archipelago.

IV. About B.C. 1582, Cecrops led a colony from Sais, in Egypt, and founded Athens.

V. Cadmus, about B.C. 1519, came from Phœnicia and colonized Thebes, in Bœotia.

VI. An Egyptian colony arrived in Argos, under the leadership of Danaus, about B.C. 1500.

VII. An influx of population—supposed to have originally emigrated from the regions of Tartary—known in Greek literature under the general designation of Scythians, is ordinarily referred to the seventh or eighth century B.C., although it is more probable that several distinct colonies successively appeared, and contested with their forerunners the possession of the soil. Of these there would seem to have been various tribes; among others may be mentioned the Getæ, the Massagetæ, the Sauromatæ, the Unni, &c.; the ancestors respectively of the Ostrogoths in Italy, the Visigoths in Spain and Portugal, the Mœsia-Goths in Germany, Norway, and Sweden, the Sarmatians or Slavonians in Russia, Poland, Bohemia, &c., the Huns in Hungary, &c.‡

VIII. From the eastern side of the Sea of Asoph, under the command of Odin or Woden, about B.C. 24, another Gothic people proceeded across the Straits of Kaffa, through the north-west of Europe, and onwards to the countries bordering on the Baltic, part remaining there, while another portion, crossing the Cattegat, entered the Scandinavian peninsula.

Of course it is easy to see, that, as each invading colony advanced, the former inhabitants must remove, and hence that the earliest colonists would be pushed most nearly to the extremities of the continent, and so we find history recording. But it is also evident that these isolated tribes would soon learn that security from gradual extinction could only be attained by mutual aid, while this very isolation would be the surest guarantee of the success of the ambitious; thus there would arise two causes for the interfusion of tribes—1st. Treaty; 2nd. Conquest. These successive interfusions would necessitate changes and modifications of Language, and hence would originate those differences of speech which were the primal fountains of our English tongue. The extensive power wielded by Greece and Rome successively, and the magnificent system of colonization which they adopted,

* From *αἰλῶες*, woodsmen, connected with Welsh *cell*, a covert or shelter, and Latin *celo*, I hide.

† Herodotus, book iv. cap. 49.

‡ For information, so far as to be found in the ancient writers on the origin of the Scythians, see Herodotus, book iv.:—1st, for the Scythians' own tale of their origin, cap. v.—viii.; 2nd, for the opinion of the Greeks near the Black Sea, cap. viii.—x.; 3rd, for the commonly received opinion in the time of Herodotus, cap. xi.—xiii.; 4th, for the opinion of the poet Aristæus of Proconnesus;—also on the general question, Justinus, book ii., and Pliny.

would, in part, tend to lessen these diversities; so that for all practical purposes we may regard the languages of Europe at, or about, the invasion of Britain (B.C. 55), as divisible into three great classes, which, with their principal subsequent sub-divisions, may be expressed tabularly thus:—

1, CELTIC.	2, GOTHIC.	3, CLASSICAL.
Basque, Gaelic, Welsh, Irish, Cornish, American, &c.	Russian, Saxon, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Belgic, &c.	Greek, Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, &c.

Having brought into one view the state of the European languages at this era, we shall forsake the discursive dissertation in which we have been indulging, and present our readers with a condensed synopsis of the chief facts relative to the History of the English Language.

1st. The earliest inhabitants of this country were Celts.

The proofs of this are—(a) the names of the chief natural permanent objects in our country retain Celtic names, as, *Aron*, a river or stream; *Bala*, the issue of a river, *e.g.*, Bala in Wales, Balloch in Dunbartonshire, Scotland; *Ken* or *Cean*, a head or end, *e.g.*, Kent; *Ta*, what expands, *e.g.*, Tay, Tamar, Thames, &c.; (b) a diligent comparison of the Celtic tongues spoken in Scotland, Ireland, Wales, the Isle of Man, Brittany, in France, and the (now extinct) language of Cornwall—little or no material difference is found among them; (c) the testimony of Cæsar (Commentaries, books iv. and v.), Tacitus (Agricola), &c.

2nd. On the 26th August, 55 B.C., this country was invaded by Julius Cæsar, and remained for upwards of 400 years a province of Rome.

This is proved—(a) by Cæsar's own account of the conquest; (b) by numerous allusions to that conquest:—i., in the letters of Cicero; ii., in the contemporary poets; iii., in the writings of Strabo, Diodorus, Siculus, &c.; iv., in the Agricola of Tacitus; v., in the works of the christian fathers; vi., on inscriptions and coins of that time; vii., in the panegyrics of Eumenius and Libanius, as well as in the writings of one or two of the minor historians of Rome;* (c) by the remnants of their language yet to be found in the names of places, &c., *e.g.*, Lindi Colonia—Lincoln; all those names of places ending in *chester*, *caster*, or *cester*, as Dorchester, Lancaster, Leicester; as well as all those ending in *wich*, as Greenwich, &c.; (d) by the accounts of the decline of the Roman power.

This last circumstance led to the withdrawal of the troops from the extremities of the world-empire, their concentration in or near Rome, the weakening of the distant colonies and dependencies, and, consequently, to their being left a ready prey to incursion and conquest. Having learned to lean upon the arm of foreign power for support, when this aid was withdrawn they felt themselves nerveless and impotent. The Celts, who had been pent up in the mountain fastnesses, yet unsubdued, eagerly sought to widen their territorial possessions, while from the coast-lands on the opposite shore, a series of pirate-tribes threatened invasion. Not long after, the swift war-barks of the sea-kings—their magic raven ensign, woven in one night by three maiden enchantrices, floating in the wind—ploughed the seething foam and landed their fierce forces on our shores; lance, axe, spear, bow, shields, and helm-crests are seen in one mingled maze; the demoniac shouts of war are heard. Then follow in quick succession the onslaught, the battle shriek—spears crashing like crisp ice-spars on the ribs of steel-clad war-men—the thunder clangor of

* For these authorities quoted at full length, see "History of the Ancient Britons, from the Earliest Period to the Invasion of the Saxons." By Rev. J. A. Giles, D.C.L.

the horn—the groan of the dying—the maddening fury of despair—and the glory-flag of the victor invaders waves over our ocean island. The stark fight terminates; over many a brave body—left on the field to the “black raven and the croaking toad, the eagle hungering after flesh, the greedy kite and the wild wolf of the woods”—is the heart’s dirge sung by the beautiful. But soberer topics lie before us. We delight not in the hell-cry of brutishness which resounds from the battle-field. We love not the music of clanging arms, the rush of mutual slaughter, the groan of the death-victim, or the wild wail of woman’s grief-riven soul. Therefore shall we throw a veil over those hideous scenes of blood, nor look again upon the grim and ghastly spectacle presented by the gore-dewed field. To proceed.

3rd. After the decline of the Roman empire, Britain was invaded, at several periods, by certain tribes of Gothic descent, and taken possession of by them.

The particular tribes who took part in these successive invasions have never been properly discriminated, nor has the portion of the continent from which they proceeded been accurately defined. It is now most generally believed that the Holstein, Fresian, Swedish, and Norwegian tribes were among the chief—that (the present Duchy of) Holstein was divided among three Saxon tribes—that north of them, in (the present Duchy of) Schleswig, dwelt the Angles—that to the west of Schleswig, opposite the island of North Strand, the inhabitants were Friesians, and that the tribe of the Jutes had never any real existence. The Saxons, then, using the word in its most extensive sense, may be said to have inhabited all the coasts of the Elbe, the North Sea, and the Baltic. The position evidently predisposed them to a piratical mode of life. Thus we find that even when Britain was a Roman province, the depredations of these pirate tribes were so common, that the Romans organized a fleet to cruise along the Saxon shore (*Littus Saxonicum*); but these fleets were manned by parties of the same race, who were rewarded for their marine services with grants of strips of land along that coast. When, however, the Roman power declined, the fleet was withdrawn, and the North Sea was again frequently ploughed by Saxon keels, and the shores of Britain were again frequently made tributary to the necessities of these races. But, tempted by the richness of the country, pressed by an increased population, and inspired with the love of conquest, successive colonists landed upon our “nook-shotten island.” Regarding the particular periods of these influxes of conquerors, there is some slight disagreement; for our own part we believe that these went on gradually, and that only the more important and striking have been mentioned or recorded. Indeed, the most rigorous criticism fails to dispel the obscurity in which the whole is involved; but the general fact admits of no question, viz., that a continuous influx of Gothic, i.e., Germanic, tribes poured into the country, gradually gained the ascendant, and gave to the country their name, language, laws, and customs. So far, however, as modern researches have been successful in unclouding the matter, the following statements present a concise outline:—

(a) About the year 449 A.D., a band, said to be Jutes, but most probably Friesians, under the leadership of two brothers, Hengist and Horsa, landed at Ebbsfleet, in the Isle of Thanet, in Kent. In about six years after that period they had acquired the mastery of that county, and had established the kingdom of Kent. The British Celtic was thus first displaced by the Saxon in Kent. (b) About A.D. 477, a Saxon colony, commanded by Ella, debarked upon the coast of, what is now called, Sussex, and established themselves permanently in that county. (c) About the year A.D. 495, a second Saxon immigration

headed by Cerdic, entered England on the coast of Hampshire. (d) The year 530 A.D., is said to have witnessed the descent of a third Saxon colony upon that part of the country now denominated Essex. By a gradual extension of power, influence, and population, the Saxons spread themselves over, and became masters of, those portions of England now represented by the names Sussex, Hampshire, Dorset, Wilts, Gloucester, Oxford, Berks, Buckingham, parts of Somerset, Devon, and Surrey, Essex, Middlesex, and part of Hertford. The so-called Jutes were already in possession of Kent and the Isle of Whit—whence, probably, they were called Jutes. (e) While Cerdic reigned in Wessex, a settlement was effected on the coasts of Norfolk and Suffolk. These were *Angles*, and the peculiar dialect of the Gothic which they introduced has been called the *Anglic*. They afterwards extended their possessions to Cambridge, parts of Lincoln and Northampton, besides the Isle of Ely. (f) About A.D. 547, under Ida, a colony from *Anglia* landed on that part of the coast of Scotland which lies between the Forth and Tweed, spread gradually over all the south-eastern counties of Scotland, as well as over Northumberland, Westmoreland, Cumberland, Lancashire, York, Cheshire, Nottingham, and the other North Midland shires. Thus we have seen nearly the whole surface of the land invaded and conquered, reft from the original Celtic population, who were ultimately compelled to betake themselves to the rocky fastnesses of the North of Scotland and the West of England, and then began that interfusion of peoples and of speech, which resulted in the production of the Anglo-Saxon tongue.

We have already intimated that we do not believe that the traditional accounts of the above-mentioned invasions are remarkably accurate in their chronology; we are rather inclined to believe that they had, even from an early period, been in the habit of landing on our coast-land and our barren beach-tracts, and that having occupied these settlements for some time the retirement of the Romans seemed to facilitate aggression and invite conquest. Several intermediate changes took place during the succeeding years, not exactly relevant to our subject, though bearing upon it. Mention of these we must, however, omit, and direct attention to the most important event which next occurred. In A.D. 806 a politic Bretwalda governed Wessex and Sussex; becoming ambitious, he began to sigh for wider domains and more extended rule. He overcame Kent in A.D. 819, Essex in A.D. 824, and went on in his triumphant career, until in A.D. 828 he raised his throne upon the ruins of the Octarchy, and was proclaimed king of all England. This sovereign's name was Egbert. By this process of consolidation and identification the different laws, customs, languages, &c., were fused into a certain degree of sameness. This was the morning dawn of Anglo-Saxon literature, one of the earliest of modern Europe. It is divided into three periods:—i., British-Saxon, from A.D. 449 to 867; ii., Danish-Saxon, from A.D. 867 to 1066; iii., Norman-Saxon, from A.D. 1066 to 1272. It is a transition literature, but one of nobleness and worth.

4th. This fact is not introduced exactly in its chronological order because it has been, in its beneficial influence, co-extensive with all future time—we refer to the introduction of Christianity. There are considerable discrepancies among the traditional accounts of this remarkable event. Some place it so early as between A.D. 43 and 61. We know, however, that several Christians, of whom St. Albans, of Verulamium, was the first, suffered martyrdom about A.D. 286. Then we have the Pelagian heresy, originated by a British monk, named Morgan, about A.D. 424. Afterwards we have the mission of

Augustin and forty monks—sent hither by Pope Gregory I., surnamed *the Great*—who landed in the Isle of Thanet, A.D. 596. The first British church was built of wood by Paulinus in Northumbria, A.D. 627. As the services of the church were conducted in Latin, and all literary compositions were at this date written in that language, as also the chief missionaries must have come from some part of the old empire of Rome, they must necessarily have spoken that tongue. It would, therefore, appear that a considerable infusion of Latin must have been introduced into the Anglo-Saxon tongue, *e.g.*, monk, saint, psalter, purple, epistle, febrifuge, porch, &c., respectively from *monachus*, *sanctus*, *psalterium*, *purpura*, *epistola*, *febrifuga*, *porticus*, &c.

5th. As we learn from the Saxon Chronicle, “the first ships of Danish men who sought the land of the English race” appeared in A.D. 787. “From this era,” remarks Sir James Macintosh, “the Danes became the incessant foes of Britain, visiting every part of the island with fire and sword.” In A.D. 867 they had conquered the greater part of England north of the Humber; subsequently they acquired the Midland counties; they next advanced towards Norfolk, Suffolk, and Cambridge, and became masters there; lastly, they invaded Wessex, the king of which was at that time looked upon as lord paramount of the whole country. In A.D. 878 King Alfred gladly concluded a treaty with Guthrum, their chief, by which he ceded to the Danes all the land upon the east coast, from the Humber to the Thames, besides the kingdom of Northumbria. This was subsequently called *the Danelagh*. In A.D. 1013, Sweyn, king of Denmark, conquered all England, and the crown remained with his descendants till A.D. 1042. Speaking of this period, Thierry says:—“The long-accumulated sufferings of the Saxons at length produced their fruit. On the death of Hardicanute, a great insurrectionary army was formed, under the command of a leader named Howne. Godwin and his son Harold raised the standard of independence in every county against every Dane—king or claimant, chief or soldier. Beaten back rapidly to the north, driven from town after town, the Danes left the country, and landed—greatly diminished in numbers—on the shores of their old country, A.D. 1039-40.” But the strange drama of British invasion is not yet ended, for,

6th. In A.D. 1066 England was conquered by the Normans—a Danish race, who, under Rolf, or Rollo, invaded the north of France about the same time as the Danes began to occupy Britain. In A.D. 912 Charles, surnamed the Simple, ceded to them a tract of land under the name of Normandy, and over that they ruled as dukes of Normandy. There they in a great measure exchanged their ancient dialect for the Latino-Francic tongue, then spoken in France, and which formed the derivative-source of the present French. The change introduced by this conquest was very great—the king, the nobles, the lawyers, the churchmen, the monks, and the soldiery, all spoke the Normanic French, and these naturally sought to spread that language among subjects, retainers, serfs, clients, proselytes, pupils, &c. For a time, therefore, the Normanic French “mightily grew and prevailed.” A subsequent influence, which tended still more to aid the propagation of the French tongue, was the marriage of Henry II. to Eleanor of Poitou, by which the English king became master of Poitou and Guienne, as well as his patrimonial estates, Anjou, Maine, and Touraine, together with his dukedom of Normandy. To a great extent, at this period, must Britain have been amalgamated with the rest of Europe, if we consider the intimate connexion which its sovereigns had with France, and its clergy with Rome. Yet it is a singular fact that the native Anglo-Saxon did not wholly

succumb to these adverse influences, but that the language of the conquerors give place, in a great measure, to the speech of the conquered; so much so, that about the year 1270 a new form of language—an interfusion of all those afore-mentioned influences—emerged, under the denomination of the English Language. To give a brief summary we have fused together—1st. The original Celtic. 2nd. The Latin of the first period. 3rd. The Gothic, from six sources, each most probably slightly differing from the other. 4th. The Latin of the second period. 5th. Another form of Gothic, through the Danes. 6th. (a) The Latin of the third period, derived from the courts of law, and the church, from fashion and chivalry. (b) The *indirect* Latin of the Normanic French and the Provençal French of Poitou and Guienne. (c) The *indirect* Danish of the Normanic French. 7th. The Latin and Greek of literature, science, and philosophy. From all these facts—the external history of the people—put together, we learn *that the English Language is a composite one; i.e., one made up from various sources, not pure and self-sufficing, but derived from, and combined out of, many diverse tongues.*

Let us now trace, as succinctly as possible, how far the internal evidence coincides with these external facts. 1st. It is evident, we think, that as the Normanic French and the Provençal, as well as the Latin and Greek, were introduced by external agencies, and were not the outgrowths of the national mind, the words derived therefrom would be less commonly used by the main body of the people. 2nd. That the Saxon, Danish, Anglic, and Normanic, being more nearly akin, would more readily coalesce, and be more commonly employed as the embodiment of thought. 3rd. That as Saxon and its kindred tongues formed the language of the commonalty, the terms in most frequent use should be of Saxon origin. 4th. That as the mutual communication of thought could only be made by parties, the construction of whose languages differed, by the disregard of grammatical forms, there should be gradually evolved a language comparatively loose in its grammatical inflections and syntactical relations. 5th. That as the Saxons were descended from a fierce people, dwelling in gloomy woods—on barren beach-tracts—or ravaging like sea-wolves the coasts of others—the language should be expressive, curt, harsh, direct, and pointed. Such indeed it was, such among the lower classes it is. In literature, however, the sturdy, stalwart, taciturn, emphatic Saxon, has been mingled with the philosophy and poetry of the Greeks, the civilization of Rome, the chivalry of southern Europe, the melody of Italy, the stateliness of Spain, the epigrammatism of France, the suffusive beauty of oriental nations, and the religion of Palestine. It is a rude stem, bearing on its branches fruits of every clime. A few observations will make the above points apparent. (a) The Anglo-Saxon is for the most part monosyllabic, and remarkably expressive—e.g., *stab, stare, start, rap, jeer, sneer, queer, quirk, jerk, crash, smash, rash, twirl, swirl, crag, shriek, scale, scream, lift, swift, quench, growl, grunt, &c.* (b) From the Anglo-Saxon almost all words denotive of—1st. Objects of sense—e.g., *sky, sun, stars, moon, frost, cold, snow, hail, hill, stream, earth, thunder, sea, &c.*

“Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and shades of death.”—MILTON.

2nd. Relationships—e.g., *father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, husband, wife, child, kin, friend, &c.* 3rd. Feelings and their manifestations—e.g., *smile, love, blush, sigh, weep, tear, laugh, gladness, shame, &c.* 4th. Common actions—e.g., *run, jump, leap, slip, wink, spring, sprawl, crawl, slide, creep, talk, &c.* 5th. Home objects—e.g., *fireside*

home, hearth, roof, board, seat, &c. 6th. Business matters—e.g., *shop, shoe, shear, farm, gold, acre, angle, bargain, borrow, wed, wayer, bake, brew, cheapen, craft, worth, work, weare, truck, traffic, rich, price, prize, penny, moil, luck, master, &c.* 7th. Satirical expressions—e.g., *scraggy, scum, scoff, knave, scrank, paltry, grasping, grovel, cajole, badly, churl, curmudgeon, drab, fiend, gabby, jabber, gawky, gaunt, grubicorm, haggler, rascish, twit, trash, termagant, sleeky, shabby, mauckish, lacky, lazy, &c.* 8th. Particulars as opposed to generals—e.g., *green, blue, red, yellow, black, white, brown, gray, &c.*, are Anglo-Saxon; colour, is Latin; *hum, hiss, howl, growl, bark, buzz, rustle, rattle, roar, low, war, squeak, creak, clash, clang, &c.*, are Anglo-Saxon; sound, is Latin; *jink, clap, scamper, skip, yawn, spurn, wriggle, skim, dart, stagger, squirt, squint, &c.*, are Anglo-Saxon; move and motion, are Latin; *dog, cat, rat, cow, hen, pig, bull, horse, deer, fox, mouse, mole, weasel*, are Anglo-Saxon; animal, is Latin. (c) The English Language has the fewest inflections and the least number of syntactical rules of any of the chief modern languages of Europe. (d) The Anglo-Saxonized English is most popular with the illiterate—e.g., the works of Bunyan, De Foe, Goldsmith, Cobbett, and Swift. The middle-English, i.e., nearly equally Saxon and Latin, is most popular with the middle classes—e.g., Thomson, Cowper, Wordsworth, Scott. The Latinized-English is most popular with the higher classes, who, having had their classical tastes cultivated, and their associations led in that direction, are best able to appreciate the beauties of such writing. We think, then, that the *consensus* of evidence is complete—that the external history and internal facts of the Language agree in proving its composite nature.

We have traced, as carefully as we were able, the source-fonts of our Language; we have marked out their points of confluence, and we have partly indicated its present width, depth, and power. We saw it first issuing, as it were, from a few almost unnoticed springs, far up in the seldom-climbed hills—coursing on its unobtrusive way—troubled in its depths by turbulent onrushings from other streams—gradually combining their waters with its own, then rolling onwards in stately majesty. Looking at the Language as it now is, we must not expect that symmetry and uniformity which belongs to an edifice planned by an architect and built by successive artizans under his superintendence. No! When we consider the ten thousands of labourers to whom we owe its erection—the myriad changes originating in fancy, caprice, accident or necessity, which were made in ignorance or heedlessness of all rule—we ought rather to feel astonished at the wondrous consistency which marks a structure eliminated from such an apparently fortuitous conglomeration of heterogeneous materials, than to be disappointed in not finding a strict, steady, unswerving adherence to general principles. This observation seems to account for the many irregularities in etymological structure and syntactical arrangement, which appear to make the study of the Language difficult.

Had we had space, a brief view of early English Literature would have tended much to the substantiation of the facts above narrated, but as we have gone abroad through such a width of field, let us now proceed to answer the question hovering upon our readers' lips—What utile application can be made of the knowledge of these facts, in so far as the study of Rhetoric is concerned? Without attempting or pretending to exhaust the subject, we may, we think, deduce from what has been related, the following lessons, which ought to have a close relation to "Style," viz. :—

1st. That as Anglo-Saxon terms denote almost all natural objects, all those things

which are dear to the heart, all feelings and emotions, &c., the staple of a style intended to be plain, easily understood, and level to the capacities of the mass, should consist chiefly of Anglo-Saxon vocables.

2nd. That in a language combined from so many sources there must be many seeming synonymes, but (a) As each of these languages was introduced at a different stage of civilization, even in words of the same general signification slight variations will be found—*e.g.*, choose, from Saxon *ceosan* ; select, from Latin *se*, aside, and *lego*, to pick out; prefer, from Latin *pre*, before, and *fero*, to carry; are all connected in the one general signification of option: but *choose* means to pick out in accordance with our *will*; *select*, to pick out for a special purpose with due regard to appropriateness; *prefer*, to pick out in accordance with the *judgment*; as “A man may *select* his wife for her beauty, *choose* her for her wealth, and *prefer* her for the amiability of her disposition.” (b) Two terms for exactly the self-same idea cannot long subsist; for as the mind progresses and becomes more acute, it perceives differences unobserved before; hence the two words become differentiated to answer the exigencies of the mind—*e.g.*, anxiety and anguish, though from the same Greek root, *αἴμα* to vex, both signify distress of mind, but anxiety implies *continuity*, while anguish implies *intensity*. (c) One of the synonymes may have a greater aptitude for impressing the mass, hence it will be used with a licence and latitude of meaning, while the other, being employed only by the learned, shall retain its restrictedness—*e.g.*, act, action, deed; the two former from Latin *ago*, to do, the last from the past tense of *do*, have etymologically the self-same signification, and are so used at present among the common people; but among the learned they are thus distinguished—*act*, a single extraordinary effort; *action*, continued exertion; *deed*, continued exertion completed.

3rd. In consequence of this copiousness of expression, this possession of duplicate terms, there can be no excuse for poverty of language or baldness of expression, while at the same time the shades of connoted meaning superadded to the denotation of these terms, should form a strong argument for a careful, critical, laborious, and attentive study of words in order that precision and perspicuity may be acquired.

4th. That it is not only possible, but necessary, to adapt our style to a subject, but also to adapt our style to the class whom we intend to address.

5th. That force, expressiveness, sincerity, plainness, heartiness, homeliness and passion rousing fire may be imparted to style by the use of Anglo-Saxon. Stateliness, copiousness, grace, melody, refinement, and elegance, may be gained by the use of Latin. Smartness, primness, compliment, archness, *abandon*, diplomatic reserve, from the French; and philosophic accuracy, scientific clearness, from the Greek.

6th. That *à priori* the style which most nearly approximates to the due and proper employment of each—*i.e.*, the using of them with equal ease and thorough mastery on fit occasions and in just degree, is the best.

We are fully conscious of the inadequacy of our present effort to do justice to our subject. We feel that it is unworthy of being called even an outline, instead of a history—want of space has precluded us from tracing so clearly as we desired, the action and reaction of each Language on the other. We perceive that we have given no criterion of the parts the commixture of which each Language supplied. We believe, however, that intelligent readers will find their way through the labyrinth of causes, and clearly discriminate their effects. In our future articles “On Style,” further elucidations

these points will be found; meanwhile we must take our leave, saying with Wordsworth—

“ In our halls are hung
Armoury of the invincible knights of old.
We must be free, or die, who speak the tongue
That Shakspeare spoke, the faith and morals hold
That Milton held. In every thing we're sprung
Of earth's best blood—have titles manifold.”

To those who may be desirous of pursuing the study of this subject farther, the following collation of authorities may be useful, viz., “*Outlines of the History of the English Language*,” by G. L. Craik; “*Sketches of the History of Literature and Learning in England*,” by G. L. Craik; “*The English Language*,” by R. G. Latham; Tacitus’ “*Germania*,” by R. G. Latham; J. H. Hippisley’s “*Chapters on Early English Literature*”; Harrison’s “*Rise, Progress, and Present Structure of the English Language*”; Hallam’s “*Introduction to the Literature of Europe*”; R. H. Horne’s “*Introductory Essay*,” prefixed to “*Chaucer Modernized*,” by Wordsworth, Leigh Hunt, &c.; Shaw’s “*Outlines of English Literature*”; Warton’s “*History of English Poetry*”; Sharon Turner’s “*History of the Anglo-Saxons*,” and “*History of England during the Middle Ages*”; Lappenberg’s “*England under the Anglo-Saxon Kings*”; Palgrave’s “*History of the Anglo-Saxons*”; Kemble’s “*Saxons in England*”; Prichard’s “*Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations*”; Rev. J. Bosworth’s “*Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*,” and “*Anglo-Saxon Grammar*”; Rev. J. G. Giles’ “*History of the Ancient Britons, from the Earliest Period to the Invasion of the Saxons*”; Hallam’s “*View of the State of Europe in the Middle Ages*”; Thackeray’s “*Ecclesiastical and Political State of Britain*”; Guest’s “*History of English Rhythms*,” and “*Saxon Language and Literature*,” in “*The Penny Cyclopædia*”; Ingram’s “*Saxon Chronicle*,” with an English Translation; Thorpe’s “*Analecta Anglo-Saxonica*”; Bede’s “*History of the English Church*”; Godwin’s “*Life of Chaucer*.” We might easily multiply authorities, but a thorough perusal of these works will furnish, in our opinion, a very complete view of the subject.

Religion.

CAN CHRISTIANS, CONSISTENTLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPLES, RENDER SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH STAGE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

“ For lofty sense,
Creative fancy, and inspection keen,
Thro’ the deep windings of the human heart,
Is not wild Shakspeare thine and nature’s boast ? ”
THOMSON.

Is wielding the pen in support of the British stage, and its claims to the sympathy and patronage of the British public, I shall prefer adopting the view taken by C. W. Jun., in his article of the April number—viz., the essential effects of the stage; and since the honour and character of this institution is at stake in this controversy, we may in justice claim to treat it thus; otherwise we should have no fair materials wherewith to enter the combat with our opponents, for we cannot shut our eyes to the abuses and objections which exist in the modern theatres of the metropolis, containing, as they do, so much that is foreign to the true end and aim of the drama. There is, alas! too much for just criticism and con-

demnation. The productions of the modern authors are often flimsy, artificial, and altogether worthless, and even in their representation too much attention and care is given to effects in scenery, by which the spirit of the drama is greatly weakened and enervated, and the theatrical piece is deprived of that peculiar influence over the mind which it ought to possess. We cannot, therefore, attempt to advocate the efficacy of the British stage of the present day, either in justice to ourselves or to that of the modern drama, but our endeavour must be to prove that the essential effects of the English stage, in the performance of the legitimate drama, are not at variance with the high moral aims of Christianity.

Taking, then, that mighty genius, Shakspeare, the dramatic poet of the English, as the representative of the English stage, I will endeavour to prove that the representation of his productions, with the artificial

assistance of scenery, &c., are in their effects highly beneficial and efficacious in promoting the sacred aims of Christianity. And though my opponents may be inclined to quarrel with this, I contend most earnestly that he may be taken as its representative, for before he arose, the modern or English drama was formed after the models of old Greece and Rome, and since his time no writer of any great pretensions to the tragic muse has arisen to pluck the laurels from his brow.

"Aristides" has indeed brought serious charges against the stage, and has struck at its foundations, but they are at the same time bold ones, and incapable of being proved. Let us proceed, then, to investigate them, and see how far they will support his views.

In the first place, he asserts "that the stage is not a representation of society, and has no counterpart except in the mind of the author." Now, if it can be proved that the personages and characters brought before the audience in all the eloquent language of the poet, and represented by all the bewitching and consummate skill of the actor, do not fairly represent the general passions of men, but are only the exaggerated fantasies of the author's brain, then indeed must the stage be robbed of its claim to instruct in morals and philosophy, and cannot but be the medium for corrupting the hearts and minds of the people, inasmuch as it must give them false views of life, and impair their judgment in discerning good from evil, virtue from vice. But it is not so. The business of the drama is to excite sympathy, and its effect on the spectator depends on such justness of imitation as shall cause to a certain degree the same passions and affections, as if what were exhibited were real, and in order to affect this the characters and events introduced must *resemble* in truthfulness the patterns from whence they are copied. It is addressed to the imagination, through which it opens to itself a communication with the heart, where it is to excite certain passions and affections; each character being personated, and each event exhibited, the ATTENTION of the audience is greatly captivated, and the imagination so far assists in the delusion as to sympathize in the representation. To the muse of tragedy Pope has therefore assigned the noble task—

"To wake the soul by tender strokes of art,
To raise the genius, and to mend the heart;
To make mankind in conscious virtue bold,
Live o'er each scene, and be what they behold."

It has been pointed out by a previous writer, what a vast superiority representation or action has over bare narration; what a power the stage has to raise the sympathy of the spectator, and from that strong-working sympathy, how the passions are agitated, and catch the enthusiasm of the author. It is as a moral philosopher that Aristotle gives the preference, above all other modes of poetic imitation, to tragedy, as capable of purging the affections, by the means of pity and terror. The first endeavour of the poet should be to touch the heart, the next to mend it.

Who will assert that the persons and characters introduced into the plays of Shakespeare are counterfeit, and bear no resemblance to the minds and characters of persons we meet with in our intercourse with the world? His greatest art was the beautiful and sublime, but no less truthful, manner in which he expresses the vehement passions, a manner in which no writer in any age ever equalled him. His talents were universal, his penetrating mind saw through all characters; and, as Pope says of him, he was not more a master of our strongest emotions than of our idlest sensations.

To take an instance of his genius in delineating characters from the play of *Macbeth*, as that has been mentioned. This piece is, perhaps, one of the greatest exertions of the tragic and poetic power that any age or any country has produced and is one most conducive to the great end and aim of tragedy, viz., to bring the mind, by the operation of pity and terror to such a lively perception of the great agonies and tortures of a guilty conscience and the terrible consequences that follow wicked actions, that it may abhor the cause that led to them; and what language can be more calculated to produce such an effect than that used by the immortal bard of Avon? What a natural character was *Macbeth*!—not an *imaginary individual* of the author's brain, but one of a class. How many men, like him, may be found in the present day, of a generous disposition and good propensities, but with vehement passions and aspiring wishes, and a sub-

able to be seduced by splendid prospects and ambitious counsels. He has described, in a masterly manner, the emotions of Macbeth in the struggles of conscience, and his agonies arising from remorse; and I must think that no one, of any moderate degree of sentiment, could go to the playhouse, and witness these scenes, with all the effects that scenery and acting can produce, without coming away a wiser and a better man. Surely it is an unjust charge against this incomparable author to assert that he is guilty of false representations! It is generally acknowledged that he gives an air of reality to everything; and, in spite of many and great faults (to be attributed rather to the times than to the man), effects, better than any one else has ever done, the chief purposes of theatrical representation. Hear the character Pope gives him:—

"His characters are so much nature herself, that it is a sort of injury to call them by a distant name as copies of her. Those other poets have a constant resemblance, which shows that they received them from another, and were but multipliers of the image; each picture, like a mock shadow, is but the reflection of a reflection. In every single character in Shakspeare is as much an individual as those in life itself; it is as impossible to find any two alike, and such as from their relation or identity in any respect appear to be twins, yet upon comparison, be found remarkably distinct. To this life and variety of character, we must add, the wonderful preservation of it, which is such throughout his plays, that had all the speeches been printed, without the very names of the persons, I believe one might have applied them with certainty to every speaker."

Again, speaking of this mighty genius, he writes:—"The power over our passions was never possessed in a more eminent degree, or displayed in so different instances. Yet all along there is seen no labour, no pains to move them; no preparation to guide our eyes to the effect, or be perceived to lead toward it; but the heart swells, and the tears burst out just at the proper places: we are surprised the moment we weep, and yet, upon reflection, find the passion so just, that we should be surprised if we had not wept; and wept at that very moment." And herein lies, I think, the great efficacy of stage represen-

tations—that they possess that peculiar influence over the heart which softens it for those impressions and sentiments which it should be the object of the dramatist to instil by his writings. The heart of man, like iron and other metals, is hard and of firm resistance when cold, but warmed, it becomes malleable and ductile; and it is by touching the passions, and exciting sympathetic emotions, that the tragedian must make his impression upon the spectator. The stage, then, is the medium for warming and rendering malleable the heart, and preparing it for the reception of those higher and loftier sentiments which Christianity teaches; and it may therefore be considered truly consistent for a Christian to render support to the British stage, as the British stage renders support to Christianity.

"Aristides" again remarks, that "the workings of tragedy do not transpire till its completion, and hence none are demoralized; but in the theatre the plan is seen evolving, and the consummation of the crime is introduced to the beholder's view." This seems to me to constitute one of its advantages as a medium of instruction. Upon the stage are brought within the spectator's view, in a comparatively short space of time, events and consequences which, in the ordinary course, would take years, perhaps, to evolve, and thus the audience steal the march upon time. With the humbler classes of society, in particular, this is a great advantage: many of them have no leisure or application to trace the consequences of ill-governed passions or erroneous principles through the long series of a voluminous work, and thus the drama happily steps in for this purpose. Events are brought within the compass of a short period; precepts are delivered in the familiar way of discourse; the fiction (lawful fiction) is concealed, and representation and action take the place of cold, unaffecting narrative.

Such, then, are the true objects of the drama—to instruct in morals and philosophy, whilst at the same time it diverts. For this purpose was it instituted in the first place, and for the promotion of this object has it been patronized, during all ages, by the learned and talented. If the stage has become corrupted and degenerated from the true spirit of the drama, it is because it has been contemptuously neglected by the professors of a morbid Christianity, and has thus

fallen for its support upon the patronage of the lower classes; and whilst such is the case, nothing can be expected but an inferior and weakly order of theatricals. Woe be to the stage when the proprietors are compelled meanly to cringe to the vitiated taste of a British populace! That the stage, whether good, bad, or indifferent, must exist, is evident, for it is clear to judge, from the perusal of history, that "*a love of dramatic representation is an inherent principle in human nature*"—from the child at school, who delights in playing at kings or heroes, and acting extempore the stories which he has read in his books of amusement, even to the wild tribes of desert islands. Is it not wise, then, that a principle of nature which must have scope, should be turned into a mighty

engine for the diffusion of moral truths and maxims, as I cannot but think was intended by that Providence who has endowed the whole human family with either talents for the truthful display and imitation of the human passions, or a mind formed for the just appreciation of it. I cannot but think that all this was appointed for the purpose that some great master-mind—such as the immortal Shakspeare—should arise, and in his sublime delineations of the human character, impart instruction to the world, and thus prepare them for a more just conception of the sacred purposes of Christianity. We are apt to consider Shakspeare only as a poet; but he is certainly one of the greatest moral philosophers that ever lived.

ARISTOTLE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THERE are many things which from their nature cannot be properly understood, or fairly determined to be right or wrong, until they have been put into practice. When our legislators frame new laws, it cannot be told whether those laws will entail misery or the reverse before they have been tried; the only thing that can be done is, to argue from analogy, and to draw deductions from facts which, as near as possible, bear upon the matters requiring the law. But in the present inquiry we have not to argue upon a subject the import and bearing of which we are unacquainted with; we have not to conjecture that such and such a result may follow; but we have simply to determine whether a Christian can consistently countenance a system the results or bearings of which are perfectly obvious to all.

The stage of England is a great fact; and too well known are the *habitués* of the theatre, and too painfully visible are the immoralities attached to the same, to permit the use of anything like conjecture while arguing either for or against the stage. C. W. has assumed a very sophistical position in this debate, by trying to make it appear that the stage, if it is not, might be, a teacher of religion and morals. I must remind our friend that we have now nothing to do with what might be made of the stage; we have simply to determine whether the God-fearing and the God-honouring man can consistently support it. I at once join

issue with our skilful friend, and affirm that no Christian can countenance a theatre: and whence do I draw my reasons for so bold a conclusion? First, from inspiration. God says, "Whatsoever ye do, do all for the glory of God;" and in the second place, the evils and immoralities attached—necessarily attached—to theatres, are so glaring, that no unprejudiced beholder can fail to see them. Who ever thinks of going to theatres to honour his God? Who ever goes upon his knees before entering their precincts, to ask God to bless his soul by what he is about to hear and see? If men never think (and they dare not) of asking God to give them his blessing in a theatre, how can a Christian be consistent when found there?

C. W. is very bold in his assumptions; by his quotations from the poets he wishes us to think that there was a time when men really went to a theatre with a holy intention—when theatres were indeed schools of virtue and religion. Either C. W. is very ignorant of the true history of the English and every other stage, or else he does not present what he knows. Let him, if he can, point out that golden age. It was not in the time of Dr. Johnson, as "Aristides" has clearly shown; it was not in the age immediately before him; vainly do we strive to find it in the time of the Stuart kings. Hear what Tillotson says about it in his days:—"As the stage now is, plays are intolerable, and not fit to be permitted in an

much less christian, nation. They notoriously minister both to infidelity. The golden age was not in the age so far-famed Shakspeare. I am not uritanical as to miss the reading of it; but neither am I so carried away by the force and splendour of his wit and wit that I can dare venture to say that our great bard is a dangerous example to read, and many of his plays not exhibited as he wrote them.

To show, by a brief summary, that I cannot point out the time when the stage was pure, I shall refer him to the famous William Prynne wrote in 1633 of Charles I. He made a catalogue of crimes against theatres, which included every name of note in the christian world; comprehending the united efforts of the Jewish and christian law; the deliberate acts of fifty-four ancient and modern general, national, and provincial councils and synods, both of the eastern and western churches; the contrary sentence of seventy-one ancient and one hundred and fifty modern catholic and Protestant authors; the hostile efforts of philosophers, and even poets; the legislative enactments of a great number of pagan and christian states, emperors, magistrates, emperors, and princes. Now, is C. W. to point out his golden age, or challenge him to produce it. But I need not, and say Prynne was a puritan, of whom C. W. evidently knows but little against whom he has imbibed very able prejudices. But be this as it may, if these are facts, let them come from their source.

If C. W. should shift his ground, and accuse ancient nations for his pure stage, I refer him to some of the opinions of the wisest men of antiquity. Plato says, "Theatres raise the passions, and pervert the morals; and of consequence are dangerous to morality." Aristotle says, "The representation of comedies ought to be forbidden to people, until age and discipline have rendered them proof against debauchery."

Seneca says, "The German women are preserved against danger, and preserve their modesty having no playhouses among them." A grave work addressed to the Emperor Augustus, advises the suppression of all amusements, as a great source of

corruption. It would be possible to swell out this paper to a volume with quotations from ancient and modern writers, all condemnatory of theatres and anything of the kind, but the above will suffice. We pass on to notice some other parts of C. W.'s remarkable paper. He tells us that he traces the origin of the English stage to the clergy—a most unfortunate origin as far as its purity is concerned. It is notorious to the students of English history, that no set of men were more depraved or immoral than were the English Popish clergy at the time our friend mentions. This being so, can it be possible that their plays would be more pure than their lives and their religion? Surely, surely, C. W. does not mean to tell us that the Popish priests of England in 1170 and preceding ages were christian men—men from whom Christians of this century do well to take their pattern. If their plays were as pure as their faith, God preserve us alike from either. A mere tyro knows that the most abominable blasphemies, and the most corrupt practices, were openly practised and allowed as parts of religion, by those very clergy whom C. W. tells us introduced the drama into England. This being so, it is small wonder that our present theatres are dens of infamy and vice, knowing from what a detestable source C. W. tells us they spring.

C. W. next attempts to show us what Christianity is, and here he is as far away from the truth as when he tries to show us that the origin of the stage was pure. He evidently wishes us to understand that Christianity permits a man to make himself familiar with vice, in order that he may learn to shun it: and in doing so, for his purpose, he makes a most unfortunate quotation, viz. :—

"Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen."

But we deny his inference altogether, and likewise prove, from the following lines of the same poem, that the poet was far from teaching the same doctrine as C. W.: hear him—

"Yet seen too oft, familiar with his face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

The truth of the last two quoted lines is painfully obvious to all who have studied

London life. Nearly all men agree, that it is the familiarity with vice which develops all the immoral and vicious propensities of human nature. What, then, becomes of C. W.'s boasted assertion, that the exhibition on the stage, of what he mildly terms "scorn," will lead men to shun vice? Let him, if he can, point to a single individual who ever became a more moral man by witnessing the representation of vice. I will tell him what the sick comedian once said, and may we weigh well the significance of his words:—"I have been acting Sir John Falstaff so often, that I thought I should have died; and had I died, it would have been in the service of the devil." If the stage were good, its good effects must be soonest felt by those who have most to do with it. Is it so? Is it not, rather, notorious that, with only a few exceptions, actors and actresses are shamefully immoral? What vice, what depravity, what corruption, disgrace the green-rooms of our principal theatres, to say nothing of those lesser hells, the minor theatres of our great towns.

"In whatever aspect we view the stage, it possesses no claim upon our sympathies, inasmuch as it ever has been the engine of falsehood, the propagator of vice, and tended to degrade and make licentious the people."

C. W. says truly, "It has undergone no change by which it forfeits its former claims," and for this reason we warn all Christians to keep aloof from the polluted thing. We have shown—at least, the quotations we have adduced have—that plays have ever had an immoral tendency; and the present condition of the drama clearly enough demonstrates, that theatres are the very strongholds of sin. How, then, we ask, can C. W. consistently uphold the doctrine, that Christians may support them?

Show me the country and the age where theatres are most in vogue, and I will demonstrate that that age and that country bear upon their front the impress of the greatest amount of sin. One fact alone shall be sufficient to attest my assertion. During the progress of the most blasphemous and ferocious revolution which ever shocked the face of heaven, theatres, in Paris alone, multiplied from *six* to *twenty-five*. Now, one of two conclusions follow from this: either the spirit of the times produced the institutions, or the institutions cherished the spirit of the

times; and this would certainly go to prove that they are either the parents of vice, or the offspring of it. Such being the state of the case, we shall offer C. W., and those who may understand Christianity as he seems to do, a few remarks from the word of God, to prove that a Christian dare not be found to countenance the stage. David says, "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor *sitteth in the seat* of the scornful," Psa. i. 1. And again: "I have not sat with vain persons, neither will I go in with *dissemblers*," Psa. xxvi. 4. Now, what is there but vanity and deceit upon the stage? Would David, would Christ, would the apostles and prophets, if on earth, countenance the stage? I trow not. Neither can Christians, who are the servants of Christ, defile themselves by countenancing the polluted stage. But one or two more extracts will suffice to show that the word of God calls upon us to keep ourselves separate from the godless throng who serve the devil by dancing attendance upon the stage. "Enter not into the path of the wicked, and go not in the way of evil men. Avoid it, pass not by it, turn from it, and pass away," Prov. iv. 14, 15. See 1 Cor. v. 9—11; 2 Pet. iii. 6, &c. We feel that we have laid ourself open to be called a puritanical dreamer, and that we would cut men off from all harmless enjoyment. We deny the truth of such an implication. If C. W., or any one else, can show that plays were ever any other than vicious in their tendency and effect, and that they may be made so again, then, and not till then, shall they have one iota of our support. Christians are not prevented from rejoicing; neither have they one whit the less enjoyment, though their principles prevent their indulging in the sinful charms of the stage. They know that to learn what virtue and vice are they have not to seek the instruction of the stage. No, the fountain of all virtues is ever welling up before them, and to its pure and hallowed springs they go for their copious draughts, and there they discover what virtue is, by reading the sayings and doings of Him who was virtue's God. Yes, from the lips and life of Him, who spake as never man spake, the Christian draws his lessons of holiness and love, and loses nothing by neglecting the lessons of the stage. And to

know the hideousness of vice, the Christian is not indebted to Shakspeare, ever so well acted. No, no; Shakspeare never did, and Shakspeare never could, teach to man the corruption of the heart within him one-tenth part so clearly as it is to be seen portrayed in the revelations of the word of God. Go, then, C. W., and study that precious book; and soon, very soon, will you learn what folly it is to run to the mimic acting of poor, erring men for your patterns of vice or virtue, when such a precious and infallible monitor is ever at your command.

A few words with H. T., and we have done. None can fail to see that he is a clever, and when his subject admits, a powerful writer; but, unfortunately for his credit, in the present instance he can only use words to hide or smother facts. What is the intention of his dulcet strain? Why, simply to break down the hedge which separates the Christian from the ungodly; he wishes to see the christian church dovetailed into the world, and thinks that such a proceeding would tend to make both parties better and happier. If H. T. were endowed with infallible wisdom, and could prove it, his reasoning would command attention; but so long as his argument runs in opposition to God's truth, we must treat it with the neglect it deserves. H. T. is evidently one of those who, having some faint notions of christian truth, allow their fancies to usurp the place of inspiration. Well would it be for such men, if they would study what St. Peter means in his first Epistle, ch. 11, 12—"Dearly beloved, I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul," &c.

H. T. evidently thinks that it is morose for a Christian to account himself only a stranger and pilgrim on earth;

but we must allow the Author of Christianity to be a better judge of what is consistent in a Christian, than a thousand reasoners such as our friend H. T. He seems to forget that a Christian's hopes are in heaven, that his joys are not centered here below. Like too many others, he seems to imagine that religion, while it prevents an indulgence in sinful delights, gives no joys in return. Has he never read how St. Paul, amidst all his manifold trials and sufferings, went on rejoicing? Had he any need of the gewgaws of the stage to make life tolerable? For him to live was Christ; to die, gain. When H. T. knows personally what St. Paul did, then, and not till then, will he understand why the stage is not worthy of a Christian's patronage.

What a mistake the worldly fall into when they think that Christians have no pleasures here below! They forget that the whole world is theirs; that temporal things subsist only for the advantage of Christians; and that when Christ has gathered together his elect, this world will cease to be. What folly to imagine that that man's happiness can be enhanced by the mimicry of the stage, who delights in the works of his God! What need for the lessons of the stage, when the Christian has the book of inspiration, the book of nature, and the book of history from whence he draws all he wishes to know? Such a one cannot waste time to see nature caricatured in the playhouse, but learns to admire virtue and abhor vice, because the universal teaching of his God commands the latter and commends the former.

Having run this paper to an unusual length, we have only room to say how much we admire the reasoning of J. E. P., and how strongly we commend it to our opponents.

W. T.

HISTORY is "the record of God's providence getting himself honour out of man's sin." Civil polity has to do with those relations, social and national, which have been divinely appointed for man; he did not invent them. Science investigates and applies those laws of nature, and properties of the external world, according to which all things have been ruled from the beginning. Art, aesthetically considered, is but the reproduction and reconstruction of images of the mind, and forms of natural beauty, whose original is beyond all earthly claim. Philosophy is concerned with the structure of the intellect, with its operations, and with man's relation to the material world in which he is placed.—*British Quarterly Review*.

Philosophy.

IS WOMAN MENTALLY INFERIOR TO MAN?
INTRODUCTORY ARTICLE.

A CORRECT answer to this question must be based on a very comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the human mind. This paper will contain only a few suggestions and facts which may assist in further inquiries. It may be presumed from the unqualified form of the query, that it is not meant to be partial, merely having reference to a few mental powers; nor should we consider it as meaning, "Is woman's mind equal in all respects to man's?" for it may be that both have points of superiority as well as inferiority. What I understand by the question is, taking all the peculiarities of woman's mind and all the peculiarities of man's, and comparing the total of the one with the total of the other, which stands the nearest to the point or standard of perfection?

What, in the *first* place, is meant by **PERFECTION**? The term is either *relative* or *absolute*. *Relative* perfection in human beings consists in their complete adaptation to their proper spheres of action. Viewed *absolutely*, degrees of perfection consist in the adaptation of different individuals to more or less elevated spheres of action. In the first sense, there can be no doubt that the Creator has

made woman as perfect as man, and man as perfect as woman, and every inferior creature as perfect as human beings, i.e., all are exactly adapted to the spheres in which they are intended to move. Here, then, there can be no dispute. The question is, rather, Is woman *absolutely* as perfect as man? Man may possibly be capable of undertaking more numerous, difficult, and exalted duties; or woman may have the pre-eminence in these respects; or they may stand on an equal footing with each, although engaged in different spheres of action. In prosecuting the inquiry, it is desirable to take a general view of human nature as regards *mind*, which must be understood to act, in this *life*, through the medium of the brain. The capabilities of mind are chiefly dependent on five principal attributes—capacity, form, tone, temperament, and texture. These are modified by age and circumstances in every individual. But it is only with the attributes themselves that we have at present to do. Five degrees are exhibited in the following table; the lowest degree being represented by 1, and the highest by 5.

	Capacity.	Form.	Temperament.	Tone.	Texture.	
5	Very great	Very excellent	Very active	Very vigorous	Very fine	5
4	Great	Excellent	Active	Vigorous	Fine	4
3	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	3
2	Small	Inferior	Inert	Feeble	Coarse	2
1	Very small	Very inferior	Very inert	Very feeble	Very coarse	1

As this arrangement is not to be found elsewhere, and the terms are too general to convey ideas sufficiently definite, a few explanatory observations are necessary.

Capacity, when applied to the intellect, means power of comprehension; *great capacity*, the power of laying hold of great ideas. When applied to the feelings, great capacity means depth of emotion, strength of impulse, and is dependent on a large development of the brain. The average of men's brains is 3 lb. 8 oz., of women's, 3 lb. 4 oz. *Excellence* of form consists of that happy balance of the faculties, that none so far predominate as to interfere with the legitimate action of the others. This harmony of the faculties is in a great measure

dependent on the form of the brain; but may co-exist with considerable variations of form, adapting different individuals to different spheres of duty. Man seems to have generally a greater proportion of intellect and animal energy, woman more of social and moral feeling. I do not think there is any one standard of perfection as to *form*. No one form can be adapted to all duties, or this would be the perfect standard. The difference of form in man's and woman's heads does not necessarily imply inferiority on either side. The term *temperament* I have used in a sense more exclusive than that usually attached to it, as simply comprehending the different degrees of activity and inertness. There seems to be no essen-

tial difference between men and women as to activity of mind. *Vigour of tone* is highly important to enable us to endure long-continued mental exertion with impunity. Woman's present inferiority to man in this attribute seems to be an accidental condition, which will be removed by attention to the laws of health. The vigour of some women seems to be equal to that of the most robust men, especially among wandering and savage tribes; which shows that feebleness is not an essential part of her character. The last attribute is *texture*. Here woman may most decidedly claim superiority. It gives her the advantage in appreciating whatever is delicately fine; in doing whatever requires delicacy of touch, of thought, and of feeling. It is conspicuous in her features, and of itself sufficiently distinguishes the feminine character from that of the "coarser sex." It will now be readily understood that according to my conceptions of a really superior or positively excellent character, it consists of a combination of these attributes, all above medium; and that a character inferior in every respect is one in which all these attributes are below medium; while an individual with attributes all medium, has but a medium character. But these attributes are more commonly combined in different proportions; thus, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2, may represent their proportions in one character, but the sum of these will be the same as the sum of 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, all medium, constituting a medium character, characterized by the number 15. Another character may consist of a combination of attributes, represented by 5, 4, 4, 4, 3; this would be among superior characters, its characteristic number being 20. Now, if we can prove that the characteristic number of woman's character is equal to that of man's, we shall prove her equality.

Man reads in history of many superior specimens of his own sex, and he is impressed with the greatness of *man*. He looks around him and sees women of comparatively inferior order, and the impression on his mind that the female character is much below the male standard is perfectly natural. But it is not just to take men who are superior compared with their fellow-men, and compare them with women who are inferior among women. It would appear more just to take the average of each sex and compare

them with each other; this would lead to a more correct conclusion as to existing facts. But these averages have not yet been ascertained; and I am not sure that a conclusion drawn from such averages would truly answer the question, which seems, from its unlimited nature, to refer to the essential characteristics of man's and woman's minds, rather than to their present accidental condition—to what they are severally capable of, rather than to their present actual attainments. Past circumstances may have tended to develop the peculiar excellences of man more than those of woman. Society is to the moral and intellectual being what climate is to vegetable existences; and exerts a deteriorating or healthful influence on individuals, according to its adaptation, or want of adaptation, to their primitive constitutions.

For these reasons we must turn from the actual to the possible condition of woman, and learn, so far as science will teach us, to anticipate to what point woman will rise under circumstances most favourable to her development, and compare her, thus perfected in her highest degree, with man when he is similarly perfected by circumstances equally adapted to his nature. Those who have not the power to do this are not in the position to form an unerring judgment on the subject—they are exceedingly liable to mistakes. The peculiar excellences of woman, viz., her superior moral sentiments and social feelings, combined with fineness of texture, fit her in an especial manner for the highest of human duties—the exercise of moral influence or control over the passions of others.

The government of mind is as superior to the government of matter, as *mind* itself is superior to *matter*. To prove, then, that woman is more eminently fitted for the exercise of this influence, is to do much towards proving that her mind is superior to man's; fitness for exalted duties being a sure test of superiority of mind. A few examples of woman's power in this respect must suffice.

George Combe mentions, that when in America he visited a school conducted by a gentleman and his wife conjointly, and that whenever the former found boys too difficult to manage he sent them to the latter: by this means all corporal punishments were superseded. Other schoolmasters are imi-

tating this example with equal success. The masters themselves feel the beneficial influence of the presence of females in their schoolrooms, by its enabling them more effectually to control their own tempers. Again, in the "Edinburgh Journal" for September, 1845, there is an account of an asylum for the upper classes, conducted by a physician and his wife, where physical force is superseded by moral influence; and not only does the lady exercise a genial influence over the whole establishment at all times, but when the patients are too turbulent for others to control an appeal is made to her; and her influence is so great as to command invariable obedience. And so greatly is she loved and respected, that nothing delights the patients more than to find some opportunity of doing her some little service. These individual instances are only given as illustrations of a new application of a power extensively possessed, but long allowed to lie dormant or run to waste.

If turbulent boys and madmen can be thus easily controlled by woman's influence, what may it not effect when society shall be based on the principle of moral influence—when woman shall be allowed and incited to use this her mighty power in improving the condition of her race? Society has been organized in accordance with the views of *man*, on the principle of *physical* force; this *he* has found to be more easy to wield; at least, so he has thought and so he has acted. It is an essential principle of barbarism. Man in barbarian society is, therefore, pre-eminent and woman degraded; because the former possesses the greater physical power and animal energy.

Amidst the turmoil of opposing physical forces and animalism, woman has not had physical force to maintain an equality of position, or such a degree of freedom, as is essential to the development of her peculiar excellences. Society is, at first, barbarian in its principles. The ancient Jews were a barbarous people, as the orientals have always been, and still are: and this is quite a sufficient reason why so little is said of woman in bible history. Much of barbarism still lingers among us; our laws have, to a great extent, been copied from those of the Romans (an essentially barbarous people), and woman is not free; she is degraded by

dependence and subjection, and often marries those she cannot love for little else than to ensure a supply of daily bread; and haughty man pleads his right to domineer from "*the curse*," as it is termed, pronounced on woman immediately after the fall, as if that conferred on him the right to tyrannize, which he did not before possess. This is not Christianity. Christianity is intended to restore both man and woman from the effects of the fall to paradisiacal perfection and harmony. As this state gradually returns, woman will be elevated more and more in her social position, till she takes her proper sphere, where she will exercise extensively the most potent of all social influences, *gentle yet omnipotent*.

Those who do not understand the nature of moral influence, can never appreciate the character of perfect woman, nor understand her proper duties or true position in our world. Man is too material in his notions, and we must wait till greater spirituality of thought is developed by him, ere we see him entertain just conceptions of woman, with the spiritual nature of her duties. To suppose that woman is merely a domestic animal, governed almost exclusively by "*domestic instincts*," is a great mistake. Most women will undoubtedly choose domestic duties when left perfectly free in her choice; but she will not choose to be, as she now is in the middle and lower ranks of society, a slave to them. Here in England she is forced into the domestic sphere of duties, and kept there by circumstances whether she will or no: in France she is forced out of it; *men* are the domestics. I ought not to dismiss this question without adding something more on woman's intellectual powers. In society we find a great many women who are superior in intellect to men with whom they are connected, engaged in the very duties which nature or custom has assigned to man. These may be considered by some as *exceptions*, though not rare ones. Our proper question is, Will woman's intellect be equal to man's, when both are equally perfected? I do not know any woman who advocates perfect equality in this respect. There are yet many instances on record of intellectual women, which point to a highly respectable position as attainable by females. A few instances must suffice.

Madame de Staël, a French authoress of

celebrity, whose talents were so early displayed that she is said "never to have been a child," from her twentieth year took an active part in literature, and an almost equally active part in politics. And so great was her influence in the political world, that on her opposing Napoleon's government in 1801, he thought it necessary to issue an order for her to quit Paris; and on her return she was again expelled. Her works amount to seventeen volumes.

Lady Hester Stanhope, a near relative and great assistant to the celebrated William Pitt, was another female of strong intellect and "masculine" energy. An account of her may be seen in "Chambers's Edinburgh Journal," 23rd August, 1845, page 117.

Mrs. Carter, an intimate of Dr. Johnson, and also of the most literary characters of that age, acquired the Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, Latin, Italian, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and German languages. She was a translator and poetess.

Anne Dacier, a French lady, who died 1720, "was deeply learned, and an eminent translator of the classics." The greater part of her life was spent in "literary labour," in conjunction with her husband. It is said, greatly to her honour, that though deeply learned, she in society carefully avoided any display of learning, and in all the relations of private life her conduct was exemplary.

Olympia Tulvia Morata was one of the earliest and brightest ornaments of the Reformation. She could declaim in Latin, converse in Greek, and was a critic in the most difficult classics.

Lady Jane Grey, too, evinced great taste and capability for study; besides which, she understood Greek and Latin, with some modern languages. This was not from the

example of most of the friends and relatives by whom she was surrounded—they were directly opposed to her in their tastes: to use her own language, "they never knew what true pleasure meant." But she had other greatness which I am inclined to admire more than learning,—she had great moral worth and fortitude, acting on the most trying occasions from motives of principle and duty. These are excellences in the female character which, when manifested, cannot be too highly valued and praised, but on which I shall not now dwell, or allusion might be made to Mrs. Judson, Elizabeth Fry, and others, whom I have never heard of as being *learned*, but who are eminently great in my eyes, more so than a large majority of men. Rosa Govona is another, vide "Edinburgh Journal," August 23, 1845.

Salade, in a small work on Astronomy, enumerates a considerable number of females eminent as mathematicians and astronomers. Herschel's daughter assisted him greatly in his studies and calculations. Such facts are valuable, as proving that woman's intellect is not essentially and necessarily of such a contemptible order as some men seem to think. Yet they are not of themselves sufficient to decide that woman's mind is equal to that of man's. Greater mathematicians are to be found among the latter.

The final questions are, Does not woman's *moral* excellences and *moral* influence compensate for the want of an equal amount of intellect with some men? And do not the duties of a moral nature, especially enjoined on her by the Creator, imply equality with man in regard to excellence of mental endowment?

T. F. O.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"May may the sterner virtues know,
Determined justice, truth severe;
But female hearts with pity glow,
And WOMAN holds affection dear;
For guiltless woes her sorrows flow,
And suffering vice compels her tear:
'Tis hers to soothe the ills below,
And bid life's fairer virtues appear.
To woman's gentle kind we owe
What comforts and delights us here;
They its gay hopes on youth bestow,
And care they soothe, and age they cheer."
CRABBE.

It is strange to contemplate the many

pranks which PRIDE and PREJUDICE are continually playing with mankind; and it is no less strange to reflect that the victims are not unfrequently found amongst those who would wish to be thought the great and wise among men. In fact, if each of us could only be induced to take the trouble to examine well our own creed, and strike out from the tablet of our belief all such notions as have gained a place there through the instrumentality of one or other of these

passions, we should find ourselves much better and more rational beings through the process.

Take an instance in point. Man has been *told* from his earliest years that he is *mentally* superior to woman. *Pride* jumped at such a flattering conclusion, and urged him forthwith to style himself "lord of the creation;" and *Prejudice* forbade him to inquire into the truthfulness of the claim, lest it should be found wanting. The point has, therefore, among many others, been deemed settled.

Now, we object to the practice of adopting conclusions based upon no better grounds than mere assumption. We have, on more than one occasion, in these pages, pointed out the folly of such a course. And, before now dismissing the subject, we would recommend the following brief rules:—1st. Never reject anything *merely* because it is *new*. 2nd. Never put implicit reliance in a thing *because* it has the claim of *antiquity* on its side.

We propose to apply these principles of investigation to the question now before us, and pledge ourselves to abide by the result. We shall, in the present paper, state our own convictions and our reasons for them; and if our opponents think we are in error, let them set resolutely to work to convince us that we are so.

It has occurred to us, that certain "lords of the creation" must sometimes find themselves sorely puzzled at the position in which they place themselves: we mean those who, while under the influence of a certain prevalent epidemic, called LOVE, have fallen down before, and even worshipped at the feet of, beings whom, in their calmer senses, they consider far inferior to themselves! But we will not, so early in the scene, introduce any "awkward insinuations."

The grounds upon which woman's mental inferiority to man is alleged, seem neither to have been clearly defined nor understood. We have heard it sometimes argued, that as woman was designedly created weaker than man in physical strength, so she was *intended* to be inferior to him in mental power. This is unquestionably a very *simple* argument in more senses than one. If mental capabilities are to be judged by the standard of physical strength, what mighty achievements might be expected from giants! And

how strange that they should be known to the world only by their Jack-and-bean-stalk doings! But we may pass on. Others there are who jeeringly point to history, and ask to be introduced to the recorded actions and accomplishments of patriots and heroes in the female line. Leaving out scriptural record, where woman is ever found foremost in charity and all good works, we may dismiss this objection by saying, that many of the noblest and most heroic deeds which stand recorded on the world's life-history have been accomplished either by, or at the instigation of, woman. But the most frequent and, at first sight, most plausible argument is, that we seldom observe in woman any manifestation of *those higher* intellectual powers which are so common in man. Where, ask these objectors, are your female painters, sculptors, poets, writers of fiction, inventors, designers, &c.? Now, as this seems to be the stronghold of our adversaries, we shall devote more especial attention to it.

Phrenologists have told us, and philosophers have failed to disprove the assertion, that the organs of the brain, the seat of the mind, is divided into *three* distinctive classes, each of them occupying a separate region, and each of them exercising a greater or lesser influence over their possessor, according to their relative preponderance or otherwise. These are usually denominated—(1) the HIGHER INTELLECTUAL, (2) the MORAL, and (3) the SOCIAL groups or faculties. Thus, according to our development, in these several regions shall we exhibit intellectual greatness, as ordinarily expressed, moral power, or social virtues. These faculties, although thus distinguished, are all component parts of the mind in its entirety. Thus, when we speak of *mental power*, we speak of them all conjointly.

Now, it is well known that in women the *social* faculties, at least, preponderate, while the *moral* faculties are, at least, equal; the deficiency therefore being in the intellectual or perceptive faculties. The consideration of these facts will at once explain *why* the mental capabilities and achievements of women present themselves in different forms and under different aspects from those of men. To make this part of our subject more clear, we have prepared and affixed a scale, intended to represent the relative

development or mental power of men and women in the several divisions before specified. In the first, that is, the intellectual department, *man*, as we have before stated, excels; in the second—the moral development—the sexes are *equal*; while in the third, or social organism, the woman has the preponderance. Now, if a line be drawn from the division *a* perpendicularly, it

becomes apparent that what the woman lacks in the intellectual region she compensates for in the *SOCIAL* region. Herein we arrive at the true solution of the problem, which is, that in the sum the mental powers of man and woman are *equal*, although not *IDENTICAL*. Our next step is to elucidate the correctness of this conclusion, and to show how completely it harmonizes with

a

MAN.	WOMAN.
Intellectual.	Intellectual.
Moral.	Moral.
Social.	Social.

all we know or could desire concerning women.

It is the mission of woman to cultivate and excel in the *social* virtues. Poets, authors, philosophers, divines, have all told us so again and again. Listen to a few of their testimonies.

Crabbe says:—

“While the sterner sex disdains
To soothe the woes they cannot feel,
Woman will strive to heal his pains,
And weep for those she cannot heal:
Hers is warm pity’s sacred glow,
From all her stores she bears a part,
And bids the spring of hope reflow,
That languished in the fainting heart.”

Gibbon observes:—“In every age and country the wiser, or, at least, the stronger, of the two sexes has usurped the powers of the state, and confined to the other the cares and pleasures of domestic life.”

Maunder beautifully adds:—“Born to feel and inspire the tender affections, it is the fault of man if well-educated females become not the grace and ornament of society. ... Woman is the *equal* and companion of man—not the plaything of his caprice, nor the slave of his passions. When unpolluted by the breath of sensuality, and unattacked by the more insidious venom of seductive adulation, if in youth her mind has been properly directed, her character will stand forth in all the majesty of native dignity—is all the grace of virtuous simplicity. With

such a being pictured in his imagination, well might the poet exclaim:—

‘Oh! she is all that soul can be,
One deep undying sympathy.’”

Again we find Crabbe exclaiming:—

“Thus in extremes of cold and heat,
Where wandering man may trace his kind,
Wherever grief and want retreat,
In *woman* they compassion find:
She makes the female breast her seat,
And dictates mercy to the mind.”

And in Mr. Ledyard’s words, as quoted by Mungo Park, we find a full confirmation of the truths which the poet thus expressed. He says:—“To a *woman* I never addressed myself in the language of decency and friendship without receiving a decent answer. If I was hungry or thirsty, wet or sick, they did not hesitate, like men, to perform a genuine action. In so free and kind a manner did they contribute to my relief, that if I was dry I drank the sweetest draught, or if hungry, I ate the coarsest mouthful with a double relish.”

There is only one other social aspect in which we wish now to speak of woman, and that is in the intensity of her *LOVE*. It is here that she stands pre-eminent and unapproachable. Man may love ardently and honourably, but it is not in his nature, and therefore he cannot manifest that intense and enduring love which is woman’s birth-right, and, we hope, her pride.

"Man's love is not so wonderful as woman's!
 He with an ardour not to be restrain'd,
 Pours forth the riches of a noble heart
 In passionate excess; yet in the pause
 That lies between the seasons of its power,
 High duties and pursuits of honoured name
 May win him to a short forgetfulness.
 Her passion is not such! The breath she
 breathes
 Is not more certainly the life of life
 Than her quick flowing thoughts the life of love!
 Her heart is in her hand, her eyes, her ears!
 Her ears take in all music, but to her
 It has one burden, and repeats one name!
 No sorrow can suppress it, or destroy
 This woman's love."

The Italian Captive.

Festus, in illustration of woman's love, says:—

"I have seen all the woes of *MAN*—pain, death,
 Remorse, and worldly ruin; *they are little*,
Weighed with the woe of woman, when forsaken
By him she loved and trusted."

But even poets must fail to depict the fulness of woman's love in its noblest manifestation—we mean in the house of adversity, affliction, and distress. It is then that she rises, as it were, out of herself, puts on the garb of a ministering angel of mercy, "and sanctifies the solemn halls of death."

But time and space both prevent us doing justice to our cause. Hour after hour could we adduce fresh instances of the influence of woman in promoting the *social* happiness and *moral* well-being of the human family. We think life would be unbearable without the presence of woman; and often have we sympathized with the exclamation of Campbell, when referring to Adam's position before the creation of Eve:—

"*The world was sad! the garden was a wild!*
And man, the hermit, sighed till woman smiled."

Let us not, then, decide hastily upon this question. Those who have had the advantage of a mother's instructions will not be likely to offer a sentence adverse to the mental claims of woman on the principles we have laid down. Think of a *home* without the presence of that being who, as

"Light intellectual, and full of love,"

is ever making our cares her own, our pleasure hers, and our happiness the object of her life!

Again, what startling facts could we place before the eyes of those who assert that *literature* owes nothing, or but little, to

woman! Even not mentioning the poems of Mrs. Hemans, or the writings of Hannah More, Mrs. Opie, Miss Martineau, Mrs. Ellis, and a thousand others, look at the indirect or, rather we should say, *unseen* influence of woman. How often do we find it recorded in the lives of great authors that their wives, their sisters, or their mothers gave the last finishing stroke to works which have afterwards gained for themselves a high place on the pinnacle of fame! Therefore, although women are not to be expected, for the reasons we have stated, to shine in intellectual attainments equally with men, yet they are not to be denied "honourable mention" for that which they have accomplished. It should also be remembered that, as a general rule, they have not yet received those educational advantages which the male sex have. In fact, we want a more scrupulous attention and regard to female education,

"To show us how divine a thing
 A woman may be made."

The conclusion, then, at which we arrive is, that in her sphere, and ever bearing in mind that *diversity* of power is *no* proof of inferiority, *woman* is in no way mentally inferior to man. She possesses equal mental energy and power, but manifests it according to the different position her divine Creator ordained her to occupy in the great drama of life.

We feel that poetry is so closely associated with the subject of woman, that we have made no hesitation in freely borrowing from the poets, and we will now conclude as we began, by a poetic tribute to woman's greatness, goodness, and beauty:—

"Behold the fair creature, how gorgeously bright,
 By innocence clad in a vestment of light;
 Around her a halo of glory is shed,
 A rainbow of promise encircles her head;
 Her smile like the sun, her tears like spring
 flowers.

Caressing, refreshing the glad infant hours.
 Her zephyrus step scarcely kisses the rose,
 Her lips' ruby caverns rich treasures disclose;
 On her movements affection and tenderness wait,
 She has wealth like a diadem'd queen in her
 state.

Engifted by nature, ennobled by birth,
 She comes to bring gladness and love upon
 earth.

"Tis woman, the crown of creation's vast plan,
 'Tis woman, the friend, wife, and help-meet of
 man."

C. W., Jun.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Woman, beauty is thy power!"

We will not dwell on the interest which is involved in the discussion of this question; although, to a certain class of our transatlantic friends, it is paramount. By them the issue of the interrogation is no longer dreaded, for it is unalterably fixed. Such is not the case in deliberative Old England. Hence this *debut*.

It is scarcely necessary to premise that our conclusions must be based on the postulation of the Baconian view of superiority being taken as the standard by which this case is to be decided. By "Baconian view" we refer to the "fruit" or "vintage" test of that philosopher. For, in the event of inquiry not being prosecuted in accordance with that postulate, it is clear the question verges into neutrality, or else it loses that character which is indispensable to definite answering. Because, proceeding in the discussion with any other aim than that of deciding the query by means of comparing the "products" of the two opposing minds, would be to proceed on the supposition that other than these means were in existence, and should for this purpose be employed. Removing consideration of the palpable results of the respective minds is precisely the same as taking away regard for the power of a machine while calculating the amount of labour that it will perform. There is no way of estimating the superiority of one machine over another, or of one mind over another, but that of concisely accounting for the labour which it performs, the effects, the "fruits," which it produces.

Neutrality, therefore, would be the only remaining ground of debate. To advocate on this ground, we must show that, in the mind of man and of woman, there is not such an approximation towards identity as would enable a comparison of reciprocal powers to be effected, and hence, which would warrant decision on the affirmative or on the negative of the question at issue.

The point of controversy then is—Has woman or man wrought the greatest mental achievements? Which has produced the most weighty evidences of intellectual superiority? Are the chief literary productions,

mechanical inventions, and scientific discoveries, to be, by the voice of majority, awarded to woman? Surely there is no approach to probability here. To whom belongs those works in which highest mental excellence and precision of physical toil are combined? It would, we think, be almost preposterous to attempt to *reply* to these interrogations. Even the Amazonian "Kate" says with indignation—

"Why are our bodies soft, and weak, and smooth,
Unapt to toil, and trouble in the world;
But that our soft conditions, and our hearts,
Should well agree with our external parts?"

Though it is utterly wrong to assume that the "fair" are of such intellectual and physical properties as to be capacitated for being identified with

"Such stuff
As dreams are made of;"

yet we certainly believe that Cowper has *nearly* typified an ideal in accordance with the "Eve" of the paradise-Miltonian, when he says—

"Composure is thy gift;
..... devote thy gentle hours
To books, to music, or
To weaving nets for bird-alluring fruit,
Or turning silken threads round ivory reels."

In reference to mental superiority alone, surely there cannot be matter for contest and doubt. This assumption, it may be urged, is ungallant. But our inquiry is now to ascertain undisguised truth or philosophical accuracy: this fact forms an all-sufficient excusative plea. We cannot echo but one reply—Man. Look at the fruits! Are they not the evidences? and do not these preponderate against woman? We take up a review of the fact. In their province the power of woman's mind is, perhaps, peculiarly adapted for elimination. But Shakspeare is now as "incomparable" as he has ever been. The only "fair" on whom his garment can be supposed, by his most insidious depreciators, and woman's most enthusiastic mental admirers, to have fallen, was that contemporary of Sir Walter Scott, of whom he said—

"She, the bold enchantress, came,
With fearless hand and heart on flame!
From the pale willow snatched the treasure,
And swept it with a kindred measure,

Till Avon's swans, while rung the grove
With Monfort's hate and Basil's love,
Awakening at the inspiring strain,
Deemed their own Shakspeare lived again."

Ben Jonson, Congreve, and Sheridan; Keats, Coleridge, Shelley, Byron; Milton and Wordsworth; Chaucer, "the father of English poetry,"

"The blind old bard of Skio's rocky isle,"

with the thousand others, have no compeers. Where is the necessity or utility of dwelling longer here? Wherever the "lesser orb" casts her shadow, it is but to be eclipsed. Until doubts arise with regard to the superiority of the mental power displayed in the works of those whose names we have enumerated, the chief point—that of literary merit—is, it must be regarded, decided. And as yet these doubts have not so much, we believe, as arisen; or, if they have, they are not prevalent, and so do not affect our position.

We now proceed to consider whether the subjects at issue have minds of a character of that identity which would justify the comparison of the respective products of action. It might be urged that intellects which are so constituted as to be eminently adapted for acquiring knowledge, projecting inquiry, and defending truth, must necessarily be of that fundamental principle which is contradistinctive to the ordained constitution of woman's mind; that the innate disposition of her mentality being docile, and in its whole bearing not suited for acquisitiveness or solid masculine philosophical research, but for intelligent urbanity, subserviency, and rational unanimity; and hence that nature, intending her for a sphere diametrically opposite to that of man, formed her with a mind adapted for the carrying out of that design; and that this, therefore, has led to the destruction of any characteristic common to men. But that this is the case remains to be shown. When the objection which we suppose to be urged has been proved to be validly drawn, the case we advocate will, at the same time, be proved nugatory. But there is no necessary connexion between the powers which act in the gaining of knowledge and the maintaining of truth, and those which act in producing the various mental evolutions indispensable to insidiousness and opprobrious deportment. We may not so far

deviate from the track of our prescribed course, as to enter into a cogent discussion on the metaphysics of this contra-abduction. Let it be sufficient if examples be produced, and that it be shown that no others in juxtaposition to them can be so adduced as to overturn their coercion. For instance, let that learned heroine of history, Lady Jane Grey, be considered. Had not she every grace to which woman is by nature heir? And if old Ascham, speaking through Landor, may be credited, she was also extensively versed in all the literary lore then extant. One who at that age could say, "But tell me, would you command me no more to read Cicero, and Epictetus, and Plutarch? The others I do resign!" must have had a mind very highly cultivated. Other instances of the union in woman of deep learning and high amiability might be quoted, but space forbids. We adverted to these ancient examples in order to controvert the opinion that unusual learning and acute intrigue were in that age invariably twin. But referring to modern times. Here we are constantly borne out. On all sides we have fruits of the skilful use of woman's pen. Those of the "fair" whose mental power has raised them towering over their compeers, have graced their sex as much as their abilities have adorned themselves. The cases in which the motives that prompted the pen were deteriorating to the image which Eve saw reflected in the lake are very exceptional. Mrs. Fry did not more grace the lazaret-house than the many of her corivals have graced literature. The Hon. Mrs. Norton is, perhaps, an exception. "But what is one to the many?" And the mental elements that wrought her unenviable notoriety were set on fire by the collusions of puerile weakness; precisely as "Wakefield" sprang from poverty, Pope from deformity. It was not so much from the possession of power as from the obloquy of impotency.

Perhaps this principle is pressed as applicable to man in common. But it is not just. For we refer to power subservient to morbidity; and while admitting the presence of that power, as incidental to humanity, in woman, deny that an example of it, though exhibiting an unusually high order of a certain grade of mental superiority, is of avail against our assumptions respecting the abuse

of mental power when it is inordinately possessed by woman.

We should wonder at the fluency of an idiot, the strength of a maniac, the acute reasonings displayed in the uncontrolled harangues of a lunatic; but surely, being surprising, we should not deem them worthy of emulation and praise.

And though there are many cases in which fortitude, personal courage, readiness for adaption to adverse circumstances, energy, promptitude, and physical skill and force, have, in a remarkable degree, been exemplified in woman, yet we may not argue that woman is the fit subject for occupying those posts in which these excellences may be developed by constant use. No! Grace Darcys, Catherine of Russia, and other heroines have honoured the world; but we must not, therefore, presume that their sex are to fill the offices in which they shone.

To what conclusion, then, do we now inevitably arrive? Obviously, if we have shown that which we intended, to this,—Woman is mentally inferior to man. The circumstances which accompanied the coming of Eve into the world appear to subtend this view. We do not refer to Milton's portraiture of that event. He had, prior to his entrance on "Paradise," passed through "experiences," which peculiarly unfitted him for correctly seeing the connexion between that event and subsequent history.

Little reliance, then, may be placed in the views which ancient poets convey of the relationships, mental or circumstantial, between woman and man. Correct judgment can be attained only by personal observation. The fruits of the mind, as the fruits of all things else, are the only means of rational decision respecting the source of those fruits. SENOJ.

Politics.

OUGHT MONEY TO BE INTRINSIC OR SYMBOLICAL?

INTRINSIC.—II.

THE currency involves principles very little understood by the masses of mankind, and yet it is a subject which is every day becoming greater importance; we therefore, with great satisfaction, hail its introduction into the pages of the *Controversialist*.

It seems to be universally acknowledged that there should be a circulating medium—a standard of exchange—of some kind or other: and the necessity of it is so evident, that it needs no arguments to demonstrate it. The most savage tribes estimate the value of commodities by reference to some particular object, such as the skins of beasts, shells, powder, shot, various kinds of cattle, &c. But wherever they have been obtainable, the metals, more especially gold and silver, have been preferred; and this for several reasons,—their scarcity, their durability, the difficulty of procuring and refining them; and these, with the fact of their being articles suitable for use and ornament, and therefore of intrinsic value,

have marked them as the most suitable articles for a circulating medium. Hence we find all the more civilized nations have made these two articles the chief medium of exchange.

And now comes the question—Should this medium of exchange possess an intrinsic or symbolical value? By the former is meant something which shall possess a value in itself, apart from the fact of its being the circulating medium, by its being of certain use in the economy of life or labour. By the latter is meant something which shall possess only a fictitious value; something which is so common, or of so little use, as to be, in itself, valueless; or which, if it does possess a certain marketable value, yet from its having a peculiar and distinctive mark added to it (that is, being made the circulating medium), shall have a value added to it far beyond what the expense and labour of adding that mark shall warrant. A sovereign may be taken as a fair example of

the one; for though you may destroy it as a current coin of the realm, by beating it out of its shape, or melting it, its value is thereby little, if at all, decreased. A check will serve as an example of the other, which, being worth many pounds, will, merely by the erasure of the name of the drawer, become valueless.

Now, the circulating medium of this and every other European country essentially possesses an intrinsic value. For, though there are some pieces of paper called notes, not possessing an intrinsic value of one farthing, which will, nevertheless, pass current for many pounds, yet they do so only because they bear a promise that the holder shall be entitled to that number of pounds in gold and silver; and which, on presentation to the drawer he can obtain. Now this being the case, it is evident, that as these notes are only of value because specie can be obtained for them, specie is the true circulating medium.

Gold and silver are recognised as possessing nearly the same marketable value all over the world; their relative value (that of gold to silver being in the proportion of about 15½ to 1) being likewise nearly the same in every country.

Now, the exchangeable value of all commodities depends—1st, upon the scarcity of the material of which they are made; 2ndly, upon the amount of labour expended upon them; and 3rdly, upon the quantity supplied as compared with the quantity demanded. These are as much qualifications of the value of gold and silver as of any other commodities. This being the case, and these two articles being recognised as the medium of exchange—money—by all civilized nations, they cannot as such be scarce, so that there shall be a deficiency in the value of the circulation of nations. As the value of gold and silver in a great measure depends upon their scarcity, the smaller the quantity supplied, the greater will be the value of that which is supplied. So if the supply be 20,000,000 lb., instead of 10,000,000 lb., the value of the circulation will not be materially increased. This would not be equally true of bullion (that is, gold and silver unwrought, not coined or made the circulating medium); for there being an increased supply, and consequently a decrease

in the value, it would be more generally used, and thus the increased demand would in part counteract the effect of the increased supply.

That the value of gold and silver in a great measure depends upon the quantity supplied, we shall soon have—if we have not had—proof. It may be remembered that the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Disraeli), in lately addressing his constituents, attributed the rise in the price of corn, not to any increase in the value of the article, but to a decrease in the value of gold, owing to the increased quantity supplied from the fields of California and Australia. Whether this be so or not, it is not our province here to inquire: but that gold, from the cause above alluded to, *will* be depreciated in value, and that to a very considerable extent, there cannot be the slightest doubt.

But to return. If the supply of gold be doubled, there will not be really a greater value of money in circulation, if, from that fact, the price of commodities rise in the same proportion. Money is only of value to us as it enables us to purchase those articles of which we stand in need; and unless an increased supply of money will enable us to obtain an increased quantity of commodities, what does it profit us to possess it!

We have been thus particular in pointing out that there can be no real scarcity of money, because we believe that it is an argument against a circulating medium of an intrinsic value, that there is not enough of it to allow of industry and energy being exerted to the utmost; that, in fact, mankind cannot labour so much or so advantageously as they would do, if *greater quantities* of money were in circulation. We have endeavoured to show that there is a fallacy in this argument, and that there can be no real scarcity of money. At the same time, there may be and frequently is a scarcity of money *in one country as compared with another*; or amongst one class as compared with another; or with one individual as compared with another. But this is so, not because there is any real scarcity of money in the world, but because the poor country, class, or individual, has not the means of procuring it; that is, they cannot produce articles for which there is a demand so cheap as others;

or they cannot dispose of those articles which they have produced, owing to the markets being glutted: there is either a deficient demand for goods on hand, or there is a want of means, or of industry, to obtain the necessary capital to produce commodities. A nation may stand in this disadvantageous position with regard to another, owing to its geographical position, the nature of its soil, a radical defect in its laws, the slothfulness of its population, &c.; or from some more temporary cause, such as the failure of a crop from which one of its most staple articles of commerce was produced. Under this latter circumstance, that nation would still be under the necessity of applying to foreign nations for those articles for which it was dependent upon them, whilst it would be without that article which it had previously been in the habit of exporting; and thus it would become drained of its gold, as it keeps paying away money and receiving none; and a scarcity of money will be the inevitable consequence. In such a case, the supply not being equal to the demand, its value will rise, whereupon it will leave those places where it is plentiful, and hence of less value, and come to that place where more can be obtained for it; and thus the equilibrium will be restored.

From what has been already said, it will be perceived that the wealth of a nation depends upon the amount of commodities which, from its industry, position, soil, &c., it is able to produce: and that amount is represented by the money which it possesses. From this it follows that a nation or individual cannot possess money—money of an intrinsic value—except as the price of commodities produced and sold.

Such then, briefly, are the leading principles which follow a currency of an intrinsic value. Wherein consists the evil, we are wholly at a loss to imagine. We have shown that a scarcity of money is only a relative term; that there must always be a deficiency of money of an intrinsic value, not necessarily in circulation, but somewhere. We have shown that no nation, class, or individual, can possess money, who cannot produce something—something which is wanted—in exchange for it. We ask, if it be not just and natural that it should be so: if there should not be a relative scarcity of money where there is a relative scarcity

of commodities produced? We hold that it is. Where then, we again ask, are the evils which attend a currency of an intrinsic value?

Let us now turn to the consideration of money of a symbolical value.

A medium of exchange of a purely and wholly symbolical value is something quite untried: the effect of its introduction must, therefore, necessarily be to a certain extent speculative. That its introduction must be universal is evident; otherwise no commerce, except in the way of barter, could be carried on between nations differing in so important a particular as the mode of payment by a currency of an intrinsic value and one of a symbolical value. For no country where the currency was of the former description, would import articles into a country which could only pay for them in a currency of the latter description.

We will suppose, then, money possessing only a symbolical value to be universally adopted. We will further suppose paper to be the article selected, as that possesses many of the essential qualities of a circulating medium. It is easy of production, of but little intrinsic value, light and portable, and capable of being made to occupy little space. It is moreover capable of being made to represent any value, and if destroyed its place is easily and cheaply supplied. All these qualities point it out as the article most likely to be adopted in case such a change in the currency as that above supposed were actually to take place. Having supposed thus much, we really are at a loss what to suppose next, so as to make the supposition, if carried into practice, workable. But as this paper money is symbolical, there must be something of which it is the symbol. What is it to be? Wheat, land, timber, flour, sheep, horses, bullocks; what? We really are at a loss to say. All these articles are continually changing their relative value. To-day wheat is plentiful and cheap: a year hence it is scarce and dear. To-day my paper money, representing so many loads of wheat, will buy me one house: a year hence that same money, representing the same quantity of wheat, will buy me two of the same description. To-day I am a poor man: a year hence, possessing the same amount of paper money, comparatively speaking, a rich one. Evi-

dently, then, wheat is too changeable in its value to serve as the article, from the representation of a certain amount of which the paper currency shall derive its value. Nor, for the same reason, will timber or cattle do. *Land* is an article which changes its value less frequently, and to a less extent; for the supply being always the same, one of the chief essentials to a changeable value is wanting. Will that serve? Let us see. We hold in our hand a paper note representing the value of an acre of land. Some land will yield forty bushels of wheat per acre; other lands twenty only; and a third acre but ten. That note will represent either a value of forty, twenty, or ten; whichever you please. The supply of land in America being greater than the demand, whilst in England the contrary is the case, that same note may be worth ten, twenty, or even one hundred times more in England than in America. Again, one acre of land is situated in a town, and being suitable for building purposes, is worth ten times as much as an acre of plough land. The various portions of the soil, then, differ too much in their relative value to serve as the commodity which this paper money is to symbolize. Bullion, will that serve? What! Gold and silver still to be the standard of exchange! What does it profit you to do away with gold and silver as the real circulating medium, if that which takes its place is only of value as it represents a certain amount of the same article, only in its unwrought state? It may be answered (and we think it is on this supposed rock that our opponents will build the structure of their argument), that the government of a nation may issue these notes representing a value much greater than it really possesses in bullion; and thus the amount of the currency will be much greater than it is at present; and mankind will be benefited by money being more plentiful. To a certain extent we are aware this might be done. In fact, it is now done to a certain extent, in this and most other European countries. For example, both the Bank of England and private banks issue notes representing a much greater value—four or five times greater—than they possess in gold and silver. Nevertheless, it still holds true that these notes are only of value as specie can be obtained for them; and it is only by a

most admirable system of management that the issuers are enabled to meet the demand. The fact is, four or five different notes are cashed by the same specie, which is managed to be obtained faster than the notes are presented for payment. But it is only *credit* which enables them to do this; for as the credit of the bank decreases, so will the value of its notes. The same thing is true of a nation. Beyond a certain extent it could not issue paper money representing a greater value than it possessed in bullion; for the more it issued the less would be its value; and in time the country's credit would be gone, and with it the value of its paper money. We ask, then, where would be the profit of abolishing gold and silver as a medium of exchange, if that which takes its place is only of value as it represents it? Besides, if such were done, would they still possess the same relative value all over the world? Would they not be of greater value in those countries where they were most used in manufactures? Nor would those nations which did not make the same use of them supply the demand; as, in return, they would only receive that which represented the article, for the article itself.

We cannot conceive, then, what should be the article of which this paper money is to be the symbol. There must be *something*, which it shall symbolize; otherwise, if it were possible to confine each nation in the amount it issued (and this you must do, otherwise, if each nation might issue as much as it pleased, it would become worthless, owing to the easiness of obtaining it), a poor nation, that is, a nation not capable, or wanting the industry, to produce its share of commodities, might issue paper money to a greater or as great a value, as one that both could and did produce its share, or even more than its share, of commodities: that is, the *really* less wealthy nation would have a greater *fictitious* wealth, which at the same time passed as wealth, than its really more wealthy neighbour. This certainly appears to be unnatural, and, we cannot but think, unjust also.

Not being able to see any evil in the present system of currency, it having besides the advantage of being the only one that has been tried, and the additional one of being practised by every nation that has

existed; whilst, on the other hand, a currency possessing only a symbolical value is as yet untried, and moreover, in our opinion,

is impracticable; we unhesitatingly answer, that money should possess an intrinsic value.
F.F.

SYMBOLICAL.—II.

As I am fully alive to the truth and importance of the cause of representative money, or paper money, I append my name, as a pledge to the readers of this most improving and impartial periodical, that I am not ashamed of the doctrines, but esteem it an honour to be an humble instrument in laying them before your readers. I sincerely believe that gold money has been an unmitigated curse to the people of the earth; that it has been adopted owing to the gross material state into which man has fallen; and that it is typified in the worship of mammon denounced in the scriptures. Gold money has scarcely any advantage over barter; for if it obviates the difficulties of barter, it widely departs from the justice of that primitive mode of exchange. The problem which money reformers have to solve is, "To invent a paper or representative money, which shall combine the justice of barter with the convenience of money."

In advocating paper money, I labour under great disadvantages. It has been often resorted to—but not on principle—as a last resource in desperate national crises. It has been ruthlessly issued without any basis of labour or production behind it. R. L. G. will find no more determined opponent than myself to an unlimited issue of paper. I am no advocate for any needy adventurer to take a piece of paper, sign it, and pass it off as money, any more than I would be an advocate for the issue of a bill of lading which had no cargo behind it; or of a warehouse warrant with no goods in the warehouse; or of a bill of exchange and no effects. It is against gold I am a determined enemy. But if R. L. G. would take one step in advance in the argument, and, allowing that no single commodity can represent the value of all other commodities, will discuss with me how can paper money be issued, that it shall never be in excess or in deficiency as compared with population and consequent production, I should with pleasure go into that important inquiry.

R. L. G. refers to the continental money of the American War of Independence.

Why, what would he have? They had no gold nor silver. They were obliged to issue paper, and that paper won their independence. Why find fault with an instrument that effected its purpose? Then the French assignats! that staple argument with bullionists. Why, the French assignats saved the republic. This powerful instrument precipitated armies on every frontier of France. It is a fact—by Carlyle admitted in his French Revolution—that though the excesses of that convulsion have filled posterity with horror, yet that the condition of the people was never better. But let R. L. G. mark this, that I still maintain that, powerful as this instrument has been for national purposes, it has been empirically issued. R. L. G. must know that the assignats were issued at first on a sound basis, on the national domains, and then performed all the functions of a legitimate money; but unscrupulous men afterwards issued them ruthlessly and without any base of labour or land, and then depreciation—excessive depreciation—ensued.

R. L. G. alludes to Russian paper money. The Russians were wise enough to invent an internal money with which to transact internal business, and so send all their gold to this country, where they got four pounds an ounce for it. I only wish the Californians and Australians were equally wise; it might open our eyes to the folly and insanity of our gold worship.

"The true theory of currency can only be that which practice has taught us." Was ever such a doctrine enunciated! The true theory of roads can only be that which practice has taught us;—have nothing to do with railways. The true theory of transmission of thought can only be that which practice has taught us;—do not theorize about electric telegraphs. Sir Robert Peel's law, that the immense transactions of this country shall, although amounting to thousands of millions, be ultimately resolvable into some fifty millions of gold, is what practice teaches, the cause and source of the incalculable ruin which fell on our trading

interests in October, 1847;—do not let the experience of that fatal year induce you, says R. L. G., to see whether money may not be based on some philosophical axioms. Practice! Practice teaches us, that so unbearable was Peel's bill, which is a legitimate bullionist bill, carried out to its legitimate consequences, that it was suspended and declared unworkable.

It seems I have Montesquieu and Smith, Peel and Horner, quoted as authorities. I could quote Sir Robert Peel's father as a set-off to the son, and I will venture to put Mr. Matthias Attwood against Mr. Horner. Adam Smith most unaccountably slurred over the question of money and its principles; and against Montesquieu I put our own Bishop Berkeley, who asks some most pertinent questions, namely, "Whether money is to be considered as having an intrinsic value, or as being a commodity, a standard, or a pledge, as is variously suggested by writers;" and "Whether the true idea of money as such be not altogether as a ticket or counter?" This great thinker saw the importance of the money question, for he asks again, "Whether the use and nature of money, which all men so eagerly pursue, be yet sufficiently understood and considered by all?" He puts another question, which R. L. G. may answer at his leisure, "Whether paper doth not, by its stamp and signature, acquire a local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold, and whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and, therefore, preferable to gold?"

Labour is the source of all wealth, and money should be only the certificate or memorandum of wealth. Now, I ask, is not an insane demand for gold, as a money, ruining Australia? The whole population have turned out, left their skilful employments, ceased to cultivate the land, ceased to build their houses, ceased to follow their useful occupation, and converted themselves, under the premium of one fixed price—four pounds an ounce—into so many grubbers into holes and cinder-shifters. I may be mistaken, but I say, that if gold was deprived of its money function, it would only be worth, at this moment, for its intrinsic qualities so useful to art, about one pound an ounce, owing to its miraculous discovery in such large quantities.

R. L. G. says, "As amicable foreign rela-

tions wane, the value of symbolical money must wane also." Not at all. The object of an internal currency is for internal purposes, and its great beauty is, that the action of foreign exchanges never withdraws it. R. L. G. must know that foreigners do not take our sovereigns—*quasi* sovereigns—but a certain weight of a valuable article of commerce; and paper money would allow every ounce of gold to leave the country without the slightest inconvenience, for the paper would supply its place. R. L. G. must be informed, moreover, that we have had an internal money, not made of paper, but of wood. He knows, I am sure, all about exchequer tallies—it would be impertinence for me to teach him what every tyro knows, that the exchequer tally was wooden money, and worked in the following manner:—

The king wanted, say, a war horse, and taking one, paid the owner with an exchequer tally. The owner of the horse next day bought sheep from his neighbour, and paid him with the piece of wood with certain conventional notches on it. The king, demanding taxes from the owner of the sheep, received the piece of wood, which was cancelled by the exchequer. So that practice is not altogether on R. L. G.'s side.

I do not want to quote authorities, for paper money is a new question, and has never, I admit, been issued on scientific principles; but I can, if space allow, quote General Harrison, Dr. Franklin, Sir Robert Peel the elder, Sir Walter Scott, under his signature, "Malachi Malagrowther," and Bishop Berkeley. I could show that America, by General Jackson's idolatry of gold, was convulsed to her centre. I could show that it was paper money that enabled Pitt to elevate the country at home, and to conquer Bonaparte. And I could show that if we had paper money issued *bond fide* on labour and products, that the illimitable powers of this country to produce might then have fair play—every man at work, every steam-engine in full operation; that poor rates might be annihilated; and that if any great work could not be prosecuted, it would never be for want of money, but because every man was so deeply engaged, that there was no spare labour free and at liberty to prosecute it.

JAMES HARVEY.

The Societies' Section.

STUDIES FOR LAW STUDENTS.

As this magazine includes in the ranks of its readers a large number of young men who intend to follow the profession of the LAW, either as solicitors or barristers; and as frequent inquiries are addressed to the Editors for information on various topics relating to the acquisition of such *general knowledge*, by students, as may be found of service to them, either in preparing for or following their profession; it is proposed from time to time, as occasion may require, to devote some space to their especial service.

We know that by some persons it is held to be unnecessary, and even dangerous, for a student to direct his attention to branches of knowledge other than those immediately appertaining to his intended profession. But it is to this principle we attribute the not unfrequent occurrence of learned men (so-called) exposing themselves to ridicule the moment they step from the path of their own immediate experience. As the Greek tragedian beautifully said, that being *human*, he considered nothing alien to him which related to humanity, so we think that the student at law should deem no knowledge unimportant to him, which will be likely, in any way, to aid him in his professional career. And where, we ask, is there a profession in which such a diversity of knowledge is essential to success as in the law? One day the solicitor or barrister may be engaged in protecting his client from the piracy of some mechanical invention or scientific discovery; the next, prosecuting upon a breach of the law of copyright; and a third, examining the accounts of a bankrupt. There is, in fact, no assigned limits to the diversity of knowledge required of him; and, as a general rule, he will succeed best whose mind has been best prepared to grapple with these changes.

It may not be necessary to adopt any particular rules for the acquisition of this secondary or supplemental knowledge. The course adopted will depend upon the individual abilities and opportunities of students, as well also as upon their tastes and inclinations, and even upon the particular branch of the profession they intend to follow. For these reasons we shall adopt no given order in our intended remarks and recommendations, but rather take them as they suggest themselves to us, or as we have reduced them to practice.

Assuming each student to have finished his SCHOOL EDUCATION, either as a prelude to his next studies, or concurrently with them, let him acquire a perfect and ready knowledge of some good system of *short-hand*. To acquire this knowledge, so as to be really useful, will occupy some time, and be attended with some little trouble. But that time and trouble will be well repaid. The student unacquainted with this art can form no conception of its many advantages. Throughout all his after studies it will be one of his best, because most serviceable, friends. For reports, for marginal notes, for extracts from works read, for copying precedents, and for correspondence with other students, nothing can exceed its advantages. It stimulates to industry, and materially lessens the labour attending it. After obtaining an acquaintance with the most popular systems in practice, we can recommend *Pitman's Phonographic Short-Hand* as the best for all the purposes enumerated.

The next thing is for the student to provide himself with an *Index Rerum* and a *Common-place Book*. Of the former, Todd's (price 3s. 6d.) is the best. The latter may be made to the student's own taste. Blue-lined paper with a margin forms the most convenient sort we have seen. The purpose of the *Index Rerum* is, as its name implies, to make an index of the facts and information acquired in the process of reading and study. As the book we have recommended contains full instructions for its use, we need only remark, that as we all know how much sooner knowledge is *lost* than gained, any plan which will enable us to retain it at our fingers' ends, ready for any emergency, must be exceedingly valuable. Some students have found that with a carefully kept *Index Rerum* they had but little need for a *Common-place Book* in addition. This will depend pretty much upon the student's own taste. Whilst reading, we often find passages which bear with peculiar force upon points to us possessing more than ordinary interest. The object of our *Common-place Book* is to get into one collected form, ready for easy reference, the opinions of different writers and speakers upon these particular points. Short-hand makes the process one of little trouble, and that little is amply repaid by the result. As the student advances, a *Precedent Book* will be required—but of this more anon.

Next, the student should be thinking about the various means of acquiring a proficiency in the art of *public speaking*. Too much importance can hardly be attached to this acquisition. If the student intends to qualify for the bar, his road to eminence, as it has been said, "lies through his tongue;" and even as a solicitor, he will find frequent occasion to speak in public, and his clients will soon appreciate any excellence he may possess in this particular.

There are various methods by which the student may attain proficiency in this art. One of the first requisites is *knowledge*, for unless a man possesses a clear knowledge of the matter on which he has to speak, and even of its bearings, he will find great difficulty in delivering himself eloquently. Next, he should make himself acquainted with the best models of eloquence, not for the purpose of becoming a mere reciter, or a servile copyist of the style or language of another; but that by seeing the excellences of others, he may be encouraged and aided in making himself excellent. Then he must **PRACTICE**. A man may be acquainted with *all* the best models—may be able to sit in critical judgment upon them—and may also have a mind well stored with information; but unless he has given some time and pains to practice, he will most likely make a miserable failure as an orator. In public speaking there is required certain gestures—"suited the action to the word"—which can only be acquired by practice. But it is not our purpose to give instruction in oratory; we will therefore only refer our readers to the "*Guide to Oratory*" (Mitchell, London), and proceed.

The student will naturally ask *where* he is to practice oratory? He cannot commence before public assemblies, and does not care to practice in his own chambers. In fact, in one case the excitement would be *too great*, in the other *too little*. What, then, is to be done? In almost every town there is, or should be, a *Debating Club* or a *Discussion Class*, where questions of present or permanent interest are opened and discussed on the plan adopted in this magazine. At such meetings the student has the advantage of the stimulus which the presence of a mixed audience of friends and strangers generally imparts, and which will prompt him to endeavour to excel. In the biographies of nearly

the great men of modern times, we have observed that they at some period of their life had joined a debating club, and many of our living orators have derived great assistance from this source. Let the student, then, enrol himself a member of one of these clubs; and let him do so with a steady determination to gain his end, and he will succeed. If there be no such class, let him forthwith call the other students of his town together and form one; but, if possible, let it be in connexion with some literary or scientific society, and not at an inn or tavern.

Besides the direct advantage of attaining fluency and readiness in public speaking, debating societies offer additional and peculiar advantages to law students. In them they learn that every question has two sides: and hence they also learn not to place implicit reliance upon either until the other has been well discussed and considered. They moreover become accustomed to sift the arguments of the various speakers, and by degrees are enabled to judge of those which are based upon sophistry, or seek to promulgate fallacious conclusions, and can treat them for what they are worth. By these means they are gradually preparing themselves for the proper discharge of those duties which will appertain to their intended profession: this is a point never to be lost sight of. Perhaps we cannot better clench our argument for the acquisition of general knowledge by the law student, than by citing the following extract from BLAIR'S Essays:—"Besides the knowledge that properly belongs to that profession to which he addicts himself, a public speaker, *if ever he expects to be eminent*, must make himself acquainted, as far as his necessary occupations allow, with the general circles of polite literature. The study of poetry may be useful to him on many occasions, for embellishing his style, for suggesting lively images, or agreeable allusions. The study of history may be still more useful to him; as the knowledge of facts, of eminent characters, and of the course of human affairs, finds place on many occasions. *There are few great occasions for public speaking in which one will not derive assistance from cultivated taste and extensive knowledge.* They will often yield him materials for proper ornament; sometimes for argument and real use. *A deficiency of knowledge, even in subjects that belong not directly to his own profession, will expose him to many disadvantages, and give better qualified rivals superiority over him.*"

C. W., Jun.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Milwaukie Mechanics' Institution.—On Friday evening, the 19th March, upwards of 200 of the members and friends of the above institution held a social festival in the Congregational Hall. The president, Mr. H. Ross, occupied the chair, and delivered an excellent address upon "The Advantages of Knowledge." The following members addressed the meeting during the evening: Mr. R. Crawford, on "The Social Condition of the Working Classes in the Olden Time;" Mr. J. Hinkley, on "Some of the Causes of Ignorance;" Mr. T. Douglas, on "The Process of Moral Regeneration in the Mind." "National Education and its probable Results upon Mechanics' Institutions," was popularly treated of by H. Carmichael; who, after briefly alluding to the necessity for a grand and comprehensive system of educa-

tion, and the duty of government in reference thereto, proceeded to prove that the cry which is being raised against a national system of secular education, as being "godless" and "irreligious," is founded on the delusion, that by making religious instruction imperative—by making it a matter of statutory business—by obliging the schoolmaster to teach it—security is thereby furnished for inculcating respect, and inducing love for religion. He strongly urged the importance of the working classes uniting in support of a truly national system of secular education (the only common ground upon which all can meet), and thereby secure to every child within these realms what he conceived to be their inalienable right, a good and useful education. He then went on to delineate the beneficial results which would flow

from Mechanics' Institutions, could they be rendered national, so as to make them a part of the popular instruction, and drew a bright and hopeful picture of the position such institutions would occupy under a national system. He concluded by maintaining that a liberal and judicious system of national education would secure for these institutions an amount of success commensurate with their design and universal importance. A musical party was in attendance, and contributed much to enliven the proceedings, by giving in good style several select glees, duets, and solos. Refreshments in pastry and fruit were served to the company during the evening, and the meeting passed off with the greatest *eclat*; forming a most appropriate finale to the present session, which has been one of the most successful in the annals of the institution; thirteen public lectures having been delivered upon highly useful and interesting subjects, many of them by gentlemen of first-rate talent and ability. Several liberal donations have been received from the gentlemen in the neighbourhood, thereby enabling the directors to develop more fully the advantages of the institution, by adding a fresh supply of those solid fruits of mental toil which go to make up our national literature; and placing them within the reach of those to whom, but for such institutions, they would have remained inaccessible.

H. C., Sec.

Shirley, near Southampton.—The second anniversary of the Shirley Mutual Improvement Society was celebrated March 24th, 1852, on which occasion about eighty friends sat down to tea. A meeting was afterwards held for the purpose of furthering the objects of the society, when the Mayor of Southampton, R. Andrews, Esq., presided. After an opening address by the chairman, the secretary read a paper illustrating the objects and principles of the society, and reporting the operations of the institution for the past year; from which it appeared that 29 lectures had been delivered, and 13 discussions held, and 33 members received into the society. Addresses were delivered by the Revs. Messrs. Hugh, Hutton, Alexander, M'Laren, and T. Falvey, Esq. The enjoyment of the evening was greatly enhanced by the performances of a glee party, and by several recitations from members and others. At the close the whole company joined in singing the national anthem, and separated highly delighted with the evening's entertainment.

South Wales.—Merthyr-Tydvil Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—This society was established in April, 1851, in the following manner:—Some praiseworthy young men, anxious for the welfare of others, caused printed bills to be placarded over the town, inviting the public, especially young men of all grades, to a public preliminary meeting for the purpose of forming a society for mutual improvement. There was a very good attendance at the meeting, and several gentlemen delivered able addresses, showing the benefits that would be derived from such a society. At the close of the meeting a committee of twenty was chosen, for the purpose of drawing up rules and regulations for the society, and the names and subscriptions of parties wishing to become members were received. The principal rules and regulations drawn up by the committee and adopted by the members were

as follow:—That the society should be called, "The Merthyr Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society;" that each member should subscribe one shilling per quarter, to be paid in advance; that none but members should be allowed to attend the meetings; that the affairs of the society should be managed by a president, vice-president, secretary, and committee of twelve; that the said officers should be elected on the last evening in every quarter by a majority of the members—the mode of election being by ballot; that meetings should be held twice in every week, viz., on Tuesday evening, for the purpose of debating, or of hearing an essay on some interesting subject by one of the members; and on Thursday evening, for the purpose of holding classes for instruction in grammar, arithmetic, geography, &c.

The only alterations that have been made in these rules are, that each member is now allowed to introduce one friend or acquaintance into the society's room once during each quarter; and that parties wishing to join must request members to propose them, and then be admitted by a general ballot.

On the first evening of every quarter we request some gentleman of known abilities to deliver a public lecture, which is duly announced by printed bills. We have also printed cards, for the pocket, containing the list of subjects for each quarter. We now number about thirty members. President, Rev. J. C. Campbell, M.A.; vice-president, Mr. William M'William; secretary, Mr. William M. Fuller.

Some of the members, including myself, take in the *British Controversialist*, and regard it as a publication of inestimable value, that cannot be too widely circulated or highly prized.

I have been thus explicit, thinking that what is here stated may be of service to similar societies.

D. J.

Greenwich Literary Institution.—The second quarterly meeting of the members of the Elocution Class was held in the great hall of this institution, on Wednesday the 24th of March, 1852. Newton Crossland, Esq., of Hyde Vale, Blackheath, presided on the occasion.

The chairman commenced the business of the evening with a short but appropriate address. The first part of the entertainment opened with Scene 3, Act I., of Shakespeare's *Henry IV.* The King was personated by Mr. James; Hotspur by Mr. D. P. Waters, who gave the part with much effect, and succeeded in calling forth a general expression of applause from the audience. Northumberland and Worcester were represented by Messrs. Jackson and B. W. Smith.

A scene from *Charles XII.* next followed, in which Mr. Talbot elicited repeated expressions of applause by the irresistibly comic manner in which he gave Peter. Then the *petite farce* of *Pillicoddy* succeeded, which afforded much merriment. A portion of Bourcicault's *farce*, *Up, and Tyrrell's* comic dialogue, *In Want of a Situation*, were given, in which Messrs. Waters, Jackson, and B. W. Smith, afforded much amusement. In addition to the above, there were some good pieces of prose and verse, from our popular authors, recited with various degrees of skill by other members of the class in the course of the evening.

The audience, consisting of between 700 and

40 persons, seemed much pleased with the evening's entertainment.

It is hoped that these quarterly elocutionary entertainments will be carried on with as much

spirit and energy as hitherto, and thus afford a treat to the friends of mental progress and improvement in Greenwich and its neighbourhood.
J. W. T.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

101. I have got an idea lately that I can pursue two studies at the same time; my plan—upon which I desire the opinion of some one more experienced than myself—may be gathered from the following:—I am sufficiently acquainted with French to be able, with little difficulty, to read an author in that language, but have by no means the familiarity with it which I am anxious to attain; I am also at present about to turn my attention to comparative physiology and history, and have thought if I could get French works on these subjects, by their perusal I might increase my knowledge of the language, while I was also gaining useful knowledge of another kind; should this plan be thought capable of being advantageously carried out, I should esteem it a great favour if some one would inform me of good French publications under those heads, with respective prices, and name of London book-seller from whom they may be obtained.

AVARUS.

102. The effects of the east wind are felt and seen by every one, and there are few who cannot testify to their prejudicial influence. And yet what is the cause? Their coming from across the continent of Europe cannot be a reason, as travellers in other lands speak of the discomfort arising from easterly winds. The locusts covered the land of Egypt, drawn thither by this wind, and indeed all its effects are rather of a disastrous character. Can it be, as some have attested, that in the earth's revolution upon its axis it rushes into this wind? I shall look anxiously for a well-grounded opinion.—CONSTANTIA.

103. As I am very desirous of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages, but have no friend near to direct me, I would feel thankful to any of your learned correspondents for a few directions as to the best mode for pursuing my studies, together with a list of the best works in connexion with the above languages. Hoping that you will deem my thirst for knowledge a sufficient apology for thus troubling you, I remain, &c.—L. G.

104. I shall feel obliged if any of the studious and intelligent readers of the *British Controversialist* will furnish me with their opinions as to the utility of Common-place Books. Are they really of service to the student, and why? Do they fix the subject more firmly in the memory? Are the subjects entered in a common-place reader of more reference than to a work itself? Is the system in general a sufficient compensation for the time and paper used in making such entries? And if this plan should be recommended by any, they will oblige by stating the system adopted by themselves in taking notes; whether it is best to form a sort of abstract or analysis of the work read, or to take a sentence here and there, as you may think such sentence would be of use? For the better illustration of this subject, I should

feel obliged if they would show me how, in reading the article on Rhetoric, in the last number, they would take full and copious notes of it; and also give me their general plans in reading any work on literature or science. I should like to have the opinions of those who are great readers and diligent students, and to have full directions and advice on the above points, as I think that the manner of reading is not of secondary importance to the matter. Indeed we may get more information by reading one book well, than twenty badly. I should also like to know the sort of books generally used, and whether one does for several subjects, or whether it is the best to have separate ones for each separate subject. I feel confident that the Editors, with their wonted kindness, will not begrudge the space necessary for such answers, as I think it is a subject which will be of importance to all who feel interested in the arduous task of self-cultivation, and particularly as no remarks on this head have as yet appeared in this excellent periodical. Answers to this will be thankfully read by—A STUDENT.

105. Would you or any of your correspondents be kind enough to inform me what might be the probable outlay for matriculation at the London University? also, what is the course of study? Any other information respecting it would oblige.

W. G. C.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

70. *Carthaginian Names*.—According to Salust, Adherbal and Mastanabal were Numidians. But it appears that Numidia (as well as Carthage) was colonized by the Phœnicians. It is therefore highly probable that the same language was spoken in Numidia as at Carthage—i.e., the Punic. Bochart and many others prove that the Punic was a language of the same origin as the Hebrew. (See Bochart de *Coloniis et Sermone Phœnicum*, lib. ii. cap. 1.) The etymology of the two names may consequently be sought from the Hebrew.

Adherbal appears to be formed of the two words *adhder*, i.e., great, magnificent, or mighty; and *Baal*, the name of an idol. Now, *Baal*, *Bal*, *Bel*, or *Belus* was the great God of the Carthaginians; the name, therefore, signifies the "*great Baal*."

Mastanabal. This word seems to be compounded of *Mathlana*, i.e., gift; and *Baal*; and therefore probably signifies, "*the gift of Baal*."

77. *Mind in its relation to Matter*.—We know of no single work which supplies the desired information. Indeed, a complete and comprehensive treatise on this subject is a desideratum in our literature. Man-science is yet in its infancy: so far, however, as we are acquainted with the writings most nearly allied in their topics with the wants of P. S., we think that the following works, read in the order given, would go pretty far towards settling the views of your correspondent, viz., Chambers's "*Information for the People*"—papers,

"Phrenology," and "The Human Mind"; Caldwell's "Thoughts on Physical Education"; Combe's "Constitution of Man," Combe's "System of Phrenology"; the three works by A. Combe, E. Johnson, and S. Smith, mentioned in the query of P. S.; Dr. John Gregory's "Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man, with those of the Animal World"; Sweetser's "Mental Hygiene"; Rapport's "Du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme" (On the Relations of the Physical Organization of Man to his Moral Faculties), par Pierre Jean George Cabanis; Comte Destutt de Tracy's "Elements d'Ideologie"; the works of Gall, Spurzheim, Bronsais, and Azais (of their chief works we believe there are translations); Lawrence's "Comparative Anatomy," and "Lectures on Man"; J. Mill's "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind"; Locke's "Essays," book i.; Mill's "Logic," book vi.; Dr. G. Moore's "Use of the Body in Relation to the Mind," and "Power of the Soul over the Body"; Dr. Wigan's "Duality of the Mind"; Hartley's "Observations on Man"; Dr. A. Smee's "Process of Thought, adapted to Words;" and, amidst much absurdity, egotism, and equivocation, several items of information may be picked up from "*Nuces Philosophicæ*" (Philosophic Nuts), by the author of "Life, Health, and Disease." The two works by Upham and Sampson would decidedly be useful; and several other articles of interest connected with this subject may be found in the "Phrenological Journal," the "Zoist," the "Journal of Health," &c. We may be allowed to say, however, that so far as these works attempt to abnegate the existence of a mind differentiated from brutish (apparent) intelligence, we do not sympathize with them. That "the earthly house of our tabernacle" may be dissolved without necessarily implying our total dissolution, we most firmly believe, and though we must acknowledge that the union-bonds of soul and body are intimately interwoven, we are irresistibly compelled to believe in their complete, perfect, and entire differentiation. We are convinced, however, that an accurate knowledge of the structure, healthy action, diseased action, and the organic functions of the mere animal machine, would materially tend to the clearing away of the mists which overshadow metaphysical inquiries. Some of the arguments for the existence of mind may be thus briefly enumerated—1st. Essentially distinct qualities presuppose essentially distinct entities. 2nd. Were mind and matter the same, mind must necessarily be latent in matter until educated to manifest itself by being put in certain relations; all matter must therefore be permeated with mind,

"And the dull clod on which we tread
Be instinct with such soul as human kind."

3rd. The evidence of consciousness. 4th. Dreams and other sleep-facts, *e. g.*, the common occurrence

of one engaged in excogitation, in the evening retiring to rest unsuccessful, and waking with a full mental view of the topic, making it probable that the mind acts continually, although we only become conscious of the motion of thought in waking hours or in diseased states of the bodily organs occasioning dreams. 5th. Absence of mind. 6th. The alternations of healthy and unhealthy action of brain in the insane, producing the idea of the derangement of mind, while it is really no more an argument to that effect than difference of media is evidence of variation in the real and actual qualities of light. 7th. The mind remaining clear, calm, and self-possessed up to the very moment of death, &c. We hope these observations may not be considered out of place, as corrective of the general influence of some of the works above mentioned.—THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

90. *Chivalry, the Crusades, and our Colonies.*—We are unable to refer J. C. H. to any History specially devoted either to Chivalry or the Crusades. The best cyclopædias furnish a good deal of information on both these subjects. In Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of Rome" there will be found many allusions to Chivalry; and in Guizot's "History of Civilization in Europe" will be found a vast amount of valuable information on the Crusades, and the benefits resulting therefrom. A work entitled, "Chronicles of the Crusades," published by Bohn, London, gives a great deal of interesting information as to the Crusaders. Undoubtedly the best "History of the British Colonies," is that now publishing by Montgomery Martin; it is sold in eight divisions, at 7s. 6d. each, is got up in elegant style, and brings all its information down to the present time. In Porter's "Progress of the Nation" will be found much interesting and useful information regarding our colonies.—C. W., Jun.

98. *The Italian Language.*—Veneroni's "Italian Master" and "Exercises" are excellent works, and such as we can confidently recommend. But if our correspondent be well acquainted with grammar, and have the advantage of knowing French, we think he will find Ollendorff's "New Method" better adapted to give a thorough practical knowledge of the language without the aid of a teacher. If the latter work should be the one of his choice, we would recommend him to limit himself to one or two lessons a week, as the case may be, always taking care that the last be thoroughly appreciated and remembered before commencing the next. Soave's "Novelle Morale" is a suitable reading-book for the student, and will agreeably relieve the monotony of Ollendorff. As to the pronunciation in default of *viva voce* instruction, he may resort to a cheap work, called "Italian Without a Master," on the Robertsonian method.—S. M. F.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XVI.

1. Define a Hypothetical Syllogism, and point out the difference between a categorical and a hypothetical one, with examples.

2. Define and exemplify Direct and Indirect Hypotheticals.

3. What are Disjunctive Syllogisms? Give examples.

4. Define a Dilemma. Give examples, and

the difference between a Direct and an Indirect Dilemma.

5. What is an Enthymeme? What are the rules regarding Enthymemes? Give examples.

6. What is meant by the terms, Epichirema, Sorites, and Prosyllogism?—and give examples.

7. Define "Analogy." What are the laws and precautions necessary to be observed in reasoning by it?

8. Define Induction, and show the connexion between Inductive and Syllogistic reasoning.

9. To which of the classes of Informal Syllogisms do the following examples of Reasoning belong, viz.:—

"Government ought to educate the people, because by so doing she would increase knowledge, refine imagination, improve taste, culture the moral faculty, elevate the mind, and enable men to act their part in life in such a manner as to be at once respectable and useful to themselves and advantageous to the public."—*Newspaper paragraph*.

"The country of Greece presents a large, irregular peninsula, intersected by many chains of mountains, separating its different districts, and opposing natural impediments to general intercourse, and therefore to rapid civilization."—*Tytler's Elements of General History*, cap. vi. paragraph 1st.

"The solemn conflicts of reason with passion; the victories of moral and religious principle over urgent and almost irresistible solicitations to self-indulgence; the hardest sacrifices of duty—those of deep-seated affection and of the heart's fondest hopes; the consolations, hopes, joys, and peace of disappointed, persecuted, scorned, deserted virtue, these are of course unseen; so that the true greatness of human life is almost wholly out of sight."—*Channing on Self-Culture*.

"Men might be better if we better deemed Of them. The worst way to improve the world Is to condemn it. Men may overget Delusion; not despair."—*Festus*.

"If a state has fallen into the unfortunate system of paper money, and this sinks in comparison with silver; then should a juncture of favourable circumstances furnish the means of re-establishing a metallic currency, it is altogether absurd, nay, purely disastrous, to make the metal resume its place with its standard *unchanged*, and the sums in all contracts abide by their *nominal amount*, while it is impossible to keep up prices at the height where they stood at the time of the paper circulation."—*Niebuhr's Roman History*, vol. i. p. 455, edition 1831, quoted in "Letters on Monetary Science," by ALADDIN.

"In general, fertile and luxuriant countries seem peculiarly fitted to be the nursery of refinement: because leisure awakens curiosity, and curiosity leads to pursuits that fill up the vacancies in human life. Every new situation presents to man new objects of solicitude and care. The demands of animal nature no longer bounds his desires. The scene now opens to the intellectual eye. He marks the relations and dependencies of things, and learns to contemplate the world and himself."—*Dunbar's Essays on the History of Mankind*, vi.

"If generals are not disrespected although they are frequently vanquished, neither should sophists be so."—*Aristotle's Rhetoric*, book ix. cap. 23.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. V.

1. Write out the following nouns, with their feminines, in a form like the one given, placing each class of words in its proper column. Deacon, nephew, hero, host, lad, heir, king, conductor, dog, earl, duke, hart, adulterer, monk, horse, lord, colt, peacock, beau, stag, wizard, bull, seamster, marquis, protector, emperor, man-servant, votary, tutor, actor, executor, caterer, administrator, arbiter, governor, director, patron, chanter, margrave, ram, ambassador, mayor.

NOUNS.

GENDER.

By different terminations.		By different correlative words.		By prefixing a word denoting the gender.	
Masculine.	Feminine.	Masculine.	Feminine.	Masculine.	Feminine.
By the addition of "us."	And contraction when necessary.				
By the addition of "ix."	And contraction when necessary.				
By the addition of "ine."	And contraction when necessary.				

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—IV.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 13. The numerator and denominator of a fraction may be multiplied by any number

without altering its value; so, $\frac{1}{2}$ may be multiplied by the product of 3, 4, 5, 7, or 420; and $\frac{1}{3}$ by the product of 3, 4, 5, 7, or 280; and $\frac{1}{4}$ by the product of 2, 3, 5, 7, or 210; and $\frac{1}{5}$ by the product of 2, 3, 4, 7, or 168; and $\frac{1}{6}$ by the product of 2, 3, 4, 5,

or 120; then we have $\frac{420}{840} \frac{280}{840} \frac{210}{840} \frac{168}{840} \frac{120}{840}$
 the answer, which may be further reduced if
 divided by 2 = $\frac{210}{420} \frac{140}{420} \frac{105}{420} \frac{84}{420} \frac{60}{420}$.

VILLAGER.

Question 14. The content of the first wall = $700 \times 12 \times 2 = 16800$ cubic feet, and the labour required to build it = $30 \times 164 \times 12 = 59040$ hours.

The content of the other wall = $900 \times 8 \times 1\frac{1}{2} = 10800$ cubic feet.

Then $16800 : 10800 :: 59040 : 37954.285$ hours' labour required to build the second wall; and as each man engaged upon it works $70 \times 10 = 700$ hours, therefore $37954.285 \div 700 = 54.22 =$ the men required.

W. H. R.

Question 15. Let x be the discount required; then by the question $x = \frac{2.5}{100} (5740 - x) = \frac{5740 - x}{40}$
 or $41x = 5740 \therefore x = £140$.

J. K.

Question 16. $x + y = 20$ (1). $x^2 + y^2 = 232$ (2).

Squaring (1) we have $x^2 + 2xy + y^2 = 400$.

Subtracting (2) from (1)² $\therefore 2xy = 168$ (3).

Subtracting (3) from (2) we obtain $x^2 - 2xy + y^2 = 64$.

Extracting root, $x - y = +8$ (4).

By addition since $x + y = 20$ (1) $\therefore 2x = 20 + 8 = 28$ or 12 . $\therefore x = 14$ or 6 .

Subtracting (1) from (4). $\therefore y = 6$ or -14 .

DIDYMUS.

Geometry.

Question 7. Construct the equilateral triangle ABC about the given circle, and through the centre O of the circle draw CD perpendicular to AB , and from O draw OE perpendicular to CA . Then let $2x =$ side of Δ , and $a =$ radius of circle.

Then $\frac{2ax}{2} \times 3 = 3ax =$ area of triangle.

and $\frac{2x \cdot CD}{2} = x \cdot CD =$ area of triangle.

$\therefore 3ax = x \cdot CD$, or $CD = 3a$.

But $CE^2 = CO^2 - OE^2$
 $= (2a)^2 - a^2 = 3a^2$

$CE = a\sqrt{3}$.

$\therefore CA$ or $AB = 2a\sqrt{3}$
 $= 17 \times 1.7320508 = 29.448636$.

W. C. D.

Question 8. The isosceles triangle touches the two circles whose centres are O and P , in D and E . The three triangles ABC , ADO , and AEP , are similar, because they each contain a right angle, and have the angle at A common. Hence,

$$AP : PE :: AO : OD$$

$$AO : OD :: AC : BC.$$

Now, if we put y for the height, AB , of the isosceles triangle, and x for its base, the first proportion becomes

$$y - 26 : 6 :: y - 10 : 10$$

$$10y - 260 = 6y - 60$$

$$4y = 200. \therefore y = 50.$$

From the second proposition we obtain by substitution,

$$40 : 10 :: \text{Side } AC : \frac{x}{2} \therefore \text{Side } AC = 2x.$$

And by Euc. I. 47. $4x^2 = (50)^2 + \left(\frac{x}{2}\right)^2$

$$\frac{15}{4}x^2 = 2500 \therefore x^2 = \frac{10000}{15} = 666.6.$$

$$\therefore x = \sqrt{666.6} = 25.82 = \text{Base.}$$

$$\text{And } 2x = 51.64 = \text{Side.} \quad \text{Ans.}$$

C. D. S.

Question 9. Let $r =$ radius; then as a line drawn at right angles from the centre bisects the chord, we have

$$(r - 8)^2 + (245)^2 = r^2$$

$$r^2 - 16r + 64 + 60025 = r^2$$

$$16r = 60089$$

$$r = 3755.5625.$$

$\therefore \text{Area} = (3755.5625)^2 \times 3.1416 = 1410429.69140625$
 $\times 3.1416 = 44309910.83$ square links, or 443 acres, 0 r., 15.857 poles.

C. D. S.

Mechanics.

Question 7. We must first find solidity of the excavation—viz., $17^2 \times 7854 \times 40 = 9079.224$ cubic feet.

2nd. Weight of the material = $9079.224 \times 100 = 907922.4$ lb.

3rd. The mean height to which the whole must be raised = $\frac{40}{2} = 20$ feet.

\therefore Total units of work = $907922.4 \times 20 = 18158448$,

$$\text{or} = 17^2 \times 7854 \times 40 \times 100 \times 20 = 18158448.$$

Question 8. Here work to be done = 18158448 , and work done daily = $2600 \times 60 \times 8$.

$\therefore \text{Time} = \frac{18158448}{2600 \times 60 \times 8} = \frac{18158448}{1248000} = 14.558$ days = 14 days, 4 hours, 24 minutes.

J. E. H.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—VI.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

21. A gentleman gave some poor people $\frac{1}{2}$ of the money which he had in his purse, and afterwards called at a tradesman's and gave him $\frac{1}{2}$ of the remainder, receiving in change 4s. 6d. On arriving at home he found that he had 15s. left. How much money had he when he left home?

22. A certain person bought a quantity of eggs at 8 for 6d., and as many more at 10 for 6d., and sold them all out at 9 for 6d., losing 1s. 3d. by the transaction. It is required to find the number of eggs.

23. Given $x + y = 18$, $x^2 + y^2 = 1674$, to find x and y .

Geometry.

11. The proportion of land and water upon the surface of the earth is as 266 to 734; and the earth's mean diameter 7926 miles. Supposing the earth to be a perfect sphere, how many square miles are there of each?

Mechanics.

10. A train of 100 tons descends an incline 600 feet, the total height of the plane is 9 feet. What velocity per second will the train acquire the friction be 8 lb. per ton?

11. If the above were ascending the incline what must the horse power of the engine be to convey it at the rate of 20 miles per hour?

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. VII.—STYLE.

THOUGHT and speech are correlates. Ideas are the mind-wealth of humanity, and words are the *media* through which they are circulated. "Unclothed, as yet, in words, or stripped of them, thoughts are but dreams; like the shifting clouds of the sky they float in the mind one moment, and vanish the next."* Human life, in its highest and noblest form, is thought.

"We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths;
In feelings, not in figures on a dial.
We should count time by heart-throbs. He most lives
Who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best."

"To live is not merely to touch, to taste, to smell, to see, to hear; it is to use all our faculties in the highest condition of development our opportunities permit. This, and not the other, is the *natural* life of man." Who are they who *have* lived, who *do* live? Are they not the thoughts-men of the world? "O'er the dark rereward and abyss of time" let the mind's eye be cast, and who are they that stud the night-gloom of the past, and are recognised as the

"Lights of the world and demi-gods of fame"?

The great *thinkers* of the race. How noble is their vocation who, in the light of consciousness, read the marvels of "the inner life," and reveal them to men! How useful are their lives who, gazing on "the outer world of sense," where

"River, sea, isle, continent,
Mountain and wood and fire-lipped hill,
And lake and golden plain, and sun and heaven,
Where the stars brightly die, whose death is day;
City and port and palace, ships and tents,
Lie massed and mapped,"—

describe to us "all the kingdoms of the earth and the glories thereof;" then directing our minds to other scenes, lead us, in thought, through the far-stretching infinities of space, past

"Yon strange world whose long nights know no star,
But seven fair maidlike moons attending him,
Perfect his sky;"

beyond "Arcturus with his sons," within "the sweet influences of the pleiades," and onward through the immense vastitudes which the Almighty hand has sprinkled with suns and world-systems, thus linking our being with worlds rising above worlds, and systems inter-blending with systems, while at the same time it is protended to the age-distant periods of their unswerving circumvolvings! How honour-worthy are those who, surveying the relations of civil life, the international amenities, the laws of trade, commerce, and agri-

* Bentham's "Essay on Language," Works, vol. viii. p. 301.

culture, the delicate involutions of diplomacy, and the conditions of social well-being, devote their life and genius to the exposition of the great truths which they have learnt, and the ingrafting of these thought-growths in the minds of men! How can we sufficiently value those who, conscious of the mental infirmities of humanity, the duplicities of his nature, his proneness to polluting deeds, his moral vagrancy, his readiness to yield to the suggestions of dishonourable and debasing passions, his want of sin-resistancy, yet endeavour to strengthen man's moral nature, heal his mental diseases, pour "the balm of Gilead" into his wounded spirit, "convince him of sin, righteousness, and a judgment to come," and act like Goldsmith's good clergyman, who

"Allured to brighter worlds, and led the way"?

Thus it is that he, in whose soul thought is wedded to expression, becomes a power, thus it is we reverence

"Men whose great thoughts possess us like a passion
Through every limb and the whole heart; whose words
Haunt us as eagles do the mountain air."

And why ought not each human being to strive earnestly, unfaintingly, to acquire this power and world-reverence? "Man was not made to shut up his mind in himself, but to give it voice, and enter into exchange with other minds. Our power of thought lies not so much in the amount of thought within us, as in the power of bringing it out. A man of more than ordinary intellectual vigour may, for want of expression, be a cipher, without significance, in society. And not only does a man influence others, but he greatly aids his own intellect, by giving distinct and forcible utterance to his thoughts. We understand ourselves better, our conceptions grow clearer, by the very effort to make them clear to another." * Did we rightly estimate the educative influence we wield, the immense potency of our example, we should more truly perceive the mighty responsibilities which lie upon him who cultures not his thought-energies. Are we not all commissioned to become the apostles of wisdom and virtue, and do we shrink from preparing for our life-task? If it be true that "the value of a thought cannot be told"—if it be true that

"He who made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like Reason
To rust in us unused,"—

it must be true that the culture of the power of thought-expression is a duty, it must be true that the capacity of translating into words the results of the highest and noblest exercises of our intellect, the deepest and most boundless desires of our souls, our greatest hopes, our holiest aspirations, all that passes in the mysterious thought-realm within, not in the enigmatical confusion and obscurity of unstudied words, but in the starlike beauty and clearness of a precise and eloquent diction, in a style

"Fit to be used by all who think while speaking,"

ought to be regarded as one of the essential qualifications of every human being. To be able, at any time, to couch our thoughts readily, in a judicious selection of fitting and

* Channing's "Self-Culture."

harmonious words—to bring forth the products of our internal consciences “clothed with light as with a garment,” and to repeat and represent them embellished with ideal loveliness, is worthy of intense study. Accuracy in the use of words, orderliness in the arrangement of phrases, precision of style, elegance of manner, in one word, *expressiveness*, is a power deserving of being sedulously aimed at, and laboriously cultivated; “this clothes a composition in the most beautiful dress, makes it shine like a picture in all the gaiety of colour, it animates our thoughts, and inspires them with a kind of vocal life.”* “The greatest truths are wronged if not linked with beauty, and they win their way most surely and deeply into the soul in this their natural and fit attire.”† “A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver.” “Perspicuous words,” says Hobbes, “are the light of human minds.” And Pascal, in his thoughts “Sur l’Eloquence et le Style,” acutely remarks that “The very same sense is materially affected by the words that are used to convey it.”

This necessity for the study of expression seems the more necessary to be insisted on, because it appears not to be sufficiently recognised by young men that Style is the result of study. There is, of course, a vital connexion between language and thought; but unless we habituate our minds by arduous cultivation to acquire a right understanding of the proper use of words, to recall readily and to employ regularly the choicest and most select phraseology, it will be vain for us to expect that they will be within our reach on demand. There will, therefore, result a stiff constrainedness, an ungainly awkwardness, a lean scantness and barren inappropriateness in our manner of conveying ideas from our own minds to those of others.

There is another error, equally to be guarded against, and which, in a great measure, arises from the false notion of what true excellence in composition is, generally entertained by those who have not attentively studied our vernacular speech.‡ It is, that, in consequence of neglecting to prune their phraseology, to select their words cautiously, to balance their diction with ease and nicety, to become accurately acquainted with the connotations and denotations of the terms which they employ, they suppose real eloquence to consist in bringing together “a gorgeous paraphernalia” of verbalisms, thickly bespangled with prettinesses and grandly sonorous to the ear; and by this false taste misconception they are led eagerly and sedulously to pursue such a method of composing as must necessarily produce that fatal redundancy, that prodigal verbosity and exuberance of speech, that love of betawdried ornateness, and contorted efflorescence which seldom fails of being efficacious in exhausting the patience of the reader, or spreading an opiate slumberousness over the mind of the hearer. A roundabout-ness of expression, a want of terse, forceful, precise, and energetic diction, a diffuseness and overstrained inflation, or a florid wordiness, can be adequately remedied in no other way than by an earnest, incessant, and careful preparatory study of word, and a constant endeavour to find the most appropriate costume for our most trivial thoughts. Thus alone can a large store of accurately-

* Longinus “On the Sublime,” sect. xxx.

† Channing’s “Self-Culture.”

‡ The facilities for speaking and writing which our mutual improvement and debating societies, our literary and scientific associations, and our philomathic institutions, may be mentioned as peculiarly liable to abuse in this way, as they have no recognised standard of excellence, no criterion of taste, no umpire to whom questions of a literary nature may be submitted.

discriminated verbalisms be acquired, and thus alone can the proper word be always attainable by the writer or speaker.

Style is the fitting expression of thought; the method in which any given mind organizes, vitalizes, and modifies its ideas in the endeavour to bring them forth from consciousness into the view of his fellow-men; "a picture of the ideas in the mind, and of the order in which they exist there." It is a technical term significant of all those peculiarities of expression by which different minds are distinguished when they strive to paint their thoughts in the hues of language; the incarnation of thought and the essence of the human soul issuing forth pervaded with truth, life, and loveliness:—"Le Style n'est que l'ordre et le mouvement qu'on met dans ses pensées. Si on les enchaîne étroitement, si on les serre, le Style devient ferme, nerveux, et concis; si on les laisse se succéder lentement, et ne se joindre qu'à la faveur des mots, quelque élégants qu'ils soient, le Style sera diffus, lâche, et trainant."* Language being the spontaneous outgrowth of the human mind, the connexion between thought and thought-expression is vital and organic. Not custom merely, not association, powerful influences as they are, could nurture speech were its root not already imbedded in the mind capable of blossoming and presenting its fruitage, when circumstances capable of occasioning its growth-powers to exert themselves had occurred. A genuine style partakes of this same spontaneity. It is at once an embodiment of the specific subject of discourse, and the specific qualities of the intellect of the individual. It is in this latter sense that the truth of the assertion of Buffon, "Le Style est l'homme même"—Style is the man himself—is defensible.

If our opinion regarding the spontaneity of Language and of Style be correct, it will follow that our method of treating this subject must differ widely from that usually pursued by writers on Rhetoric. We cannot counsel imitative studies. We cannot recommend any one of our readers to "give his days and nights to the study of Addison," or any one else. If one would study terseness, force, expressiveness—if he would avoid mannerism, formality, strut, and swagger—if he would avoid unnatural distention, inflation, or attenuated feebleness, as well as an equally unnatural spasmodic trenchantness, abruptness, or apothematicality of expression, let him not attempt to qualify his thoughts for occupying any Procrustes' bed. No imitation of Style, no compound of even the best qualities of Style culled from the best authors, will suit gracefully with your thoughts unless it is homologous with your manner of thinking. Imagine to yourselves the keen, racy, idiomatic, indigenous Style of Swift, translated into the sonorous, magniloquent classicality of Dr. Johnson; imagine the massy-thoughted bullion of thought contained in Foster's "Essays," beaten out into the thin wire and glittering gewgaws, more fit to ornament the border of a cambric handkerchief than to embody great thoughts, employed by the Rev. Robert Montgomery, and you will perhaps gain an idea of the folly of assuming any other Style than that which is natural to your own mind, when supplied with the requisite knowledge of the meaning of words.†

* "Style is only the order and motion which we give to our thoughts. If we link them closely, we compress them, the style becomes firm, nervous, and concise; if we allow them to follow each other negligently, and only connect them by the help of words, however elegant they may be, the style will be diffuse, slipshod, and insipid."—*Buffon's Discours de Réception à l'Académie Française*, page 6.

† "'Consider,' says our Lord, 'the lilies how they grow: they toil not, they spin not; and yet

That which is nature in one man cannot be successfully counterfeited by another. There is a variety in the ways which the mind takes of communicating ideas which such copyist doctrines totally ignores, and hence the signature of one's own mind is continually overacrawled by the name of the party imitated. Each person's Style, if it is desired to be free from jejune, smooth, characterless insipidity, mere effeminate mediocrity, or questionable and eccentric rant, must give full scope to the individualities of his intellect, in all its varieties of culture and mood, fancy and feeling; deep thought and stateliness of mind, calmness and gravity, cool reflection and artless sincerity, may either, or all, be developed in style, provided it is an untheatrical exhibition of the mind. All, however, must be regulated by good taste, and combined with a capability of giving the due amount of executive skill to the accurate manifestation of thought. The fullest and freest play must be given to the mind energies within these limits, while all must be full of fresh, vigorous, individual thought. "Bien écrire, c'est tout à la fois bien penser, bien sentir, et bien rendre; c'est avoir en même temps de l'esprit, de l'ame, et du goût."* Petronius beautifully observes:—"Grandis et ut ita dicam pudica oratio naturali pulchritudine exurgit"—"The great and, if I may so speak, the chaste oration, rises up in its own natural beauty."

From the observations which have just been made, if they have sufficiently fulfilled the design of the writer, it will have become evident that, in his opinion, the cultivation of the intellectual powers, the imagination, and the sentiments, is of far greater importance than the elaboration, even if it were possible, of the most fascinating method of expression. Language and Style are educts of the mind, and follow in their development the natural and constitutional bias or bent of that from which they originate. If, then, the mind be creative, if it be endowed with a tendency to give forth new, vigorous, healthy, genial thought, it will not fritter time and study on the task of re-casting its ideas as they form themselves in all the beauty of nature, into another and more artificial mould, or if it does, it must be contented to appear like those old-fashioned gardens, in which the trees and hedges were clipped and cut into the most formal and fantastic shapes, where nature was distorted, contorted, trimmed and pruned, in order that it might be taught to obey those laws of beauty, which a frigid, unenthusiastic, narrow-minded artificiality had introduced. Nature is always lovely, and a natural style is no exception to this general rule. But such a style can only be the result of the free and unconstrained utterance of thought as it arises. As Style is the consequent of mental cultivation, it follows that the general improvement of the intellect is the surest and safest method of attaining a sincere, healthy, pure, and natural Style.

I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. If then God to clothe the grass, which is to-day in the field, and to-morrow is cast into the oven; how much more will he clothe you? Let us here adopt a little of the tasteless manner of modern paraphrasts, by the substitution of more general terms, one of their general expedients of infrigidating, and let us consider the effect produced by this change—"Consider the flowers, how they gradually increase in size; they do no manner of work, and yet I declare unto you, that no king whatever, in his most splendid habit, is dressed up like them. If, then, God in his providence so adorn the vegetable productions, which continue but for a little on the land, and are afterwards put into the fire, how much more will he provide clothing for you?" How spiritless is the same sentiment rendered by these small variations! The very particularizing of *to-day* and *to-morrow* is infinitely more expressive of transitoriness than any description, wherein the terms are general, that can be substituted in its room."—*Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric*, vol. ii. p. 137.

* "To write well is to think well, to feel well, to express well all at once; is at the same time to exert mind, heart, and taste."—*Buffon's Discours*, &c.

At the basis of Style lie the grammatical proprieties which may on no account be violated. The limits which the Grammarian assigns the Rhetorician must occupy. The laws of Language, which are, in fact, the laws of mind, so far forth as they are concerned in thought-utterance, must be strictly obeyed; such inversions and involutions as they allow are admissible, but no others. From these laws there is, there can be, no appeal. But beyond and above these laws the Rhetorician has free scope. The architrave, the pillar, the entablature, the dome, may fitly be added to the more necessary portions of the building; but no decorations are permissible except such as are consonant with use, symmetry, and taste.

Words are the *media* of thought-representation; they are thought-signs, the symbols of the riches of the spirit. With words, therefore, the Rhetorician labours as instruments; they are the means by which he effects his purposes. Whether mere exposition is demanded, persuasion is necessary, conviction or exhortation is to be employed, words are the instrumental agents by which these ends are to be attained. The Rhetorician must therefore recognise the power of words, must know with hair-breadth accuracy the signification of terms, whether singly or combined; for thus alone can his design be effectually accomplished, and the correlation of his words with his thoughts be accurately meted. The whole doctrine of our present article may be concisely comprised in the words of the author of "The Book of Thoughts":—

"To think rightly is of knowledge; to speak fluently is of nature;
To read with profit is of care; but to write aptly is of practice."

Religion.

CAN CHRISTIANS, CONSISTENTLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPLES, RENDER SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH STAGE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

WOULD W. T. be astonished and delighted by our acquiescence in three of his reflections? We admit our fallibility—acknowledge the advantage of studying St. Peter—and allow the Author of Christianity to be a better judge of christian consistency than ourselves. But we relent no further, though we should stretch the full tether of controversial politeness.

There is not likely to be a cordial agreement between people who misapprehend each other. "He was a very great man! added my uncle Toby (meaning Stevinus). He was so, brother Toby, said my father (meaning Pierskious)." While we have recommended the elevated sentiments of a virtuous dramatic stage, the licence of the extravaganza and short-petticoated ballet has been

thrust upon our charity. Had our weak sympathies melted, how could we have disregarded the awfully funny warning of the moral and short-sighted philosopher? Dr. Johnson, Aristides, and "some faint notions of christian truth," terrify us into propriety.

Since we relinquish the defence of so untenable a post, the enemy kindly challenges a contest for the "gewgaws" of the stage. We invite him to the old Globe Theatre by the Bear Garden of Southwark. The walls are as bare as a conventicle, the scenery borrowed from the bars of Theopis. He will presume upon a bold rhetoric if he apply the term "gewgaws" to the sweetly-enforced moralities of Shakspeare.

If W. T. has Paley's "Horn Paulinae" I

fer to the first section of
ter. He will there find
Paul not only read but
athen poets. Above all,
e has inserted into the
ambic of Menander's:—
ons corrupt good manners."
ote *one hundred and eight*
ccused of suicide! Un-
by didst thou neglect the
Dr. Watts?

here'er 'tis found,
ends, amongst your foes,
heathen ground;
ine where'er it grows."

overshoots its aim; our
have proved too much.
ositions are to be indis-
ined because gross-man-
licentious moderns have
snew would be acceptable
also have foul-mouthed
zed the pulpit by horrible
ey knew would be palate-
men are not to be taxed
their scapegrace brothers,
e neighbour chooses to
n that there is taint in
Such a neighbour, how-

ever, ought first to consult his own genealogy.
The stage is blamed for unravelling villainy;
let us, then, close the play, and trace the
intricate depths of human wickedness in the
narratives of the Bible.

We have no space to vindicate the British
stage by an allusion to the writings them-
selves of her noble moralists; nor would we
presume thus to usurp the position of C. W.
We desire only to reiterate our former argu-
ments unqualifiedly. These arguments do not
find favour because they are based upon a
liberal conception of christian obligations.
We look upon constancy as one of the high-
est virtues, and cannot join in the vulgar
rant against honest puritanism. However,
we desire to be constant to a more genial
Christianity. We are sufficiently morose to
consider ourselves "strangers and pilgrims
upon earth;" but strangers bless the hos-
pitality which supports their strength, and
pilgrims may be made agreeable by the inno-
cent solace of the road. God, who formed
us for immortal destinies, has also tempered
our souls with human sympathies, that we
may exercise them worthily in the drama of
life. Surely our affections were not given
for the sole purpose of betraying us to
death.
H. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

ious legitimate means of
d in religion and virtue,
better adapted to this end
these various means the
professes to be one. How
claim to this prerogative
see. C. W., Jun., in the
ticle upon this question,
estions for consideration,
t is the purpose of the
lly, "What are the prin-
ciple?" But it is not
d reply to these questions
ving shown the objects of
inciples of Christianity,
far they are compatible

The answers to these
ly half the truth. There
s to be first asked and
the whole truth can be
; as it were a sequel to
answers to which we may
der of the truth to be

developed; viz. :—3rdly, "Does the stage
fulfil its vaunted mission?" And 4thly
"Does it or does it not run counter to the
principles of Christianity?" It will be our
chief aim to furnish replies to these two
latter questions. But as the answer to one
involves the answer to the other, and it is
difficult to reply separately to each without
much repetition, we shall consider them
together.

In the first place, we contend that the
drama is too powerful in its effect for the
object intended. It addresses itself too much
to the imagination and affections. It does
not sufficiently appeal to the reason and
understanding. Like intoxicating liquors,
when taken in excess, it inflames the mind,
excites the feelings, arouses the propensities,
and agitates the whole frame. Do you deny
that such is the case, that such is the effect
of witnessing the drama? Then we will
suppose you to enter for the first time one of
the principal London theatres, and to take

your seat in the pit. Upon your entrance you are dazzled by the glare of light reflected from a thousand lamps and sparkling chandeliers. You gaze around; on all sides of you is a sea of human heads. Above you perceive tier upon tier of boxes and galleries, faced and decorated with rich crimson and glittering gold. First, is the dress circle, filled with all the *élite* of beauty and fashion; fair young girls, blooming in lace and muslin; richly dressed dames, adorned with jewellery and trinkets; gentlemen in spruce attire, and bright military uniforms. Above is another tier of boxes, with gaily attired occupants. Above these again rise the upper boxes and gallery, with their quota of human beings. You turn towards the stage. In front of you is the orchestra, with its row of musicians pouring forth the most spirit-stirring or soul-subduing strains. Immediately beyond it lies the stage, with its drop curtains and scenic decorations. In all this glare and glitter, and with the ravishing tones of the music, are you not dazzled and bewildered? You must own that you are. It is the experience of every one who visits the theatre for the first time. And although much of this amazement wears off by frequent attendance, yet we think the most constant visitor is not wholly proof against their effects. Is such a scene as this calculated to suitably prepare the mind for the reception of moral and religious lessons? Presently the tinkling of a bell is heard, the music ceases, the curtain rises, and the stage, with its painted scenes, and the actors in their quaint and ornate costumes, with their fascinating looks, pleasing tones, and graceful movements, are presented to your wondering, admiring gaze. The performance commences, but how much of the moral is attended to? At first the mind is so unhinged and the attention so divided with all around, that but little more than the motions of the actors is noticed; and the words uttered are scarcely heard, much less understood. By degrees the attention becomes more fixed upon the performance, till the whole soul is absorbed in the piece. The imagination and the feelings reign predominant, reason is led a feeble, willing, unresisting captive, to the charms of the scene. You laugh, or weep, or shudder, in quick succession, as your fancy is

touched and your feelings are wrought upon; and that, with as much or greater force than if you were witnessing the reality of the scenes represented. It is the reality to you for the time being: you cannot, or care not, to undeceive your vanquished reason, and despoil your soul of the charms to which you have resigned it. Is such a state of mind, thus uncontrolled by reason, fit for the impression of moral and religious truths? Do you think it is capable of that discrimination necessary to distinguish between the representation of real and specious virtue? Reason, sober-minded, impartial, critical reason, being overthrown and stifled, the heart is easily deceived with specious views of religion and virtue; and the imagination regards everything through an extravagant medium. Theatres, then, if we wish our reason to maintain its sovereignty, and exercise its delegated function, we must forego, and all those places where, and all those things by which it is likely to be trampled upon and debauched. Do not mistake our meaning. We condemn not the proper exercise of the imagination and affections; when rightly attuned and attuned, they are the loveliest and most sublime faculties of the soul; but when subjected to no control, when suffered to run riot and unrestrained, they are the most fascinating, it is true, but the most dangerous faculties of the soul. "Eloquence," says Hume, "when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection, but addresses itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers and subdues their understanding." This may equally be said of dramatic performances. But he adds, "Happily this pitch it seldom attains." We wish we could also make this sentence applicable to the drama. If the foregoing observations are correct, the British stage is neither calculated to fulfil the object of its institution, nor is in accordance with the principles of Christianity. It may be urged that the brilliancy of the lights, the beauty of the decorations, the music, the quaint costumes of the actors, &c., are not absolutely essential to dramatic representation. But do away with all this show, all these accessories, and how much of the attractiveness of the stage would there be gone! Who would then care to visit the theatre, to see a plain, ungarnished, unsophisticated

performances ? We venture to say but very few. But be this as it may, all these dazzling accessories exercise undoubtedly great attraction, and tend to allure the senses and prepare the mind for the delusive scenes of the stage. As long as they have this effect, so long will they be deemed indispensable accompaniments to theatrical performances. For ourselves, we cannot conceive the time when the stage will appeal more to the reason and understanding than at present. When it does, it will in that degree lose its alliciency and popularity, and being insufficiently supported by the public, will, in consequence, terminate its existence. But while it appeals so intemperately to the imagination and the affections, so long will it be an alluring snare to young and old, rich and poor. It was not St. Paul's wont to give instruction beyond the ability of his hearers to receive it beneficially. In addressing his Corinthian converts he writes, "I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able. For ye are yet carnal," 1 Cor. iii. 2, 3. If, then, the stage offers instruction too strong for mental digestion, it not only misses its professed object, but at the same time violates, or at least conforms not to the principles of Christianity, and we have therefore a sufficient reason therein for withholding from it our support.

Again, the dramatic art is a delusive art. The greater the delusion, the more effective, the more captivating and perfect it is. Its very existence depends upon its power to deceive, and to impress one with the idea that what is witnessed is actuality itself. May it not be reasonably questioned whether a deceptions art be a proper or a probable means of teaching truth ? — of teaching frankness, openness, uprightness ; abhorrence of falsehood, deceit, equivocation ? Is it not probable that the frequenter of the theatre insensibly acquires a habit and an aptitude to deceive ? Surely the constant attention paid to the avowed practice and open profession of an imitative delusory art, cannot fail to exercise a morally baneful influence in the direction mentioned.

Once more, admitting for a moment that the pieces represented are designed for the purpose of inducing man to choose the good and avoid the evil, by exhibiting the love-

liness of virtue and the deformity of vice, do they effect this object ? We fear not. The nature of man is so depraved (scripture has declared, "that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart are only evil continually"), that the evil passions depicted, and especially those indicative of appetency and carnal desire, are far more likely to take hold upon him when his reason is subdued, and the imagination and affections hold triumphant sway, than are the calm and sober virtues. The passions and evil inclinations of our nature are easily—alas ! how easily—aroused from torpor, and called into unruly activity ; and when aroused, how averse are they to restraint or subjection ! Man, then, should be careful how he enters upon scenes where they are likely to be awakened. "Pray that ye enter not into temptation," was our Saviour's injunction to his disciples ; those who support the stage would do well to meditate upon these words. Further, as vice is of quick growth, and difficult of eradication, so virtue, on the contrary, is tardy, and can only be gradually cultured. The violent *ad captandum* teaching of the stage is not, therefore, suited to the development of virtue. It cannot be poured into the heart as through open sluice gates. The evil passions are not to be subjugated and ousted by any startling or sudden assault. It is true they may be temporarily checked thereby, but they will quickly recover their wonted power and dominion ; and assail and take possession of you, in return, with bifold fierceness and security. The theatre, then, is not the school for teaching and training the heart in sentiments and deeds of virtue.

If the stage be not fitted to teach virtue and morality, it is still less fitted to teach religion. The appeals so frequently made to God's mercy, justice, truth, and his other attributes, in simulation, and for a commendation object, is surely a mockery, a taking of his name in vain. Let those who see no harm in these feigned appeals, bring—as J. E. P. has recommended—this commandment to their remembrance, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain ; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless, that taketh his name in vain."

But people do not frequent theatres for the sake of moral and religious instruction. Their sole object is pleasure and amuse-

ment. Such being the case, they are not likely to derive benefit by the instruction of the drama, supposing it affords any. That no virtuous impressions are made, I think is sufficiently evident from the uproar and laughing that immediately ensues upon the falling of the curtain and the closing of the theatre. Judge also by your own experience. But if pleasure be the only object of the playgoer, he had better seek it in the quiet and comfort of his own home, by his own fire-side.

"Needs he the tragic fur, the smoke of lamps,
The pent-up breath of an unsavoury throng
To thaw him into feeling; or the smart
And snappish dialogue, that flippant wits
Call comedy, to prompt him with a smile?
The self-complacent actor, when he views
(Stealing a sidelong glance at a full house)
The slope of faces from the floor to th' roof
(As if one master spring controll'd them all)
Relax'd into an universal grin,
Sees not a countenance there that speaks of joy
Half so refined, or so sincere as ours."

The Task.

We have hitherto been speaking of the unsuitability of the stage as a school for morality and religion, and of the evil effects of dramatic representations upon the people generally. But there is one class of people upon whom they have perhaps a still worse effect, and justifies us in specially noticing them; I mean the actors themselves. They are acting, it may be, with a view to instruct, but at the same time with a view to allure and deceive. The greater their powers of imitation and simulation, the greater the delusion, and the greater their own success. It is true they may feel and appreciate much of the sentiment, and enter deeply into the spirit of the piece enacted (for it is essential to good acting that they do), but, nevertheless, dare any one assert that their whole souls are wrapt in the words and sentiments to which they give gesticulated and impassioned utterance? If they do not, think of the lessons they are learning in the art to deceive and beguile. And having the power, and knowing they possess the power, to feign and simulate feelings far from their hearts and intentions, think you occasions will never occur when they will be tempted to put in practice their deceptions art to their own hurt and the hurt of others? Deceit, however, is contrary to the principles of the christian religion; to countenance it, or to encourage

others, by any means, in the cultivation of the art of deceiving, must therefore be likewise contrary to christian principles.

But, doubtless, much of what they so impassionately declaim upon the stage is deeply felt. At one time they are the words of ardent love and vehement desire; at another time, of cruel hatred and savage revenge; now of playful banter, and now again of withering scorn; at one moment a curse is invoked, at another moment, God is blasphemed. Can these sentiments and words be uttered, even without thought or feeling, with impunity? Who will say they can? But when uttered in the fervour of enthusiasm, how much greater, then, must be the evil! Shall that tongue, taught to curse and blaspheme so volubly and passionately upon the stage, never break out into cursing and blaspheming when off it? We fear that the sentiments and the words they are accustomed so energetically to declaim upon the stage, do only too surely and naturally find vent, upon sufficient provocation, when off the stage. But not alone do the actors learn to sin in words and thoughts. In love scenes, for instance, the passionate outpouring of sentiments of love and love's desires, is not alone the dreadful lure. The position and actions of the two lovers, the music, the tasteful costumes, &c. all work their baneful spell. And we fear alas! unhallowed desires and their gratification too frequently result from the mimic words and actions; and this may account for the generally admitted fact, the loose morals of so many of those who follow the stage as a profession. Can Christians, consistently with their principles sanction and encourage, by their presence and support, scenes which lead to such deplorable results? What says St. Paul, the Epistle to the Romans, xiv. 13? writes, "Let us not therefore judge of another any more: but judge this rather that no man put a stumblingblock or occasion to fall in his brother's way." And again, in the 21st verse of the same chapter "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything, whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." The support afforded to the stage, gauged by this test, will, I think, be found to counter to the principles of Christianity.

ADALPHO

Philosophy.

IS WOMAN MENTALLY INFERIOR TO MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE moral and intellectual difference between the sexes is no less than the physical. In the physical frame nature has assigned to the man strength, activity, and vigour; to the woman, beauty, delicacy, and grace. The features of the one are best calculated to inspire admiration and respect; those of the other, affection and love. The one is adapted for danger and toil; the other, for the duties of domestic life.

Nor in the mental organization is the division less broad and distinct. Active courage, sagacity, and firmness, are not more the property of the man, than passive endurance, tact, and persuasion, are of the woman. Though the former may be better qualified to shine in the camp, the senate, or the exchange; the latter, in training future generations, in creating and supporting the amenities and courtesies of social life, and in softening down and refining the more rugged and sterner portions of man's nature, has a field of action as wide, and in my opinion as important, and requiring an equal amount of ability to excel. This is, in fact, the whole question—Is the sphere of woman as important as that of man? Few, I think, will deny her fitness for her duties; their relative value is, then, what we have to consider. This seems to me a fairer way of stating the matter than to attempt to prove, from scattered instances, her equality to man in his own sphere, in which, neither by constitution or inclination, she is qualified to excel; and to expect her to do so is as absurd as to require of the deer the strength of the ox, or of the ox the agility of the deer. A woman who thrusts herself into and usurps man's position, is as far from being an ornament to the female sex, as a fop or a coward is to the male. A Semiramis is as odious as a Sardanapalus.

But to proceed. The mental improvement of mankind has need of two agencies—energy to remove the obstacles which prejudice or barbarism may have placed in its path; elegance and polish, to soften the fierce pas-

sions evoked in their removal. The edict of an autocrat may compel men to appear civilized; it is not till the influence of woman begins to be felt that they will become so in reality. To what other cause but the influence of woman can we attribute the gradual progress of civilization among the Gothic barbarians who overran the western division of the Roman empire? While, to the lack of that influence we may, with equal propriety, assign the stationary and retrograde state of the tribes who conquered the east. The importance of her humanizing agency may be estimated when we consider what is the proper meaning of civilization. It does not consist in the mere acquisition of knowledge, or the progress of the arts and sciences; these are only the means and instruments of it: their final object is the regulation of the passions, the subjection of the corporeal to the spiritual, the removal of those prejudices and differences which are so hostile to our comfort. What a mighty effect in promoting these ends must a sex have, possessing such a natural refinement of taste, so susceptible of pity, so inclined to peace, so little prone to the darker passions, and so easily influenced by the tender ones! How often, too, do we find that in the hour of difficulty and trial, when active courage is of no avail, and man's energies seem unnerved and his spirit broken, that female endurance, female fortitude, meek, uncomplaining, yet assiduous perseverance, have consoled the afflicted, imparted hope to them that were ready to perish, and frequently conquered calamities which seemed to the sterner sex insuperable! Where man's work ends, woman's begins. The temple of civilization has its stately and lofty columns, its broad and massive arches; but how shapeless and forbidding would these be unless there were superadded the elaborate carving, the glowing canvas, and the life-like statue. The last may not be actually so needful as the former, but their production requires mental power as great, though of a different nature. I

would not claim, with some, for women the duties and the privileges of active and busy life. In these she is decidedly inferior to man, and by undertaking them she deservedly forfeits the respect and affection due to her sex. Such characters as Elizabeth of England, and Catharine of Russia, while they retained the foibles and weaknesses of their sex, lost its attractions, seem to have been exceeded in mental energy by the statesmen around them, and only to appear great by comparison with the rest of women. To female vanity and jealousy they joined the unscrupulous ambition of a Cæsar and the relentless

cruelty of a Tamerlane, without imitating the clemency of the one or the justice of the other. Woman's mental powers are only great when employed in the proper direction; so long as she so employs them, she is not only equal to man, but exercises an incalculable influence over him. She then holds a secret, but not the less a powerful, empire, and man willingly submits to it. Society, the legislature, literature, the arts, are ruled by women perhaps more than by men; but it is by their exercising the persuasive powers in which they excel, and not the commanding, in which they are deficient. S. A. J.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

SUPERIORITY and inferiority are relative terms which may be well applied to the different orders and classes of creation; but when, as proposed by the question before us, the most important being in creation is selected as the object of inquiry, that being again severed into sexes, and the mental powers of each sex set in juxtaposition to the other, the matter assumes a very different and not less delicate feature. It also involves the necessity of close investigation into the nature and character of each sex individually as well unitedly as a species. Great care is also required in order that due honour may be given to each sex, without infringing upon or detracting from the one for the sake of the other. The subject is a large one, and we shall at present, therefore, confine ourselves to general views.

It is an important truism that in creation every order and class has its peculiar sphere and office; and also that there is to be found in each member of a class its peculiarity or mark of identity, in contradistinction to all others. It may, therefore, be fairly argued, that in the wisdom of the great Creator, each specific being was created for an end peculiar to itself. Every animate creature may, therefore, be presumed to possess wisdom or instinct peculiar to that end; and this may, in a certain sense, be considered to constitute superiority, whether compared with its own species or the creation generally.

Although this statement may appear to be somewhat beyond the limits of the question before us, it may be found useful as a general argument, and assist us in consider-

ing the real point at issue in directing our attention to the relative position of those most noble of all God's creatures—man, and his helpmate, woman. It cannot be disputed that, so far as headship is concerned, man stands first and foremost. That man was created before woman, we learn from holy writ; and also the fact, that the whole creation was placed under his hand, and creatures called by such names as he selected, before woman appeared upon the globe. When she did appear, it was not to take from man the office previously assigned to him, nor indeed do we even learn that she was commissioned to interfere therein—at all events, not in contravention of man; but the duty assigned to her was that of a helpmate, to act under the direction of and assist man in his work. We also learn from the same source, that the moment she was tempted to assume a position of independence, and relied upon her own wisdom and ability to confront the serpent, she fell, and thereby entailed misery upon her whole posterity. Indeed woman, even by the extraordinary means of her creation, is entirely precluded from assuming a position of superiority over, or independence of, man, for she was actually taken from him, and must be considered a part of himself, and therefore inferior to him.

The office, however, assigned to woman was a peculiar one, and she was endowed with wisdom peculiarly adapted thereto, and may fairly be presumed to possess ability and tact in matters within her sphere superior to man.

The mental superiority or inferiority of

man or woman cannot be ascertained from a partial or one-sided view, nor arrived at by the consideration of any particular capacity or feature, nor indeed by the selection of mere individuals, but each must be viewed in class and as component parts of society. There is also a distinction between wisdom and knowledge which must not be overlooked. Some women may possess capacity for learning and acquiring knowledge, far superior to many men, and had they the same advantages, might even surpass the opposite sex in many branches of literature. Poetically, woman is often found to excel; in the finer feelings and sentiments of the mind she may, perhaps, be said to bear the laurels (for these are especially within her sphere).

Although all these attributes are beautiful and valuable, still it is submitted that neither one feature nor another, nor indeed the whole combined, constitute mental superiority in the sense in which we are bound to understand those terms. It is in the great powers of ruling, sound judgment, and discretion, that superiority of mind is to be sought; and herein, doubtless, man surpasses woman, however far advanced she may be in the acquirements before alluded to; and however inferior in such attainments may be the unfortunate lot of her husband, still, in the attributes which belong peculiarly to the man, and come within his sphere of action, she is, doubtless, inferior. For a

proof of this assertion we need go no further than to the domestic circle of him whose wife assumes superiority, and takes the position of ruler; the result of such a course is invariably the destruction of order and peace, and instead thereof is to be found, in almost every instance, the greatest possible disorder, discontent, and confusion.

We trust the foregoing remarks will suffice to show that although viewing the sexes as a whole, we feel bound to conclude that mental superiority must be ascribed to the man; still it is far from being our wish to detract from or undervalue the capacity and excellency of woman; on the contrary, we are most anxious to ascribe to her all that consistency will allow, and to encourage her every effort to acquire those literary attainments and accomplishments which lie within her sphere.

Man, the noblest of creation's birth,
Reigned supreme throughout the earth,
Alas! without companion blest.
In vain he sought creation's whole,
In vain, there was no human soul,
Till God did give him rest.

Then from man's side God took a rib,
Then closed he up the flesh instead,
And with it woman form'd.
Man slept, indeed, but little thought
What sleep would do, what sleep had wrought,
Awoke, and woman found.

VIR

Politics.

OUGHT MONEY TO BE INTRINSIC OR SYMBOLICAL ?

INTRINSIC.—III.

NOTWITHSTANDING bullion committees and blue books, currency laws and banking acts, there ought to be no intricacy about a simple question which practice will assuredly answer for us, if we dally too long over our fine-spun theories. To a commercial people money is a necessary of life; and, when common sense and interest combine, we anticipate that they will not blunder much. Hence, the existence of an intrinsic currency is presumptive evidence in its favour. If, while

seeking the corroboration of principles, we make no dissertation upon the perplexing technicalities of trade balances, bullion prices, monies banco, agios, and similar niceties, our silence must be laid to this account—that they have nothing to do with the argument.

Mr. Harvey furnishes an excellent text, when he says that "Labour is the source of all wealth, and money should be only the certificate or memorandum of wealth." Commercial systems and monetary regulations

direct and facilitate the acquisition of wealth, but cannot themselves create it. Political economists cannot contrive a scheme which shall supersede hard work and industry. England is rich, because her men and machines are incessantly producing: she will continue to grow richer and richer every year so long as she adds horse-power to horse-power, in spite of a thousand dull volumes upon the circulating medium. There is no call for astonishment should a nation flourish after a bankruptcy, or a repudiation, or a currency crash, because these are only symptoms of suspended animation, and not of death. The laws of nature, defying the Chancellor of the Exchequer, will continue to yield crops and merchandise to the hand of repentant labour. Whether we are disciples of Adam Smith or Quesnai, we must not, while investigating details, allow important truths to evaporate. Agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, as they appear in books, may disguise their operations under the pretence of scientific intricacies; but see them in the field, the workshop, and warehouse, busy in straightforward, honest efforts to amass and distribute the productions of the "teeming earth," in order to support the existence and enlarge the gratifications of the family of man. Under the comfortable assurance of such facts let us proceed to consider the use of money.

Money has its origin in the inconvenience and inadequacy of barter. A nursery-tale analyzation is scarcely required to show the impossibility of payment in kind wherever the division of labour has been accomplished. The mason who has erected a building in a distant neighbourhood cannot take home piles of food and clothing in remuneration, for this would be physical absurdity. He accepts instead an equivalent in money, which will procure him at home, and at convenient seasons, whatever food and clothing he may require. In this transaction, which is a type of others, money acts merely as a medium, a certificate, or counter. It has no intrinsic power to clothe or feed; it cannot force itself upon the acceptance of the tradespeople; it is a sheer unfructifying piece of metal, perchance, or salt, or paper. It is a ticket, to which common assent has imparted value and currency; and, while it is honoured by the payment of the commodities whose price it represents, it is, for the purposes of com-

merce, equal in value to those commodities. Withdraw the common assent, and the ticket, losing its honour, resumes the humble destiny of rags and metal. The truth of a proposition is frequently made more palpable by a demonstration of its converse. Imagine, therefore, a nation to be suddenly deprived of its cash; in the nature of things it will recur to the primitive simplicity of stark barter; commodities will be bought with commodities, instead of being purchased with coin, as heretofore. So cumbersome a system will work its own remedy; the weekly labourer and monthly servant grumbling to receive their pay in bulky and perishable articles—the merchant oppressed with the tardy progress of his unwieldy business—the whole people, continually anxious, incommoded, reduced to a savage existence—will cry out for a restoration of the ancient plan, the convenience of the trustworthy tickets.

Money, then, is a substance to which the necessities of mankind have affixed a representative value. Now, the maintenance of an assumed value depends upon two conditions—the mutual understanding and the mutual faith of those who conspire to support it. Unless the value of money be precisely determined and universally recognised, there will be constant inconvenience and liability to fraud: unless there be implicit faith in a currency, every extensive commerce will be checked. Consequently, a community, in order to prosper, requires money, the value of which, once fixed, shall be secure from tampering interference, and the credit which shall be steady and perpetual.

There are only two methods by which a substance can be converted into money. One method is, the attaching an arbitrary value to something in itself worthless, as in giving to a piece of stamped paper the estimation of £50. The other method consists in adopting some substance which has been obtained by labour, and in establishing the price of the labour as the exchangeable value. This is exemplified in the case of metallic coin: a sovereign, for instance, is equal in worth to the cost of its digging, purifying, shipping, and coining. All the money in the world exists under one or other of these categories. Bank-notes, exchequer-bills, bills of exchange (inland and foreign), bonds and coupons, have an arbitrary valuation affixed, and are symbolical money. Salt, hides, shells, &c.

Tan, doubloons, pence, shillings, and pounds, were obtained by labour, and bear the honourable denomination of intrinsic money. Does the symbolical or intrinsic species give to the bartering propensity of mankind the more trustworthy guarantee?

Fixity of value and credit for currency we demonstrated to be indispensable requisites of the exchangeable medium. Symbolical money will not pledge itself to possess either: from birth it presumes to disregard suspicion. But political economy is not satisfied with complementary pledges. Value cannot be fixed or credit confirmed so long as the issue of superfluous paper by needy exchequers and hungry engravers suspends mistrust over a nation. And in what manner an effectual control can be placed over these industrious copper-plate printers will perplex the thirtieth century, moral and republican, but still human in its generation. Why are the bills of a reputable merchant accepted? Because it is believed that he has property to back them; and reasonable credit is justifiable on the ground of expedience. But when a crisis brings ruin upon a score of houses, where is the value of their "promise to pay?"—flown with their credit, which alone supported it. Credit, in this case, reposed unworthily upon "an honourable man" and his flimsy bills: in like manner would it unworthily repose upon an honourable government and its flimsy notes.

Intrinsic money, on the other hand, having a value equal to the cost of its creation, will not recompense the secret fraud of the private or official speculator. A necessitous ministry will be powerless to regulate its issues, which will be accommodated to the natural laws of commerce, being plentiful or scarce as the demand shall strengthen or relax. If the supply whence the circulation is in the first instance obtained be steadily proportioned to the growing wants of an increasing population and an extending business, the value of money will preserve the constancy which is inseparable from it. Presuming, for argument's sake, the possibility of a circulation so adjusted, we shall obtain a perfect currency—fixed in value, because no one can manufacture it more cheaply, and because government cannot flood or contract the market at pleasure—established in credit, since no one can refuse a tender essentially valuable, enforced by custom and law.

The commercial transactions of civilized people rely upon the system of credit to a vast degree. Trade would be hampered, and judicious speculation wholly checked, if every bargain were struck with cash. The evils of rash credit must not be attributed to the use of money: were barter re-established, it would be found useful—in fact, necessary—to allow debts to stand over; and a debt is still a debt, whether due in goods or coin. If merchants consent to accept their creditors' paper certificates—if tradesmen choose to bandy these certificates—if capitalists will put faith in Spanish honour intrusted to pen and ink—they tempt fortune, wisely it may be or unwisely, yet of their own free will. Paper there always will be, and more and more of it as enlarged connexions and facilitated communications render the employment of it more desirable and more secure. But it would be cruel and most pernicious injustice to compel men against their will to traffic with unsubstantial paper, which might be depreciated at any moment by the fraud of government or individuals. Forgeries now are comparatively rare, because they have to contend with the prudence of those who recognise familiar signatures and intricate designs; but they would be unlimited, if millions of people were compelled to use notes of low amount, whose validity, obviously, they could not ascertain.

We presumed the possibility of adjusting the original supply of intrinsic money to the demand. Since the discovery of America, the quantity of the precious metals obtained from the mines has never exceeded the growing avidity of commerce. Europe may have had less, but certainly she has not had more metallic money than she required. The produce of the Californian and Australian fields threatens to disturb the existent equilibrium. Abundance of gold, as of any other commodity, will tend to cheapen it; and until, by the failure of the supply, the price of gold be again permanently settled, the inevitable advance in the price of other articles will cause great perplexity and dispute in the matter of wages, rents, and other payments. Whether parliament could contrive a system by which a progressive accommodation might be effected, is a subject most digressive and difficult. A universally-diffused commerce will, of course, absorb more of the metals than has hitherto been required; but, should

the mines be inexhaustible, recourse must be had to silver or platinum; or we may even anticipate that chemistry will compound a substance, expensive, durable, portable, difficult of imitation, possessing all the requisites of intrinsic money. The substitution of gold for a corresponding amount of paper to be withdrawn is inadvisable, for this reason,—that gold is a portion of the community's capital, incapable of increase by germination—a dead mass; and therefore, however small a quantity exists in a country beyond the need, is so much capital lying at waste.

Leaving practical details to the suggestions of the future, and considering the main question in its theoretic principles, we conclude that an intrinsic currency ought to be the basis of a monetary system, because the credit which justifies the employment of symbolical money is not universal, nor can it ever become so. The progress of time may abolish nationalities, and thus admit a world-wide reciprocation of paper; but there will never be so complete a reliance upon personal integrity as to render needless the *in terrorem* enforcement of hard cash.

The benevolent but obscure intentions of J. H. are not sufficiently developed to be refuted, except by the tenor of a general argument. Money would be cheap enough, and beyond his liking, upon the symbolical system. Fifty million pounds' worth of coined metal, accumulated through many years, is not too expensive for the service it renders, especially if it be indispensable. Englishmen pay a great deal every year for their clothes

and food, and a great deal also for their ships, and carts, and railways, because these things are useful. If they grudge to pay for so useful an article as money, let them do without it, if they can; or try paper, if they choose.

Mr. Harvey hits hard when he asks why a whole population have turned into grubbers and cinder-sifters. Will he describe his protection against the forgery of paper? The Australian grubbers are, in effect, forgers; but their trick will in time be frustrated by the failure of the gold, the legal supremacy of another metal, or the introduction of a valuable substitute. How will the symbolical mints maintain their credit against skilful imitators? A spurious sovereign can be detected and tested; a spurious five-shilling note will be as good as its better—a pretty bull, but a sad joke. The scheme of exchanging tokens with a labour value by means of Socialist banks is liable to the objections already adduced, and repeated failures have brought it into bad repute. Besides, the scheme cannot be separated from Socialism, the merits of which may be great, but have nothing to do with them at present. Many considerations connected with our subject we have necessarily left untouched, and the ramifications of the question would occupy a treatise. We have simply endeavoured, in a comprehensive and conclusive argument founded upon the nature of things, to establish the necessary qualities of money; and the conviction stands that a currency ought to possess the foundation of intrinsic value.

H. T.

SYMBOLICAL.—III.

THIS discussion will not possess much of interest or importance in the eyes of anti-bullionists, unless we adopt that strict interpretation of the word money which makes it synonymous with *legal tender*. It will be known to most of your readers that all money, commonly so called, is *not* legal tender: that is to say, it is not such an instrument as a debtor can legally compel his creditor to accept in satisfaction of his claims. For instance, copper is not legal tender, neither is silver, above a certain limited amount. Some few years ago *paper* was legal tender; now gold alone is so. The question we propose to ourselves therefore is, Ought

the *legal tender* of a country to possess intrinsic or a representative value? or the indefinite original words of the question, "Ought money to be intrinsic or symbolical?"

It is a mistake to suppose that it is part of the necessities of our case entirely to condemn the use of metallic currency. We believe that, for the ordinary purposes of trade, we could not propose an advantageous substitute for our present silver and copper coinage. Paper would be impracticable for small sums; wood would be unsafe; a metallic currency of other than intrinsic value would, in a greater degree than wood, be

posed to the depredations of coiners. I therefore prefer copper and silver to any other kind of currency of the same value. After this avowal, then, any wit or wisdom which may be expended in the attempt to prove the impracticability of a representative currency for small values, will be misapplied and expended in vain.

At this point, however, my favourable opinion in respect to a metallic currency entirely ceases. Gold money, in every possible form, I consider an unmixed evil.

My first charge against money, or legal tender of intrinsic value, is that it is hopelessly insufficient for the supply of our commercial necessities. It is a high estimate to give £40,000,000 as the amount of our present legal tender. And this amount, it must be borne in mind, cannot be so largely extended as to keep pace with our increasing wants. Add to this £40,000,000 of bullion £37,000,000 of notes, the amount of our paper circulation, and we have thus a circulation of £77,000,000, exclusive of purely commercial money. Well, then, if our metallic currency is sufficient for us, we may at once sweep away the whole stock of our paper currency. To do this, however, would be to reduce our circulation nearly one-half; and unless our present circulation is really superabundant, in a superabundant degree, the country could no more stand it than it could to have our little island compressed into half its present dimensions. But we may judge, by the light of history, of the probable effects to ourselves of such a reduction in our circulating medium. We had such a contraction of the currency in 1816: and in reference to the panic of that period, "Mr. Lloyd, the eminent banker, deposed before a committee of the House of Commons, in 1819, that the circulation of the country was at its highest in 1813 and 1814, but that it was reduced nearly one-half in 1816 and 1817. The consequence was a scene of agricultural and monetary distress of unprecedented severity. The total number of bankruptcies in 1815 was 1,285; in 1816 they increased to 2,089, being an addition of fifty-five per cent. in one year. The government became alarmed, and the restriction of cash payments was further extended from July, 1816, to July, 1818. By this means the downward course of industry was promptly stayed. The bankruptcies, which in 1817 were 1,575, were reduced in

1818 to 1,056, being a decrease of thirty-three per cent."*

Here, then, we have, as the result of contracting the currency to this extent, an amount of individual distress and ruin indicated by 6,005 bankruptcies in one period of four years.

Sir James Graham has stated, "on the authority of the most competent judges," that "the losses sustained at that period by individuals, counterbalanced all the profits of all the bankers during the war." From this we may judge of our probable condition were we to reduce the circulation to any considerable extent, as we should do were we to discard our "worthless rags."

But if any further evidence were necessary to prove that any amount of metallic money we can command would be totally insufficient for the supply of our monetary necessities, it is supplied by Sir Robert Peel himself. In the bill which he introduced, in 1846, he gave to the Bank of England an issue in notes of £20,000,000; to the country banks, £8,000,000; to the Scotch, £6,000,000; and to the Irish, £3,000,000: £37,000,000 in all: *thirty-one millions* of which rest upon no metallic basis whatever!

Are we not, then, justified in our strong condemnation of an intrinsic legal tender, when we see the "apostle of bullionism," in remodelling our monetary system, providing for a circulation of £31,000,000 of "fimsies?"

Our next charge against money possessing intrinsic value is, that it has a natural tendency to create those disastrous commercial panics which in previous years have brought this country to the very verge of revolution.

There are but two ways in which gold coin can be made available for purposes of currency. The first is, to make the coin of any size and weight, simply affixing to it a mark to indicate its weight and fineness, and leaving its value to be determined by the current price of gold in the market. But it will be seen at once that this system could not be carried out, on account of the vast amount of trouble and inconvenience to which it would give rise. The other way is, to make the coin of some definite weight and fineness, and to give it a fixed denominational value, at which it shall be current throughout the kingdom.

But, it is also quite obvious here, that, in

* Duncan's "Letters on Monetary Science."

order to give the coin a definite and fixed value, the price of gold itself, in the market, must also be fixed; otherwise the plan would offer a premium to private speculators to take advantage of the fluctuations of the market, and to derive a considerable profit by a brisk, though clandestine, competition with the mint. And it will also be quite evident, that the price so fixed must necessarily be a low one, else, being higher than that of neighbouring countries, the evil just noticed would not be obviated, while that of smuggling would be added to it. But supposing, however, these two points to be gained, we should then possess a gold currency which would possess the apparent double advantage of not being subject to any fluctuation in value, and of being current everywhere within the limits of the United Kingdom. Now, most of your readers will have discovered that we have sketched the precise plan adopted with reference to our present gold coinage; and, I suppose, many of them will think that, by its adoption, we, as a nation, have advanced a considerable way towards perfection in monetary science. But let us now see how the system works.

A time of national prosperity is a time when the bulk of the population is employed at good wages, and, consequently, of high prices and large profits. Now at such a time it must necessarily happen that gold, being tied down by law to a certain dead-level price, cannot participate in the general rise of prices; and it therefore becomes the cheapest commodity we have. Under these circumstances, then, we are visited by the foreign merchant, and gold being to him not simply money, but a commodity, and, as such, the cheapest in our markets, he naturally takes it away in preference to anything else. This causes a drain of the metal from the country, which would be nothing were it simply *gold*; but being the *sole legal tender* of the country, it becomes of serious consequence. The first effect is to cause a ruinous competition in trade, and ruinous discounts at the bankers: in a short time follows the *panic*; banks are besieged; bankruptcies become ominously frequent; and then the full tide of consternation and misery rolls over the nation, under the effects of which it lies for the time prostrate and helpless.

There is nothing of imagination or of exaggeration in this statement of the results

of the system under notice. It is *not* a "sketch by fancy drawn," but a fair transcript from the page of English history. We have already presented one piece of evidence respecting these effects, and we now offer another illustration of the same truth.

We wish to impress upon our readers that this memorable panic (1825) arose solely from the want of a single commodity, gold. All other commodities were plentiful. The prosperity of the country is attested by the speech from the throne in that year (1825). "There was literally a whole population," says Mr. Francis,* "*with food in abundance staring them in the face, unable to procure it, as nothing but gold would be taken.*" "Many a firm, of unimpeachable honour and unquestionable solvency, was compelled to bend before the storm. It was remarkable that the question would soon be, not Who goes? but Who stands?" "It was stated that the distress arose from want of confidence in men able to pay 40s. 50s. and 60s. in the pound. The officers of the mint were ordered to coin sovereigns with all possible dispatch; they worked night and day: during the space of a week 150,000 were manufactured every twenty-four hours. But this activity did not stay the panic, or remove the pressure; and the reason is obvious. The sovereigns were still kept down to their mint price, and being cheaper than other commodities, were exported as fast as they were coined. The measure did not help British subjects, but enriched foreigners."†

Now we ask, in conclusion, would or could these things have happened had we had a legal tender of representative money? We say, No. Foreigners would have had no inducement to abstract our paper money, which to them *would* be "worthless rags:" and while we were allowed to retain our instrument of exchange, we should also have received the enhanced price of our goods: because, evidently, the foreign merchant would have to make his election between our goods and our gold; and, if he chose the latter, *being paid in paper* for the goods which he sold, he would have to buy it at its market price. But, as it would, at that price, be of less service to him, as a merchant, than manufactured goods, he would most certainly

* "History of the Bank of England," vol. ii. chap. i.

† Duncan's "Letters on Monetary Science," p. 3.

have taken the latter, and thus would have helped to promote the prosperity of the country, instead of impoverishing and ruining it.

IRENE.

Social Economy.

WOULD COMMUNISM PROMOTE THE HAPPINESS OF MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

In order to come to a just and impartial conclusion on the subject of our present debate, we must consider Communism in its principles, and inquire what would be its effects.

By the term Communism, I understand that principle which would render the earth and all it contains—all its productions, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral, and the labour expended on such productions—as the common property of the human family. It advocates equality of labour, and equality of the profits of such labour; that the wisdom of the philosopher and the folly of the clown are both equally the property of the community; and both are to be rewarded, not in proportion to the merit of each, or the good respectively done, but each is to receive a like share of the blessings of this life. And here we may ask, at the outset, Is it consistent with human nature for the philosopher to wish that the profits of his study should be shared by the illiterate? No; the industrious person would not wish the wages of his labour to be distributed amongst every idler, who had not contributed at all to such labour. Yet this is what the Communists wish. They would have the industrious and the lazy, the wise man and the fool, the learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the clown, all placed on the same footing.

What form the great inducements to labour? The fear of want is, perhaps, the first motive. Yet, by the principles of Communism that fear would be taken away. A person would know that he need not exert his power, for he would partake equally of the general profits, whether his talent were used or not. He would see that if he were the most industrious, skilful, and cunning workman, that he would receive no greater remuneration than the idlest and most stupid member

of the community. Another inducement to labour is the desire of acquiring property. Yet the Communist would take away this, by depriving a man of the possession of anything that was not necessary to his actual and present wants. What, then, would be the effect of Communism? Would it not create idleness, the greatest of all evils? The progress of literature, science, and art would be immediately stopped, and, as F. F. remarks, we should soon become "a mere food, clothes, and shelter-producing community." The community would not consent to support the astronomer, the traveller, and the mechanic for a lifetime in return for the chance of their discovering a new planet, a new land, or a new piece of machinery. But suppose some were supported in order to study in each different department of science, while others were condemned to the performance of manual labour. Is it possible to suppose that all would be satisfied with the department of business allotted to them? One man's work would be easier than another's. All would be discontented, all would be grumbling. Truly this would make a wonderful exhibition of "*a HAPPY family*" of *Communists*. Suppose all were employed in mere manual labour. Then I would put the question before proposed by F. F.: If one man can produce in ten hours that which takes another fifteen, how are they to be treated? Are both to work the same time? If so, would not this cause great dissatisfaction? Besides, one man would fancy that he performed more than his share, while a lazy fellow, a thorough Communist, would be idling away his time, knowing that whether he worked much or little, there was an equal share of the profits for him. I should like very much to see how the advocates of Communism would have affairs managed. I should like an epitome of what they would

consider as proper rules for the guidance of society, if such a state *could* be formed—how every man would be compelled to perform his quota of labour—how the different stations of business and labour could be occupied so as to give satisfaction to all, so that none might fancy his neighbour had easier work than himself. I do not know the full extent the Communists would go to, nor do any of the preceding articles in favour of it give us a full account of its principles. I suppose the first thing on being formed into a Communistic body would be to consider all property as common. As long as there was anything to eat, drink, or wear, we might go on merrily; but when all was gone, what would come next? If one man worked, he would have a feeling of jealousy at others idling away their time and still reaping the same benefit as himself, and this feeling would render all reluctant to labour. A man's labour would not be for his own benefit, but for that of the community. I hope that sufficient has been said to show that the principles of Communism can never be carried out; and that if they could, they would not prove a benefit to mankind.

I will now endeavour to prove "the right which a private individual has to the possession of a part of the earth, debarring some of his fellow-creatures from all interest in such part." In the beginning, we are informed that God gave to *man* "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." On this is based the fundamental principle of Communists, that as God gave to *man* dominion over all the earth, the earth and its produce ought to be the common property of all. The doctrine which they would inculcate would have done very well whilst the earth continued bare of inhabitants, when it is reasonable to suppose that all was common amongst them, and that every one took from the public stock to his own use such things as his immediate necessities required. These general notions of property were then sufficient to answer all the purposes of human life; but when mankind increased, it was absolutely necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion. As human life grew more refined and civilized, numerous conveniences were devised to render it more agreeable. But would a man be

at the trouble to provide any so long as he had only a property in them in common with others—if as soon as he left his tent or pulled off his garment, the next person who passed by would have a right to inhabit the one and to wear the other? Even the brute creation, to whom everything else is in common, maintain a sort of private property in their own domains—the birds of the air have nests, and the beasts of the field caverns, and they deem the invasion of them as flagrant injustice, and will sacrifice their lives to preserve them. The article of food, we should think, would be one of the first objects of consideration; and, therefore, in order to sustain themselves by a less precarious manner than hunting, they would be induced to gather together such animals as were of a tame nature, and thus a permanent property would be established in their flocks and herds. The support of these cattle would naturally make the article of water of great importance; and therefore we read in the book of Genesis of many contentions respecting wells, the exclusive property of which, even in those days, appeared quite naturally (though in opposition to Communistic principles) to have been established in the first digger, even in places where the ground and herbage adjoining remained in common. So we read,* that Abraham, although a stranger and sojourner in the land, asserted his right to a well in the country of Abimelech, because he had digged such well, and was suffered to enjoy it without molestation. This is the first instance I can recollect where private appropriation of what was before in common is suffered, on account of the labour requisite in rendering useful the land so in common. Again, we find that Isaac, about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed his father's property, after much contention with the Philistines, and he was permitted quietly and peacefully to enjoy it, not in *common* with others, but solely to his separate use and benefit.† As the world became more largely populated, it was then made clear that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the labour of tilling it, if the land was the common property of all, and any one might seize upon

* Gen. xxi. 25, 30.

† Gen. xvi. 15, 18.

enjoy the produce of the tiller's labour, and art? Had not, therefore, property been vested in some persons, the world would have continued a forest, and we should have been little better than savages. Society thus begat property, and in order to ensure that property, recourse was taken to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable consequences, such as states, governments, laws, courts, and the public exercise of duties. Thus connected, it was not a part only of society was sufficient to provide, by their manual labour, for the necessary subsistence of all; and, therefore, opportunities were afforded to others to employ the human mind, to invent useful things, and to lay the foundations of science. Property thus became vested in some persons, and though there is a difference of opinion here, yet all writers agree that title is gained by occupancy that such title was gained. Some writers assert, that title is held by the tacit consent of the community, that the first occupant should be considered as owner; and others maintain that there is no need of their assent, but that the very occupancy being a sign of *bodily labour*, is a *natural justice*, sufficient to gain a title.

I have endeavoured to show, that the earth was originally the common property of all, yet as it was not *primarily* divided, nor did it become so until improved and meliorated by the bodily labour of the occupant, each man, by seizing such property as was most convenient to him, NOT OCCUPIED BY OTHERS, and exerting on it such bodily labour, did give him the best and most reasonable title to an interest in the property therein, and thus, as has been rightly observed, "*Labour constitutes the title to ownership, and is the original property.*"

It has been said by the advocates of Communism on the evils of competition, and in order to beg to subjoin, by way of conclusion, for the especial benefit, a few remarks from a writer, who says:—

"There is a world of thought in this one word (i.e., competition), and there are many things to which we are more indebted to it than to any principle which it expresses. Man is naturally a competing being. He is naturally disposed, not only to imitate his

brother, but to surpass him. There is a progressive element within us all, which, when duly cultivated, leads us to seek after something better than we have yet attained. Even Christ teaches us 'to provoke one another to love and good works,' and he is always pressing on towards perfection. Where there is no competition there is no advancement. Savages and barbarians never bring this principle to bear upon anything but mere feats of physical strength and deeds of cruelty, and, consequently, they remain in the same state from age to age. In China, there is little competition, and mind is stereotyped. The Japanese are now what they were a thousand or two thousand years ago, because nothing new or foreign is admitted among them. In several despotic governments every motive for emulation is taken away, and their caste is perpetual. The nobles are nobles, the priests are priests, and the slaves are slaves, from age to age.

"We are sorry to find that some of the *professed friends of liberty* and of the *working classes*, in our day, are lifting their voices against competition, and condemning it as a most vicious and destructive principle. The idea of revolution and equality is one of the wildest visions that has ever entered the mind of any DREAMING ENTHUSIAST. If all the land and property of the country were *equally divided* to-day, there would be an immense disparity in the circumstances of the population before to-morrow evening, unless those who undertook the matter should also limit the expenditure of every person, by constructing a tariff of household economy, by observing pains and penalties on its non-observance, and ordaining a number of government officials to detect and punish offenders. There must be a financier at every house to inquire how much each individual spends, or else one will lay out, and another will lay up, more than his brother or sister, and the grand *beau ideal* of equality will be infringed on and overthrown. But the institution of such a system of espionage and restraint would *overtop any tyranny* of which we have ever heard or read. The idea which *some* entertain of a nation of *Communists* involves it in the *utmost despotism*. As soon as an *industrious* man obtains a sixpence more than his *lazy* neighbour, he must give it up or have it taken from him, that the indolent miscreant,

who does not like to exert himself, may share a part of it. We have been extremely sorry for some years to find how many individuals of *apparently* philanthropic sentiments have been led away by the delusion, that by restraining persons from obtaining wealth and independency, you would cut up every evil root and branch, and completely provide for the whole population. With morality, liberty, and wealth on their lips, they strive to render virtue impossible, by converting every human being into a machine; to abolish freedom in labour, buying and selling, by transforming every man, woman, and child into a slave; and to banish all prosperity, by reducing each person into a penniless pauper.

"If we allow men and women to be free, there must certainly be competition, *inequality*, and a thousand other differences of opinion, pursuits, and circumstances. England owes her greatness to competition. We have resolved, from a very remote age, not only to raise ourselves, and to rise *above one another*, but also to outdo foreign nations; and here has been one great secret of our progress.

"We are told that many evils have resulted from this spirit of rivalry. So we may say, in reply, many evils very often result from eating and drinking, and therefore appetite is a bad thing; or, that human hands often do much mischief, and therefore we should have been better if we had been born without any. Wicked men abuse everything, and would do far more damage to their species under the system of Communism than it is possible for them to do under this of competition. But the *abuse* of a thing is the very antipodes of its use. There may be an honest, a noble, and a christian rivalry. There is no reason why a man who competes with another should be unjust or oppressive. It is not competition that produces low wages or selfishness. Far from this, we are persuaded that the working classes owe innumerable blessings to this very emulation which some are so seriously condemning."

I now conclude, remarking, that if there is any truth in the assertion, that "Britons never shall be slaves," as a natural consequence, *Communism never shall prevail.*

D. H.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—VI.

A FURTHER argument in favour of the ability of Communism to promote human happiness is derivable from the moral benefits it would confer upon individuals and societies. It has been ever the problem of Utopians, from the time of Plato to that of Morelly, "To find a situation in which it should be nearly impossible that man should be depraved or wicked."* This most important of all social problems is, in its generality, satisfactorily solved by Communism. We say, in its generality. It is not to be supposed that by a mere commencement of an outward Communitive constitution of things, that human beings will at once become virtuous or wise, saints or sages: some religious inspirations and moral impulses must always be presupposed. Granted the maximum of these, and we would contend, then, that Communism would be the most consonant sphere for their practical action: and granted the minimum of these,

and we would argue that Communism would be the most perfect school for their development. Compare, in fact, the dangerous positions in which private property places its holders, with the contrary conditions contingent upon a voluntary communion of goods, and you cannot but give the preference to the latter, as a sphere for the evolution and maintenance of virtue, and thus as conferring moral benefits, most highly productive of human happiness.

Let us glance, then, at several instances in illustration of the moral argument against private property, and in favour of Communism. Our first shall be an extreme case.

"The bad Lord Lonsdale," an opponent of the Rockingham administration in George the Third's reign, became Lord Lieutenant of Cumberland and Westmoreland, and possessor of an immense estate. He assumed the savage haughtiness of a feudal chief, and exacted a serf-like submission from his poor and abject dependants. As he passed through Penrith, awe and silence pervaded the inhabitants, and a tremor ran through the

* Morelly's "Code de la Nature," p. 37. Paris. 1790.

town as the gloomy despot traversed its streets. His despotic disposition manifested itself on every occasion. Speaking of Whitehaven, of which borough he was the patron, he said he was in the possession of the land, the fire, and the water—a boast which is thus mentioned in the *Rolliad*:—

"E'en by the elements his power confessed,
 Mines and boroughs Lonsdale stands possessed;
 And one sad servitude alike denotes
 The slave that labours and the slave that votes."

At some periods of his life, even, he resisted the payment of all bills. His lordship either declared that his creditors were knaves, or that he knew nothing about them. In this latter class was the father of William Wordsworth, who died, leaving the poet and four other helpless children. The executors of the will, foreseeing the result of a legal contest with a millionaire, withdrew opposition, trusting to Lord Lonsdale's sense of justice for payment; but they leaned on a broken reed, for the wealthy debtor died and made no sign.*

Here, then, we see private property giving the power to exercise tyranny, to excite fear and selfish submission, and to practise dishonesty with impunity. Here are three of the elements—land, fire, and water—monopolized by private property. How wide the immoral influences thus capable of being realized! How dire thus to the soul, the individual possession of such power, and how heightening its social effects! That the one we have adduced is an extreme case, we fully know; but we contend that it only thus comprises, in an individual instance, the divided details of the immoral influence of private property generally. There are, indeed, thanks to the radical good in human nature, but few Lord Lonsdales. There are, however, many minor men, who, in the aggregate of their characters, compose an extended image of his lordship. Worse still, certain fluctuations of fortune, certain combinations of cent. per cent., may be the hotbeds to raise other individual Lord Lonsdales, while the immoral influences of private property continue in the world.

Mark, however, that we do not assert that private property is the abstract cause of

crime and immorality. These, we deeply feel, have their original seeds in the sinful spirit; but we contend that these seeds are terribly nursed and brought forward under the framework of private property—that there they find nutriment for their monstrous growths and most destructive developments. Common property, although it changed not human nature, would at least cease to afford those easy stimulants and convenient accessories to vice, which a monetary currency now supplies. The lower the nature, indeed, the more prone is it to the sinful temptations connected with private property; but even the higher natures, who have honestly opened their breasts to us, have some time or other during their existence here been subject to the immoral influences of which private property is the bribe and aliment. Heritage and succession, the primary legitimate results of the system of private property, afford us an illustration of this in an instance, from the biography of Cowper, which will speak for itself:—

"Sad thoughts," says his biographer, "were now crowding upon Cowper. He was now in the thirty-second year of his age, his patrimony was well nigh spent, and, to use his own words, there was no appearance that he should ever repair the damage by a fortune of his own getting. He began to be a little apprehensive of approaching want, and under that apprehension, talking one day of his affairs with a friend, he expressed his hope, that if the clerk of the journals of the House of Lords should die, his kinsman, Major Cowper, who had the place at his disposal, would give him the appointment. 'We both agreed,' said he, 'that the business of the place being transacted in private, would exactly suit me; and both expressed an anxious wish for his death, that I might be provided for. Thus did I covet what God had commanded me not to covet, and involved myself in deeper guilt by doing it in the spirit of a murderer. It pleased the Lord,' he concluded, 'to give me my heart's desire, and in it and with it an immediate punishment of my crime.'"^{*}

Of the immoral influences, in the midst of which certain classes exist, through the positions of private property, mark the following four:—

* *Memoirs of M. of Rockingham*, &c., vol. i. pp. 70—72.

* Southey's "Cowper," vol. ii. p. 108.

1st. The position of the lawyer and his client—the interest of the former being in the litigation of the latter.

2nd. The position of the patient and his physician—the interest of the latter being in the ill health of the former.

3rd. The position of the parson and his hearers—the interest of the former being in the sins of the latter.

And 4th. The position of the testator and legatee—the interest of the latter being in the death of the former.

Passing, however, from particular instances, which may be either too much strained, or rendered too elastic, the entire system of private property presents antagonistic aspects to the general development of the highest commandment of the moral law, "Do unto others as you would be done by." The spirit of selfishness incessantly feeds upon it. All its conditions concur in the culture of covetousness and the love of self-aggrandizement. There are glorious exceptions, but these are still exceptions—units amid the mass. As a system, it is one of selfishness and antagonism. Individual is arrayed against individual—family against family. It too often poisons even those relations of family and kinship which should be the most sacred and sympathetic ties of society. Its immoral effects are felt through every fibre of the social body—relaxing the most sacred obligations, severing the most sympathetic ties, loosening the natural bonds of blood, and sapping the very foundations of faith and virtue. Look at the position of the soldier and the trader—the former for money combating to the hilt him by whom he had not been injured; and the latter, buying cheap and selling dear the props of life—the daily bread for which all Christians are taught to pray. Then again, mark the immoral anomaly of the idler surfeiting—the worker starving; the non-producer having the produce—the producer being deprived of it. Indeed the evils of private property are felt most in the moral relations of life. In bankruptcy as well as in success in trade, there exists alike a moral contamination. A successful tradesman, if he thinks morally, must know that success in trade is attended too often by the ruin of unfortunate rivals, and that thus he is working with a system contrary to the highest moral law. Seduction, prostitution! what

shall we say of these? It is not to be said but that cases of pruriency or lust might arise in a contrary state to the present—for generations would be required to allay the present evil development of the passions, but certainly Communism would not furnish these with the terrible abettors and accessories with which they are now supplied by private property. The disgusting marriages of money, and the indelicate purchases of pleasure, would certainly not be there; while here, what soulless seduction, what loathsome prostitution, what suicide, what infanticide! In fine, if we analyze avarice, or misinformed, untutored, barren selfishness, we shall find it at the root of all the vices; and private property is the fosterer of avarice. Love of lucre, and love of lust, are alike avarice. As the apostle Paul tells us, that by the law sin came into the world, so we may say of the present system of private property, that it is the nurse and nourisher of the very sins which it condemns. It is the Mercury of thieves, the tutor of theft; its Jove visits Danae in a golden shower; and without it theft and prostitution, strictly so called, with many other vices, would have no existence.

How immoral, then, is such a system! How sad and sinful must submission to it be, in the eyes of those who have awakened to the consciousness of its immoral influences! How would they joy to exist under a system of a contrary tendency!

This system is that of Communism. Under that system the desire of heritage would no longer poison the fountains of filial love. No Lord Londale would be a tyrant to all around, terrifying even his creditors from a demand for their dues, for fear of further losses from litigation, and seducing a peasant maiden, whom death even could not free from him, as he caused her body to be embalmed, and preserved it in a glass case, as a satisfaction for his solitary selfishness. No poet Cowper, either, weak for the world's work, and possessed of a pining pietism, would wish to step into the shoes of the dead, instead of labouring to mend his own.

Among the moral benefits of Communism may be reckoned the submersion of many sins now connected with the social state, such as theft and forgery—and the submersion of many vices thus connected, such

as seduction and prostitution. All the dishonesties of trade, the antagonistic interests of different individuals in the same department of business, and the doubtful positions of certain classes and professions, in reference to other portions of society, with all their immoral influences, would also thus be submerged.

In the affirmative aspect, the moral benefits of Communism cannot be so confidently registered, as they are largely those of theory. It is thus that we chiefly dwell upon the immoral influences from which it will remove us, as these are known and felt. The very removal of the weeds of vice will surely allow to the plants of virtue greater room for growth. If these have in special instances developed themselves in moral loveliness, even amid the present contrary circumstances and immoral examples of the present social state; surely, in more congenial conditions, with these circumstances and examples removed, they will more generally grow in beauty and grace, flowering on earth and bearing fruit for heaven. Finally, with Communism will come a cessation of those motives of interest and worldly prudence which, for the sake of self-preservation in the present state of things, so often interfere between the kindly wish of the heart and the generous offer of the hand. Mutual service will thus also become of high spiritual significance. All will require to receive, and all will have power to give.

"Silver and gold have I none," said the apostle; "but what I have I will give unto thee. Rise up and walk." Moral elevation is the greatest of earthly gifts. Millionaires after all cannot monopolize generosity. The general education refused in the plethoric city will be freely given in the compact communistery. The immoral influences of private property removed, with institutions congenial with Christianity and virtue, Communism would, I believe, gradually elevate all its participants, and being voluntarily and pacifically established, in faith and love, be moral in itself and moral in its means, affording a sphere of society the most removed from immoral influence, and the most consonant with moral development.

In conclusion, then, as morality is to the actions that which religion is to the sentiments—the will of God and the duty of man; and as human happiness depends upon the harmony of creature with creature, and of creatures with their Creator; and as Communism in its contrast with private property would remove from present society its most immoral influences, and thus form a sphere superiorly suited for moral development; would we further advocate Communism as promotive of the happiness of man. The best of men in the present state have deplored the immoral influences in which they have been placed. The worst in Communism might rejoice in better advantages than the best have here. G. B.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"You, like all mankind, have had dim inspirations, confused yearnings, after your future destiny; and, like all the world from the beginning, you have tried to realize, by self-willed methods of your own, what you can only do by God's inspiration, by God's method. Like the builders of Babel in old time, you have said, 'Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven!'—and God has confounded you, as he did them. By mistrust, division, passion, and folly, you are scattered abroad."—*Edmond, in "Alton Locke."*

Our first duty, as one of the openers of this debate, is to acknowledge the amount of learning and ability which our subsequent writers have brought to bear upon the question. It is true, after all which has been said, that we see no cause to alter our original views. Communism still seems to us like a fair flower in the bud, but with a canker

deeply imbedded in its heart; and Communistic bliss appears that which, should it ever be sought after, will never be attained. We are, however, pleased to see so much ability, although it be arrayed against us; and we now proceed briefly to notice the several writers, and the arguments they have adduced.

The affirmative writers range under the respective signatures of U. M.; L. J.; "Homo"; J. F.; and G. B. In the last initials, and also in the style of the paper contributed, we recognise a writer of eminence in Communistic matters—one whom we have met with pleasure elsewhere, and who, if any one can, is capable of showing us the best side of Communism. We shall notice his arguments in their turn.

U. M. furnishes some strong arguments in support of the principle of common property in the soil, and in inventions and discoveries; and further enjoins the principle that all men should labour. We shall not here stop to dispute any of these points, inasmuch as they appear to us to fall wide of the mark. It was not the object of the present inquiry to determine how far Communism *might* be desirable, or even just, but whether the system itself would really conduce to man's happiness. We see no real argument in the paper under consideration reaching this point.

The next affirmative writer is L. I. His object is to show, both on scripture and historic authority, that the *theory* of Communism is sound, and that to some extent it has succeeded in practice. He cites in support of the first allegation the *belief* that the apostles were Communists, "and exemplified their sentiments by forming the first christian church into a community;" and in support of the practicability of the system, adduces several authorities, laying most stress upon the partial success of the Moravians. If this writer refers to our opening paper, he will observe that we made special exception to persons "imbued with a high sense of moral and religious rectitude." Such persons would be comparatively happy under *any* circumstances: but as they unfortunately form only a small proportion of the human family, we must look a little beyond them—they have the least need to resort to new remedies. The Moravians and all others who have at all succeeded in the practical application of Communism, have been first and chiefly actuated by religious zeal; and Communism has only been made subservient to this end. The fact that the *idea* of Communistic happiness has long been *entertained*, is no proof that its application would be successful. The alchemists long entertained the idea of the possibility of transmuting the baser metals into gold, but we do not find it authentically recorded that they ever succeeded in so doing.

"Homo," on the same side, presents us with a truly doleful picture of our social position as a great nation. We wish, for our country's sake, that we could at once deny much that he has asserted. But the simple fact that our present condition is bad, is no proof that Communism would

make it better. We must see how the remedy is to be administered. "Homo's" definition of the principle of Communism, which seems to us about correct, is that it "seeks to restore the primal rights of mankind, by abrogating all claims to the possession of *private property*; and to secure the equal rights of all men to develop their *unequal* faculties, by establishing a community of goods and a concerted combination of effort among all classes of society." The real point, then, is to see how far the carrying out this principle would be likely to secure the end in view—namely, the promotion of man's happiness.

Now, we are prepared to assert our full belief that the chief sources of man's happiness (leaving out that resulting purely from religion, and which cannot therefore be affected by any earthly considerations) may be traced as originating either in the acquirement, by one's own exertions, and in a fair and honourable manner, of a comfortable competence for the support of ourselves and those dependent upon us; or, failing to secure such competence, still having the inward satisfaction of having led a good moral life—of having, to the best of our ability, and by the cultivation of our best faculties, contributed to the comfort and happiness of our fellow-creatures;—in word, having done all that our position in life enabled us to do towards leaving the world better than we found it. The satisfaction, we say, of having well acquitted ourselves in these particulars constitute real happiness, and at the same time tend to rear up within us that true nobleness of nature which ever has and ever will constitute the real and unmistakable distinction between *really civilized* and *moralized* being and those who are not so.

Well, how does this bear upon the question before us? We shall see. It is truly and wisely said that SELF is referred to in the *first* law of nature. It might be well were it not so, but the fact we cannot alter. Where our own interests are concerned, where our own fame may become extended, or our own honour advanced, there we are ever active, energetic, and determined. Where only the interests of others are involved, or our own but very remotely, there we are apt to exhibit sloth, neglect, and indifference. When, mainpring, self-interest, being absent,

whole machinery stands still. If this be man's nature, how are we to hope for any universal departure from it? A few conventional minds may for a time suppress their individuality, and amalgamate into a union of brotherhood. Their religious or moral qualifications may enable them to do so; but how will the principle apply to mankind generally? for this is the point to be thought of. It is not sufficient that many, or even the majority, are content to doff their individuality, and surrender their self-interest to the common good. Upon the simple yet obvious principle, that

"One sickly sheep infects the flock,
And poisons all the rest,"

the few dissentient or non-conforming individuals, would most effectually mar the perfection of the whole plan, by undermining the basis on which alone the structure could be upheld—namely, the constant unanimity of every member interested. We see then, at a single glance, that the principle embodied in, and being indeed the very basis of, Communism—the forfeiture of self-interest, self-accumulation, self-distinction—is contrary to the *natural* impulse and desires of mankind, and hence we discover the cause of the limited progression which Communism has hitherto made, and to which we doubt it must submit to make in future.

To say that we arrive at this conclusion without some feeling of regret, would be to belie our own conscience. We have a sympathy with all projects for the amelioration of human misery, or in other words, the promotion of man's happiness. They all perform a great good, by directing public and individual attention to the points they aim at. The world is, no doubt, indebted to the dreamings of the Communists for many of the social improvements which have already taken place. We wish, for the world's sake, their theories were more suited to practice. We eagerly seize upon every new Communistic proposition, with the hope of finding something *REAL*. We therefore entered upon a discussion of the question in these pages with every desire to do the subject justice; and although we have very freely expressed our views, we hope, whenever Communism shows itself equal to its aims, we may be permitted to join the ranks of its supporters.

We are drawing speedily to a close, but

we should be guilty of an act of injustice to pass unnoticed the learned arguments of G. B., in recent numbers. We agree with his first proposition, that "the ability of Communism to promote the happiness of man is not necessarily connected with the question of the abstract right or wrong of private property," but that it has rather to do with "the ability of *common property* to promote human happiness." The point of our argument has been to show that the principle of common property is antagonistic to man's happiness: because that happiness, as we have shown, seems to arise either from the success of individual exertions, or an inward consciousness of having individually, *and of our own free will*, endeavoured to serve the great cause of human progression. Therefore, if by adopting the principle of common property you discourage or altogether banish the inducement to individual exertion, from which happiness proceeds, the result *must be* just the opposite of that held forth by the Communists. Such, at least, is our own belief.

Most of us will also agree with G. B. in the high estimate he forms of the beauties and advantages of the religion of Jesus, but we may pause with advantage before we are drawn into an admission of the truth of the proposition so ingeniously interwoven into this part of the argument. We mean, that Communism tends naturally and almost necessarily, to direct our minds to think upon, and our hearts to adopt, this "pure and undefiled" religion. We have already endeavoured to show, that where religion has had to do with Communism it has taken the initiative, and has *not* been the consequence of Communism. Certainly, even in the present day, we have had instances of the attempt to make religion subservient to the practice of Communism, of a certain class. We have cause to rejoice that the attempt has proved a failure. Communism to be successful must be *religious*, pure in principle, holy in practice. Then we revert to our first argument, that the religious element alone would be that around which the happiness would irradiate—in which it would concentrate.

We know G. B. will forgive us for believing that he rather writes of Communism as he wishes it to be, than as we have *real* grounds to believe it *would be*.

How much still remains unsaid ! Yet we must conclude, and we would do so with an extract from the beautiful prayer of the saints, in *Festus* :—

“ May all who dwell
On the open earth, or in the hid abyss,
Howe'er they sin or suffer, in the end
Receive
The Mercy that is mightier than all ill.
May all souls love each other in all worlds
And all conditions of existence :
And knowing others' nature and their own,

Live in serene delight, content with good,
Yet earnest for the last and best degree.

• • • • • May kindness and truth,
Wisdom and knowledge, liberty and power,
Virtue and holiness, o'erspread all orbs.

• • • • • The world be bliss and love,
And heaven alone be all things ; till at last
The music from all souls redeemed shall rise,
Like a perpetual fountain of pure sound,
Upspringing, sparkling in the silvery blue—
From round creation, to thy feet, O God ! ”

C. W., Jun.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

In the article which I wrote at the opening of this discussion, I attempted to show that the earth and all that it produces ought to be recognised as the common property of man. In support of this view I stated that the earth has an intrinsic value, which has been stamped upon it by the Creator, and that this value was designed for the use of the human family : and hence that any rental which is charged upon this value, is a fraud which is practised upon that part of the community who have to pay it.

It has been intimated, however, that this charge is not made upon the original value of the land, but upon the labour that has been expended upon it : and F. F. supplies us with a very interesting picture of a man who, being wrecked upon an island, sets about to enclose and cultivate a portion of the soil, and eventually leaves the fruit of his labours to be enjoyed by his son. We say it is an *interesting* picture : as it regards the mass of landed property which is held in the world, it is, unfortunately, a *fictitious* picture : for this is not the way in which the soil has become the property of those who hold it.

The rental which is charged upon the soil does not necessarily represent the labour which has been bestowed upon it.

How much labour has been expended upon the forest land which to this moment exists in some parts of our country ; land which to all appearance is as wild as that of any uninhabited country can well be supposed to be, and yet for this soil tenants who occupy neighbouring farms are called upon to pay rent. It will perhaps be said that if labour has not actually been expended upon the soil, roads have been formed in its neighbourhood, and are from time to time kept in order, and so the land has been improved in

its position. To this we reply, that as the land is extra-parochial, if roads have been formed, it has not been at the expense of its proprietors, and hence a charge of rental on the ground of such accommodation is a charge upon other people's capital, which is notoriously unjust. But the lords of the soil would not acknowledge the rental of such land to be a charge on the labour and capital of others : it must therefore be a charge on the *intrinsic value* of the soil.

But this doctrine of the right of occupancy is a farce. Take the case of our own country. Suppose we have a proprietor who holds ninety or a hundred thousand acres by inheritance in a direct line from the time of the Conqueror. Whose land was it before that period ? How did the present proprietor acquire his right ? From the original right of occupancy ? Certainly not—but from the sword. His land was by the right of occupancy the property of the Saxon who held it before him ; and this Saxon had in his turn taken it from the Briton, who in his day possessed a similar right.

Now the question naturally presents itself, Which of these rights of occupancy is the proper right ? It may be said, The original one. But who knows which is it ? and if we were in possession of this information, where should we look for the proper inheritor ? By rendering the land common property, Communism avoids this dilemma, for it gives the *heir*, if living, a right among the rest.

But there is some little ambiguity about this term *occupancy*. It may mean as much as a man is able to cultivate with his own hands, or it may mean as much as he is able to appropriate to his own use. If the former be intended, it would certainly take a long time yet to occupy the globe ; but if the

d men who appropriate land by tens and of acres be recognised as occupiers it is not quite certain whether the land is not already occupied. It would require some discernment to distinguish between the right of the lord who owns a portion of his land, which he preserves, and that of the Indian who has a right over a part of an island or continent which he designates his hunting-ground.

objects to Communism on the ground that it would prove a barrier to all progress, by removing the great incentive to labour, the accumulation of property; "Would society support the astronomer, the traveller, the mechanist, in return for the discovery of a new world, or the discovery of a new piece of machinery?"

the first part of our friend's objection does not acknowledge the premises. The accumulation of property is *the incentive to labour*. That it is *an incentive* we do not deny; but there are at present incentives which take the lead of the love of power and the love of fame. *cases* the accumulation of property is an incentive simply because it *leads* to power and fame. Now in a Communistic state there are no positions of power, and the fact of there being such positions would itself be a sufficient stimulus to the accumulation of property inasmuch as these positions would be obtainable without the aid of wealth. *then* as to *fame*. No doubt in a Communistic state great deeds would be recorded and the report of them transmitted to all climes and other generations, and this would still be an incentive to great

deeds. The community would not support the astronomer or the mechanist. Nor would it be useful that it should. As the general principle of labour would be very much curtailed, extending beyond some four or five hours per day, after which persons would be at liberty to employ themselves according to their tastes.

The traveller would be sure to be benefited; the desire to extend the blessings of Communism to other lands and people, and to introduce, from time to time, such

improvements as would be calculated to benefit the community, would ensure this. He would not, indeed, as now, travel for mere personal pleasure, or perhaps scientific purposes; but as the missionary of the community he would make known to those who are without the blessings of Communism, the advantages which would accrue from their adopting the Communistic state.

Another objection is that men will not be *equally* capable of benefiting the community, and hence jealousies will arise.

Can any fact tend to prove the expediency of the Communistic state more than this—that all men are not equally fitted to benefit the community? All are not fitted to be *heads*; some are suited for hands, some for feet; some for one place, some for another. Labour, in order to be well done, and done to advantage, must be divided. Each man must occupy his proper position. Well, one of the advantages of Communism will be that it will furnish each with his own proper work. Instead of a man having to feel his way, as now, through a long lifetime before he finds his place, and then dying before his work is done, his education will be carefully watched from early youth, the particular tendency of his mind marked, and before he arrives at manhood he will have been suitably trained for that occupation in which he is to spend the prime of his life.

But our friend thinks it horrible that the community should have the education of the young intrusted to its charge, and that this necessarily implies a severance of those ties of affection which ought to subsist between parent and child. We do not sympathize with him, for we do not think that such need to be the case. The position of such a child would certainly not be worse in this respect than that of the naval or military officer, who at a tender age is taken to a government school. Do children, under such circumstances, forget their parents? or do parents cease to remember their children? Surely the circumstance of children being properly educated will in no wise tend to lessen their affection for those who gave them being, while it must render every succeeding generation more advanced, and thus, as one of the results of Communism, promote the happiness of man.

U. M.

The Societies' Section.

POETIC CRITIQUE.

Speech is silver, but silence is gold.—CARLYLE.

THE office of the poet announces itself, with clear and well-defined utterance, as unmistakably the same in all ages. The vehicle of his revelations may be somewhat different, but the divine truth which he utters is the same—to lead man to look upon the beautiful as the only true and divine side of life, and to learn that only the true is beautiful. He it is who shows us there are no brass walls between the immortal spirit of man and its divine Originator; that the spiritual side of our nature should continually sun itself in the smiles of God; that the hallowed precincts of the human soul should not rudely be invaded by any listless vagrant, who knoweth not that the footsteps of Deity are heard, clear and distinct, in the secret chambers of that spirit.

The poet is a man of all times. He is never out of place. His mission is never doubtful. He knows the spiritual wants of his age, and to him is given the power to satisfy the craving of a nation after truth. He, of all men else, is the favoured of the gods. His feet are resting on the earth, while deep clouds are round his head—his full glory veiled from the eyes of grosser men. His spirit dwells in a land where a "spring eternal makes glad the garden of the heart"—where he drinks deep at the fount of light and joy. Amid the crumbling walls of Time no step is heard more firm than his. And, round about him, in fancy may we often hear a chorus of spirits, to whom he first gave breath, rising in low, murmuring strains like the swelling surge of a distant sea, or the shrill warbling heard by the dying musician—like a whisper of hope from the silver clouds above.

The same innate perception, the same spiritual necessity, which causes the musician to pour forth his soul in harmonious strains, as though the very stars were moving "to the concourse of sweet sounds," also dictates to the poet the utterance of his holy thoughts.

Yet there is another perception, of a somewhat lower kind, distinguished alike by these two men, namely, that law and order are beautiful even in simple things. The best truths should be uttered in the best way; the sweetest strains conveyed in a manner pleasing to all. Hence the one has his verses, the other his stave, with its adjuncts. These are his servants, not his masters. These are what we may call the mechanics of poetry and of music, and, of course, are the most easily reproduced. But what is a combination of cogs, governors, and spindles, without the motive power—the vital force that moves the whole?

The ease with which this mechanism is imitated, has brought into existence another class of writers, generally designated poets, but—! This last class, which will be more properly styled verse-makers than poets, certainly, to an extent, fulfils its mission. Some there are who serve to while away an hour pleasantly enough; some appeal to our better feelings with that directness of purpose which shows a spark of the true man. *But the danger of this heterogeneous plant is, that*

it so often runs to seed, and becomes husky. Musical numbers are pleasant, so there be some meaning in their music, and not a mere jingle. But, as we have said, after all "they are but the faintest echo of poetry," which is—

"An endless fountain of immortal drink,
Pouring unto us from the heaven's brink."

Yet, with all our astrigent remarks, there is, now and then, a versifier who, as he "babbles o' green fields," does win from us a fair portion of love. He who would lull an unquiet soul to rest, and, while he soothes, strives to elevate the fainting spirit, and gently rouse it to action and noble duty-doing, shall not pass unhonoured.

What is sweeter or more entrancing to a real quiet, yet hearty, spirit, than to seize a volume of ballad-poetry, and ramble forth into the woods and fields, and there, lying beneath a glorious canopy of green leaves, with here and there a glimpse of the bright blue sky above, drink deep

"Of teeming sweets, enkindling sacred fire"?

Perhaps no age was ever so distinguished for its writing propensities as the present, yet it is not a complete dearth, else it would be weary indeed. The names of Bayley, Tennyson, Browning, Longfellow, and a host of others, are too well known for that. The only objection is, that every tyro imagines it is not enough to write, but he must *print*, his effusions, thus besetting, like a bevy of importunate beggars, poor, wayfaring men, who have none too much time, nor too little to do in it.

And now, having said thus much of poets and poetasters, we turn to our own Parnassian friends, to see what mole-hills or what mounts they have perched themselves upon. Some, we imagine, will find themselves upon sand, ere long, and that every breath of wind that passes will carry away a portion of their pedestals to mingle with the common stock of puerilities and grains of nothingness.

First in order comes "The Stars," by "Condiscipulus." This piece, our readers will remember, was printed in conjunction with "Poetic Critique, No. II.," vol. ii. page 471; but owing to unforeseen circumstances, our remarks thereon were entirely omitted, thus giving "Condiscipulus" reason to believe we had dealt with him somewhat summarily. We read the lines with some degree of interest, as they were decidedly the best we had received. One faulty phrase there is, namely, "sunless suns;" there is too much of the *s*, which is, at the best of times, not a most delightful sound. There is an interest in the stars which has been felt in all ages; there is a brightness in the very memory of a starry night. So magical is the influence which they have exercised, that men have imagined them linked up with our very destiny. How calm and holy is the pure light shed from their lustrous eyes of love! What thoughts of other lands and other worlds do they bring with their cheering smiles! What promises of rest for the weary!

as! thou bringest all good things—
weary, to the hungry cheer;
bird the parent's brooding wings,
stall to the overlaboured steer.
peace about our hearthstone clings,
household gods protect of dear,
round us by thy look of rest;
at the child, too, to the mother's

nded of the stars, is to be carried
tion, to the woods and fields, there
nce and awe, on the "beautiful
e of night."

murky walls of a city for the pure
the "vaulted blue," can only be
ed by those who have a love for
the bright and happy stars look
their lustre, on the earth beneath,
ek some fallen spirit to the skies.
those silent monitors, those spirit-
a pure and holy religion, seem to
ze! How kindly do they smile
above! Can we blame the child
ider and adoration, believes them
f angels, looking through the floor
ield his lowly couch from harm?
isions of the night—the dreams!
what strength to resist temptation
a visions of a brighter land,

green turf hides no grave,"
ered in the night, from the sweet
uce of the stars?

ill, even after the lapse of ages of
hat are those radiant inhabitants
or what end created? have they
beginning of Time? Will those
of glory, which light up the ever-
of the universe—the temple of
b—ever be extinguished, leaving
Will the "star-dust of God's feet"
in those fields of ether throughout
ages that have yet to roll? Will
to sound their celestial songs—
they be by the ear of mortals—
ave of time shall have broken on
mity?" Yes, we believe they will
tinue to "bathe in rosy light" the
s and of angels, where—

"Lowly reverent,
r throne they bow; and, to the
location, down they cast
swove with amaranth and gold.
anth! a flower which once
it by the tree of life,
s; but soon, for man's offence,
moved, where first it grew, there

oft, shaling the fount of life,
river of bliss thro' midst of heaven,
ism flowers her amber stream;
t never fade, the spirits elect
splendent locks entwreathed with

urlands thick thrown off, the bright
like a sea of jasper shone,
s celestial roses, smiled."

hyme is of "Summer Evening
minely an enchanting title, and
ritten; it brings back remem-

brances of the sunny hours of youth, when we
rambled amid the green pastures, makes us wan-
der again beside clear streams and shady groves,
where we sit in silence and in solitude, to listen
to the twittering of the birds, the busy hum of
insects, who sport away their lives—a summer's
day—in one continual buzz and murmur of
delight; we watch the clear rivulet as it ripples
musically along over the stony bed

"Which ruffles the wave, but sweetens it too;"
or, perhaps, again turn children, and gather the
wild flowers that enamel the green carpet which
we tread; or wander on to the lone wood which

"Overshadoweth
Eternal whispers, glooms, the birth, life, death,
Of unseen flowers in heavy peacefulness."

The lines, of which we give the first verse, are,
as we said, tolerably written; yet, on the whole,
there is a barrenness of idea, as is evidenced in
the fact of so much being said of the rays of the
sun:—

"Sweet is the hour of eve! How fair the scene
Nature reveals! How beautiful the west
Glow in the sunshine's mellow beam,
Ere, for the night, he calmly sinks to rest.
His farewell glance—his last bright parting ray—
Illumining the azure arch of heaven,
Far fairer than at full meridian day
His beams—though then in powerful splendour
given."

"Lines to Young England," "from an Ardent
and Outbursting Spirit of Twenty," show the pos-
sibility of improvement. There is truly evidence
of an ardent spirit; yet we would warn the writer
not to let it degenerate into mere bombast. Re-
member, it is the shallow brook which makes the
greatest babble. Has "Henricus" ever read
Kant's Poems?

With regard to the subject-matter of the "Lines
to Young England," we cannot subscribe to the
notions there expressed. For instance, speaking
of Greece, Rome, Persia, &c., he says:—

"Their sun derived its source and light below
[from below],
Ours from the Sun of Righteousness above;
Their pole-star, war, ambitious or [and] unjust,
Our pole-star, justice, honour, love of truth." (?)

Indeed! And thus, in the space of four lines,
does "Henricus," in his own mind, eclipse the sun
of Greece, Rome, and Persia. We would remind
him that he must know very little of history,
either ancient or modern—nay, even the events
of to-day—to draw such a conclusion, especially
as he says "Greece and Rome's grand monu-
ments decayed." Has he ever been to the British
Museum? Has he ever noticed how, in all quar-
ters of the earth, copies even, where originals
cannot be procured, of all that Greece and Rome
ever produced, are eagerly sought after, as though
they were pure virgin gold? Has H. ever read
Plato? has he read Homer?—works which will
yet outlast the flood of literature—England's
"mental monuments." And is it thus that these
grand phases of humanity are to be blotted out
for ever? Oh, no! The spirit of the beautiful
never was more grandly expressed than in ancient
Greece. Believe us, her memory will never know
decay.

And is it true that her light was derived from

below, while ours is derived from above? The very thought is sacrilege. To compare a nation whose only god is now gold—whose very doctrines of exchange are, Let the body live, though the soul perish:—is it not an acknowledged principle of English trade that every man must beat his neighbour out of the market if he is to get rich? for that is now the grand desire. When was there an age when people were so infatuated as at present? Gold! gold! at whatever cost. And is this *yellow*, feverish glitter the light derived from the Sun of Righteousness? And have our wars been so honourable? What, for instance, was the cause of the Chinese war? Was "justice, honour," or "love of truth," the pole-star of England then? If so, what was the meaning of the "*Opium Trade*"? Has the late war at the Cape been particularly distinguished for humanity? Shame! "*Henricus*," to strive, for the sake of rhyme, thus to ignore the memory of a noble people, whose

"Souls of the lofty, whose *wandying* names,
Rouse the young bosom still to noblest aims."

We trust H. will, ere long, think otherwise of this land of heroes and of gods. We wish not to underrate the glory of England. It is great truly, and we love her as our mother earth; but we cannot hear her noble predecessor, the very morning star of civilization, thus lightly spoken of.

The "*Dream of Words*," by P. D., we do not much admire. There is a hazy indistinctness about it—we had almost said a fog. The drift of the piece seems to be, that we should be careful what words we utter, as they will appear against us at the last day in brighter colours than we may imagine. However, the idea is not well wrought up. The "*dream of words*" has become a *wordy dream*. We would recommend to the notice of P. D. the words of a celebrated poet, of which we give a *free* translation:—

"He who strives to rise too far,
May bump his head against a star."*

The "*Night-Wind's Lesson*" is better. However, "*Songs of Heaven*" is decidedly the best, though the reading of the first part of it was somewhat painful, on account of the inconveniently small hand in which it was written. We would give this as a warning to our "*Poetic Friends*," at least,—to let their *honied* ink be spread out in fair proportions. We give two verses of "*Songs of Heaven*:"

"The *cloudy mists* around thy throne,
Trail their garments dim;
And the blue ether's springing dome
Is made by Deity a home
In which we worship him"

"I heard the *trailing garments of the night*" is by Longfellow: we will not say P. D. has seen it; yet we *do think* he has seen Goethe's "*Faust*," from other sentences in his verses.

"The vaulted aisles of the airy sky
Echo adoring love;
We wait the word through space to fly,
And we live on the breath of Deity,
While the *Sanctus* rings above."

* "Quod si me lyricus vatibus inseris,
Sublimé feriam sidera versice."
Per: aps P. D. will take this into consideration.

P. D. has some good thoughts now and then; but they require greater care in giving them expression. We should like to see another attempt, written with greater care, both from P. D. and the writer of "*Summer Evening Thoughts*;" there is possibility of improvement.

Next comes our friend of "*Old Scot/And*" again, with his lines "*To Miss —*". Reader, would you like to know her name? He calls her "*Isa dear*" in the last verse, which we cannot do better than paraphrase to J. C. himself, thus:—

But *I say* (*Isa*), dear, now, don't you think,
(To be plain without disguise.)
That you some common sense could write,
And cease to poetize?

If it would be saying much to J. C., or give him an hour of sweeter sleep, we may say we prefer "*Isa dear*," as being a little more graceful than "*Victoria*," though—(our lady readers will please place their crochet-needle over the next sentence)—neither of the ladies are "any better than they should be."

Lines "*On an Apple*" we do not like at all. The philosophy is decidedly bad. E. A. S. calls the apple deceitful—seeks to place the blush upon it for the sin of Eve—and straightway he would leave off eating apples (!).

"And when an apple meets my eye,
A voice says, 'Eat not! lest ye die.'"

"Ye gods and little fishes!" what want of *taste*? "Eat not"!! When an apple meets our eye, rosy, streaked, or beautifully plump, a voice cries, Eat! eat! and we obey that voice forthwith, so that "the apple of our eye" becomes at once "the apple of our palate;" and we find, that which in the "mouth was sweet," "in the belly is" not "bitter." E. A. S. gives us another piece without a title, though we should suppose it is "*Hope*":—

'Let sorrowing hearts bear this motto in mind—
A life without hope is a world without sun,' &c.
The construction of this piece is decidedly bad; the sentiment we can agree with.

"Last, though not least"—that is, in length—is a "*Song to the Lark*." We would certainly give our readers a treat by publishing the whole of the "*Lark*," but he has such a *tail*—only twenty-five verses!

Ver. 1. "Oh, my companion, thou
Bird of sublimest wing,
Together let us now
Communicably sing."

Good! That word, "*communicably*" is exceedingly fine. E. D. *scapt* before, with a beech tree

Ver. 2. "Of Empyréan height
Thy song does all inspire;
And mine is the *twilight*
Of glimmering desire."

We should suppose, at any rate, the *candle* was out with our singer, and he was "left darkling."

Ver. 3. "With yearnings to *ascend*,
I spend my *flickering flame*;
And my *lax wings* dissend
Unrising. They are lame."(!)

Yes, our "*glimmering*" friend has again "spent" his metal to its utmost length—"spent" his

"flickering flame," and his "lax wings dissend
 arising;" dipped in treacle, perhaps. "They are
 lame." So is his verse. Poor Pegasus! "Drop
 a tear; ay, drop another."

Ver. 6. (Patience, gentle reader, only twenty-
 five, remember!)

"I am a worm, O bird,
 A grovelling worm but here (*hear!*)
 Wherever I have heard
 Thy music I reverse."

We should think the bird had no *bill* when E. D.
 said he was a worm (which nobody doubts), or
 his account would have been settled immediately.

Ver. 8. "I crawl about a space—
 A little space below—
 (Only twenty-five verses!)
 Though wishful oft to race
 With the swift-footed roe."

E. D. is too heavy for such gymnastic exercises
 as flying and racing.

Ver. 12. "Into the vault of heaven
 Thou dost high-minded (*bodied!*) go,
 With due attention given
 To humbler *thought* below."

Ver. 13. "Thou dost *descend* again—
 Again *ascending up*—(yes, up again!)
 As my poor thoughts which wave
 Betwixt despair and hope."

Ver. 14. "Perhaps thy theme is not
 Of heavenly things alway;
 Or, as poor Hogg (*bruin*) has *thought*,
 Thou sometime tun'st thy lay."

Ver. 17. (Only half this time.)
 "Let us sing merrily
 Our love songs without end."

We would advise E. D. never to sing or weep any
 more, though he says, "I did consider myself
 rather watery-headed." Well, never mind; so was

the "beech tree which dropped in a leaf." There
 is sympathy in companionship.

Ver. 18. "For I *descend* as thou—(down again!)
 To seek rewarding love—(a whipping!)
 From kindred souls below—(the cook!)
 Who shall my songs approve."

Bless her taste! We'd rather suffer any amount
 of grinding from a barrel organ.

Ver. 21. "If none shall say 'tis good—(what say
 our readers?)
 If none shall *smile* assent—(it makes us grin!)
 Then be my fairest flood
 Of verse for ever spent."

So say we—he will *spend*, this time, to advantage.
 "Flickering flame" extinguished—"Metal spun
 its utmost length"—"Flood of verse for ever
 spent."

"Fare thee well, and if for ever—
 Still for ever"—

Stop! here's another verse. Yes, just this one. It
 is the last feather in the *tail*; yes, the twenty-
 fifth:—

"By the sweet soul of song
 Which doth inspire my heart—(nonsense!)
 But I will not prolong
 This lay. Sweet bird, we part."

Surely our readers must have revelled in the
 delights of the muse. Surely no bird ever sang
 so sweetly before. He deserves a *cage*; his *perch*
 he has already found. "*Water*" he professes to
 have plenty of; *seeds* he has none—at least of
 genius, or even talent in verse making; feathers
 he has some few (which we hope will not be
 ruffled), though he has no wings. All we have
 left to say to our unfledged songster is—

"Sweet bird, we part."

E. B.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Chesham Mutual Improvement Society.—
 This society held its first half yearly meeting on
 Tuesday, May 18th, when about 100 members
 and friends were present and partook of tea, after
 which a meeting was held, the Rev. W. G. Lewis
 presiding. The secretary (Mr. H. W. Lusty) read
 the report, which stated that the usual difficulties
 presenting themselves in the formation of such
 societies had been most successfully overcome,
 and the committee congratulated the members on
 the prosperity which had attended their exertions.
 During the half year discussions had taken place
 on important topics, such as the following:—
 "Has Government any Right to Interfere in
 Education?" "Is War, under any Circum-
 stances, Justifiable?" with many others equally
 important. Lectures had been delivered on
 various interesting subjects, and a library for cir-
 culation had been established for the use of the
 members. After calling upon the members to
 renew their exertions for the society's good, the
 committee concluded their report, expressing the
 hope that the Divine blessing might attend and
 prosper the society. Interesting and able speeches
 were made by the following members on reso-

lutions prepared by the committee:—Messrs.
 McMichael, C. Channon, Baker, Keen, Hewson,
 D. Channon, Steel, and Pye.

Mr. Moore addressed the meeting in a very
 able manner, showing the advantages of the age
 in which we live over all preceding ones, and
 pointing out the causes we have for thankfulness.

Mr. Lang offered some very practical remarks,
 showing the necessity of making reason in some
 cases subject to revelation.

The chairman then delivered an excellent
 address, in which he censured those persons who
 seem to believe that all the educational and
 scientific wonders, &c., of the present day are to
 be wholly ascribed to the superior wisdom of the
 present generation, instead of only looking upon
 them as improvements upon the plans of our
 forefathers, the benefit of whose experience and
 counsel we enjoy. He warmly congratulated the
 society on the success which had attended it, and
 assured the members of his constant sympathy
 and support.

After a vote of thanks to the chairman the
 company separated, highly delighted with the
 proceedings of the evening.—H. L.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

106. I was told in conversation the other day, that Monmouthshire is not in Wales. My informant gave me to understand that it used to be, but, by an agreement made many years ago, once every century a county passes from Wales to England, and ceases to be considered a portion of Wales, Monmouthshire being the last that underwent this change. If any of your correspondents can solve this mystery, and give me the particulars of the agreement (if such there be), they will confer a great favour upon—H. P.

107. Being desirous of studying the French language, and my means being rather limited, I shall feel greatly obliged if any of your contributors will kindly give me information as to the best and cheapest books for self-instruction in that language. A reply in "The Inquirer" will oblige. D. J.

108. "Armand," who is anxious to study the German language, would be extremely obliged to any of your numerous readers who would furnish him with an account of the methods severally introduced by Robertson, Lebach, and Ollendorf, and any critical remarks thereon.

109. A. Z. has a friend, a farmer, in whose farmyard is a pump for procuring water for the cattle. Can any of your numerous correspondents account for the fact that the water which flows from it becomes warmer at every stroke of the handle?

110. Some years ago I met with an anecdote of the late Daniel O'Connell, M.P., to the following effect:—During a debate in the house, a remark was made by a certain "gallant and honourable member" which called from the "Liberator" an impromptu parody of those celebrated lines of Dryden—

"Three poets in three distant ages born," &c., substituting "colonels" for "poets;" and, in the second line, "counties" for "countries:" if any of your readers would favour me with a complete account of the circumstance, with the whole of the parody, I should be particularly obliged.—IOTA.

111. Should the fact that a father was once afflicted with insanity (though he afterwards entirely recovered) be sufficient reason to deter his son from contracting matrimony?—or would his doing so involve any moral culpability? A reference to any work in which the subject is ably treated would confer an obligation.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

87. *Literary Eminence—how to attain it.*—The literary character is one of the best and noblest of the present age. To be *the thinker* for the people—to be the prime mover of all great agitations—to be the trusted friend, counsellor, and instructor of the many—to be the tutor of legislators, the critic of princes, the arbiter of the disputes of nations and the leader of public opinion, are attributes which, however glorious and captivating, imply mighty responsibilities. To direct the current of the world's progress—to occupy the mountain-places of thought—to watch the dawn

and advent of new truths and circumstances—to "find the future from the causes which arise in each event"—to study the past, and thence

"To glean
A warning for the future, so that man
May profit by his errors, and derive
Experience from his folly"—

to register immortal thoughts upon the "fleshy tablets" of men's hearts—to point the pathway in which humanity should journey in its search after the *summum bonum*—to arrest and guide the whirlwind passions of the mob, as well as the whimsical eccentricities of the high in place, are undertakings not lightly to be entered on. The thought-king is now the sovereign ruler of the people; to aspire to that monarchy requires careful self-knowledge. The mere possession of an ambition to wear the glory-haloed crown of a nation's gratitude—the mere effervescence of an ardent youthful enthusiasm—the "burning thirst" to benefit one's fellow-men, pure and disinterested as it may be—are not sufficient to support a claim to such a proud pre-eminence. True, there are men who hold no such lofty ideal who labour with the pen—such are not so much literary characters in the genuine, as it is the loftiest sense, of the term as *litterateurs*. But to one who "out of a pure heart fervently" desires to bless and benefit his comrades in life's journey—and such an one we presume T. G. to be—we would humbly advise a calm, serious, and severely-judging self-inquisition regarding his mental and moral capacity to assist in building up the fabric of man's happiness and knowledge—a diligent perusal of the chief thoughts-men of our own country—a critical, analytic study of the style of the chief classic in the English language—a steady, persevering course of training in composition after those models which approved themselves most to his own mind in the logic of the inductive science and the elucidation of metaphysical truths. This course of study would be largely aided by the reading of Hallam's "Literature of Europe," the constant use of Webster's Dictionary, Smith's Dictionaries of Ancient Geography, Antiquities, Biography, and Mythology, McCulloch's "Dictionary of Commerce," Murray's "Encyclopedia of Geography," and a good Encyclopedia. The acquisition of a knowledge of synonyms and pseudo-synonyms, paronymous and conjugate terms, &c., would be beneficial. From what we have said above, T. G. will perceive that we have virtually given an answer in the negative to the query regarding the *classical and foreign languages*. Our reason is simply this:—Society, intellectually speaking, may be, in a general point of view, divided into three classes—1st. The high classes, who receive an education comprising the languages mentioned, who use one or other of them as a medium of familiar intercourse, and who are capable, in consequence, of receiving enjoyment from a style largely interfused with such terms. 2nd. The middle classes, who, although they receive a learned education, from circumstances of station are more frequently brought into contact with those who employ

vernacular, and are consequently more aptly used in it than any other form of speech. 3rd. The lower classes, who receive no education except in the mother tongue, whose philosophy and associations are made up of homely joys, "wise saws and modern instances." It is obvious, therefore, that an accurate knowledge of the proper use of the vernacular affords sufficiently wide scope for the exercise of a great and glorious dominion to any one whose sceptre is a pen, wielded by an honest and sincere heart, and an intellect full of lofty thoughts.—PHILOMATHOS.

8. To the query put by T. G. we are inclined to give as an answer a conditional negative. There can be no doubt but that a knowledge of the classics and foreign languages is a great aid to accuracy in the use of words and copiousness of expression. But the object of the orator, we apprehend, is not to utter recondite truths in unerringly accurate language. His great office is to be the interpreter to the people of those truths which the prophets—if we may so speak—have elaborated and recognized; to feel his heart beat "with a giant's throb" at the occurrence of wrong, and to send forth his voice in defence of right in such a manner as shall "touch and thrill" the hearts of the great mass, and to hasten the dawning of

"The morn of Truth's immortal day."

For this purpose he must make his heart "the home of the great dead and their great thoughts;" though all this lore must be directed to the one great aim, the amelioration of the present and the advancement of the future. To this should all studies be subordinated—all energies bent—all thoughts directed. If our opinion be right, the great object of the orator in using language should be, to make himself understood—to have a style

"Clear as a beautiful transparent skin,
Which never hides the blood, yet holds it in."

To have this he must be a thorough master of the language of every-day life—the homely, nervous, idiomatic, honest, pointed speech of the people. The finely modulated English, which resembles

"That soft bastard Latin

Which melts like kisses in a female mouth,
And sounds as if it should be writ on satin,
With syllables that breathe of the sweet south,
And gentle liquids gliding all so pat in,
That not a single accent seems uncouth,"

is not the vehicle which should be chosen for the transference from mind to mind of noble and heroic thoughts. Neither should we accept, as the conductor of "the electricity of thought," a mingled mass of "hipped-out phrases, stolen from every class," but rather prefer a lexicon largely interwoven with genuine Saxon. Were we to sketch a course of study suitable to the case of T. G., it would be this—a careful study of the great orators, e.g., Strafford, Selden, Hampden, Cromwell, Clifford, Shaftesbury, Lyttleton, Bolingbroke, Chesterfield, Chatham, Mansfield, Burke, Wilson, Fox, Pitt, Sheridan, Canning, Grattan, Carran, Hall, Foster, W. J. Fox, Peel, Cobden, and a few of the speeches of O'Connell and the anti-Peel invectives of Disraeli—a perusal of our older dramatists, e.g., Shakspeare, Ben Jonson, Ford, Massinger, Shirley, Beaumont and Fletcher—the works of Hooker, Jeremy Taylor, Hobbes, Swift, Bunyan, Owen, Feltham, Pope, Reid,

Smith, Paley, Hume, Macaulay, Carlyle, &c. These should be read dictionary in hand. Crabbe's, Platt's, Taylor's, and Whately's Synonymes—all good works—ought to be regularly consulted, and the precise signification of each difficult word should be firmly fixed in the mind. The modern poets, the leading articles in the chief newspapers, the debates in parliament, &c., should form part of the curriculum: while a rigorous system of training in Logic and Rhetoric ought to be diligently and carefully practised. The natural enthusiasm of a young mind—the love of virtue for its own sake—the self-sacrificing spirit of a hero must be cultivated, and then his thoughts will go swiftening through the world with wings of power.—S.N.

90. *Chivalry and the Crusades*.—In your number for June, your able correspondent, C. W., Jun., replies to a query of J. C. H., relative to the Crusades and Chivalry; and he says that he is unable to refer to any work that treats *specially* on them. I therefore would draw your querist's attention to Mill's "History of the Crusades," which is generally considered to be a good and authentic work. Further, there is the celebrated one of Michaud, which took the author upwards of twenty years to complete, and is admitted to be by Alison and others a standard authority, and the most elaborate on those stirring events. A translation of this work is being published by Routledge and Co., and two volumes out of three have already appeared.

With respect to the "History of Chivalry," Sir Walter Scott has written on it, and Mr. G. P. R. James has a volume specially devoted to the subject, drawn from Palaye and other sources. This work I have frequently seen on second-hand book-stalls. These works may suit, perhaps, J. C. H.—W. L.—h.

97. *Manchester Engineering*.—The case of your correspondent, A. B., is beset with some little difficulty, inasmuch as the greatest impediments to meeting with the situation sought, are, that he is nineteen years of age, and not being independent, some remuneration would be requisite in order to sustain him. Two courses are open to A. B., and he may avail himself of either as convenience suggests. If he is not in immediate want of such a situation as that to which he refers, he must direct his attention to the advertisements for such situations in the *Manchester Guardian*, and should he meet with any which he thinks similar to the situation he desires, he can address the party advertising, stating his case fully as to the circumstances in which he is placed, and notifying that he is dependent on the rewards of his labour, &c. If, on the other hand, he wishes to meet with a situation immediately, then he should advertise himself (and this would be the most satisfactory course he could take, as he might be capable of making a selection of the replies and of the terms offered, without loss of time); by that means he would secure other advantages of which he would be deprived by replying only to advertisements.

Unhappily for those similarly circumstanced to our friend, a revolution has of late years taken place with regard to situations, and the terms offered. The advantages offered by mechanics' and other institutions, of acquiring the rudiments of a good education, have necessarily acted as a stimulus to the rising generation, and hundreds of youths having acquired the knowledge of read-

ing, writing, and arithmetic, through the medium referred to, then have set out in quest of situations in *counting-houses*, and other mercantile pursuits. The result is, that most of them being only *ten, eleven, and twelve* years of age, a very small salary, if any, is *sought*; and as employers make the best bargains they can, they agree to take youths in the counting-house at three and four shillings per week, who have acquired a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic, nothing else being required. Hence those who have received a superior education, and expect a better remuneration, have to struggle with those who undertake to do little less than themselves, at 3s. per week. In warehouses the case is still worse; a year is the least possible time for which youths are taken for *nothing*; two up to five years being a *very common* term for a person to *serve before* he receives a salary in our Manchester warehouses. Your correspondent will see the drift of these remarks. If he has received a good education, in seeking for a situation he will find himself combated by *those who have not*, and the *latter* will be *taken* if their *attainments* will enable them to *discharge* their *duties*, in *preference* to your correspondent, who has good abilities, and is consequently qualified to fill an important and responsible situation.

The fact that A. B. has a knowledge of mechanics, &c., is very much in his favour, and will be a great recommendation to him. I shall be glad to assist your correspondent in any way in my power. If he adopt the last plan I have pointed out, and would communicate with me, I might (as I reside in Manchester) give him some hints as to his advertisement. If he does not approve of either of the courses suggested, it will be well for him to write to a mechanical or engineering journal.—J. G. R.

98. *The Italian Language*.—A. A. is desirous of commencing the study of Italian. We recommend you to purchase a copy of Vergani and Piranesi's Grammar, which contains Exercises, Dialogues, Letters, Historical Anecdotes, Idiomatical Phrases, &c. This, accompanied with a dictionary, will serve as a pleasing introduction to Italian. To act as your own tutor in composition, it will be necessary to purchase besides some easy Italian book; for instance, the key to Mons. Porquet's "Tesoretto." Put a few sentences from this carefully into English. Lay them aside. Next lesson put your English into Italian, compare your exercise with the original, and you will discover your errors, if any. The pronunciation of Italian is very easy; there are some words, however, which may prove an obstacle without a master, and a few lessons in pronunciation is desirable. With a knowledge of Latin you find Italian much easier. Avoid many elementary books, especially large ones.—M. W.

99. *Homœopathy*.—H. D. C.—Your friends are most decidedly exceptions to the general order of Homœopathic patients, if they have "remarkable pale and sickly faces," and we wonder that you do not assume the position of a *friend*, and advise them to desist from a practice which they find non-effective or injurious. Those patients who have come under our notice have manifested symptoms just the reverse to those named by you: and the case of your friends affords another instance of the folly of thinking that the *same remedy* will be

equally effective in *all cases*, when there exists so great a difference in constitutions, with other reasons why it should not be so. Cold bathing is generally very beneficial, and therefore generally recommended; but there are instances in which it would be the sure precursor of cramp and rheumatic pains, and it would *therefore* be madness to persist in the practice under such circumstances.

C. W., Jun.

100. *How to Cultivate the Voice*.—In answer to the first part of "Damon's" inquiry, I would recommend him to practise the singing of the musical scale upon the following plan. Let him construct a scale such as this:—
 Let him then, if he has a voice at all, sing some note, it makes no matter whether high or low, but it is better low to commence with. He will then call that note Do, and proceed up the scale till he reaches its replicate, the upper Doh. A little practice of

Doh.
Te.
Lab.
Soh.
Fa.
Me.
Ray.
Du.

this sort will make him perfectly master of the scale. He may then change the starting note making it higher or lower, according to the pitch of the previous one, and running up and down the scale in the same manner. This is certainly simple enough as an exercise, but simple as it is, I can promise "Damon" that a month's constant, but not laborious, practice will greatly improve the power, flexibility, and compass of his voice, and will give him a greatly increased command over it. In singing he must keep his chest well open, and his *lungs pressed out against his ribs*: and, particularly if he has a *bass voice*, let him manage his voice so as to cause the *high notes* to come from the *lower* part of his throat, and the low ones from the upper part. This will be a little difficult at first, but a little patient practice will overcome the difficulty; and, indeed, the benefit, in the ease and increased pleasure of the exercise, will make him think lightly of it, be it ever so much. "Damon" will also find much information that will answer his purpose in Carwen's "Grammar of Vocal Music," price 2s. 6d., and in the articles "Music," "Larynx," and "Voice," in the "Penny Cyclopædia."—M.

100. *Elocution*.—The first step we should recommend "Damon" to take is, to obtain Tyrrell's "Practical Elocutionist" (Vickers, Holywell-street, Strand). In this book will be found much useful information of the nature required. We would suggest that the inquirer should commit to memory several of the pieces contained in this book, and then practice upon them until the voice has been drilled to the pitch, the style, and the subject of the piece selected. Having succeeded in one or two, let him try some others, and he will soon make improvement. We know students in elocution often find it extremely inconvenient to practise recitation, or declamation, by reason of their having no suitable place for the purpose. This may, in many cases, be remedied. If we remember rightly, Demosthenes sought the seashore, and there, amidst the howling of the wind, the rolling of the waves, and the dashing of the surge, he found meet companionship for the irresistible torrent of his own ungoverned eloquence, and at the same time a remedy for softening the original harshness of his voice. We know students in the same walk who have derived great advantages from a similar custom. Let those who have the opportunity try the experiment. Others may

known solitude for the purpose. fourteen would, without doubt, be ready for a commencement: however, the old adage, "Better late than never," and the earnestness which will now be put into the study will soon compensate for the delay.—C. W., Jun.

and Greek without a Master.—And "Henry's First Latin Book," by Henry, would be the most suitable to commence Latin. And as young people find Latin rather perplexing when commencing, and as the study of Latin, it would be well to observe, that the accusative invariably governs the governing verb, as in the first *abus murum aedificat*. Not "Balbus murum," or "murum," as many write, not the rule before them. In longer sentences the principal verb, too, will generally govern the end, as in the following:—

decorum est pro patria mori.

(It is decent it is for (our) country to die.)

This is precisely similar in the German; and the same will serve as an example.

du armes Shind, gethan?
(Why to thee, thou poor child, done?)

Advise L. G. to keep to this little book a few months at least before proceeding to the "Second Latin Book" by the same author, wherein will be found much valuable information, especially under the heading "Building."

At this stage we would recommend the "Latin Grammar," by Messrs. Edinburgh. It will do good service as a common-place book.

Many excellent Latin Dictionaries, but means are limited, Entick's Latin Dictionary is the advantage of being both good

Kühner's Greek Delectus, translated by Alexander Allen, would serve as a dictionary to Greek. Matthiae's Greek Lexicon; Bloomfield's Greek Testament; Duncan's Greek Testament; Wright's Lexicon, may be purchased when opportunity has been made.—M. W.

Common-place Books.—To answer the queries of "A Student" on the use of books, in detail, would occupy considerable time and space. We have referred to their uses in the June number (see Students); but we may add a few observations. No student should enter into the study of Latin without one of these common-place books, or, in addition to their direct use for the study of Latin, the method of their use is of service. It is that they are more likely accurately to record anything which they have once learned. Thus, if the common-place book be used for extracts and quotations, it will be of great use if the student go further, and devote it to understanding everything he reads, as to the method of study, as to be able, from his notes, to enter into his common-place book an abstract of the ideas and matter of his own words, he will derive a much greater benefit from the process, and his notes, when made, be highly valuable for after-reading. The difficulty of laying down any specific subject has been felt by all writers

thereon: and the reason is obvious, that as the mental capacities of each student, together with his particular pursuits, vary, so each, in order to succeed, must adopt the method most likely to serve best his own particular end. To give a simple illustration. If a student, being blessed with a good memory, have to study with another with a bad memory, both using common-place books, and reading the same works, the one will have to make his notes much more ample than the other, in order that they may be of real service to him, and compensate for his deficiency. Or, again: if we were endeavouring to acquire extensive general knowledge—embracing all subjects fairly coming within the term—and another student was desirous of studying *theology* only, our common-place book, in order to be useful to us, must be on a far more extended scale than his—probably on a different system altogether. This will be very plainly seen. The more you adapt your common-place book to your own immediate wants and circumstances, the more valuable will you find it. We now confine ourselves exclusively to an *alphabetic arrangement*, as we find it materially assists us in speedy reference. What is the use of a large store of facts and experiences, if they are not readily available? The inquiry as to whether separate books should be kept for separate studies is one which often occurs. We do not recommend too great a multiplication even of books of reference. However, where the nature of the studies are entirely distinct, separate books are certainly advisable. Thus a person studying law and general literature, would require a book for each purpose, to prevent waste of time and confusion of subject. It is quite true, as "A Student" suggests, that one book read well is better than twenty carelessly read. Our own plan is, while reading a book, to mark carefully such passages as we desire more particularly to notice in our common-place book. Having completed our first reading, we recommence the book, and devote our attention to the passages marked, extracting, as we proceed, such portions of them as we desire; adding a short reference to the title of the volume and the number of the page. Attention to these small points is of great service. When the books we read are *our own*, a simple reference to the volume and the page, under an appropriate heading, is all we require. Take two examples selected at random.—"WOMAN, her Social and Moral Influence: Mrs. Ellis's 'Wives of England,' pp. 76, 140, 185." This is under our letter W; and the next under the letter M: "MAN—the Hume and Monboddo's theory of the origin of, i.e., that he sprang up from the earth as a vegetable, and only acquired ideas and speech, with other mental endowments, by virtue of the principle of *progressive development* implanted, or rather embodied, in his nature: Bell's Introd. to Rollin's 'Arts and Sciences of the Ancients,' p. 20." We think we have said sufficient to enable "A Student," and other readers, at once to turn their attention to common-place books. We shall have occasion, in future papers on Studies for Law Students, again to touch upon some of the points here referred to. In conclusion, we will only remark that, as "A Student" seems already aware that the *manner* of reading is not of secondary importance to the *matter*, so the *manner* of keeping a common-place book is not secondary to the *matter* with which it may be filled.

C. W., Jun.

105. *University of London Matriculation.*—The matriculation examination takes place once a year, commencing on the first Tuesday in July. Candidates must have completed their sixteenth year; a certificate to this effect must be transmitted to the registrar at least fourteen days before the examination begins. A fee of two pounds is paid previous to the examination. If the candidate fail to pass, the fee is not returned to him, but he is admissible to any subsequent examination without charge. The examination is conducted by means of printed papers; but the examiners are not precluded from putting *visd voce* questions if they think fit. The subjects are as follow:—One Greek and one Latin, selected one year and a half previously by the senate (for 1852, Homer, “*Iliad*,” book xi.; Sallust, “*War with Jugurtha*”); Arithmetic, Algebra (as far as Simple Equations); the first book of Euclid, Natural Philosophy, or Chemistry, at the option of the student; the English * Language, and the Outlines of History and Geography.—Δ.

* After the year 1852, Natural Philosophy and

The only outlay required for matriculation at the London University is a fee of two pounds, which is to be paid to the registrar previous to commencement of examination. The subjects of examination are arranged under the following heads:—Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Classics, the English Language, and Outlines of History and Geography. It would be impossible, without encroaching too much upon space, to enter into details which would be essentially necessary for a candidate to be acquainted with. The best piece of advice that I can offer W. G. C., supposing he intends to matriculate, is to obtain the “*London University Calendar*” for 1852, price 3s., published by Taylor and Walton, Upper Gower-street, in which he will find full information with regard to the required course, and will also have an opportunity of seeing, from the examination papers of last year, the nature of the questions proposed.

AN UNDERGRADUATE.

Chemistry, as well as Translation from the French or the German Languages, will be required.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XVII.

- 1. What is Truth?
- 2. Define, and distinguish between, the terms Truth, Error, Falsity, Falsehood, Fallacy, and Sophism.
- 3. What are the chief kinds of Error-sources?
- 4. Explain what is meant by Intellectual Error-sources.
- 5. Explain what is meant by Volitionary Error-sources?
- 6. What is the Aristotelic Classification of Fallacies, with examples?
- 7. Explain J. S. Mill's Synoptic Table of Fallacies.
- 8. How many varieties of pure Logical Fallacies are there? Exemplify them.
- 9. How may pure Logical Fallacies be detected?

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. VI.

- 1. Arrange the nouns of the following sentences in a form like that given:—

The father loves his children. The house is guarded by the dog. The “*Farmer's Boy*” was written by Bloomfield. Bunyan wrote the “*Pilgrim's Progress*.” Bats' wings contain no feathers. Moses' books are five in number. Cromwell's actions have been much misrepresented. St. James's Church was struck by lightning. Englishmen will never forget Wellington's victories. The warrior has been honoured more than he deserves—the legislator less. The history of Caesar's wars was written by himself. The master's interests are studied by the servant. St. Helena's isle was Napoleon's prison. The boy's books are torn. The honour of Britain is dear to her sons. A good book is the author's life-blood. Hannibal's wintering in Capua drove him from Italy. The monarch's tyranny effected his ruin. We read the doctor's book, and approve of its principles.

Breathes there a man with soul so dead,
Who never to himself hath said,
This is my own, my native land;
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned,
As home his footsteps he hath turned
From wandering on a foreign strand?

NOUNS.

PROPER.		COMMON.	
Nominative (and Objective).	Possessive.	Nominative (and Objective).	Possessive.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—V.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 17. The least common multiple of 14,

20, and 48 = 1680; therefore the travellers will all meet again at the same place in 1680 days from Christmas-day, 1851; which, allowing leap-year in 1852 and 1856, will fall on July 3, 1856.

For, Dec. 25, 1851, to Dec. 25, 1852 = 366 days.

Dec. 25, 1852, to Dec. 25, 1853 = 365

Dec. 25, 1853, to Dec. 25, 1854 = 365

Dec. 25, 1854, to Dec. 25, 1855 = 365

Dec. 25, 1855, to Dec. 31, 1855 = 6

Jan., 1856 = 31

Feb., 1856 = 29

March, 1856 = 31

April, 1856 = 30

May, 1856 = 31

June, 1856 = 30

July, 1856 = 31

1680
C. D. S.

Ans. July 31st, 1856.

Question 18. Here the number of cubic feet in the lump is 11071.7902×10534 , number of oz. in a cubic foot = $116,830,237.9668$, weight in oz. = $35,840 = 3254.1919$ tons weight. Then the value of 1 oz. being £.275, which \times by 10534, number of oz. in a cubic foot = £2896.85, value of 1 cubic foot.

\therefore Value of whole lump = $2896.85 \times 11071.7902 = £32,073,315.44087$.—Ans. R. J.

Question 19. Let x, y , and z equal A, B, and C's shares respectively. We have then, from the conditions of the question, the following equations, involving three unknown quantities.

$$x + \frac{y+z}{2} = £100 \quad (1)$$

$$y + \frac{x+z}{3} = £100 \quad (2)$$

$$z + \frac{x+y}{4} = £100 \quad (3)$$

By clearing these equations of fractions, we get the following:—

$$2x + y + z = £200 \quad (1)$$

$$x + 3y + z = £300 \quad (2)$$

$$x + y + 4z = £400 \quad (3)$$

Then subtracting (1) from (2) we get

$$-x + 2y = £100 \quad (4)$$

And by subtracting (3) from (1) $\times 4$ we get

$$7x + 3y = £400 \quad (5)$$

Here we have two equations, (4) and (5), involving only two unknown quantities, x and y .

By solving these in the usual way, we find that

$$x = £29 \text{ 8s. } 2\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$$

$$y = £64 \text{ 14s. } 1\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$$

Then substituting in (1) these values for x and y , we can find the value of z by subtracting their sum from £200, (viz.) $z = £200 - £123 \text{ 10s. } 7\frac{1}{4}\text{d.} = £76 \text{ 9s. } 4\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$

From (1) then it appears that £29 8s. $2\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$, £64 14s. $1\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$, and £76 9s. $4\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$, are the values of x, y , and z , respectively.

If, then, these be the true values of the letters, it follows that if we substitute these values for the letters themselves in (1), (2), and (3), the sum of their values will equal that of the letters in each respectively.

i.e., that £56 16s. $5\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ + £64 14s. $1\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ + £76 9s. $4\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ should = £200.

And that £29 8s. $2\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ + £194 2s. $4\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ + £76 9s. $4\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ should = £300.

And that £29 8s. $2\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ + £64 14s. $1\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ + £306 17s. $7\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$ should = £400.

Since this is the case, $x = £29 \text{ 8s. } 2\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$; $y = £64 \text{ 14s. } 1\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$; and $z = £76 \text{ 9s. } 4\frac{1}{4}\text{d.}$

J. M. A.

Question 20. $x - y = 12$
 $x^2 - y^2 = 336$

Since $x^2 - y^2 = x + y \times x - y = 12 \times x + y$

$\therefore 12 \times x + y = 336$

and $x + y = 28$

but $x - y = 12$

by addition $2x = 40$

and $x = 20$

and by subtraction $2y = 16$

$\therefore y = 8$

R. M.

Geometry.

Question 10. (a) The solidity of a sphere is equal to the cube of the diameter multiplied by .5236; hence dividing the solidity by .5236, and extracting the cube root of the quotient, will give the diameter.

Therefore diameter

$$= \sqrt[3]{\frac{11071.7902}{.5236}} = \sqrt[3]{21145.512223} = 27.65$$

(b). The number of ounces in one cubic foot = $10.534 \times 1000 = 10534$

The value of do., do., = $10534 \times .275 = 2896.45$

Hence side of cube

$$= \sqrt[3]{\frac{760,000,000}{2896.85}} = \sqrt[3]{262354.623} = 64.01$$

J. J. M.

Mechanics.

Question 9. The contents of the tank = $20 \times 12 \times 9 = 2160$ feet, and this being divided by 24, the area of the section of the well gives 90 feet, the difference in the level of its water at the commencement and end of the operation.

Hence $45 + 36 + 4.5 = 85.5 =$ the distance between the middle of the tank and the mean level of the water in the well, which, being multiplied by the weight of the volume of water in the tank, gives the units of work required to fill it; this being divided by 33000×6 , the units of work performed by the engine per minute will give the time required.

$$\frac{62.5 \times 2160 \times 85.5}{33000 \times 6} = 58.295 \text{ minutes.}$$

J. K. L.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—VII.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

24. The train A leaves London at the same time as the train B leaves Bristol, on the Great Western Railway; but the train B arrives in London 5 hours, and A in Bristol 9 hours after they meet. How long was each upon the road?

25. I bought a certain number of sheep for £31 10s. Now, had there been three less for the money, they would have cost me 5s. a head more. How many did I buy?

26. At what time between the hours of five and six will the hour and minute hands be together?

27. Given $x + y = 24$, and $x^2 - y^2 = 96$, to find x and y .

Geometry.

12. A circular mound, whose radius is 90 feet, is surrounded by a moat 40 feet wide. What is the area of the moat?

13. The greatest possible sphere is to be made out of a cubic block of freestone, whose side is 4·5 feet. Required its superficial and solid content.

Mechanics.

12. A train of 50 tons moves at the rate of 30 miles per hour on the level rail; the resistance of friction upon the rail is 8 lb. per ton, the resistance of the atmosphere 33 lb. on the whole train when it moves at the rate of 10 miles per hour.

The diameter of the driving wheel 6 feet, the area of the piston 100 inches, the length of the stroke 1·5 feet, the resistance due to the blast-pipe 1·75 lb. per inch of the piston, when the speed of the train is 10 miles per hour. It is required to determine the pressure of the steam, the evaporation of the boiler, and the number of bushels of coals necessary for a journey of 120 miles, supposing 1 bushel will evaporate 11·5 cubic feet of water.

Notices of Books.

Old Eighteen-Fifty-One; a Tale for any Day in 1852. By the Author of "Pleasant Pages." London: Houlston and Stoneman.

This is designed as the first of a series of year books for young people. The editor of "Pleasant Pages" represents himself as inviting to his house a pleasant party of young folks on the last evening of the old year. In the course of the entertainment, and by phantasmagoric means, an old man is introduced, who turns out to be Eighteen-Fifty-One, who has only two hours to live! He offers to tell the company of the wonderful things he has seen—an offer which is gladly accepted; and he then begins to talk of intellectual, sanitary, social, temperance, peace, anti-slavery, and national progress; and goes on to speak of the Great Exhibition, and to chat about general news, good and bad, home and foreign. One, at least, of his juvenile auditors appears to have thought that he was attempting too much, and we are decidedly of his opinion. Although we admire the plan of the book, and acknowledge the general interest thrown around many of the subjects, we believe that that interest would have been much stronger had fewer topics been touched upon, or greater space secured to each. We need not remind Mr. Newcombe, nor any well-qualified instructor, that the surest way to gain the attention of the young is to amplify and simplify, not to generalize or enumerate, and therefore we recommend him to increase the size of his next volume, or to reduce the range of his subjects. In the meantime, we hope the present little work will secure an immense sale, for nothing but this can make it remunerative, seeing that it is got up in a superior style, beautifully bound, and sold for one shilling. We need scarcely say that we look with interest upon Mr. Newcombe's various undertakings for the benefit of the young, and believe that he deserves the support of all who wish

"To try the rivalry of arts,
Of science, learning, freedom, fame—
To try who first shall light the world
With Charity's divinest flame."

A Manual of Logic, Deductive and Inductive. By H. H. Munro. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

In our January number we reviewed "Logic for the Million," and expressed our conviction that it, "as a sequel to the study of any of the more rigid and abstract works on the subject, would be of much service." The work now before us is exactly such an one. It is a regularly digested and philosophic treatise on Logic, evidently the production of an acute mind, and

highly deserving of the attention of the student. While inclined to advocate the *formal* view of the science, the author does not feel warranted, it seems, to depart from the usual method of writing on the subject, so far as the full adoption of that theory would demand. He does not profess to develop and methodize new views, but to exhibit in a clear, succinct, methodical manner, the most useful portions of the already-received doctrines of logical science. Some of the preliminary topics of discussion, e.g., "Terms," "Abstraction," and "Generalization," the "Predicables," &c., are excellently conducted, while some of the more intricate "tabular forms" of other logicians have been reconstructed and simplified. The Syllogistic examples, too, are more various and less puerile than those generally seen in books of the kind. The style is plain, perspicuous, and concise, and the work, as a whole, is well calculated to fulfil the author's purpose, viz., "to facilitate an earlier and easier acquaintance with the science than is at present attainable." The following "Table of Opposition," which we prefer to that of Whately, we extract, for the behoof of our "Logic pupils:"—

The subject of Opposition, it will be remembered, was discussed in "The Art of Reasoning No. XIII."

OPPOSITION.	Subaltern	{ between A. & I.	A.	I.
			N. True. I. False. C. False.	True. False. True.
	Contrary	{ between A. & E.	E.	O.
			N. False. I. True. C. False.	False. True. True.
	Sub-contrary	{ between I. & O.	I.	O.
			N. True. I. False. C. True.	False. True. True.
	Contradictory	{ between A. & O.	A.	O.
			N. True. I. False. C. False.	False. True. True.
		{ between E. & I.	E.	I.
			N. False. I. True. C. False.	True. False. True.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. VIII.—ON STYLE.

HAVING, in a previous paper, defined the sense in which the word "Style" is to be understood, and indicated some of the essential pre-requisites for the formation of an accurate, pleasing, and vivid method of thought-utterance; having shown that extensive knowledge, sound judgment, mental culture, precision of thought, and delicacy of taste are the foundations of all excellence in speaking or writing; we shall now proceed to present our readers with a series of practical instructions in the use of Language.

This is by no means so easy a task as many may be apt to imagine. It is difficult to reduce to formulæ the nice distinctions which the keen-seeing eye of the critic perceives as existing between the proper and the incorrect. Some even believe that there is an instinctive acuteness in certain of the mental powers which enables certain men to fill the office of critic, and to become the umpires of literary taste. But whether this be the fact or not, it seems to us quite evident that the assiduous culture of the finer perceptivities—those which concern themselves with *the fitting*—must tend to the evoking of a higher degree of sensibility, and a greater nicety of skill in the use of words, than the leaving of them uncultured. The fruit of the wild vine is scarcely so delicious as the grape-clusters of one that has been carefully nurtured. Let us not, however, be misunderstood as asserting that Genius can be manufactured, or that any system of rules, however diligently culled or laboriously practised, will supersede the necessity of original thought. These studies will, of course, concentrate the faculties, acumenate the powers, and fit them for exertion; but they cannot avert the pangs of thought-birth. "Rules are designed to check a genius that is irregular, not to damp the ardour of that genius which takes wing: their chief use is to prevent those passages which are truly eloquent from being debased by others in which negligence or bad taste prevails."* "It is not for the sake of enabling men to produce beauties, but of qualifying them to avoid faultiness of style, that the rules of the great masters have been instituted. Nature forms men of genius as she forms precious metals in the bowels of the earth, rough, irregular, and compounded with other substances. Art is of no other service to genius than it is to these metals: it adds nothing to their substance, it only separates what is foreign, and displays in full perfection the genuine work of Nature."† We believe that Style and Thought are reactive—that great "eagle-winged" thoughts will not suffer themselves to be caparisoned to an unworthy vehicle—and that elegance of composition cannot fitly be employed on stale and little ideas. We cannot use "the birds of Jove" to run the messages of the inferior gods, nor can we look complacently upon

"The ocean into tempest tossed,
To wait a feather or to drown a fly."

Although, however, valuable ideas, just and clear conceptions of a subject, a vivid

* D'Alembert's "Reflections on Eloquence."

† D'Alembert's "Discourse before the French Academy."

imagination, ready associations, elevated sentiments, and a well-cultured taste, are decided essential to good composition, it does not follow that any man possessed of these qualifications is capable of so discoursing or writing as to ensure success. He must have, in addition, acute powers of discrimination—selection, arrangement, combination, and practical readiness—an accurate knowledge of language, skill in its use, choiceness of expression, and copiousness of vocabulary. Only by a union of such qualifications, natural and acquired, wrought up into activity, energy, and power, and rendered capable, by patient and continuous culture and exercise, of giving adequate expression to the treasured wisdom of his soul, can he become one of those

“ Who shed great thoughts
As easily as an oak looseneth its golden leaves
In kindly largess to the soil it grew on—
Whose rich, dark, ivy thoughts, sunned o’er with love,
Flourish around the stems of their deathless names—
Whose names are ever on the world’s broad tongue,
Like sound upon the falling of a force—
Whose words, if winged, are with angels’ wings—
Who play upon the heart as on a harp,
And make our eyes bright as we speak of them—
Whose hearts have a look southwards, and are open
To the whole noon of Nature.”

We shall make no apology for the minuteness and apparent triviality of those directions which we shall find it necessary to give. “The rudiments of every art and science exhibit, at first, to the learner, the appearance of littleness and insignificance. And it is by attending to such reflections as to a superficial observer would appear minute and hypercritical, that language must be improved and knowledge perfected.”* “Of all the works of man, Language is the most enduring, and partakes the most of eternity. And as our language, so far as thought can project itself into the future, seems likely to be coeval (co-equal in existence?) with the world, and to spread vastly beyond even its present immeasurable limits, there cannot easily be a nobler object of ambition than to purify and better it.”† Neither can we consider ourselves necessitated to excuse ourselves for the vast amount of exertion which such a system of cultivation as we shall advise must entail on the diligent student. “Whenever labour implies the exertion of thought, it does good, at least to the strong; when the saving of labour is a saving of thought, it enfeebles. The mind, like the body, is strengthened by hard exercise.”‡ Now, we must confess that “the attainment of a correct and elegant style is an object which demands application and labour. If any imagine they can catch it merely by the ear, or acquire it by the slight perusal of some of our good authors, they will find themselves much disappointed. The many errors even in point of grammar, the many offences against purity of language, which are committed by writers who are far from being contemptible, demonstrate that a careful study of the language is requisite in all who aim at writing it properly.”§

Style, so far as its mere mechanism is concerned, may, for convenience of treatment, be considered as divided into two parts—1st, Diction; 2nd, Structure; the supreme canons

* Campbell's “Philosophy of Rhetoric,” p. 244. † “Philological Museum,” vol. i. p. 653.

‡ “Philological Museum,” vol. i. p. 636.

§ Blair's “Lectures on Rhetoric,” lect. ix. vol. i. p. 211.

of which are—of the former, *Speak and write words according to the signification which strictly belongs to each*; of the latter, *Observe the relations which subsist amongst ideas, and represent these relations by such concatenations of vocables, such variations in the reflections of words, and such a use of particles, as are customary in the writings of the best authors in that language*. We shall confine our attention for the present to the elucidation of the rules which are applicable to Diction.

The qualities of Diction are—I. Purity; II. Simplicity; III. Propriety; and, IV. Precision.

I. Purity of Diction is the employment of such words and phrases exclusively, as, according to the best authorities, really belong to the particular language in which we speak or write.

II. Simplicity of Diction consists in the use of such words and phrases as are most frequently and commonly employed, such as are easily comprehended, and level to the capacities of ordinary men.

III. Propriety of Diction is the employment of words in such a manner as to preserve the precise signification which "the best usage" has attached to each of them, as well as in carefully discriminating the nicer and more delicate shades of meaning which they acquire in peculiar collocations.

IV. Precision of Diction consists in giving exact expression to each particular thought in the most unambiguous manner, so as to set misconception, as far as possible, at defiance—employing words in rigidly-defined senses with unswerving uniformity and undeviating care.

"It is not enough that men have ideas—determined ideas—for which they make these signs (words) stand; but they must also take care to apply their words, as near as may be, to such ideas as common use has annexed them to. For words—especially of languages already framed—being no man's private possession, but the common measure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleasure, to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the ideas to which they are affixed; or at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be, to be understood, which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions where men do not follow common use. Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage, and therefore deserves some part of our care and study, especially in the names of moral terms. The proper use and signification of terms is best to be learned from those who, in their writings and discourses, appear to have had the clearest notions and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be understood, yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks as not to be able to understand it when made use of as it ought to be."*

"Language is established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom. Of reason, the chief ground is analogy, but sometimes etymology. Its antiquity recommends itself to us

* Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," book iii. chap. 11. sec. ix.

by a certain air of majesty, and I might almost say reverential feeling. Its authority is to be sought in historians and orators; the necessities of metre often excuses the poet. When the judgment and example of the great masters of eloquence are accepted as rules, even error seems right to those who offend in imitating them. But the common usage of the most polite writers and speakers is the most certain guide in the use of words; for speech like money, when it receives the public stamp, should attain a currency. * * * I, therefore, look upon the general practice of the learned and polite as the usage of a language—just as the general conduct of the virtuous and fashionable is to be regarded as the etiquette of life.”*

How, then, shall we most easily and accurately attain this knowledge of “the best usage”? To understand this fully we must remember—1st. That words are the representatives or symbols of thought, and serve to call up into the mind the particular ideas which they are the mental signs; 2nd. That there is no natural, necessary, and essential connexion between these “signs and the things signified thereby;” 3rd. That at different periods different words are employed in the same language to symbolize the selfsame ideas; and, 4th. That conventional agreement is that by which the peculiar signification of each term is adhibited to it, and to it only.

Now, bearing these things in mind, we are led to inquire, with even greater perplexity and anxiety, how shall we attain a knowledge of the best usage? We shall explain. Certain gentlemen of reputation have employed themselves in carefully investigating the signification of words, weighing in their minds the peculiar use made of the word by the best authors and speakers—the etymological connexions which it has with others—the general analogy of the language and the necessities of the human mind. The results of these studies they have stored up in voluminous though useful works for our advantage. When, therefore, we are desirous of learning the usage of a language, we must consult the lexicographers and discover the result of their laborious toil. In general this will yield us the information sought, although “Language is in its very nature inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence, and so liable to it from design,” that great caution and care are necessary in order to make a proper use of this assistance; while, at the same time, the progress of refinement, the desire for significant and harmonious words, and the increased luxuriance of taste which an advanced civilization produces, cause a constant fluctuation in the use of words. No instructions, it is obvious, can adequately guard us against minor errors; but the following general rules may, and we hope will, be serviceable in teaching the greater part of the errors in Diction which it is advisable to avoid.

I. PURITY.—1st. Unless there be some special reason for their use, all obsolete or antiquated expressions ought to be carefully avoided. The following are examples of the kind of words meant:—Fictious, timidous, greatening, belikely, cruciate, unctuation, exscribe, coagmentation, easiliest, manuduction, plurious, commentitious, avolation, failious, rutilate, negoce, acception, affrontiveness, acconglutination, &c.

2nd. Strange or unauthorized vocables ought to be as seldom employed as possible; never without a special reason. Examples of such words we subjoin:—Extroitive, introitive,

* Quinetillan's “Institutes.”

unletupable, wide-awake-ity, go-awayness, pocketually, betweenity, fashiondom, connexity, absquatulate, flabber-gas-tuality, plumptitude, adoremment, judgmatical, corrosivisity, magneticalized, &c.

3rd. The unnecessary introduction of foreign phrases or idioms, and poetical forms of expression, are reprehensible: *e. g.*, *Delicatesse, fraîcheur, délasement, la famiglia, étoffe, demi-toilette, chevachie, des notres, habitués, odeur*; "It serves to an excellent purpose;" "All that youth has of amiable;" "The night, now far advanced, was brilliantly bright with the radiance of lunar and astral effulgence;" "The fair moon, taking her external promenade along the cloudless azure and stellar canopy of heaven, walked in all the resplendency of her highest and brightest glory," &c.

II. SIMPLICITY.—1st. Words unnecessarily complex or abstruse, unless absolutely necessary, ought not to be used: *e. g.*, Configuration for *figure*, deleterious for *hurtful* or *injurious*, electrotyping for *impressing*, &c.

2nd. Technical terms ought not to be unnecessarily introduced: *e. g.*, Velocity for *speed*, infinitesimal for *very small*, specific gravity for *weight*, density for *thickness*, &c.

3rd. "Nothing can contribute more to enliven expression than that all the words employed be as particular and determinate in their signification as will suit with the nature and scope of the discourse. The more general the terms are the fainter is the picture, the more special they are it is the brighter."*

III. PROPRIETY.—1st. Equivocal or ambiguous expressions are carefully to be guarded against: *e. g.*—

"He aimed at nothing less than the crown;" meaning, either "nothing was less aimed at by him than the crown," or "nothing inferior to the crown was aimed at by him."

"The whites and blues gained the prize." Were "the whites and blues" one and the same, or were they individually different?

"His memory shall be lost on the earth." Shall he forget or be forgotten?

2nd. Unintelligible, inconsistent, or inappropriate terms ought to be eschewed: *e. g.*,

"These words do not even convey an *opaque* idea of the author's meaning."

"If the savour of things lies cross to honesty; if the fancy be florid, and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties, and lower order of worldly symmetries and proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn the latter way."†

"Some pains have been thrown away in attempting to *retrieve* (regain) the names of those to whom he alludes."‡

3rd. Avoid vulgarisms and provincialisms: *e. g.*, Hurlyburlies, pell-mell, the tables were turned, to get into a scrape, thinks I to myself, says I, overtopple, currying favour, left to shift for one's self, &c.

IV. PRECISION.—1st. Retrench all tautological expressions: *e. g.*, "They have a *mutual dislike to each other*." "When will you *return again*?" "They returned *back again* to the same city *from whence* they came forth." The italics indicate the tautologies.

2nd. Repeat the same word whenever absolutely necessary: leave no expression incomplete or ambiguous for the deficiency of expression: *e. g.*, "This house is built of the same stones as that one" (kind).

* Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," vol. ii. p. 137.

† Shakespeare's "Characteristics," vol. iii. misc. ii. ch. 2. ‡ Hallam's "Lit. of Middle Ages," vol. i. p. 132.

The sentence—"Moral *precepts* are *precepts* the reasons of which we can see,"* is an example of correct usage.

3rd. Be careful not to confound words apparently synonymous, or otherwise bearing a resemblance to each other. "Words apparently synonymous, and really so in the great majority of instances, have nevertheless each an appropriate meaning, which on certain occasions is made to appear. The propriety of meaning is known *à priori* by the scholar who is acquainted with the etymology of the word, but the person who has collected its meaning only from its use is ever liable to mistakes, and often to the most ridiculous mistakes; because, perhaps, in the course of his experience it has never been used in such a manner as to demonstrate its peculiar signification: *e. g.*, Benevolence and Philanthropy are frequently synonymous; they might, nine times out of ten, be substituted for one another; and an illiterate person, collecting that each term is applied to characters and actions of kindness, mercy, and humanity, will indiscriminately use them, even when that humanity is shown towards the brute creation, than which mistake nothing could be more ludicrous."† Further examples of this error we subjoin, *viz.* :—Critic, critique; observance, observation; conscience, consciousness; endurance, duration; successfully, successively; contagious, contiguous; ingenious, ingenuous; eminent, imminent; subtle, subtile; luxurious, luxuriant; continual, continuous, &c. The following sentence contains an apt illustration of the clearness given by attention to the delicate shades of signification, by which words nearly synonymous are frequently distinguished, *viz.* :—"The diligent student may *acquire* knowledge, *obtain* rewards, *win* prizes, *gain* celebrity, and *get* high honours, though he *earn* no money."

4th. Words ought not to be used with the signification of the language from which they are derived, when another meaning has been attached to it in the language of the writer: *e. g.*, "I have considered the subject in its integrity,"—where integrity, from *integer*, whole, means *entirety*, instead of honesty, uprightness, wholeness of moral character, which is its usual signification.

Such are a few of the rules of expression which we desire to impress upon the minds of our readers. In our next article we shall pursue the subject, when we hope to have the patient attention of our readers. Dry, tedious, and uninteresting as our remarks may appear, they are useful. Pray let them be carefully studied.

* Butler's "Analogy," p. 165.

† "The Common-place Book" of the late Bishop Copplestone, quoted in the preface of Whately's "Synonymes."

THOUSANDS of men breathe, move, and live—pass off the stage of life, and are heard of no more. Why? None are blessed by them; none could point to them as the means of their redemption: not a line they wrote, not a word they spoke, could be recalled, and so they perished; their light went out in darkness, and they were not remembered more than the insects of yesterday. Will you thus live and die? Live for something. Do good, and leave behind you a monument of virtue that the storms of time can never destroy. Write your name, by kindness, love, and mercy, on the hearts of thousands you come in contact with year by year, and you will never be forgotten. No; your name, your deeds, will be as legible on the hearts you leave behind you, as the stars upon the brow of the evening. Good deeds will shine as brightly on the earth as the stars of heaven.

Religion.

CAN CHRISTIANS, CONSISTENTLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPLES, RENDER SUPPORT TO THE BRITISH STAGE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

IN taking up my pen to write upon this subject, I shall not attempt to criticise any of the articles that have appeared in this debate, but rather give my own views on the subject as briefly as possible.

In the first place, I would inquire whether the theatre may be supported merely on the ground of its being a source of amusement? That it is a source of amusement none will attempt to deny, and this characteristic has commended it to the attention of many of the great and good. Dr. Johnson says:—"I am a constant frequenter of the playhouse: *where else can one have so much entertainment with so little concurrence of one's own endeavours.* At all other assemblies he that comes to receive delight will be expected to give it; but in the theatre nothing is necessary to the amusement of two hours but to sit down and be *willing to be pleased.*" Addison, in *the Spectator*, says:—"As a perfect tragedy is the noblest production of human nature, so it is capable of giving the mind one of the most *delightful and improving entertainments.*" "A virtuous man (says Seneca) struggling with misfortunes is such a spectacle as gods might look upon with pleasure, and such a pleasure it is which one meets with in a well-written tragedy. *Diversions of this kind wear out of our thoughts everything that is mean and little. They cherish and cultivate that humanity which is the ornament of our nature. They soften insolence, soothe affliction, and subdue the mind to the dispensations of Providence.* It is no wonder, therefore, that, in all polite nations of the world the drama has met with public encouragement." Again, in another part of the *Spectator*, we find this passage:—"Pleasures and recreation, of one kind or another, are absolutely necessary to relieve our minds and bodies from too constant attention and labour; where, therefore, public diversions are tolerated, it behoves persons of distinction, with their power and example, to preside over them in such a

manner as to check anything that tends to the corruption of manners, or which is too mean or trivial for the entertainment of rational creatures." From the foregoing remarks I infer that support may be rendered to the "British stage" as an excellent source of amusement; for, though religion condemns such pleasures as are immoral, it manifests no improper austerity with respect to those that are innocent. The cautious discipline it prescribes excludes us not from the gay enjoyments of life; but rather admits them as recreations from care, as instruments for promoting friendship and of enlivening social intercourse.

But, further, the stage is worthy of support from the fact that much real good may be derived from it. Dramatic poetry has been esteemed by all civilized nations. It is divided into the two forms of tragedy and comedy. The former rests upon the strong passions, the virtues, crimes, and sufferings of mankind; the latter on their humours, follies, and pleasures. In the former, terror and pity are the great instruments; but ridicule mainly so in the latter.

Tragedy, considered as an exhibition of the character and behaviour of men, in some of the most trying and critical situations of life, is a noble kind of poetry. It is a direct imitation of human actions and manners: it is a mirror in which we behold ourselves, and the evils to which we are exposed. Tragedy, in its general strain and spirit, is *favourable to virtue.* Such power hath virtue over the human mind, by the wise constitution of our nature, that our passions cannot be strongly moved without at the same time awakening within us some virtuous emotions. We feel interested in those characters who are represented as virtuous and honourable, and an indignity is raised against the objects of vice and depravity. Sometimes, indeed, the virtuous may be represented as unfortunate; but this is often the case in real life, and our hearts will always be engaged in their behalf.

Even when bad men succeed in their designs, punishment is always made to attend them; and misery of one kind or other is shown to be unavoidably connected with guilt. Love and admiration of virtuous characters, compassion for the injured and distressed, and indignation against the authors of their suffering, are the sentiments most generally excited by tragedy. And, therefore, though dramatic writers may sometimes, like others, be guilty of improprieties, yet we must admit that tragedy is a species of moral compensation. Aristotle says the design of tragedy is "to purge our passions by means of pity and terror;" while another says, "Tragedy is intended to improve our virtuous sensibility." Modern tragedy has aimed at pointing out to men the consequences of their own misconduct, showing the direful effects which ambition, jealousy, love, resentment, and other strong emotions, when misgarded or left unrestrained, produce upon human life. A *Macbeth*, incited by ambition to commit the crime of murder; an *Othello*, hurried by jealousy to put to death his innocent wife; a *Jaffier*, ensnared by resentment and want to engage in a conspiracy, and then stung with remorse and involved in ruin; a *Calista*, seduced into a criminal intrigue which overwhelms herself, her father, and her friends in misery;—these, and such as these, are the examples which tragedy displays to public view, and by means of which it inculcates the proper government of the passions.

Comedy is distinguished from tragedy by its general spirit and strain. While pity and terror, and the other strong passions, form the province of tragedy, the chief instrument of comedy is ridicule. Comedy has for its subject neither the great sufferings nor great crimes of men, but their follies and slighter vices, with those parts of their character which raise in beholders a sense of impropriety, which expose them to be censured and laughed at by others, and which render them troublesome in society. There is nothing in the idea of this kind of composition that renders it liable to censure. To polish the manners of men—to promote attention to the proper decorum of social behaviour—and, above all, to render vice ridiculous—is doing a real service to the world. Ben Jonson well says,

"My strict hand"
Was made to seize on vice, and with a gripe

Squeeze out the humour of such spongy souls
As lick up every idle vanity."

The insight which is given by theatrical performances into real life is a very great advantage attendant upon them. He who has not been "hackney'd in the ways of men" may here find a true picture of their extravagances. When a man is made up of the dove, without a particle of the serpent, he becomes ridiculous in many circumstances of life. The Cordeliers tell a story of their founder, Sir Francis, that, in passing through the streets in the dusk of the evening, he discovered a young fellow with a maid in a corner, upon which the good man lifted up his hands to heaven with secret thanksgiving that there was still so much christian charity in the world. The innocence of the saint made him mistake the kiss of the lover for a salute of charity. Thus, then, the representations from the theatre will disclose to us the motives of many of the actions of our fellow-creatures of which we should otherwise be ignorant. This I consider one great consideration in its favour; for, as Addison says, "*I am heartily concerned when I see a virtuous man without a competent knowledge of the world.*"

Having described the benefits which may be derived from the stage "*as it ought to be,*" I do not wish to close my eyes to the stage "*as it really is.*" I doubt not but that it is the scene of many improprieties, both in words and actions. But I would ask, what is there in the world that is not liable to perversion and abuse? We cannot mention one single blessing that has not been, at some time or other, perverted. Are the evils said to be at present attendant on the British stage necessarily so, and cannot the British stage be supported without encouraging vice? If it can, then it is the duty of all Christians to support it, and to remove from it all that is of an immoral tendency, and thus to provide for the people that which is so desirable—an amusement which is not pernicious or hurtful to their morals.

One great reason adduced by many for their opposition to theatrical performances is, that no moral truth should ever be conveyed to the mind under the garb of fiction. I think that fictitious history is one of the best channels for conveying instruction—for painting human life and manners—for showing the errors into which we are betrayed

by our passions—and for rendering virtue amiable and vice odious. Lord Bacon takes notice of the taste for fiction as a proof of the greatness and dignity of the human mind: he observes that the objects of this world, and the common train of affairs which we behold going on in it, do not fill the mind, nor give it entire satisfaction. We seek for something that shall expand the mind in a greater degree; we seek for more heroic and illustrious deeds, for more diversified and surprising events; for a more splendid order of things; a more regular and just distribution of rewards and punishment than we find here: and thus we have resort to fiction; we create worlds according to our fancy, in order to gratify our capricious desires.

I shall not attempt to deny that the province of comedy has frequently been abused, and therefore has been deserving of some censure; but, as I have stated, it is on comedy alone that such reproach is justifiable. *Bulcane* is an instrument of such a nature that, when managed by *unskilful or improper hands*, there is hazard of its doing mischief instead of good to society. Licentious writers, therefore, of the comic class, have too often had it in their power to cast a ridicule upon characters and objects which did not deserve it; but this is a fault *not owing to the nature of comedy*, but to the writers of it. In the hands of a loose, immoral author, comedy will mislead and corrupt, while in those of a virtuous and well-instructed one it will not only be a gay and innocent, but a *knowledgeable and useful enter-*

tainment. We will admit that the writings of Wycherley, Congreve, Farquhar, and others, have in them a slight tendency to immorality; but that is looking at the question "*as it was*," and not "*as it is*." I think we ought now to confess the truth of what a learned writer states on the subject:—"I am happy to have it in my power to observe, that of late years a sensible reformation has begun to take place in English comedy; we have at last become ashamed of making our public entertainments rest wholly upon profligate characters; and our later comedies are much purified from the licentiousness of former times. If they have not the spirit, the ease, and the wit of Congreve and Farquhar, they may, however, justly merit the praise of being innocent and moral."

I have thus laid the case before the readers of this magazine in the fairest light I can, without any misrepresentation on either side. I have endeavoured to draw a true picture of the stage and its effects, and I trust I have convinced some that, although the stage may not now be all we could wish, it is the duty of Christians to strive to improve it. Massinger has well said—

" 'Tis urged
That we corrupt youth, and truauce superiors,
When we do bring a vice upon the stage.
That does go off unpunished. Do we teach,
By the success of wicked undertakings,
Others to tread in their forbidden footsteps?
We show no arts of Lydian panderism,
Corinthian poisons, Persian flatteries,
But mulcted so in the conclusion, that
Even those spectators that were so inclined
Go home chang'd men."

D. II.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

As this discussion will necessarily elicit opinions affecting the moral and religious character of thousands, we ought to be very calm and dispassionate, as well as conscientious, in evolving those opinions; then they will be such as, when dying, we shall not wish to retract. We take it for granted that the principles of a Christian are the same as those enunciated in the word of God, especially in that part of it called the New Testament; and, if so, we fearlessly avow our opinion that these principles are radically antagonistic to, and vitally incompatible with, the principles of the British stage as it is, and as it always has been. Consequently

no Christian can, without compromising his principles, support the "British stage." This opinion is supported by the following reasons:—

1. The principles and tone of the "stage" are—theoretically and practically, intentionally and professedly—of a secular, and not unfrequently of a sinister character. To obtain money and applause, to please the senses and gratify the morbid cravings of a depraved nature, is the design of the "British stage;" whereas the principles of a Christian are set forth in such passages as these:—"Love not the world, neither the things *that* are in the world. If any man love the world,

the love of the Father is not in him." "The friendship of the world is enmity with God." "Be ye spiritually minded." "The carnal mind is enmity against God." "To be carnally minded is death." "Have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them."

2. The stage is, in its tendency, "earthly, sensual, and devilish"—designed to allure the unwary—calculated to neutralize the religious effects produced in the minds of the young at our Sunday and other schools. That these ruinous effects may be secured, no expense, labour, or risk is spared. Finery and farce, *ad infinitum*, are resorted to by managers and actors. Hence thousands of pounds are expended to furnish the theatrical wardrobe of a first-rate actor, and twelve or fifteen hundred pounds are jeopardized on a single night's performance. Now the injunctions upon a Christian are these:—"Give me thine heart." "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind." "No man can serve two masters." "Lead us not into temptation." "They (Christians) are not of the world." "Set your affections on things above, not on things on the earth."

3. The stage is attended with indecent expressions, licentious gestures, and immoral suggestions. In proof of this we might refer to numberless plays, with many of which our readers are, undoubtedly, familiar. But, to give weight to our argument on this delicate point, we shall make an extract from a work* whose author, though a minister of the gospel, was an advocate for the "British stage." "It cannot be denied," says he, "but that it has been long the fashion, and which has lately grown to a rank excess, to contaminate the language of the drama with a mixture of ribaldry and obscenity, and a profusion of all the contemptible equivocations of indecency. For these no excuse can be pleaded; they tend directly to corrupt the heart and to vitiate the moral sentiments. They profane the sacredness of modesty, and they wither that nice sensibility to the blush of shame which, when on particular occasions it shows its delicate tints on the cheek of youth and beauty, is inexpressibly captivating." Such

is Fellowes' picture of the "British stage," and, as one of its christian patrons, he would undoubtedly give it in its best colours. Contrast this picture with the following words of holy writ:—"All that is in the world—the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life—is not of the Father, but is of the world." "Mortify your members which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, and evil concupiscence." "Pure religion is this—to keep himself unspotted from the world."

4. The principles of the stage are derogatory to God, inasmuch as they profane, take in vain, and blaspheme, his holy name. The Christian is taught otherwise:—"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." "Swear not at all." Conscious that this was an evil calculated to bring down the curse of God upon this nation, an act* was once passed by the British legislature to prevent its continuance; and, if we are not mistaken, the said act remains in unmitigated force to this day. We subjoin the following extract, which alone will negative the question at issue:—"Be it enacted by our sovereign lord, &c., that if, at any time or times after the end of this present session of parliament, any person or persons do or shall in any stage play, interlude, show, &c., jestingly or profanely speak or use the holy name of God, or of Christ Jesus, or of the Holy Ghost, or of the Trinity, which are not to be spoken but with fear and reverence, shall forfeit for every such offence by him or them committed, ten pounds, the one moiety thereof to the king's majesty, his heirs and successors, the other moiety thereof to him or them who will sue for the same in any court of record in Westminster, wherein noessoine, protection, or wager of law shall be allowed." Other acts of the same nature have been passed at various times in the British parliament to suppress the dangerous tendency of playhouses, &c. But hitherto all have proved abortive, as the present existence of the noxious nuisance testifies.

5. The playhouse is the rendezvous of libertines and strumpets—the hotbed of lust and profligacy; while the principles inculcated upon Christians are:—"Depart ye, depart ye; go out of her; touch no unclean thing." "Be ye separate from sinners." "If

* "A Picture of Christian Philosophy," p. 136. By R. Fellowes, A.B., Oxon.

* 3rd Jac. I., cap. 21.

ye live after the flesh, ye shall die." "Let him that thinketh he standeth, take heed lest he fall." "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful." "Can a man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned?" "Can one go upon hot coals, and his feet not be burned?"

6. The stage, to say the least, has the "appearance of evil;" whereas the Christian is to "abstain from all appearance of evil." To take the most liberal and verbal view of christian principles, the stage is of doubtful character. This is not *our* opinion only, but the opinion—the best opinion—that can be formed of the stage by those Christians who support it. Even the question under discussion endorses this opinion. Now, whatever is doubtful, whether in nature or tendency, cannot be supported by a Christian, nor by any man, unless it can be demonstrated to be right for a man to drink the contents of a cup in which he suspects there is poison. Joshua-like, Christians must be decided to serve God. What, then, can be more palpable than the incompatibility between the principles of a real Christian and those of the "British stage?" And how it is that those men who dogmatically insist upon sponsors "promising and vowing" that their god-children "should renounce the devil and all his works, the vain pomp and glory of the world, with all covetous desires of the same, and the carnal desires of the flesh, and not follow nor be led by them," can be the foremost of those who frequent the playhouse, we cannot divine.

7. There is another reason, of a somewhat more philosophical character, which confirms our opinion on this subject. It is this:—If the stage be perfectly congenial to, and the natural element of, the most sensual and violent passions and cravings of the human mind in its unregenerate state, how can it please and merit the patronage of the same mind in its regenerated and sanctified state? The Christian is one who has "put off the old man with his deeds." Once he was "in darkness, but now he is light in the Lord." He has become "a new creature; old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new!" And his theme now is:—"Yea, lordless, and I count all things but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ

Jesus my Lord." If the abandonment of the stage be not one of the leading features in a converted man's life, what is? And if a converted man—a Christian—can, consistently with his principles, support and patronize the "British stage," what is it that he cannot do?

"As by the light of opening day
The stars are all concealed,
So earthly pleasures fade away
When Jesus is revealed."

Stage-playing was repudiated by the more enlightened heathens, as the following extracts testify. Seneca, the moralist, says:—"Nothing is more injurious to morality than attending upon such amusements; for by these means vice, through the medium of pleasure, insinuates itself into the mind." The Romans, according to Tully, "counted all *stage-plays* uncreditable and scandalous, insomuch that any Roman who turned actor was not only to be degraded, but likewise, as it were, disincorporated and unnaturalized by the order of the censors." And "a theatre" which was building (A. C. 599) was, by the appointment of the censors, ordered to be pulled down, as a thing hurtful to good morals." If such were the sentiments of heathens, the children of the night, what ought to be the sentiments of Christians, the children of the day?

We regret that those persons who have taken an affirmative view of this important question have not had recourse to the word of God for proofs in defence of their position.

C. W.'s argument, that the "British stage" originated from religious motives, proves too much, for supposing it thus originated, he must allow that it has been wholly diverted from its first purposes. Hence the stage has become another thing; consequently, the arguments which justified its adoption will not justify its continuance. Their weight is thrown into the other scale. But, if we wish to benefit by the tragical and comical follies of others, let us turn our attention to another quarter, for—

"All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players."

J. F.

By permission of the editors I would take this opportunity of cordially and conscientiously recommending to the perusal of every

* Adam's "Rom. Antiq.," p. 329.

young man interested in the mission of the *British Controversialist*, a pungent work on the temptations of the young, written by the Rev. H. W. Beecher, entitled, "Lectures to Young Men," and published by Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

X "The finest exhibition of talent, and the most beautiful moral lessons, have been interdicted at the theatre. * * * Where is every feeling more aroused in favour of virtue than at a good play? Where is goodness so feelingly, so enthusiastically learnt? What so solemn as to see the excellent passions of the human heart called forth by a great actor animated by a great poet?"—SIDNEY SMITH.

X THE more important the question, as a general rule, the greater the diversity of opinion upon it; and, where religious enthusiasm can be brought to bear, that diversity will generally be much more amplified, and the ardour of the disputing parties increased. Being perfectly cognizant of these facts, and being likewise more desirous of giving encouragement to the free expression of opinion than of retarding it, we have nothing to regret in the part we took in the introduction of the present question, nor have we been disappointed at the subject eliciting greater warmth of feeling than is generally manifested in these pages. But to our task.

On introducing the question of the stage, we imagined that in all fairness we should rather keep in view its legitimate position and influence, than treat it under the adverse circumstances by which neglect and corruption have surrounded it. The subsequent affirmative writers have seemed also to appreciate this line of argument, and have adopted it. On the contrary, the negative writers have found it would best suit *their* purpose to deprecate this mode of procedure—to put prominently forward the abuses of the stage—to impart to the whole argument a strong *religious* tone and colouring, and to make hard hits at those whose opinions are contrary to their own. Well, after all this we are not dismayed. We may have erred in our judgment, and *may* have to suffer the defeat consequent thereon; but there is yet one consolation, and it is this—that, if we have erred, it has been in good company; for we have the testimony of the greatest writers of the greatest nations in favour of the beneficial influence of well-planned dramatic representations; and nearly the whole band of poets—ancient and modern, living and dead—join, either in letter or in spirit, in

the same declaration. But we must descend more to details.

"Aristides" is the first with whom we join in debate. Passing over, for the present, his argument, that the stage is not a representation of society, and has no counterpart except in the mind of the author, which we unhesitatingly deny, we would inquire for an explanation of the following sentence which occurs in his paper, near its close:—"We are debarred from having that *higher order of theatricals which might be beneficial*; and, so long as theatres are directly dependent on the public for support, so long must *inferior* theatricals prevail, for the few only can appreciate *intellectual theatricals*." What are we to infer from this sentence? or what is its common-sense translation? "Aristides," it may be unwittingly, but certainly *very clearly*, admits the *possibility* of a "higher order of theatricals;" and he certainly also admits their *desirability*, by using the words, "*which might be beneficial*!" If there is a probability of their being beneficial, it is desirable they should be tried. No one will deny this. And, to make it more clear to his readers that he is perfectly in earnest in this belief, "Aristides," at the close of his sentence, refers distinctly to "*intellectual theatricals*." But then, of course, "Aristides" is labouring under a mistaken notion! There is no intellectuality in theatricals! Oh, no! they are all abominations! designed to ensnare, engulf, ruin, and undermine all moral and intellectual aims and ends, and sanctioned only by those who are debased below the common level of their fellow-creatures! Wherefore, then, such allusions? But stay! Supposing that "Aristides" *should be right*, and that there really might be "*intellectual theatricals*"—or, in other words, that theatres may be made places for intellectual culture and intellectual improvement—how would our Paritane friends be affected under such circumstances? We apprehend that the same dictate which says unto other men, "Get wisdom"—"Seek knowledge and understanding"—"Cultivate and improve the intellect"

which God has given you," would them, and that *they* might, as *con-* as other men, adopt the means now consideration, and the *inconsistency* rather "in the breach than in the ice!" We believe "Aristides" is The true drama has a decidedly *mal tendency*. We do not for a moment suppose that "Aristides" intended to cause such efficient service; it is one instances in which "zeal overshoots"; nevertheless, we are equally indebted to him for his unintentional good

ext writer who claims our notice is, who, after some just remarks, with an air of self-satisfaction, "What quality is discoverable in envy? Christian grace in malice? What virgosity in jealousy?" Surely the answer cannot be in earnest! Does he for a moment suppose that envy, malice, or jealousy introduced upon the stage to find in the eyes or ears of the auditors? as a more mistaken notion! In all the plays the characters who excel in one or more of these particulars invade us to an ignoble and infamous end. Now add that the reason of the introduction of these debasing passions into plots and histrionic entertainments is the purpose of "showing virtue her own scorn her own image," and deterring who witness the evil resulting from passions from falling into the like? We E. P. will, in future, have a better understanding of the subject.

us, after all, to have been left to administer to all insane believers in the merits and mission of the stage the reputation which they so richly deserve; and us (the unfortunate C. W., Jun.) seems to have descended heaviest. That we, in the exercise of that power of thought and expression belonging to men, should have dared to defend a position which "ever has been, is now, will be," demoralizing and debased—added forth the lamentations of the biographer, Johnson—and which, so as the days of the Monarch of the age, the busy brains of Master Wilkie, not to abuse, but to chronicle of those who had performed *that* in his time! Or, again, that we

should adopt anything which had been originated by the clergy, or which had been devoted to the purposes of religion. Detestable source for even the meanest advantage to spring! In these days of boasted toleration, to think of tolerating an institution upon such a plea! Excommunication, without benefit of clergy, would be far too good for us! Yet we are prepared to stand by what we have written. It is not yet proved to our satisfaction that there is anything in Dr. Johnson's writings upon which to build an argument against the stage; and, as to Mr. William Prynne, had we time we could very considerably reduce the formidable appearance of *his* efforts to cast obloquy on the drama.

Turning to Johnson's "Progress of the Drama," we find the opening stanza to consist of a tribute to the memory of Shakspeare, the greatest hero of the stage:—

*"When learning's triumph o'er her barbarous
foes
First rear'd the stage, immortal Shakspeare
rose.
Each change of many-coloured life he drew,
Exhausted worlds, and then imagined new.
Existence saw him spurn her bounded reign,
And panting time toil'd after him in vain:
His powerful strokes presiding Truth impress'd.
And unresisted passion storm'd the breast."*

He does, indeed, lament that the public taste sometimes induced managers to lower the standard of their performances; but furnishes the following just apology:—

*"Hard is his lot that here by fortune placed,
Must watch the wild vicissitudes of taste:
With every meteor of caprice must play,
And chase the new-born bubbles of the day.
Ah! let not censure term our fate our choice,
The stage but echoes back the public voice;
The drama's laws the drama's patrons give,
For we that live to please, must please to live."*

And he concludes by reminding his readers that it was for them

*"to bid the reign commence,
Of rescued nature and reviving sense;
To trace the charms of sound—the pomp of
show—
For useful mirth, and salutary woe;
Bid scenic virtue form the rising eye,
And truth diffuse her radiance from the
stage."*

Let W. T. and "Aristides" digest these lines!

With regard to W. T.'s challenge for us to "point to a single individual who ever became a more moral man by witnessing the representation of vice," we will endeavour to

X perform the bidding. If our friend will turn to the life of George Colman, who was very excellent in the character of *George Barnwell*, he will find it narrated that Coleman once received a *fifty pound note* from a person unknown, accompanied with a letter begging his acceptance of it as a token of the writer's gratitude, *who was some years ago saved from destruction by seeing him perform the part of Barnwell in a tragedy of that name!* We venture to say that other instances are on record; but, as we are asked only for one, we need not give more. The great Shakspeare himself says, in *Hamlet*:—

“I have heard
That guilty creatures, sitting at a play,
Have by the very cunning of the scene
Been struck so to the soul, that presently
They have proclaimed their malefactions.”

Let those who build their argument on assertions only, remember they stand on dangerous ground.

“*Adelphos*” in the last number, and in the present, follow in much the same way as their predecessors, and therefore require particular attention.

Several points to which we had intended to have made allusion are already anticipated by D. H. in the preceding paper; we now, therefore, only to express a hope that those who adopt our views as to the legitimate purposes of the stage will endeavour, by the means in their power, to purify and to make it *less* the slave of fashion, licentiousness, and more the receptacle and preserver of great thoughts and pure

C. W.,

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE papers on the affirmative of this question are of an apologetic, instead of being of a defensive, nature. The writers in common admit that the British stage is in a corrupt state, but maintain that Christians, having neglected it, are themselves to blame; and the question they have discussed is, “May theatrical representations be made conducive to morality?”—one which few will be hardy enough to oppose. We will not grant them that the debate should be so construed. The British stage has a large constituency, among whom are many intelligent and christian men; and, as it cannot be supposed that these render it their countenance and support unreasoningly, we expected to have had the arguments by which these had satisfied their consciences of the propriety, or rather the righteousness, of their course. We cannot, however, admit a change in the terms of the debate, as it is not some ideal, nor what a future age may call the British, stage with which we have to do, but what actually is at the present day.

We are nearly at one with our opponents as to the value of theatricals, abstractedly considered. If it were possible to separate the stage from the present attendant abominations, it might be an institution calculated in an eminent degree to exalt the character; but such a title cannot be claimed for it *until it has undergone a radical change.* It

is forced into a stricter observance of the amenities of social life now than here for the people, despite its pestilent influence; but have attained a higher morality; but time has been when lady visitors, on the introduction of a new play, lest it might be of an equivocal character, were in the habit of wearing masks. What else, indeed, could be expected? At that period both actors and players were beneath the standard of morality of other men, low as that was. Theatrical representations are within their sphere when exhibiting the more lovely qualities of man's nature, and are, in that case, calculated to exert a beneficent influence on the auditory; but that sphere is not extended when the less amiable traits are placed there; for, though it may be argued that it is not acting faithfully to nature, and we thereby lose, in variety of character, the moral lessons conveyed by representations in which these disfigurements of nature are even granted that the vicious expiations of poetical justice, are not a whit more than those of our public strangulations. The support of good men need not be extended till this change has been effected.

We can examine only one or two statements of the opposing writers. The first compels us to be brief, else, as the matter abounds in other papers, ours would extend to a considerable length.

C. W. writes:—“Nor shall we en-

say that the results of such teachings be 'to raise the genius and amend the it.' Will the writer pardon us when we that we consider this as merely a waste betoric, as he himself, a little way further states that the stage "is *now*, in many acts, *far different* from what he would e it to be." The statements are clearly contradictory; for if it has retrograded, as intimates it has, it is impossible that its such as he states could have accrued the teachings to be had there. But stage is, in truth, now more healthy, ally, than it ever has been before. On point our able coadjutor, W. T., has ady done himself honour. We shall endeavour to show that it is not compatible the nature of the stage, as at present ducted, to produce the results claimed it by C. W. The object of those who the stage is, professedly, amusement. intellectual only unite the desire to with that of being entertained. Now, entertainment provided is an index of prevailing taste. for it is not the interest managers to foist on their audiences never may please themselves, so that the liar likings of the frequenters are so oughly studied that the performances, in effect, be said to be of their own eing. One would think, if the facts as stated by C. W., the performances needs be of a strictly moral, if not of eligious tendency; but, to a considerable at, the reverse is the case; so much so, many of the most popular plays, while lured attractive by their sparkling wit their humorous incident, are founded on ritories, such as illicit amours, &c., and are very far, removed from genuine morality. cannot go along with C. W. in thinking t this contributes to the enlightenment be mind, the correction of the heart, the ifying of the affections, or the government the passions. The very retentiveness ch, as he remarks, characterizes the mind egard to that which we see, renders the- ical representations all the more dan- us; for the thoughts reverting, as they a must, to scenes in which "moral nacy" is interblended, but aggravates perpetuates the evil.

Although the immorality of the stage is,

as H. T. remarks, incidental, that it still deforms the plays will not be denied; and this, taken in conjunction with the other fact, that in the theatre are to be met the depraved and designing of both sexes, who are always ready to mislead, renders it exceedingly hazardous to those whose characters are as yet unformed. A Christian, however, is not at liberty to tamper with temptation, and his refusal to visit the theatre does not argue any want of "moral restraint," or any neglect of responsibilities, but argues that, from a strict regard to principle, he has determined that, in this particular, he should not be ranked with those who are "lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God." We do not say that those frequenting the theatre must "necessarily fall into loose habits;" but that their position is extremely perilous we think we have clearly established. In view of the circumstances stated, how inconsiderate is the ridicule of H. T., when he says, "the Christian who cannot run the gauntlet of a visit to the playhouse may be benefited by considering the phantasms that bewitched the saintly hermits of old in the seclusion of deserts."

"All morality (says H. T.) is akin, whether contained in 'Bentley's Minstrel' or the Bible." We should have liked him to have pointed out the correspondence between the morality of the playhouse and the Bible. He meant us to infer that they, also, were alike. This is a position which Christians can never yield; and he who should give countenance to any code of morals other than that contained in the sacred writings is unworthy to be ranked among them, because, besides doing violence to the principles he professes, he insults the great Author of his being. The morality of the stage wants the religious motive, the grand distinction between christian and human morality.

We quote from one of our weekly serials the following pertinent remarks:—"A national drama should be all beautiful; deformity should never be legitimized by the sanction of a name; vices ought never to be permitted to steal in under the patronage of talent; and, above all, the worship of individual reputation should never be suffered to deprave the taste and corrupt the judgment of the public."

ARISTIDES.

Philosophy.

IS WOMAN MENTALLY INFERIOR TO MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THIS is a great and interesting social question. On the verdict of general judgment upon it depends very largely the social position of the fair portion of creation. One great feature of that position is universally recognised in the civilized world: claims for the other have been only recently heard. The long unquestioned occupants of the Downing-street of the heart—the ladies—are now in many quarters advancing their claims to a share in the guidance of the head. We are inclined, while admitting the absurdities into which many advocates of the "rights of woman" have fallen, to move that the petition be taken into consideration; and we have a strong suspicion that, if the petitioners were themselves "heard at the bar" of the *British Controversialist*, the negative of the question would be *ipso facto* proved.

What, we are entitled to ask at starting, is the *necessity*—moral or otherwise—for mental disparity between the sexes? Where is the natural law upon which we are bound to receive it? Is human happiness and social harmony more secure on this than on a contrary assumption? Is man able to do more for the world alone than man and woman together? But, not to pursue further inquiries, each of which suggests a puzzling successor, there are several positive difficulties in our mind in the acceptance of the inequality theory. It appears "very like" the affirmation of a second order in creation. It is possible to conceive of many differences of another kind without involving any such distinction: but a difference in *mind* is fundamental; it is the grand feature of humanity, which separates it from lower tiers of being. We can understand, too, the existence of variations and inequalities in the male and female mind to a great degree; but when we are told that they spring from inherent necessity—that the one, *as a sex*, is superior, *because* it is male; the other, *as a sex*, inferior, *because* it is female—we hardly know how to escape the inference that the one is a lower, although a similar, race than the other.

To draw another argument from analogy—that of the universal law of compensation, which in the animal world has afforded so much employment to naturalists, and so much interest and instruction to others. On this principle we should expect to find inequalities in one direction balanced by beauties or advantages in another. Regarding mankind physically, we find the law to hold good. Man challenges the pre-eminence in strength and vigour, woman in beauty and grace. Morally, too, man is distinguished for the sterner, woman for the gentler, impulses. But viewed mentally, if woman be inferior here, where lies the compensation? How is the balance adjusted? Is nature at fault? or is the disparity theory wrong? Again. For what is man, as an intellectual and moral agent, eminently constituted? For society. For what, as an *individual*, is he constituted? For society—*individual* society—with a view to mutual effort, encouragement, and co-operation. Such co-operation it does not admit of a doubt, is intended to extend to the higher elements of nature. Besides the more obvious designs of such society, it has the laudable and sacred end of united moral action and united mental exertion, each helping and animating the other in the struggle of responsible existence, each leading the other onward and upward. But if in this latter exigence woman fail, and that, too, from a necessity of her being so, how powerful and beautiful a charm is destroyed! She participates the battle with man with the realities of life; she divides with him its vicissitudes and its cares; she shares his sympathies and affections, his hopes and fears: but now, in the most arduous and the most important phase of his exertions, man is left alone! The "help meet for him," pronounced to be so upon the highest authority, fails him, when, at such events, as deeply needed as before—cannot understand, counsel, or advise, requires itself to be led! And such a position robs it almost as much of its charm

as of its value. The mind ceases to love what it is obliged to despise. Men have partners that cannot sympathize with, perhaps, two-thirds of their nature. It is true that, on any supposition, many must incur that misfortune; but, on that of inherent female inferiority, very few can be otherwise situated: the vast majority must be linked with beings of a lower mental grade than themselves. To our apprehension such a circumstance would involve a not insignificant deduction from the felicity even of primeval Eden. But if it would be unfortunate for man, would it not be no less unjust to woman? Is it not unfair to deny her, *as woman*, even to any extent, her due share in those pleasures of the mind which are so justly accounted the chief pleasures of an immortal being? You admit the happiness of a highly-cultivated mind; and yet you deny that happiness to woman, or, at least, claim for man the greater share.

"But are male and female intellect, then, radically the same?" By no means. That there are differences, it were as absurd as it were vain to deny. The gist of the controversy lies in the question, whether the differences are those of disparity or of diversity. We believe them to be the latter; and we think the losing sight of the just distinction between the two is the cause of much of the misconception which prevails. The same test is applied to feminine as to masculine mind, and the result is, that the former is declared to be found wanting. No wonder. But this is unfair. In harmony with the principles which govern all the works of God, the mind, no less than the other features, of the constitution of man and of woman respectively, whilst characterized by a beautiful harmony, are also distinguished by peculiarities suited to the individual character and the mutual relations of each. Their differences are those of working, rather than of essence. We do not contend that the chariot of intellect, which, guided by man, flies so swiftly, and reaches oft so distant a goal, shall precisely in the same manner pursue its course when a feminine hand holds the reins; but we do contend that the chariot is there—that the steeds are as fleet and the wheels as powerful: and that, although the track it follows be diverse, there is nothing to hinder the same goal being reached. All, as it appears to us, that the advocates of sexual

mental disparity can prove is, that there exists no necessity for female intellect to flow in the same channels and assume the same contour as male intellect—that the mental stream assumes varied colours from the fields and skies through and under which it winds, and not from any deficiency of proportion or of depth in itself.

It is not uncommon to refer, in support of the contrary view, to the primitive curse upon woman, and its predicted consequences. There is here some appearance of plausibility; but reflection has convinced us that inferences of an opposite nature are quite capable of being drawn from the same source. On a comprehensive view of the scripture narrative, the subordination of woman to man would seem to be rather a *special* than a *natural* order of things; less a consequence of the respective peculiarities of the sexes—which it would have needed no divine intervention to point out, and which would have possessed none of the features of punishment which, as it is, seems properly to belong to it—than a subjection *ordained* on a special occasion and for a special purpose. The very occurrence, indeed, of such an incident in the sacred records appears like an indication that no such subjection had previously existed—that there had been no disparity, and no inferiority; and it will not, we presume, be said there is any reason for concluding that causes have been in operation since the event referred to, to induce dissimilarities which had no existence before.

The tribunal, however, to which appeal is most usually and confidently made is that of *fact*. It is notorious, we are told, as by "Senoi," that, with whatever degree of feasibility you may theorize, as a matter of fact, women are *not* mentally equal to men. Before offering some reasons for rating these facts at a less value than would otherwise attach to them, we will venture to dispute that, notwithstanding these reasons and their grounds, the facts are *not* so conclusive as they are affirmed to be. We have not left ourselves time or space for the details which might otherwise be given. Without accepting the press—so often in similar controversies appealed to—as a complete and certain index of the current social mind, we think we could name those whose *published* works, in history, poetry, art, religion, and even science and metaphysics, demand for their

authoresses niches in the temple of fame of no mean order; whilst we believe it would be impossible to estimate how much clear, pure, and healthy thought is unostentatiously contributed to the aggregate by the female mind, and how much we owe some of the most vigorous minds that have enlightened and improved mankind to the unnoticed but powerful vigour of intellect and soundness of judgment of those whose guidance was the unseen spring of their greatness. But it seems to be scarcely fair to appeal in the matter—that is, as exclusively—to existing fact. Besides the diversities before referred to, and the misconceptions to which they may give rise, it is only reasonable that the wretched degradation to which, for so many ages and in so many quarters, woman has been subjected, should be taken into account; and that it should further be remembered that, even in civilized Europe, the character of female education has been the least calculated to develop the better and greater energies of the mind. Surely, when we contemplate the pitiable mockery which has, till recently, been dubbed “female education”—the pettinesses and peccillities of which it has been

made up—the sedulous but somewhat uncomplimentary considerateness with which all that is great in knowledge has been kept out of their way, as though beauty were all the more beautiful for lack of brains—in short, the science which has contrived to substitute as the complete idea of a “lady,” for an intelligent and thinking woman, a well-bred doll—the wonder in the reflecting mind must be that any have been able to emancipate themselves. A better feeling is happily spreading, and woman is being treated as something more than a piece of waxwork, to be simply admired and amused; and with the spread of the feeling will be the spread of the happiest results. Woman must ever be less prominent than man: the rules by which the intellect of the one and the value of its manifestations are gauged, can never be applicable to those of the other, but no less will these latter have an influence as great in their sphere and as little estimable in their fruits; no less will all that is great and holy and beautiful in man largely and widely owe its being to her who is at once the star of his darkest hour and the sunshine of his sunniest day.

J. S. J.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It must be acknowledged that the question upon which we are about to express an opinion is one that is very difficult of solution—the parties of whose mental constitution we are about to write are so differently situate, their education is, for the most part, of so diverse a character, and the duties that they are called to perform are so entirely dissimilar, that it requires more than an ordinary amount of discrimination and care to decide on the matter. In proof of the foregoing it is necessary to do little more than direct attention to the following considerations:—

The present relative state of the sexes is no proof of their natural inequality. Consider the state of the education of our female population, when compared with that of the males. Girls are kept from school by their parents on a variety of pretexts, for which boys would not be kept. Hence they do not derive near so much advantage from the schools which are provided for them as they otherwise might do, nor so much as boys do from similar schools.

Then it must not be lost sight of, that the schools which are provided for females are in many respects far inferior to those that are provided for boys. Many of the teachers of our large public boys' schools have had the advantage of a university education, which none of the teachers of female seminaries have had; while the male teachers of other schools are, perhaps, equally in advance of those of female schools of the same class.

If we consider, further, the efforts which have been put forth for the development of mind in young persons, as mechanics' institutes, debating societies, fraternal associations, and the like, we find that they have been established and carried on with a view to the improvement of young men. The benefit which women have derived from such efforts have been almost entirely confined to the books which they may have read from the libraries usually attached to such institutions.

Now, whatever may be our views of woman's capacity when compared with that

of man, we cannot but deplore either the utter neglect with which her education has been treated, or the flimsy character of the education which she has received. It is, indeed, to the credit of the sex that, though labouring under such disadvantages, there have been found some who have been able to wield the pen and govern empires. These, however, have been exceptions to the general rule; and, when compared with similar persons of the other sex, we find them few and far between.

After reading the foregoing it may easily be imagined that we are not satisfied with that method of deciding this question which would compare the mental achievements of man with those of woman. If women were educated in literature, mechanics, or science, to the same extent as men, it would not be unfair to draw the comparison, as "Senoj" suggested. As it is, however, the case is entirely different. It would be quite as reasonable to suppose that an engineer should be able to overlook and manage the arrangements of his kitchen, as that his wife should understand his mechanical inventions. There is another source of difficulty under which we labour in attempting to decide the question before us. We do not know the exact amount of intelligence which is displayed in the highest works of either men or women. Perhaps there is as much intelligence displayed in the designing and execution of some exquisite pieces of needle or crochet work as there is in the invention of many pieces of machinery. Nor is it fair to compare the utility of the one with the utility of the other, inasmuch as women have, by education and custom, been carefully shut out from works of utility beyond those of the kitchen or the house. Again, perhaps, it would be unjust to woman to suppose that, because we have no long list of inventions in mechanics to which her name is attached, therefore she is altogether devoid of mechanical genius; for, such is the kindness of her nature and the benevolence of her disposition, that it is more than probable that a husband or a brother has oftentimes taken the credit of that which is really her own, while she has been ready to remain in her native obscurity, quite content if those whom she loved were honoured by the world, the "kings of the creation," meanwhile, have

been perfectly ready to rise to fame on a woman's labours.

If, then, for the reasons already stated, we cannot judge of woman's mental ability as compared with that of man, by her labours as compared with those of men, the question is very naturally suggested,—How do we arrive at the general conviction that woman is inferior in mental ability to man? We answer—

1st. Woman was taken from man. This circumstance, of itself, would certainly not imply superiority.

2nd. Woman, from the time of the fall, "at least," was placed in a position of subjection to man. See Gen. iii. 16; 1 Cor. xi. 3. Now, it is customary for the weaker to be placed in subjection to the stronger, and not the stronger to the weaker. The very circumstance that *God* has placed the woman under subjection appears to be proof of man's superiority in mental power. To say that man has gained and retained his superiority over woman through his greater physical power is nothing to the purpose, for it is well known that *mental power*, when associated with *physical weakness*, is more than competent to deal with *physical power* when associated with *mental weakness*.

3rd. This arrangement of the Divine Being, as stated in scripture, is fully borne out in nature. Even in educated families this may be seen in the amount of deference which is paid by sisters to the opinions and wishes of a brother, provided he has been guilty of no moral delinquency, or is subject to no mental disease; by the manner in which women generally defer to the opinion of men in matters which do not belong to their own particular sphere of labour; and by the general wish of young women to have some one upon whom they can depend rather than whom they can rule.

If women sometimes meet with men who are not mentally their equals, and whom, as a consequence, they are obliged to rule, it is not a matter of choice; they would prefer, generally, that the husband should be acknowledged superior to them in mental capacity, in order that they might repose on his judgment rather than rule it. According to the natural order of things, however, the greater mind must rule the less—the less must be ruled by the greater. U. M.

Politics.

OUGHT MONEY TO BE INTRINSIC OR SYMBOLICAL?

INTRINSIC.—IV.

I HAVE read with much interest the articles which have appeared on both sides of this debate, and I feel sure that they will give your readers an intelligent view of an important subject that is little understood; at the same time, I could have wished that the writers had taken a wider view of the question, and been more definitive in its treatment. It may not, therefore, be out of place for me, without entering into the heat of the controversy, to offer some additional information that may be of interest to your present readers, and render your work still more valuable for reference on this subject.

The term "money" is somewhat indefinite. Mr. John Taylor, the author of an "Essay on Money," says that the word *moneta* signifies a token, being derived from *monere*. He defines *real money*, as "*all those things which, in return for a sufficient inducement, are capable of being transferred from one person to another.*" Mr. Cobbett contended that only the precious metals can, strictly speaking, be called real money; but Sir Robert Peel added *legal-tender paper*. Colonel Torrens has supplied a number of valuable definitions on this subject that I would commend to the thoughtful attention of your readers:—

1. Money consists of articles possessing intrinsic value, and adopted by general consent as the measure of value, the medium of exchange, and the equivalent by the acceptance of which debts are liquidated and transactions finally closed. In all civilized countries, the articles adopted as money are the precious metals. The money of each particular country consists of pieces of the precious metals on which stamps are impressed by the sovereign authority, certifying that they are of a given weight and fineness.

2. Paper money consists of instruments possessing presumptive value, and rendered by law or custom measures of value, media of exchange, and equivalents, by the acceptance of which debts are liquidated and

transactions closed. The most perfect forms of paper money are notes payable on demand in the amounts of the precious metals which they purport to represent.

3. The term "circulation" denotes paper money, which, under the existing law, consists of promissory notes payable in specie on demand, and uttered to the public by banks of issue.

4. Currency is the term employed to express the aggregate amount of coin and circulation in the hands of the public.

5. Auxiliary money consists of those forms of credit by which money is economized, and a given amount of currency made to effect a greater number of transactions than could be effected by the same amount of currency without their intervention. Auxiliary money is divided into deposits and credits in the books of bankers, checks drawn against such deposits and credits, and bills of exchange and other negotiable instruments promising to pay in coin or notes specified sums at future periods.

6. The term, "media of exchange," comprises metallic money, paper money, and auxiliary money—circulation, deposits, credits, and bills of exchange.

Colonel Thompson gives a wider definition to the term currency, as being "anything which the inhabitants of a country are in the habit of handing from one to another as the instrument of purchase and exchange;" and in this sense it is generally used.

As others have already observed, various articles were used as money in primitive times, but many of them were destitute of those qualities of invariability of value, divisibility, durability, facility of transportation, and perfect sameness, which must have formed the reasons of all civilized communities employing gold and silver as money. At first, gold and silver would be taken to market in a rough state, and certain quantities would be given for certain articles; thus we read of Abraham ~~weighing~~ four hundred shekels of silver, and giving them

in exchange for a piece of ground purchased from the sons of Heth, Gen. xxiii. 16. As commerce increased, the trouble of weighing the metal in every exchange would soon be felt, as well as the difficulty of deciding as to its purity and consequent value, and hence, in process of time, the invention of stamping or marking, each piece with a *stamp* declaring its weight and fineness.

In the earliest periods, after the invention of writing, pecuniary engagements would be committed to paper. A short time only would elapse, before individuals having written engagements from others, would begin to present them in payment to their debtors. None would object to receive as money the promissory note of a man of known wealth, and hence the origin of symbolic money.

Those who advocate money possessing an intrinsic value, do not object to the use of a limited paper currency as supplementary to a metallic one. Our opponents may cry out on our behalf, "Gold! gold! nothing but gold!" but they do it unauthoritatively. J. H. may amuse himself by recommending that a merchant having a thousand pounds to receive, should be followed by a clerk with a wheelbarrow; and we have only to add that he who suggests the plan should perform the labour; and certainly it would be a very suitable employment for "a man of progress," as our friend evidently is!

One of the principal objections to gold being used for money, was its scarcity, and

now that the productiveness of the mines of California and Australia has demonstrated the futility of this, we are told by some that this productiveness will materially alter the price of gold, and seriously derange the relationships of property. To such we commend the following recent remarks of the *Times*:—"Gold constitutes the general measure of price, and is therefore the only thing that has not a price of its own. It is simply receivable at the rate mentioned; that is to say, when one man talks of owing another £3 17s. 9d., he means that he owes him an ounce of gold. To speak literally of money price of gold is just as if a person were to ask how much tea he must give for a pound of tea."

Thus many and various are the considerations which belong to the discussion of a question like this, and though much may be said against our present system, yet remembering the melancholy proofs which history supplies of the dangers and difficulties arising from tampering with the currency of a country, I, for one, would oppose any change unless the necessity could be shown to be great, and the utility to be evident. This determination I more strongly hold when I find perhaps the greatest of money-symbolizers, Dr. Franklin, living long enough to change his opinion, and to declare to posterity, "I am now convinced that there are limits beyond which paper money would be prejudicial."

SCBUTATOR.

SYMBOLICAL.—IV.

As a general rule, the value of commodities is determined by the amount of labour expended in their production and distribution. Then why not make labour (which thus gives value to all commodities), instead of gold (which is only one commodity), the standard or measure of value? Why not issue notes which shall represent an amount of labour equal in value to the money denomination put upon them, and thus prevent the greater or less *quantity* of one commodity (gold) from affecting the *value* of everything else? This might be done by fixing upon some certain quantity and description of labour, the *present* value of which is equal to the present pound sterling, or sovereign, and substituting it for the existing standard of 5 dwts. 3·274 grains of gold, and making it

the future *permanently fixed* standard; for a standard that requires "adjusting" cannot be a *correct* standard. If it be one thing to-day and another to-morrow, how can it always be an exact measurer of value? Take, then, the *present* value of the pound, as measured by the present value of some one description of *labour*, and let *this* be the future *unchangeable* pound sterling, whatever the future changes in labour or commodities; and, although labour or commodities then might rise or fall in price, it would not be from alterations in the currency, but from alterations in the quantity or value of labour, or in the commodities themselves. The currency would only show that their then value was so much above or below their value in 185—, when the currency was settled. What

I propose, therefore, is, that the pound sterling shall represent the value of a certain quantity and description of labour *at the time of the basis being fixed*, not that it would or could be made always to represent the precise value of that exact quantity and description of labour under every future change or aspect of that labour.

Suppose, then, we were to say that the present average value of unskilled manual labour is 2s. per day—ten hours' labour to the day. This supposition would serve well for a *decimal* system of currency, if a decimal system should be thought preferable to the present, for the pound sterling would then be the representative of the present average value of *ten* days' unskilled manual labour; the *tenth* of a pound, or a florin, would be the representative of the present average value of *one* day's unskilled manual labour; and the *hundredth* of a pound, or the *tenth* of a florin (or about 2½d. of the present coinage) would be the representative of the present average value of *an hour's* unskilled manual labour, &c. Thus the "pound in account" would be a tangible pound, and not an abstract term having no definite meaning or foundation at all. And the superiority of such a pound over the pound founded on or convertible into gold would be, that the currency would then be dependent upon no one particular commodity for quantity or value, but might be made perfectly fixed and steady in price, and always procurable in quantity or amount to suit the exact wants and necessities of the people under every phase or emergency of trade or commerce. But for the better accomplishment of this purpose, and for the national instead of individual benefit, a national bank of issue ought to be established, which should be the *only* bank of issue (except its branches, for convenience), and should be entirely free from all party control in the management of its issues, so that there might be no "tampering" with the currency. All existing legal-tender currency should be called in, and the national notes made the only legal-tender currency for the future, except small currency. And, in order that there may be no alteration in the present purchasing or legal-tender value of money *by the change of standard*, national notes should be given in exchange for existing legal-tender currency, at equal value. The notes thus issued in exchange for exist-

ing legal-tender currency should form the groundwork or body of the new circulation, or that amount or portion of the new circulation which the every-day wants and necessities of the people would require to be constantly afloat. All *additional* issues of national notes should be dependent upon the legitimate demands or requirements of trade or commerce, and should be supplied in quantity in exact accordance with those demands, whether that quantity be greater or less; or in other words, as your correspondent J. H. phrases it, "they should increase with production and disappear with consumption." To do this *correctly* the bank of issue ought to issue its *extra* or *additional* notes only by discounting good *bond fide* or genuine bills of exchange, and only where sufficient or satisfactory *collateral* security is afforded—the nature and description of security acceptable to be well and clearly defined—and the rate of discount, a uniform or fixed rate, say the present minimum rate of the Bank of England, or 2 per cent. per annum.

Thus the quantity of money afloat would always exactly adapt itself to the real wants and necessities of the people and the state of trade and commerce. When more money was wanted, as commerce expanded or bills became due, more bills would be discounted at the national bank of issue or its branches, and when less was wanted fewer bills would be discounted. The *extra* issues of the national bank would, therefore, simply be a substitution of cash, or legal-tender money, for bills of exchange; consequently, there could be no danger of over or excessive issues to act injuriously upon the currency, as bills of exchange (upon which the *extra* issues would be based) are themselves legitimate currency, being called into existence by the state of production and the actual demands of trade and commerce. But as, from their very nature, they are not adapted for legal-tender currency, a substitute for that purpose is required, which shall be equally as harmless in its effect upon the general quantity and value of money, as well as be always available or procurable upon uniform terms; and this I consider would be accomplished by a *really national* bank issuing notes, by way of discount, on good, genuine bills of exchange, as above. Perfect freedom of dealing and banking in the national issues

ought, of course, to be permitted, so that money might get properly and thoroughly diffused amongst the people, and that those who might not have the requisite means to obtain it from the national source of issue direct, might obtain or procure it through the instrumentality of others. Moreover, for the satisfaction and convenience of the public, as well as a detective check or security against fraud or forgery, the national notes should all be "convertible" at the national bank or its branches, not into gold at a fixed price on demand, but in lieu thereof, from larger to smaller amounts, or from smaller to larger, at the will of the holders. With such a system of currency and issue gold might be left as free as any other commodity to find its own natural price in the markets of the world; but, nevertheless, the certainty with which its comparative purity and genuineness can be ascertained by the skill of the assayer, and, consequently, its real marketable value known, might still point it out as a necessary and useful instrument in balancing foreign exchanges, until a better or more convenient medium could be agreed upon and adopted.

But let me here remark, that, with a correct system of *symbolic* currency, it is of little consequence *what* is adopted as the *standard* for the currency, provided it be of the same real and exchangeable value at the time of its adoption; for it is not the nature or *material* of the *standard*, but the *mode of issue* and the *conventional value* conferred upon the currency by making it the legal tender, that gives to it that *fixity of price* so essential in a measure of value. This doctrine may seem somewhat new; but, notwithstanding, I consider it the true one. The difference in value betwixt gold and notes, during the period of the late wars, I do not attribute to a depreciation of paper or notes, but to an *appreciation* of gold, owing to the "inconvertibility" of notes (and consequent conversion of gold into a commodity), added to the *then* extreme scarcity of gold as compared with the demand for it: the "inconvertibility" of notes was all that time considered a necessary step to provide a sufficiency of currency for carrying on the business of the country. Neither do I consider the then generally increased prices of goods to have been produced, to any considerable extent, by the mere fact of the

"inconvertibility" of the currency (and the possible "expansion" thereby created), but *mainly* by the enormous sums spent in carrying on the wars, which added so extensively to consumption and demand, without a corresponding increase in supply. As soon as these enormous sums ceased to be spent, trade collapsed, and prices fell. And this would still have been the case, ultimately, had the currency remained unaltered. But the alteration of the currency coming at or near the same time as the collapse, the alteration of the currency has got all the blame (though undeservedly) laid at its door. By the extraordinary demand for commodities above supply, created by the wars, prices had increased beyond their natural level. The reaction was, therefore, inevitable, sooner or later. It will hence be seen that I am not of that school of currency reformers who think that taxation can be added to price, by the issue of what they call "taxation notes." With a legitimate system of money issue, the prices of commodities must always be governed or regulated by cost, supply, and demand. The "taxation" principle of issue I consider a fallacious one, inasmuch as I can see no essential difference, in respect to the effect upon prices, betwixt a certain sum of money issued by the state, and taken back in payment of taxes, and the same sum issued by, or procured from, the Bank of England, or any other bank, and returned to it by the state, as taxes are received. If the amount of "taxation" money annually to be issued by the state were not to be called in, but allowed to remain *afloat*, and the yearly additions to its amount left to accumulate in the country, then I admit that such "taxation" money would affect the prices of commodities, just the same as did the annual issue and funding of large amounts of exchequer bills during the late wars. But the constant accumulation of the notes is not what the advocates of "taxation" money propose. Therefore, seeing that the professed object of issuing "taxation" notes, viz., that of adding taxation to the general prices of commodities, is incompatible with the means proposed for its accomplishment, I am at a loss to know what other advantages can be specially derived from that mode of issue. If it be sought to reduce the burden of the national debt, so that the present real value of the interest of

that debt may more nearly correspond with the real value of that interest when the debt was contracted, there is a more simple and effectual way of attaining that object. For instance, the minimum rate of interest at the Bank of England has ranged, within the last few years, from 2 to 8 per cent. per annum. The national creditors have, through all these changes in the value of money, been constantly receiving the same fixed sum as interest upon their debt. If, therefore, the national debt be a *money* debt, and *the price of money* should *hereafter* be *permanently fixed*, what is there to prevent the national debt being then made to correspond in value with money? that is, to have the same interest allowed as the national money would then be worth at the national source of issue. The national creditors have hitherto enjoyed the full advantages which inventive skill and ingenuity have exercised in diminishing the money value of all descriptions of goods and produce since the debt was contracted; consequently, although the interest of their debt might be *nominally* reduced by the above process, its *real* value would be as

great, or probably even greater, than when the money was lent. And what injustice could there be to the national creditors in giving them the same, or it might be even a greater, real value than that which was originally contracted for? It must be borne in mind that, under the circumstances supposed, the value of their debt would not then have to suffer from *fluctuations* in the quantity or price of money itself, the price of money, at its source, being then *fixed*.

I will now conclude by stating that I think the establishment of a good sound system of *symbolical* currency would be the most effective remedy for the present state of things in Australia. What is the physical and moral value of a few paltry tons of gold, compared with the disruption of society, and the breaking up of all the regular sources of wealth and industry in the country? If gold were "disfranchised" there would not be the same inducement for deserting other and more important callings for that of digging gold. Its price would be less certain, and the market for its sale more doubtful.

C. E. R.

Social Economy.

IS THE CONFESSIONAL IN HARMONY WITH INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FREEDOM OR SOCIAL WELL-BEING?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

No institution of the Roman Catholic Church is more cherished than that of Confession. It is to this that the church is indebted for its boasted unity; but if any other church, purer and more liberal in its principles, were adopting this as one of its tenets, defection from the mother church would immediately ensue. The fierce opposition given to the Episcopal Church in Ireland arises from this—it lacks the power to forgive sin. Did it possess the power of absolution, it would be popular. Auricular confession dates its introduction from 1215. Previously public confession was the only admissible form; but the affluent, that their character and their status in society might not be compromised by discreditable revelations, were granted the privilege of confessing

privately. This more agreeable mode brought with it a large accession of influence to the church: the clergy, ever alive to the interests of that, had it adopted generally. It was ratified by Innocent III., at the date above quoted. The requirements of confession are—sorrow for sin, confession to a priest, the performance of the penance adjudged: its purpose is—the reconciliation to God of such as have become alienated by sins committed subsequently to baptism. The Rev. Stephen Keenan (a Roman Catholic divine), in the "Controversial Catechism," p. 186, says:—"The penitent, to be absolved, must *detest his sins*; he must be firmly resolved to *avoid sin and its occasions* in future; he must be *willing to submit to whatever penance the priest imposes*; and, if able, he must *confess*

all his sins;" and, at p. 185, says:—"The sacrament of penance was instituted for the remission of sins committed after baptism." Every individual is bound, under pain of excommunication, to appear at the tribunal of penance at least once a year; but monthly, and even weekly, confessions are recommended as more meritorious; and parents are ordained to send their children so soon as these can discern between right and wrong: this faculty divides ascribe to them about their seventh year; the church has thus its members under its guidance from the most impressible period of life.

Penitents are required to accuse themselves of all mortal sins committed since their previous confession, beginning with the more heinous first. They must be very specific in their self-accusations, embracing every variety of sin, and narrating every concomitant circumstance, especially such as tend to aggravate the guilt of the sin. "If," says the Rev. Joseph Curr (in his manual—"Familiar Instructions in the Faith and Morality of the Catholic Church"), "a penitent omits one mortal sin in confession, or one about which he even doubts whether it be mortal or not, his confession is null and sacrilegious;" and the Rev. Mr. Kernan, before quoted, says,—"The priest is a judge who must decide what sins he ought to forgive and what he ought to retain: now, no judge can pronounce a decision without hearing the whole case." Should penitents hesitate, either from timidity or from bashfulness, to detail their transgressions circumstantially, the father confessor, skilled in ex-amination, can generally extort the concealed sin, if not by entrapping questions, by threats of spiritual terrors; this accomplished, contrition expressed, admonition listened to, and penance prescribed, absolution is granted, and the penitent withdraws, vainly believing his sins forgiven.

From the circumstance that the penitent submits the inmost secrets of his soul to his confessor—that he deigns to sue for salvation through his agency, although a man impotent as himself—must, we think, induce a servility of mind diametrically opposed to intellectual and moral freedom. Yet, to a man in that character the adherents of the Roman Catholic Church are commanded to intrust their reputation, and on his graciousness to hazard their hopes of eternal life. We say

hazard; for it must ever be remembered that the efficacy of absolution, even after an unreserved confession, depends entirely on the confessor; it matters not that the person confessed is of the most irreproachable character, meritorious in every respect, if, when pronouncing absolution, the confessor have not the *intention* of securing grace for the penitent, the confession has been of none effect. Of all despotisms, the despotism of the confessional is the most degrading, as by it the dependence of the sinner for mercy is transferred from God to man: it is, indeed, absolutism in perfection, when the fickleness of a priest can exclude from the joys of Emmanuel's kingdom.

It may be asserted that secrets confided to priests dare not be divulged. This fact does not, however, remove the evil. A man, on confession, must feel as if filched of his equality. This feeling priests are at no pains to lessen, but arrogate to themselves a proud superiority—a superiority no less than that of being the vicegerents of the Omnipotent. Confession is inimical to the wholesome self-respect of individuals. It is an institution which in no way exerts a salutary intellectual or moral influence either on priest or penitent; for, while it gives a fictitious ascendancy to the one, it detracts from the common manhood of the other.

The Romish clergy being celibates, not from choice but from compulsion, it is quite apparent that the power they wield is liable to abuse: to expect unwavering virtue under the circumstances would be to suppose them endowed with a superhuman morality. We must bear in mind that priests, although robed in canonicals, are nevertheless inheritors of human frailties, and as such fall before the like temptations with other men. They are the victims of a system which imposes on them unnatural restraints, and which, at the same time, subjects them to an ordeal to which the severest austerity is often unequal.

The confessional inflicts irreparable injury on man's moral nature. The majority are not vicious, as is assumed at that tribunal. In the process of eliciting the penitent's delinquencies, vices are rehearsed offensive to the commonest delicacy, and on these especially, in every phase, artful and insinuating interrogatories are put, for the avowed purpose of obtaining an "honest, fair confes-

sion." As a pertinent illustration of the questions proposed, we quote a passage from the "Poor Man's Manual," a Catholic book of devotions, which we chanced to dip into while in the house of one of the "faithful" the other day. In justice to ourselves we must say we had some scruples anent transferring this passage to the pages of the *British Controversialist*: we prevailed upon ourselves to do so only by the thought that the intelligent reader would perceive we were animated solely by a wish to place this subject in its true light. The passage occurs in the section referring to Preparation for Confession. On the sixth commandment (our seventh) we are to examine ourselves as to whether we have "Taken pleasure in unchaste thoughts or desires, or in the sight of immodest objects; frequented immodest plays; uttered or read, or given ear to or not hindered, immodest words, verses, discourses, books, or songs; touched myself or others, or kissed them unchastely; committed adultery, or any other impurity." Now, we submit that this very practice must vitiate the mind—must introduce it to the knowledge of vices previously unthought of. We have no doubt that the first immodest thoughts—calculated powerfully to influence the character—which occur to many a young person may be dated from the confessional. The questions are suggestive of the very thoughts, and words, and acts, which ostensibly they are meant to suppress. It is not to be supposed that interrogations such as these, addressed to youth under the accompanying solemnities of place, person, and circumstance, will readily be forgotten. No; the impression left will be indelible—will be retained in the memory, and pondered over, till thoughts of a kindred character become habitual to the mind.

From childhood to senility, all must submit to confession: the youngest are duly examined as to indiscretions of the blood;

and, according to their years, their examinations become more and more indecent, no matter whether the penitent be male or female; even married life enjoys no immunities from these execrable examinations; the insatiate confessor, with a painful interest, still perseveres in his ungracious offices. We can scarcely permit ourselves to venture another quotation from these devotional works. In the "Familiar Instructions," already quoted, Mr. Curr impresses on the minds of married penitents "That the debt of marriage, which each one owes to the other, cannot, without just cause, be lawfully refused, and that the party so refusing is answerable to God for whatever evil may ensue from it,"—very properly leaving the justness of the cause to be determined by the confessor. The prurient curiosity of the priest is gratified by prying into the liberalism of his parish: he seems to experience an ungodly delight in listening to detailed recitals of licentiousness. Let any one doubtful of this, peruse a few of their devotional works, especially the sections referring to confession, and we are satisfied he will be disgusted with the melange of piety and obscenity to be found. If afterwards he chooses a more minute investigation, let him peruse any of their institutes of theology, and he will conclude that no system could be devised better calculated to defile the minds of both confessor and confessed.

We have shown that the confessional is not in harmony with either intellectual or moral freedom: that it is not in harmony with social well-being necessarily follows. We have only further to remark, that man's actions, being governed by his belief, the Roman Catholic will be comparatively unscrupulous, seeing that he believes his sins to be cancelled by the absolution which follows confession and the performance of the penance prescribed. ARISTIDES.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It cannot, I think, but afford satisfaction to every sincere friend of truth, to mark with what consistency you continue your efforts to place your readers in a position to pronounce an intelligent verdict upon every important doctrine and practice respecting which there exists a diversity of opinion. None can regularly peruse your magazine

without gaining much instruction and having many prejudices dispelled; and I fondly hope that it will be thus with respect to discussion of the confessional, upon which we are about to enter. I have no doubt that many of your readers regard this institution with feelings of dislike, and even detestation; but this, I venture to assert, is on acco-

d their partial information as to its workings, and the distorting medium through which that information has been received. I would, therefore, earnestly entreat them to endeavour to banish preconceived and prejudicial notions from their minds, and to come to the consideration of this subject with a true eclectic feeling, prepared to

"Seize upon truth where'er 'tis found."

The advocates of the confessional believe it to be an institution of the church of God, and its claims to this honour must be examined before we regard it in its social bearings.

The confession of sin was a duty enjoined under the Jewish dispensation. The high priest, at the feast of expiation, made confession to God in the name of all the people; and the people practised confession as a personal duty, as appears from Numbers v. 6:—
"When a man or woman shall have committed any of all the sins that men are wont to commit, and by negligence shall have transgressed the commandment of the Lord, they shall confess their sin and restore the principal, and a fifth part over and above." Again, this duty was enjoined in later times, for we find the royal Solomon declaring that—
"He that hideth his sins shall not prosper: but he that shall confess and forsake them shall obtain mercy," Prov. xxviii. 13.

So far from this law being abrogated by Christianity, we find John the Baptist, the forerunner of our Saviour, baptizing the multitudes who went out to hear him, on their receiving his word and "confessing their sins;" and many of the apostles have given it their support, both by example and precept. We find St. James saying, "Confess your sins one to another, and pray for one another, that you may be saved," and thus teaching us that the confession of our sins to man is a condition of salvation. Again, we read in 1 John i. 8, 9:—"If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." This testimony is so strong, and clear for the necessity of confessing our sins, that our adversaries have no other way to escape the force of it, but by vainly pretending that the apostle means only the confession of our sins privately to God alone. But that this cannot be the apostle's meaning is evident for two strong

reasons; first, because *the confessing our sins* is here put in opposition to the *saying we have no sin*; these two are opposite to one another, and therefore must certainly relate to the same object. Now, who is there in his senses that would seriously dare to say to God, in private, that *he has no sin*? In this part of the sentence, then, the apostle certainly means saying, *we have no sin before men*; and, consequently, in the opposite part of it, when he says, "If we confess our sins," he necessarily means the doing so *before men also*. Besides, the apostle here declares that, if "we confess our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins." How comes the fidelity and justice of God to be engaged here? Has he anywhere engaged his promise to pardon those who confess their sins to him alone in private? David, indeed, says, "I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin," Psa. xxxii. 5; which shows that, in the old law, when a sinner "with a broken and contrite heart," that is, with *perfect repentance* of his sins, returned to God, and acknowledged his guilt with sorrow, God, of his infinite goodness, would show mercy to such a repentant sinner. But we do not read anywhere that God ever engaged his fidelity or justice to forgive the sins of any who confessed them in private to him alone; consequently, in the above text, the apostle cannot mean the confessing to God alone; but, from what we have seen above, it is manifest that God has solemnly engaged his fidelity and justice to forgive the sins of those who confess them to the pastors of his church in the sacrament of penance, when he declares to these pastors, "Whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." The effects of this promise cannot be obtained, as we have clearly seen, unless the sinner confess his sins to his pastor; and when he does that with the proper dispositions, then this sacred promise of Jesus Christ engages him, in fidelity and justice, to grant the wished-for pardon.

The confessional being thus surrounded by so many scriptural sanctions, we shall not be surprised that it has ever been regarded by the church as a channel appointed by God through which the grace of justification flows into the sinner's soul. I am aware that some assert that the confessional is only

an institution of the thirteenth century; but this only shows their ignorance of history, or their wilful misinterpretation of it. It is only necessary for us to cite one or two witnesses to put them to silence; and, first, we have one whose name will be received with reverence by all—the venerable Bede, who flourished in the seventh century. We hear him saying:—“As to our light sins, they may be forgiven by confessing them to our neighbour, and by their praying *for us*; but if we are stained with impurity, or infected with a leprosy of great sins, we must, according to the laws, confess these to the priest; and he must perform the expiation according to his will, during the time and in the manner which he shall command us.” Egbert, bishop of York, who flourished in the eighth century, wrote a penitential for the direction of the confessor and the confessing, and urges the duty of confession upon all true penitents. That this custom was recognised by the church at large is evident from the fact that Alfred the Great and Gurtarnus ordained, in union with the clergy, that, if any criminal wished to have a priest to confess to, this privilege should never be denied him; and, in the canons enacted under King Edgar, it is enjoined upon persons going to confess to arm themselves with fortitude to make a full discovery of their faults, “because, without confession, there is no pardon to be hoped for.”

There is another fact that ought not to be overlooked in this discussion, and one which we commend to the special attention of our opponents, viz., that the Church of England, with all her errors, recognises the duty of confession, as appears from her 113th article, which runs thus:—“Provided always, that if any man confess his secret and hidden sins to his minister for the unburdening of his conscience, and in order to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him, we do not in any way bind said minister by this our constitution, but we do strictly charge and admonish him that he do not at any time make known to any person whatever any crime or offence so committed to his trust and secrecy.”—See *the body of the canons drawn up in 1663*.

Having said so much of the institution of the confessional, we have little space left in this paper to devote to the separate question, is it “in harmony with intellectual and moral

freedom or social well-being?” Nor, indeed, is this necessary, for we might at once argue, *à priori*, that no institution sanctioned by God can be opposed to the true welfare of man. None can be so well acquainted with the nature and wants of man as his Maker, and He graciously ordained ordinances to meet those wants in connexion with His holy church. The confessional may be opposed to sinful practices and vicious passions; but these, again, are opposed to man's highest interests; for they debase his mind, defile his heart, and undermine the very foundations of society. The confessional opposed to freedom? Never, when the *freedom to do as we choose* is associated with the *determination to do as we ought*. As to its bearing upon social well-being, hear the testimony of one who surely will be taken as an impartial and a true witness—I mean Voltaire. He says:—“There is no more wise institution than that of confession. The most of mankind guilty of crimes are naturally tormented with remorse. The lawgivers who established mysteries and expiations were equally anxious to prevent the criminals, under the influence of despair, from rushing recklessly into new crimes. Confession is an excellent thing—a bridle on inveterate crimes. It is excellent for disposing hearts ulcerated with hatred to forgive; and the unjust, the injuries they may have done to their neighbour. The enemies of the Roman Church, who oppose so salutary an institution, have taken away from man the greatest check that can be imagined on iniquity. The wise men of antiquity have all recognised its importance. The Catholic religion has consecrated that of which God permitted human wisdom to perceive the advantage and embrace its shadows.”

If evidence still more distinct be desired as to the effects of the confessional on the well-being of society, we have only to cite Raynal, who, in his “*Philosophical and Political History of the Indies*,” says:—“The Jesuits established in Paraguay a theocratic government with the practice of confession—the very basis on which religion reposes. It alone is a substitute for all penal laws—preserves and watches over purity of morals. In Paraguay religion, more powerful than the force of arms, conducted the criminal to the knee of the magistrate, whereas far from palliating his crimes, repentance made him aggravate them; where, far from

cluding punishment, a humble suppliant, he demanded it on his knees. The more severe it was, the more it tranquillized the conscience of the criminal. This chastisement, which everywhere else terrifies the criminal, here consoles him in banishing remorse by expiation. The people of Paraguay have had no criminal laws, because each person voluntarily accused and punished himself. All their laws were precepts of religion. The ties of all governments would be that of a

theocracy in which the tribunal of confession would be established."

We commend these words to the attention of the thoughtful readers of the *British Controversialist*, and the whole question to their impartial consideration, believing that they will be convinced that the institution under review is in harmony with man's highest interests, and productive of his true welfare.

CONFESSARIUS.

The Societies' Section.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

PROLOGOMENA—(Continued.)

BEING, knowing, doing! Mystery-enshrouded conceptions! how fondly have men aimed at comprehending "the full significance" of all that is wrapt up in these little words! how ardently have they gazed at *life*, *intellect*, and *action*!—these three wondrous correlates existent in humanity—that they might acquire a knowledge of their various interdependencies! how eagerly have they toiled on, with unintermittent energy, in the anxious endeavour to penetrate into the regions of absolute Truth! And must all these impulses which move us to attempt the decipherment of "the purpose of life," which tempt us to forsake "the torpid quietude" of ignorance, which urge us to the performance of the task-work of great thoughts and deeds, which incite us still to work on and pause not, in the hope of winning yet the goal at which we aim, be adjudged inutile and vain? Can all the toil of thought the sages of the earth have undergone be fruitless? Must all the hopes which they have entertained be classed with dreams and phantasms? Dare we assert that—

"All this fair Nature is but as a mask,
And this her wondrous beauty * * *
Is but the beauty of the Sphinx, that smiles
Its dread enigma in the face of men"?

Necessity laid upon us to sigh out, with "Manfred"—

"Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most
Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth,
The tree of knowledge is not that of life.
Philosophy and science, and the springs
Of wonder, and the wisdom of the world,
I have essayed, and in my mind there is
A power to make these subject to itself—
But they avail not!"

Can we believe that all is sterility and barrenness, and yet that Deity has given to our intellect an impetus which "goads it on again to run its fruitless circle"? Is the destiny

of man an "interminable theme, which still eludes all seizure"? Is it true that "to aspire to the knowledge of mental phenomena, their resemblances and successions, is to aspire to transcend the limitations of human faculties"?* Are we—if this be true—merely *phenomena* to ourselves? Is *self-knowledge* an impossibility? Is *consciousness* not a possession, but an appearance? Is *personality* a figment? and *self-differentiation* a mere product of Transcendentalism? Can we abnegate the notion of self, or are we necessitated to postulate *that* as one of the prime, elemental *facts* in nature, without which all other facts or notions would be impossible? Have we *here τὸν σῶν*, a stand-point of certainty—an indubitable actuality? If so, then is Philosophy possible. If so, man is not

"Like a loose wheel in some crushed mechanism,
Whose sick and feeble motion spends itself
On its own inane circle,"

but is interlinked by numerous relations; such as origin, succession, co-existence, final cause, &c., with other beings, while many time-ties unite him with the past, the present, and the future, as well as co-active in the production of those causes whose effects shall constitute futurity. If, then, we can *reason* from what we *know*, Philosophy is possible, and the mysteries which enshroud that being of "mixed essence," who on earth is found

"Contending with low wants and lofty will,"

are resolvable, and shall yet become as patent to the thought-energies of humanity, as are *now* the properties, &c., of—

"The lightning pale, that scrawls with hurried hand,
Huge hieroglyphics on the screen of night."

It cannot be denied that we are so constituted as to desire a correct acquaintance with the Philosophy of our own nature—a knowledge of the laws of being, knowing, and doing. On the accuracy of our information on these points our welfare, in a great measure, depends. All human soul-queries may be reduced to a fourfold classification; viz.:—1st. Ontologic—What *am* I? 2nd. Critic—What can I *know*? 3rd. Dikaistic—What ought I to *do*? 4th. Elpistic—What may I *hope*? Without an answer to these interrogations, the soul cannot rest satisfied, and Philosophy, like the ark-dove, is continually on the wing, seeking a resting-place for "the sole of her foot." But she will not always be "seeking rest and finding none." Surely she is yet destined to return with "an olive-leaf pluckt," indicative of peace, to "the city of Mansoul," as quaint old Bunyan hath it! Such hopes, at least, by the constitution of our nature burn within us, nor were we wise to wish for their extinguishment. "For what end and from what source were these extra-mundane endowments and wishes placed within us, that we should wish to stifle them in their birth-world? Let us rather set ourselves energetically to discover a solution. By collecting and classifying the phenomena of human thought—by discovering the limits of the intellectual faculties, and confining our researches within these—by carefully examining the motive-sources of human action—by closely and rigorously analyzing the moral judgments which we form—by judiciously reading the hopes which rise spontaneously in the soul, and estimating the probabilities of their ultimate fulfilment, may we not hope

* Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 21.

perform this? "Truth is the daughter of Time," say the ancient sages; and they are right. Instead, therefore, of concluding, with one of the ablest expositors of philosophic tenets, that "it is in vain to argue that the difficulty of Philosophy is much greater than that of any other science, and therefore greater time is needed for its perfection. The difficulty is impossibility. No progress is made because no certainty is possible."* Let us rather, welcoming the difficulty—"proud to be daring"—prove that

"The high-born soul
Disdains to rest her heaven-aspiring wing
Beneath its native quarry."

If there be truth in human aspirations, hopes, or feelings—if our own souls do not betray us—if the voice of nature lies not, Philosophy is possible. And even were it not so, who would not rather dare the Impossible, fighting bravely, and dying "with harness on his back," than walk "the green unripened universe," partaking of "the old insanities of life," wearied and forlorn, the living sepulchres of crushed and ruined hopes, bearing about with us, throughout "the ceaseless, changeless, hopeless round of weariness and heartlessness," a soul in which Death sits gnawing at the core, as

"Mindless of our immortal powers and their
Immortal end, as is the pearl of its worth;
The rose its scent; the wave its purity?"

Let us not be misunderstood, however; as if we sought to elevate Philosophy to "the enthroned seat" of Religion. There is this difference between the offices fulfilled by these twin-sisters. Religion is the all-credence-worthy *practical* instructress of humanity; divinely commissioned, she descends from heaven with a dogmatic code of regulations applicable to *life and conduct*. But to whom are these instructions valuable? By whom will this code be accepted? Whose credence will be given to her august authority? Will it be the man whom no soul-queries have disturbed?—in whose mind no lofty aspirations burn?—in whom no *want* has been developed?—who demands no solution of his destiny? No! It is when the soul is awakened to its needs—when the incompetency of mere earthly life to satisfy his hopes has been felt—when the past is insufficient, the present horror and the future agony—when the soul is excited and despairing—when thought, reflection, speculation, philosophy, have taught the mind the *need* of a life-guide that religion becomes acceptable. Religion gives peace to the mind through the necessity which the mind feels for some guidance, for some balm to its distress, for some light in the profound darkness. Religion gives life and vigour to the soul by calling forth faith; and, so long as life-sustenance can be drawn from authority and testimony, the life of faith in the soul is active. But reason requires to be satisfied of the validity of the grounds on which faith rests, demands that the credentials of religion be given to its inspection; asserts its right to "prove all things." Philosophy, then, is the *ordinator* of the speculations of the intellect; the arbiter of the true and the false; the assayer of opinions; the critic of faith and practice. Religion appeals to Philosophy to prove that she is required; that she is adapted to satisfy man's wants; that her credentials are duly authenticated; that she can bring true peace to the soul. Not only so; but Religion takes for granted the labours of

* Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 21.

Philosophy assumes the existence of truth, the idea of destiny, the possession of moral principles, &c.; gives her answers to his most urgent soul-queries, and leaves their elaboration, classification, proof, and illustration, to Philosophy. Philosophy is necessary, that a man may *know*; Religion, that he may *do* and *hope*.

Having thus far elaborated the arguments—1st. For the existence of philosophic thought; 2nd. The possibility of Philosophy; 3rd. The differentiation of Philosophy from Religion, and the fact of their co-existence—we shall, in our next, briefly place before you a synoptical view of the pathways of thought through which we desire you, with us, to wend. This will be advantageous, not only as a guide in the future, but as an incitement in the present. It will prepare the mind for understanding the divergences in our course, as well as for a perception of the goal at which we aim. The way is arduous, the toil severe; but such as are willing to gird up their loins, and follow our guidance, we feel persuaded shall not return, crying, "All is barren!" but will be ready to assent to the opinion of the amiable Jouffroy, that "the history of Philosophy is an important study, a study which eminently belongs to the present epoch; and it is no less curious than indispensable to regard it, not as a catalogue of strange opinions, altogether foreign to the affairs of this world, produced at hazard in the head of certain individuals, at such and such a time, in such or such a country, but as a progressive series of attempts to solve the questions which most nearly concern humanity, by everything most illustrious to which it has given birth."

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Nottingham Castle Gate Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The third annual meeting of the above valuable society was held in the Hounds Gate schoolroom, on Tuesday, June 1st. At five o'clock about fifty persons of both sexes partook of tea provided by the committee; after which the Rev. R. S. M'All took the chair, and delivered a most impressive and instructive address, urging the young onwards in the work of self-improvement. Mr. H. Bray, the secretary, read the report; from which we learn that the society is in a progressing state. During the past year its members (twenty-five) have read upwards of thirty essays upon religious, historical, and scientific subjects. Several discussions have taken place upon "The Union of Church and State;" the "Temperance" question; "The Character of Oliver Cromwell," &c. &c. The adoption of the report was moved by Mr. William Crosbie, seconded by Mr. Bonser, and supported by Mr. S. W. M'All (son of the chairman), who spoke at length upon the principles and workings of such societies. The meeting was also addressed by Messrs. Hackett, Smart, More, Preston, and W. Filkin, Esq., Mayor. The evening's entertainment was varied, at intervals, by the handing round of plates of fruit, &c., and the meeting

broke up about ten o'clock, with best wishes for the society's progress and prosperity. The officers of the society are as follows:—Mr. S. W. M'All, president; Mr. F. Booth, vice-president; Mr. H. Bray, secretary; Mr. S. Page, treasurer; committee, Messrs. S. Briggs, R. Breese, W. C. Underwood, S. Sanders.

Leovil Mutual Improvement Society.—On the evening of Tuesday, June 1st, the members of this society held a public soiree at the town-hall. In the absence of the president, G. Harbin, Esq., the chair was efficiently occupied by T. Lyon, Esq., one of the vice-presidents. A report of the proceedings of the society, and of its gratifying success since its formation, was read by Mr. Williams, one of the honorary secretaries, after which J. T. Vining, Esq., the delegate from the institution to the Society of Arts in London, gave some interesting information respecting the conference, and alluded to the benefits likely to result from it. Addresses were also delivered by Messrs. Bide, Newman, Tucker, Highmore, Hanham, &c. The amateur music-class contributed much to the enjoyment of the evening, and the meeting was prolonged to a late hour, and gave general satisfaction to its numerous and respectable attendants.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

112. What is the meaning of the letters Jm and re, occurring in old charters and deeds, and inserted in place of the year?
113. Will some of your readers favour me with the plan of a diary, and inform me whether it is usual to enter each day's proceedings?
114. Having lately witnessed, at a microscopic exhibition, the decomposition of water, I am anxious to know what zinc is used, and how it is applied. Should any danger arise from the gaseous separable state, please to point it out. G. H. F.
115. Having devoted my attention for some time to that most interesting branch of natural science, botany, and feeling the desirability of preserving specimens of plants, I shall feel much obliged to any of your readers who will give me some instructions as to the best method of forming a herbarium.—R. F.
116. Could any reader inform me of the nature of "laughing gas"—of what it is composed, and its use, and if it is injurious in its effects? A. C.
117. The writer, being in the habit of forwarding notices to local newspapers, is desirous of receiving advice, which, if practised, would be likely to obviate the following defects in his style, composition, &c.:—His sentences are generally too long, sometimes convey several distinct ideas, mingling on each other, but not necessarily connected. There is a stiffness in his composition which he is anxious to supersede by a flowing and graceful style. There are, also, occasional defects in his punctuation, arising from the want of a simple, fixed rule, which some friend will, perhaps, kindly furnish.—E. W. L.
118. Can any readers of "The Inquirer" inform W. H. W. whether there would be ready employment for a Cambridge student in any of the larger towns of Australia, as a teacher or assistant in a school? The extent of his acquirements is a moderate acquaintance with Greek and Latin authors, and the elementary mathematics. Also, whether a slight acquaintance with French and German would be any additional advantage, and by what means such employment could be best obtained? Would such a person find any difficulty in procuring a situation as a school teacher in Germany or France, and what salary would he be likely to obtain in those countries respectively?
119. I should be much obliged if you or some of your correspondents would inform me whether a chicken is hatched from the yolk or the white of an egg.—P. C. C.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

114. *Common-place Books.*—Without for one moment considering myself to answer to the Festus-like portrait that "A Student" has drawn, I am still disposed to believe that the subjoined notes may possibly be of some service to him. Inferring from the *modus operandi* of the common-place books in general circulation, it is conjectural

that their utility in a great measure depends on the persons that use them. These books are, as all know, intimately associated with the name of Locke. From this fact a suggestive inference may be drawn. For myself, I cannot profess to advance an opinion, not having used one myself, or even seen one in use. Perhaps this is not quite correct, for the "Index Rerum" is, in its purposes, nearly allied to the *common-place books* most in vogue. Of the "Index Rerum" (the using which I am about to explain and sincerely advocate) I can speak positively and from personal experience, having myself used one for some time; and I can assure "A Student" that, when intelligently kept, it fully answers all the questions he has put with reference to such books. As to making out an "abstract or analysis" of a work, or taking notes, though each of these modes has been profitably pursued by several eminent men, I think that the "Index Rerum" unites all the advantages of both notes and analysis, together with many more; and that, too, by the expenditure of far less time and trouble; not that the "Index" forms a "royal road" to a vast store of available knowledge; no; to make a really good and useful one—one that shall be available *at all times*, and without an expensive trouble—much thought and labour must be expended. But the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing amply repay all the pains and time expended. But I must proceed to unfold the method of using it. This I will do as clearly and with as much brevity as possible. The book to contain the *index* should be of the *quarto* size, and number at least 120 pages. A few quires of paper stitched in a cover would, of course, answer the purpose; but, as one book must last the owner "his whole life," it is advisable to have two or three times as many pages, and have them strongly bound. "Index Rerum," blank as regards *contents*, are sold at 8s. 6d. each. These have the initial letters and vowels printed, and the pages ruled in blue, and are altogether of a superior description. I must suppose the student has one entirely blank, and is now about to make use of it for the first time. Opening it at the first page, he would draw an ink line parallel to, and about an inch from, the top edge, and another line perpendicular to the former, and about two inches and a half from the left-hand side of the book, and so on through every page. Turning again to the first page, he must place the first letter of the alphabet, in *capital*, in the immediate left-hand corner, and the first of the series of vowels in the centre of the first line, but in *small* or *italic* character, and so proceed to the end of the book, arranging each of the five vowels as integers to each of the capitals till the alphabet has been exhausted, thus obviously requiring 120 pages. If more pages are used, every vowel must be repeated accordingly. Then, further, supposing that "A Student" has been reading of Anabaptists (as this word is adapted for the first page), he would place it, as being a term involving the *chief idea*, in the left-hand margin of the first page, the numeral vowel, "a," being coincident with the first vowel of the word—i. e., the first that follows the initial

letter. Then would follow a brief but comprehensive definition or index of the subject connected with the indices, Anabaptist, and also a reference to the book and page containing the subject in question. This "posting" may be thus shown for example:—

A.	a
Anabaptists	account of the creed of. Smith's "Hist. of the Sects," vol. i. p. 100.

There are then three things to be considered; first, the term that shall involve the principal idea: this is sometimes somewhat difficult to the novice, as the word that will be certain to eliminate the same train of ideas in the future as it does at present must be sought and employed; second, the definition, which should evidently be as concise and cogent as possible; third, the reference. When these are properly arranged, there can be no difficulty in making an immediate reference to any subject of which you have at any time read and noted. This is, undoubtedly, the chief advantage. But there are very many collateral and scarcely less valuable advantages, and these possess the unusual rarity of being absolutely indispensable. There are these:—Attention is arrested and concentrated; hence memory is brought into useful action, and thereby strengthened; it is also aided by the adventitious circumstances of posting, &c.;—a tendency to digest and dwell on the information educed by reading is originated and assiduously fostered. Many others might be mentioned: but these will certainly form a sufficient "deposit" to induce "A Student" to commence the undertaking, and to pursue it hopefully. In connexion with the "Index Rerum" used by myself I have introduced "A Vocabulary of Synonymes and Unusual Words," the latter of which, however, I think of discontinuing; for, having lengthy, high-sounding terms at command, a tendency to make undue, and even ridiculous, use of them is cultured. I speak from a sense of the great error into which I have myself fallen. On others, perhaps, this hint may have salutary influence. Words and phrases suitable for a Johnson may not grace the thoughts or style of a student. Let me observe that it is advisable, on the ground of neatness and facility of reference, to have "paper and pencil in hand" when reading, and thus take the index, posting on the following day. In this way the intervening time allows opportunity of altering the indices and modifying the definition, if then it is deemed advisable. The "Index Rerum" was invented by Dr. Todd, and a full description of it is found in his "Student's Manual," a book of several hundred pages, very useful, and sold at a low price—1s. 6d., I believe. Any other information on this topic I should be most happy to communicate to "A Student" by post, if he should require it, and will furnish me with his address. A further explanation of the use of the integral vowels will, perhaps, be needed. They are used to "divide and conquer," and to aid all kinds of reference. The limited width of the columns of "The Inquirer" will not admit of the examples "A Student" requests; indeed, in this matter it is obvious that a reference which would be at all times recognisable by him who wrote it would not, therefore, be apprehended by any other

person. Difference of mental constitution solves this paradox. An "Index Rerum" is essentially peculiar to him who constructs it.—SENOR.

107. *The French Language.*—Having studied French, I may be, perhaps, excused for venturing to reply to the queries of D. J., and for giving the routine which I adopted. It may be well to state that the French language is now in use throughout the world; and, with the single exception of the English, it is the most polite, as well as the most *recherché*, language spoken. There is but little difficulty in acquiring the grammatical construction: the pronunciation is, however, the most important branch of the study; and your correspondent, if he wishes to distinguish himself in company by taking part in the conversation, should not only seek the assistance of a French master, but endeavour to pass some three or six months in France. The latter is, undoubtedly, the preferable plan; and he will in that short space of time acquire a much more correct knowledge, not only of the construction, but likewise of the pronunciation (which is of paramount importance), than by passing any period, however lengthened, in these realms. In France he will, of necessity, hear nothing spoken save the language of that country; and the difficulty of conversing with any person, or of making any inquiries, save in the French language, will compel him to become as familiar with it as he possibly can. He will soon overcome difficulties, and after a few days will be competent to make any of the inquiries in French which are most connected with his business there. Questions relative to the country—diet—mode of living—travelling; indeed, all queries having any reference to his physical wants, will soon become quite familiar to his tongue as well as to his ear. What Englishman is there who, although never having been in Paris, can understand the every-day phrases of—*Parlez-vous Français, monsieur? Comment vous portez-vous? Avez-vous diné? A quelle heure vous couchez-vous? J'ai faim. J'ai soif. Voulez-vous promener avec moi? Madame, votre santé.** And a hundred other questions now almost as familiar to us as English. A knowledge of this language is indispensable to any one who wishes to become acquainted with literature, history, political economy, &c., as some of the best standard works are written by the French. Such works are always sought by those who are desirous of becoming well read. I will briefly state the system which I pursued when aspiring to an acquaintance with the language. I obtained the French Grammar by M. Levison, and wrote out carefully into French the exercises as they appeared in the book. I had two lessons of one hour each per week, and I came each time prepared with a certain amount of exercises, which my tutor corrected. I also learned by heart about forty words per lesson. In addition I had a "conversation-book," in which questions on various topics, but mostly in accordance with common usage, were given in French—the answer (in English) was placed opposite. In like manner I learned these. At each lesson I had a verb

* Do you speak French, sir? How do you do? Have you dined? At what time do you go to bed? I am hungry. I am thirsty. Will you take a walk with me? &c.

conjugate, to prepare for recitation at the following lesson. Of course each verb was conjugated according to its termination, an example of which was given in "The British Key to the French Verb," by H. Levalleux, my tutor. This is one of the simplest and best works on the French language; indeed, my progress with its help was very rapid. Lastly, I read frequently (with my tutor) in French, and translated likewise into English. "Easy Lessons in French," reprinted from "The Working Man's Friend," price 6d., may be consulted by your correspondent. I have not examined them, consequently I cannot speak to their utility, or to the character of the method of instruction which they pursue; yet, if the testimony of their publisher is correct, they bid fair to be a very useful and cheap method of acquiring "La Langue Francaise." Lessons in French are also published weekly in the "London Journal." I would not, however, recommend your correspondent to seek instruction through the medium of that journal, as the character of some of the papers published therein is more calculated to cumber the mind of D. J. with vague, unreal, and visionary speculations of novel and romance than to benefit it by the study of French. The price of the works which I studied (exclusive of tuition) amounted to about 17s. No other books are required for the acquisition of the language, although a constant perusal of, and acquaintance with, French

newspaper literature is indispensable—that is, if your correspondent is desirous of preserving his knowledge of the language.—J. G. R.

108. *The German Language*.—I cannot give your correspondent "Arnaud" any information as to the methods of Ollendorf, Robertson, and Lebahn, for teaching a language, never having seen their works; but perhaps it may be of use to him to know that the German language may be learnt easily and well, without the aid of a tutor, from the following books:—1. F. Ahn's "New Practical and Easy Method of Learning the German Language," in two parts, published by Brockhaus and Avenarius, Leipzig.—2. Schmidt's "Synoptical German Grammar;" Simpkin, Marshall, and Co.—3. Stahl's "Manuel de Phrases Francaises et Allemandes;" Paris, J. H. Truchy.—4. "Dictionnaire Complet Francais-Allemand-Anglais," fourth edition; Leipzig, Brockhaus. After the first three have been gone through carefully, and the exercises written out, he will be able to follow without much difficulty the lessons, gospels, epistles, &c., as they are read in church (if he attends one) in a German bible—a plan which will accustom him to the different styles of composition—historical, poetical, devotional, and argumentative, which are all to be found there. This plan has helped me much in studying the Greek, Latin, French, and German languages.—F.L.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XVIII.

1. How can Logic be defended from the objection, that it is incapable of offering formal rules for the detection of Semi-Logical and Non-Logical Fallacies?

2. What are Semi-Logical Fallacies, and into how many classes may they be arranged?

3. Describe the characteristics of each class, and give examples.

4. What are Non-Logical Fallacies, and into how many classes may they be arranged?

5. Describe the characteristics of each class, and give examples.

6. Detect the Fallacies in the following quotations:—

1. "Many thousands in your metropolis (says Sir Thomas More) rise every morning without knowing how they are to subsist during the day; as many of them, where they are to lay their heads at night. All men, even the vicious themselves, know that wickedness leads to misery; but many, even among the good and the wise, have yet to learn that misery is almost as often the cause of wickedness.

"There are many (says Montesinos) who know this, but believe that it is not in the power of human institutions to prevent this misery. They see the effect, but regard the causes as inseparable from the condition of human nature.

"As surely as God is good (replies Sir Thomas) so surely there is no such thing as a necessary evil; for, by the religious mind, sickness, and pain, and death, are not to be accounted evils."

Southey's "Colloquies on Society."

2. "A people may be too rich, because it is the tendency of the commercial, and more especially of the manufacturing system, to collect wealth rather than to diffuse it. Where wealth is necessarily employed in any of the speculations of trade, its increase is in proportion to its amount. Great capitalists become like pikes in a fish-pond, who devour the weaker fish; and it is but too certain that the poverty of one part of the people seems to increase in the same ratio as the riches of another. There are examples of this in history. In Portugal, when the high tide of wealth flowed in from the conquests in Africa and the East, the effect of that great influx was not more visible in the augmented splendour of the court and the luxury of the higher ranks than in the distress of the people."—*Ibid.*

3. "He that imposes an oath makes it,
Not he that for convenience takes it;
Then how can any one be said
To break an oath he never made?"

"Hudibras," book ii. chap. 2.

4. "Embowelled! if thou embowel me to-day,
I'll give you leave to powder me, and eat me too,
to-morrow! 'Sblood! 'twas time to counterfeit, or
that hot termagant Scot had paid me scot and lot
too. Counterfeit? I lie, I am no counterfeit.
To die is to be a counterfeit; for he is but the
counterfeit of a man, who hath not the life of a
man: but to counterfeit dying, when a man thereby
liveth, is to be no counterfeit, but the true and
perfect image of life indeed."

Henry IV. Part I. act 5, scene 4.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. VII.

1. Construct a form like the one given, and arrange the subjoined phrases in their proper columns:—

The pilgrim's progress. The Christian's hope. Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress." The works of Newton. The servant of the king of Israel. Alliene's "Christian's Armoury." The pride of glory. The mandates of the ministry of Britain. The rights of the people of England. The laws of Moses. Burns' "Cotter's Saturday Night." The world's glory. Evening's silent breath. Duncan's Cicero's "Orations." Spirits of the mighty dead. The duties of the followers of Jesus Christ. The wealth of the merchants of Glasgow. The conqueror of Darius. Haynes' Virgil's "Æneid." A warrior's sword. Night's starry robe. Jacob's children's children. The words of the preacher. The progress of the pupils of this institution. The sceptre of the Queen of England. The son of David. Gibson's "Thompson's Seasons." Stewart's "Gray's Arithmetic." Beautie's "Virgin Tear." The sun's bright circle. Wilkie's "Blind Man's Buff." The wreck of Thebes. The speech of the hero of a hundred fights. The history of the philosophy of Europe. The law of our being. Dilworth's "Schoolmaster's Assistant." Ocean's dark expanse. The "Arabian Nights' Entertainment." Ainsworth's

"Miser's Daughter." Lovell's "Wife's Secret." The caprice of fortune. The last of the Roman kings. The apostle of the Gentiles. The rust of sloth. The educational scheme of the Church of Scotland. The currents of the straits of Gibraltar. The spirit of the religion of Christ. The frowns of fate. Chambers' "Burns' Poems." Scotland's hero. Homer's "Iliad." The love of God. The style of Cicero. Murray's edition of "The Works of Lord Byron." The brilliancy of Macaulay's writings. Cruikshank's "Bottle." Tallis's "Hume's History of England." The child of affliction. The humour of the works of our early writers of comedy. The horrors of the stormy deep. The pencil's mimic skill. Green's "Barnes' Notes." The dust of the earth. The breath of the morn. The stroke of the hammer. The reviews of Gillfillan's "Bards of the Bible." A view of the works of God. The wreck of the wooden walls of Old England. The close of a day of pleasure. Macnee's portrait of Dr. Heugh, of Glasgow.

2. Put the following prepositional possessive phrases into a terminational form:—
The children of Israel. The peace of God. The Queen of England. The homes of the million. For the sake of peace. The character of Felix. The seminary of the lady. The school of the ladies. The voice of the nation. The decision of the nations of the world. The sons of victory. The voice of conscience. The petition of the mouse. The training of the children. The rights of man.

NOUNS.

POSSESSIVE CASE.

Terminational Possessive.		Prepositional Possessive.	
Simple.	Compound.	Simple.	Compound.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—VI.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 21. Let $3x$ = the money he had (in shillings),
then x = the sum he first gave away,
and $2x$ = the money left.
 $\frac{3}{4} + 2x = \frac{3x}{2}$ = what he gave the tradesman.

By question $2x - \frac{3x}{2} + \frac{9}{2} = 15$
or $4x - 3x + 9 = 30$
 $x = 21 \therefore 3x = 63s.$ —Ans.

R. M.

Question 21 (second solution). Before receiving the change he had 15s.—4s. 6d. = 10s. 6d.
This was the remaining $\frac{1}{2}$ after his payment of $\frac{1}{2}$.
Therefore, before that he had 10s. 6d. $\times 4 = 42s.$
But this last sum was the remaining $\frac{1}{2}$ after paying $\frac{1}{2}$.
Therefore, $\frac{1}{2} : 1 :: 42 : 63s.$ the original sum.

W. H. R.

Question 22. Let $2x$ = the number of eggs;
then, as $8 : x :: 6 : \frac{6x}{8}$ or $\frac{3x}{4}$ = cost of one half the eggs;
and, as $10 : x :: 6 : \frac{6x}{10}$ or $\frac{3x}{5}$ = cost of the other half the eggs;
also, as $9 : 2x :: 6 : \frac{12x}{9}$ or $\frac{4x}{3}$ = what he sold the eggs for.

$\therefore \frac{3x}{4} + \frac{3x}{5} = \frac{4x}{3} + 15$, clearing the fractions.
 $45x + 36x = 80x + 900$
 $81x - 80x = 900$ or $x = 900$
 $\therefore 2x = 1800$ —the number of eggs, required.

G. C. H.

Proof.—As $8 : 900 :: 6 : 675$ = cost of half the eggs;
-and, as $10 : 900 :: 6 : 540$ = cost of the other half the eggs;
 1215 = cost of all the eggs;
and, as $9 : 1800 :: 6 : 1200$ = what he made of the eggs;
 $\therefore 15 = 10s.$

G. C. H.

Question 23. $x + y = 18$ (1) } find x and y .
 $x^2 + y^2 = 1674$ (2) }
 Cubing (1) and subtracting (2) we have
 $3x^2y + 3xy^2 = 4158$
 dividing by 3 and taking out the common factor,
 $\therefore xy(x+y) = 1386$
 substituting in (1)
 $\therefore 18xy = 1386$
 $\therefore xy = 77$
 $\frac{18}{18} = 77$
 Again: $x + y = 18$ (3)
 $xy = 77$ (4)
 squaring (3) as the first method for finding the
 value of $x-y$
 $x^2 + 2xy + y^2 = 324$
 subtracting four times (4) we have
 $x^2 - 2xy + y^2 = 16$
 $\therefore x - y = 4$ (5)
 $\therefore x = 11$ or 7 } Lastly, $x - y = 4$ (5)
 $\therefore y = 7$ or 11 } $x + y = 18$ (1)
 which values }
 verify the } by addition $2x = 22$
 original equa- } $\therefore x = 11$ or 7
 tion (1) & (2). }
 by subtraction $2y = 14$ or -22
 $\therefore y = 7$ or -11 .

Geometry.

Question 11. The surface of a sphere is equal
 to that of its circumscribed cylinder; *ergo*, the
 number of square miles on the surface of the
 earth = $7926^2 \times 3.1416 = 62621476 \times 3.1416 =$
 197359949.0016 ;
 and the extent of surface occupied by water
 $= 24 + 734 : 734 :: 197359949.0016 : 141862202.5071744$ square miles,
 and the extent of surface occupied by land
 $= 24 + 734 : 246 :: 197359949.0016 : 52497746.4344256$ square miles. J. J.

Mechanics.

Question 10. The work due to friction, sub-
 tracted from the work due to gravity, will give the
 work of the train; thus:—

$$100 \times 2240 \times 9 - 100 \times 8 \times 600 = 1536000$$

$$\therefore V^2 \times 100 \times 2240 = 1536000$$

$$\frac{64}{V^2} \times 100 \times 2240 = 98816000$$

$$224000V^2 = 98816000$$

$$V^2 = 441$$

$$\therefore \text{Velocity} = 21 \text{ feet.}$$

Question 11. It will be easier if we suppose
 that the train has to ascend a hill of 20 miles, and
 having a rise of 9 feet in every 600 feet, because
 the horse power of the engine must be the same,

whether conveying the train 20 miles or only 600
 feet, the same work being performed on every
 600 feet of the whole distance.

$$\text{Speed of the train in ft. pr. min.} = \frac{20 \times 5280}{(60)} = 1760$$

$$\text{Weight of the train in lb.} = 2240 \times 100 = 224000$$

$$\text{Rise of rail in 1760 ft.} = \frac{1760}{600} \times 9 = 26.4 \text{ ft.}$$

Hence it appears that the whole weight of the
 train is raised 26.4 ft. every minute in opposition
 to gravity.

$$\text{Work due to gravity per minute,} \\ = 224000 \times 26.4 = 5913600;$$

$$\text{work due to friction per minute,} \\ = 100 \times 8 \times 1760 = 1408000;$$

$$\text{and total work} = 7321600$$

$$\therefore \text{horse power} = \frac{7321600}{33000} = 221.87 \text{ nearly.}$$

J. B. H.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—VIII.*Arithmetic and Algebra.*

28. A man and his son together can do a piece
 of work in a days, which the man could do in b
 days. How long will the son be doing a similar
 piece of work by himself?

29. A ladder 40 feet long will reach the top of
 a wall over a ditch 15 feet wide. The height of
 the wall is required.

30. An irregular piece of land, containing 67 a.
 2 r. 16 p., is to be exchanged for a square piece
 of the same area. Required the side of the
 square.

31. Given, $x^2 + xy = 126$, and $xy - 2y^2 + 5 = 0$,
 to find x and y .

Geometry.

14. Required the side of the largest equilateral
 triangular pyramid which can be made out of a
 sphere of iron whose diameter is 18 inches, sup-
 posing there be no loss by the change of form.

15. Required the content of an hemispherical
 bowl, the diameter of which is 2 feet.

Mechanics.

13. A well is 100 feet deep, 17 feet in diameter,
 and 56 feet from the top to the surface of the
 water. It is required to find the time that it would
 occupy a man with a windlass to empty it, sup-
 posing that he will do 2500 units of work per
 minute, and that no water flow in during the
 process.

14. How far would the train in Ex. 10 ascend
 a second incline of 1 in 100 without stopping,
 friction being as before?

Notices of Books.

The Life of Edward Baines, late M.P. for Leeds.
 By his Son, Edward Baines, Author of the
 "History of the Cotton Manufacture." Long-
 man and Co.

[Second Notice.]

The apprenticeship of Edward Baines, the sub-
 ject of this memoir, expired in September, 1797,

and on the day following he commenced business
 on his own account. Now was the foundation-
 stone laid of his subsequent eminence. Energy,
 industry, and prudence, were his watchwords,
 and his course was one of continued progress.
 In due time he was united in marriage with an
 excellent woman, with whom, for fifty years, he
 was privileged to journey through life. Soon

came those interesting stimulants to the energies of a virtuous man—children, and he did not lack the heart and mind to answer to the increased demands. At five o'clock in the morning, and, when occasion required, still earlier, was the young printer in his office. He was above no kind of work, but might have been seen both at case and press. He kept his own books with neatness and correctness, although he had had no training in book-keeping. Not a penny went out or came in but had its record, either in his office or his domestic account-book, and hence he always knew the exact position of his affairs, a most important matter for a young tradesman. His customers and friends steadily increased, because he was to be depended upon in all that he undertook. His punctuality and method were exemplary, for he threw his soul into his work. His perseverance in business was seconded by economy at home. He began by laying down the serious resolution that he would not spend more than half his income, and to the carrying out of this he owed his future ease, not to say opulence. His habits were favourable to frugality. He always drank water, never smoked, took no snuff, and never entered tavern or theatre. While he loved good society, it has been well said that "the chief room in his terrestrial paradise was his own parlour, and of all human beings his chief companion, and best earthly friend, was Mrs. Baines." Men in Leeds were accustomed to point to him exactly as men pointed to Franklin. Old men referred the young to him as to a pattern, and it would be said, "Thou seest an example in thy neighbour Edward." At length, the *Leeds Mercury*, one of the oldest provincial newspapers, came into his hands. He purchased it with a circulation of some 700 or 800, and left it with more than as many thousands. The number of words in a copy of the *Leeds Mercury* in 1801, was 23,376, and in 1848, including the weekly supplement, it contained not fewer than 180,000. Here indeed was progress as to quantity, and we believe that it was as great with respect to quality.

Mr. Baines had now become a public man, and took an active part in the various political movements and electoral struggles of the day, but into these it is not our province to follow him. In the meantime his sons were growing up around him, full of hope and promise, for though so much engaged in business, he secured time to interest himself in their various pursuits, and to stimulate the development of their mental powers. The following is an interesting parlour scene:—

"About this time, in the intervals of the university terms, a little debating society was held weekly in Mr. Baines's parlour, of which his two sons, and their intimate friend, James Parsons, then training up for the legal profession, were the only members; whilst Mr. Baines presided over it, and judiciously summed up at the close, awarding his encouragement and advice to the juvenile orators. His eldest son and James Parsons were of the same age, and they had many years been class-fellows at the same school. Their taste for literature, law, and politics, was kindred, and the immortal speeches of Burke, Fox, Erskine, and Grattan, fed their minds, and fired their spirits. When those debates began James Parsons was not fluent, still less florid; sterling sense, correspond-

ing with his sterling honesty, chiefly marked his speeches, yet with a decided love and appreciation of high eloquence. Mr. Baines listened to the efforts of the young disputants with warm sympathy and admiration. But before this early arena was exchanged for that of active life, James Parsons, having in the interval spent some time in London, burst forth in a brilliant intellectual development: he had acquired self-reliance, had given wing to his imagination, and had discovered his capability of daring flights. His companions were now astonished at his fervid eloquence; and the kind moderator of the little society predicted future distinction. A spiritual change sanctified his talents. He devoted himself to the ministry, and has become one of the most distinguished preachers of his age. And when, thirty years later, he preached the funeral sermon of his early friend, he made touching allusion to the well-remembered scenes of youth, and, with an overflowing heart, assured the mourning family, that he 'mourned with them as with the reverence of a son, and with the affection of a brother.'

Mr. Baines had now reached the meridian of life, and had attained a position of great honour and influence. His well-known character, and his business tact, aided by his pen and press, gave him great power for the furtherance of any public movement; and that he generally employed this power for good, his promotion of mechanics' institutions, savings banks, infant schools, &c., evidences. Mr. Baines's course had been continually an upward one, but at length the time arrived for the most signal honour to be placed upon him, in his being chosen by his fellow-townsmen to represent them in parliament. The passing of the reform bill gave to Leeds the power of sending two representatives to parliament, and their choice fell upon Mr. John Marshall, and the now celebrated historian, Thomas Babington Macaulay. After two or three years of service Mr. Macaulay accepted a seat in the council of the governor-general of India, and a vacancy consequently occurred in the representation of Leeds, and Mr. Baines was thought by the majority of the electors to be a "fit and proper" person to succeed him. He consequently took his seat in parliament, and there he zealously and conscientiously discharged his duties. His principle was, "measures, not men;" and he appears to have supported those projects which commended themselves to his judgment by whatever party they were brought forward. Although he never dazzled the house with brilliant oratory, he frequently enlightened it in business-like speeches, hence he was uniformly heard with attention, and even respect. Three successive times was this worthy man returned for Leeds, and for eight long years did he thus serve his town and country. But now "his way of life" fell in "the sear, the yellow leaf," and his general health began to give way; he therefore, in 1841, felt it his duty to resign his trust; but his constituents did not allow him to retire without a handsome testimonial in "admiration of the integrity, zeal, and ability, with which he had advocated the principles of civil and religious liberty during a public life of more than forty years, and to evince their gratitude for his important services, as the faithful and indefatigable representative of the borough of Leeds in three successive parliaments."

retirement from parliament, Mr. Baines was necessarily much less active than in his earlier period, but he still discharged the duties of a magistrate for the borough, and of a Justice of the Peace for the West Riding, and even occasionally attended political movements and meetings. Like the "worn warhorse," he was in the sound of battle, and it was only the age of others that prevented him from being in the "tented field." But when the scene of conflict he might find the thought that he had represented it was his happiness to see his son, Talbot Baines, become eminent as a distinguished member of parliament as for Hull; while his second son, Edward, conducted the *Leeds Mercury*, and took an important part in the great educational reform.

draws to a close. In the winter of 1848, Mr. Baines became seriously indisposed, and made a final appearance on the bench with the judges, where his last effort was in the night, and relieving the distresses, and the poor. Alarming symptoms, which awakened the deepest concern, and his children's children, to enter "the chamber where the fate of his life," but suffice it to state that he died on August 3rd, 1848, at the age of seventy-four years and six

months. We somewhat departed from our plan in presenting so extended a notice of a man whose career is so fully and so ably recorded in the volume before us, but we do so, not merely to interest but to instruct our readers. We consider its careful perusal to stimulate to intellectual and moral advancement.

In the subject of our notice as the subject of our notice, diligently attending to his duties, carefully improving his leisure, and in we have beheld him as the man and the influential M.P.; and we find it too deeply impressed upon our minds that it was the course he pursued that led to the honours of age. Let this be remembered over, and it will suggest a salutary thought to youthful minds. "England! contemplate the up-coming of Edward Baines, and say if it is not worthy of emulation."

Our readers cannot but have been struck by the similarity between the life we have just read of the great American printer Benjamin Franklin. There were many points of resemblance in the mental character of the two men, and Mr. Baines, not inappropriately, the "Franklin of England." Nor was this resemblance fortuitous; for it comes out that from his youth he had the resolution of imitating Franklin.

The influence of this resolution cannot be estimated, but it was great; and we cannot express a better illustration of the influence of Franklin's life on Baines, so the example may be taken as a model by many of our readers.

Our remarks it would be an unpardonable omission if we did not record the deep

interest with which we have perused the volume before us, and express our opinion that it ought to find a place in the library of every mechanics' institution and mutual improvement society throughout the land.

The Life of Lord Jeffrey, with Selections from his Correspondence. By Lord Cockburn. 2 vols. Edinburgh: A. and C. Black.

This is a work that will be eagerly perused by all who are familiar with the history of our literature during the last half century. The name of Lord Jeffrey is indissolubly associated with the *Edinburgh Review*, and it was his connexion with this powerful serial that gave such interest to his life, and will give immortality to his memory. His merits as a private and professional man will be forgotten long before his influence as a writer will cease; and therefore in presenting a brief notice of his life we shall dwell more particularly upon this phase of it.

Francis Jeffrey was born in Edinburgh, October 23rd, 1773. At an early age he was sent to the High School, Edinburgh, and in his fourteenth year was removed to Glasgow College. He here enjoyed many educational advantages, and commenced the practice to which he steadily adhered, of taking full notes of all the lectures he heard—not mere transcripts of what the lecturer said—but expositions by the pupil, in his own language, of what he had meant, with discussions of the doctrines advanced. From his very boyhood he was not only a diligent but a very systematic student, and he formed very early the invaluable habit of collateral composition, not for purposes of display, but for his own culture. He has left behind him a mass of these writings, consisting of lectures, essays, translations, abridgements, speeches, criticisms, tales, poems, &c., and each one bears the impress of laborious thoughtfulness. It was thus that he laid the foundation of that character of mental acumen and literary exactness, which he afterwards so eminently sustained. Early in his sixteenth year he returned home, where he remained for the next two-and-a-half years, pursuing his studies alone, making translations, writing essays, composing speeches, &c. He next went to Oxford University, which appears then to have been surrounded with an uncongenial moral atmosphere, and he gladly removed from it, after a residence of only nine months. He was now nineteen, and his ideas about a profession began to take a definite shape. It appears that he had some thoughts of living by literature, and chiefly by poetry, but these were only the casual longing of taste, and not the prevailing views of his practical judgment. The law was plainly his destiny, and to its study he now devoted himself. He attended the Scotch law lectures of Professor Hume; those of Professor Wyld, on the civil law; and those of Professor Alexander Tytler, on history. As an illustration of his application, it may be mentioned that his "Notes taken from Tytler" occupy 436 folio pages of his writing, which would be at least double in ordinary manuscript. He now joined a celebrated debating society, known as "The Speculative," which was established in 1764, and exists at the present time. His biographer considers that "this did more for him than any other event in the whole course of his education." He was remarkable for his regular

attendance; he read several very able papers, and took a zealous part in every discussion. It may easily be supposed how exciting some of these debates must have been to Jeffrey, when it is stated that he had to struggle with Lansdowne, Brougham, Kinnaid, and Horner, who, with other worthy competitors, were all in the society at the same time. On the 16th of December, 1794, he was admitted to practise at the bar, and though it was a long time before he obtained any celebrity, yet he still pursued his studies, learning "to labour and to wait." Early in the year 1802, a small but important meeting of young men* was held in Mr. Jeffrey's "upper room," Buccleuch Place. The object was, seriously to discuss the practicability of a proposition made by Mr. Sidney Smith, for the establishment of a quarterly review, and it was acceded to by acclamation. It happened to be a stormy night, and this suggested many a joke respecting the greater storm they were about to raise. They had had little experience in writing for the press, and although Sidney Smith was the appointed editor for the first number, they evidently leant much upon Jeffrey's judgment. The first number was to have appeared in June, 1802, but it was postponed to September, and ultimately to October. Jeffrey's anticipations of success were not sanguine; in writing to a friend, he said, "Our review is still at a stand. However, I have completely abandoned the idea of taking any permanent share in it, and shall probably desert it after fulfilling my engagements, which only extend to a certain contribution for the first four numbers. *I suspect that the work itself will not have a much longer life.* I believe we shall come out in October, and have no sort of doubt of making a respectable appearance, though we may not perhaps either obtain popularity or deserve it." At last the 10th of October, 1802, arrived, and the first number of the *Edinburgh Review* made its appearance, containing seven articles by Smith, four by Horner, four by Lord Brougham, and five by Jeffrey, one of which, on the French Revolution, began the work. It is almost impossible for us to state the impression made by the new luminary. The learning of the new journal, its talent, its spirit, its writing, its independence, were all new; and it was a matter of increased surprise that a work so full of public spirit should spring up so suddenly in a remote part of the kingdom. Jeffrey gives some interesting particulars of the doings behind the scene; he says, "The first three numbers were given to the publisher—he taking the risk and defraying the charges. There was then no individual editor; but as many of us as could be got to attend, used to meet in a dingy room off Willison's printing-office, Craig's Close, where the *proofs* of our own articles were read over and remarked upon, and attempts made also to sit in judgment on the few manuscripts which were then offered by strangers. But we had seldom patience to go through with these, and it was found necessary to have a responsible editor, and the office was pressed upon me. * * * Smith was by far the most timid of the confederacy, and believed that unless our *incognito* was strictly maintained we could not go on. And this was his object for making us

hold our dark divans at Willison's office, to which he insisted on our repairing singly, and by back approaches, or by different lanes!" This was the modesty of true greatness. Jeffrey suffered not the same and occupation of the *Review* to draw him from his obscure professional practice, and at length advancement, and even popularity, came.

Jeffrey, at the age of twenty-eight, was married to an amiable lady, with whom for four years he lived in the enjoyment of the greatest domestic happiness. Her death, in 1805, appears to have given him the greatest shock he ever experienced, for he described himself as "the most miserable and disconsolate of men." But time healed the wound which death had made, and in 1813 he sought an alliance with another lady. The object of his affections had removed to America, but notwithstanding he entertained the greatest horror for watery adventures, *after making his will*, he boldly set sail, and ultimately returned with his "lady's love." He now continued with increased success his professional career, and still editing the *Review*, and writing many of the articles that enriched its pages, until in the year 1829 he was chosen "Dean of the Faculty of Advocates," when he withdrew from connexion with the *Review*, after having edited the 98th number.

When relieved from the anxious and incessant labour of the *Review*, he expected to spend the remainder of his life in comparative repose. But in December 1830, the Whigs came into office, and he, by pre-eminence, was appointed Lord Advocate. This gave an unexpected turn to his prospects and avocations; he had to go into parliament at a great pecuniary cost, for while his office realized about £3,000 a year, in eighteen months he spent about £10,000 in electioneering! If he made no great figure in parliament, he proved useful to his party in carrying their reform measures, and he was afterwards, in December, 1832, returned to the first reformed parliament for his native city—Edinburgh. But his parliamentary career was of short duration, for a vacancy occurred on the bench of the Court of Sessions, and he became a judge, and according to Scottish custom, assumed the title of Lord Jeffrey. The current of his life now flowed gently on, and though age brought with it some of its attendant infirmities, they were lessened by the ministrations of warm friendship and constant love. But ere long the end came, and he breathed his last on Saturday the 26th of January, 1850, in the 77th year of his age.

Even in this rude and hasty sketch of the career of a great man, our readers will discover much that is worthy of close and imitative study; here is another illustration of how mental discipline gives mental power, and how persevering industry, starting even from comparative obscurity, can attain to affluence and honour. Let our readers mark these things, and in them may there be realized the beautiful language of Joanna Baillie:—

"When thinking of the mighty dead,
The young from slothful couch will start,
And vow, with lifted hands outspread,
Like them to act a noble part!"

With respect to the work now before us, we need not make many remarks. With such materials before him the writer could not fail to produce an interesting book.

* Allen was 32, Smith 31, Jeffrey 29, Brown 24, Horner 24, and Brougham 23.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. IX.—ON STYLE.

"THE great art of knowledge lies in managing with skill the capacity of the Intellect, and in contriving such helps as, if they strengthen not the natural powers, may yet expose them to no unnecessary fatigue. When ideas become very complex, and, by the multiplicity of their parts, grow too unwieldy to be dealt with in the lump, we must ease the view of the mind by taking them to pieces, and setting before it the several portions separately one after another. By this leisurely survey we are enabled to take in the whole; and, if we can draw it into such an orderly combination as will naturally lead the attention, step by step, in any succeeding consideration of the same idea, we shall have it ever at command, and with a single glance of thought be able to run over all its parts."*

In our present prelection upon that power by which

"A drop of ink,
Falling, like dew, upon a thought, produces
That which makes thousands, perhaps millions, think,"

we shall endeavour as far as possible, by orderly arrangement, simplicity of treatment, and careful differentiation of one idea from another, to present such an analysis of our subject, complex as it is, clearly and concisely before you. It will then be your duty to synthesize our instructions, and, by the constant practical application of the whole of them, at once, and connectedly, while engaged in "shaping forth the lofty thought," make your words not only the distinct and transparent, but also the attractive and graceful medium of communicating your ideas.

Without further introduction we shall at present proceed to indicate the chief qualities which ought to distinguish Style, and the most important laws which ought to govern it, in so far as these relate to the structure of sentences.

A Sentence is any number of words so collocated as, by their combination, to form complete sense. Sentences are either simple or complex.

A Simple Sentence expresses one complete act of thought—consists of one distinct proposition, i. e., of a subject, copula, and predicate,† with their several necessary adjuncts.

THE SUBJECT may be—1st. Any noun or pronoun; 2nd. Two or more nouns or pronouns, so connected in sense that the predicate cannot be affirmed of each individually; 3rd. A noun or pronoun, with its adjunctive, explanatory, modifying, or dependent words; 4th. A noun or pronoun, and words placed in apposition to it; 5th. The infinitive of a verb, either singly or with its adjunctive, explanatory, modifying, or dependent words; 6th. A part of a sentence.

THE COPULA is always the verb *to be*; but this may be, and in general is, compounded with

* Duncan's "Logic," p. 37.

† See, for explanation and definition of these terms, "Art of Reasoning," No. V., vol. i., p. 139, 4th edition.

attributives to constitute a verb,* and may thus be, and in general is, employed in conjunction with the predicate.

THE PREDICATE, when not compounded with the copula, may be—1st. A noun or pronoun singly, or with adjuncts; 2nd. An adjective or present participle, singly or with adjuncts; 3rd. The infinitive of a verb, singly or with dependent words; 4th. A part of a sentence. When compounded with the copula, it may be—1st. Any intransitive verb or verb passive, singly or with adjuncts; 2nd. Any transitive verb, with its object and adjuncts.

Adjuncts consist of nouns, adjectives, pronouns, adverbs, and prepositions, with their governed objects.

The object of a transitive verb may be—1st. A noun or a pronoun singly, or modified by other words; 2nd. The infinitive of a verb, singly or with its dependencies; 3rd. A part of a sentence.

A Complex Sentence consists of two or more simple sentences, so combined as to make but one complete proposition, i. e., to express one complete act of thought regarding the thing spoken of.

Those simple sentences which unitedly form a complex sentence are called clauses. Clauses are either primary or secondary.

A primary clause, in general, expresses a complete idea, even when separated from the other parts of a sentence. It contains the leading affirmation in the sentence.

A secondary clause is a simple sentence, or part of a sentence, connected more or less with the primary clause, and is used to modify and explain it; it cannot, therefore, stand by itself, but must be joined to a primary clause.

A complex sentence must always contain one primary clause; it may, and frequently does, contain more clauses, which are independent of each other, and are called *co-ordinate*.

Clauses which are dependent on other clauses are called *subordinate*.

Primary clauses are always *co-ordinate*.

Secondary clauses are always *subordinate* to primary clauses, although they may be *co-ordinate* with one another.

Secondary clauses may also be subordinate to each other.

Primary clauses receive names according to the nature of their connexion with each other.

Primary clauses having the relation of equality are denominated *equivalents*; those which express opposition or contrast are called *antithetics* or *adversatives*; the former are introduced by *and*, *both*; *also*, *either*; *or*, *neither*; *nor*, &c.; the latter by *but*, *however*, *although*, *yet*, &c.

Secondary clauses are named—1st, from the nature of their connexion with primary clauses; 2nd, from the names of the parts of speech by which they are introduced.

Conditional clauses are those which imply condition or contingency; they in general commence with the conjunctions *if*, *unless*, *except*, &c.

Casual clauses contain a reason, and are introduced by such conjunctions as *for*, *because*, *since*, &c.

Inferential or consequent clauses denote an effect or consequence; *that*, *therefore*, *wherefore*, &c., introduce such clauses.

When comparison is expressed, as by *than*, *as*, &c., the clause is called *comparative*.

A concessive clause denotes yielding, or apparent yielding, or concession: *though*, *although*, &c.. are in general the introductive conjunctions.

Explanatory clauses may be introduced by a noun, adjective, pronoun, participle, adverb, or preposition.

When a noun in the nominative independent begins a sentence, it is called an *absolute* or *independent* clause.

When a noun or pronoun is placed in apposition to a preceding word or clause, the clause which contains it is called *appositive*.

A parenthetical clause is one enclosed in parentheses.

* See "Rhetoric," No. IV., p. 125.

Secondary clauses are also divided into adjective, relative, participial, and conjunctive, according as they are introduced by an adjective, relative, participle, or conjunction.

The following aphorisms may be found serviceable in guarding against errors in Style, or in giving information to such as are only beginning to engage in composition, viz.:—

- 1st. Be particularly careful in studying the subject on which you intend to speak, in order that you may possess a full and complete knowledge of it.
- 2nd. In the choice of words, endeavour to unite *reputable*, *national*, and *present* usage.
- 3rd. Give each word in a sentence its due grammatical or rhetorical relation.
- 4th. Avoid awkwardness or inelegance of expression, whether it violates the syntactical rules or not.
- 5th. Words necessary to the sense, harmony, or beauty of a sentence should never be omitted.
- 6th. Words which are unnecessary to the sense, or destructive of the harmony and beauty of a sentence, ought to be elided or amended.
- 7th. Carefully abstain from using the same word in the same sentence too frequently; especially avoid using the same word in different significations.
- 8th. Unnecessary transitions from one person or subject to another, as well as ambiguity in the syntactical relations of words, ought sedulously to be guarded against.
- 9th. Topics having little or no necessary connexion with each other, or that are capable of being considered in separate sentences, ought seldom, if ever, to be discussed in one sentence.
- 10th. When expressions are in all other respects equal, those which are most harmonious and pleasing ought to be preferred.
- 11th. When, of two words or phrases, the one is univocal and the other equivocal, the former should be chosen.
- 12th. Obsolete, obsolescent, harsh, ambiguous, quaint, low, technical, barbarously-coined, and solecistical words or phrases are reprehensible.
- 13th. Vulgar phraseology, or the language of low life, ought in serious composition to be eschewed.
- 14th. Easy, idiomatic, and colloquial diction is preferable to that which is heavy, poetic, and overlaboured.
- 15th. The one idea which we wish to express in a sentence ought to be gradually unfolded, satisfactorily dealt with, carefully elaborated, and the sentence ought to be free from anything that can retard or embarrass the intellect in its endeavours to comprehend it.
- 16th. The *protasis*, i. e., the former or forthstretching portion, ought always to excite expectation; while the *apodosis*, i. e., the latter or recurring portion, ought always to gratify it.
- 17th. Correspondence of purpose, quality, cause, effect, &c., should be expressed by correspondence of construction; and contrariety of purpose, property, origin, result, &c., should be expressed by an antithetical construction.
- 18th. Sentences ought not to be extended to a tiresome or fatiguing length by the mention of too many circumstances or objects, even though they be closely connected with

the principal clause or clauses; a little consideration will show how they may be arranged in different sentences.

19th. We ought to conclude as few sentences as possible with an adverb, a preposition, or any insignificant or unimportant phrase.

20th. A judicious intermixture of long and short words, phrases, clauses, and sentences, gives a pleasing variety, grace, and vivacity to style.

21st. Consecutive sentences ought, in general, not only to vary in length, but also, wherever it can be accomplished with due regard to perspicuity and the laws of speech, in syntactical arrangement.

22nd. Words having the same or nearly the same sound in their final syllables, ought as seldom as possible to be allowed to occupy consecutive situations in the same sentence or member of a sentence.

23rd. Consistency in the use of the numbers of nouns and pronouns, the moods and tenses of verbs, accuracy in the use of modifying inflexions, concord among the members of sentences, correspondence among correlative terms or phrases, and a regularly coherent dependency of structure and signification, ought to be carefully preserved.

24th. The collocation of our words should never be such as to present to the mind an inverted order of things, or a violation of the principles of reason and propriety.

25th. Words which signify ideas that are closely related to each other ought to be closely connected by collocation; in short, the order of our words should correspond with the order of our ideas.

26th. Words ought never to be placed in such positions with regard to each other as to give occasion to misapprehension; in such cases the juxta-position should be altered.

27th. Unintelligible or inconsistent words, and words or phrases not peculiarly adapted to the lucid and accurate expression of the meaning intended, must be carefully avoided.

28th. Everything which has even the semblance of tumidity, jejeuneness, puerility, affectation, stiffness, or incoherence, must be regarded as reprehensible.

The structure of sentences may either be grammatical or rhetorical: the former is the order in which words are placed in ordinary and unimpassioned speaking or writing; the latter is that method of collocating words, when not only thought, but also emotion and passion require to be represented in our speech or writing.

The chief laws relative to the position of words in grammatical structure are the following, viz.:—

1st. The subject generally precedes the verb.

The nominative may, however, be placed after the verb—(a) when the verb is neuter; (b) when the sentence is interrogative or imperative; (c) when the sentence begins with *here, there, thither, &c.*

2nd. The articles are generally placed immediately before the noun whose signification they define.

When, however, the noun is qualified by an adjective, the article precedes the adjective; but the definite article (*the*) is placed between the noun and the adjective *all*; the indefinite article (*a*) is put between the noun and the adjectives *many* and *such*, as well as between the noun and such adjectives as are preceded by *as, so, too, how, &c.*

3rd. Adjectives are usually put before the nouns which they qualify.

But adjectives follow nouns under the following conditions, viz.—(a) when some circumstance depends on the adjective; (b) when the adjective expresses dimension; (c) when it expresses the effect of a transitive verb; (d) occasionally when several adjectives belong to one noun; (e) when the adjective is employed as a title.

4th. Adjectives often follow substantive verbs, or past participles.

5th. Pronouns are placed inversely, i.e., the third precedes the second, and the second the first; and relatives follow their antecedents.

6th. Transitive verbs are generally placed before the words which they govern.

7th. The infinitive mood follows the noun, adjective, or verb, which governs it.

8th. Adverbs usually precede the adjectives, and succeed the verbs which they qualify; but if the verb have an auxiliary, the adverb may be placed between it and the verb.

Adverbs sometimes follow the objects of active verbs.

9th. Prepositions, in general, immediately precede the words which they govern.

10th. Conjunctions come between the words, phrases, or clauses which they connect.

The chief law regarding rhetorical structure is, place the most important words and phrases in those positions in which they will acquire the greatest prominence, and be most impressive.

To effect this, the following, among other variations of the ordinary grammatical structure are allowable, viz.:—

1st. The subjective may be placed after the verb.

2nd. The adjective, if emphatic, may be placed first in the sentence.

3rd. A transitive verb may be stationed after the nouns or pronouns which it governs.

4th. The infinitive mood may occasionally precede the verb which governs it.

5th. Adverbs, when very important, may be placed at the beginning of a sentence.

6th. Conjunctions necessary in ordinary grammatical structure may sometimes be omitted.

7th. When we are desirous of sustaining the attention, exciting the curiosity, as well as giving weight to the sentiments expressed, the most important words may be employed to close the sentence.

We have been thus minute—perhaps some may think tediously and minutely so—in opposition to a maxim too rashly adopted by Pope, from the Duke of Buckingham, viz.—

“Nature’s chief master-piece is writing well;”

but which he himself finds it necessary, in another part of the “Essay on Criticism” to contradict, saying—

“True ease in writing comes from art, not chance,
As those move easiliest who have learnt to dance;”

because we believe in the importance of trifles. We consider that nothing which hinders our sentiments from being properly appreciated, and gaining acceptance from those whom we address, is unworthy of notice, or undeserving of hard study to acquire the power of avoiding it. Seldom do we rightly estimate the value of those seemingly needless *minutiae* which appear so difficult to remember, and so hard to practise. But did we note rigorously how many of those who displease us, while hearing or reading them, from the inobservance

of little and apparently insignificant points—did we accurately observe how fastidious, nice, and critical we are ourselves inclined to be, and make up our minds to the belief that an equal, if not a greater degree of watchfulness and attention is being exercised upon ourselves, we would then most likely be impressed with the fact that “little things” are not so unimportant as we had imagined. Besides, a careful director ought to regard it as a duty to take every means to perfect his students in the minutest parts of their studies; for he will always be the most skilful person who is most sensitively alive to the slightest imperfections. We believe that, so far as regards Style, nature furnishes us with *all* the elements of which the art consists, but that these elements are not found completely and perfectly incarnated, so to speak, in any one object in nature. The mind culls from each the most pleasing qualities—those which are best fitted for the purpose in view; it observes, selects, judges, discriminates, systematizes, and legislates—it observes the individual qualities which objects display—selects those which appear admirable, judges of their propriety or impropriety—discriminates between the really attractive and the meretricious—systematizes or arranges these in the order of their relative importance—fuses and harmonizes them together, then gives these decisions forth as laws to be hereafter observed by all those who aim at perfection. Thus is Art called into being; thus are her laws formed; not arbitrarily and *à priori*, but by the strictest inductions regarding the pleasing, the useful, and the ideal. There are, indeed, some

“—— Nameless graces which no art can teach,
And which a master's hand alone can reach;”

but that, surely, is no reason why we ought not to pursue our researches as far as we can. It is not alone beauty of language, minute accuracy in its use, fine thoughts, perfect syntax, the glow of feeling, or the vivid expressiveness of diction, “but the joint force and full result of all,” that constitutes a good and pleasing style.

We have not composed this paper as it is without a purpose. We have noticed that, when many minute things are talked of in consecutive sentences and paragraphs, the individual instructions on each point which it contains do not *stand out* with full and just prominence before the mind, hence the aphoristic and disjointed style of the present article. We hope our purpose may be fulfilled, and that the distinctness thus artificially given to these remarks may aid in producing that distinctness in the mind which the importance of the trifles herein brought to view require, and that our students may be enabled to go on with us from perfection to perfection.

Philosophy.

IS WOMAN MENTALLY INFERIOR TO MAN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to ^{argue} one. We have now come to what will be
Freely, according to conscience, above all other ^{chronicled in the page of history as an event-}
liberties.” ^{MILTON.} ful and ever-memorable era, not only in the
THE present age is essentially a progressive political, historical, and philosophical, but

also in the social life of that bright "little spot"—so dear to all English hearts—our island home.

Free intercourse, free thought, and free action, are the mottoes inscribed on every heart. "Onward!" is the watchword:—

"The people's cry is—'Onward!'
The loud voice of their will,
Strung by a proud intelligence,
Is 'Onward—onward still!'"

The creed of the new age has been ably enunciated by Lamartine. To quote his eloquent exposition,—"*Its faith is reason; words are its organs; the press its apostle.*" Man has higher and nobler aims—more fervent aspirations—a deeper and stronger faith in PROGRESSION, than to believe that

"Tis better to stand still,
For to meddle is to mar;
Change is rash, and ever was so;—
We are happy as we are."

In the midst of this stirring spirit—this "world's awakening to industry"—this onward march of the mind, can we wonder that some questions which have long remained buried in that "night of lethargy and idleness, now rapidly passing away,"—others, which have never yet had a "clear field" and "fair play," should arise, and assume an importance never before practically felt? We have hailed, then, with pleasure and satisfaction, the *British Controversialist*, as providing the arena whereon mind may battle with mind, where the darling opinions and pet theories of man may be boldly confronted, and controversy carried on in that calm, yet forcible manner, so essential to the uprooting of error, and the establishing of truth.

The present question is one of those which has long been enwrapped in the mantle of prejudice—long remained ensconced in the almost impenetrable fastnesses of that rock, which, guarded with especial care and fondness by man, has been almost inaccessible to truth. It would have been our province to have torn from this question the mantle in which it had been so long enveloped—to have stormed the citadel in which it had so long remained entombed, covered with the "accumulated dust of ages;" but this, we think, has already been fully done by C. W., Jun., and by the talented and clever writer of the "Introductory Article." We shall, therefore, confine ourselves principally to a strictly impartial consideration of the arguments and assumptions adduced by some of our

opponents in support of the position they have taken in this interesting debate.

We propose first, then, to notice the arguments and assumptions of the writer who has taken for his motto the words, "Woman, beauty is thy power." Now, believing, as we most assuredly do, that there is power in the beauty of woman, and not altogether disregarding the possession of that power in man, we yet cannot agree with the *apparently* cherished opinion of "Senoj," that the power of woman lies wholly in her *beauty*; or, more than this, that woman is, as he would have it, mentally inferior to man. "Senoj," evidently intending to make his position impregnable, boldly tells us that "our conclusions must be based on the Baconian view of superiority being taken as the standard by which the case is to be tested;" or, in other words, the "fruits of the mind, as the fruits of all things else, are the only means of rational decision respecting the source of those fruits." So far the fabric built up by our friend is good; but we cannot say the same of the after-structure; and, combating "Senoj" on his own ground—fully and freely allowing that the "fruits of the mind are the only rational means of decision respecting the source of those fruits"—we yet think we shall be able to show that our friend has not made out a "clear and satisfactory case," and that he has taken an extremely one-sided view of the question. It needs not many words to substantiate this assertion; and we would not insult our readers by supposing that they have not already perceived this as well as ourselves; but we would ask their attention to the following part of "Senoj's" article, which we think fully corroborates our position. After deliberately making the assertion that "there is no way of estimating the superiority of one mind over another but that of concisely accounting for the labour which it performs, the effects, the 'fruits,' which it produces," "Senoj" maintains that "the point of controversy, then, is—Has woman or man wrought the greatest mental achievements? Are the chief literary productions, mechanical inventions, and scientific discoveries, to be, by the voice of the majority, awarded to woman?" Here, then, we say, is the proof of our assertion:—Does not the mind bear other fruits than those which may be classed under the name of 'literary productions,' "mechanical inventions,"

or "scientific discoveries?" Bold, we think, is the man who answers in the negative. "Senoj" has laid down a standard; but has he come up to that standard? Has he placed the "effects," the "fruits" of the two minds, side by side? Has he upheld these to our gaze in all their variety of action—dispassionately contrasted the one with the other, and pronounced judgment accordingly? We think not. On the contrary, seeming wholly to forget the standard set up by himself, he tells us that the "chief literary productions, mechanical inventions, and scientific discoveries, being by the voice of majority awarded to man," *he* must necessarily be superior to woman. Because woman excels not equally with man in these, she has a mind of an inferior order! Reader, what think you of this? Is it an enlarged and magnanimous view of the question? Is it placing the question on those grounds which harmonize the nearest with the principles of reason and justice? Our friend seems to have forgot entirely that (to use the words of C. W., Jun.) "diversity of power is no proof of inferiority;" and, inscribing on his banner "literary productions," "mechanical inventions," "scientific discoveries," sums up with the magnanimous declaration that, "in reference to mental superiority, there cannot, surely, be matter for contest and doubt." We have been thus particular in noting this part of our friend's argument, as it is generally the stronghold wherein the upholders of man's mental superiority ensconce themselves, vaunting the impregnability of their position. In their province (says "Senoj") the "power of woman's mind is peculiarly adapted for elimination." Perhaps it is; and, if we are not mistaken, the power of man's mind, in his province, is as peculiarly adapted for elimination as that of woman. Because we have a Shakspeare and a Milton, whom man seems as little likely to equal as woman, we are not, therefore, to conclude that the mind of man is not adapted for elimination. No! Passing onwards we meet with the following:—"It might be urged that nature, intending woman for a sphere diametrically opposite to that of man, formed her with a mind adapted for that sphere." We believe this to be the case; we ourselves urge it as true; and we challenge "Senoj," or any other detractor of woman's mental excellence, to

show us different; and further than this we urge—ay, and urge it as a fact incontestable, and one which will come unscathed from the severest test—that there is nothing in the whole range of speculative inquiry—of historical or philosophical investigation—which, brought to bear on this question, would lead any unprejudiced and earnest inquirer after truth to the conclusion that the all-wise and all-merciful Creator, in ordaining that woman should walk in a sphere essentially different to that of man, did at the same time intend this as a proof of inferiority of mind, or that she was to be considered in any way an inferior being. Our opponent next brings a very serious charge against woman; but one, happily, which is as unfounded as it is serious. After admitting that woman does possess sometimes (what he calls) an inordinate share of mental power, he says, that "when this power is possessed by woman we generally find it abused." However near or dear this creed may be to thy heart, "Senoj," do not, we entreat thee, seek to defend it, or to blacken woman's character, by first allowing her mental power, then asserting that it is generally abused. Generous man! We would have thee to go with us for a moment to those records of female talent which are furnished not only by this country, but by almost every other on the surface of the globe—to those whose names and talents are now shedding their lustre "o'er the intellectual world"—and how many, thinkest thou, will be found to have abused that mental power, which ought to prove a blessing rather than a curse? We have a Johanna Baillic and a Mrs. Browning, a Mrs. Rowe and a Miss Landon, a Mrs. Barbauld and a Mrs. Grant, a Mrs. Tighe and a Mrs. Radcliffe, a Miss Cook and a Miss Martineau, who, if she had written nothing more than her "Household Education," would have been entitled to the esteem of mankind; we have "a Catherine Philips, exhibiting the deceitfulness of pleasure; a Mary Chandler, proclaiming the blessings of temperance; a Lady Carew, enjoining the duty of forgiveness; an Amelia Opie, teaching the sinfulness of war; a Mary Howitt, sweetly sympathizing with the wants and sufferings of the poor," and hundreds of other familiar names, "bright and lasting;" and in all we shall find "a cheerful love for humanity, a noble trust in virtue, and a hoping, clinging,

earnest piety." So much, then, for our opponent's assertion of woman's abuse of mental power. Believing, with him, that "because such heroines as Grace Darling and Catherine of Russia have honoured the world, we must not presume that their sex are to fill the offices in which they shone," we yet think that these, and other names we could mention, show that, when necessity calls for it, woman can show courage equal, if not superior, to man, and that she is possessed of mental qualities which, when they have been called into action, have proved that she is not

" Such stuff
As dreams are made of,"

but equal, if not superior in many respects, to man.

Our next opponent's arguments, we fear, will find us very little employment; for, with the exception of one or two particulars, which will be noticed in order, we think his article would have read very well as a negative answer to the question before us. Passing over his introductory remarks, we come to the following remarkable argument in favour of man's mental superiority,—that woman, "by the extraordinary means of her creation, is entirely precluded from assuming a position of superiority over, or independence of, man, for she was actually taken from him, and must be considered a part of himself, and therefore inferior to him." What strange arguments are brushed up to defend a position which is "swiftly tottering to its fall;" a position which, ages ago, man himself, if he had not been blinded by pride, prejudice, and envy, would have condemned, and, when fully alive to the folly of an opposite course, would have been eager "to have shared with woman the throne of intellect"—to have given her free scope for the exercise of her mind—the cultivation and development of those noble intellectual faculties bestowed upon her; and in so doing would have given to her those rights which are her due, and from which she has been so long enviously withheld. But to our opponent's argument—"woman, by the extraordinary means of her creation, inferior to man." We cannot see any connexion between the "extraordinary means of woman's creation" and the inferiority or superiority of her mentality. Our readers, we feel assured, will instantly perceive the fallacy of this

mode of argumentation: let us follow it up, and see where it will lead us. Was not man's creation as extraordinary—yea, more so—than that of woman? Man was created from the "dust of the earth;" woman from man; and that man in the "image and likeness of God" himself. Our inference, then, must be, reasoning according to the mode of our friend "Vir," that man is inferior to woman, rather than woman inferior to man. Again, if we allow that woman is inferior to man, being taken from him, we must (pursuing the same course of reasoning) allow that man is inferior to the "dust of the earth," being taken from *it*. The one inference is as reasonable as the other. Passing, then, from this *stronghold* of our opponent "Vir," we are pleased to meet with the following assertions, which we think fully corroborate the truthfulness of our position. First, then, "Vir" allows that "woman, in her sphere, may fairly be presumed to possess ability and tact superior to man;" that the "mental superiority of man or woman cannot be ascertained from a partial or a one-sided view;" that "some women may possess capacity for learning and acquiring knowledge far superior to many men, and, had they the same advantages, might even surpass the opposite sex in many branches of literature. Poetically (our friend goes on to say) woman is often found to excel; in the finer feelings and sentiments of the mind she may, perhaps, be said to bear the laurels." What more, we ask, is needed to convince even the most prejudiced and dogmatic mind that woman is *not* inferior to man? But, following "Vir," we next stumble against his comprehensive summary, that "all these attributes, though beautiful and valuable, do not constitute mental superiority *in the sense in which we are bound to understand those terms*." If, in discussing this subject, we are all to have our own separate and distinct way of *understanding the terms superiority and inferiority*, we had better never have taken the pen in hand, for we shall never be able to arrive at a correct and satisfactory conclusion. "It is," says "Vir," "in the great powers of ruling, sound judgment, and discretion, that superiority of mind is to be sought." Now, we think we may, without much endangering our position, admit that, in the great powers of ruling, sound judgment, and, perhaps, dis-

cretion, man is superior to woman; but that woman, in consequence of not possessing these powers in equal development with man, is inferior to him, we emphatically deny; in fact, the possession of those "finer feelings and sentiments," which "Vir" himself has allowed to woman, tends very far to prove her equality with man; for we believe, with T. F. O., that the possession of these "superior moral sentiments and social feelings fit her in an especial manner for the highest of human duties—the exercise of moral influence or control over the passions of others." What man lacketh, woman possesseth; and what is wanting in woman, man can supply.

Our further remarks must, necessarily, be brief. Feeling assured, then, that our readers will attach the proper value to the arguments and assumptions put forth by our two opponents, "Senoj" and "Vir," we shall proceed to unfold those reasons which have induced us, after a careful consideration of the subject in all its bearings, to affirm that woman is *not* mentally inferior to man. That woman plays an important and essential part in society will not for a moment be questioned, even by her most invidious detractors; but that she is not equal to man in the exercise of those faculties which belong peculiarly to his sphere—that to her cannot be awarded the palm of superiority in those great mental achievements which require severe and prolonged thought—in the "great powers of ruling, mechanical invention, or scientific discoveries," we fully and freely admit; and yet even in literature, in "mental achievements," woman has won for herself a well-deserved fame; so high an eminence has she attained that we are left almost in doubt whether, if she enjoyed the same advantages as man, she would not surpass him in many of those branches of literature which he claims as peculiarly his own. It is true, we have no female Shakspeare or Milton; but what other great poets are there with whom we have not poetesses to compare? Have we not a Byron in Miss Landon, a Cowper in the Countess of Winchilsea, a Spenser in Mrs. Tighe, a Goldsmith in Mrs. Grant, a Johnson in Hannah More, a Wycherly in Mrs. Centlivre, a Collins in Mrs. Radcliffe, a Coleridge in Mrs. Browning, a Wordsworth in Mary Howitt, a Scott (and more) in Joanna Baillie? Or if it still be maintained that

some, or even all, of these ladies fail to reach the full height of the poets they resemble, where is to be found the dogmatist daring enough to say that the difference is sufficiently great to be set up as a mark of distinction between the one sex and the other? Woman mentally inferior to man? Is it not degrading to Englishmen—is it not a blot on the age in which we live—that so absurd a belief should be held by any? That our mothers, wives, sisters—that one-half of the human race—should be deemed to be endowed with an inferior kind or degree of intelligence to that which animates the remaining portion of the species, is a theory so monstrous that we can only wonder at even a savage age believing it. The mental constitutions of the two sexes are different; the spheres in which they move are essentially distinct (not antagonistic); but that this implies inferiority either in one or the other we cannot admit. "Man rules the mind of the world—woman its heart." Our opponents themselves have allowed that in many points woman is superior to man; and they have asserted that in others man is superior to woman. What, then, are we to infer from this? Obviously that what the one lacketh the other possesseth; that woman is in *no* way inferior to man; and that the "perfect character is only formed by the union of the two incomplete parts." The secret of man's power lies not only in the masculine formation of his intellect, but also in that of his body. Man is formed to command, to rule to exercise a palpable and wide-spread influence; to him "belongs the sway of force;" he more especially distinguishes himself in the senate, on the platform, in commercial and scientific pursuits, in the pulpit, and on the battle-field. The world looks on and admires the actions of man; the loud trumpet of fame is ever ready to sound for him whilst woman, putting forth her virtues, her talents, and attractions chiefly in the social circle, lives, we may say, "unnoticed and unknown" by the world around her. Woman sways the all-powerful sceptre of influence. "Her province is to soften, round off, smooth down, the irregularities of life and conduct—to act (gently but unceasingly) upon the swiftly-beating heart of the world, soothing it into calmness when violent, mildly stimulating it into action when torpid, and refining, purifying, and exalting its passions and a

pirations when excited. Home is her empire, and affection her sceptre. It is hers to endure, to watch, to suggest, to inspire, to re-invigorate, to sustain. It is hers to colour, and perfume, and beautify the way of life—to adorn existence and make it musical. It is hers to resist and counteract the deadening influences of the world. Man goes forth to his labour day after day; he performs, day after day, the same cramping round of duties; it is woman's office to preserve him from becoming a mere piece of animated, but spiritless mechanism. He comes in contact with villainy and selfishness; it is hers to keep alive in his bosom the generous flame of virtue. He falls in with the degraded and deceiving; it is hers to prevent their evil influence upon him, and to keep up a proper estimate of humanity. It is hers, when the world has disgusted him with its dullness, to restore him by the tranquil delights of home. It is hers, when misfortune overtakes him, to cheer him with hope, and support his sinking spirits. It is hers to preserve in their purity the moral sentiments of his nature. It is hers, while intellectual knowledge makes him wise, by moral persuasion to render him good. It is hers at all seasons to inspire him with a purifying love for the beautiful, and to anchor his soul firmly in the everlasting rock of religion." We have to thank Frederick

Rowton, author of the "Female Poets of Great Britain," for the above beautiful and eloquent lines on woman; and we would advise the stern dogmatist—the believer in woman's mental inferiority—to turn to the pages of that book, where he will see a "comprehensive and well-arranged gallery of mental female loveliness—every picture ranged with artistic skill in its proper light;" and we think we are not asserting too much when we say that he will be compelled to admit that he no longer disbelieves.

Having shown that our position is based on those principles which time itself cannot shake—i. e., Truth, Justice, and Right—we would conclude, earnestly impressing on every mind the importance of allowing to woman those rights from which she has long been withheld, and in so doing we shall reap our own reward in its "richest fulness," and be carrying out in practice what is expressed in the signification of those noble, yet much-abused words, "LIBERTY, EQUALITY, and FRATERNITY." Then,

"Hurrah for the mind-march!—the music
That stirs among nations of brave;
That wakes them to war by the spirit,
And sets up the soul o'er the glaive!
That sheaths the old sword of the tyrant
To revel in peace with the free,
And calls upon truth as its syren
To warble in liberty's tree!"

J. N. C.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Neither reason nor Christianity invites woman to the professor's chair, nor conducts her to the pulpit, nor makes her welcome to the pulpit, nor admits her to the place of ordinary magistracy.

They forbid us to hear her gentle voice in the popular assembly, and do not even suffer her to speak in the church of God."—REV. J. A. JAMES.

"For the same reason they seldom succeed in long works, even on the subjects best suited to their genius, their natural training rendering them equally averse to long doubt and long labour."—LORD JEFFREY.

"Generally speaking, enlarged views of politics and science—the bold flight of metaphysics—the sublimer conceptions of poetry, which, bursting every shackle, soar in the boundless region of thought and imagination—are not in the province of woman."—MONOD.

THE question to be debated and decided is this—and preceding writers have forgotten it—not whether woman is *morally* inferior or superior to man, but whether she is *mentally* co-equal. Morality—and that is not the question—refers to the ethics, or the

doctrine of the duties of life; mentality is not a practical or external property, but is rather that faculty which thinks, studies, and meditates.

It has been urged, and with good reason, that judgments deduced from appearances are apt to be erroneous. To a certain extent this may be true; but it remains to be shown that, without other means by which to obtain correct opinions, all confidence in this precept is misplaced. There are but few persons who (while admitting the truth of that maxim) are not guilty of frequently ignoring it. There are, then, but two inferences to be drawn; viz., that such persons are grossly inconsistent; or that, while correct in its general acceptance, the application of the moral is unreasonable, unless there be certain infallible indications by which we are enabled to arrive at precise facts. And an

our whole assures us that there is no rule without an exception.

These remarks are intended to show, in order to determine the subject under discussion satisfactorily, the necessity, in the absence of more direct evidence, of an appeal to the mental productions of the female sex. Although we may have other means of illustrating or confirming our decision, this is the most simple, will admit of less misapprehension, and be considered, even by our female friends, as the best for arriving at legitimate conclusions.

It must be admitted that but few of the productions of the female sex are really substantial works; that is, they are confined to the fictitious class of literature. An appeal to any London daily newspaper will confirm this assertion; and I will venture to assert that five-sixths of the works advertised or reviewed will be of the class alluded to.

Now, the question may be asked, Why do you object to novels, &c.? is not there much benefit to be received from their perusal, and do they not often contain some useful moral? I reply in the affirmative; but I will put another query, and ask if there is none that can confer greater benefit on the reader than such a class of works as this? Need I refer to "Eliza Cook's Journal" and Mary Howitt's works as significant illustration of the truth of my position? There we have talent devoted to the best of purposes, and attended with less harm, and fear of alienating the moral faculties, than is consequent upon a perusal of novels; at the same time there is sound, elevating advice given to purify the mind, to ennoble the heart, and to render us better adapted for our several duties and stations in life. It should be the aim of all writers to depend as little as possible on the speculative and visionary, to avoid, as far as in them lies, any approach to the uncertain and phantom-like, and to shun all topics which are calculated to fill the mind with unreal and sophisticated notions. Cannot this be better attained than through the medium of novels? and cannot subjects be sought which will convey pleasant, though valuable, instruction, without involving the necessity of a perusal of some hundreds of pages in order to obtain it?

In making these strictures, let it be remembered that I make no reference to the character of talent displayed in the compo-

sition of such works; I pronounce no opinion on the genius displayed in the compilation of novels; I refer only to their particular constitution and subject matter.

The fact that a vast proportion of the productions of women are of the class of the novel and romantic, is certainly an indication of a prominent feature in their mental character, and hence the difference between the sexes. Whilst, with some honourable exceptions, the writings of our female friends are fictitious or imaginary, the productions of the male sex are confined to no class whatever, but are distributed over every department of literature—science, art, education, political economy, &c. &c. From this simple but veritable fact an inference may be manifestly drawn, which appears to my humble judgment to be correct, viz., that the mental character of man is more universal in its application, and hence a corresponding amount of mental power, of depth, concentrativeness, and continuity of thought is the necessary and indispensable accompaniment. If we survey the vast number of books which have been left as a legacy to future ages—if we carefully examine their divisions and subdivisions, the various branches to which they belong, the labour required for their compilation, and the intensity of thought which has been evoked, we cannot, I think, but conclude that the mental and intellectual capacity of man is superior to that of woman.

To mention the honoured names of those who have immortalized their names by their works would be useless. A little reflection, however, would immediately suggest the old Grecian and Roman philosophers, poets, historians, legislators, and senators, as well as those of our own country. We should be reminded of Lycurgus, Solon, Homer, Socrates, Plato—of Shakspeare, Chaucer, Milton, Locke, Luther, Newton, Byron, Marvel, Russell, Bacon, Cowper; and, of our own day, Macaulay, Carlyle, Foster, Smith, Emerson, Mackintosh, Washington Irving, Jeffrey, &c. Let it not be thought, however, that I am so partial to the male as to forget the writers of the "softer and fairer sex." It is with no small gratification that I add those of Queen Elizabeth, Mrs. Hemans, Fry, More, Hoffland, Barbauld; Mesdames De Staël, Somerville, Marcet; Miss Martineau, Eliza Cook, Mary Howitt, Madame de Seveigné,

Miss Edgeworth, &c. &c. And be it said that in enumerating these names there is the consolatory fact that the most of them are associated with works which, while of no common or mediocre character, are valuable, instructive, interesting, and abounding with fact and data profitable to all readers; herein consists their value and intrinsic worth—that such works may safely be placed in the hands of all readers and of all classes, be they young or old, grave or gay—good, solid, substantial truth is inculcated in them—it is with reverence, therefore, that I mention these authoresses; for we are all deeply indebted to them.

But I refer to the character of the subjects mostly sought by female writers in proof of the assertion that such compositions are not necessarily dependent upon intensity of thought or great mental power; in other words, they do not involve any close application to study. Unlike philosophical reasoning, it is not necessary to confine the mind to the demonstration of certain theories; for instance, a sermon is intended to illustrate the subject chosen; now, as all truth harmonizes, it is clear that the arguments advanced by the preacher must be sound, logical, and conclusive. It is not so with romance. Taste, in a great measure, varies, and hence the termination of a tale is as uncertain as the choice of the individual. Such works as novels are either founded on fact, or are unconnected with time or circumstances. The latter do not require searching investigation, minute inspection, or close application, in order to form the subject matter; in the former the groundwork is already laid, and only remains to be attired with such a variation of incident as may be most in accordance with the views, feelings, and desires of the writer. It matters not what the superstructure of the work be subsequently, or the materials of which it is composed; certain it is, facts are sought to form the foundation; the result is dependent upon the accidental, individual feelings which are common to the author. But on other subjects the difference between fact and fiction is great. Facts have to be obtained prior to any superstructure being raised upon them. These are not attained at hazard, or by chance; or, if they are, they have to be thoroughly investigated before any further progress is made. If this were

not so, future development would be at variance with them. "Facts are God's truths," and must harmonize, either separately or *tout ensemble*. We therefore see that philosophy is not indebted to fortune, but rather to the persevering efforts of men of learning, genius, and talent. It is not indebted to accidental circumstances, nor does it owe its present high position to the caprice of an individual: it is the result of intense application to study, combined with a due regard to discrimination and to a judicious selection of those facts upon which the superstructure is based. Hence the necessity for the accuracy and stability of the groundwork, lest by any means future development might prove the fabric to be of uncertain and untried materials. My readers will now understand the distinction which I have drawn—that, appealing to the writings of our female friends, we discover infallible indications of their taste for works of fiction—that the greater proportion of their writing is of the aforesaid description—that novels, whether historical or otherwise, do not necessitate intensity of thought and study—and that, while it is intended to convey some moral, it is not expedient that the author should demonstrate any truth, or follow and trace out the relation which such truths have in their application to other data and principles.

But, to examine this question in another light, what would be the result were woman's attention bestowed upon other subjects? Divinity, philosophy, science, art, politics, &c., are lost sight of by them. They produce no works on such topics. Some opponent may very properly ask if such subjects are fitted for woman to expound, or if she is gifted with those powers of mind which are suited for such questions; in other words, the query might be put, Does the mental power of woman demonstrate that she is peculiarly adapted to such pursuits? I reply, that, so far as I am able to judge from scripture, I do not discover that it was the intention of the all-wise Creator to endow her with such depth of mental power requisite for the subjects I have referred to—that He did not seek to place her in that domain, or fit her for such a sphere. On the other hand, I am impressed with the conviction that God adapted each sex to its own peculiar sphere, and accordingly appointed cer-

tain duties and stations for man and woman. I am further of opinion that, while the latter was not intended for mental and studious purposes, she was endowed with mental abilities proportionate to the duties which she was to be called upon to discharge; and that, as her field of action was to be of no mean character, but rather intended for the training of her offspring and the duties of the domestic circle, she was gifted and endowed with such mental and moral capabilities as were necessary to enable her to sustain with honour to herself, as well as with satisfaction to those around her, the heavy and solemn responsibilities which devolved upon her.

The relative position of man and woman, as set forth in holy writ, appears to sanction the assumption of man's mental superiority. St. Paul says, "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife * *." And again, "Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression." The natural inference consequent upon the perusal of these injunctions is, that man, by reason of the headship, possessed some qualification which the woman did not, or that he was endowed with a greater share of mental power than her. Is not this deduction reasonable? The greater should rule the less; and, as woman is dependent upon man for support, for which man himself is indebted to his mental acquirements, and feeling that his position in life is of great and paramount importance, from the risks he encounters, the difficulties he surmounts, the trials and misfortunes he undergoes, is it not fair to assume that her duties, momentous and important as they are, do not require so great an amount of talent and mental labour as that which is essential to the due discharge of the still more weighty responsibilities of the husband? I wait for reflection to suggest a reply.

As man is superior to woman in physical power, so he is in intellectual. Nature has proportioned woman's physical power to her mental capacity; and, as it is obvious that an unnecessary preponderance of either would

endanger the well-being of the other, we cannot, therefore, but conclude that woman is inferior in mental, as she is in physical or bodily force.

It has been urged, that if woman has not proved herself equal in respect to mental capacity, it is to be ascribed to the limited and inefficient education which she has received. Although it is deeply to be regretted that the accomplishments which she receives are not of that permanent or valuable character which they might be, yet it is to be doubted whether instruction would demonstrate her co-equality in respect to mental talent with that of man. Genius will develop itself in spite of the disadvantages of education. Watt, Galileo, Burns, Arkwright, Milton, and others, received little education, yet perseverance, patience, and industry crowned their efforts with success. If the mental character is of any worth it will develop itself, whatever be the obstacles which impede its progress.

In concluding this very complicated and certainly discursive subject, a few words suggested during the penning of this article may not be unimportant. It may, possibly, be thought by some (especially by the ladies) that I have been somewhat severe—that I have not made allowances for circumstances which are, unfortunately, associated with the sex—that I have not been as enthusiastic in applauding their virtues and literary excellences as I have been zealous in pointing out their mental deficiencies. To such I would reply, that I have only advanced what I conceive to be in unison with experience, and dictated by reason. The ladies must have been prepared to receive evidence coincident with that which I have tendered, or I should have withheld these remarks. I have not omitted to deplore the necessity for more education among females generally. In this age mere accomplishments are too often sought rather than solid, substantial knowledge. Music, dancing, drawing, painting &c., may be essential to complete the education of ladies, in order to enable them to amuse and to please; but let not that be forgotten which will please when beauty has faded, when the music of the voice is no longer charming to the ear, and that of the fingers is lost in the inability to appreciate sound—in a mind stored with knowledge and a character rendered precious by tho

traits which are the natural property of the female sex, and which fail not to win the admiration of all. Among men of sense and liberal politeness, a woman who has successfully cultivated her mind, without diminishing the gentleness and propriety of her manners, is always sure to meet with respect and attention bordering on the enthusiastic.

I have said that, so far as I have been enabled to judge, in respect to mental capacity, we must accord to man the palm of superiority. To the unequal, varied, and different standards of mental power which exist between man and woman is to be ascribed the present happiness which we enjoy, as well as the high position which is being attained in all things. As the vocations of man and woman are each adapted to dissimilar purposes, so has God ordained that the mental capacity of either sex shall be suited to its duties and stations in life. As man is called upon to discharge certain offices, so has his mental ability been fitted accordingly; and so it is with respect to woman; and, as the relationship of talent is varied, so it renders it a difficult matter to decide which is mentally superior. Their spheres of action, as their talents, are wisely qualified for different ends. I am not insensible to the value of female productions; and, speaking honestly, I believe some of the writings of our female friends to be fully equal in power to those of men. Oftentimes, when depressed by languor and exhaustion, I have sought relief in female writings, and drawn consolation therefrom. Feelings, dictated by a nature unknown to man, are there evoked, which cannot but have a beneficial and genial influence on his character. Morality is woman's domain; to teach, to instruct, and to edify the heart, is her peculiar sphere; and then, in those traits which so distinguish her sex—fortitude, long-suffering, kindness, forbearance, gentleness, patience, affection, and those moral faculties which have their seat in the heart—she excels. Her office is to teach the heart—to nurture it in the attainment of piety, order, justice, virtue—and to instil into the minds of the young those sound, but moral principles, which shall act as their guides through life. The domestic circle is her domain: there she reigns supreme. To comfort and to console the husband when misfortunes harass him—to cherish and invigorate his

spirit when cast down by trouble—to contribute her gentle counsel and encouragement when he is undecided what route to take—to share his hopes, his joys, his anxieties, and his exultations—to comfort him in the sick chamber—to add a balm to his wounded heart—appears to be her natural and loved province.

Our own happiness is bound up in her existence amongst us. The most delightful companion that we have, she can very often turn the scale of our destiny, for good or evil. As such great and incalculable results depend upon her, let us not be unmindful of her education and training, in order to avert evils which would be inimical to our moral and social well-being. The instruction of woman improves the stock of natural talents, and employs more minds in the elevation of the world; it increases the pleasures of society, by multiplying the topics upon which the sexes take a common interest, and makes marriage an intercourse of understanding as well as of affection, by imparting dignity, importance, and worth to the female character.

I must apologize for this digression from the more immediate subject under discussion; but as I considered that some remarks on woman, morally and socially considered, with passing hints on her education, were due from me; and as, after the strictures I have made, some apology was due for their severity, I thought it consistent with my subject, and just to myself, to express my sentiments on the morality of this topic, seeing that it is inseparable from the question of the mental capacity of the sexes.

A few words in conclusion, more especially addressed to the ladies, and I have done. If I have offered anything in this article which is in the slightest degree calculated to hurt their feelings, I sincerely ask pardon. Should they, on the other hand, suppose that I am in *any way* prejudiced against them, I beg to assure them that they are mistaken. I have endeavoured, honestly but conscientiously, to express my own convictions; and if I have advanced any *opinions*, or given utterance to any *sentiments*, which are *antagonistic* to truth and justice, *they are not to be attributed to the slightest prejudice on my part*, but to the *secret and intricate windings* of the theme before me, they having precluded me from arriving at conclusions

which (if the converse of my position be true, and providing that I entertained it) would have afforded me the gratification of according to the ladies a greater share of *mental* power than I at present believe them to possess, and would also have enabled me to add that there were good grounds for supposing (through scripture) that God had endowed both sexes with a co-equality of *mental* talent. Unhappily, circumstances do not impel me to take that view of the subject, and I feel persuaded that my female friends would much sooner pardon me for adopting *this* than the reverse phase of the question; as, however pleasing the latter view would be to my own feelings, any vindication of it would involve a violation of the true dictates of my conscience. J. G. R.

History.

WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE CRUSADES FAVOURABLE TO THE CIVILIZATION AND MORAL ELEVATION OF THE PEOPLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"A nerve was touched of exquisite feeling, and the sensation vibrated to the heart of Europe."—GIBBON, "*Decline and Fall*," chap. lvii.

PHILOSOPHERS and historians have, in the question before us, found a theme both for learned disquisition and disputation, and also for sound reasoning and useful reflection; therefore it may not be unreasonable for us, in our humble way, to hope that the discussion in these pages may be fraught with some good. The question certainly opens a wide field of research for our young historical readers.

Did the Crusades promote the civilization and moral elevation of the people? We think so; and the reader shall have our reasons by which we have arrived at this conclusion.

The Crusades arose out of a *spontaneous*, and, so far as most of Europe was concerned, a *general* effort on the part of the human mind to get into action—to rid itself of the many fetters which had impeded its development. Circumstances were never more favourable for the attainment of this end than at the moment from which the Crusades date their rise. Chivalry was held in the highest esteem throughout most of the countries of Europe, and it only required to be animated by religious enthusiasm to call into existence a power which has never been equalled.

It was towards the close of the eleventh century that these two influences amalgamated. In the days of chivalry the outward

observances of religion, at least, were held in the highest esteem. It was customary for the Christians of Europe to make pilgrimages to the Holy Sepulchre; and so long as the caliphs of Bagdad, and after them the fatimides of Egypt, possessed Palestine, the Christians were not checked in this religious practice; but when the Turks had conquered Palestine, the hospitality of the Arabs gave way to the brutality of the new possessors, and religious pilgrims were subjected to the greatest vexations and annoyances. It was then that Peter the Hermit commenced his mission, and the eloquence with which he depicted the wrongs and cruelties sustained by the pilgrims did, indeed, create a sensation which "vibrated to the heart of Europe." The minds of the christian warriors became inflamed; and although at first they only demanded a free pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, the contest soon came to be for the actual possession of Jerusalem.

The Crusades commenced, as we have seen, at the close of the eleventh century, and continued in operation for the two succeeding ones, during which time, either conjointly or distinctly, nearly all the great powers of Europe took part in them, and were therefore more or less brought into frequent contact with each other. There can be no doubt but that they exercised a vast influence, for good or for evil, over the destinies of Europe. We have said that we believe this influence was for good, and we shall now

proceed to quote our authorities in support of such belief.

We turn first to Gibbon, who, as our most philosophic historian, is likely to have given the question before us mature consideration. We find him obviously disposed to give no more credit to the influence of the Crusades than truth absolutely demands; but he makes the following admissions and declarations, which are abundant for our purpose:—
 "About the eleventh century the second tempest had subsided, by the expulsion or conversion of the enemies of Christendom: the tide of civilization, which had so long ebbed, began to flow with a steady and accelerated course, and a fairer prospect was opened to the hopes and efforts of the rising generation. *Great was the increase, and rapid the progress, during the two hundred years of the Crusades.*" Again:—"The larger portion of the inhabitants of Europe were chained to the soil without freedom, or property, or knowledge; and the two orders of ecclesiastics and nobles, whose numbers were comparatively small, alone deserved the name of citizens and men. This oppressive system was supported by the arts of the clergy and the swords of the barons. The authority of the priests operated in the darker ages as a salutary antidote: they prevented the total extinction of letters, mitigated the fierceness of the times, sheltered the poor and defenceless, and preserved or revived the peace and order of civil society. But the independence, rapine, and discord of the feudal lords were unmixed with any semblance of good; and every hope of improvement and industry was crushed by the mor weight of the martial aristocracy. *Among the causes that undermined that Gothic edifice, a conspicuous place must be allotted to the Crusades.* The estates of the barons were dissipated, and their race was often extinguished, in these costly and perilous expeditions. *Their poverty extorted from their pride those charters of freedom which unlocked the fetters of the slave, secured the farm of the peasant and the shop of the artificer, and gradually restored a substance and a soul to the most numerous and useful part of the community.* The conflagration which destroyed the tall and barren trees of the forest gave air and scope to the vegetation of the smaller and nutritive plants of the soil."

Hume, the great English historian, bears testimony to the good services rendered by the Crusades in arousing mankind from that state of degradation into which they were rapidly falling at the period of their commencement. He says, "Europe was at this time (1096) sunk into profound ignorance and superstition: the ecclesiastics had acquired the greatest ascendancy over the human mind. * * * *All the great lords possessed the right of peace and war: they were engaged in perpetual hostilities with each other: the open country was become a scene of outrage and disorder: the cities, still mean and poor, were neither guarded by walls nor protected by privileges, and were exposed to every insult: individuals were obliged to depend for safety on their own force, or their private alliances; and valour was the only excellence which was held in esteem, or gave one man the pre-eminence above another.* When all the particular superstitions, therefore, were united in one great object, the ardour for military enterprises took the same direction; and Europe, impelled by its own ruling passion, was loosened, as it were, from its foundations, and seemed to precipitate itself in one united body upon the East." Surely it was time for some change! But to our next authority.

"Better," says Macaulay, our fireside historian, "that the rude inhabitant of the North should visit Italy and the East as a pilgrim, than that he should never see anything but those squalid cabins and uncleared woods amidst which he was born. * * In times when statesmen were incapable of forming extensive political combinations, it was better that the christian nations should be roused and united for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre than that they should, one by one, be overwhelmed by the Mahometan power. * * * Its effect was to unite the nations of Western Europe into one great commonwealth. * * * Thus grew up sentiments of enlarged benevolence." Again:—"The islanders returned with awe deeply impressed on their half-opened minds, and told the wondering inhabitants of the hovels of London and York that near the grave of St. Peter a mighty race now extinct had piled up buildings which would never be dissolved till the judgment day. *Learning followed in the train of Christianity.*"

Guizot, in his "History of Civilization in Europe," takes a still more extended view of the subject, and all who feel any interest in this question should read and study his chapter on the Crusades. Confirming the dark picture already drawn by the historians we have quoted, of the state of men and morals previous to this time, he remarks, "The main characteristic of the Crusades is their universality. All Europe together took part in them; they were the first European occurrence. Previous to the Crusades, Europe had never been moved by an identical sentiment, nor had acted in one and the same cause; *there was, in fact, no Europe. The Crusades unfolded a Christian Europe.* The French formed the bulk of the first army of the Crusaders, but there were also Germans, Italians, Spaniards, and Englishmen. Take the second or the third Crusade, all the christian nations were engaged in each. Nothing similar had ever been witnessed. This was not all. In the same manner as the Crusades were an European, so were they in each country a national event. In each nation all classes of society were animated with the same conviction, obeyed the same idea, and abandoned themselves to the same enthusiastic impulse. Kings, lords, priests, burghers, husbandmen—all took the same interest and the same share in the crusades. *A moral unity amongst the nations broke forth, a fact as novel as the European unity.*" And he continues:—"When such events occur in the youth of nations, in those times when they act spontaneously and from free impulse, without premeditation, political intention, or governmental combinations, we acknowledge them to be what history calls heroic events, and to evidence the heroic age of nations. *The Crusades were, in fact, the heroic era of modern Europe, a movement at once individual and general, national and yet unguided.*" And now for the more direct beneficial results. "It is," says Guizot, "more commonplace to say that the mind of a traveller is set free, and that the custom of comparing different nations, manners, and opinions, expands the ideas and clears the judgment from ancient prejudices. *Now the same fact occurred to these travelling populations who have been called Crusaders; their minds were opened and elevated by the mere circumstance of witnessing a multitude of different things,*

and by becoming acquainted with manners distinct from their own."

Listen also to one of the most learned men of which France can boast, M. Abel Remusat, whom Guizot quotes in support of the opinions above advanced:—"All these unknown travellers carrying the arts of their own countries into distant lands, brought back others not less precious, and made, without perception on their parts, more advantageous exchanges than all those of commerce. By these means not only the trade in silks, porcelain, and Indian commodities, became extended and more practicable, opening up new routes to commercial industry and activity, but—what was of still greater consequence—foreign manners, unknown nations, and extraordinary productions, crowded upon the minds of Europeans, repressed since the fall of Rome into too narrow a circle. They began to estimate properly the finest, the best peopled, and the most anciently civilized of the four quarters of the globe. They set about studying the arts, creeds, and idioms of the nations who inhabited it, and there was even a project for establishing a chair of the Tartar language in the university of Paris. Romantic accounts being soon investigated and valued as they deserved, spread on all sides more just and comprehensive ideas. The world seemed to open on the side of the East; geography made a prodigious stride; and an ardour for discoveries became the new direction which the adventurous spirit of Europe fell into."

Maunder, one of our modern writers, thus expresses himself on the same subject:—"By means of these joint enterprises the European nations became more connected with each other; feudal tyranny was weakened; a commercial intercourse took place throughout Europe, which greatly augmented the wealth of the cities; the human mind expanded; and a number of arts and sciences, till then unknown by the western nations, were introduced."

A writer in the recent edition of the "National Cyclopaedia" also gives us his testimony on the same side:—"It cannot be denied that the Crusades were accompanied by many beneficial effects. Such, for instance, were the increased activity of political life in Europe; the breaking up of the feudal system, by the sale of estates to the mer-

chants in exchange for the money required by the nobles for their military accoutrements and provisions. The increased wealth of the mercantile towns in Italy, which led to the revival of the fine arts and sciences in that country; and, finally, the diffusion of more liberal modes of thinking in matters of government and religion, occasioned by the intercourse of the western and eastern nations."

Enough of proof, so far as proof can be obtained, has been adduced for our present purpose; and we have now simply to anticipate one or two of the usual objections urged against our view of the case, and then leave the question for the present in the hands of our readers.

It has been frequently urged, that whatever good resulted from the Crusades was simply accidental, being neither sought after nor expected. It would answer the present inquiry simply to show that, in the end, no real harm ensued. But we prefer to deal liberally with the question. So long as any obscurity attaches to the *real* origin of the Crusades, so long they will remain liable to misconstruction and misrepresentation. We say the "real origin," because we look upon the spirit which first animated the Crusaders as distinct and apart from the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the Infidels. The *real accident* was the occurrence, at the precise moment, of a pretext to give colour and scope to the great drama ready for performance. We believe the true

mission of the Crusades was the emancipation of the human mind. It may be that this mission was only *felt*, and *not acknowledged*, by the immediate actors; but, nevertheless, it was well and nobly performed.

Lastly, there are those who become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the horror and misery which naturally attended such perilous expeditions, that they entirely overlook the final result. "Look," say they, "at the immense sacrifice of human life! See the immense amount of property lost in the undertaking, and the consequent amount of misery and destitution which must have followed." Remember, reader, however much you may deplore the fact, that in the early progress of European civilization and liberty you have the din and horrors of war ever ringing in your ears. Happily, those days have passed away; but, for this very reason, measure not the past by the standard of the present.

"Time changes much the surface of the world!
Where once the Roman marshall'd his bold
host,
Bristling with swords and spears the rocky
height,
The shepherd tends his flock, and the young
lambs
In sportive gambols tread the flow'ry turf."

He, it has been said, who would understand history aright, must transport himself in imagination to the scenes and times narrated. Let this be done in the present case. We ask no more: we shall be content with no less.

C. W., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Is looking abroad upon the present state of the people of Europe, and comparing that state with the accounts which have been transmitted to us from the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, we find that nations which were then semibarbarous have become civilized; that those who "sat in darkness and in the shadow of death," have seen a great light—the light which is emitted by the Sun of Righteousness; that those who were captives—slaves, under the hands of feudal lords, have gained their liberty, to a very considerable extent, and are in a fair way for rendering that liberty complete; that the popedom, which at that time ruled the nations with an iron rod, has lost a very considerable portion of its power, and some of the nations

have even dared to think for themselves in matters of religion, so far as to set up rival systems, and that thus, instead of uniformity, diversity has become the order of the day; and, further, that in those cases in which nations have diverged most from the standard of opinion, the happiest effects have, for the most part, resulted.

It is but natural, in looking upon the changes which have thus taken place, and the progress which from time to time is being made, to inquire into the causes which have been at work, and to which this transition and progress can fairly be attributed; and closely to canvass the claims of every fresh candidate who steps into court and demands to share in the honour.

The candidate whose claims come under consideration at the present time, is that series of wars which was begun in the eleventh, and continued to the middle of the thirteenth, century, and which, owing to the circumstances of its being fought under the standard of the cross, has been designated the Crusades.

The seat of these wars was Palestine; their object the recovery of that country, or more particularly of Jerusalem, from the hands of the Turks, in order that free access might be given to the pilgrims of different nations who professed the christian religion, and who went to visit and pay homage in the place where the Saviour lived and suffered; and the aggressors were persons from most of the countries of western Europe, but principally from Germany, France, and England.

The Crusades were conceived in error, carried on in madness, and ended in disaster. They originated in the idea that a pilgrimage to Jerusalem could cancel the sins of a vicious life; that to fight in defence of religion is a most sacred duty, and to kill an infidel is an acceptable religious service. They were carried on at the most reckless expense of property and life; for, while the nations who engaged in these wars were impoverished, not fewer than two millions of precious lives were sacrificed. And they ended by leaving the very object for which they were undertaken, as far from being accomplished as when they were commenced.

And what did the nations of Europe get in exchange for so much money and blood? The various orders of knighthood are said to have been originated, surnames and heraldry instituted, and the rough German to have first conceived a taste for the arts.

Allowing that these, especially the last, may have done somewhat to promote civilization, it must still remain a question whether the habits which they who had the good fortune to return, had contracted during the wars, did not far more than counteract all the good which resulted. As far as our own country was concerned, the evidence of history appears pretty conclusive: beside suffering from the absence of her king, who was honoured to share in the war, and being well fleeced, first for the expenses of the war, and then for the ransom of the sovereign, the

state of society in England, during and after the Crusades, appears to have been of the most unhappy description. The circumstance that, out of a reign of ten years, the king spent but little more than four months in his kingdom, and in the midst of his people, together "with the fact that his whole life was spent in war, or in preparation for war, will prove that the internal state of the country was anything but satisfactory. A people who were called to look upon the whole of Europe as one great arena for royal gladiators—a people so familiar with war and blood—a people whose resources had been drained, and whose property and life were held of comparatively little value, were not likely to make much progress in civilization and refinement; yet who can doubt that a progressing and uplifting civilization would have done more for humanity and religion, than the most successful crusade that ever was undertaken?"*

If the introduction of the arts, through the Crusaders, may have done somewhat towards civilizing the people, the very fact that the Crusades were wars, is a fearful one to counterbalance this circumstance. "There is nothing improving, nothing elevating in war." While it is being carried on the worst passions of humanity are excited; and when it is over, and there is no common enemy against whom to exercise it, it is brought to bear against friends and neighbours. It is but a narrow view which men take of war to suppose that the entire loss of the conquered is included in the sum of men and money which may be expended; to this must be added the depreciation which the morals and manners of the people undergo for at least some fifty years after. Perhaps it would not be too much to add to this account a large proportion of the criminals which from time to time inhabit our prisons: for if it be right to rob and murder innocent persons of another nation, it cannot be far wrong to treat similar persons of our own country in the same manner. While governments make use of soldiers to do the one, it is only reasonable to suppose that the soldiers, after being discharged, will not scruple to do the other. Add to this the sum of the other evils which usually attend the camp, and which are as usually indulged in after a war, and it may

* Dr. Ferguson's "England."

be fairly questioned whether any accidental good which may accrue from war is sufficient to compensate for the certain evil.

Taking this view of the matter, we are led

to conclude that, on the whole, the effects of the Crusades were not favourable to the civilization, much less to the moral elevation, of the people.
G. N.

Politics.

OUGHT MONEY TO BE INTRINSIC OR SYMBOLICAL ?

INTRINSIC.—CONCLUDING ARTICLE.

THIS discussion now approaches its close. With this number the final dialectical *passes* between the principals will be exchanged, and thus will have ended this political

"Duel, in the form of a debate—

The clash of arguments, and jar of words."

John Bull is the next actor on the field. *Himself* his own hobby, and his "pocket" the hallowed *sanctum*, to give his decision as umpire must be a vital act. But finance is the riddle of his life—a "will-o'-the-wisp" which sometimes produces ridiculously blundering effects. Luckily, as to the present question there can be no fear of his safety. He is a stout hater of "sweeping changes," and his verdict against "shadows," "flim-sies," or *precious* paper money generally, will be but another repetition of former decisions. Old opinions are strengthened by opposition. So with old systems. But, happily, debates like the present are healthy forerunners of reformation.

Satisfaction cannot but be felt at the spirit in which our question has been met and answered. On both sides there has been no lack of sincerity blended with courtesy. But, though our opponents have enforced respect for their arguments, they have not obscured our perception of the fallaciousness which clings to them.

Among our opponents' views are some having a spiritual cast. These deserve prior consideration and settlement. J. H. and James Harvey, who may be one and the same person, are their sole promulgators. Starting from a point as sublime as it is benevolent, J. H. would institute symbolical money because it would be a practical solution of the vague problem, how the rights of labour are to be reconciled with the rights of property. England, it seems, has bungled,

and is still bungling, about this problem. "What," he asks, "is free trade, or the education question—the former 'a doubtful benefit,' producing insignificant fruits!—compared to 'the question of employment for the people?'" Statesmen, political economists, even prophets, have neither seen nor foreseen the true social panacea; but, as discovered by J. H., it is the plenteous manufacture of money. He would have money plentiful enough to *pay* for the employment of all, fallaciously thinking it would *cause* the employment of all. Resting on the many suppositions that money is something more than the *organ* of demand—that supply can never be in excess of demand—that "cheap money and dear commodities" are preferable to "dear money and cheap commodities" (in the same way that a circular pound weight is preferable in accuracy to a square pound weight)—J. H. and James Harvey prophecy, as incident to abundant symbolical money, that "every man should be at work, every steam-engine in full operation—that poor-rates might be annihilated," &c. Does not the millennium *now* clearly "loom in the distance?"—

"When every transfer of earth's natural gifts
Shall be a commerce of good words and works"—
(SHELLEY)

when Hobbes' antithesis may be read—
"Money is the *words* of wise men, and the
counters of fools?"

"Oh! happy earth, reality of heaven!"

After this it would, indeed, be strange if we had not a "religious element" in our discussion. Mr. Harvey readily introduces one. He, evidently, is less an advocate for a purely symbolical currency than an abhorrer of gold. He is a sincere mammon-hater. "As Egypt chose an onion for a god," so he personifies

gold and intrinsic money generally as the great arch-distributor and father of filthy lucre and venal corruption. "Gold money," he says, "has been an unmitigated curse to the people of the earth," and "is typified in the worship of mammon, denounced in scriptures." But will paper money elevate humanity to a purer spiritual state? Will the miser's soul be quenched, or the organ of acquisitiveness never be abused, when once this paper-pound panacea for human depravity is instituted? To some "the very light of heaven is venal;" but Mr. H. apparently abnegates this quality to paper money. Not so thought the satirist:—

"Blest paper-credit! last and best supply,
That lends corruption lighter wings to fly."
POPE.

But politico-economic science admits not of the introduction of either utopian or religious elements. The sound sense of our readers will, we trust, cause their eschewal, and so fit their minds for more legitimate argumentation. And, first, we must express our surprise at Mr. Harvey's nervous repudiation of our doctrine that "the true theory of the currency can only be that which practice has taught us." Why, it is upon this very doctrine he reasons against intrinsic money. Arguing from financial history, he infers the nation-saving utility of symbolical money. France, America, and Great Britain, he asserts, were saved from ruin in momentous exigencies—the first by its assignats, the second by its continental money, and the third by its restricted cash payments. Yet he scouts experience as a tester of seemingly theoretic truths, and in a lively strain of analogical ridicule crushes the great doctrine upon which we had fondly built, and from which he draws all his condemnatory inferences. Nevertheless, he will catch at a straw. "Practice is not altogether against us!" he exclaims; as witness the exchequer tallies, or wooden money, which once existed even in this country, and which was a symbolical money, and for internal uses. Why, our opponent must have forgotten that the money of most savage races is also mere tokens. So with them, indeed, practice is not against him. But how happens it that, with civilization, money invariably advances in intrinsicity or worth; and that everywhere, in great emergencies, that money-characteristic is departed from, a resumption

is always consequent upon the decadence of the forth-calling emergencies? We will not say "a divinity has shaped" these ends; but it is none the less true that exchequer tallies, assignats, continental money, and inconvertible British paper money, now rank among the things that were.

Mr. Harvey, apparently, has yet to learn that there are such distinctions as a natural and an unnatural demand for money. An intrinsic currency, we confess, as it is the growth of political nature, can do little more than answer natural political requirements. Its expansion *follows* the expansion of production and commerce. Like its antecedents, therefore, it is of slow development. The individual in want of sustenance must work for it; when in want of money, he must do the same. If his expenditure, whether conducive to future gain or not directly productive, is great, he must by labour, skilful outlaying, and careful husbandry, first acquire the necessary means; but if, like the spendthrift, he live and purchase expensively upon credit alone, he is a non-producer, and is pursuing a course equivalent to circulating a false or factitious money, *having no prospective value*. He is a non-producer, because he wastes commodities, and neither multiplies his own nor his neighbour's stock. Of course, as it is with the nation, so it is with the individual. Now, it is remarkable that transitions from an intrinsic into a symbolical currency have always been the temporary resort of states in this condition of spendthriftcy. When France became "a nation of soldiers" it required an artificial money, not the growth of labour, to pay for sustenance and the expenses of gigantic enterprizes, increased in price as they must have been by the scarcity of labour. The credit upon which the assignats obtained currency hung upon the bloody points of Gallic bayonets. Armies are non-productive; they waste particular commodities without ever adding to the general stock. Moreover, they drain their own countries of their intrinsic money to pay for what they consume in other states; for the credit which forces the circulation of factitious money at home is *effete* abroad. From these facts our readers will easily understand the true ground upon which rests Mr. Harvey's boast that non-intrinsic money "saved" America, France, and Great Britain, when bending under their unnatural loads of enor-

mons expenditures. But we little fear that, in these temporary money transactions, they will recognise the symbolical theory of the currency as the one which recorded financial experience tells them is founded on truth and the fitness of things.

We are now naturally led to the most conflicting point in our discussion—that of “scarcity of money.” It is the main pivot round which revolve our opponent’s fallacies. The term sadly wants definition. Sometimes it is used for scarcity of bullion; sometimes it is applied to a rise in prices; and sometimes it is used to express some vague notion of a limited circulating medium. Money-symbolists are never more fallacious than when condemning gold money, because its increase in quantity is not so proportionate with the increase of commodities that no fluctuation of prices can accrue. Their blunder consists in confounding a nominal with a real value. The real value between the media and the article of purchase is irrespective of the relative quantities of either. “The abundance of currency in the markets,” says Mr. Attwood, “has the very same action in raising prices as the scarcity of property has; and the scarcity of currency in the markets has the very same action in lowering prices as the abundance of property has.” But upon this point F. F. has already fully and clearly enlarged. No system of symbolical money has ever yet been mooted that could entirely obviate the fluctuation of prices; so that evils incident thereto must ever be tolerated so long as the scarcity and overplus of commodities in proportion to the demand are affected otherwise than by the current value of money.

We feel our position too strong, as respects the lesson to be drawn from the history of the disastrous results of a contraction of the currency in 1816, alluded to by “Irene,” to enter into lengthened argument. The 6,005 bankruptcies consequent on this collapse tell not in the least against an intrinsic currency. We advocate no reduction in the quantity of the circulating medium; nor have we yet seen cause to “sweep away the whole stock of our paper currency.” But the principal argument of “Irene” is, that “money possessing intrinsic value has a natural tendency to create those disastrous commercial panics which in previous years have brought this country to the very verge of revolution.”

This is strongly and boldly stated; but let us see how it is supported. It is because of the fixity in the value of gold, and because in prosperous times of “high prices and large profits,” this fixity of price in gold is the cause of “a drain of the metal from the country.” How? Because gold then “becomes the cheapest commodity we have,” and is, therefore, exported by the foreign merchant in exchange for his imported goods. What is here meant by “cheapest commodity” we are puzzled to say. “Irene” does not mean that the foreign market price of gold has risen above our standard price, for some checked home influence seems implied. Most likely his meaning may be, that, amid a general rise in the prices of other commodities, it is most profitable to the foreigner to take that particular commodity whose price has not proportionably risen. But what unknown causes are they which make gold money and commodities *dear alike*? Dear money and cheap commodities, and *vice versa*, we can understand; but, aware of the fixity of gold money value, dear money and dear commodities, coupled with high profits, go beyond our comprehension. Even admitting the “sole legal tender” to be cheaper to foreigners than any other of our commodities—not because there is any difference in its value in the two markets, but because the other commodities are dearer in our market than in the foreigner’s—this inequality could not be of long continuance. The equilibrium of prices, through the action of a free commerce, would speedily be restored. The drain of specie would, by limiting partially the circulating medium, lower the prices of commodities to those of other markets, without necessarily lessening the profits. But, in reality, “Irene’s” argument, even if tenable, is of insignificant importance. His so-called “fair transcript from the page of English history,” loses all its force as an example by the accurate explanation. The memorable panic of 1825 was distinguished and maintained by the want of a single commodity,—gold; and it is true that the missing gold was exported: but, primarily, the panic arose from the great mania for speculation in foreign loans, in costly joint-stock-company undertakings; also from an overplus of British manufactures in foreign markets, and from the failures of numerous private country bankers, who so far transgressed the law of intrinsic

currency, as to engross the whole circulating medium of their districts, without possessing sufficient capital to meet demands.* Thus great, indeed, were the ruin and havoc among incomes and fortunes; and not even "Irene" could resist the temptation of exposing a system under which such financial tragedies occurred. But "Irene's" primary argument having failed, so also does his secondary one, that, under a representative currency, foreigners would take our goods instead of our gold, because, at the then market price, he asserts, our gold would be less advantageous to foreign merchants than our goods. Certainly our opponent plays the dangerous game of vaticination boldly and positively.

Space, however, forbids prolonged debate. We will not call our reader's attention to Australia, or speculate on that apparently endless theme. Be the results of the insane scamper for gold as they may, the general argument on this question will scarcely be affected. But of Australia we think, that, considering the numbers finally destined to people it, their poverty, their distance from their old houses—the fact of other pursuits being sacrificed to gold-digging, and healthy comforts to life-shortening privations—the

importance of the country as a promising field for colonization and even incipient nationalization—there need be less apprehension for either extraordinary fluctuations in prices, or any undue alteration of the present standard value of gold at home.

We will now conclude. We have replied according to the manner in which our opponents have treated the question. Nothing has been said by its advocates in favour of a symbolical currency which can, we think, justify its institution. C. E. R. would make it an entirely inconvertible currency, representative only of "a certain quantity and description of labour at the time of the basis being fixed." This "symbolical money" he would base, we see, limitedly upon production, but he has no better plan of *expounding* it with production than through the imperfect medium of discounting bills of exchange. But if our readers would have a currency that represents and expands with labour—one which is of universal value, which can force a free-trade for itself, the fixity of which ensures its invariability, as a measure of value, and which is not dependent upon forced credit or arbitrary authority to ensure circulation—then let them give their verdict for intrinsic money.

R. L. G.

SYMBOLICAL.—CONCLUDING ARTICLE.

It has been conceded by many bullionists, that if paper could be limited in amount, it would serve as a money equally as well as gold; but their fear—a very natural one, a fear which arises from a dread of disturbing the relations of debtor and creditor, a fear for which I have every respect—is, that paper would be issued in excess. This is the weak side of paper money, and I would assent to the most stringent regulations which could prevent a baseless issue. But paper may be so issued as to be more valuable than gold, as M'Culloch confesses in his "Commercial Dictionary," when he tells us that, in the Bank Restriction Act, Mr. Pitt did not issue paper enough, and his notes were worth more than twenty shillings.

I think the illustration I am about to give shows the real nature of money and its representative character. When Captain Franklin was approaching the Arctic Sea, he dismissed

his Indian guides, and, to their great surprise, offered them a piece of paper. Were they, after their fatigues and exertions, to be remunerated by a piece of paper? Captain Franklin explained to them, that this piece of paper was an order on the government stores at Montreal for a liberal remuneration in the shape of muskets, gunpowder, and blankets. The Indians, having faith in Captain Franklin, took his paper order, which became to them what a bill of lading is to a banker, or a warehouse order to an advancing broker, or a penny postage stamp to a man about to write a letter, or a ship note to a sailor. Now, if all other Indians had the same faith with whom they came in contact, this paper would have become money. Then why should not England, a civilized country, have faith in her government, and allow it to issue paper money? I maintain that the first function of a government is to find its people in an instrument of exchange. Taxation implies such a power and such a function.

* "Pop. Cyclopædia;" Article, *Britain*.

If government refuses, as all governments refuse in the present day, to take taxation in kind, but demands money, then that government ought to make a money, and not compel its people, as our government does, to go to the ends of the earth to dig for a yellow ore, which ten years since could not be found, but now may be found in such quantities as to disturb all social relations, upon a plea, and a false plea, that when this nation contracted a debt of £800,000,000, it contracted a debt of 8,000 tons of gold—more than exists on the face of the globe—which the nation must pay down, or else an annual interest of 300 tons.

The consequences of such an absurd money are very disastrous. A man has an income of £10,000 a year; he lives on, say, £1,000 a year, and has the difference, £9,000, to dispose of. What is he to do? If he wishes to be quite safe, he must do as the orientals do; must hoard and bury it. But let him take it to a bank, in the foolish belief that the bank puts it by safe in boxes for him to have whenever he may choose to call. For a few years he goes on imagining that the bank has in its coffers some £30,000 in gold. But a cloud gathers in the political horizon; the commercial world becomes distrustful, the bank puts the screw on—that is, raises discounts; that is, cheapens commodities; that is, enhances money. A panic begins; it spreads; our friend runs to the bank for his deposit, but finds his fellow-depositors have been before him; the bank stops payment, and his fancied wealth, or rather gold, is—nowhere! And this happens every four years. His savings have accumulated, but the gold which ought to increase with them, or represent them, does not increase. With paper money he might accumulate with safety, for, as his savings increased, paper money would increase, and panics, or runs for gold, would be impossible, for gold would not be a money, and if people ran for paper, they would get it, provided it was owing to them.

I could write a thick volume to illustrate the insanity of our present system; but if I am asked for a better, my answer is, I am not prepared to give a better; but let the nation take this question up, and attend to it before any other, for this emigration to Australia indicates what I am attempting to show, viz., that what the country is thirsting for is, more money.

What is wealth? Is it not raw material moulded and fashioned by labour? Raw material being, then, inexhaustible; labour more efficient, with the assistance of machinery, than ever was known; and man's desires being boundless—for I suppose every man wishes for more various food, for a more commodious house, for more elegant dress, and for better furniture; for more books, pictures, and flowers—what is it that ties this great industrious nation of England to such mean accommodations, but want of money? Then, I say, give government power to make money, and what would a little extravagance signify? What would the nation care if a few millions more a year were spent, seeing that it would give employment?

I could illustrate the fact that the want of money is the great obstacle to advance; but, as one instance, take the education of the people. Why are not the people educated? Because of the cost. Well, suppose my plan annihilates cost, is it not worth attending to? Issue education paper money; build schools; pay schoolmasters; supply apparatus; let such money circulate among the people, and let the government recognise it as legal tender for the education rate, when it might be cancelled. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." To the man who is in an affirmative state this is enough, but to the man who worships gold, who cannot shake off the prejudices of youth, no words can have effect, no argument satisfy. Do you want the people educated? Are there men enough to build your schools? Is there enough of slate, brick, clay, and lime? Are there enough of men competent to be schoolmasters? Is there any short supply of books, maps, and chemical apparatus or geological specimens—of Bibles, Testaments, and prayer books—of slates and pens? If not, for heaven's sake go to work, and don't let money stop you: make your money. Money is the servant of man—man should not be the slave of money. I will close by giving some queries by Bishop Berkeley, which will have more weight with your readers than anything I may say.

"Whether the four elements, and man's labour therein, be not the true source of wealth?

"Whether money be not only so far useful as it stirreth up industry, enabling men mutually to participate in the fruits of each other's labour?

"Whether money is to be considered as having an intrinsic value, or as being a commodity, a standard, or a pledge, as is variously suggested by writers? And whether the true idea of money, as such, be not altogether that of a ticket or counter?

"Whether the term livre, pound sterling, crown, &c., are not to be considered as exponents or denominations of such proportion? And whether gold, silver, or paper, are not tickets or counters for reckoning, recording, and transferring thereof?

"Whether the denominations being retained, although the bullion were gone, things might not nevertheless be rated, bought and sold, industry promoted, and a circulation of commerce maintained?

"What makes a wealthy people? Whether mines of gold and silver are capable of doing this? And whether the negroes, amidst the gold sands of Africa, are not poor and destitute?

"Whether there be any virtue in gold or silver other than as they set people to work, or create industry?

"Whether power to command the industry of others be not real wealth? And whether money be not, in truth, tickets or tokens for conveying or recording such power, and whether it be of great consequence what materials the tickets are made of?

"Whether to promote, transfer, and secure this commerce, and this property in human labour, or, in other words, this power, be not the sole means of enriching a people; and how far this may be done independently of gold and silver?

"Whether a fertile land, and the industry of its inhabitants, would not prove inexhaustible funds of real wealth, be the counters for conveying and recording thereof what you will—paper, gold, or silver?

"Whether the opinion of men, and their industry consequent thereon, be not the true wealth of Holland, and not the silver supposed to be deposited in the bank of Amsterdam?

"Whether, in order to understand the true nature of wealth and commerce, it would not be right to consider a ship's crew cast upon a desert island, and by degrees forming themselves to business and civil life, while industry begot credit, and credit moved to industry?

"Whether such men would not all set themselves to work? Whether they would

not subsist by the mutual participation of each other's industry? Whether when one man had in this way procured more than he could consume, he would not exchange his superfluities to supply his wants? Whether this must not produce credit? Whether, to facilitate these conveyances, to record and circulate this credit, they would not soon agree on certain tallies, tokens, tickets, or counters?

"Whether it be not agreed that paper hath, in many respects, the advantage above coin, as being of more despatch in payments, more easily transferred, preserved, and recovered when lost?

"Whether the sure way to supply people with tools and materials, and to set them to work, be not a free circulation of money, whether silver or paper?

"Whether the great evils attending paper money, in the British plantations of America, have not sprung from overrating their lands, and issuing paper without discretion, and from the legislators breaking their own rules in their own favour, thus sacrificing the public to their private advantage? And whether a little sense and honesty might not easily prevent all such inconveniences?

"Whether there are not to be seen in America, fair towns, wherein the people are well lodged, fed, and clothed, without a beggar in their streets, although there be not one grain of gold or silver current among them?

"Whether the use and nature of money, which all men so eagerly pursue, be yet sufficiently understood or considered by all?

"Whether a discovery of the richest gold mine that ever was in the heart of this kingdom would be a real advantage to us?

"Whether, therefore, a national bank would not be more beneficial than even a mine of gold?

"Whether counters be not referred to other things, which, so long as they keep pace and proportion with the counters, it must be owned the counters are useful; but whether beyond that, to covet or value counters be not direct folly?

"Whether we are sufficiently sensible of the peculiar security there is in having a bank, that consists of land and paper, one of which cannot be exported, and the other is in no danger of being exported?

"Whether money could ever be wanting to

the demands of industry, if we had a national bank?

"Whether paper doth not, by its stamp and signature, acquire a local value, and become

as precious and scarce as gold? And whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore preferable to gold?"

JAMES HARVEY.

Social Economy.

IS THE CONFESSIONAL IN HARMONY WITH INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FREEDOM OR SOCIAL WELL-BEING?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It is our duty to defer the reception of a doctrine until we are fully informed respecting its various relations; hence our obligation thoroughly to examine those relations, and to refer them to some natural or supernatural standard, before we arrive at conclusions. The exercise of this discriminatory power is the native and inalienable right of every human being, having full scope in regard to all human enunciations, and extending even to divine communications. The great Governor of the universe sanctions and invites the free, unfettered exercise of human judgment in relation to himself, his dealings, and his teachings. He speaks thus:—"Come, now, and let us reason together." "The Lord hath a controversy with his people, and he will plead with Israel." "Oh, men of Judah! judge, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard." And, through Paul, the word is thus submitted to man's judgment: "I speak as unto wise men; judge ye what I say." Again, in regard to the treatment of that which christian teachers may enunciate, we are taught not only to receive the word gladly, but to bring it to the issue of a comparison with the word of God; for we are enjoined to go "to the law and to the testimony: if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." And again:—"Believe not every spirit; but try the spirits, whether they be of God, for there be many false prophets." Thus the word of God is quite clear with reference to the province of human judgment, a province which no human agency can destroy, be it prophet, priest, or church.

Most ominous to the pretensions and tendencies of the Church of Rome is that word in its literal applicability, which speaks of

those who make the scriptures of none effect by their vain traditions. Rome receives that word as authentic and authoritative; but it has also traditions, and from these it gathers its many errors, and amongst others its theory of the insufficiency of the scriptures. The Church of Rome invalidates the authority of scripture, in that it denies man those rights as a reasonable and moral being which the Bible clearly assigns to him. This thing of humanity usurps the authority of the Almighty; and violates the legitimate claims of man. This priestly power sets forth all imaginable advantages as arising from connexion with its communion, and demands, as the condition of such connexion, a pledge of absolute unconditional submission. This church—in the most charitable sense ecclesiastically-human in its origin, its doctrinal and constitutional growth, determined by circumstances of worldly policy and after the manner of secular institutions—this church teaches in relation to its position that man, in his infirmities, is altogether dependent upon it, and that its claims are such that to doubt or dissent is to sin. The Church of Rome forecloses all examination of its doctrines by denying the legitimacy of private judgment; and it anticipates all further appeal to other authority by maintaining the dogma of its own infallibility.

The standard of eligibility to the priesthood furnishes no intervention between the evils of the system and the interests of humanity. That standard recognises no difference between the man carnal and the man renewed in the divine image. Men who, under some phase or other, are personally ill affected towards the mental and

moral freedom of mankind at large, have full scope and ample powers in such connexion, and even those naturally or by grace indisposed to act detrimentally to others, are, in this church, converted into active parts of a despotic agency, and tools of a thought-quelling, soul-enslaving system; their individual responsibility merges into that of the church.

To such a system—such a priesthood—we have to add the confessional. Confession, as required by the Romish Church, is the thorough laying bare of a man's inner life to the church's ken, in such manner as that all diversities from a disposition well affected towards itself shall be known and dealt with. All that in the system is hostile to the legitimate exercise of the individual mind—all the several, and may be numerous, personal predilections in the priesthood unfavourable to such exercise, and the whole priesthood as unfavourably affected by the system—all these hostilities are brought to bear intimately and directly upon the springs of principle and upon the sources of mental action. Through the confessional the priest gains knowledge of the impulses yet latent in the soul, and of crude feelings there, in such stages of their formation as that they are scarcely obvious to the man himself. The confessional offers itself to the priesthood as a means of obtaining full possession of a man's soul—of taking the rulership out of the hands of his reason—and the moral jurisdiction away from his conscience.

It seems to us impossible for persons educated in Romanism, and practising confession as the church prescribes, to form a truly rational and impartial judgment upon ecclesiastical and spiritual matters. The stipulated unreservedness of confession, the searching power vested in the priest, and the habit of unreasoning obedience to all his counsel wrought in them from infancy, places the determination of their wills at the option of the priest, and makes him, if he wills, the absolute fashioner of their mental development.

The more intimately confession is identified with the life, the earlier will the man's inner transgressions against the church be known to its emissaries; and thus the church's influence will be employed, ere reason has collected its energies, or the conscience has clearly outspoken.

In the classification of matters for confession, those which relate chiefly to the system and the class are placed highest, and in the same category as the most aggravated sins against the supreme Lawgiver. Priestcraft will also ever be more solicitous about offences against itself than transgressions against God.

The patriot Romanist detecting the latent working of aggressive tendencies in his church, or observant of more open manifestations, must, in proportion to the depth of his patriotism, feel troubled and suspicious; but these feelings are the germs of rebellion against the church, and constitute themselves serious sins. They must be confessed to the priest; and if he cannot make an enthralled conscience or a coward heart stifle the germinating crudities of the inner life, priestcraft will institute extraneous interferences. If Galileo were persecuted, would his discoveries be patronized? If Garibaldi were hunted, would his opinions be allowed to pass? If Guiccardini were imprisoned, would the study of the scriptures be recommended? If Luther were excommunicated, would church reform be petted in the Vatican, or would Lutheran doctrines be left unmolested? A suspicion that Galileo was right, according to Romanism would be a sin; a fellow feeling with Garibaldi, touching ecclesiastical reform or national freedom, would be a sin; a doubt in relation to the purity, policy, or constitution of the church in Luther's day would have been a sin; and a longing after the scriptures would now be a sin. And these all are matters for the confessional. Thus the confessional enables the church to nip in the germ the results of the soul's gathering consciousness, and finally to destroy that consciousness, and leave the soul to inanity and torpor. The confessional is, therefore, plainly at issue with mental and moral freedom, not only because it is in connexion with a system essentially and universally inimical to that freedom, but it would necessarily be so in connexion with any system which threw round its agents peculiarities to them amongst men as a separate and privileged class.

The second and distinctive aspect of the question before us involves the social influences of the confessional. The classes of interests proposed for our consideration are so mutually identical as to excuse their

juxtaposition in the question; but we are necessitated to consider this last abruptly and briefly. Everything inimical to man as a thinking and moral being must necessarily be disastrous to his social position. An unlawful interference with his mental powers must tend to retard the progress of society. Such interference also with the moral man must tend from the evangelical to the idolatrous or the atheistic. Besides these things, the confessional is, unhappily, fruitful of illustration of more direct antagonism to social welfare. It has a natural and necessary tendency to convert domestic and social intercourse into a system of mutual espionage. It engenders individual reserve, generates distrust, and originates treachery. Where is the proof of a naturalized and general treachery most to be found, but in countries where the confessional is most upheld?

The confessional tends to the aggravation of crime in general. The premeditation of crime, or its commission, is naturally and universally attended by a fear of certain indefinite consequences: this, in the most savage communities, must, in some measure, act beneficially; but men of Belial, assured by the father confessor that, at the price of a show of compunction—of a full and yet safe disclosure of their guilt—of the performance of certain frivolous or temporarily painful acts, or of the disgorgement of a portion of their spoil, they are fully and freely forgiven by Him to whom all things are naked and open, and are, therefore, safe from the punishment due to their sins—the

natural, universal barrier to crime is broken down. This evil is so manifest, and the inference so obvious, in reference to the action of the confessional upon society, that we make no further comment.

The confessional tends to the aggravation of profligacy in particular. Think of the priesthood, with its various forms of reactionary discipline—the celibate more especially; it would seem as if the whole nature of the man were studiously reined in in order for a more impetuous spring. Satan must certainly have suggested to the Romish priesthood the most unnatural forms of religiousness, as affording the readiest leaps into the diabolical, fearfully preparing them for the rebound from unnatural restraint to its opposite licentiousness. Think of the priests individually, and in the solitude and secrecy of the confessional, being the unseemly and unnatural repositories of woman's secret sins, eliciting, in accordance with their instructions, that which nature, and feminine nature especially, would solicitously conceal. A *good* man here would stand as on slippery ground; a bad man must find this the gate of hell—a very Sodom. What can possibly come of the confessional in this aspect, but a lamentable deterioration of moral sentiment, and a most fearful corruption of the virtuous element in our social fabric. The confessional must dim the fascination and destroy the life of domesticity, and degrade the moral position of woman. The confessional is at intentional issue with intellectual and moral freedom, and is at direct and deadly issue with social well-being. W. G.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In taking up our pen to support the position of "Confessarins," we desire to view this question not as affecting the dogma of a certain creed; and, laying aside all religious dissensions, we will look at it simply by the light of reason. The higher ground of its divine origin or its scriptural authority we will leave, and confine our attention to its harmony with the moral nature of man. The confessional is an institution coinciding with a law of our nature, and any organization calculated to carry out those laws, and to preserve our moral nature from corrupting influences, must be regarded as a positive good.

First let us look at the principle of confession, before we look at it as developed into a system in the form of the confessional. "Confess your sins one to another," says the inspired writer. The individual who has committed an ill deed, or thought an ill thought, has degraded himself in his own eyes; he is deprived of so much purity; and, like a rust spot, the sin will sink and canker in his soul, unless brought out and cleansed by confession.

The man who has confessed even to his vile accomplices feels comparative ease and freedom from the load of guilt which would sink him to perdition—is lightened. A

candid confession allows a person a starting point for a new course of moral rectitude; he is "a new creature;" he has done with the past, and the future may be full of hope. Every creature must feel the necessity of occasional confession for the sake of his individual happiness; it is an outlet from which flows the generated corruptions of his nature. The man with the dark brow, shadowed by the mantling gloom of malignity, does not confess his crimes; no, he hides them in his heart, until he is saturated with his own villainy.

Again, watch the man upon his dying bed who has committed crimes and buried them within his own bosom: they torment him more than his physical sufferings; he discloses them for present relief, as much as for pardon from the avenging Providence.

Thus we see that confession is a principle of our moral nature, and, as such, it becomes our duty not to repress, but to develop it. We now come to inquire which is the best system for promoting the efficacy of confession. Some would say, let your friends and relatives be your confessors. There are many objections to this. Jealousy, rivalry, and personal ambition mix up largely in the common affairs and ordinary relationships of life. Indiscriminate confession to surrounding friends would throw the apple of discord into society; bonds would be broken, ties severed, and domestic anarchy would follow.

But the publicly-established confessional affords the desideratum. When we view the confessional as an institution of society; when we see its functionaries absorbed in the duties of their holy calling, elevated above the sordid and mercenary world, living in an atmosphere where the conflicting passions of sensuality are unknown, we are inclined to think that no institution could be more calculated to advance the moral welfare of the human family. For this reason the party who receives the confessions must possess some superior claims as a teacher and practiser of religion, although he may not be able to grant absolution. The forgiveness attends the act of confession and the feeling of repentance. The priest is the hearer; and, while the heart is opened to him and its secret thoughts exposed, he can administer the balm of consolation, mingled with gentle censure, and apply the principles and precepts of religion for its future guidance. Man is

ever prone to deviate from the paths of truth; his inner light is not sufficient to keep him from straying into the mazes of error, or we might dispense with every species of religious instruction; but, once grant the necessity of theological teaching, and what line can be drawn to exclude the confessional from assisting in the instruction of the people? The confessional does its work silently, but powerfully: it adapts itself to individual cases. Private appeals have been as effectual in the conversion of the world as the public practice of preaching. The confessional is as much in harmony with intellectual and moral freedom as any town missionary society. We do not readily imagine that the wretches which this society rescues from the pit of ignorance and vice lose any portion of their liberty by being brought into the sun-lit moral atmosphere of spiritual knowledge. No one would dream of making such a charge; but the confessional is said to be incompatible with freedom for performing the very same office.

The confessional is perfectly in harmony with intellectual and moral freedom; and, further, its tendency is to preserve both. As a great preventative of crime, it is the necessary ally to freedom. Freedom becomes aggression when it gives people a licence to act contrary to the well-being of society; and when a person has violated the laws of freedom, either by act or thought, he may go to the confessional, humiliate himself, seek for pardon, cleanse his conscience of guilt, and re-establish purity of heart. The ills which society receives from its members are not always sufficiently tangible to come within reach of the civil law; these are brought to light and condemned at the confessional: the offender is not stamped as an outlaw and then let loose an enemy to society, but he is received again to her bosom; he is forgiven, becomes a better man, and goes on his way rejoicing.

Let us now, in conclusion, sum up the claims of the confessional:—

Firstly. The confessional does not interfere with individual freedom.

Secondly. It possesses no judicial function, and, therefore, is incapable of tampering with public liberty.

Thirdly. The confessional stands like a mighty champion of morality, checking those under-currents of licentiousness and sedition,

and thus tends to preserve the peace of the world.

Fourthly. The confessional is a sort of quarantine for the mind, by which it is purified from pestiferous contact with the world of sin.

Fifthly. We may regard the confessional as a sort of faculty of moral physicians. The bodily advisers have studied the researches of science and the laws of nature; we trust to their guidance. The spiritual advisers have studied the nature of the soul, and know how to apply the truth to heal her diseases; but without confession the efforts

of either would be futile, and it is as necessary a part of one system as the other. You cannot apply the remedy to an evil without first knowing it. And this is what the confessional facilitates in order to effect the removal of the weeds of vice from society, and to direct men's minds from the gross and sensual world to pure and holy objects, to infuse in them the spirit of love and devotion, to pilot them through the world (with its dangerous quicksands and rocks) to the haven where "the wicked cease from troubling, and where the weary are at rest."

J. B.

The Societies' Section.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

PROLOGOMENA—(*Concluded.*)

In composing a History of Human Thought, it is of great importance to notice and signalize the direct filiation of Ideas. Truth is not self-generative, but produced. To trace the genealogy of thought—the antecedents and subsequents of each idea—is one of the great duties of a historian of Philosophy. The parentage may not, at first sight, be obvious; but the historian's researches will enable him to present a *cumulation* of evidence which leads him to believe in the mutual connexion of thought with thought. Hence it arises that, in presenting an outline of the course to be pursued in the present series of selections, we shall be compelled to introduce, *in limine*, a sketch of that Philosophy which took its rise in those orient regions where man most early put forth the blossomry of thought.

The Introduction will treat of a period which recedes into the far distance of Antiquity, and which is but faintly discernible through the long vista of five thousand years. Our pilgrimage will be in "The Lands of the East"—Persia, Egypt, India, Chaldea, China, Palestine. There Philosophy, like the waters of the Nile, flows from sources, some of which are yet undiscovered, and merges into the vast ocean of human intelligence.

To this period belongs the Evangel-Philosophy contained in the works of the God-taught Moses—in the polity and religion of "The Children of Israel"—in the sayings of Wisdom's most richly-endowed son, Solomon—in the mildly-persuasive though sternly-reproving words of Isaiah—in the plaintive wailings of the woe-worn Jeremiah—the thunder-threatenings of Ezekiel—and those other "voices of the Lord," the minor prophets.

In the Celestial Empire Confucius and Meugius will appear to us, and give forth the great thoughts which came to them of Duty, Obedience, Honesty, Love, and Worship.

They will arise and teach us the value of forms, and the necessity of rituals, to express "the Ideas of the Reason."

A glimpse of the Chaldaic life-oracles, derived from the study of "the stars," which they made not only "the poetry," but also the philosophy, "of Heaven."

Then we shall change our point of vision, and the thought-science of Hindustan will meet our view. Here we have Deity symbolically represented as Brahm—pure Intelligence, or Om—glorific Light; and the grand desire of human souls should be towards Eeswar—the divine light-beams which Om evolves and circulates throughout the universe for the nourishment of the soul.

Mysterious Egypt—dawn-world of great thoughts embodied in great works—will invite us to inspect the inscriptions on her monuments, statues, temples, pyramids, and tombs—now almost outworn by the constant tread of ever-travelling Time—to see if we can there learn aught of her solution of the great queries relating to human destiny.

The Persian will then present his Zendavesta—a vast mythic symbolization of the Omnipresent and the Holy. He will tell us of Ormuzd—Light, Creation, and Unity—the fountain of Good, as well as of that fell opponent-power, Ahriman—Darkness, Destruction, and Disunion.

In all the speculations of this era one great fact will arise, viz., the *identicalization* of Philosophy and Religion. The human soul, stirred by "the problems of the Reason," constructs for itself, or accepts as an answer, a Religion. A class is then set aside to perform those sacrificial and propitiatory rites which such a Religion necessitates. Thus Philosophy becomes venerable in the eyes of the people, too sacred for vulgarians. The degeneracy of learning in all but one exclusive caste, and the gradual attainment of an hereditary monopoly of the treasure-stores of wisdom by the priest-rulers, are the more prominent results of this coalition or identicalization.

This view of pre-European Philosophy will lead to the proper topic of this series of papers, which shall be considered in three great divisions, viz.:—

I. Greek Philosophy.—1st. Pre-Socratic; 2nd. Socratic; 3rd. Post-Socratic.

II. Mediæval Philosophy.—1st. Subordination of Philosophy to Theology; 2nd. Alliance of Philosophy and Theology; 3rd. Differentiation and Divorce of Philosophy and Theology.

III. Modern Philosophy.—1st. Sensationalism; 2nd. Idealism; 3rd. Scepticism; 4th. Mysticism; 5th. Eclecticism.

To indicate the general tendency of such a series of papers is exceedingly difficult, because—1st. So wide a range of thought is not easily held at one glance before the mind; 2nd. The necessary concentration of remark is likely to produce that sort of ambiguity which results from too great brevity; 3rd. The great landmarks only can be noticed, and hence an apparent disconnectedness of thought results; 4th. We must presume a certain degree of knowledge in the reader which he may not possess; which, if he has, he wants not to receive from us, and if he has not, cannot acquire, so that either way we risk becoming tedious and tiresome; 5th. An aptitude of filling up the outline-thoughts presented must be presupposed; and, 6th. The unsatisfactoriness of a mere "bird's-eye view" of the landscape of human thought may deter the reader from pursuing his inquiries further. Still, when we consider how much we shall gain by the establishment of confidence between ourselves and our readers, we are inclined to set these difficulties at nought and hazard the attempt.

Should we fail, perhaps the reader will remember that the magnitude of the topic presented almost insurmountable obstacles to the accomplishment of our design—it is not easy to write a copy of the “Iliad” which may lie in a walnut-shell; while at the same time he may reflect that there may be deficiencies in the reader as well as in the author.

I. Greek Philosophy.—This division introduces us to a land where thought was free as the waves which encircle its glory-haloed shores—the land of the enfranchisement of mind—of wisdom-worship—where appeared those thought-kings whose shades still “rule our spirits from their urns.” Of the earlier period of philosophic thought we have but little record. At first ideas would arise spontaneously in the mind unsystematic and unscientifically trained; like bright flashes of intuition, they would course along “the hemisphere of thought,” beautiful and interesting from their novelty and sublimity. Hence Philosophy and Poetry became wedded friends, and the earlier sages were not only philosophers, but poets. Ever it is thus, the grand mysterious sublimities of mind educe poetic skill, and the dawn-thoughts of the wise are embellished by the gifts of the Muses. Through the strange though beautiful cloud-haze of myth which shadows man’s earlier history, there is enough seen to convince us of the fact that the curiosity of the human mind was early awakened to cosmogonic and metaphysic speculations. Among the earliest thinkers Orpheus—perhaps a mere myth representative of the sacerdotal race who thus early ruled in Greece—arose, and by his religious hymns and poems commenced that deep thinking on God, creation, destiny, &c., for which Greece has been so famed. Musæus followed, and led the thoughts of men to the dwelling-place of the dead. Homer and Hesiod individualized and named the various sub-forces of nature as minor gods; and other lyric and gnomic poets, by their hymns, odes, &c., contributed, if not to the elaboration of a philosophy, at least to a mythology in which the seeds of much philosophic thought lay embalmed.

Next came a contest of minds, a revolt against blind faith, an attempt to elaborate a practical wisdom—a wisdom which should guide in legislation, life, and warfare. Sacerdocy, opposed by sternly practical minds, who saw no hope for man so long as he was a blind follower of creeds and performer of ceremonies, if these were uninformed with higher meanings bearing on man’s moral wants, fell; and the Heptad—the seven wise men of Greece—appeared, and gave utterance to their lore. Political prudence, acute observation, much knowledge of the human heart, a keen sense of freedom, seem to have been the predominating qualities of their minds; and the pearl-strings of sayings, marked by sagacity, conciseness, and that epigrammatic terseness which impresses the mind at once, which they left, though delivered without any signs of philosophical elaboration, are the germs of much subsequent speculative thought.

Contemporaneously the Ionic and Italic schools of Philosophy appear on the historic *stage*, with Thales and Pythagoras respectively occupying the foreground. Subsequently the Eleatics, with Xenophanes of Colophon, Parmenides, and Zeno—the originator of “The Science of Reasoning”—as the chief teacher, present themselves. The Cosmogonists—those to whom the universe seems a mystery, and their own being “the mystery of mysteries,” and whose inquiries, therefore, relate to the Origin of the Universe and the Soul of Man, the chiefs of whose school are Heraclitus, Democritus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras—call for our attention.

Then there arises a new sect, who deny that knowledge is attainable by humanity, the Sophists, men who professed to teach the true method of thought, speech, and action—men who by their verbiage, by cloudiness of phrase, sought to conceal their ignorance and ape wisdom—men who by word-jugglery contrived to maintain the semblance of knowledge.

But who is that man of curious gait who walks about the forum? From his hearty laugh one would suppose him a humourist. His flattened snub-nose, his thick, protruding lips, his projecting eyeballs, his short, squat figure, his somewhat unwieldy portliness of person, and his general awkwardness, combined with the evident shabbiness of his dress point him out as one who, in the ordinary course of things, can only be the sport of the gay “wise men” who surround him. But, no! See! he is listened to with deference and respect, and ever and anon a loud laugh seems as if it hailed with pleasure the discomfiture of some one or more of those professors of wisdom, who are seemingly obliged to confess themselves baffled or mistaken by that poor, unfashionable, inelegant personage whose parents, we understand, occupy the humbler walks of life. That is Socrates—name which can only be forgotten when the stars sickle and die. We shall introduce you to him at a future time.

The several Socratic schools are now originated—the Megaric, with Euclid for its head—the Cyrenaic, with Aristippus as its chief teacher—the Cynic, with Antisthenes and Diogenes as its chief representatives.

Afterwards appeared the broad-browed, meditative Plato—perhaps the greatest, the most widely-discursive genius of ancient times. High-souled and gifted, brilliant and wise, his works are a mine of wisdom, richer and more precious far than the gold treasure which Australia or California conceals in its bosom—the riches of a spirit revealing its struggles in that great truth-search in which all good men in all ages have delighted to engage. To him succeeds the mighty Stagyræite—that cool, clear, formal, acute, and daring thinker—that giant amidst a race of giants. Eager, impetuous, deep-thoughted and truth-loving—extensively learned, laboriously studious, enthusiastically enamoured of speculation; he has become one of the mightiest names which the glorious land of Greece can boast. We hesitate not to say that to him we are indebted, indirectly, for many of the blessings of the Reformation. How, we shall show anon.

Stoicism took its rise from Zeno of Citium; then Epicurus of Samos produced his much misunderstood doctrine. Afterwards Philosophy withdrew from Greece, and erected her chief seats in Alexandria and Rome. Why? Macedonian ambition, aided by the general declension in morality, had snatched at Greek liberty and gained it; and with the loss of liberty, Arts, Science, Civilization, Intellectuality, Philosophy, fled “the desecrated shores.” Rome, it is true, had a few on whom the mantle of the Greek masters had fallen, and Alexandria was busy with thought-traffickers.

Christianity—“the day-spring from on high”—descends, and the destinies of the earth are changed.

Gnosticism and Greco-Christian speculations now occupy many minds. The Theological Philosophy of the Fathers of the Church becomes considerably dominant. But another day dawned. Rome, sated with conquest, swollen with pride, enslaved by luxury, infatuated by success, became a mass of, almost unleavened, moral putrefaction. Pass-

was no longer subordinate to Reason; and while she held the reins of the whole world, she permitted her own appetites to run riot, unswayed and unchecked. The foe approached. Paralysis unnerved the arm of Rome. Resistance was vain. The crown was snatched from the laurelled brows of the world's mighty mistress. Gloom and darkness settled upon the intellectual horizon of Europe.

II. Mediæval Philosophy.—A scene of dismal blankness, scantily illumined by the radiance of genius, is all that History can here present us. Corruption had entered the Church. The world and its honours became the possession of the reputed successors of him who said, "My kingdom is not of this world." A pseudo-infallible church having seized the reins of power as they were stricken from the nerveless arm of Rome, promulgated her edicts against the culture of the Intellect. Religion, by her interpreted, was to be man's "all in all." Boethius, Averroes, Alcuinus, Scotus Erigena, &c., belong to this era. The purpose of the Church, however, could not be accomplished. The mind cannot rest in unspeculative contentment and inactive torpidity—it *must* reason. Then she strove to combine the philosophic doctrines of the ancient world with the infallible doctrines which she promulgated. But she defeated her own end, and prevented the possibility of having an hereditary monopoly of all knowledge within her own pale, by the law of clerical celibacy. Then was the reign of Scholasticism consummated. Disputations, logic, mistaken subtlety, ingenious quibbling, inane debate, word-jugglery—anything, in fact, was hailed with "*benedicite*" which could occupy the mind on any other topic except the investigation of the credentials of that spiritual tyranny which sat on the throne of the world, bore the tiara of a *duplex* dominion, and stretched an iron sceptre over a prostrate and benighted universe. St. Anselm, Roscelinus, William of Champeaux, Abelard, Peter Lombard, John of Salisbury, Amaury, Bonaventura, and Thomas Aquinas, were the chief illustrious names connected with philosophic pursuits which appear in this era.

But this very Logic, which was employed as a mere instrument of wrangling, contained within it the seeds of greater things—it led the mind to inquire into the origin of knowledge, the rules of evidence, the *criteria* of truth, &c. It found the solution of these points by the Church unsatisfactory, while its practice militated against the laws which were found to regulate the development of human thought. The Church, however, had so far incorporated the Logic of Aristotle with its other would-be infallible decisions, that, when doubts of the utility of such studies entered the mind, men were punished as heretics, and thus the initiatory steps were taken which eventually resulted in that mighty, that unparalleled movement, in which all dominion, merely human, over human reason, was contemptuously renounced. The Church having been found fallible in one point, the idea of infallibility began to wane, and the mind, having loosed some of its fetters, was too happy in liberty not to attempt greater revolts. Roger Bacon, Duus Scotus, Raymond Lully, William Occam, John Charlier de Gerson, Manettus, Lodovicus Vives, and that "bold and persevering spirit," Peter Ramus, arise in our memory as worthy of notice.

III. Modern Philosophy.—Printing has been invented—the New World is discovered by Columbus—the passage by sea to India is found—"Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin" is ominously written on the walls of the Church of the Seven Hills. Great things are stirring to their birth—mind is in a ferment—unwonted activity animates thought. The

indomitable spirit of Luther burst asunder the fetters of the all-potent Church like stubble-withes. Then rushed that flood-tide of passion across the mind of man which made resistance to this monstrous soul-tyranny a virtue. They resisted; and "they stood free"—free, but not "alone," for by their side, "that they might not be moved," was God. Then the philosophy of Bacon dawned upon the world, teaching men that they were "the servants and interpreters of Nature, and could only act and understand so far as they observed and studied the order of Nature." Descartes wrought out the criteria of metaphysical truth, and the *formulae* of philosophic thought. Arts, Science, Civilization, Freedom, Religion, grew and flourished. In rapid order arose the various philosophies of mind and matter; and the names, amongst others, of Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Gassendi, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Kant, Reid, Fichte, Schelling, Stewart, Jacobi, Schlegel, Hegel, Brown, Coleridge, Cousin, Schulze, Sir William Hamilton, Comte, &c., were in rapid succession written in characters of light upon the page of Fame.

In an appendix we shall endeavour to condense an account of philosophic thought in America. As the tendencies of Philosophy there are the direct results of "European Philosophy," we apprehend that this will be found a fitting sequel. The names of Edwards, Schmucker, Upham, Tappan, Rauch, Hickok, &c., will grace this page, while a general abstract of the progress of Philosophy in modern times, and an estimate of the tendencies of Thought, will form an appropriate conclusion.

The foregoing abstract may rather be considered as a running table of contents than as an appreciation or signalization of the phases of philosophic thought: as such we hope our readers will receive it with indulgence. The ideal outline, rude and imperfect as it is, is now before you. May we be able to fill it up fittingly!

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

120. Can I beg of you to give me a short account of the origin and nature of manors? What is enacted by the statute, *Quia emptores*? Why must all manors, existing at the present day, have existed before that statute was passed? An answer inserted in the *British Controversialist* would be esteemed a very great favour by—**INQUIRER.**

121. I wish to enter the Church of England as a minister; but being possessed of a limited income, I take the liberty of inquiring, through the medium of your journal, the best and least expensive method of so doing, the probable cost, and the examination (if any) that has to be passed previous to entering college.—**A SUBSCRIBER.**

122. I should esteem it a great favour if any of your experienced correspondents could inform me—

1. Of the conditions and intellectual attainments required of a young man before he can enter a Dissenting college to be trained for the ministry.

2. The plan of studies pursued from beginning to end of such college course, or of any "manual," giving the information I seek—"EARNEST."

123. Being about to have my name entered on

the boards of one of the colleges at Cambridge, some of my friends advise me to study for honours; others tell me that, as I have no aptitude for mathematics, I had better not attempt that, but study, as they call it, for an ordinary degree. Now I should like much to know, if any of your readers could inform me, what is the difference between the two courses of study, and what, if any, are the peculiar advantages of pursuing each respectively; advantages, I mean, to be gained thereby after one has left college.

Any other information respecting Cambridge University will oblige.—**S. E. E.**

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

101. *The Study of Language.*—The plan wished to be adopted by "Avarus" is one that I cannot recommend. The maxim, "He who hunts two hares leaves one and loses the other," will, I think, apply in this instance. The study of any language requires great attention, and an undivided energy should be directed to it; and, if it is wished to unite with it any other study, then the thoughts are distracted and the energies divided, and not only will there be no saving of time, but also

neither study will be so successfully pursued as if each had received a separate and undivided attention.—D. H.

113. *How to keep a Diary.*—The term "diary" (derived from *dies*, the Latin for *day*) signifies a daily record, or account of every day's transactions. Those who desire to keep one, but have hitherto not made the attempt, will find the following hints of service; the peculiar circumstances of some persons may, however, render modifications and additions necessary:—

1. A diary should contain an account of every day's transactions, for events apparently insignificant at the time may materially affect the course of our after-life, and a day in which absolutely nothing has been done is not one of the least important in the view of those who have regard to their moral progress. Consequently, a book to contain such an account should be large, in proportion to the amount of time and pains we can daily devote to it, and should be strongly bound, as it is intended to be kept long—to be a life-book. It should be ruled, but not ready-dated, as most of the prepared diaries are; for on some days there will be, probably, little to record, while others will be full, perhaps, of striking and important events, requiring much longer notice.

2. It should be as legibly written as possible, in a round, easy, attorney-like hand.

3. It should be perfectly faithful in every respect. There is no need of dwelling on this point, as I presume no person writes a diary for the inspection of others, or to acquire a posthumous reputation (of which vanity we have an example, perhaps, in "Caesar's Commentaries"), but as a means of moral and intellectual progress.

4. It should contain an account of all transactions with other men, of current prices of articles of food and clothing, of travels and places visited, of new relations entered into—of all, in short, of which it may be important to remember the dates and circumstances; also with those who keep no regular accounts of income and expenditure, of bills paid and moneys received.

5. It should contain a faithful relation of all our offences, of omission and commission, against God and against man, against the law of conscience and against the law of the land, of secret faults as well as of open sins. This is absolutely necessary if we would have our diaries faithful records of our moral condition, and the only way in which we can render them effectual means of moral progress. For the same end those who wish to keep complete diaries should record all yearnings after improvement, and new resolutions of amendment formed.

6. Books read should be noticed, and their contents reviewed, briefly or at length, according to the impression they may have produced on our characters, and the time and attention we have bestowed on them. Such review, however, should only be attempted by those who have full leisure time for it, and then only when the particular book has been carefully read and reviewed *mentally*, before committing one's thoughts of it to paper.

7. In our observations upon the character and conduct of others we should be especially careful to remember the golden rule of charity, "Think no evil one of another."

8. Intellectual or moral progress which we have made, or think we have made, should from time to time be recorded.

These rules, if conscientiously followed, will, I believe, in a few years produce ample fruits in increased diligence and attention to every-day business, in a contented spirit, and in enlightened views of moral and intellectual responsibility.—NON NOBIS SOLUM.

115. *An Herbarium.*—The method of forming an herbarium is very simple. R. F. will, of course, take his "Manual of Botany" as a guide, and arrange his specimens according to the order as there laid down. The plants he wishes to preserve should be gathered in fine weather, and submitted to the following process of drying:—Place each plant between several sheets of blotting-paper, and iron it with a smooth heater, pretty strongly warmed, till all the moisture is dissipated, which will have a tendency to fix the colours. In compound flowers, and those of a stubborn and solid form, some art is required in cutting away the under part, so as to obtain a view of the profile and form of the flowers; this is especially necessary when the method is adopted of fixing the flowers and fructification to the paper previous to ironing. R. F. must always be careful to keep his herbarium in a dry place.—L. S.

I am myself no botanist, and cannot therefore give the result of any practical experience of my own, on the method of preserving plants. However, in the "Popular Educator" there is an article on the subject, from which I shall take a few extracts, and pen them in as *small a compass as possible*. The plants should be collected in dry weather, and should on no account be placed in water after being gathered. You will require a number of sheets of red blotting paper, and a small press of some kind or other. Lay the plant you wish to preserve on two or three sheets of blotting paper, previously heated at the fire till they become as hot as they can be made without scorching: arrange the leaves naturally, pressing down any stubborn stalks, and disposing the flowers with the greatest care. When the plant is arranged, lay over it half a dozen sheets of blotting paper; then insert another plant, and so proceed with successive layers. Put them in the press, and screw it up. After about three days the plant should be taken out, and fresh paper substituted, and the damp paper dried for further use. The specimens, if not very fleshy or robust, will be dried in the course of a week, or even less time. The quicker the process used for drying, the more will the colour be retained. Small specimens may be dried in a book, warmed by the heat of the pocket.

The article from which the above is extracted gives much fuller directions than space will permit me to do here. It also furnishes instruction for arranging the plants when dried: and I would therefore recommend R. F. to purchase the 17th number of the "Popular Educator."—D. H.

116. *Laughing Gas.*—Nitrous oxide, or "laughing gas," is composed of an equal number of equivalents of nitrogen and oxygen (fourteen parts nitrogen, eight parts oxygen). It is easily made, by subjecting thoroughly dry nitrate of ammonia, in fine powder, to a degree of heat equal to 275° Fahr. A flask should be employed to contain the salt, having a bent tube for the conveyance of the gas into a pneumatic trough. Below 275° sublimation occurs, which, if suffered to proceed, soon causes a stoppage in the inner aperture of the tube, and thus, preventing egress, occasions a fracture of the flask. If, on the other hand, the

heat be superior, nitric oxide is also evolved, a gas extremely deleterious to the lungs. This, however, may be detected by dissolving a small quantity of sulphate of iron (the common green vitriol) in the water of the trough, thus forming a solution capable of showing the presence of nitric oxide, by changing from an almost colourless liquid to a blackish one. The proper degree of heat, therefore, can be easily obtained.

The gas thus generated is collected in a receiver over the pneumatic trough; it is devoid of colour, taste, and smell, and possesses a density somewhat greater than common air.

"Laughing gas" is respirable, but unfitted to support life. Its effects vary as the temperament of persons inhaling it. Some few it is incapable of affecting; but for the most part the sensations produced by it are pleasurable. Sir Humphrey Davy, in 1799, was the first chemist who accurately investigated it. We subjoin, as a fair description of its effect, that of Davy. He writes:—"Having previously closed my nostrils, and exhausted my lungs, I breathed four quarts of nitrous oxide from and into a silk bag. The first feelings were similar to those produced in the last experiment (giddiness), but in less than half a minute, the respiration being continued, they diminished gradually, and were succeeded by a sensation analogous to gentle pressure on all the muscles, attended by a highly pleasurable thrilling, particularly in the chest and the extremities. The objects around me became dazzling, and my hearing more acute. Towards the last inspiration the thrilling increased, the sense of muscular power became greater, and at last an irresistible propensity to action was indulged in. I recollect but indistinctly what followed. I know that my motions were various and violent.

"These effects very soon ceased after respiration. In ten minutes I had recovered my natural state of mind. The thrilling in the extremities continued longer than the other sensations.

"This gas has been breathed by a very great number of persons, and almost every one has observed the same things. On some few, indeed, it has no effect whatever, and on others the effects are always painful."—C. J. H.

Laughing gas (chemically termed nitrous oxide) is a combination of nitrogen and oxygen. Its composition, *according to atom*, is 1 of nitrogen and 1 of oxygen; *according to volume*, 1 of nitrogen and $\frac{1}{2}$ of oxygen; its equivalent or atomic weight being 22. There is a great difference between the chemical and philosophical atom; the latter is the supposed ultimate molecule which is incapable of division, the shape of which being (according to the great majority of philosophers) spherical, the interspaces being filled up with what is termed *luminiferous aether*, or the bearer of light; the former (chemical atom) being the *smallest quantity* with which one substance will COMBINE with another. The standard by which we reckon the chemical atom is hydrogen, which, being the lightest, is taken as ONE. On the continent oxygen is taken as the standard, which is A HUNDRED. The atomic number is reckoned from hydrogen, and is consequently relative; for instance, the atomic weight of oxygen is 8, i. e., the least proportion of oxygen required to combine with another substance is *eight times* as much as hydrogen, and of nitrogen *fourteen times* as much;

therefore the atomic weight of nitrogen is 14. The formula for laughing gas would be as follows:—

1 atom of nitrogen 14, which is its atomic weight
1 atom of oxygen 8, ditto ditto

—
22 the atomic weight of laughing gas.

This laughing gas, or nitrous oxide, is obtained from nitrate of ammonia. Nitrate of ammonia is composed of nitric acid and ammonia; the former consists of

1 atom of nitrogen, 14; and

5 ditto of oxygen, 40;

the latter, of 1 atom of hydrogen, 1; and

3 ditto of hydrogen, 3

—
The atomic weight of ammonia is 17.

It is prepared by heating the nitrate of ammonia in a Florence flask; when this salt decomposes 3 atoms of oxygen from the nitric acid unite with 3 atoms of hydrogen from the ammonia, and form 3 atoms of water. The remaining 2 atoms of oxygen from the nitric acid unite with the 1 atom of nitrogen from the ammonia, and the 1 atom remaining from the nitric acid, forming 2 of nitrogen and 2 of oxygen, which, together combined form 2 atoms of laughing gas, which pass over.

The gas is colourless and heavy, it is slightly absorbed by water, and has a sweetish taste. It supports respiration and combustion, on account of the oxygen it contains.

Before respired, it should be carefully washed with water, in order to free it from any nitrous acid which might be mixed with it. When inhaled, it is a very powerful stimulant, as is well known. Although numbers have taken it without any apparent injurious effect, yet I believe, even in the healthy, it acts prejudicially (however slightly) on the constitution. In many morbid conditions, as organic disease of the heart, disease of lungs, tendency to apoplexy, &c., it would be most decidedly detrimental, and the ill effects produced, most likely, would be of a very serious nature, and might prove fatal.—A. S.

119. *Incubation*.—Strictly speaking, a chick is neither hatched from the white nor the yolk of an egg, but from a little semi-opaque spot about an eighth of an inch in diameter, termed the *cellular*, or germ-spot, and which may be detected on the surface of the yolk-bag of a fresh egg. This, during incubation, extends itself into the *germinal membrane*, which gradually spreads over and encloses the yolk, and on the central portion of which the embryo is developed. Further information is required by P. C. C., he would do well to consult "Carpenter's Principles of General and Comparative Physiology."—A. C.

The chemistry of life is certainly one of the most deeply interesting, yet subtle subjects to which the inquiring mind can be directed. To affirm dogmatically that the godlike principle of the life-giving quality, is inherent in the yolk or white of an egg, exclusively, would be saying more than the lynx eye of the most accomplished chemist can discover. Nay, in the eye of a chemist, the yolk and the white are the same, viz. albumen; the difference of colour arising from the presence of a little yellow oil. But what is albumen? A glairy fluid, the chief property of which is its coagulability by the action of heat; but a fluid in which motion and life elude

everest scrutiny. Liebig on this subject (if my memory serves me) makes no mention of the yolk; and his remarks upon the white are so very general, that they could scarcely be made to bear on the point at issue. But there is a passage in a lecture by Thomas Turner, Esq., F.L.S.,

which may satisfy P. C. C.; it is, "If these parts (the yolk and the white) are examined chemically—for they are not the germ, the germ is in connection with the yolk; . . . the egg contains what is necessary for the developing bird during its habitat in the shell."—H. C.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar.—No. VIII.

1. Write out the following sentences, and underline the adjectives:—

Old men are not always wise. A soft answer turneth away wrath. Have no dealings with an angry man. Foolish conversation should be avoided. Sin is hurtful to the soul. Some have the art to make the worse appear the better reason. The most severe strokes of Providence

are generally healed by time. This man is wiser than his brother. The most faithful dealing and the purest motives are often misunderstood. The liberal devise generous things. The peacemaker is blessed in his deeds. The meek shall inherit the earth. Light is sown for the righteous.

2. Make a form like the one given, and place the positive, comparative, and superlative forms of the adjectives in the preceding exercise in their proper columns:—

ADJECTIVES.

Positive.	Comparative.	Superlative.
Old.	Older, or elder.	Oldest, or eldest.

3. Underline the proper adjectives in the following sentences:—

The English were sufficiently foolish to interfere with the French Revolution. The Scotch Gays were very valiant at Waterloo. The Swiss people contended many years for liberty. Scriptural knowledge is most valuable. The Welsh regard their language as the most beautiful spoken. The Bourbon family has been most unfortunate.

4. Make sentences, using each pair of the following adjectives—first, in the positive; secondly, in the comparative; and, thirdly, in the superlative forms:—

Wise, merciful; good, honourable; honest, brave; industrious, late; poor, respectable; rich, luxurious; chaste, sentimental.

Examples:—1. That man is both wise and merciful. 2. That man is wiser, and at the same time more merciful, than his neighbour. 3. That man is the wisest and most merciful man I know.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercises on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XIX.

1. What is Method, and of how many parts does it consist?

2. Mention some of the pre-requisites of Knowledge.

3. Describe the true Method of Science.

4. Mention some of the defects of the Baconian Philosophy.

5. Give a concise outline of the Methodology of Descartes.

6. Give a concise outline of Comte's "Philosophie Positive."

7. What are the rules by which methodical inquiries ought to be conducted?

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—VII.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 24. Let x = hours between the times of starting and meeting of the trains; then the train A will travel the whole distance in $x + 9$ hours, and the train B in $x + 5$ hours. If the whole distance in miles be represented by d , A

travels at the rate of $\frac{d}{x+9}$ miles per hour, and B

travels $\frac{d}{x+5}$ miles per hour; therefore, when

they meet, A has travelled $x \cdot \frac{d}{x+9}$ miles, and B has travelled $x \cdot \frac{d}{x+5}$ miles; but these two distances make up the whole distance:—

$$\therefore x \cdot \frac{d}{x+9} + x \cdot \frac{d}{x+5} = d.$$

Expunging d from this equation, and multiplying out, we get—

$$x^2 + 5x + x^2 + 9x = x^2 + 14x + 45.$$

$$\therefore x^2 = 45$$

$$x = \sqrt{45} = 6.708204 \text{ hours.}$$

\therefore Train A was 15.708204, or 15 hours, 42 minutes, 29.5 seconds; and train B was 11.708204, or 11 hours, 42 minutes, 29.5 seconds upon the road.—Ans.

We see from this solution that, in a question of this kind, the distance between the places is not required to be known; and the reduction of the above equation shows us that, in all similar questions, x will be equal to the square root of the product of the two given numbers of hours, or is a mean proportional between them. C. D. S.

Question 25. Let x = the number of sheep; then $\frac{630}{x}$ = the price of each; but, if $x-3$ = the number bought, then $\frac{630}{x-3}$ would be the price of each, which, according to the question, is 5s. more than the cost price.

Therefore, $\frac{630}{x-3} - \frac{630}{x} = 5$; dividing by 5, and clearing fractions, $126x - 126x + 378 = x^2 - 3x$; completing a square, $x^2 - 3x + \frac{9}{4} = \frac{1521}{4}$;

extracting the root $x - \frac{3}{2} = \frac{39}{2}$.

$\therefore x = 21$.—Ans.

J. S. D.

Question 26. Here, when the hour hand is at 5, the minute hand is at 12.

Let x = the number of minutes the hour hand is past 5.

Now, the minute hand goes twelve times as fast as the hour hand.

$\therefore 12x$ = the number of minutes the minute hand has gone over. But the minute hand has gone over 25 more minutes than the hour hand.

$\therefore 12x - x = 25 \therefore x = 2\frac{1}{11}$ minutes.

\therefore Time = $25 + 2\frac{1}{11} = 27\frac{1}{11}$ past 5.—Ans. F. D.

Question 27.

Since $x^2 - y^2 = x + y \times x - y$

$$= 24 + x - y \therefore 24(x - y) = 96$$

$$\text{and } x - y = 4$$

$$\text{but } x + y = 24$$

$$\therefore, \text{ by addition, } 2x = 28$$

$$\text{and } x = 14$$

$$\text{and by subtraction, } 2y = 20, \text{ and } y = 10.$$

J. C. M. C.

Geometry.

Question 12. Let D be diameter of the larger circle, and d the diameter of the smaller; then $D^2 \times .7854$ = area of the larger, and $d^2 \times .7854$ = area of the smaller circle. $\therefore D^2 \times .7854 - d^2 \times .7854 = (D^2 - d^2) \times .7854 = (D + d)(D - d) \times .7854$ (1), substituting this value in (1).

$$(260 + 180)(260 - 180) \times .7854 = 440 \times 80 \times .7854 = 27646.08 = \text{area of moat.}$$

J. J.

Question 13. The diameter of the sphere must be equal to the side of the cube, i. e., 4.5 feet. \therefore The superficial content of the sphere is = $4.5^2 \times 3.1416 = 63.6174$ sq. ft., and solid content = $4.5^3 \times .5236 = 47.71305$ cubic feet.

L. R.

Mechanics.

Question 12.

$$\text{Total resistance} = 8 \times 50 + \frac{40^2}{10} \times 33 = 400 + 297 =$$

697 lb. Space moved over in one revolution of driving wheel = $6 \times 3.1416 = 18.8496$. \therefore Work performed in one revolution = $18.8496 \times 697 = 13138.1712$. As there are two cylinders, and each piston makes two strokes while the driving wheel makes one revolution. The work of 1 lb. per inch on the pistons in one revolution of the driving wheel = $1 \times 100 \times 1.5 \times 4 = 600$.

$$\therefore \text{The effective pressure on one inch of the piston} = \frac{13138.1712}{600} = 21.8969.$$

Then the resistance of the blast pipe increases in proportion with the speed of the engine.

$$\therefore \text{Resistance of blast pipe} = 1.75 \times \frac{30}{10} = 5.25.$$

$$\therefore \text{Total pressure} = 21.8969 + 21.8969 \times \frac{1}{2} + 5.25 = 18.40275 \text{ lb.}$$

Then number of revs. of driving wheel per minute

$$\frac{5280 \times 30}{60 \times 6 \times 3.1416} = 140.$$

\therefore Number of strokes = $140 \times 4 = 560$, and the volume of steam discharged,

$$= \frac{100}{144} \times \frac{3}{2} \times 560 = 583 \text{ cubic feet.}$$

Now the number of cubic feet of steam, at a pressure of 45.275, produced from 1 cubic foot of water, is 594.

NOTE.—This result is obtained by the formula given by Tate, $V = a + b P^a$, i. e.,

$$V = 12.5 + 20670 \times 45.275^{.2222} = 594.$$

\therefore Number of cubic feet of water evaporated per minute = $\frac{583}{594} = .982.$

And as one bushel of coal evaporates 11.5 cubic feet of water,

\therefore Number of bushels consumed per minute =

$$\frac{.982}{11.5} = .0854.$$

\therefore The total number of bushels =

$$\frac{120}{30} \times 60 \times .0854 = 20.5, \text{ nearly.}$$

W.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—IX.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

32. A, B, and C, together, can reap a field in 4 days, which would take B and C $5\frac{1}{2}$ days, or A and B 6 days. How long would each of them be doing it by himself?

33. If I sell Three Per Cent. at 98, at what price must I purchase Two and a Half per Cent. to add 5 per cent. to my income?

34. A certain village cost its proprietor £30,000. Supposing it to pay a rental of 5 per cent. on the outlay, and to be assessed 20 per cent. below the actual rental, what will a rate of 6d. in the pound produce?

35. Given, $7x + 8y = 127$, and $8x + 7y = 125$, find x and y .

Geometry.

16. The superficial content of a cone is required, the diameter of whose base is 16 inches, and whose height is 20 inches.

17. The wheels of a chaise, each 4.5 feet high, in turning within a ring, moved so that the outer wheel made three turns while the inner wheel made two; their distance from each other was 5 feet 6 inches. What were the circumferences described by them?

18. The height of a cylinder is 20 feet, and the diameter of its base 2 feet 6 inches. What is its superficial contents?

Mechanics.

15. A train of 100 tons moves at the rate of 10 miles per hour when the steam is cut off. How far will it go before it stops, the friction being 4 lb. per ton, and the resistance of the atmosphere 3 lb. on the whole train, when it moves at the rate of 10 miles per hour?

16. What is the pressure on a flood-gate, whose breadth is 6 feet, and depth 10 feet?

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. X.—ON STYLE.

LANGUAGE is the natural interpreter between soul and soul; and Style is that genuine and beautiful product of the mind by which the results, distinctions, combinations, and connexions of systematic thought are transfigured and glorified. The play of feature, however delicate and exquisite—the smile of modest admiration—the changing cheek—the writhing lip—the contorted frame—the passion-clouds upon the brow—"the heavenly Rhetoric of the eye"—all the infinite variety of bodily gesture or facial expression—while they may become, and indeed often are, admirable exponents of human *emotions*, are very far from being capable of giving adequate symbolic manifestations of those intellectual activities whose results are *thoughts*. Speech alone is capable of imparting that appropriate explicitness to the conceptions of man which they require. It is only through the possession of this faculty that man is enabled "to seize, at once, the roving thought, and fix it," and thus embody and incarnate the results of the processes of the Intellection in

"Eloquence which, like the vows of love,
Can steal suspicion from the hearts
Of all that listen."

Only by this can the spiritual element in our nature be fittingly revealed, and our faculty of thought be thoroughly and effectually disciplined. The inward and unseen is thus rendered visible, and the outward sign enables our thoughts to pass current through the world. To give clear utterance to clear thoughts is the chief requisite in Style. To effect this, words must be well chosen, correctly arranged, and pertinent to the topic of discourse; they must be grammatically and logically assorted before they can be either eloquent or persuasive. The acquisition of the power of employing an apt transparency of Language—of picturing forth our thoughts in clear, cogent, felicitous diction—of using the simplest language with elegance and the most adorned with ease and propriety, and of adding the charms of grace and beauty to those "winged accents" in which we give utterance to our ideas, while it is of vast importance as an *end*, is of still greater moment when regarded as the *means* by which our own souls are educated, as well as the medium through which we educate the souls of others. Hence it is that "*Nobis prima sit eloquentiæ virtus, perspicuitas, propria verba, rectus ordo, non in longum dilata conclusio; nihil neque desit neque superfluit.*"* The vital importance of accuracy, in the art of thought-expression, will be perceived at once; but as there are other accompanying graces

* "To us Perspicuity should be the chief excellence of Style, proper words, an accurate arrangement, a period not drawn out in length; nothing should be wanting, nothing should be superfluous."
—Quintilian's "*Institutes*," lib. viii.

of Style to which some attention is requisite, we shall distribute our remarks in a classified form, under the six following topics, viz.,—Perspicuity, Conciseness, Unity, Strength, Vivacity, and Harmony,—which comprise all the most essential qualities of Style, so far as regards the structure and arrangement of sentences.

I. "PERSPICUITY consists in the using of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts which we would have pass from our own minds into those of other men. It is this that gives them an easy entrance; and it is with delight that men hearken to those whom they easily understand. Whereas what is obscurely said, dying as it is spoken, is usually not only lost, but creates a prejudice in the hearer, as if he that spoke knew not what he said, or was afraid to have it understood."* It entirely objects to the couching of our ideas in vague, inaccurate, obscure, or ambiguous phraseology, where the thoughts

" Flit before the mind,
As flit the snow-flakes in a winter's storm,
Seen rather than distinguished."

It demands the constant and uniform employment of such words, phrases, and idiomatic constructions as shall make the conceptions of our minds clear, obvious, and easily comprehended. The outlines of our thoughts must be sharply defined, boldly sketched, distinct, complete, carefully discriminated and demarcated from everything similar, as well as harmoniously consorted with each other. "Without this," says Dr. Blair, "the richest ornaments of Style only glimmer through the dark, and puzzle instead of pleasing the reader" or hearer. "Man," says William von Humboldt, "speaks *because* he thinks." Language ought, therefore, to exhibit thought, not conceal it. The man who cannot speak plain truths in plain words is, so far at least as his hearers or readers are concerned, as despicable as the man who will not. Those who listen or read have a right to expect that no unnecessary confusion, embarrassment, or inconvenience—no difficulty not unavoidably incident to the subject—should be imposed upon them; but that they should receive as much instruction and pleasure, at the smallest possible expense of time and thought, as the case will admit of. It is true, that in some cases a writer cannot give his thoughts the eloquence of beauty; but he may at all times bestow on them that much more requisite eloquence—perspicuous utterance. It is true, that men generally delight in perusing those works in which,

" With the light of thoughtful reason mixed,
Shines lively fancy and the feeling heart."

But the chief *sine qua non* of delight is a clear and ready comprehension of the ideas presented to the mind. This can only be produced when the meaning of a sentence, or a collocation of sentences, is so transparent as not only to render misunderstanding difficult but impossible. As quickly as one reads, supposing him to have an average acquaintance with the language, combined with ordinary intellectual powers, so quickly should he understand. If he must laboriously reflect, carefully remember, frequently pause to reconsider, re-examine the context, re-read the sentences, or is otherwise hindered from discovering the intended meaning, the Style is defective in Perspicuity. When sentences are

* Locke's "Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study."—Works, vol. iv. p. 601.

so composed that there is no mistaking the signification—when one meaning alone, and that the one intended, can be found in the passage—the *jus et norma perspicuitatis* have been obeyed. Words taken singly have many significations; in composition, however, they lose their individual meaning, and form, by their syntactic junction, one special expression, indicative of the whole thought which is intended to be unfolded at the time. The many consignificancies which each word bears must be carefully noted; the one meaning capable of becoming, in conjunction with the needful accessorial and adjunctive terms, the exponent of the special idea requiring exposition, must be adopted, and the whole sentence must be so arranged that the precise and exact conception shall necessarily and inevitably arise in the mind of the party addressed, and that all other interpretations may be as absolutely excluded. It is, of course, quite evident that there are two pre-requisites to the attainment of such a manner of composition, viz.—1st. A complete and accurate knowledge of the language in which we speak or write, and a ready practical mastery of it; 2nd. Logical precision of thought. If the medium through which ideas are to be viewed is deficient in transparency, an accurate acquaintance with them cannot be gained; and if the ideas themselves be hazy and indistinct, no clearness in the medium can possibly make them capable of being accurately observed. Thought being the primary, demands the chief attention; for Horace truly remarks, “Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.”* If we suppose the possession of clear thoughts, then a proper choice and collocation of words should secure the perspicuity of the sentence. It is very true, however, as Archbishop Whately says, “that perspicuity is a relative term, and, consequently, cannot be predicated of any work without a tacit reference to the class of readers or hearers for whom it is designed; and also that it is not inconsistent with ornament and conciseness;” and this ought to be kept distinctly in view in forming our judgment regarding any work.

Having thus explained what is meant by the term Perspicuity, we shall lay before our readers, in the form of rules, a few of the chief points involved in the subject.

I. The words and members which constitute a period ought to be so arranged as to secure syntactical completeness and accuracy; or, in other more specific terms, adjectives, relative pronouns, participles, adverbs, and explanatory clauses, should be placed as near as possible to the words to which they relate, and in such positions as shall make their reference quite apparent. Nouns and pronouns should, in general, be placed immediately before or after the verbs with which they are connected; prepositions should always precede the nouns they govern, and conjunctions ought to stand between those words or clauses which they are intended to conjoin. This rule is frequently violated. The following instances of the neglect of it may be quoted, viz.:—

1. “There is, among the people of all countries and of all religions, a belief of immortality, arising from the natural desire of living, and strengthened by tradition, *which* has certainly some influence upon practice, and some effect in fortifying the soul against the terrors of death.”—*Lindsay's Sermons*. *Which* should follow *immortality*.

2. “And, indeed, in some cases, we derive as much or more pleasure from that source than from the thing itself.”—*Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful*. Better thus:—And, indeed, in some cases, we derive as much pleasure from that source as from the thing itself, perhaps more.

* “To think well is the first principle and fountain of correct writing.”

3. "The young
Gather their joys up underneath the tears
Of aged eyes—moist, perishable joys ;
And scarce the dew has dried upon the leaf,
Than they, too, fade."—*Smith's "Sir William Crichton."*

Than should be *Ere*.

4. "Above rolled the planets, each, by its own liquid orbit of light, distinguished from the inferior or more distant stars."—*Scott's "Guy Mannering."* *Distinguished* ought to follow *each* and precede *by*.

5. "Chaucer followed nature everywhere, but was never so bold to go before her."—*Dryden's "Essay on Dramatic Poetry."* *As* should follow *bold*, as the correlate of *so*.

6. "Thales was not only famous for his knowledge of nature, but for his moral wisdom."—*Enfield's "History of Philosophy."* Should be—Thales was *famous* not only for, &c.

7. "Nor is the reason difficult to be discerned which has led to the establishment of this moral law."—*Mackintosh's "Dissertation on Ethical Science."* Better thus:—Nor is the reason which has led to the establishment of this moral law difficult to be discerned.

8. "There are a sort of spirits fall but once,
But that once is perdition."—*Smith's Dramas—"Guidone."*

Better thus:—

There is a sort of spirits who fall but once,
But that once is perdition.

II. Ambiguity or obscurity arising from the uncertain meaning of words, their equivocal reference to each other, the use of the same word in different senses, or different words in the same sense, and the introduction of such parenthetical clauses as are not absolutely necessary, ought to be carefully guarded against. The following sentences may be quoted as illustrations of the sort of errors against the committal of which this rule warns us, viz.—

1. "Any reasons of doubt which he might have in this case, would have been reasons of doubt in the case of other men, who may give more, but cannot give more evident signs of thought than their fellow-creatures."—*Bolingbroke's "Philosophical Essays,"* i. sect. 9. This sentence would be improved by saying,—who may give more numerous, &c., or by using the adjective *clearer* instead of *more evident*.

2. "God hath given to man a busy soul, the agitation whereof cannot but through time and experience work out many hidden truths; to suppress these would be no other than injurious to mankind, whose minds, like so many candles, should be kindled by each other."—*Hall's "Occasional Meditations."* *These* should be *this*, if, as we presume, it refers to *agitation*: if the antecedent be *truths*, the sentence is correct; but, as the agitation of the busy soul of man is the means by which many hidden truths are wrought out, we apprehend that the former is the intended word.

3. "Of the nineteen tyrants who started up under the reign of Gallienus, there was not one who enjoyed a life of peace or a natural death."—*Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire."* As a man cannot be said to *enjoy* death, even when *natural*, some other verb seems wanting to express the author's meaning; perhaps the insertion of the word *died* immediately after *or* would be the easiest emendation.

4. "There are so many advantages of speaking one's own language well, and being a master of it, that, let a man's calling be what it will, it cannot but be worth our taking some pains in it."—*Locke*. Better thus, perhaps:—There are so many advantages of speaking one's own language well, and being a master of it, that, whatever a man's calling may be, the study of his native language cannot but be worthy of some pains.

III. The bombastic, the puerile, the inconsistent, the would-be-profound, ought, as much as possible, to be avoided. The following are instances of the neglect of this rule, viz.—

1. "My wound is grent, because it is so small."—*Dryden*.
2. "Just as the mighty rains,
Which, gathering, flood the valleys in the days
Of autumn; or as rivers, when snow decays,
Sweep all things in their course, till nought remains
Distinguishable."—*Barry Cornwall's "Marcian Colonna."*
3. "Slow sinks more lovely, ere his race be run,
Along Morea's hills, the setting sun,
Not as in northern climes, obscurely bright,
But one unclouded blaze of living light."—*Byron's "Corsair."*
4. "Our flag the sceptre all who meet obey."—*Ibid.*
5. "From harmony, from heavenly harmony,
This universal frame began;
From harmony to harmony,
Through all the compass of the notes it ran,
The diapason closing full in man."—*Dryden*.

6. "The Carthagenians were remarkably *precious* of the blood of their own citizens, while they lavished that of their mercenaries with reckless prodigality."—*Keightley's "Rome."* *Precious* should be *careful*, or some word of similar signification.

IV. To make periods more lengthy than is absolutely necessary is a great fault.

"The greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or farthest end of knowledge; for men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes from a natural curiosity—an inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction, and most times for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account of the gift of their reason to the benefit and use of men; as if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit or sale, and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate."—*Bacon's "Advancement of Learning."* This period, we believe, might be, with much advantage to the sense, as well as ease to the reader, redistributed, and composed into different periods, thus, perhaps:—1. The greatest error of all the rest is, the mistaking or misplacing of the last or farthest end of knowledge. 2. Men appear to have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes from a natural curiosity—an inquisitive spirit, sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight, sometimes for ornament and reputation, and sometimes to enable them to [acquire the] victory of wit and contradiction. 3. In most cases, however, professional purposes and the acquisition of lucre are the moving causes. 4. Seldom do men seek wisdom sincerely to give a true account of the gift of their reason to the benefit and use of man. 5. It oftener seems as if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless [unquiet?] spirit, or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect, or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon, or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention, or a shop for profit and sale, and not [instead of?] a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate. —The words in italics represent the changes rendered necessary by the suggested variation of style from the involved period to the simple: those in brackets seem necessary to complete or improve the sense.

The examples which we have thought it necessary to adduce have occupied so much of our space that we have but little more at our disposal for the present paper. Before concluding, however, we may be permitted to quote, from one of the great men of the nineteenth century, a distinction which ought to obtain between two terms which have been

frequently employed in this article, viz., ambiguity and obscurity:—"Ambiguity is where the effect of the expression employed is to present in conjunction divers imports, in such sort, that though to the individual mind in question it appears clear enough that in one or other of them is to be found the import which was intended to be conveyed, yet *which* it is that was intended to be conveyed is matter of doubt. Obscurity is where, of the expression employed, the effect is, for the present at least, not to present any one import as that which was intended to be conveyed. In the case of *ambiguity*, the mind is left to float between two or some other determinate number of determinate imports;—in the case of obscurity, the mind is left to float amongst an indeterminate, and it may be an infinite number of imports. Obscurity is ambiguity at its *maximum*."* The only method by which these defects of style may be fully and fairly escaped, is to aim in our writing so to choose and colligate our terms that we may observe Quintillian's general rule for perspicuous composition, and write, *Non ut intelligere possit, sed ne omnino possit non intelligere curandum; i. e.,* Not that the hearer may understand if he will, but that he may understand whether he will or not.

Philosophy.

IS WOMAN MENTALLY INFERIOR TO MAN?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"The very first
Of human life must spring from woman's breast;
Your first small words are taught you from her
lips;
Your first tears quenched by her, and your last
sighs
Too often breathed out in a woman's hearing,
When men have shrunk from the ignoble care
Of watching the last hour of him who led them."
BYRON.

WE shall, perhaps, best please our friends, and at the same time pass the highest compliment in our power upon our opponents, if we abstain from any minute or critical examination of their several papers upon this interesting question. Their arguments have been so weak, so mystical, so rambling, and, withal, so far-fetched, that we have strong reason to doubt if any of them can boast the virtue of *sober seriousness* in the course they have pursued; in other words, we believe more credit to be due to their *hearts* than their heads: they have *meant* right, but gone wrong!

It would, perhaps, occupy the greater part of the present paper simply to classify and arrange what they have *endeavour'd* to say, and then, without more ado, to dismiss the whole with a glance of mingled scorn and pity; but our intention is to make light work of it.

With the exception of what has been said by the affirmative writers in favour of our view of the question (and each of them has given us *some* assistance), their efforts seem to have been almost entirely directed to prove that the mental power of woman is *not equal* with that of man, because *not identical*. In the onset we took some pains to prevent the discussion from assuming this turn. Nothing can be more unjust, or more unreasonable. Do we expect to find the perfume of the violet imparted to the majestic sunflower, or the fragrance of the rose emitted by the forest oak? Each has its own peculiar qualities; but no one would dare to call one of these *inferior* to

* Bentham's "Nomography; or, the Art of Inditing Law Works," vol. iii.

the other; neither would they, were the diversity ten times greater. Each is constituted properly to fulfil the office assigned to it.

What has been the nature of the illustrations adduced in support of woman's mental inferiority? Catalogues of illustrious statesmen, historians, philosophers, poets! We should lament the destiny of the sex if we saw women rushing into a contest with men in all or any of these pursuits. But why do these writers overlook one important fact in connexion with this very point? Why so lavish in the admiration of great men, and so niggardly in yielding due honour to those who laid the foundation of their greatness? Read the lives of our most illustrious princes, heroes, poets, authors, divines, and in the majority of instances stands the recorded fact that their greatness is to be attributed to their MOTHER'S influence. It is a characteristic of woman that she exercises her influence rather than displays it: but honour is none the less hers. The reply of Madame Campan to a question from Napoleon, and his rejoinder, are directly to the point. The emperor, complaining of the old systems of education, asked, "What is wanting in order that the youth of France be well educated?" "*Mothers*," replied Madame Campan. The emperor seemed struck with the aptness and truthfulness of the reply, and, after a pause, said, "Here is a system of education in one word." And never man spoke more truly. It is the province of the mother to impart that electric influence which shall awaken the energies and quicken the genius of her offspring, and the extent of this influence will depend upon her mental power and capacity.

A writer in the "Westminster Review," some time since, beautifully illustrated this truth in the following passage:—"The true woman speaks to every true man who sees her, refining and exalting his intellect, and making him know that true manhood consists in the noble action of his soul. She sends him from her with all the subtle threads of his being in firmer tension, and remembering that he, too, is only a little lower than the angels! She can make him work, and dare even death for his work, and his heart ever beating with the love of the highest love. She can do this without knowing it, *because her genius is influence*. Yes; to warm, to cherish into purer life and

motive that shall lead to heroic act—this is her genius—her madness—her song flowing out—she knows not how—going she knows not whither, but returning never again. The woman evenly developed—unfolded after her own type—the one God struck approvingly when she was created—*differs from man, then, in this—in possessing a greater capacity—a greater genius to influence*. She influences through no direct exercise of power, but because she *must* influence. Influence breathes from her, and informs every thing and creature around, *and we are only conscious of it by its results*."

About the same time the "Edinburgh Review" very ably and impartially examined this question. We shall not hesitate to extract a passage or two bearing with peculiar force on the point before us:—

"Men in general," says the writer, "when serious and *not* gallant, are slow to admit women even to an equality with themselves; and the prevalent opinion certainly is that women are inferior in respect of intellect. This opinion *may* be correct. The question is a delicate one. We very much doubt, however, whether sufficient *data* exist for any safe or confident decision; *for the position of women in society has never been—perhaps never can be—such as to give fair play to their capabilities*. It is true, no doubt, that none of them have yet attained the highest eminence in the highest departments of intellect. They have had no Shakespeare, no Bacon, no Newton, no Milton, no Raphael, no Mozart, no Watt, no Burke. But while this is admitted, it is surely not to be forgotten that these are a *few* who have carried off the high prizes, to which millions of *men* were equally qualified by their training and education to aspire, and for which by their actual pursuits they may be held to have been contending; while the number of *women* who have had either the benefit of such training, or the incitement of such pursuits, has been comparatively insignificant. When the bearded competitors were numbered by thousands, and the smooth-chinned by scores, what was the chance of the latter? or with what reason could their failure be ascribed to their inferiority as a class?"

Again:—"High art and science always require the whole man, and never yield their great prizes but to the devotion of a life. But the life of a woman, from her cradle upwards,

is otherwise devoted; and those whose lot it is to expend their best energies, from the age of twenty to the age of forty, in the cares and duties of maternity, have but slender chances of carrying off these great prizes. It is the same with the high functions of statesmanship, legislation, generalship, judgeship, and other elevated stations and pursuits, to which some women, we believe, have recently asserted the equal pretensions of their sex. *Their still higher and indispensable functions of maternity afford the answer to all such claims.*"

But "it is in literature that women have most distinguished themselves; and probably because hundreds have cultivated literature for one that has cultivated science or art. Their list of names would rank high even among literary males. Madame de Staël was certainly as powerful a writer as any man of her age and country; and, whatever may be the errors of George Sand's opinions, she is almost without a rival in eloquence, power, and invention. Mrs. Hemans, Miss Edgeworth, Miss Baillie, Miss Austen, Mrs. Norton, Miss Mitford, Miss Landon, are second only to the first-rate men of their day, and would probably have ranked even higher, *had they not been too solicitous about male excellence*—had they not often written from man's point of view instead of from woman's.

* * * So true is this, that, in the department where they have least followed men, and spoken more as women—we mean in fiction—their success has been greatest. Not to mention other names, surely no man has surpassed Miss Austen as a delineator of common life? Her range, to be sure, is limited; but her art is perfect. * * * In all she attempts she is uniformly and completely successful."

The purport of the foregoing observations is clearly to show that, although the mental capacities of the sexes are constituted in conformity with the difference in their pursuits and destinies, still, where circumstances have been favourable, females have very closely approached to male excellence; but that, chiefly, their higher powers and energies became absorbed and concentrated in the noble office of *maternity*. If those by whom our first impressions are to be awakened lack mental power, what hope is there for our after-progress! The number of learned men *who have adorned our country* is one of the

most substantial proofs of woman's mental excellence. Of such a mother as we are speaking the poet gives us the following picture:—

"Where dawns the high expression of a mind
By steps conducting our enraptured search
To that eternal Origin, whose power,
Through all the unbounded symmetry of things,
Like rays effulging from the parent sun,
This endless mixture of her charms diffused."

Of the possession of this quiet but important power in women Milton must have been fully aware, for we find him exclaiming in "Comus":—

"All higher knowledge in her presence falls
Degraded; wisdom in discourse with her
Loses, discountenanced, and like folly shows;
Authority and reason on her wait,
As one intended first, not after made
Occasionally; and, to consummate all,
Greatness of mind, and nobleness, their seat
Build in her loveliest, and create an awe
About her, as a guard angelic placed."

Notwithstanding all this, Milton is said to have been a hater of women!

The poets, one and all, seem to have formed a correct opinion of woman's influence and power. In addition to those quoted in our opening paper, we find Alfred Tennyson reminding us—

"The woman's influence, and the man's,
They rise and fall together;"

while Wordsworth pictures before us

"A perfect woman, nobly plann'd
To warn, to comfort, and command."

America sends us an additional and graceful wreath, through her poet Eastburn:—

"Woman! blest partner of our joys and woes!
Even in the darkest hour of earthly ill,
Untarnished yet, thy fond affection glows,
Throbs with each pulse, and beats with every
thrill!
Bright o'er the wasted scene, thou hoverest still
Angel of comfort to the sailing soul."

When sorrow rends the heart, when feverish
pain
Wrings the last drops of anguish from the brow,
To soothe the soul, and cool the burning brain,
Oh, who so welcome, and so prompt as thou!
The battle's hurried scene and angry glow,—
The death-encircled pillow of distress,—
The lonely moments of secluded woe,—
Alike thy care and constancy confess,
Alike thy pitying hand, and fearless friendship
bless!"

And Shakspeare boldly tells us—

"However we do praise ourselves,
Our fancies are more giddy and unfirm,
More longing, wavering, sooner lost and won,
Than women's are."

In all countries, and in all ages, the good, the heroic, the beautiful, have been associated with woman. Think you, then, reader, that these excellences could be made so world-wide and enduring unless emulated and supported by high mental power?

"Mind, mind alone, bear witness, heaven and earth.

The living fountains in itself contains
Of beautiful and sublime!"

We are quite prepared to admit, with one of the authorities we have quoted, that, with the public, the question is, and will remain, for a time at least, an unsettled one. Man-kind are slow to decide against their own prejudices. The matter rests chiefly on the adoption of improved systems of *female education*. How frequently we meet in female society "human flowerets," destined by nature

"To grace in their degree a throne,
Or any rank adorn,"

yet completely crushed in the bud by the superficial and tawdry education they have received.

But we hope the days of such a system are numbered. Public discussion is, perhaps,

under the circumstances, the most efficient remedy. We are glad to have been instrumental in lending a helping hand to a good cause.

We cannot, perhaps, more appropriately dismiss this subject than in the following eloquent words of Dr. Blair:—"The prevailing manners of an age depend more than we are aware of, or are willing to allow, on the conduct of the women; this is one of the principal things on which the machine of human society turns. Those who allow the influence which female graces have in contributing to polish the manners of men, would do well to reflect *how great an influence female morals must also have on their conduct*. How much, then, it is to be regretted that women should ever sit down *contented to polish, when they are able to reform—to entertain, when they might instruct*. Nothing delights men more than their strength of understanding, when true gentleness of manners is its associate; united, they become irresistible orators, blessed with the power of persuasion, fraught with the sweetness of instruction, making woman the highest ornament of human nature." C. W., Jun.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE IS, OURSELVES TO KNOW."

"Tis hard to say, if greater want of skill
Appear in writing or in judging ill;
But, of the two, less dangerous is the offence
To ure our patience, than mislead our sense."

THE most difficult and unsatisfactory of all labours proverbially is, to controvert those statements which will only allow of the supposition of their being argumentative, because they appear in a controversy, and are given professedly to support certain opinions. Some writers believe there is ample proof afforded, if they collect quotations and comment on the "authority" discoverable in them; while others will confine themselves to extracts selected from their opponents, and, having gathered a few sentences and "illuminated" them, they close the question with appeals terminating in "reason," "justice," "generous man!" "wide view," "magnanimous," and the like, doubtless imagining that such a process clearly demonstrates the seminal error of their antagonists. Some of the articles under our consideration fully

substantiate the truth of these remarks; and this is the more remarkable since they contain much strong language about "arguing," "arenas," "confronting darling opinions," and "carrying on controversy in that," &c. One writer has elaborately unfolded the due effects of certain acts, dilemmas, and transpositions, but immediately afterwards he disappeared in the haze of assertion. Another has seized upon a particular aspect of his private view of the case, and, taking its truth for granted, distended it into monstrous proportions; hence concluding that, because one or more of them contravene the tenets of an opponent, therefore he himself vindicates truth; *ergo*, all others do not.

Now, is not this the most acceptable method for disputation, that sentiments be founded upon adequate causes, and *both* mentioned? And, if principles were dealt with instead of particulars, then there would be a guarantee for the philosophic treatment of subjects. Besides, when there is a candid and unreserved exposition of the grounds of belief, together with care and intelligent

study in educating and collating them, we are furnished with the best of mere mechanical tests for truth. Not that we suppose that all men may, by any means, be induced to think precisely alike; on the contrary,

"Tis with our judgments as our watches; none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own."

Nevertheless, that there are laws of belief, and that those laws are common to the human mind, are undisputed propositions.

T. F. O. insists upon an "arrangement," about which, we have no doubt, he speaks truly in saying that elsewhere it is not to be found. Now, we shall not dispute with him concerning the essential difference between tone, texture, and temperament; but it would not be just to refrain from remarking on his definitions and use of terms. In one place he defines "capacity" as being "the intellect's power of comprehension," and "great capacity, *the power of laying hold of great ideas!*" This "lame and impotent conclusion" is supplied, because he is fully aware of something particular and definite being required! Subsequently he tells us that "great capacity, when applied to the feelings, means *depth of emotion, strength of impulse*, and is dependent upon a *large development* of the brain." Where, then, is the sphere for his fine, vigorous, and temperamental properties? Did it never strike you, T. F. O., that there is a glaring impropriety in applying the epithet, *laying hold of great ideas*, as equivalent to mental perceptivity? Of the vague, accommodating terms, "comprehension," "capacity," "great ideas," he makes frequent use, and fully avails himself of their singular power of collocation. The two first named he employs to indicate an innately active power *common* to the mind; but what that power is, in virtue, he has not mentioned, further than that it is the mind's capacity for laying hold of great ideas. Now, if he had but made it to apply particularly, we might, without doubt, have arrived, at least, at some plausible conclusion: *e. g.*, in the case of the phrenological faculty, number, it is not difficult to suppose that the comprehension of that organ—otherwise, its great capacity—was intended to be equal to *appreciation*, and to imply the power of appreciating the values of numbers; while tone, texture, or temperament would be admissible for supply-

ing the vigorous element. This arrangement, then, possessed in a high degree by an individual, enables him to be rapid in performing calculations, and exact in estimating values. But how to apply this interpretation to many of the numerous mental organs which have an existence of quite as certain entity, we are, indeed, at a loss. Would not the theory on texture, since delicacy of touch is one of its chief exponents, elevate the blind above humanity in general? And is it so?

T. F. O. does not attempt to substantiate any of his positions; yet he acknowledges *some* of them to be novel. He is doubtless, aware that Whately's *onus probandi* hypothesis has exploded. Nowhere does he distinguish between a principle and an example. The entire absence of unity and perspicuity in exhibiting his subject, and of argument to enforce his propositions, places his article in precisely the same position as that in which a "king" stands when solitary on a chess-board; it is useless to the defendant, and not to be captured by the adversary. The assumptions, therefore, with which we disagree, are met by simply propounding the *retort courteous*. His article, had it been, as professed, purely didactic, would have been useful; but as it is, it assumes the judge, and rejects the summing up.

We now turn to survey the position of C. W., Jun. We cordially agree with his preliminary remarks. Opinion *does* give

"Report of good or evil, as the scene
Was drawn by fancy, lovely or deformed:
Thus her report can never there be true,
Where fancy cheats the intellectual eye."

But we object to his first aspect of the question. If the illustration proves anything, the evidence is inadmissible, unless we accept the proposition of man never venerating things beneath himself—a proposition not to be maintained. And we must not believe that purely abstract admiration, and appreciation for the beautiful, are the only elements of love: abstruse self is the primary source.

The "scale" of this writer also appears just; it certainly has the merit of being philosophic; hence it claims respect. But, while concurring with the view which it exhibits, we strongly deny the inference. The solution we admit, but the conclusion we reject; and, unfortunately, C. W., Jun., has not advanced proofs establishing the legitimacy of this weighty result. What that result would

involve, were it demonstrated, may be inferred from the fact of its appearing on the negative. Unquestionably, the quotations are produced as testimony, testimony being considered equivalent to proof. Here lies a fallacy. The quotations are nothing more than the moment-prompted opinions of some ten men whose persuasions appear to be collateral with C. W., Junior's.

Now, as the forthcoming reasoning applies to the basis of every adversary's defence, we advance it with due care and deference, at the same time being fully convinced that its truth extends to the minutest point, as well as that it forms a complete vindication of our advocacy. First, then, as C. W., Jun., has not provided definitions, we submit a definition and reduction of those hackneyed, vague terms, "intellectual," "moral," and "social." Intellectual appears to denote that combination of those faculties which produce the effects which are said to result from thought, reflection, or study. The moral faculties are those which prompt rectitude: hence the term moral, or justice. It is the province of the social order to be the source of whatever actions—whether hidden or exposed—are referable to that "fellow feeling" which "makes us wondrous kind." Reducing this abstract feeling, or sympathy, and tracing it to its mental source, we find that it springs from a certain pure, unbounded, Platonic benevolence. Now our friend takes up the subject on phrenological grounds. The organ of benevolence, then, is our object. This faculty, considered accordingly, is one of the *blind propensities*. That this is the true definition all will acknowledge. Observation says so. Hence, therefore, the organ in itself has no intelligence; its action on the mind is that of merely an *abstract faculty*. Now mark the context, for in it here lies the culmination. The faculty cannot be governed. To what, then, must it be referred for guidance? Obviously, to the thinking, the reflective, the perceptive principles of mental constitution. But there are those which are granted to compose the intellectual; and the intellectual is that portion of the human mind which C. W., Jun., in common with each of our antagonists, has truly postulated to be in man predominant or woman. Here, therefore, is the final sequent; namely, that our adversaries, in making man to possess the superior intel-

lect, granted that for which we profess to contend; and more, alas! for the admission inevitably entails nullity on the first and essential principles of their own defence.

It is not a little strange that C. W., Jun., does not enunciate the causes for the Hindoo fortitude, constancy, &c., which he affirms of woman when involved in the dilemmas at which he hints. And as it is dubious whether superiority in such cases is an infallible proof or sign of *mental* superiority, we shall not consider the matter more in detail than by requesting an inference from the foregoing reasoning, and in referring him to the works of Miss S. Stickney.

Agreeing with much that J. S. J. says, and believing that the particulars in which we differ are removed by the above, we pass over his article by merely remarking that, doubtless, second thoughts will ask him to state definitely, and to prove that statement when made, in what way "literature, legislature, and the arts, are governed by women, perhaps, more than by men."

S. A. J. may be considered to be already fully noticed. We next come to the anomaly of J. N. C. This writer appears to cultivate aspirations for the beautiful: he invokes Wisdom to lead him, and to "teach his best reason, reason;" but, unhappily, he has caused the purity of truth and beauty to be enshrined in the *Idola Tribus*. Puerile and hackneyed sentiments are here found embodied in high-flown, paltry gaudiness: in this guise they would pass for the genuine currency of enthusiasm.

But let it be seen. During the first four columns our friend appears to have performed very little more than introduce a *verbatim* copy of sentences from the opening paper into his own, and salute them with a profusion of apostrophes and interjections. To example a few instances:—First, let the essence and climax of proof and import, found between lines twenty and thirty of the second column of page 329 be perused, and its argument stated. Second, where is the proof of woman excelling in those "other fruits," and where is the difference between these fruits and those previously mentioned? Again, what does J. N. C. mean in the first column of page 329? Does he flatter himself that exhibiting an adversary's tenets in a light the most revolting to his own persuasions is a process calculated to affect the reason-

ruled judgment? Does he suppose that queries and adjectives are proofs and demonstrations? If so, we congratulate him. Farther—and here he takes a high position, appearing enveloped in all the sacred glory of a defender of the infringed mental dignity of the softer sex—Has J. N. C. read the paper he criticizes? If he has, his fiery indignation at the expected base insinuation clouded his brain, for he advocates our own sentiments!

Once more. By inadvertence the mention of the “poets” was omitted in the last paragraph of page 225. J. N. C. has unconsciously taken advantage of this omission.

We have now concluded, J. N. C. Go; let your faith in the “strong minded” be steadfast and unbounded; be valiant for your lady; study your standard authors in household education; attend to Catherine Phillips while she expounds the “deceitfulness of pleasure”—to Amelia Opie, “teaching the sinfulness of war”—to Mary Chandler, “proclaiming the blessings of temperance,” and learn, with Lady Carew, “to enjoy the duty of forgiveness;” for you must believe in Mrs. Grant, in Mrs. Tighe, in Mrs. Barbauld, in Mrs. Rowe, and in Mrs. Radcliffe, for these are all orthodox in doctrine, and are continually “shedding lustre o’er the intellectual world!” Never bear with the dim light of genius found in Johnson, or Paley, or Baxter, or Jenyns, or Watson; consider Brown, Barrow, Magee, and Combe, to be mere glowworms, virtually in the dark. But what a train of tapers has J. N. C. ranged against these eternal suns! The “Blind Boy,” J. N. J., has proselyted thee; therefore, what folly is it, and labour in vain, to attempt, by pen and ink, thy rescue into light and knowledge!

But, seriously. We desire, in conclusion, only what every one does in closing a question, *i. e.*, an impartially appreciative consideration, not of the forcibly-expressed sentiments, but of the grounds and inferences found in the conflicting papers. Now, one

or more of our friends have demurred on the legitimacy of the train of argument formerly advanced, condemning the principle as nugatory of appealing to things and effects in their *noumena* for initiation as to their source and efficient causes, as though it were folly to examine effects in order to ascertain causes. But if, indeed, this plan be wrong, why is it not shown to be such, or superseded by an improvement? The fact is, our friends are at a loss to find some specific principle on which they may base their assumptions. There is, therefore, no other plausible resource remaining to them except that of simply rejecting any such principle, be it found elsewhere. Now that principle, in the form of a “test,” was previously offered, and, as a natural consequence, rejected: the reasons for rejecting it are not mentioned; for, when the point of stating them arrived, parties discovered that, unfortunately, they have not left themselves *further space*; or if they did apply the said test, it was by contenting themselves with the plain state of matters, *i. e.*, adducing such comparisons and parallels as are nowhere discoverable but in those which Fluellen drew between Macdon and Marmouth. With this course, however foolish, they may be consoled by reflecting that it is, nevertheless, the best. In a comparison, *equality* must be present. In determining a species, it is not sufficient that two points are alike—the majority must balance. The inference we leave non-drawn.

In the discussion of vexed questions there is a certain element which *will* be present. Now, if the individuals on whose statements we have ventured stricture, perceive either harshness, or that paltry criticism which arises from egotism or undue zeal in factis, we heartily apologize, remembering the aphorism, *Magna est veritas, et praevalet*.

“Farewell, farewell!

For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.”

SENOS.

MAINTAIN a constant watch at all times against a dogmatic spirit; fix not your assent to any proposition in a firm and unalterable manner, till you have some firm and unalterable ground for it, and till you have arrived at some clear and sure evidence—till you have turned the proposition on all sides, and searched the matter through and through, so that you cannot be mistaken.

History.

WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE CRUSADES FAVOURABLE TO THE CIVILIZATION AND MORAL ELEVATION OF THE PEOPLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

CIVILIZATION has not inappropriately been likened to the growth of a tree disciplined after the full fashion of nature. Through long years of summer and winter, sunshine and tempest, has it come to maturity; new seasons have wooed its buds, and soon dropped them in the chill of death, yet it has not only emerged complete from the variable influences affecting it, the seemingly unfriendly as well as the friendly, but completeness has been the *result* of this same admixture of circumstances. The shower and the sunshine were essential to life; but solidity required the hindrances of winter and the rockings of the tempest: without these the oak had never been the pride of the spot which gave it birth, nor the future bulwark of a nation.

In this common illustration the observant mind recognises but the operations of a still commoner law of being. It is the law which combines with the main purpose preparative and subsidiary schemes: it is the law which loosens the springs of existence, and again bends them for fresh activities: it is the law which unites the playground with the school-room, and makes the one indispensable to the other, if the sound body is to be retained in conjunction with a sound mind: it is the law which follows exercise by dormancy—singleness by the goad of trial and adversity: it refreshes the weary, scourges the indolent, restrains the morbidly exuberant, and disciplines alike the mind and the body for healthful, vigorous action. As in nature, as in individuals, so may it be observed in society at large, the one grand regulating principle, which has *retarded* but to infuse fresh energies, and chastened but to ennoble to a needed manliness of character. Out of this provision of an all-wise Governor is evolved the fruit of *progress*; and the philosophical student in his survey of history, and drawing conclusions therefrom, will not view its events in forgetfulness of this principle.

He will pursue the growth of nations—in other words, their growth in civilization and moral elevation—not only when learning, as a fair blossom, rejoices in the sunshine of royal favour, and the bright examples of the age are men of genius and virtue, but also when the checks of occurrences, apparently untoward, disturb for a time that regularity of progress so agreeable to the sanguine spirit. Where superficial observation would heave a sigh, or, it may be, recoil with horror, and thank heaven that the mischievous blunders of olden times had no longer their power, he, equally thankful for the dawn of better days, will place his hand, and say, “Here mankind needed tutorage, and received it; here human frenzies worked themselves out; here that which had been termed evil accomplished its purpose as a means to good.” He is unable, perhaps, to *mark* the operation: he is only conscious of its course. The most he is able to do in many cases is to observe the facts, leaving the lapse of many years to give the result; and even these, from a thousand causes, may baffle recognition; nevertheless, from those that are certain he has had proof upon proof of the general law; and now that the skies have grown dark, the winds high, and the strainings and creakings of society are portentous to the fearful of calamities at hand, as certain is he that the process is subservient to the ultimate improvement of the subject, as he must be when, in the world of nature, analogous indications determine the maturing of an oak; the process is, however, in both cases so slow and subtle as to be unobservable, and, possibly, the results beyond his means of witnessing.

Now it is upon this principle, the truth of which we think every one must acknowledge, that the influences of the Crusades must be estimated. The facts are awful—so strangely terrible. Horrors, multiplied and intensified by the vast numbers subjected to them, and

that unlimited excess which irresponsibility, as taught by the church, added to the peculiar charm of fresh gratifications for the passions, allured to:—whole nations, no longer bound by reason, prudence, the more powerful ties of affection, and the interests which had hitherto been of value, wandering forth to destroy, and to be themselves the victims of destruction:—desolation and death let loose upon civilization in her only refuges—surely must she fall their prey. Such, indeed, would be the first-view conclusion. If there lived in that age, when the military idea was the chief, as it was esteemed the worthiest, one of nobler mould than his fellows, and whose glory would have been the true elevation of mankind, how must his heart have sunk within him, how his fond anticipations of a coming deliverance been quenched, as he beheld events, which would have dumbfounded the faith of a prophet, transform a partly-civilized world into scenes of barbarity and woe. But future ages, which he would never see, would show how unnecessary were his apprehensions. The eternal law is faithful: its operation is, indeed, mysterious, and, as a means to good, difficult to follow. Bloodshed and violence, and their consequent miseries, are not the instruments which benevolence—finite benevolence—would choose for itself; for it has not, and, we confess, cannot have, at least by immediate perception, a conviction of their applicability. Still is the difficulty not where it is supposed to be, but in the weakness which advances it. To the all-wise Ruler of the universe there can be no difficulty—no inconsistency—in the relation which one part of his procedure bears towards another. Far from the view of man, he appoints means, operations, and effects, in harmonious combination. Let it not, then, be said that it is not consistent to argue for the Crusades as a means of benefit to mankind. We do contend that, by the existence of a divine regulation, adapted to the constitution of human nature, they could not have been otherwise. Where would have been the oak if it had nought but the sun to form it? if it had all to cherish, and nothing to discipline it? Precocious luxuriance there might have been; but not tenacious, enduring, storm-resisting power. So with civilization and moral elevation. They are not the children of the softer influences, tended by indulgence and matured

in unchangeable ease. Like all things else in the world which are of value, because of great service, they have sprung and derived their character from a mixed treatment, and owe much more to the rigours and adversities of their position, than to its genial but enervating elements. Disappointments, bereavements, the retributions of folly and error, the want which goads to industry, and that sense of degradation and oppression which precedes the determination to be free; these enter into the very existence of them; in short, *experience* schools the world into the blessings of civilization and moral elevation; and to talk, therefore, of their being retarded by those experiences, without which they never could have existed, is to speak that which is simply absurd.

It is, as we have before hinted, a difficult and often unsatisfactory task fully to recognise the effects of a certain set of events, because they may be lost in the vast mass of complexity of which they form a part; or, if not wholly lost, so blended with the rest that we hesitate to pronounce a cause. Happily, however, in the present case, we are in no dilemma. No sooner is the standard of the cross unfurled, than effects the most instantaneous and important are seen to follow. Christendom might hitherto have been divided into two classes—the oppressor and the oppressed. Now, in removing the one from his native sphere of domination, and the other from that of the most degraded obedience, the old relation is for ever broken. Men, wives, and children, are no longer in the list of chattels. No blow, surer of being fatal to feudalism, could have been struck, than that dealt by Peter the Hermit. But his services do not stop here. The tyrannical lords learn better manners towards each other, as well as towards the people at large. Their fierce jealousies and resentments are merged into one object of deep interest to all; they become courteous and polite, reciprocate the better feelings of their nature, and with the bad, which are embodied in the military passion, take the most natural course, as it is by far the wisest in a political point of view, of turning them against distant nations, rather than their own which they despise. The East and the West, who have long trampled on the liberties of mankind, now meet, and in long and bloody conflict learn the salutary lesson, that war is a

own destroyer. New tastes, new energies, are awakened; and priestcraft having made a mistake, and thereby shaken the general credence in its infallibility, is no longer potent over the minds of the people. With the constant migration of armies does the commercial necessity arise. Every voyage is a voyage of discovery: every march adds to the stock of fresh information. The acquisition of new knowledge stimulates to inquiry into the old, and thus are intelligence and commerce, the basis of a civilized community, taking the place of ignorance and semi-barbarity. These events, the most important effects of the Crusades, will not be denied: they are matters of fact too intelligible on the page of history to be questioned. It may be attempted to counterbalance the blessings they became to the world by a heavy set-off of temporary evils; but, if we bear in mind that these were the instruments by which elevation and advancement were secured—that out of them sprung, by the

most natural process, the social and political benefits we have been considering—we cannot commit ourselves to the inconsistent supposition that they also formed an obstacle.

Europe, especially Britain, owes much to the Crusades. Our forefathers erred, sinned, and were chastened for us; they “sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind”—learned wisdom from adversity, and courage from danger, for our advantage. But we have not sufficiently profited from the teachings of this great moral cyclopædia. Society is now passing through a discipline which will leave it all the better. Let us look willingly and hopefully at our entire series of experiences: thus,

“Whate’er we see,
Whate’er we feel, by agency direct
Or indirect, shall tend to feed and nurse
Our faculties—shall fix in calmer seats
Of moral strength, and raise to loftier heights
Of love divine, our intellectual soul.”

B. W. P.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“THE present age” is a favourable theme with popular writers and speakers, and its various phases are certainly worthy of careful thought and close discrimination. “A thousand and one” voices assure us that it is an age of progress, and this we will not dispute, although we have a strong suspicion that much which is taken for progress is mere motion—movement in a circle—a constant change, without any real advance. It has been thus, we conceive, with the favourable opinion of the Crusades which is now so popular, though many persons regard it as a proof of intellectual progress and the augmented strength of independent judgment. But the pleasing delusion vanishes when the light of history is cast upon it, and we find that the same opinion generally prevailed in the seventeenth century, became unpopular in the eighteenth, and revived in the nineteenth; so that which has been held as a product of the present is but a figment of the past.

But a truce to preliminaries, and now to the immediate subject of our inquiry—the Crusades, or the religious wars for the recovery of the possession of the Holy Land, and their effects upon civilization.

At the onset our thoughts naturally turn

to the origin of the Crusades; and it is important that we should have clear and truthful ideas respecting that. C. W., Jun., with an attempt at generalization and philosophic research so common in these days, asserts that the Crusades arose “from a general effort on the part of the human mind to get into action,” and that their mission was “the emancipation of the human mind.” These sentences are high-sounding, but are they truth-telling? We think not. The Crusades originated in the superstitions of the dark ages, and more particularly in the delusive belief of the sin-atoning efficacy of a visit to

“The holy fields,
Over whose acres walked those blessed feet,
Which, eighteen hundred years ago, were nailed,
For our advantage, on the bitter cross.”

To such a degree was the superstitions regard for the *land* of Palestine carried, while the *truths* there promulgated were forgotten, that its very dust was adored, and brought to Europe as a charm against demons! To prove that miracles had not ceased in his time, St. Augustine tells a tale about the cure of a certain young man, who had some of the dust of the holy city suspended in a bag over his bed! If the hardships atten-

dant upon visiting Palestine, and the difficulty of obtaining *more dust* were the immediate causes of the Crusades, we fancy they present no indications of an effort, on the part of the human mind, "to rid itself of the many fetters which had impeded its development." We should like C. W., Jun., to inform us by what system of mental alchemy he has obtained the gold from these materials!

Such, then, was the origin of the Crusades; such the source of that wild and furious stream, whose poisonous waters spread barrenness on its banks, and prevented the lowly verdure or the towering tree flourishing within its influence.

Again, how unworthy the motives appealed to, to induce men to engage in these conflicts! The forgiveness of sin was promised to all, and a passport to heaven to such as might die on the battle-field. The promised result was valuable; the terms were easy, and therefore eagerly seized upon. "The moral fabric of Europe was convulsed; the relations and charities of life were broken; society appeared to be dissolved. The storm of public feeling was raised, and neither reason nor authority could guide its course. The prohibition of women from undertaking the journey was passed over in contemptuous silence. They separated themselves from their husbands where men wanted faith, or resolved to follow them with their helpless infants. Monks, not waiting for the permission of their superiors, threw aside their black mourning gowns, and issued from their cloisters full of the spirit of holy warriors. A stamp of virtue was fixed upon every one who embraced the cause; and many were urged to the semblance of religion by shame, reproach, and fashion. . . .

They who had been visited by criminal justice were permitted to expiate in the service of God their sins against the world. The pretence of debtors was admitted, that the calls of heaven were of greater obligation than any claims of man. Murderers, adulterers, robbers, and pirates, quitted their iniquitous pursuits, and declared that they would wash away their sins in the blood of the infidels. In short, thousands and millions of armed saints and sinners ranged themselves to fight the battles of the Lord. *All nations were enveloped in the whirlwind of superstition.*" Such is the historic picture of the men who prepared to do battle for "the

Prince of peace!" War, when employed in the holiest cause of self-defence, and carried on by disciplined troops, is ever cold and cruel; but, when instigated by revenge or aggression, and committed to the hands of a rude and savage rabble, it will perpetrate the blackest crimes against God and man, with unblushed impudence and unrelenting heart. It was thus with the Crusaders. Our time would fail to tell their cruel deeds, and our space prove insufficient to chronicle their wild excesses. Our readers, too, would sicken as they

"Looked to see

The blind and bloody soldier, with foul hand,
Defile the locks of the shrill-shrieking daughters;
The fathers taken by the silver beards,
And their most reverent heads dash'd to the walls;
The naked infants spitted upon pikes;
Wiles the mad mothers, with their howls confus'd,
Did break the clouds."

All these scenes the Crusades presented; and hell, we think, must have looked on with savage delight to observe that men with the symbol of the cross upon their shoulders could perpetrate, in the name of religion, deeds as foul as would have been done had the infernal gates opened to let forth upon earth a host of incarnate demons! But, according to Guizot, "*the Crusades unfolded a Christian Europe!*" Darkness, in future, may pass for light, and truth for error, or we must adjudge the author of this sentence as ignorant of the true character of the Crusades as of Christianity itself.

The question now comes, Were the effects of the Crusades—thus conceived in error, fostered by superstition, and carried out by crime—favourable to the civilization and moral elevation of the people? C. W., Jun., and many others, reply in the affirmative, although we were inclined to answer, *a priori*, in the negative, and subsequent research shows, we think, the truthfulness of such an opinion. We have carefully examined our friend's long string of authorities, in expectation of discovering some conclusive arguments in favour of the position that he has taken; but in this we have utterly failed. The list of writers quoted certainly presents a formidable front; but an array of names and opinions will not strike awe in a thoughtful mind, for he will regard mere authority in matters of belief as possessed of very little convincing power.

The "holy" excursions are said to have

had a very beneficial effect upon the minds of the men who engaged in them, as they widened the range of their observation, and opened up fresh sources of knowledge. But, remembering the circumstances under which the crusaders went forth, the nature of the scenes which they witnessed, and knowing that it is only a "brute, unconscious gaze" that ignorance casts around it, we are not prepared to admit that any mental elevation proceeded from these exploits of moral depravity. If it had been otherwise, and the minds of the multitude had received the full benefit of foreign travel in oriental lands, how few of them would have returned to impart the improvement to others! It is an undisputed matter of history, that the corpses of upwards of three millions of Europeans either fell in the battle-field, or their bones were left bleaching on the desert's sands. Yet it is still urged that those who did return brought with them most precious products. To this we would reply, in the words of another, "If it be still insisted that some benefits in domestic, civil, or scientific knowledge were necessarily communicated to Europe, either by the expeditions themselves, or, at least, owing to our long abode in the East, I ask what those benefits were? or how it happens that the literary and intellectual aspect of Europe exhibited no striking changes till other causes, wholly unconnected with the Crusades, were brought into action? I believe, then, that these expeditions were *utterly sterile with respect to the arts, to learning, and to every moral advantage.*"*

It is urged that the condition of the people was improved, and civil liberty promoted, by the Crusades. Much treasure, and blood more valuable, were wasted; but this affected all classes of the community alike: the prince and the peasant might move, but they preserved their relative distances. "The papal authority for a crusade acted as an act of temporary enfranchisement of every description of slaves; but *such of them as returned from the holy wars resumed, of course, their old occupations; consequently, Europe gained nothing by the matter.*"

But it is said that, "by means of these joint enterprises, the European nations became more connected with each other," and

"a moral unity amongst the nations broke forth." Where is the proof of the correctness of these assertions, and to which page of European history will our friends turn for illustration? We wait to learn.

It will be asked with confidence, did not a great advance in civilization follow the Crusades? Not immediately, and not as a matter of consequence. It was not till the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that any great movement took place, and this period embraces the following thought-awakening events:—1st. The revival of classical learning, including the diffusion of a knowledge of the language and spirit of ancient authors. 2ndly. The invention of printing; before which it might be truly said of the people,

"That knowledge to *their* eyes her ample page,
Rich with the spoils of time, did ne'er unroll."

3rdly. The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, which so deeply interested the public mind. 4thly. The discovery of America, which opened up a new world of unknown richness and extent to European enterprise. 5thly. The rise and progress of the Reformation, by which the whole surface of civilized society was moved, and the mind of every thoughtful man was agitated. The sharp disputings of the adherents of the rival systems developed the moral and mental faculties of mind. At length the Catholics, finding reason fail them, resorted to arms, and then began that fierce and protracted struggle, which terminated in the establishment of the freedom of thought in every Protestant land. It is, we conceive, to these events, and events like these, that the progress of modern Europe is to be traced, rather than to the excesses of the crusaders.

But our space is well nigh spent, and we cannot do better than cite, in conclusion, the testimony of Mill, who says, "The spirit of crusading, composed as it was of superstition and military ardour, was hostile to the advancement of knowledge and liberty, and, consequently, no improvement in the civil condition of the kingdoms of the West would have been the legitimate issue of the principles of the holy wars. * * * The Crusades retarded the march of civilization, thickened the clouds of ignorance and superstition, and encouraged intolerance, cruelty, and fierceness. Religion lost its mildness

* "Literary History of the Middle Ages."

and charity, and war its mitigating qualities of honour and courtesy. Such were the bitter fruits of the holy wars! Painful is a retrospect of the consequences, but interesting are the historical details of the heroic and fanatical achievements of our ancestors. * * * Nature recoils with horror from their cruelties, and with shame from their habitual folly and senselessness. Comparing the object with the cost, the gain proposed

with the certain peril, we call the attempt the extremest idea of madness, and wonder that the western world should for two hundred years pour forth its blood and treasure in chase of a phantom. * * * We feel no sorrow at the final doom of the Crusades, because in its origin the war was iniquitous and unjust."* J. M. S.

* Mill's "History of the Crusades."

Politics.

OUGHT NATIVE PRODUCE AND INDUSTRY TO BE PROTECTED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"It were to be wished that commerce were as free between all the nations in the world as between the several counties of England. So would all, by mutual communication, obtain more enjoyment. *Those counties do not ruin each other by trade; neither would the nations. No nation was ever ruined by trade, even seemingly the most disadvantageous.*"—DR. FRANKLIN.

THE words we have just quoted were written by a philosopher, and not by a professed political economist: they are, however, alike worthy of either, for they embody at once a wise precept, and furnish a most apt illustration of its truthfulness. We should wish to treat the subject in the same philosophic light as Franklin did, viewing it upon its broadest basis, and illustrating it by the most simple truths and examples which it may be in our power to produce.

We say, with Franklin, it is to be wished that commerce was as free between the nations of the world as between the counties of England. We shall endeavour to show why it *should be so*, and the evil consequences which have resulted, and which are resulting, from the existence of an opposite state of things.

"There are," says Porter, in his "Progress of the Nation," "but few countries so circumstanced, with regard to their natural capabilities of soil and climate, as to be independent of all other countries for the supply of many of those productions which have become necessary to their comfort, if, indeed, they be not indispensable requisites to the

well-being of their inhabitants." This is the highest modern English authority we can produce. We may also quote the next sentence, as it may be useful to us during the debate:—"England is, assuredly, not one of those countries, and foreign commerce is to its inhabitants a thing of social, if not of physical, necessity." We turn, next, to the greatest French authority, M. Say, and we find him declaring that "a government which absolutely prohibits the importation of certain foreign goods establishes a monopoly in favour of those who produce such commodities at home AGAINST those who consume them; in other words, those at home who produce them, having the exclusive privilege of selling them, may elevate their price above the natural price; and the consumers at home, not being able to obtain them elsewhere, are obliged to purchase them at a higher price." Further, we find it asserted by Adam Smith, that "Taxes imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish, importation, are evidently as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of trade." We have, therefore, some tangible ground upon which to enter into the inquiry.

Now, as scarcely any country contains in itself all the natural productions for the physical necessities and enjoyments of its inhabitants, it may be fairly presumed that it was part of the design of Providence that commercial relations should spring up between

neighbouring and distant nations, for the purpose of supplying the different wants of each. Any other hypothesis would imply that mankind were *not intended to pursue the full means of physical enjoyment*, which is so contrary to the evidence of our own senses, as scarcely, we presume, to gain a moment's credence. Any legislative enactment, therefore, having a tendency to restrict this free interchange of commodities, must be directly at variance with the beneficent design of Providence, which was, no doubt, ordered as a means of promoting unity and concord, by showing to each nation how much it was dependent upon others for the advantages it enjoyed. The love of war, and other depraved passions of the human heart, have, however, set nations so much at variance with each other, that in many cases this design has been entirely lost sight of; while in other cases the debts entailed in the prosecution of such wars and disagreements have been so great as to render it almost incumbent upon such nations to create a monopoly of some sort in favour of themselves, in order to meet their great liabilities. In either case a wrong is committed.

Again:—The prohibitive restriction of *importation* creates a monopoly in favour of the producer, and hence against the consumer. This truth is obvious. Take an example in point. France is a warmer country than England, and can produce a greater quantity of silk in the raw state than England, and at a cheaper rate; England, however, has a more inexhaustible supply of iron than France, and has greater facilities for working it up by reason of its supply of coal and steam power. But England thinks proper to restrict the importation of silk from France by imposing a heavy duty: the consequence is, that just to the amount of the duty imposed is the English silk producer *protected at the expense of the English consumer*; because, had there been no duty, the consumer would have had his silk at the French cost of production, and not at the greater English cost. In the same way, if France imposed a duty upon the importation of English iron (we believe she has not yet been foolish enough to do so), would the purchasers of iron in France have to pay its *artificial* instead of its *actual* value, *i. e.* the cost of producing and shipping it. Both countries, therefore, suffer; first, by having

their commercial transactions crippled by the restrictions imposed; and, next, by the consumer having to pay an artificial instead of the real value of the commodity he requires.

Then there comes the plea that the *revenue* "must be raised." Of course it must, and a large proportion of it out of trade and manufactures. But is there only *one* way of raising a revenue, and is that way necessarily detrimental to that class who contribute most largely to it? Is a man a gainer in any form who escapes a *direct* impost, amounting, say, to thirty per cent. upon his income, but pays *several indirect* ones, amounting together, at the least, to fifty per cent.? This is what actually occurs to every one in a country where the revenue is raised upon importations of foreign commodities; or, in other words, where native industry is protected by legislative enactments. We contend, in the face of every argument we have yet seen adduced to the contrary, that the inhabitants of a country commercially free in every sense of the word would be better able, as a body, to pay any reasonable amount of taxation than they possibly can under a restrictive system, however devised, and that, in such case, the burden of the revenue would fall more equitably and justly.

After these general observations let us look at the matter still more in detail.

Unrestricted commerce has a tendency to promote manufactures, and cover the earth with industry. Restrictions, in whatever form they appear, deaden the commercial spirit, and confine trade to particular spots. This is not a principle of our own suggesting; it is a truth which has been recognised well nigh as far back as English history carries us. In Magna Charta there was inserted a clause to the effect "that all merchants should have safe and sure conduct to come into England and to depart from it, and to buy and sell without the obstruction of evil tolls." Several acts of parliament were also subsequently passed confirming this privilege; and we have the authority of Lord Coke (referring to the clause in the charter and the acts of parliament following it), "That all monopolies concerning trade and traffic are *against the liberty and freedom granted by the great charter*, and divers other acts of parliament which are good com-

mentaries upon that charter." It would have been well for England, and, indeed, for the whole world, had the rights of the people, and the true spirit of the British constitution, been as carefully watched and defended at subsequent periods as at the obtainment of the charter. But when British princes began to think more of foreign conquests than of the prosperity of their subjects at home, and when, in order to meet the great expenses incurred by their foreign defeats and conquests, extraordinary grants were required to be raised, it was then that constitutional rights were lost sight of, and commerce became fettered with every description of impost human ingenuity could devise. This was the primary step; but the evil did not rest here. As the wants of kings became more urgent they had recourse to the merchants for loans, and these merchants were too often instrumental in causing restrictions to be imposed upon the importations from foreign countries, in order to promote the sale of their own commodities, at a higher rate of profit, at home. This is an historical truth; and by it we learn *how* false principles and practices usurp true and just ones, and in process of time become defended and justified.

Again, protected manufactures have almost always been found in a languishing state. The woollen, the cotton, and the silk manufactures in England all afford striking examples of this truth. The woollen trade, perhaps, affords us the best example, on account of the almost unheard-of extent to which the attempts to protect it were carried. In the year 1678, an act was passed for the encouragement of the English woollen manufacture, in which it was ordered that *all dead bodies* should be wrapped in woollen shrouds! and, but a little later, finding that the woollen manufacture was making some progress in Ireland, the English manufacturers petitioned the king (William III.) and his parliament to interfere for its suppression in that country. Nor was their supplication unheeded; for in the king's answer to their address, he made the following promise:—"I shall do all that in me lies to discourage the woollen manufacture in Ireland, and encourage the linen manufacture, and to promote the trade of England;" and an act very soon *did* pass to that purport. Here, then, was legislative pro-

tection with a vengeance. But what came of it? The woollen manufacture remained protected until 1825. In the five years, from 1820 to 1824, our exportation of woollen goods amounted to 1,064,441 pieces. In the five years, from 1840 to 1844, it reached 2,128,212 pieces, or just double the quantity exported during the last five years of prohibition; and this, too, in the face of a rapidly increasing trade in cotton! What will our Protectionist friends say to these figures? But why need we even go so far back as the history of the woollen trade for an example? We have a still more powerful illustration in the case of agriculture. Up to within the last few years British agriculture was protected by an import duty upon foreign corn. And what was the consequence? Just what we might expect. Prices were high, and the *less corn there was produced the higher the prices rose*. This was virtually a premium for bad farming, and so it operated. Nowhere were the resources of the land properly or fully developed. Want of skill and energy was everywhere prevalent among agriculturists, until their supineness became proverbial; and what the upshot of another century's persistence in such a course, none can describe and but few imagine, except those who so nobly came forward, and, amidst the "mingled jeers and laughter" of the *few*, averted the impending evil, and laid the foundation of peace and plenty for the *many*.

"Mind is mightier than the strong,
Right *hath* triumphed over wrong."

We know that the question of free trade in corn is a sore one in many quarters. We do not wish to wield the last too heavily. Landlords complain loudly of the wrongs they have suffered. Their rent-roll has become reduced, and the value of the fee simple of the land has been lessened. This is undoubtedly true. As ever, so now, "after the crisis comes the crash." Land and its produce had been raised to an artificial value, and that, too, at the expense of the necessities of the people: thus the people had suffered at the hands of the landowners. But retributive justice came, and many of the mighty were put down, while the humble have been exalted. Well might poor Hood exclaim, in days gone by—

"O God! that bread should be so dear,
And flesh and blood so cheap!"

Long ago did that most truthful of poets, Ötver Goldsmith, tell us—

"Ill fares the land, to hastening woea prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay."

But in the all-absorbing scramble for wealth, the cries of humanity were long overlooked.

We are prepared to show that the tendency of protection is to destroy *external trade*; also to uphold the advantages of all commodities being rendered as *cheap* as is consistent with their cost of production, without their being encumbered with taxation; and finally to maintain that *free importation* is the source of plenty, and protection the forerunner of scarcity; but space reminds us that it, too, must not be over-taxed, and we therefore hasten to a conclusion.

We cannot but rejoice in the fact of a steady determination having set in, to rid commerce of its fetters, and leave it open to the only legitimate *protection* we have learnt to recognise, namely, *the protection of its own intrinsic superiority and worth*. If British manufactures are more durable, and not necessarily more costly, than those of other countries, they will, of course, take pre-eminence. If British commerce generally be more advantageous and accessible than that of other countries, then it also will still maintain the superiority. But if it be

otherwise, then let the country which excels Britain in these particulars derive the advantage of her excellence. *The world must gain by every improvement in production, or increased facility in exchange*; but it is neither desirable nor just that any nations or people should, by any possible means, usurp the laurels or the bounty, to which in the "great race of nations" now going on, they do not show themselves to be honourably entitled to receive.

Glancing at the alterations which have, within the last few years, taken place in the tariff of the several countries of continental Europe, we perceive most assuredly a "move in the right direction." To this we may refer more particularly in another paper. Looking at the opinions recently expressed in high quarters in England, we feel assured that the tide of free trade has set in, and that before it every legislative restriction to commerce must be entirely and for ever abolished. This is not an age for retrogression.

Looking at the question in its broadest aspect, we are prepared to maintain that native industry *ought not to be, and need not be, protected* by legislative enactment; and this opinion we shall hold, until proof be adduced to the contrary. C. W., Jun.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It forms a curious yet interesting task to compare Britain, as now presented to our view, with its position and capabilities in gone-by ages. It has evidently been ordained by God that civilization can only be gradually etched from barbarity; and while we see some nations high in intellectual progress and moral greatness, others are sunk in ignorance, and debased by vice. But, strange to say, we have instances of the glory of the first departing, while the shame of the latter has been taken away. Need we cite the case of Palestine, which was once the delight of the Lord, and which, from the influence of His favour, attained the loftiest eminence in religious privileges and moral greatness? But, when basking under the influence of the smiles of heaven, a sad and desolating blight came over the whole land, and now "its holy cities are a wilderness, Zion is a wilderness, Jerusalem is a desolation," &c. Speak we of Rome, "the mistress of the world," and

tell of her conquests and universal rule? Then we must dwell on her decay, and finish with her fall. Or, if to Greece we turn our retrospective glance—to Greece, "mother of arts and eloquence," the land of philosophers and the home of sages—we involuntarily recur to her present aspect, and sigh over the sad change which has come over her, feeling

"'Tis Greece—but living Greece no more!
So coldly sweet, so deadly fair,
We start, for soul is wanting there!"

Without staying to inquire into the causes that sapped the foundations of these great empires, let us see in what state our own land must then have been. From what we can gather from the historian, Britain must have been barren and unfruitful in the extreme. It occupied its place as a dark spot on the face of the deep. Again, as we look down the long vista of time, we behold mighty changes passing over its surface, which cannot be better described than in the language of the

inspired penman, when he speaks of the wilderness and the solitary place being glad, and the desert blossoming as the rose. The character of Britain has indeed changed; barrenness has yielded to verdure, and weakness been supplanted by strength.

The question then comes, What is the cause of this prosperity? And we conceive that the answer will lead us to adopt the affirmative view of this question. We depend much upon agriculture for our prosperity, but it is evident that if this had been the only foundation for our greatness we should have been very different to what we now are. The principal cause of our present proud position was the industry and inquiring spirit of the people. After the treasures of the mineral world had been discovered, intellect began that noble course which, in its upward range, has brought us where we now are. It is a remarkable fact, that when our land was found of a peculiar internal construction, embodying a wonderful combination of the most useful minerals, then the people became famed for their untiring toil; the mind was called into operation; practice soon gave birth to theories; and, after a series of careful experiments, mighty results were realized. Invention had only to lift her wand and mutter her incantations, and a thousand varied forms and strange combinations sprung into existence. The invention of the steam-engine marks an era in the progress of Britain, and as its immense power was further developed, its multifarious applicability became manifest. And now, behold the result! Where is there a nation that presents such a scene as ours?—a scene where mechanical forces and appliances, in their most striking forms, are displayed—a scene in which manufacture takes a sovereign place, in which trades are carried on with such perfect system. Upon these things, as well as upon natural produce, not only our greatness, but our very existence as a people depends; and therefore they ought to be protected—protected by such means as will prove most efficient; and these must necessarily be legislative enactments. This is a great and important question, and as such deserves our close attention. Were the glorious fruits of our industry exposed to the gaze of the world without a legislative fence encircling them, we should soon be robbed by the unhallowed grasp of the stranger, or

the unprincipled fellow-countryman. Yes, to preserve native industry, to keep it in a healthy and energetic state, legislative enactments must be made. These have the happy influences of preventing the foreigner from culling our inventive ideas, and of making self-dependence flow in its own proper channel; for self-dependence will keep one countryman from living on another's toil. For this purpose—to take a case in point—we believe patents were first instituted; and these have at least the tendency, if not the direct power, of giving to each man his due. When a man invents a machine, it is his undoubted right to claim the protection of his government; and were this not the case, that happy dependence referred to, which man places upon his own energy and skill, would be sadly weakened; rights would be violated, and injustice committed.

Here, then, we have a form of protection, the propriety of which even our opponents will admit; and we maintain that the principle involved in it may be advantageously applied to other cases. We do not advocate the abstract principle of protection as of universal applicability; but we maintain that it may be properly and beneficially applied, at certain stages, in a nation's progress, and especially towards certain crafts and classes in a community. Even Adam Smith, who lays down as the first principle of the wealth of nations that, "as far as mere wealth is concerned, the fewer restrictions on industry the better," admits that there are two cases in which it may be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the benefit of domestic, industry. The first, "*when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country*." The second, "*when some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of domestic industry*."

It has been well said by the ex-premier (Lord John Russell):—"Were there no such thing as war, no such thing as commercial disputes, no such thing as a national debt, it might be easy for the ministers of different communities to come to an understanding upon a plan of general freedom, and regulate the world according to the rules of universal liberty. But the existing fact is, that every nation is obliged to guard its independence with the utmost jealousy; to avoid with the greatest care putting itself under the control

f any other power; and to check its industry by taxes, which are absolutely necessary for the preservation of its separate existence. . . . It is not only internal but external situation, also, that must be consulted in arranging economical laws for a nation. In deciding every question that comes before him, a legislator ought to consider that he has to provide, not for the execution of a project of perpetual peace, but for the welfare and prosperity of his own country.

Without going the length of a Venetian proverb, '*Pria Veneziani, poi Christiani*,' I am disposed to say, '*Let us first be Englishmen, then economists*.'

Considering these things, and, above all, the fact that under a faulty system of protection Britain has become "great, glorious, and free," we give, with confidence, an affirmative reply to the question now under debate.

A.

Social Economy.

IS THE CONFESSORIAL IN HARMONY WITH INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FREEDOM OR SOCIAL WELL-BEING?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE nature of the confessional is a point on which many are grievously ignorant, although it is so important. If auricular confession be enjoined by God *as necessary to salvation*, how many there are who, by denying it, forfeit his mercy; but, if it be not, what must be thought of a church which sets up such a doctrine in defiance of his holy word, and in direct breach of his command "not to add to or diminish" from it? When, too, we consider the training of a priest for the confessional, we wonder not when even St. Liguori cries, "Oh! how many confessors have lost their own souls and those of their penitents!"

Of "Aristides'" article we say nothing; his arguments are clear, and, to an impartial mind, convincing; but we purpose examining those of "Confessarius," not in party feeling, but with an unbiassed mind, whose only desire is to elicit truth.

"Confessarius," then, commences with this argument:—"No institution sanctioned by God can be opposed to the true welfare of man." Auricular confession is an institution sanctioned by God; therefore, auricular confession is not opposed to the true welfare of man. Now, the major premise we reluctantly admit, but the minor we unequivocally deny. We may at once grant that confession of sins has that sanction which the first two texts adduced affirm; but, happily, they have nothing to do with the point

at issue. No word about *secret confession to the priest* is here used. The people *confessed* their sins to God in public, not to the priest in private. These two passages, then, prove nothing for "Confessarius." His whole argument hinges on the word "confess," the correct meaning of which he will find by comparing Numb. v. 6; Lev. v. 65; xxvi. 40, "If they (the Israelites) shall *confess their iniquity* . . . then will I remember my covenant." Josh. vii. 19, where Joshua exhorts Achan to give "glory to God, and make *confession unto him*." 1 Kings viii. 33, 35, 47; Nehem. ix. 2, "And the seed of Israel . . . stood and *confessed their sins*." Psa. xxxii. 1—5, "I will *confess my transgressions unto the Lord*." Dan. ix. 3, 4, "And I prayed unto the Lord my God, and *made my confession*." Ezra x. 1; 2 Chron. xxx. 22; Rom. x. 9, 10; 1 John x. 8, 9; *cum multis aliis*. Thus we see that, although God enjoins confession of sins, yet that it means not secret confession to the priest, whereby may be obtained absolution, but a humble acknowledgment of our manifold iniquities to Himself, the great Fountain Head, who alone is able to pardon them.

"Confessarius" next brings forward that oft-quoted passage by St. James, ch. v. 16, "Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed. The effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." This bears on the face

of it something very different from auricular confession. The meaning of the text is plain and obvious, and is explained fully by our Lord Jesus Christ in the sermon on the mount, Matt. v. 23, 24, if any one has injured another, let him go *confess it to him*, and then let him come and offer his gift. Lastly, he quotes that beautiful passage in St. John's 1st Epistle, i. 8, 9, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, God is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." This, by a mysterious course of reasoning, he tries to make conclusive. He says, "Private confession to God alone cannot be meant for two strong reasons; first, because the confessing our sins is here put in opposition to the saying we have no sin: these two are opposite to one another, and therefore must certainly relate to the same object. Now, who is there in his senses who would dare to say to God, in private, that he has no sin? In this part of the sentence, then, the apostle certainly means saying, we have no sin before men; and, consequently, in the opposite part of it, when he says, 'If we confess our sins,' he necessarily means before men also." We grieve deeply at such wresting of God's word. Weak must be the authority for a doctrine, if proofs such as these are required. Alas! people, instead of taking their religion from the Bible, make a creed of their own, and then go to the Bible for proofs. "If we say we have no sin, we deceive *ourselves*," not *others*, as it must be, were the reading of "Confessarins" correct. No. If sin has hardened our heart, so that we say in it we have no sin; or if, conscientiously believing ourselves pure, we repeat our conviction to others, then "we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us;" but if humbly we acknowledge our iniquities, and confess our manifold sins unto God, then "He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness."

We think, then, we have satisfactorily shown that the Roman Catholic Church is utterly destitute of scriptural authority for her doctrine of auricular confession; and it now remains for us to endeavour to prove it a novel doctrine, without exhibiting any great "ignorance of history," or "wilful misinterpretation of it."

"There is no doubt that, in the early days

of Christianity, public confession and penance for open and scandalous crimes were in use, and were observed with much strictness. But we do not find traces of any general law, or even custom, that called for the secret confession of sins to the priest, as a necessary part of repentance, and a condition of forgiveness. When this ancient discipline fell into disuse, it was at length succeeded by private confession to a priest particularly appointed to the office, and called the *penitentiary*; but, upon the occasion of a scandal which happened, the practice was abrogated by Nectarius, bishop of Constantinople, which plainly proves that, in the judgment of the church, it was not regarded as a sacramental act." This their own canon law proves, which states, "It was *taken up* only by a *certain tradition* of the church, and *not* by any *authority of the Old and New Testaments*."* Panormitan says, "he finds no manifest authority that ever God or Christ commanded us to confess our sins to a priest."† And Peresus, a bishop of the Trent Council, declares, that "the clear and plain manner of this ordinance, both in respect of the substance and circumstance, *appears only by tradition*."‡. Petrus Oxoniensis, too, affirms, that "it had the beginning from a positive law of the church, and not from the law of God."§ The Romish St. Breveture|| held this, as well as Medira** Rhenanus†† and Erasmus‡‡ affirm, that "neither Christ ordained it, nor the ancient church used it." Hear Caietan:—"A man contrite or sorrowful for his sin standeth clean in the judgment of God, and is a formed member of the militant church."§§ Hence contrition, as it goes before confession, so may be without it. Lastly, St. Chrysostom says, "This is wonderful in God, that he not only forgives us our sins, but neither doth he disclose them nor make them known, neither does he enforce us to come forth and tell

* De Pœnit. d. 5, in Pœnitentia. Oloff.

† Super 5 de Pœnit. et remiss.

‡ De Tradit. par. 3, censur. 3.

§ Carraur. in Sexto. 4 Onand. 4 d. 16, pro 2.

|| 4 d. 17 pag. 157 post Allexand. part 4, q. 76, m. 3, art. 2, p. 298, quos refert. Fran. Onand. *ult supra*.

** Refert Henri. sum. p. 206, edit. Salaman. Rhem. annon. Joh. 21, 23. Hopk. Memor. of Christian. 225, § 2.

†† Annot. ad Hier. de obitu Fabrol.

‡‡ Annot. ad Tertull. de Pœnit.

§§ 3 Tho. q. 80, art. 4.

them. *He requires no more but that we speak to him alone, and to him alone confess our faults.*"* For many years the matter rested in this state, and, until the year 1215, no effort was made by the church to establish it; then, at the fourth council of Lateran, a decree was passed concerning it. At the Council of Florence it was again considered, and at the noted Council of Trent it received the form it now bears, which is as follows:—

"The universal church has always understood that an entire confession of sins was ordained by Christ, and that it is of divine right, necessary to be observed by all who have fallen into sin after baptism; for our Lord Jesus Christ, being taken from earth to heaven, left his priests as his vicars, to be judges and presidents, before whom the faithful should bring all the mortal sins into which they have fallen, to the end that, using the power of the keys committed to them for the remission or retaining of sins, they pronounce sentence; as it is manifest that the priests could not exercise this jurisdiction without knowledge of the causes of sin, or maintain equity in the infliction of penances, if penitents should confess their sins only in general and not in detail, it follows that they ought to disclose and enumerate all the mortal sins with which they are conscious they are chargeable, even the most secret of their transgressions; and not only the sins themselves, but all the circumstances which gave a particular complexion to them." We find, then, that although for many years the wholesome custom of penance may have been gradually changing, yet as, until 1215, no official recognition of auricular confession took place, we cannot date it from an earlier period.

Now, what is the nature of the confessional? We read that it is a part of the Romish sacrament of penance, which is instituted "for the remission of sins after baptism," and "is as necessary as baptism." In the "Real Principles of Catholics" we read, "What is sacramental confession?—Answer. It is an accusation of our sins to a proper priest, &c., in order to receive absolution.—Question. Is it a great sin to conceal, through shame or fear, any mortal sin in confession?—Answer. Yes, it is a grievous sin, because it is *lying to the Holy*

Ghost." Thus every conscientious Romanist believes that, without absolution, all who fall into mortal sin after baptism *cannot* be saved; whilst to omit any mortal sin in confession, from whatever reason, is regarded as a mortal sin, and invalidates the sacrament of penance.

The influence, then, of the confessional must be most powerful. It is a net, cunningly woven, to ensnare the minds of men through their superstition. Is it employed for good or evil? The answer is to be found in its history and practice. However it may vary in unimportant particulars with different nations, yet its vital principle is the same—the animating principle of Popery—absolute power. Though confession is only absolutely commanded twice a year, yet its constant use is not forbidden. Hence the credulous or the morbid minded will be frequently using the—to them—comfortable sacrament of penance. The priest, too, in the confessional, stands as a judge; the penitents as criminals. Hence every evil thought—every unholy action—every carnal desire—all the hidden secrets of the heart—must be laid bare to him before absolution can be received. Think what power he has—gentle or harsh, consoling or denouncing, strengthening or terrifying, knowing how to discover that human depravity we would in vain conceal; *all* his questions *must* be answered by the wretched penitent, for without this absolution is refused, and without absolution—damnation. Secrecy is promised. "Only God knows it; then why hesitate?" How awful a power to place in the hands of flesh and blood—no angel, but one subject to all the unholy wishes he demands an account of from the penitent. "*I* the Lord search the heart; *I* try the reins." And shall any fallen man presume to exercise God's prerogative? Can this be consistent with moral freedom? No! not moral freedom, but moral slavery. Is it consistent with social well-being? Peruse the casuistical works of Liguori and others. We have said confession is made under the vow of secrecy. The confessor knows as God's servant, not as man. Should murder, treason, or any fiendish crime be intended, and revealed in the confessional, he could not divulge it, not even to save the life of one victim. Thus, all the evidence necessary to convict an atrocious criminal may lie within the reach of the priest, and yet the

* Hom. 22, ad Pop. Antioch.

offender against God and man escape, only to commit greater crimes and heap up more damnation. Still there are cases where disclosures may be made, and yet not infringe the oath of secrecy. Out of many such we will cite one. Liguori says, "Out of confession, with the permission of the penitent, it is possible to act concerning things heard in confession, either with the principal or any one else, although it is dangerous." "He that confesses may so act that what the priest knew . . . as God he may also know as man; which he does when he gives him permission to speak concerning it; and, moreover, if he speaks he does not break the seal."* Is this, too, consistent with social well-being? What fearful schemes may be contrived between the priest and penitent (?) for the harm of innocent persons, who can have no guard against them!

And will any one declare that such a practice is christian? It is a dangerous pitfall. It is a deadly poison, for which

Protestantism is the only antidote. It blunts the edge of conscience, and stupifies the moral sense. Instead of leading to God, it kills the soul. Were this a place to enter into detail upon the bulls of Pius IV. or Gregory XV. for "repressing the abominations of the confessional," none would marvel at the disgust and horror every true Protestant feels towards it. Its casuistry—its seal of secrecy—the subjects touched on—all prove that the confessional is detrimental to the morals of the confessor and penitent. Can it stand the test of Leviticus v. 1? "And if a soul sin, and hear the voice of swearing, and is a witness, whether he hath seen or known of it; IF HE DO NOT UTTER IT, THEN HE SHALL BEAR HIS INIQUITY." Alas! no. No one can thoroughly examine it without sorrowfully feeling that its origin is unscriptural, and that it is utterly at variance with intellectual and moral freedom and social well-being.

C. C. F.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE impressions which we form of any object depend very much upon the position which we occupy and upon the medium through which we view it. A foggy atmosphere envelops everything with gloom, and changes the appearance of the very orb of day. It is so with moral and spiritual subjects; our own prejudices and antipathies obscure the plainest truths, and give repulsiveness to the most beneficial practices. When, therefore, we have formed an unfavourable opinion on any subject, we ought to inquire whether that opinion has been produced by the antagonism of the subject to our feelings or to our perceptions of verity and virtue. It would be well for the opponents of the confessional to do this, and not to come to the discussion under the influence of all their blinding anti-Catholic prejudices.

This train of thought has been occasioned by W. G.'s negative article in the last number of this magazine. He there indulges in a long tirade against the Catholic Church, the claims and character of which are not now the subject of dispute; and then expatiates on the right of exercising reason—a right tacitly admitted by all taking part in this

debate. While professing to be the friend of Reason, he bribes Passion to lead her astray! "Alas, poor Yorick!"

We cannot help contrasting with this the tone in which the affirmative articles are written. Both "Confessarius" and J. B. very properly and calmly view the question apart from its connexion with any particular church. And thus, we conceive, it ought to be viewed; for the confessional is not exclusively a Catholic institution, for there is at the present day, notwithstanding "Aristides" may be ignorant of the fact (*vide* 1st par. Neg. Art. I.), a large and increasing body of clergymen and laity in the Church of England very properly insisting on the importance of auricular confession.

Having made these observations on the spirit of our opponents, we may offer a few hints on the arguments they have brought forward. They attempt to prove that the confessional is not in harmony with mental and moral freedom by asserting that it induces "servility of mind," detracts from our "common manhood," and takes away "the moral jurisdiction" of conscience. And here we would ask, Might not these objections be urged against the restraints of every moral precept and every civil ordinance? For all

* See, also, D. Thom. in Supple. 9, 11, a 4.

these are opposed to man's individualism in thought and action, when that thought and action are contrary to the laws of God and man. If man was now, as once, a perfect being, he would require no restraining nor restoring influences. But, alas! he has fallen from his high estate, and needs external agencies to bring him back and keep him right. His "mind" is strong, but it is apt to run astray; his "manhood" is noble, yet it is defaced; and his "conscience" only speaks while her voice is regarded, and then she closes her lips in sullen silence. The confessional is in harmony with man's conscience that "gives evidence against his soul;" it is not antagonistic to his manhood, but to his great enemy, sin; and it is not opposed to mental freedom, when that freedom is not opposed to God. True, it may be contrary to our flesh, and repugnant to our nature, but from this fact a very powerful argument in its favour may be drawn. It has been well said—"The very nature of this duty itself proves it to a demonstration; for, as it is a duty exceedingly contrary to flesh and blood, most humbling to our pride, and most afflicting to self-love, it is plainly impossible that mankind could ever have been induced to practise it as a necessary duty, by any human authority, or indeed by any other means whatsoever, than the full conviction, that God himself required it from them; and this conviction they never could have got, if it had not been introduced into the world with Christianity itself, and flowed from the same divine source with it. Let us suppose, for example, that the Christians of the first ages had no knowledge of this practice, nor believed it necessary to confess their sins; who would ever have dared, in after ages, to introduce so heavy a yoke, or impose such a burden upon the faithful? What opposition must such an attempt have met with? What clamours would have been raised against it? What divisions and dissensions must it not have occasioned? And how would everybody have cried out against it as a novelty, an imposition, a heresy, and what not? It is, therefore, plainly impossible that it ever could have been established in the christian world, but by the command of Almighty God himself. Besides, all monuments of antiquity clearly show, that it has been universally received and practised through the whole christian church, in all countries, and in all

ages; nor is it possible to assign any other beginning to it than that of Christianity itself. Add to all this, the infallible authority of the church of Christ, which always did, and to this day does, hold and teach as a truth revealed by Jesus Christ to his apostles, and by them delivered to their followers, that the duty of confessing our sins in the sacrament of penance is commanded by God himself, and is his express law to all Christians."

With respect to the bearing of the confessional upon morality, many dark insinuations have been thrown out. "Aristides" says that "the Romish clergy, being celibates, not from choice but from compulsion (*though they chose the office knowing that it entailed celibacy*), it is quite apparent that the power which they wield is liable to abuse;" which is tantamount to say, that they are human, while no one denies it. Can our friend point to any kind of power, to any ordinance of religion, or any gift of God, that is not liable to abuse? We think not. Then the only point of inquiry is this—Are those clergymen that possess the influence of the confessional more frequently guilty of moral crimes than others? And we maintain they are not. That such crimes among them do not more frequently reach the public ear than others is a circumstance patent to all; and that they are not more frequently committed, is probable from many reasons; especially from the fact that prudent matrons who have been accustomed to frequent the confessional themselves, have no hesitation or reluctance in sending their own daughters there. Were it otherwise, is it at all probable that these persons would so far forget their womanly feelings as cheerfully to place their beloved children where they knew their virtue would be probably despoiled, and their purity destroyed? We dare trust to any female heart for the reply. Again, it is objected that the books which the priests use, in order to know how to probe the human heart, must necessarily pollute *them*. To this we need only remark, that the same charge might be made, on the same grounds, against medical men who have to study the remedies for secret sins, and to solve the mysteries of midwifery. It is further said, that the questions which are put in the confessional are calculated to pollute the mind: but it is forgotten that these questions are not put indiscrimi-

nately, and only to suspected persons, and that the object is to lead the persons to detest such sins, and to avoid them and their occasions in future. It is better to draw the festering thorn from the flesh, painful as the operation may be, than allow it to remain there, endangering health and life.

In regard to the relation of the confessional to social well-being much has not been said. W. G. makes one or two assertions, the boldness of which is designed to compensate for their lack of truthfulness. "The confessional," he complacently informs us, "tends to the aggravation of crime." Indeed! How so? By breaking down the "universal barrier to crime"—"a fear of indefinite consequences." The indefinite consequences of crime the confessional cannot alter; but, after a full confession and expression of sorrow, it can and does add certain penalties to sin, which must have the effect of rendering it more repulsive. As to the premeditation of crime and the inviolability of the confessional, the following extracts from "A Digest of the Evidence taken before Select Committees of the Two Houses of Parliament, 1824-25,"* may prove illustrative.

THE RIGHT REV. JAMES MAGAURIN, D.D.

"Q. Supposing the priest was made acquainted with an intention to commit murder, in the way of a confession, would he think himself authorized to make any communication upon that subject?

"A. *He would exert himself to prevent the crime being committed; but any communication made to him in confession is inviolable; he cannot divulge it.*

"Q. Supposing it related to a crime not actually perpetrated, but about to be perpetrated; in that case is the communication made inviolable?

"A. If a crime is intended, and if it is made known to him in confession *only*, he cannot divulge it; *he is to use his influence with the individual so far as he can to prevent the crime being committed; but what he hears in the way of confession is inviolable.*"

Here we see that a persuasive influence is brought in *against crime*, entirely through the existence of the confessional; and though its inviolability may appear to mar its usefulness, yet that this is essential to its very existence, is self-evident, and is plainly set

forth in the following extract from the same work:—

REV. J. DOYLE, D.D.

"Q. Would not such a regulation (i. e., as making known the secrets of the confessional) defeat its own purpose, as far as connected with the security of the state, by preventing the habit of confession on those subjects?

"A. Altogether: but by leaving it as it is, the abuse of it is impossible; because when a criminal comes, if he should come, to make known his crime to the priest, the latter endeavours to dissuade him from it, if not perpetrated, and to repair, if it be done, the injury he has committed, as far as it is in his power. *If, however, it were once allowed to the priest to reveal the confession, under any circumstances, no criminal would come to him.*"

Thus we see that the confessional, so far from encouraging crime, is diametrically opposed to it, and established for the very purpose of its suppression: to prove that this effect is produced by it we may, in conclusion, quote the following remarks of an intelligent Protestant, Lord F. Williams:—"No persons in the Catholic communion can approach the holy Eucharist without having confessed all their sins, without distinction or exception, in the tribunal of confession; and no minister can give them permission to approach the holy table, without having first purified themselves with all the necessary dispositions. But these indispensable dispositions are, contrition, the precise and general avowal of all the faults they committed—the expiation of every injustice—the full restitution of everything illegally acquired—the pardon of every injury received—the interruption of every criminal and scandalous connexion—the renunciation of envy, pride, hatred, avarice, ambition, dissimulation, ingratitude—and of every feeling opposed to charity. It is, moreover, at the same time necessary in this tribunal, to give a sacred pledge to God, to henceforth avoid even the most trivial faults, and to strictly accomplish all the sublime laws of the gospel. What securities, what pledges, are not then exacted from each individual, to discharge his social duties—to practise every virtue—integrity, charity, mercy! Here conscience is regulated before the tribunal of God, & before that of the world. Here the criminal is his own accuser, and not his judge; &

* London: T. Cadell, 1826.

while the Christians of other communions, after a partial examination, pronounce in their own cause, and absolve themselves with indulgence, the Catholic Christian is scrupulously examined by another, awaits the sentence of heaven, and sighs after that consoling absolution which is being accorded to him, refused, or deferred, in the name of the Most High God. What an admirable method of establishing among men a mutual confi-

dence—a perfect harmony in the exercise of their respective functions! The authority of the prince cannot degenerate into despotism; nor the liberty of the people into licentiousness. The magistrate, in the administration of justice, must be impartial—the senator, equitable and disinterested—the priest, pure and zealous in his ministrations—the soldier, loyal—the subject, faithful—and the sovereign, just.”
X.

The Societies' Section.

HOW TO STUDY HISTORY.

Try to do it upon some system. Endeavour to group, as it were, into different sections the various parts of what we call history. Have a plan; no one of our English histories will do for you taken alone; not even those of them that are most nearly descriptive of what my views are as to what English history is, would I advise you to read, to the exclusion of the rest. It seems to have been allotted to us as the result of the various conflicts out of which our system in policy and religion has taken its complexion, that history shall be everywhere written, more or less, under a party bias. Well, then, trust to no one implicitly. Compare those that are known to write under different influences, and try to get your impressions from a fair comparison. But that is an extended labour. I have spoken of history as having parts. “Divide and conquer” is the maxim; ascertain what the parts are. There is what is called military history; there is what is called civil history; there is the history of arts and science; there is the history of manufactures. Break up all these into their distinct sections; learn what the history gives you in relation to these civil matters separately; question yourself, when you have read certain portions—“What have I learned from this relative to the great questions of government, the condition of the people, legislation, and how the laws are administered, and manufactures, and commerce, and learning?” Except you do this, my fear is that you may read a large space, and feel that, for want of some plan of this kind, you have not gathered the result that is necessary to the encouragement of your efforts. Now we have histories that are written considerably upon this plan—Hallam’s “History of the Middle Ages,” for instance,—where you have the different parts broken up, each part complete in itself, and all the parts going to constitute the entire of the history. I make these suggestions, having once had some experience as a professor of history, though so obscure were my dealings in that way, that you may not be aware of the fact. I have ascertained how important it is, in order to enable youths to feel that they are making actual progress, that they should proceed upon some such plan.—*Dr. Robert Vaughan.*

EDUCATION; ITS PROVINCE AND ITS INSTRUMENTS.

THE only being capable of Education is man. In the inferior animals, when certain stages of physical development have been accomplished, the animal can perform all the

functions of its kind, and no more. There is no progress, nor improvement. It is not so with man. He is possessed of powers and faculties, which indeed need development, but which are capable of endless improvement. He can avail himself of the experience of his fellows, and of the accumulated experience of past ages, and advance towards perfection.

To develop his powers, to place within his reach all that others have accomplished, to rouse him to vigorous and continued effort in behalf of his own personal improvement, to aid him to form habits which will render him a valuable member of society, and to excite him to employ his energies in behalf of social progress and national welfare; this, and much more than this, lies within the province of Education. In the child there is a temple in ruins, which it is the aim of Education to remodel in all its pristine beauty. In his mind there is the image of Deity defaced, and Education, *as an instrument*, is to be employed to restore it in all its lineaments and fair proportions. Education aims to bring out and train up, in due time and at their proper seasons, all that constitutes man. In its most comprehensive scope it embraces both time and eternity. But as it relates to the schoolroom, it chiefly includes development of powers, formation of habits, and fitness for the discharge of social, relative, and national duties.

Education includes *development*. Man is a being of various powers and faculties, physical and mental. *The man* is allied to a physical nature, through which he receives all his impressions of the external world, and through which alone he acts in his relations with his fellow-men. Again, the mind receiving all its first impressions through the senses, is passive, but it has active powers, such as perception, conception, and judgment, though these powers in the infant are latent, and need to be developed. Again, man has relations to man and to God, and certain duties arising out of those relations; he also possesses the power of discerning the nature of these duties; in other words, he has a moral nature. Here, again, time and circumstances are necessary for these relations to be recognised, and for these duties to be performed. Hence, again, there must be development. Where the physical nature is not defective, the development of some of these mental powers begins at the very dawn of existence. Sensations are produced on the mind by external objects, through the senses, and in a little while the mind begins to associate these sensations with the objects, and then there is perception. And here development is the result of circumstances; but it is not solely attributable to external causes; much of it is owing to the mind's own energy. Yet circumstances have largely to do with the development of the powers and faculties. As far as this development is concerned, we should define education as the art of placing the child in such circumstances, of employing such agencies, and of giving him such exercises as are best adapted to develop his physical, mental, and moral powers.

Education includes *instruction*. It is a common error to confound these. But the one is essentially distinct from the other. If a man make known to me some fact that has come under his observation, he is giving me information; if he make plain to me some proposition in science or art, he is giving me instruction; but if he employ the latter skillfully for the *purpose* of exercising my own faculties, then he is educating me. Instruction is the art of making things plain to the understanding. It is that which throws light over an object, and renders it visible to the eye of the mind. It has the same relation to the mental faculties and the objects of mental culture, that the sun has to the eye and the

external world. As the eye could never revel amongst the beauties of nature, without the presence of light, so the mind could never enjoy the creations of the past without instruction.

Instruction should be employed solely as an instrument of Education. We thus claim for it a higher sphere than that of making man acquainted with the discoveries of science, and the progress of art, or even of fitting him for the discharge of certain employments, which his wants or his social position require at his hands. We ask the educator never to give instruction with these things as his aim. He should never employ instruction for its own sake. We would not have him leave them entirely out of his calculations, but he should hold them in a very subordinate position. We would have the educator never to forget that the child is a being of high powers and destiny—of powers capable of boundless improvements, and with a career of progress that knows no termination.—*Papers for the Schoolmaster.*

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Indee Literary Societies' Union.—First Annual Meeting and Festival.—The first annual meeting of this important association was held in Lamb's Reading Room, Murraygate, on the evening of Thursday, July 20; Mr. John Hunter, vice-president, in the chair. The reports by the treasurer and secretaries showed that the union, notwithstanding the many difficulties contended with, and the public delivery and publishing of a series of lectures, has proved itself to be a successful experiment, so much so that it was resolved to proceed immediately with arrangements for another course during the ensuing winter. The office-bearers for the ensuing year were elected as follows:—Rev. George Gillillan, president; Messrs. John Hunter and William G. Kimmont, vice-presidents; Mr. David Myles, treasurer; and Messrs. Geo. Stewart and Andrew Clow, secretaries. The annual festival of the union was held in Lamb's new hall, in the Temperance Hotel, Reform-street; Thomas Dick, M.D., "the Christian Philosopher," and ex-president of the union, in the chair. About 150 sat down to tea, which was served at tables in a very superior manner. Interesting addresses were delivered by the Chairman on the advantages of such societies, and by Mr. George Robertson on moral music, Mr. George Stewart on the literature of the day, Mr. Walter Brudie on popular manias, Mr. David M. Walker on ambition, and Mr. John Hunter on the language and poetry of astronomy. The intervals were admirably filled up with recitations and music. Altogether, the entertainment was of a high caste, and reflected great credit on all the individual societies of the union, and it would have been a difficult task to decide which of them made the best appearance on the occasion. The utmost harmony and good humour prevailed, and the venerable doctor in the chair, and some veterans clustered near him, were as happy and delighted as the youngest in the hall.

Mechanics' Institute and Mutual Improvement Society, Kidderminster.—The first anniversary of this society was held on Wednesday, September 1, 1852, at the Wesleyan School Rooms, Mount Pleasant. Upwards of fifty members partook of tea. Mr. Samuel Yates, being moved to

the chair, opened the meeting with an appropriate speech, showing the value of such institutions to the youth of Britain. After tea, the officers for the ensuing quarter were balloted for, when a vote of thanks was passed to the late officers. Mr. C. T. Trevis, master of the Old Meeting Day School, in addressing the meeting, stated that he felt a great interest in the cause of "mechanics' institutes," and kindly proffered his services in instructing the members in various branches of education. The meeting duly appreciated this generous offer. The thanks of the meeting being proposed to the ladies who had so kindly consented to preside at the tea-tables on the occasion, a hearty response was the result. Mr. W. S. Roberts, one of the active members, in reply to a call from the chairman, gave a retrospective glance of the society's progress during the first year of its existence. He stated that its originators, about twelve in number, had, by undaunted perseverance and unwearied exertion, increased their numbers to upwards of sixty, and directed them to regard this as an earnest for the future. He trusted that, instead of numbering by tens, they might, at no distant period, count by hundreds, intimating that very great praise was due to the small band that first commenced operations, and that this was an indubitable proof that none should "despise the day of small things." He then portrayed the great benefit to be derived from these institutions in manufacturing towns, especially in consequence of multitudes being sent forth by their parents (in some cases from compulsion, in others merely for the sake of pecuniary gain) to earn their daily bread when they ought to be gaining instruction for the mind in the public seminary, the result of which was, that as they attained to riper years they were prevented from filling situations of respectability and trust for want of mental attainments. The object of these institutions was, in some measure, at least, to provide a remedy for this evil, and thus elevate the working population to a position nearer to the middle and opulent classes. The speaker believed that, while some few might abuse their attainments, the great majority would be morally improved, and shun the places where

vice resorts. Advice was then given with respect to the maintenance of good order in the various departments of the institute, both as regarded the officers and the members, and the necessity of maintaining an upright and consistent character in the daily avocations of life.—Mr. G. Northover then rose and briefly addressed the meeting, bearing testimony to the fact that he, for one, had received intellectual benefit from its operations; and, being a person in middle life, intimated the importance of not merely providing for time, but also for eternity.—The remainder of the evening was enlivened by vocal performances and the reading of selected pieces. At the conclusion, thanks were given to the committee of the Wesleyan schools for allowing the use of the rooms on the occasion.

New Basford Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—This society was established, in 1851, by eight persons. The members, now twenty in number, held their first annual meeting on Saturday evening, August 7, 1852. After regaling themselves with an excellent cup of coffee, &c., they elected the officers for the ensuing year; viz. the Rev. J. Wassall, president; Mr. F. C. Brown, secretary; and Mr. J. Yates, treasurer. This society meets every Saturday evening, and is occupied with essays and discussions alternately. It is gratifying to learn that the society is progressing so well. A marked improvement is visible in all who take any interest in its debates. Several of the members feel much indebted to the editors for the valuable instruction derived from the perusal of their magazine.—F. C. B.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

124. Having long felt an earnest desire to study mathematics, both for the sake of their acknowledged utility, and also with a view to an university degree, I wish to have the opinion of some one, competent from previous study to give it, on the following points:—

1. Which is the best method of studying mathematics, the analytic or synthetic? Is it advisable to use the pen much in committing propositions and theorems to memory?

2. Is Goodwin's "Course of Mathematics" a good work, *per se*, to use as a curriculum of mathematical study?

3. Does the study of mathematics injure the health, and may a person of weak constitution give close and exclusive attention to it for a time (say two years) without harm? Is it generally injurious, or otherwise, to the health? How does it, in the end, affect the moral and intellectual character?

4. How many hours a day should a person of ordinary ability study, and what kind of simultaneous reading is best suited to counteract its effects?

To answer all these properly will require, I am aware, a knowledge of mathematics, of physiology, and of mental philosophy, such as few possess; but of those few there will be some, I doubt not, courteous enough to reply to these queries, and oblige—A LOVER OF NATURE.

125. I have understood that the tide-wave which passes by the west coast of Ireland, and afterwards washes the northern coast of Scotland, returns within a few hours down the German Ocean. Would one of your readers be kind enough to inform me in about what latitude the turn takes place, and what are the presumed causes for this apparently backward movement?—A. C.

126. What kind of an examination are druggists required to pass to be members of the Pharmaceutical Society—the knowledge requisite, expenses, &c., and every circumstance connected with it?

Is there any society (or what else it may be

called) for examining in chemistry solely? If so, what is the address—is it a very strict examination—expenses, and all other connected necessities?—W. B.

127. Having devoted some attention to the retical music, I am desirous of pursuing the beauties of melody and harmony still further; but of late I have become perplexed as regards the application of accidental notes, viz., passing and transient notes, appoggiaturas or notes of taste, and pedal passages (suspensions, anticipation, and melodical syncopations I am familiar with). Will any of your readers inform me of some of their uses, with examples?—W. P.

128. Will any of your correspondents be kind enough to furnish me with information on the following points with respect to "Mercator," who has given his name to that description of map known as "Mercator's Projection," viz., who he was, what he was, and to what country he belonged?—IRENE.

129. In the opening article of the "Eclectic Review" for March, on "The Genius and Writings of Bunyan," it is stated that the three greatest natural geniuses of Britain hitherto have been a player, a tinker, and a gauger. A little further it is asserted, strange though it seem, that the three most rising poets of our day are a brewer, wine merchant, and a seller of shawls. Now who are these three poets hinted at, and what the nature of their poetical effusions?—DICK WHANNAN.

130. Will any of your correspondents be kind enough to inform me what are the best means to be adopted in the preparation of canvas, in order to bring it into a state for receiving the paint?—J. Y.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

75 and 121.—*St. Bees College, Cumberland.*—The question of "A Subscriber" recalls to memory that of "Clericus," which, I think has not yet been answered, and perhaps the following hints may be of service to both.

they have the same object in view—entering the ministry in connexion with the Church of England. St. Bees College, Cumberland, presents peculiar advantages to needy students, its object being to supply a good and economical education for candidates for holy orders. The time necessary to be spent in the college is, in all cases, not less than two years. This period is divided into four terms, during which residence is indispensable. The first term commences about the 1st of January, and ends towards the 5th of May; the second begins about the 25th of August, and closes about the 5th of December. The third and fourth are like the first and second. Students are required to be in residence some days before the commencement of lectures, which begin punctually (Sundays excepted) on the 1st of February and the 1st of September. Students are admitted at the commencement of either term.

There being no collegiate buildings, each student furnishes himself with a house or lodgings in the village, under the direction and control of the principal. The expense of board and lodgings, with economy, may be very small. The fee for tuition is £10 a term, paid each term in advance; three guineas are paid by each student when he comes into residence, in aid of a fund for keeping the college in repair and increasing the library; the cap and gown cost about £1 10s.; this, with the additional cost of some prescribed books, includes all the necessary expenses. The librarian, who is generally a distinguished student of the college, is exempted from the payment of the college fee.

Before any application for admission can be entertained, the principal must be furnished with testimonials from two clergymen of the Church of England; one of these must certify (after a long and intimate acquaintance) that the party in whose behalf it is given is a man of unblemished morality and consistent piety; that he is cordially attached to the Church of England, and fitted, by his general habits, character, and attainments, for the office of the ministry. It must also specify his age and condition, as well as his pursuits from the time when he left school to that in which the certificate is granted. The other testimonial is to certify, after a sincere and *bona fide* examination, that the individual desiring admission is able to construe the Greek Gospels and Grotius *de Veritate* readily and grammatically; and that he has a correct knowledge of the rudiments of Latin composition. No student can continue a member of the college whose conduct is not in all respects satisfactory to the authorities.

The limits of age are twenty-one and thirty-five. It is desirable that the testimonials should be sent in as early as possible before the commencement of that term in which the student proposes to begin his residence.

The course of study during the four terms embraces scriptural and ecclesiastical history; the evidences of religion, external and internal; an expository knowledge of the New Testament; lectures on the creeds and the articles of religion; theology, doctrinal and pastoral; and Latin and English composition, especially that of sermons.

It is not necessary that the students should bring with them, in the first instance, more books than an annotated "Greek Testament" (Burton's), Middleton's "Grotius," and Tomline's "Introduction."

For further particulars see "St. Bees College Calendar" for 1851; Rivingtons, London.

It would be a difficult and delicate matter to point out to "Clericus" how to raise the necessary funds, for this must depend upon his own peculiar circumstances. If he has no friends to assist him, and can procure none, then his only chance is by accumulating sufficient from his present profession to enable him to study for the one he has set his heart upon. This may be difficult, but it is not impossible to the earnest man, and such a one we hope our friend is.—A. C.

91. *The Welsh Language*.—In answer to "Viator," as to what books are most suitable for commencing the study of the Welsh language, assuming that he is acquainted with the first principles of the Welsh language, I beg to forward the following list of books, which, I believe, will supply the information sought:—"Vocabulary," by D. Jenkins, Aberystwith, 6d.; "Aberystwith Welsh Interpreter," by Williams and Son, Aberystwith, 6d.; Spurrell's "Grammar of the Welsh Language," 2s.; and "English-Welsh Teacher," by Prichard, Caernarvon, 1s. If "Viator" is not acquainted with the first principles, the enclosed book ("Llyfr y Dosparth Cyntaf") is the best that I can recommend him to commence with, which I think he will find useful, together with conversing with some person that is conversant with the Welsh language; if not, he will be labouring under a great disadvantage without seeking the aid of some one.—GWILLIM.

106. *Monmouthshire not in Wales*.—The first part of H. P.'s informant's statement—that Monmouthshire is not in Wales, but that it used to be—is quite correct; but, as regards the agreement, made many years ago, by which one county passes from Wales to England once in every century, and ceases to be considered a portion of Wales, the following extracts will show that, if such an agreement ever existed, the provisions of it were never carried into effect. It is true, I have heard parties state something similar myself; but they were uneducated, and knew little or nothing of Welsh history. The mere mention of such an agreement generally creates a smile. But for something conclusive. Judge Blackstone, in treating of the countries subject to the laws of England, in the fourth section of his "Commentaries," says:—"It is enacted by this statute—27 Hen. VIII., c. 1—that the dominion of Wales should be for ever united to the kingdom of England. * * * And the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII., c. 26, confirms the same, adds further regulations, divides into twelve shires, and, in short, reduces it into the same order in which it stands at this day, differing from the kingdom of England in only a few particulars, and those, too, of the nature of privileges (such as having courts within itself, independent of the process of Westminster-hall), and some other immaterial peculiarities, hardly more than are to be found in many counties of England itself." Particular attention should be paid to the words, "divides into twelve shires, and, in short, reduces it into the same order in which it stands at this day." Blackstone wrote in the reign of George III.

T. C. Thornton, in his "Popular Geography," says:—"Wales was formerly of greater extent than it is at present, being bounded only by the Severn and the Dee; but, after the Saxons had made themselves masters of all the plain country,

the Welsh, or Ancient Britons, were shut up within more narrow bounds, and obliged gradually to retreat westward. It does not, however, appear that the Saxons ever made many further conquests in their country than *Monmouthshire* and *Herefordshire*, which are now reckoned part of England."

The following extract is from James Bell's "Geography:"—"Divisions in Alfred's time."—The present division of England in counties or shires owes its origin to Alfred.

According to the division of England by Alfred, it contained but thirty-two counties, Durham and Lancaster being included in Yorkshire, Cornwall in Devonshire, Rutland in Northamptonshire, *Monmouthshire* in Wales, and Northumberland, Westmoreland, and Cumberland being subject to the Scots. The statute 34 Henry VIII., c. 26, gave to the counties of Wales, and to the adjoining counties of England, the names and extent which they still retain."—Vol. iii., part xi.

I will make no remarks upon the above, but leave H. P. to draw his own conclusions.—D. J.

107. *The French Language*.—In answer to an inquiry inserted in your valuable periodical as to which books are best adapted to one in the position which D. J. describes, I would beg to suggest that he will find John Cassell's books on the study of the French language both very excellent and very cheap. The first one, "Easy Lessons in the French Language," price 6d., is compiled expressly for self-instruction in its rudiments; and "The Manual," price 2s., is adapted to the student who has passed through the former.—PHONO.

109. *The Temperature of Water from a Pump*.—A. Z., doubtless, has heard of the philosophers who were puzzled to account for the difference in the weight of an animal before and after its death. Now, is he or his "friend" certain, from experiment with a thermometer, that the case is as his query insinuates? For the case as stated many plausible reasons may be assigned; but all of them are, to a certain extent, hypothetical, and would therefore, if wrongly based, give rise to a pleasant parody on scientific explanation. A. Z. is aware that there is an exact ratio between the average temperature on the surface of the earth and the temperature in approaching towards the centre of the earth: the farther we recede from the surface, so much the warmer does it become. The principle here involved might be construed to serve as an explanation. Again:—Friction is continually taking place in the barrel of the pump. Friction gives rise to heat; and the frictive operation regularly repeated must, by all laws, be accumulative of heat; and this heat, during its progressive stages of increase, necessarily passing to the water, must consequently, from time to time, raise its temperature also. In advancing these statements, we would distinctly intimate that the explanations they contain are not supposed to be applicable in case the water manifests the enumerated symptoms to the organs of touch. It is doubtful whether the most delicate instrument would indicate the effect of the issue of the combined causes which we mention; and it is certain that no thermometer can show an increase in the temperature of each successive body of water which the pump propels.—E. S. J.

110. *Anecdote of O'Connell*.—The circumstances referred to in this anecdote happened on the 30th of July, 1838. The Chancellor of the

Exchequer (the Right Hon. Thomas S. Rice) had moved the annual grant of several thousand pounds for the Roman Catholic college, Maynooth. This grant was opposed, first, by Colonel Sibthorp, member for Lincoln; then by Colonel Percival, member for Sligo; and then by Colonel Verner, member for Armagh, all in succession. They were followed by O'Connell, who, after amusing the house by calling the three colonels the "church militant of the house," convulsed the members with laughter by an "impromptu parody" on Dryden's well-known lines. "O these gallant colonels!" said he; "I must venture a parody upon them.

"Three colonels in three distant counties born
Did Lincoln, Sligo, and Armagh adorn:
The first in gravity of face surpass'd;
Sobriety the next—in grace the last.
The force of nature could no further go—
To beard the first she shaved the other two."

What made this so ludicrous was, that Colonel Sibthorp was "bearded like a pard," while the two others had faces as smooth as monks.

J. K.

113.—*Diary*.—The best form of diary, for ordinary use, are those prepared and sold by the stationers, providing a space for each day, with the date of the month and year. These are so convenient for after reference—a great point in the matters. If, however, you would frequently require more space than ordinary diaries provide you must of course have one made to meet your own peculiar wants. The diaries prepared for the use of the legal profession are generally conveniently made. It is well to enter, if ever briefly, the proceedings of each day. Many persons enter up regularly, every morning, the proceedings of the previous day. Some prefer to close the day by a review of what they have done, and thought of. Circumstances will probably much determine this point; only, if possible, at a time and keep to it.—C. W., Jun.

Diaries are now so common, the plans of the arrangement so numerous, and the objects which they are applied so various, that the inquirer cannot expect a very precise answer to question respecting them.

The plan of a diary depends upon the object the inquirer has in view. Does he wish to preserve record of his mental life—of his daily avocation of his studies—of his desires—of his failings—his progress? Then his object is worthy of attention; for if he can attain a process that will carry out his wish, he will possess an instrument that, whenever employed, may teach him that which is so primarily important—a knowledge of self; it will bestow on him a habit of reflection worth acquiring; and in consequence of his advances, and errors being reviewed by his mind, will learn how to follow the former and avoid the latter.

Your inquirer asks for a plan of a diary, which demand I am at a loss to know how to satisfy; if his vocation is literary, he requires a different plan altogether from a commercial man: if his life is amongst the higher classes, or if his sphere is that of the counting house, it would be a great mistake to present him with the plan of a diary of a professional man. Indeed, we can hardly imagine how a system could be laid down suitable to record the mental life of two characters.

However, I may safely recommend to the notice of the inquirer, the journal of Dr. Chalmers, in the 6th chap., 3rd vol. of his life, by Dr. Hanna: or, if a diary in which to note engagements, &c., is needed, that published by Letts, Royal Exchange, would be found useful. Although Abercrombie, in his work on the "Intellectual Powers," relates of a physician who never kept any note of very numerous engagements, and yet was invariably punctual to them, it is not all who possess such a memory, so that a note book or diary of some sort is needed.

A diary must be (for the word implies it) a daily account, and such, in all proper diaries, is the case.—N. C.

The following is the plan of a diary which I have used for many years, and find to answer the purpose very well. First, like Mrs. Partridge's cook, having caught my hare—a blank book large enough to contain the record of events for a year—I drew two lines parallel with the top of the page. In the first down I inserted the day of the week, day of the month and year; in the second I indexed the contents of the page. It will frequently happen that the record of a day's proceedings will finish halfway down a page. In that case, both for the sake of neatness, to save the space, and to obtain a heading for next day, I draw a line down the middle of the page. It is not necessary, nor, I believe, is it usual, to enter each day's proceedings. My own plan is, to carry a pocket-book, and to note down anything remarkable which may occur, under its proper date, to be afterwards filled into my journal. I should also mention that I always commence with a notice of the state of the weather.—I. X. X. X.

115. *An Herbarium.*—In gathering flowers for preservation, the following things must be attended to:—"A good specimen should show every part of the plant; its root-leaves and stem-leaves; its flowers, both open, and in bud; its seed and seed vessel in their different states; and, if possible, collected together upon the same specimen." These things are of the utmost importance in distinguishing the different species of numerous families of plants. When a specimen is obtained, it should be placed between two sheets of blotting paper, in a book suitable for the purpose, the paper being first warmed before the fire. Arrange the specimen as naturally as possible, and, after carefully closing the book, put a weight upon it. The specimen should be placed between fresh sheets of blotting paper every day for about a week. When the stalk of the plant is thick and woody, the under side of the stem may be cut away. After your specimen is dried, it may be washed in a little alum-water, to prevent its being devoured by insects. In arranging the various specimens, the collector may follow any system which he prefers. The plants being thus prepared, he should procure some stout writing paper, folded in folio and stitched into a cover. A sheet of finer paper should also be obtained, and washed over with a solution of gum arabic. When dry it should be cut into a number of narrow slips: then, taking a dried plant, lay it in your book, and fasten it down by means of a few slips of the paper. In this manner all the plants for an herbarium should be treated. At the top of the page write out the class and order, and at the bottom the place where the specimen was obtained and the various Latin and English names by which,

it is known. Frances's "Grammar of Botany" is an excellent work for a beginner.

117. *Style and Punctuation.*—It would occupy considerable space to endeavour, in these pages, to provide a remedy for the defects under which E. W. L. labours. In fact, nothing short of personal correspondence (which, under the circumstances, he will agree with us, would not be desirable!) would be likely to be effectual. We will, therefore, now refer him to several little works from which we derived great assistance under similar circumstances, and doubt not, with perseverance, he will attain the end he desires. Let him obtain Day's "Punctuation Reduced to a System" (Ollivier, Pall Mall); "Guide to Oratory" (Mitchell, Red Lion-court, Fleet-street); and "A Treatise on Grammatical Punctuation" (E. T. Whittfield, Essex-street, Strand). The latter is a fine work, with full instructions for correcting for the press, and much other useful information. We shall be glad, in due time, to hear the result.—C. W., Jun.

There is a difficulty in giving advice upon style, inasmuch as a man's style is generally a duplicate of his manner of thinking. I would recommend E. W. L. to study good authors, with a determination to excel. He must not be soon daunted, although his progress be slow, as it is no easy matter to become a successful writer. "Not every musician who can make a noise, and show slight of hand upon an instrument, is fit for a composer of music; neither is every man who can think with freedom, able to write with good effect." I would recommend E. W. L. to procure Reid's "English Composition," a most useful little work, published at 2s.—H. C.

120. *The Origin and Nature of Manors, &c.*—Perhaps the following brief account of manors will be sufficient for your correspondent, "Inquirer:"—

Manors arose out of the division of land among the barons at the time of the Norman Conquest, and are the consequence of feudal tenure. It being a fundamental rule of this tenure that all lands are holden of the king, the barons were allotted certain lands, which they held of the king by military service, and the other incidents of feudal tenure. A portion of this land they retained for their own immediate use, which formed their demesne; a portion they let out to tillage, to their serfs or villans (the present copyhold land); and a portion was granted to their military retainers by what was called knight service, or some other more honourable tenure than that of villanage. The remainder of the land was waste or common, and was used by all the inhabitants equally. This was the origin of manors. The owner was called the lord, and held courts, termed courts leet and courts baron, for the redressing of misdemeanours and recovery of debts. The barons in many cases granted these manors to the inferior nobles, to hold of themselves, and on the same tenure as they held of the king. These inferior lords acted on the same principle of subletting, and had vassals in the same way as their superior lords. This system of subinfeudation proceeded for some time, till the great barons began to perceive that, by not knowing where to look for the tenant to whom they granted the land, they were deprived of all substantial rights as suzerain. This being a serious inroad on their power, they caused the statute *Quia Emptores* (so called from the first

words of the act) to be passed, in the reign of Richard the First. This statute provided that on the sale of any land no new seignior, or intermediate tenure, should be created, but that the purchaser should hold of the *same lord* as the *owner immediately preceding him*. No new seignior having from that time been created, of course all existing manors, which include a seignior, must have been created prior to the passing of the statute. There is an exception, however, in the case of the king, who, being lord paramount of all lands in the kingdom, has the right of creating what manors he thinks proper out of the royal lands.

The subject is rather an intricate one, and to understand it fully a knowledge of the feudal law is requisite. I shall be glad, however, if I have been able to furnish the information your correspondent requires. The chapter on tenures, in Blackstone's "Commentaries," and Sullivan's "Feudal Law," will, I think, afford any further information that may be wanted.—J. L.

Manors are, in substance, as ancient as the Saxon constitution, though, perhaps, differing a little in some immaterial circumstances from those that exist at this day. It is from the Normans that we derive the particular form of manors with which we are now conversant; and among these a manor (*manerium*, or *manuendo*, because the usual residence of the owner) seems to have been a district of ground held by lords or great personages, who kept in their own hands such parts of it as were necessary for the use of their families, which were called *terra dominicales*, or demesne lands, being occupied by the lord, or *dominus manerii*, and his servants. The rest, or tenemental lands, they distributed among their tenants, to be held of them in perpetuity.

A manor consists of two parts, viz., *demesnes* and *services*; and neither of these two parts have the name of a manor without the other; for, as a messuage or lands cannot be called demesne without tenants thereunto belonging to pay rents and do services, so, on the other part, though a man have tenants to pay him rents and do him service, and no messuage or lands whereupon to keep his court and to receive his rents and services, this cannot be called a manor, but only a seignior in gross. The two material causes of a manor, then, are demesnes and services. The *demesnes* comprise all that part of the land retained by the lord for his own use, and from which the other parts were dismembered. The freehold of these is vested in the lord, and they were formerly cultivated by his villans for the maintenance of his family. The *services* were the returns due from the persons to whom the lord had granted the freehold of the rest of his lands, to hold of him as of his manor. The uncultivated part of the manor was called the lord's waste, which served for public roads, and for common of pasture to the lord and his tenants.

Manors were formerly called baronies, as they still are lordships, and each lord or baron was empowered to hold a domestic court, called the court baron, where they might redress misdemeanours within their precincts, punish offences committed by their tenants, and decide and abate controversies arising within their jurisdiction. This court is, indeed, the chief prop and pillar of a manor; and if the number of suitors should so *fail as not to leave sufficient to make a jury* or

homage, that is, two tenants at the least, the manor falls to the ground.

Quia Emptores, &c.—In the early times of our legal constitution the king's greater barons, who had a large extent of territory held under the crown, frequently granted out smaller manors to inferior persons, to be holden of themselves; in imitation whereof these inferior lords began to carve out and to grant to others still more minute estates, to be held as of themselves; and were so proceeding downwards, till the superior lords observed that by this method of subinfeudation they lost all their feudal profits of wardships, marriages, and escheats, which fell into the hands of these mesne or middle lords, who were the immediate superiors of the fee-tenant, or him who occupied the land; and also that the mesne lords themselves were so impoverished thereby that they were disabled from performing their services to their own superiors. This occasioned, first, that provision in the thirty-second chapter of Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III., "that no man should either give or sell his land without reserving sufficient to answer the demands of his lord;" and afterwards the statute of Westminster, or *Quia Emptores*, 18 Edw. I. c. 1., which directs, "that upon all sales or feoffments of land, the feoffee shall hold the same, not of his immediate feoffor, but of the chief lord of the fee, of whom such feoffor himself held it." The practice of creating manors, or tenancies in gross, was effectually prevented by the statute *Quia Emptores*, in consequence of which all manors existing at this day must have been created before the 18th Edw. I.; for it is essential to a manor that there be tenants to hold of the lord, and no person since that period could, upon the grant of an estate in fee simple, create a tenure of himself.—H. S. W.

121. *On entering the Ministry of the Church of England.*—"A Subscriber" might, if he already possess the requisite qualifications for taking holy orders, which have reference to age as well as moral and intellectual endowments, apply at once to the bishop in whose diocese he resides for admission, at the proper time, to the preliminary examination, which will probably be allowed, in case he can produce testimonials from two or more clergymen of the parish in which he resides as to his character and fitness for the office; or he might enter his name as a sizar at one of the small colleges at Cambridge (Clare, or Pembroke, or St. Peter's), where the expenses might be kept down to £60 or £70 per annum; and if he could then procure one of the London Companies' exhibitions it would materially assist him; or, lastly, if willing to go out as a missionary, he could receive the requisite education at King's College, London, or at one of the Missionary Society's colleges, for almost nothing, the only expense being, I believe, his board and lodging. For fuller particulars he might apply to the bishop's examining chaplain, to the tutors of the colleges, or to the secretaries of the Missionary Society and of King's College, London.—FIL.

123. *Cambridge University.*—All information respecting the University of Cambridge necessary previous to becoming a member is to be found in the "Calendar," to which I would refer your correspondent, and others who may wish to know what are the expenses, terms to be kept, lectures attended, examinations passed, &c. There also will be found a full description of the courses of

study for honours and for an ordinary degree respectively; and it will be seen that, while the former consists almost exclusively of mathematics, the latter is of a more elementary, but at the same time more general character, embracing Greek and Latin authors, Greek Testament, Paley's "Moral Philosophy," church history, the elementary mathematics, and, recently, a professorial examination in one or more of what are called "the natural sciences." That part only of your correspondent's inquiry, an answer to which is not contained in the "Calendar," remains to be considered, viz., "what are the peculiar advantages of pursuing each course of study respectively after one has left college?" A proper solution of this question is to be sought, I apprehend, in a variety of circumstances, mostly independent of the consideration of what may be the intrinsic value of the higher mathematics as a mental discipline—in the situation and prospects of the student—in his strength of constitution, his "aptitude for mathematics," his ultimate views with regard to the choice of a profession, and his expectations of after-preferment, if in the church. If he possess good health, with tolerable skill in apprehending mathematical theorems, and intends studying for the bar, the mathematical course of study would undoubtedly be preferable, and he would find the advantage of it through life in a sharpened intellect, in greater readiness in arranging and classifying facts and evidence, in deducing general conclusions from numerous and apparently contradictory statements, in detecting and exposing fallacies in the arguments of others, and in producing conviction by his own. In the same manner, but in a different degree, the study of mathematics will be useful to the members of every profession—to the theologian and politician (vide J. Stuart Mill's "Logic")—and to the eu-

gineer, the mechanic, the military man (vide Whewell's "Cambridge Studies" and "Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics;" also, Warren's "Law Studies," and Professor Sedgwick's "Discourse").

On the other hand, a total incapacity for mathematical study, especially if combined with ill health, ought to deter any one from attempting to graduate in honours (vide Andrew Combe's "Principles of Physiology," ch. xii., xiv.). Many who have gained that distinction at the expense of a ruined constitution and blighted hopes of after-usefulness have regretted their folly ever after. The course of study for an ordinary degree is for the great mass of students, who will have neither time nor inclination in after-life to become proficient in science, more really useful than the higher mathematics. Bacon himself, the great master of modern philosophy, in later life condemned with severity the high pretensions of the mathematicians, "Delicias et fastum mathematicorum." Assuming the well-being of the human race to be the end of knowledge, he pronounced that mathematical science could claim no higher rank than that of an appendage or an auxiliary to other sciences.—(Macaulay's "Bacon.")

In conclusion, I would advise your correspondent, if he finds much difficulty in understanding the first six books of Euclid, and Elements of Algebra and Plane Trigonometry, which are the A B C of Mathematical Science, to suspend his decision upon the course he will adopt until after he has been a term or two at Cambridge, when he will know better, by a comparison of himself with his fellow-collegians in the examination, what he is capable of doing, and will, besides, be able to have the advice of an experienced tutor upon his chances of success in studying for honours.—A TRINITY MAN.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. IX.

1. Make a form like the one given, and arrange the pronouns in their respective columns.

John and I are going to Bristol, where we expect to remain with a friend, who has kindly invited us to spend a month at his house. My sister is to remain at home, to take care of our little ones, each of whom has promised to attend

PRONOUNS

PERSONAL.		RELATIVE.		ADJECTIVE.	
Singular.	Plural.	Simple.	Compound.	Possessive.	Indefinite.
Mas. Fem. Neut.	Mas. Fem. Neut.				
Nominative.	Nominative.				
Possessive.	Possessive.			Distributive.	Demonstrative.
Objective.	Objective.				

to every word which she may say to them. The horse which is to take us is mine, purchased with my own money, and hence no one has any right to control me in the use of it. This house of his, that was given him by that uncle that set him up in business, has been seen by the whole of his relations who have made it their business to visit him, and whom he has entertained to the best of his ability. His house is, indeed, larger than ours, but its fittings are not nearly so elegant. Whoever maliciously injures a friend, is sure to hate him. That is a fine horse, whosoever it is. We are all here. Which do you want? What message have you to send to my friend? Thou art innocent, therefore thy conscience is easy. I have some nuts; will you take a few? Perhaps you will prefer an apple, if I can find one. Ye are not your own. Those peaches are some of the very best sort. That book of Hannah's is very neat, as her papers usually are. This writing is hers, too; it is very pretty. Whatsoever thy hand findeth thee to do, do it with all thy might. Whichever you choose, I shall be satisfied.

2. State the peculiarities of the following adjectives, and account for them, so far as you are able:—

Good, bad, worse, better, old, evil, ill, late, more, nether, near, further, farther, former, next, most.

LOGIC CLASS.

Exercise on the Art of Reasoning.—No. XX.

1. What are the objects of "Method?"
2. Show how far, if at all in your opinion, any one of the "Methods" quoted in Paper XX., fails to include all the objects in Nature.
3. Write a Criticism on any one of the "Methodologies" which you do not take up in answer to Query II.
4. What are the Laws of Association?
5. Distinguish between, and show the respective offices of, Analysis and Synthesis.
6. A brief view of the several points comprehended in our Logic Class.
7. How far have I, i.e., each individual, benefited from the course of study given me?

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—VIII.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 28.—Let x be the time required; then the son would do $\frac{1}{x}$ of the work in 1 day, and the father $\frac{1}{b}$.
 \therefore The father and son would $\frac{1}{b} + \frac{1}{x}$ or $\frac{x+b}{bx}$ in 1 day.

But this per question = $\frac{1}{a}$

$$\therefore \frac{x+b}{bx} = \frac{1}{a}$$

$$ax + ab = bx$$

$$\therefore x(b-a) = ab$$

$$\therefore x = \frac{ab}{b-a} \text{—Ans.}$$

J. C. M. C.

Question 29. By "Euclid," book i., p. 47, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of

the squares of the base and perpendicular. Hence the height of the wall = $\sqrt{40^2 - 15^2} = \sqrt{1375} = 37.08$.—Ans.

Question 30. The side of the square may be found by extracting the square root of the area. 67 acres, 2 roods, 16 perches = 10816 perches. $\sqrt{10816} = 104$ perches, or 2 furlongs, 24 perches.

R. J.

Question 31. Given $x^2 + xy = 126$ } to find x
 $xy - 2y^2 + 5 = 0$ } and y .

Substitute vy for x ;

$$\text{then } v^2 y^2 + v y^2 = 126 \quad (1)$$

$$v y^2 - 2 y^2 = -5 \quad (2)$$

$$\text{from (1) } y^2 = \frac{126}{v^2 + v} \text{ and from (2) } y^2 = -\frac{5}{v-2}$$

$$\therefore \frac{126}{v^2 + v} = -\frac{5}{v-2}$$

$$\text{or } -5v^2 - 5v = 126v - 252$$

$$\text{by transposing } 5v^2 + 131v = 252$$

\therefore completing the square—

$$v^2 + \frac{131}{5}v + \left(\frac{131}{10}\right)^2 = \frac{252}{5} + \left(\frac{131}{10}\right)^2 = \frac{22201}{100}$$

and extracting the root—

$$v + \frac{131}{10} = \pm \sqrt{\frac{22201}{100}} = \pm \frac{149}{10}$$

$$v = \frac{149}{10} - \frac{131}{10} = \frac{18}{10}$$

$$\text{or } -\frac{149}{10} - \frac{131}{10} = -28$$

$$\text{and } y^2 = -\frac{5}{v-2} = -\frac{5}{\frac{18}{10}-2} = 25$$

$$\text{or } y^2 = -\frac{5}{-28-2} = \frac{1}{4}$$

$$\therefore y = \pm 5 \text{ or } \pm \sqrt{\frac{1}{4}} \}$$

$$xy = x = \pm 9 \text{ or } \pm 28 \sqrt{\frac{1}{4}} \text{—Ans. T. B.}$$

Geometry.

Question 14. The solidity of the pyramid being equal to the solidity of the sphere = $18^3 + 236 = 3053.6352$ inches.

Now the side of the pyramid = the solidity of the same when its lineal edge or side is 1. (i.e., .1178511) multiplied by the cube of the lineal edge or side of the pyramid in question.

Let x = the side required;

$$\text{then } x^3 \times .1178511 = 3053.6352,$$

$$\text{or } x^3 = \frac{3053.6352}{.1178511} = 25910.9605$$

$$\therefore x = \sqrt[3]{25910.9605} = 29.5 \text{ inches.—Ans.}$$

L. E.

Question 15. $2^3 \times .5236 = 4.1888$ feet solidity of the sphere, and $4.1888 \div 2 = 2.0944$ feet solidity of the hemisphere;

then $(2.0944 \times 1728) + 277.274 = 13.05$ gallons imperial.—Ans.

R. M.

Mechanics.

Question 13. Depth of the water,

$$= 100 - 56 = 44 \text{ feet;}$$

mean height to which it is to be raised,

$$= 56 + \frac{1}{2} = 78 \text{ feet;}$$

weight of the water,

$$= 17^3 \times .7854 \times 44 \times 62.5 = 624196.65 \text{ lb. ;}$$

work in raising it,

$$= 624196.65 \times 78 = 48687338.7;$$

time required,

$$\frac{48687338.7}{2560} = 19018.49 \text{ m.} = 39 \text{ d., } 4 \text{ h., } 58.49 \text{ m.}$$

the days being 8 hours each.—Ans. T. L. D.

Question 14. Work due to the velocity of the train at the foot of incline (by solution 10)=1536000.

Work of ascending 1 foot of the incline

$$= \frac{100 \times 2240}{100} + 100 \times 8 = 3040.$$

Therefore, distance ascended

$$= \frac{1536000}{3040} = 505.26 \text{ feet.} \quad \text{—Ans. W. H. R.}$$

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—X.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

36. If 7 horses eat as much grass as 9 cows, and 5 cows as much as 14 sheep, how many, either horses, cows, or sheep, could summer on a field which will keep 19 cows and 87 sheep?

37. Tea at 8s. per lb. is mixed with tea at 4s. 6d., and the value of the mixture is 5s. per lb. How much of each was used in 112 lb.

38. In what time will £700 double itself, at 4 per cent. per annum, compound interest?

39. Given $3x + 11y = 104$, and $3x^2 + 11y^2 = 782$, to find x and y .

Geometry.

19. Four men joined in the purchase of a grindstone, 3 feet in diameter. A paid $\frac{1}{4}$, B $\frac{1}{4}$, C $\frac{1}{4}$, and D the remainder of the price. The condition on which it was purchased was, that each person was to have the entire use of it, in the order in which his name occurs, until he has used his share, and that 6 inches diameter was to be allowed for waste. It is required to find the diameter of the stone when it came into the possession of B, C, and D, respectively.

Mechanics.

17. A certain mine is 140 fathoms deep. In what time will a stone dropped from the surface reach the bottom?

18. A ball is projected at the rate of 200 feet per second in an horizontal direction from the top of a tower 180 feet high. How far will it go, supposing that the atmosphere offer no resistance?

Notices of Books.

The Autobiography of William Jerdan, with his Literary, Political, and Social Reminiscences and Correspondence during the last Fifty Years. Vol. I. London: Hall, Virtue, and Co.

William Jerdan is "a man of letters"—almost a literary patriarch, having been connected with the periodical press for half a century. With an experience so extended, no wonder that he has been able to make this first volume of his autobiography a very pleasant, readable, after-dinner book. On finishing the perusal of a chapter, one feels as though he had an interesting half-hour's chat with the author; and, though we may not have been struck with his profundity, we shall admire his cheerfulness and communicability. He appears to tell us all he remembers of the scenes through which he has passed, and he tells that all in such an easy conversational style, that we close the first volume anticipating with pleasure the perusal of the second.

Jerdan, like so many others who have served their generation at the press, on the platform, and in the pulpit, is a Scotchman, and was born at Kelso, on the 16th of April, 1782. With the other boys of the place above the poorest orders, he was educated at the parochial school, and designed for the legal profession. When nineteen years of age he removed to London, and obtained a situation as clerk in the house of a West India merchant, where he came in contact with Mr. John Prie, a clerk, and Mr. Peter Laurie, a foreman in a saddler's shop, both of whom have since had the high civic honour of becoming Lord Mayor. Jerdan, like Jeffrey and Baines, whose lives we have recently noticed, joined a small literary society, which must have proved of immense service to him. He says, "It consisted of the three

Pollocks, three Wildes, two Bramahs (sons of the ingenious and celebrated mechanic), Frederick Burchell, and myself. * * * And here let me pause to offer a few words in earnest commendation of youthful associations of this kind. They are of immense utility in developing the intellectual faculties, in stimulating to instructive competition, in leading to self-improvement and a right standard of self-value, and in worthily employing the time which is otherwise but too likely to be wasted, if not worse, in idleness and want of thought. Our literature, our statesmen, our senate, our pulpit, our bench, our bar; yea, our public, and civil, and corporate, and even our vestry meetings, afford abundant evidence of the future capacity which is derived from such exercises, and eminently they serve to promote the advancement of those who have been trained in their voluntary school. The gift of elocution and eloquence is, in fact, the readiest, most certain high road to preferment, and if the mind is by the same process stored with information,—

'When house and lands are gone and spent,

This learning is most excellent.'

On the talents displayed at our club assemblages, in Mr. D. Pollock's chambers, it does not become me to deliver an opinion, for I was not a laggard in the race. David and Frederick Pollock and Thomas Wilde were the most active contributors; and when I reflect on the circumstance, that the first died Sir David and Chief Justice of Bombay, the second is Sir Frederick and Lord Chief Baron of her Majesty's Court of Exchequer, and the third Lord Truro, the other day Lord High Chancellor of England, the foremost civil subject of the realm, I cannot but marvel at the fate of their fourth and their not very unequal

competitor." And to what is this to be attributed? To the fact (Jordan being his own witness) of his "*leaning for life on the fragile crutch of literature for support.*" This is a sad reflection; but the only way of escaping it is to suppose the existence of concurrent circumstances connected with the case before us, at which it would not be generous to do more than hint. Serious illness occasioned Jordan's return to Scotland, where he spent three years in congenial pursuits, and afterwards he repaired again to the metropolis. He was now in a pitiable condition, with no fixed object—unsettled and dissatisfied. His resources were limited, and his prudence more so, for he now entangled himself in the difficulties of debt. In recording this fact we are pleased to find him saying, "I cannot omit the opportunity afforded by my earliest taste of the bitter fruit which poisons every pulse of existence, earnestly to exhort my youthful readers to deny themselves every expense which they cannot harmlessly afford, and revel on bread and water and a lowly couch, in humility and patience, rather than incur the obligation of a single sixpence beyond their actual means." His scarcely-recovered health could not withstand the mortification of debt, and he relapsed into serious indisposition. His uncle, a surgeon of a Portsmouth guardship, took him under his medical care, and he spent some months upon board. He now made his first appearance as a poet in print, and he thus pleasantly describes his *debut* and his feelings on the occasion (with which some of our readers may be able to sympathize):—

"I was restless, and could not tell what was the matter with me; I pulled the paper out of my pocket every ten minutes, and again and again perused my contribution with an intensity of satisfaction, ever growing—ever new. I had been writing lines to this, and lines on that, and stanzas to * * *, and epigrams, and songs, and the first staves of epics and tragedies, ever since I was ten or twelve years old. But what were they? They were never blackened with printers' ink—never impressed and multiplied by a great machine on wetted paper—never published to the wondering world! Now the deed was done which could never be undone, and I was a printer poet!"

Jordan soon after launched upon "the treacherous sea of literature," and was engaged as a reporter upon a short-lived morning paper, the *Aurora*. In the spring of 1808 he became connected with an evening paper, the *Pilot*, and subsequently with the *Morning Post*, the *British Press*, and the *Satirist*; but in 1813 he was installed in the more important position of editor of the *Sun*, which he retained, with the editorship of the *Literary Gazette*, for the long space of thirty-seven years.

The work contains some interesting editorial anecdotes, a lively sketch of Paris in 1814, and many *et ceteras*. We purpose duly noticing the subsequent volumes, and shall defer till then our more critical remarks.

Every-Day Astronomy; or, Practical Lessons on the Celestial Sphere. By Berenice Gazewell. Bath: Binns and Goodwin. London: Whittaker and Co.

This is not a regular treatise on astronomy,

but it is what was more required—a plain and practical guide to the every-day phenomena of the heavenly orbs. The authoress takes the position of a friendly teacher; and with steady finger and intelligent gaze, points to stars and planets, talking of their movements, and telling their names. Her lessons assume a conversational form, and are divided into daily portions. She thus, in the first place, secures advantages which a didactic style would not have afforded; and, in the second, avoids presenting at once too much of the technical and uninteresting. We have often wished in by-gone days for such a work, and believing that others have felt a similar want, we cheerfully recommend this, the only volume we have met with well adapted to supply it.

A Manual of Universal History, on the Basis of Ethnography. By J. B. Wright. Bath: Binns and Goodwin. London: Whittaker and Co.

The distinguishing characteristic of this work is the combination of ethnography with history: presenting at the same time a description of manners and customs, and a relation of public events. This is a desideratum in the study of history: for in contemplating the rise, progress, or fall of nations, we often feel desirous of knowing something of their most remarkable characteristics; as, their personal appearance, their costumes, their mode of life, their habits of thought. It too frequently happens, that imagination, unguided by knowledge, in attempting to gratify curiosity runs into many and serious errors. The present volume seeks to remedy this evil by associating with the general facts of history succinct descriptions of men and manners. The work is intended to embrace four definite periods of history, viz.: "1. The primeval period, when the world was young; when the greater and wiser part of mankind dwelt in the east, in the region of the rising sun, and civilization appeared in its orient brightness, clothed with 'the golden exhalations of the dawn.' 2. The classic period of Greece and Rome, when civilization began to concentrate its brightness, and assume palpable form. 3. The mediæval period—the dark ages, so called—the night of civilization; yet with many a bright star and beaming crescent raying forth through the surrounding gloom. 4. The modern period, when the daylight of civilization being restored, it is advancing to its culminating point." Such, then, is the prospectus which our author lays before the public; and with it he presents the first volume on the "Primeval Period," intimating that the appearance of the other volumes will be regulated by the reception given to this. For ourselves, we cannot but express our admiration of the plan of the work, and our satisfaction with the manner in which it has thus far been worked out. We hope the writer will be encouraged to persevere to the end, and we feel sure he will produce a useful addition to our historical literature.

We cannot conclude this notice without referring to the superior style in which the volume is got up, both with respect to the beauty of the typography, and the elegance of the binding. We have rarely seen it equalled, never surpassed.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XI.—ON STYLE.

"If men by nature had been framed for solitude, they had never felt an inclination to converse one with another; and if, like lower animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognised the proper subjects of discourse. Since Speech, then, is the joint energy of our best and noblest faculties (that is to say, of our Reason and our Social Affections), being withal our peculiar ornament and distinction as *men*, those inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal which either search how Speech may be naturally *resolved*; or how, when resolved, it may be again *combined*."* The *resolution* of words belongs to that department of grammar denominated Etymology; the re-combination of them belongs in part to Syntax and in part to that portion of Rhetoric of which we are now treating, viz., Style. We are perfectly aware, of course, that the ordinary definition of a good Style, viz., "proper words properly arranged," has been assailed with the light arrows of raillery by that prince of wits, Dean Swift, who asserts that it conveys as little real information on the subject as if a telescope were described as an instrument consisting of proper glasses properly arranged. This objection, inasmuch as it implies that the queries, What are proper words? and What is their proper arrangement? require to be asked and remain unanswered, would be formidable if a similar one were not capable of being urged against all definitions; but if all other definitions, in a similar manner, present the ideas of which they are the exponents in the most concise and perspicuous form in which they can be placed before the mind, presupposing that the terms in which it is couched are already known, or delaying the peculiar signification in which they are to be understood for after-explanation, then this objection is as irrelative against this definition as against any other. A definition is a synthesis which requires to be unfolded by a minute analysis. To accomplish this analysis, and obviate the objection above stated, we have divided our prelections upon Style into two parts; the one treating of "Diction," and answering, so far as general directions can do so, the question, What are proper words?—the other concerning itself with the laws of composition so far as they regard Sentences, and affording a reply to the query, What are the proper places which words should occupy? In our previous papers we have discussed the laws of Diction, and had proceeded so far with the portion relative to Sentences as to bring us to the second quality which they ought to possess, viz., Conciseness; and to the consideration of this topic we shall now address ourselves.

II. CONCISENESS.—Conciseness is a term employed by rhetoricians to express that quality of Style in which all superfluity of words is avoided, and the ideas intended are

* Harris's "Hermes," book i. chap. 1.

exhibited with distinctness, brevity, and force. It does not countermand elegance or ornament, although it requires a skilful employment of clear, powerful, and compressed diction. It permits no "long drawn out" and elaborate artificiality—no straining after effect—no mere grouping together of high-sounding epithets—no dilution of thought; but a vivid, direct, and intelligible development of the ideas within us which pant for utterance. The chief object of Speech is, or ought to be, the communication of instruction. When the Style of an author is unnatural, stilted, grandiloquent, or verbose, this end is frustrated. When a sentence is not readily and easily understood by those parties for whom the writing was chiefly intended, the purpose of the author remains unfulfilled. Without due attention to the perspicuity and conciseness of a composition, the would-be sublime is bombast, and the most brilliantly ornate figurative language resembles the leaves of "the barren fig tree." To follow out a thought with strict logical consistency, to proportion the expressions employed to the real importance of our ideas, to give definiteness and compactness to the utterance of the intellect, and so to place before the mind the thought, the whole thought, and nothing but the thought, that it shall be clearly and distinctly understood, are the chief excellences of composition; and, if these purposes be kept in memory, and are steadily acted upon, a concise style must be the result;—

"For when the mind with clear conceptions glow,
The willing words in just expression flow."

When the soul is in earnest it cannot linger in the bowers of beauty, culling "the flowers of Rhetoric;" but improvises, in its enthusiasm, with succinctness and energy. The pure gold-ore of Intellect *may* be wrought into garish trinketry, but the concise writer is contented with bestowing upon it so much labour and ornament as shall secure its general currency. Such a Style obviously requires great concentration of mind, a thorough mastery of language, and a perception of the logical harmony of thought with thought and phrase with phrase. It stands opposed to tedious prolixity as well as to vague generality, because these are opposed to intelligibility and attractiveness. It does more. "Tediousness," says Dr. Johnson, "is the most fatal of all faults;" but an affected epigrammaticality, an overstrained sententiousness, or an elaborate smartness, in our opinion, ranks next in order. Hence it is necessary to say, be not too concise neither; express so much as will make what you leave to be understood by your hearers or readers perfectly easily perceived. A too great parsimony of words defeats its own object. Over-concise sentences may be forcible, but they are difficult of comprehension. Verbiage is distasteful and wearisome; but enigmatical brevity is annoying and repulsive. To do full justice to an idea, it must be accurately embodied in words. This, however, cannot be done if we do not condescend to discriminate, select, and arrange those terms through which a knowledge of it may be best conveyed. To pass hastily over necessary steps in an argument—to omit in our over-eagerness any needful explanatory clause, phrase, or vocable, or to slur over with incautious zeal any important element of a thought—is to defeat the object of conciseness, and to give our thoughts indistinct and imperfect utterance. Do not let it be supposed, therefore, that we advise a uniform condensation of phrase and conciseness of Style. Far from it. Diffuseness, and even prolixity, have their uses. We merely recommend the acquisition of the power of writing concisely, in order that when the necessity shall arise,

viz., when important truths demand forcible statement, you may not be found wanting. In this, as in all things else, "let your discretion be your tutor;" for rhetorical rules, being for the most part elaborations of the intellect when too strictly followed, are apt to make too little allowance for the exercise of the affections.

Conciseness must not be purchased at the expense of intelligibility. Let it never be forgotten that there is "a limit to the grasping power of man's apprehension, beyond which, if you add article to article, the whole shrinks from under his efforts. The point is, therefore, to distribute the materials of the several divisions of the fabric into parcels that may be portable without fatigue."* This is to be really and truly concise; this is the most effectual method of complying with the rhetorician's demand, viz., that no one shall be put to any unnecessary trouble in discovering what you *intend* to say. It is true that

"Within the soul a faculty abides,
That with interpositions that would hide
And darken, so can deal, that they become
Contingencies of pomp."

To the exercise of this faculty—"the shaping spirit of Imagination"—we do not object, when it is not so employed as to make composition "dark with excessive bright;" so long as the writer is not one of those who

"With gold and jewels cover every part,
And hide with ornament their want of art."

Harmonious grouping, idealized colouring, statuesque simplicity, compactness, and taste, we admire rather than deprecate. Against excessive brilliancy of diction, redundancy of phrase, and lengthiness of simile or metaphor, we are desirous of warning unpractised writers or speakers. To all such we would say, in the language of the old adage, "*in medio tutissimus ibis*:" you will be safest if you adopt a middle course. Archbishop Whately has given the same advice already, and we cannot do better than quote his directions, with the very significant reason which he gives for acting upon them, viz.:—"To an author who is, in his expression of any sentiment, wavering between the demands of perspicuity and of energy (of which the former, of course, requires the first care, lest he should fail of both), and doubting whether the phrase which has the most forcible brevity will be readily taken in, it may be recommended to use *both* expressions—first to expand the sense sufficiently to be clearly understood, and then to contract it into the most compendious and striking form. * * * The hearers (or readers?) will be struck by the forcibleness of the sentence, which they will have been prepared to comprehend; they will *understand* the longer expression, and *remember* the shorter."† "A noble energy of thought, modestly decorated by a proper and natural expression,"‡ ought sedulously to be cultivated; for, "As when the rays of the sun are collected into the focus of a burning-glass, the smaller the spot is which receives them, compared with the surface of the glass, the greater is the splendour; so, in exhibiting our sentiments by speech, the narrower the compass of words is wherein the thought is comprised, the more energetic is the expression."§

* Bentham's Works, vol. x.—"Memoirs and Correspondence," p. 74.

† "Rhetoric," p. 93.

‡ Ward's "System of Oratory," Sect. xxxv.

§ Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric."

"Circumlocution seldom conduces to plainness; and you may take it as a maxim, *that* when once an idea has been *clearly expressed*, every additional stroke will only confuse the mind and diminish the effect. When you have once learned to express yourself with clearness and propriety, you will soon arrive at elegance. Everything else, in fact, will follow as of course. But I warn you not to invert the order of things, and be paying your addresses to the Graces, when you ought to be studying perspicuity. Young writers are in general, too solicitous to round off their periods, and regulate the cadences of their Style. Hence the feeble pleonasm and idle repetitions which deform their pages. If you would have your compositions vigorous and masculine in their tone, let every *word tell*."

The following extracts will illustrate what we mean in the preceding paragraphs on Conciseness, viz.:—

1st. "*It requires a clear soul to see a truth so as to believe it at first sight, and there is nothing more doubtful than a fact to an ignorant or presumptuous mind. The reason of this is, that nothing is understood while standing alone. To separate any idea from its connexion is to put it out of its place, and thus to make it a puzzle. It is like presenting a fossil to a man and asking him what it belonged to when alive, and begging him to describe the nature, property, and fashion of the creature of which it once formed a part. A large and exact extent of knowledge is demanded mentally to allocate anything, or to form a complete idea of any object before us. The man of small knowledge has a small vocabulary, and few meanings, or at least few truths, and whatever does not seem to fall in with these, he looks at as a wonder or a lie.*" †

2nd. "The use of language is not confined to its being the medium through which we communicate our ideas to one another; it fulfils a no less important function as *an instrument of thought*, not being merely its vehicle, but giving it wings for flight. Metaphysicians are agreed that scarcely any of our intellectual operations could be carried on to any considerable extent without the agency of words. None but those who are conversant with the philosophy of mental phenomena can be aware of the immense influence that is exercised by language in promoting the development of our ideas, in fixing them in the mind, and detaining them for steady contemplation. Into every process of reasoning, language enters as an essential element. Words are the instruments by which we form all our abstractions, by which we fashion and embody our ideas, and by which we are enabled to glide along a series of premises and conclusions with a rapidity so great as to leave in the memory no trace of the successive steps of the process; and we remain unconscious how much we owe to this potent auxiliary of the reasoning faculty." ‡

The general rule for concise composition is, Avoid the use of superfluous words and phrases; be content when a thought is clearly expressed; aim at acquiring such a command of language as shall enable you to get the right word in its right place at the right time. Superfluity of words must be particularly eschewed; "the world is too rich in books to endure it."

As writers distinguished in general for conciseness we would mention J. S. Mill, Macaulay, Foster, Carlyle, Sir W. Hamilton, and Grote, the historian of Greece; Crabbe, Rogers, and James Montgomery.

III. UNITY is a term employed to designate that characteristic of Style which places an idea before the mind clearly demarcated from all others, free from extraneous words, and so connectedly and completely embodied as to leave no part unexpressed—

* "Kirke White's Remains"—Letter to Mr. B. A.—, Nottingham, May 7, 1804.

† Moore's "Man and his Motives," chap. ix. p. 251.

‡ Roget's "Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases," Introduction, p. viii.

which gives an integrity and oneness to the conceptions of the intellect. Heterogeneity of expression, the disjunction and disparting of the several elements necessary to present a whole thought in its individuality, affected laconism and oracularity, needless pauses, unnecessary parentheses, and the want of a clear and distinct differentiation of one idea from another, are all opposed to unity. Unity of Style can only result from unity of thought, the capacity of taking a thorough grasp of our ideas, and an habitual striving after the attainment of continuity and fixedness of thinking. The flighty, fickle, uncontrolled mind cannot follow any intellectual operation through all its consecutive developments, and seize, retain, and represent the resulting conception; it is only from the steady, resolute, practised mind that unity of thought can be expected. To such alone is it given to rank amongst

“The mighty, who with tranquil brow,
In the pale majesty of thought, control
The boisterous world.”

The properties of a really correct Style are so closely interrelated, that attention to one point necessarily conduces to the observance of others. No composition can be concise without being somewhat perspicuous, nor perspicuous without being concise; in like manner, perspicuity and conciseness almost necessitate unity, while unity as necessarily concurs in promoting the clear, brief, and pointed expression of our thoughts. And it is well that the rhetorician's laws should be thus mutually aidant; for when an accurate knowledge of the several laws of Style has been attained, carefully studied, and rigorously practised, there naturally results an actionary and reactionary influence of one upon another, by which the comprehension of the whole is facilitated, and each becomes more easily obeyed, while the increase of light thus flowing upon the subject from numerous points enables the inquiring mind more readily to perceive the combined beauties of a clear, concise, and captivating style. Few thoughts are so definite as to be wholly detached from the modifications of circumstances, and hence it is that accessorial and dependent ideas are generally associated in the mind with the principal conception in any sentence. To indicate the respective influences which these exert upon the primary idea, like the grouping of a picture, requires skilful management. Without this, the due concatenation and arrangement of the subordinate parts in the respective gradation of their subordinacy could not be properly accomplished, neither could the chief idea be *thrown out* in accurate perspective. The general conception, destitute of all accessorial modifications, or without any mention made of the circumstantialities of time, place, or manner, is a pure abstraction, cognizable only by the philosophic mind, and not referrible in any manner to general experience. It is needful, therefore, if we wish to be understood, to attend to the circumstances which modify and influence ideas, and exhibit them in just proportion. Unity demands that the precise idea should be presented to the mind as one whole, with all its subordinate relations duly arranged and fittingly grouped, so that no misconception can possibly arise.

The following rules ought to be carefully studied and assiduously attended to by young writers, in order that violations of Unity may be as seldom as possible observed in their compositions:—

1st. Ideas having no intimate or necessary relation to, or dependence on, each other,

ought not to be associated in the same sentence; or, in other words, different topics should be treated in different paragraphs, and distinct ideas ought to be embodied in separate sentences. False metaphors and mixed figures of speech, mutually-contradictory terms applied to the same object of thought, or the introduction of two leading subjects into the same sentence, violates the above-given rule, as will be seen from the following examples, viz. :—

1. "There is a period in the history of Europe when every commotion on its surface was occasioned by one cause deeply seated, *like the internal fire that is supposed to have produced the earthquake at Lisbon*; and, like it, breaking out with violence in one place, and making itself felt in every part of the globe. This cause was the Reformation. From 1520 to 1649 the Reformation was the great lever of Europe."—*Memoirs of Europe from the Peace of Utrecht, by Lord John Russell*, vol. i. p. 27. Here it will be observed that one elevating agency has, by a mixed metaphor, been substituted for another, viz., a lever for an earthquake! Had the last sentence stood thus, "From 1520 to 1649 the Reformation was the great earthquake which convulsed Europe," the unity of the metaphor would have been sustained.

2. "Every sentence should be simple, energetic, and perspicuous; laconic, yet simple in explication; *fertile and flowing*, yet free from turgidity, pomposity, and affectation on the one hand, and sterility on the other; divested of ambiguity and vulgarity, together with a strict adherence to the rules of grammar. This being granted, Custom, like the hydra-monster Credulity, when coupled to Ignorance, must be *exploded*, and sent to seek its baneful retreat among the haunts of Superstition, in the mountains of Error, no more to make its appearance in the fruitful valleys of heaven-born Science, among the illuminated sons of Wisdom."—*Samuel Alexander's "Logical Essay on the Syntax of the English Language,"* Preface, p. vii. We can merely quote this passage; we cannot amend it.

3. "Devotion is that holy and heavenly fire which darteth into our minds the light of spiritual knowledge, which kindleth in our hearts the warmth of holy desires; if, therefore, we do continue long absent from it, a *night* of darkness will overspread our minds—a deadening coldness will seize upon our affections."—*Barrow's "Discourse on Devotion."* Were the word *night* changed into season, the unity would be preserved. We cannot talk consistently of fire being the cause of day, which is implied by the use of that word.

2nd. The course of a sentence should be interrupted as seldom as possible, whether by the introduction of parenthetical clauses, a change of the grammatical structure, or the employment of superfluous relative words or clauses. The following are examples of the neglect of this rule:—

1. "The noun, or subject of a proposition, variously modified as we have seen it may be, is frequently complicated *still farther* by a definition or description of the object which it denotes. Now, the reference of the description to the object, *and* which object is called the antecedent, because antecedently *expressed*, is marked by the relative pronoun, *which* is called *relative*, because, like the clause which it introduces, it relates to the object or antecedent. In truth, the relative is but another and varied expression for the object or noun, *which* is represented under a new relation, and therefore put in that case *which*, with the verb of the relative or descriptive clause, expresses the relation."—*Professor A. Alexander's "Elements of Greek Grammar."* The unity of this passage might be improved thus, perhaps:—The noun, or subject of a proposition, variously modified as we have seen it may be, is frequently still farther complicated by a definition or description of the object which it denotes. Now, the reference of the description to the object, which is called the antecedent, because expressed antecedently, is marked by the relative pronoun, so called because *it*, as well as the clause which it introduces, relates to the object or antecedent. In truth, the relative is but another and varied expression for the object or noun, and therefore put in such a case as, with the verb of the relative or descriptive clause, expresses a relation.

2. "My voice proclaims
How exquisitely the individual mind
(And the progressive powers, perhaps, no less
Of the whole species) to the external world
Is fitted;—and how exquisitely, too,
(Thence this but little heard of among men,)
The external world is fitted to the mind."—*Wordsworth's "Excursion."*
3. "Lorenzo, thou hast seen (if thine to see)
All nature and her God (by nature's course,
And nature's course controlled) declare for me;
The skies above proclaim, 'Immortal man'!
And 'Man immortal' all below resounds."—*Young's "Night Thoughts."*

3rd. Abrupt, short, smart, oracular, and laconic sentences must not appear too frequently in composition; although they may appear energetic, they are destitute of the dignity, beauty, and clearness which belong to the carefully-constructed though lengthy period. While by not placing the whole object and its concomitances at one view before us, but elevating each itemal relation into the dignity of an independent subject, we break the unity of aspect which it ought to possess. It does not present the picture in a group, but brings before us in succession the individual figures which are intended to form a group. Such sentences as the following are inconformable to this requirement, viz.:—

"Nor let any church of our order take upon itself, as a necessary part of its character, the form of aggression. This is often said to belong to it. If the calm and consistent presentation of principles be the strong assault upon their opposites, then such must be our offence. But it is no more. We seek not to condemn. To maintain the right is our duty. Against what may be wrong there may be in this an implicit rebuke. Yet it is not for us to trouble other churches. We doubt if certain success would compensate for all the evil the attack would provoke. To live for denominational purposes seems to us an unworthy end. It is no ultimate good. It is no immortal triumph. It is only an included benefit. It is only a subservient use. Far be it from us so to bear ourselves as though we raised but one stern protest against all who differ in anything from us; so as to set up the model of our church, as if, forsooth, we disallowed the existence and acceptance of any other."—*"Sermons," Second Series, by R. W. Hamilton, LL.D.*

The length to which our preceding remarks and extracts have extended, leaves us no space for farther remark at present. We hope to conclude, in our next paper, all the directions which are needful for writing a pure prose style; meanwhile, we say again, have these precepts "writ in your remembrance" and diligently reduced to practice.

"It was said by Charles XII. of Sweden, that he who was ignorant of the arithmetical art was but half a man. With how much greater force may a similar expression be applied to him who carries to his grave the neglected and unprofitable seeds of faculties which it depended on himself to have reared to maturity, and of which the fruits bring accessions to human happiness—more precious than all the gratifications which power and wealth can command."—*Dugald Stewart.*

"Who in the same given time can produce more than many others, has *vigour*; who can produce more and better, has *talent*; who can produce what none else can, has *genius*."—*Lavater.*

History.

WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE CRUSADES FAVOURABLE TO THE
CIVILIZATION AND MORAL ELEVATION OF THE PEOPLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"Nor doth the mastering voice
Of Nature cease within to prompt aright
Their steps; nor is the care of heaven withheld
From sending to the toil external aid;
That in their stations all may persevere
To climb the ascent of being, and approach
For ever nearer to the life divine."
AKENSIDE, *"Pleasures of the Imagination."*

IN glancing back through the volume of the past history of our race, a thoughtful observer cannot but feel that every page has had its use—that it is a link in the chain of progress, the destruction of which mars the unity of the whole—which may, indeed, be dark and discoloured, black with human passions and human conflicts, but which yet is a necessary step in that gradual unfolding and opening of the human mind which has conducted us to our present state of refinement and civilization. And this principle of weighing well all the circumstances and relations of an event, its bearings upon things to come as well as things present, we feel to be especially necessary in surveying the darker scenes of history, which, with their endless succession of battles, murders, machinations, and general depravity, would otherwise lead us to doubt whether there be a divine Ruler, and by inference a divine Maker, of the universe. Nothing, we think, is more necessary to one who would read history with profit, than a conviction that every event, however apparently untoward, has been productive of benefit to mankind, and has, in the end, advanced their social and individual well-being, although we, with our short-sighted visions and imperfect faculties, may be unable to trace the manner how, or the means whereby.

On these grounds, then, had there existed no other, I should feel obliged to differ from G. N. and J. M. S. in condemning the Crusades as detrimental to the general and final welfare of the human family. That they had quite a contrary effect there is strong evidence to prove; but, before adducing it, I

will briefly examine the nature of that in which those gentlemen so confidently trust.

G. N. and J. M. S. allege, as arguments against the utility of the Crusades, that they originated in error, in superstition, and unworthy motives; that "they were carried on at the most reckless expense of property and life;" that they ended in disaster, and failed to accomplish the object with which they were undertaken. But do these premises, if well founded, prove that no advantage, or no advantage equivalent to the disadvantage, sprung from the Crusades? If it was superstition that originated them, it was also superstition against which they were directed. Mohammedanism is the very essence of superstition. And the conflict of errors has been often the cause of the evolving of truth. Men, in this case, fought, it is true, for an empty shadow; but it is also true that they soon learnt to regard it as such—to regard the objects of their superstitious veneration in a juster light. Hence the crusading spirit quickly died away. It lasted long enough only to link the European nations together by one moral bond, their mutual Christianity.

But may not superstition in the end produce good? The monks of the middle ages frequently imposed on themselves as a penance the transcribing of the scriptures. Was this superstition or not? Yet it was probably the means, under Providence, of the conservation of those scriptures, which might otherwise have been irrecoverably lost to mankind. But the Crusades, we are told, "were carried on at the expense of much blood and treasure." Were they therefore injurious to civilization and freedom? The wars of Wellington in Spain were carried on, the battle of Waterloo was fought, at the expense of much blood and treasure; but were they therefore necessarily detrimental to the dearest interests of Europe? The answer is plain. Further, if the main object

with which these expeditions were undertaken, viz., the recovery of the Holy Land from the hands of the infidels, was wholly unworthy of such gigantic efforts—of such vast expenditure of blood and money, as we grant it was—it could not, surely, be injurious to Europe generally that they failed in accomplishing their object; and if they terminated in disaster to the individuals who embarked in them, they also, as I shall now proceed to show by a statement of their effects, produced lasting benefits to millions, by improving the condition of European society.

The first and most perceptible effect was the extension of commerce. After the series of mishaps which the adventurers in the first and second Crusades had met with, the French and English, Gibbon tells us, “preferred the navigation of the Mediterranean;” and the Italian maritime cities, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, furnished transports for the conveyance of their armies to Palestine, and likewise “provisioned them when arrived off the coast of Syria, and kept up their communication with the West.”* But these cities did not wholly monopolize the benefits resulting from commercial intercourse with the East. “The Crusaders, on their return, brought with them from Asia to Europe specimens of the productions of those strange and splendid regions; and the exhibitions of rarities excited a general desire to possess them. Thus new wants were created, the spirit of commerce was awakened, and the intercourse which had been opened by the Crusades was, after the war, continued, in order to gratify the demands of the opulent.”†

Next we see as a result the increase of personal freedom. The petty fensual barons, whose wealth consisted in the extent of their lands and the number of their villans, or serfs, and who needed money to enable them to proceed to the Holy Land with a retinue suited to their dignity, were often forced, in order to raise the requisite sums, to sell their lands to their superior lord, or liberty to their slaves. Every serf, likewise, who would assume the cross was set at liberty. These causes “greatly diminished the number of petty fiefs and small domains—of inferior

fiefholders,—and they concentrated property and power in a smaller number of hands;”* and “thus,” says Robertson, “in every state there was formed a new order of citizens, to whom commerce presented itself as their proper object, and opened to them a certain path to wealth and consideration.” These burghers, forced to depend on their mutual aid for safety, and on the products of their own labour and skill for sustenance, gradually became the most powerful bulwarks of individual and national freedom. Oppressed and plundered by the barons when beyond the protection of their own walls, they eagerly received and sheltered any serfs that fled to them for protection from the tyranny of their masters, for this strengthened their own party at the expense of the enemy. To them kings and princes would naturally look for aid against their too powerful nobles—to them they would fly for subsidies in time of war with other nations, and in return would grant them various immunities and privileges. Thus originated the great towns and boroughs.

Thirdly, if we look at the Crusades in a religious point of view, we cannot but conclude, however much to a superficial observer they may appear to have forwarded the ambitious designs of the popes, that they were, on the whole, favourable to religious liberty, to freedom of conscience, and to the eventual emancipation of the human mind from the thralldom of priestcraft and superstition. For what first opened the eyes of Luther to the enormities of the Roman system? Was it not the sale of indulgences? And this corruption, which originated in the time of the Crusades, together with the crafty manner in which the popes took advantage of the religious enthusiasm which prevailed at their commencement to extend their power—“to bind the kings with chains, and the nobles with fetters of iron”—had undoubtedly, long previous to the time of Luther, opened the eyes of millions to the grasping and ambitious designs of Rome. “Numbers of the laity,” says Guizot, “viewed her policy and manners, and could see how much of personal interest influenced religious controversy. Doubtless this new knowledge inspired many minds with a hardihood till then unknown.”

Another, and by far the most important

* Sismondi's “History of the Italian Republics,” in one vol., p. 29.

† See also Guizot, “Civilization,” &c., vol. i. pp. 155—157.

effect produced, was the general extension of knowledge. Between the moral and intellectual condition of the people of the eleventh and that of the thirteenth century there is a wide interval. "Compare," says Guizot, "the contemporaneous chroniclers of the first Crusades with those of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; for instance, Albert d'Aix, Robert the Monk, and Raymond d'Agiles, who took part in the first Crusade, with William of Tyre and James de Vitry. When we compare these two classes of writers, it is impossible not to be struck with the distance which separates them. The first are animated chroniclers, full of vivid imagination, who recount the events of the Crusade with passion. But they are, at the same time, men of very narrow minds, without an idea beyond the time in which they have lived—strangers to all science, full of prejudice, and incapable of forming any judgment whatever upon what passes around them, or upon the events which they relate. Open, on the contrary, the "History of the Crusades" by William of Tyre; you will be surprised to find almost an historian of modern times—a mind developed, extensive, and free

—a rare political understanding of events, completeness of views, a judgment bearing upon causes and effects. James de Vitry affords an example of a different kind of development; he is a scholar who not only concerns himself with what has reference to the Crusades, but also occupies himself with manners, geography, ethnography, natural history; who observes and describes the country. In a word, between the chroniclers of the first Crusades and the historians of the last there is an immense interval, which indicates a veritable revolution in mind."

If, then, the advocate for the beneficial influence of the Crusades be asked in which of their numerous effects he discovers that influence, his answer is ready:—"In promoting commerce and intercourse between nations; in bursting the bands of the oppressor and letting the oppressed go free; in sowing the seeds of the glorious reformation in religion; in awakening Europe from the sleep of ages, to run the career of improvement, until, in wealth, liberty, and intelligence, she had left the ancient seat of learning and religion, the birthplace of the human race, far, far behind." F. J. L.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

If the human mind be susceptible of improvement under circumstances disadvantageous to its own welfare—if it be possible that any benefit can accrue to those who, being unfortunately the victims of superstition and idolatry, are buffeted with the scorn and derision of beings who profess to be the disciples of a religion which teaches us "to love our enemies," and "to do good to them that hate us"—or if the surest and simplest means of achieving a benevolent and praiseworthy object be to appeal to the malevolence and prejudice of those with whom we have to deal, to offer violence to their bodies, to set at nought the precepts of that faith which they profess, and openly, whilst giving assurance to the world of their good intentions, to negative them by our acts—then the advocates of the holy war have good reason to congratulate themselves on the position assumed by C. W., Jun., in the September number of this journal. But the proofs which he adduces to establish the truth of his argument by no means answer the desired end. If the extracts quoted are

sufficient to substantiate the view taken by him, then there is, at once, an end to the discussion. In themselves they are mere assertions; it therefore becomes our duty to see if they will agree with facts—to ascertain if they are likely to agree with the data which history has furnished, and whether they were the causes of those favourable results to which our opponents refer. C. W., Jun., has merely contented himself with a few extracts, affirming that the Crusades promoted the civilization and moral well-being of the people; but he forgot to explain to his readers how such effects were possible, when contrasted with the many baneful and noxious influences which were generated by, and attendant upon, all the Crusades. I shall prefer dealing even more "liberally" with the question than he has, and will endeavour to take a more extensive view of the whole subject. It must be admitted that certain effects always follow from certain causes; and, when it is considered that wars on so gigantic a scale as those which we are now discussing must of necessity be pro-

ductive of much good or evil, we can readily arrive at something like truth by making ourselves acquainted with the question in all its bearings, and drawing conclusions from the *total ensemble*, without attributing credence to gratuitous assumptions, which are only mere assertions in themselves, without affording the reader any clue by which he may seek to form his own opinion, independently of the views of any author. If we examine the principal elements which were at work in the holy wars—the motives which impelled the Crusaders to action—the professions which they made, and how they were carried out; and if we ascertain in what degree of prosperity Europe stood both before and after the wars, not forgetting to see if the feudal power was broken, whether the barons maintained inviolate their domineering tyranny over the serfs, and also whether the clergy were benefited or not by the Crusades—it cannot but be that we shall be able to form our own opinion on the result of the Crusades.

Of all wars, religious feuds are most to be lamented and deplored; and this applies with double force in the present instance. A people professing Christianity, acknowledging one Saviour as their head, and his injunctions as their rule or standard by which to measure their conduct, formed themselves into one mass for the purpose of recovering, per force, the scene of our Lord's sufferings, &c., in order that they might go thence and do him homage, forgetful that he was "risen and was not there," and that a grateful heart maketh every place a Jerusalem, where God may as well and as acceptably be worshipped. Without prejudging the question, the narration of these wars, which devastated Europe for two centuries, destroyed the lives of upwards of two millions of human beings, besides involving the destruction of an immense amount of property, other than that of military paraphernalia, &c., the generation of those evils which are attendant upon all wars (and this, being a religious one, only aggravated the evil, for then the worst feelings of our nature are aroused and brought into play), besides the hindrances and impediments which were created, and which would necessarily retard the progress, not only of civilization, but of commerce and the education of the people; when, I say, all these disastrous and fiend-like calamities are

set before the reader, they afford a melancholy exemplification of cruelty, treachery, robbery, and an utter disregard of the sacred character of human life. Let it be remembered, too, that the Crusaders were, or professed to be, Christians; and further—and this seems anomalous, and the more irreconcilable with the very doctrine which they acknowledged—all this was perpetrated against the infidels, a race whom we should have supposed they would have endeavoured to reclaim, if not by their religion, certainly by humane and conciliatory conduct—by examples of meekness and kindness of spirit, by benevolence and gentleness of temper and intention.

But it will be seen by those best acquainted with those portions of England's history that the fraud, cruelty, and treachery which were practised towards the heathen (besides the divisions and dissensions which frequently took place between the Christians) only served to open the eyes of the infidels to the real intentions of the former, to see them in their true colours, to discern their hypocrisy, to increase the animosity and hatred which already existed, to widen the breach between them, rendering further intercourse the more improbable, and extended concessions impossible. Granted, for argument's sake, that their real intentions were pure—how miserably carried out! and if not pure, how could good result? "By their fruits ye shall know them. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Yet, forsooth, according to the argument of C. W., Jun., this emphatic declaration was falsified, and the order of nature "inverted." But enough of prelude. Now to an examination of the question by historic testimony.

We will first institute an inquiry into the question, whether the infidels were endangering the safety of Europe? Mill informs us that "no dangers hung over Christendom at the time when the Crusades commenced. But, as they (the Christians) had acquiesced for ages in the existence of Islamism, they could not afterwards draw the sword, except for the purpose of preventing or repelling new aggression."

The conduct of the Christians, and their general character, is thus described by Fuller:—"These Hospitallers afterwards getting wealth, unloosed themselves from the strict-

ness of their first institution, and grew loose into all licentiousness. The Templars, to whom the king promised the spoil if they took it, entered through this breach into the city: they set a guard at the breach, that no more of their fellow-Christians should come in to be sharers with them in the booty."—"But the most remarkable church matter in this king's reign was the clandestine christening of a sultan of Iconium. And more of his courtiers might have followed him, but that his ambassadors, being at Rome, were offended with the viciousness of the Christians' lives, which made them to exclaim, 'How can fresh and salt water flow from the same fountain?' This hath made many pagans step back which had one foot in our church, when they saw Christians *believe so well and live so ill*, breaking the commandments against the creed. * * King Almeric having looked on the beauty of the kingdom of Egypt, longed for it; and now no longer to drive out the relics of the Turks, but to get Egypt to himself; and the next year, against the solemn league with the caliph, invaded it with a great army. He falsely pretended that the caliph would make a private peace with Noradin, king of the Turks, and hence created his quarrel. An oath being the highest appeal, perjury must needs be a heinous sin, whereby God is solemnly invited to be a witness of his own dishonour. I know what is pleaded for King Almeric, viz., that Christians are not bound to keep faith with idolaters. But open so wide a window, and it will be in vain to shut any doors. All contracts with the pagans may easily be voided if this evasion be allowed. And God, to acquit himself, knowing the Christians' prosperity could not stand with his justice after their perjury, frowned upon them."—"Yea, never could the *christian religion* be shown to pagans to more *disadvantage*. *Grecians and Latins* were at *deadly* feud. Many among the Latins, Guelfs and Ghibellines sought to ruin each other. *Humility* was *preached*, and *pride* practised; they *persuaded* others to *labour* for *heaven*, and fell *about earth* themselves; *their lives* were *contrary* to *their doctrines*, and their doctrines one to another."—"Meladin, much troubled with this loss, to purchase peace, offered the Christians all Jerusalem, in as ample a manner as ever formerly they had enjoyed it—all *prisoners* to be *released*, with

a *great sum* of MONEY to defray their charges, and many other good conditions; so that we may much wonder at his profuseness, and more at the Christians' indiscretion in their refusal."—"Next unto superstition, which was deeply inlaid in the holy war, we may make the Christians' *peace breaking* with the infidels the second cause of their ill success. When Godfrey first won Jerusalem, *pardon* was *proclaimed* to all the Turks who yielded themselves; yet, three days afterwards, in cold blood, they were all, without difference of *age* or *sex*, put to the sword."—"And how could safety itself save this people, and bless this project, so blackly blasted with perjury?"

Referring to the Christians falling out amongst themselves, he says:—"But these civil wars amongst themselves were dangerous, and destructive to religion."

Keighley (who views the wars favourably) says:—"It is not our desire to exalt the Mahometans at the expense of the Christians; but these facts, all of which are related by the people themselves, testify strongly for the *degeneracy* of the latter, and *for the benefit* which the fall of their power was to the *Holy Land*, over which they were no longer worthy to hold dominion."

Mill says:—"None of the principles which originally caused the Crusades influenced the actions of either." At the siege of Acre, as well as at the old siege of Antioch, the morals of the holy warriors were as depraved as their condition was miserable. The Crusaders were seemingly devout, but in reality were *dissolute*; and compromised for personal excesses by *pharisaical scrupulosity* and *uncharitableness*.

The "Encyclopædia Londinensis" says:—"The Christians neither could agree while marching together in armies with a view to conquest, nor could they unite their conquests under one government after they had made them. *They were continually making war upon one another.*"

Their cruelty in war is equally as revolting as their hypocritical show of devotion to piety. The last-named writer says:—"The *horrid cruelties* they committed were such as must have inspired the Turks with the most invincible hatred of them, and made them resist with the greater obstinacy. When Jerusalem was taken, not only were the numerous garrison put to the sword, but the

inhabitants were massacred *without mercy or distinction*. No age nor sex was spared, nor even sucking children. According to Voltaire, some Christians who had been suffered by the Turks to live in that city, led the conquerors into the most private caves, where women had concealed themselves with their children, and not one of them escaped. What eminently shows the enthusiasm by which these conquerors were animated, is their *behaviour* after this terrible slaughter. They marched over *heaps of dead bodies* towards the *holy sepulchre*; and while their hands were yet polluted with the blood of so many innocent persons, they *sung anthems to the common Saviour of mankind!!!*"

Lingard says:—"The next was the last day fixed by the treaty. The hostages were led to the summit of a hill, in sight of the Saracen camp. The Crusaders assembled in crowds to witness so glorious a spectacle, and at a given signal 2,700 infidels fell under the swords of their *butchers*. At the same time, an almost equal number, the portion which had fallen to the lot of the king of France, was *massacred* under the walls of Acre, by the troops under the Duke of Burgundy. Out of 5,000 captives, only seven emirs were saved, for the sake of exchange or ransom. Nor was this the end of the tragedy. The dead bodies were abandoned to the insults of the soldiers, who cut them open to discover the precious stones which it was believed they had swallowed, and carefully preserved the gall for medicinal purposes!" This is corroborated by Fuller:—"Yea, in his anger Richard commanded all the Turkish captives, 7,000 in number, to be put to *death* (except some choice persons) on that day whereon the articles should have been, but were not, performed; for which fact he suffered much in his *repute*, branded with *rashness and cruelty*, as the *murderer* of many Christians, for Saladin, in *revenge*, put as many of our captives to death. On the other hand, the *moderation* of the French king was much commended, who, *reserving his prisoners alive*, exchanged them to ransom so many Christians." Keighley confirms the same, and adds, "Thus, with a massacre which covered the king of England and the Christians in general with disgrace, terminated the siege of Acre." Mill says, respecting Edward,—“But he was not less cruel than any preceding hero of the

holy wars, and he gave a dreadful earnest of that *savage implacability* which Scotland afterwards so often rued. The barbarities which stained the entry of the Christians into Jerusalem two centuries before were repeated, in a smaller theatre of cruelty, in Nazareth." Again:—"The conquest of the seat of the Grecian empire was achieved, and the triumphant barbarians had the choice of mercy or revenge; but the ferocity to which they were indebted for success was not easily extinguished, and they abandoned themselves to the usual vices of conquerors. The scenes of *female violation* need not be described. The palaces of the rich, and the meanest houses of the poor, were explored for plunder by the cruel diligence of the victors. Their *sacrilegious hands* tore away the ornaments of churches, the coffins of the emperors were broken open, and the mouldered imperial vestments were stripped from the corpse of Justinian. Their destruction of the rich and beautiful church of Sophia would pass as an ordinary circumstance in the history of sieges; but the annals of profanation have seldom presented us with an instance of a vulgar courtesan, the priestess of the furies, seating herself in the chair of the patriarch, and singing a bacchanalian song to the corresponding actions of the surrounding soldiers and mob. The Marquis of Montferrat and the French and Venetian ecclesiastics prayed and threatened their companions; but the voice of reason and religion could not abate the storm of the passions. Nothing was so difficult as to soften the ferocity of these barbarians and to gain their affections. They were so irritable that a single word would kindle the flame: it was folly to attempt either to lead them or to make them hear reason."

These examples might be multiplied, but enough has been said on this part of the question.

It is gratifying to observe that there were in these barbarous days those who foresaw that the Crusades would be demoralizing, destructive to life and property, prejudicial to good manners, and repugnant alike to religion and common honesty. Mill says:—"Though pilgrimages were generally considered acts of virtue, yet some of the leaders of the church accounted them *useless and criminal*. Gregory, bishop of Nice in the fourth century, dissuades his flocks from

these journeys. 'They were not *conscientious obligations*,' he said; 'for in the description of persons whom Christ had promised to acknowledge in the next world, the name of *pilgrim* could not be found.' A migratory life was dangerous to virtue, particularly to the modesty of women. Horror at spectacles of vice would diminish with familiarity, and the moral principle would gradually be diminished. Malice, idolatry, poisoning, and bloodshed, disgraced Jerusalem itself; and so dreadfully polluted was the city, that if any man wished to have a more than ordinary spiritual communication with Christ, he had better quit his earthly tabernacle at once, than endeavour to enjoy it in places originally sacred, but which had since been defiled. Some years after the time of Gregory a similar description of the depravity of Jerusalem was given by St. Jerome, and the Latin father commends a monk, who, though a resident in Palestine, had but on one occasion travelled in the city. The opinions of these two venerable spiritual guides could not stem the torrent of popular religion. The coffers of the church were enriched by the sale of the relics, and the dominion of the clergy became powerful in proportion to the growth of religious abuses and corruption."

The general results of the Crusades are thus summed up by the authors already quoted; but, as I observed before, I give the principal features of the wars, and it will be for my readers to draw their own conclusions, and to determine in their own minds whether good or evil resulted from them. At the same time, the *finale* of the authors following is entitled to grave consideration, inasmuch as the reasoning is consistent and concordant with the facts of the case. Fuller, who is favourably disposed towards the war, says, "The French proverb was verified of this voyage, 'Much bruit and little fruit.' They (the Christians) not only did no good in the Holy Land, but they did much harm. Thus, after one hundred and ninety-four years, ended the war, for continuance the longest, for money spent the costliest, for bloodshed the cruellest, for pretences the most pious, for the true intent the most politic, the world ever saw." Of the latter phrase let my readers judge.

Another writer (Keighley), alike favourable, says:—"Though the Crusades certainly did not produce all the good imputed to them, they may have produced some; and though

it is not just to deprive them of all redeeming qualities, we must concede that they had in them a sufficient alloy of evil to neutralize much of their good." Whether the writer be really sincere in adding that "it is not just to deprive them of all redeeming qualities"—whether it proceed from a deep conviction, evoked by a study of the wars only, or whether he says it out of compliment, I cannot determine; but certainly the latter appears to me to be the probable motive.

Lingard says:—"The only benefits which the nation received in exchange for the immense sums with which it had furnished the king (Richard) in his expedition to Palestine, for his ransom from captivity, and in support of his wars in France, were two legislative charters, one establishing uniformity of weights throughout the land, the other relating to wrecks, which provided that the cargoes of a ship were recoverable if the sons or daughters of the owner, or, in default, their brothers and sisters, existed, in preference to the crown."

The results of the holy war, as regards the power of the feudal barons, the spiritual authority of the clergy, the progress of "civilization and moral well-being," and the general effects on the times which followed, are thus eloquently and cogently summed up by Mill:—"The origin and history of the fanatical and military enterprises, called the Crusades, have been traced. No religious wars have ever been so long, so sanguinary, and so destructive. Countless hosts of holy warriors fell the victims of their own vindictive enthusiasm and military ardour. Fierceness and intolerance were the strongest features in the character of the dark ages. It was not for the conversion of people, or the propagation of opinions,* but for the redemption of the sepulchre of Christ, and the destruction of the enemies of God, that the crimson standard was unfurled. Men did not arm themselves from any conviction that the co-existence of Christendom and Islamism was incompatible with the doctrines of the Koran, or that the countries of the West would be precipitated into the gulch of destruction if Asia Minor were not torn from the hands of the Turks and restored to the emperor of Constantinople. The floodgate

* How does this accord with the assertion of C. W., Jun., that it was "the emancipation of the human mind?"

of fanaticism were unlocked for the savage and iniquitous purpose of extermination.

"The question of the justice of the holy wars is one of easy solution. The Crusaders were not called upon by heaven to carry on hostilities against the Mussulmans. Palestine did not of right belong to the Christians in consequence of any gift of God; and it was evident, from the fact of the destruction of the Temple, that there was no longer any peculiar sanctity in the ground of Jerusalem. There is no command in scripture for Christians to build the walls of the holy city, and no promise of an earthly Canaan as the reward of virtue. On principles of morals and politics, therefore, the holy wars cannot be justified. If the Christians had been animated by the conviction that war with all the world was the vital part of Christianity, then also a right of hostility would have been raised (to the infidels). But, before they could have been justified on this last-mentioned argument, proof is necessary that the danger was imminent, and that time and circumstances had not reduced the principle to a mere dry imperative letter of the law.

* * * In tracing the history of Europe in its progress from civilization to refinement, and in accounting for the various phenomena of the moral world, the philosophical observer of man reverts with anxious seriousness to the Crusades of the Latins in the East. These transmarine expeditions so deeply convulsed the moral fabric of the West, they stand so prominent in the picture of former ages, that curiosity is awakened whether they left some lasting impression of good or evil. In the two hundred years of their continuance Europe was making slow and silent advances in arts and civilization, and there were great changes of scene in the political theatre. Viewing, then, the natural union between principle and event, and guarding ourselves against the error of confounding chronological coincidences with moral connexions, the inquiry is to be made into the consequences of the holy wars. A stamp of permanency was fixed on popular superstition when pilgrimages became a matter of public concern and national interest. These religious journeys were only consistent with the christian character when they were performed in harmony with great and primary duties. They might have been considered the ornaments of a religious life

if they had proceeded from holy sympathy; but, when their essential merit was made to consist in the destruction of men and trampling on the law of nations, their natural tendency was to indurate the heart and brutalize the character. The fair face of religion became besmeared with blood, and heavenly attraction was changed for demoniacal repulsiveness. The Crusades encouraged the most horrible violences of fanaticism, and the precedent for the military contentions of the church with the Prussians and the Albigenses; and, as the execrable Inquisition arose out of the spirit of clerical dragooning, the wars in Palestine brought a frightful calamity on the world. The pastors of the church used anathemas, excommunications, interdicts, and every weapon in their storehouse of spiritual artillery; and, when the world was in arms for the purpose of destroying infidels, it was natural that the soldiers of God should turn aside and chastise other foes to the true religion. When offences were commuted for money, the religious application of the price of pardon soon ceased to be necessary. Absolutions from penance became a matter of traffic, and holy virtues were discountenanced.

* * Undoubtedly, the Crusades augmented the wealth of the clergy. The rapacious barons frequently plundered the clergy; and when, afterwards, they were brought to such a sense of religion as to resolve on a holy war, the restitution of ecclesiastical property became a necessary preliminary proceeding. The ecclesiastics flourished more vigorously than any other men; they took a high rank in society, and purchased the birthrights of rash, fiery enthusiasts, who tried the hazard of fortune in the Holy Land." After stating that Europe, had she enjoyed peace during the temporary absence of the great mass of her people, it was "because the horrors of civil war were stayed," he proceeds to add—"But afterwards civil and national hostilities raged with unceasing and unrelenting fury; and, moreover, the spirit of the Crusades fanned the flame of military daring." Referring to the charm in the expression, "days of chivalry," and the suggestion that chivalry "dissipated a cloud of ignoble passions, and transports itself (that is, the fancy) to those remotest ages, which it gilds with the virtues of honour and courtesy, he proceeds to say:—"On the fair part of ancient warfare the Crusades cast a baneful influence.

That tenacious and delicate regard to veracity, which was a great characteristic of the true knight, must have lost much of its sensitiveness by the habitual and systematic violations of faith with infidels. A liberal treatment of prisoners was another remarkable point in the chivalric character. So firm was the trust of cavaliers in each other's honour, that it was common for a victorious knight to suffer his captive to return to his own country in order to collect his ransom; but (in Asia) bigotry and cruelty were the ruling passions of holy warriors. The soldiers of the cross had all the heroism, but none of the polish, of knight-errantry; and the sword leapt from the scabbard, not for the generous purpose of avenging the looks which threatened beauty with insult, but for the vile and rude office of striking off a Saracen's head. * * * We are unaccustomed to think that the national and civil hostilities which raged in the West during the middle ages were favourable to intellectual cultivation, and it would be as difficult to prove that the holy wars were beneficial to Europe, by rousing it from intellectual torpidity and strengthening or refining the tone of mind. They were times of action rather than of letters. They excited a cruel and savage cruelty, and lighted the consuming fires of superstition. Spoliation and slaughter were accounted the highest pitch of human glory, and therefore all that most merited fame was in silence hid. Modes for their destruction, not for their amelioration, occupied the minds of the Christians. The humble and unobtrusive virtues of peace, and their long train of useful and elegant arts, were not fostered, for tranquillity was perpetually broken in upon; the leaders of opinion made the duty of war their greatest theme; and, when the indulgence of their ferocious passions became sanctified, no desire could be felt to emerge from rudeness and ignorance. Much has been written on the supposed advantages to Europe of the collision of minds produced by the mixture of the various nations of Christendom in the course of the Crusades. The connexion between different states was so short and occasional that national prejudices were not softened, political varieties obliterated, or mutual knowledge interchanged. At the close of the Crusades the nations of Europe were as much separated as they had been at

the commencement. Religion had united them for a while, but the bond soon was broken, and the world returned to its former state. But, if the pilgrim ever steps out of his course, it is only to collect with holy reverence those relics which his idolatrous fancy has sanctified; and the mere soldier can imbibe no ideas except those which are connected with his professional habits. The letters that enlighten, the sciences that improve, and the arts that polish life, are not in the intellectual sphere of either. * *

"The last point of inquiry into the consequences of the holy war concerns their effect on the political relations of the great European states. As the Crusades were carried on for holy objects, not for civil or national ends their connexion with politics could only have been collateral and indirect. The spirit of crusading, composed as it was of superstition and military ardour, was hostile to the advancement of knowledge and liberty, and consequently, no improvement in the civil condition of the kingdoms of the West could have been the legitimate issue of the principles of the holy war. Great changes in the political aspect of Europe were coeval with, but were not occasioned by, the holy war. The power of the French crown was much higher at the end of the thirteenth than it had been at the same period of the eleventh century; but the influence of the imperial throne was materially depressed. These opposite effects could never have been the results of the same cause, viz., the loss of the flower of the western aristocracy in Palestine. The pusillanimous John assumed the cross; but the circumstance did not occur till after he had surrendered his crown to the papal see, and until the barons had formed a confederacy against him."

After stating that the great political event of the thirteenth century was the establishment of free and corporate towns—that this was not owing to the Crusades—he says:—"Whenever any part of the public became more rich and enlightened than the rest, the tyranny of the aristocracy was found to be insupportable. The kings of France and England eagerly assisted the burghers of their respective countries, and enfranchised the towns in order to raise a barrier against baronial aggressions on the throne. After various vicissitudes of fortune, the battle of Legnano and the peace

Constance established the independence of the towns in the north of Italy. The Crusades did not contribute to these events, for the two sacred expeditions which had taken place were as disastrous to peasants as to princes, and drained Europe of all ranks of society; consequently, it was not from the holy wars that the people gained their liberties. We find that, so ill regulated was the liberty of the towns alluded to, anarchy soon succeeded. Men of personal importance and wealth aspired to sovereign honours, an overwhelming aristocracy extinguished freedom, and at the end of the thirteenth century there were as many princes in Tuscany and Lombardy as there had been free towns at the end of the twelfth."

My task is now completed. I have traced the rise, progress, and termination of the war, and have exhibited the Christians' professed and actual conduct. As the *tout ensemble* had an influence for good or evil, taking into consideration the immense sacrifice of life and property, the impediments created to commerce, civilization, and Christianity, the numberless evils generated, and the consequent barrier thus raised against progress—were such effects likely to assist the moral well-being of the people? or were degradation, misery, and disgrace more probable? If my readers should possibly assume that the former be correct, it would be well to enquire if such good results followed as a natural consequence from the holy war, or whether they were collateral or indirect? if the latter, then the affirmative of this question cannot with justice be maintained, for its supporters will hardly venture to contend that their position is tenable when the good is merely accidental, and when it will not always flow from the same circumstances and from the same springs of action. In dealing thus "liberally" with this question, it will be seen that I have preferred to lay the moral facts and historical data of the Crusades before my readers, and thus enable them to form their own conclusions. By examining the conduct of the Christians, the motives which impelled them to act in concert, as well as by tracing their ruling passions and marking their diplomacy, a correct opinion may be arrived at. For my own part, I consider it derogatory to truth and good sense to place particular credence in mere quotations, in which certain effects

are merely asserted, *without making a comparison between the actual facts and assumed consequences.* It is too much the fashion, as Dryden says, to take on trust the evidence of historians, without *searching for ourselves* in order to ascertain the probability of certain influences.

Speaking on my own behalf, the contemplation of the holy wars is serious and instructive. It affords ample illustration to future generations of the utter folly of war being considered as a boon, or even as the arbiter of disputes. The holy war originated in a superstitious reverence for relics, both of locality and the seemingly less important articles of bones, clothes, wood, &c. Although it would be unjust to deny that many engaged in the warfare who were prompted by pious and holy feelings, yet the extracts show that a love for military glory, in combination with a despicable hatred of the infidels, animated the great mass of the Crusaders. Cruelty and bloodshed frequently stained their banners, when it would have been more christian and humane to have spared the defeated. They pursued a course which was detrimental to their own interest, repugnant to religion, revolting to humanity, and lamentably discreditable to Christendom in its consequences. They imbrued their hands in innocent blood, and then called upon God to bless and countenance the bloody deed. Whilst professing to adorn the "gospel of God their Saviour in all things," whilst preaching and commending christian virtues and duties, they outwardly showed an utter disregard for morality and decency, and, under the guise of hypocrisy, perpetrated the most cruel and reprehensible acts. That such conduct could have any influence but for evil on the infidels there can be no doubt, and the entire loss of the Holy Land is, perhaps, the most pregnant illustration of their dissolute conduct, and was a just retribution as well as a warning to future generations of the folly and madness of proclaiming, but not acting in unison with the dictates of Christianity. It cannot but be natural to suppose that a continental people, or a combination of professing Christians, visiting, for religious purposes, a foreign country whose inhabitants were infidels, would have their characters examined and a comparison instituted between their creed and conduct; nor is it less natural to surmise that the Chris-

tians would be as eager in being circum-spect and deliberate in their conduct as the infidels in gratifying their curiosity. But it was not so in this case; consequently the immorality and licentiousness which the Christians imported into Asia were not very creditable to the christian religion. Christianity was blighted by its own professors, and the very unfavourable contrast which existed between the two only served to render the former more contemptible in the eyes of the world, and the latter less worthy of respect and admiration.

A short comment on the concluding remarks of C. W., Jun., and I close, craving the pardon of my readers for this lengthened paper. He has certainly avoided a difficulty which he could hardly solve, when he says, "It would answer the present inquiry simply to show that in the end no real harm ensued. But we prefer to deal *liberally* with the question." As if discovering (in his own mind) that this could not possibly be substantiated, he coolly takes it for granted that his readers are aware of the circumstance "that in the end no real harm ensued," and thus very discreetly avoids entering into a topic, the discussion of which would involve him in the "horns of a dilemma," which would eventually expose the weakness of his argument, the fallacy of which he is conscious, and has not the courage to avow. And, as if viewing with derisive scorn the feelings of those who revolt at cruelty, he says:—"Lastly, there are those who become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the horror and misery which naturally attended such perilous expeditions that they entirely overlook the final result. 'Look,' say they, 'at the immense sacrifice of human life! See the immense amount of property, and the consequent amount of misery and destitution which must have followed!'" And, as an apology for this, he makes the following unblushing exclamation:

tion:—"Remember, reader, however much you may deplore the fact, that in the early progress of European civilization and liberty you have the din and horror of war ever ringing in your ears." Is this any justification for the conduct of the Christians? or are we to sit down, consoled with the fact, that because, "in the early progress of European civilization we have the din and horror of war ever ringing in our ears," we must excuse the Christians on the same score? Is this the plea set up for forgiveness, or are we, forsooth, to accept C. W., Junior's doctrine of justification? Are we still to continue confirming the old adage, that "like begets like;" or, because I knock C. W., Jun., down, is that any justifiable reason why he should act similarly to me? Away with such arguments; no apology can be accepted for deeds done in cold blood, and when the blessing of the Almighty was invoked on such cruelty. I can take into consideration the character of the times; nevertheless, christian charity and forbearance were well understood even at that period. "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword;" and most assuredly as the Christians were the first to appeal to that weapon, this solemn though emphatic declaration was fulfilled against them in all its severity. They transformed benevolent feeling into furious and demoniacal passions; but

"They err who count it glorious to subdue
By conquest, far and wide—to overrun
Large countries, and in fields great battles win
Great cities by assault. What do these worthies
But rob and spoil, burn, slaughter, and enslave
Peaceable nations, neighbouring or remote,
Made captive, yet deserving freedom more
Than those their conquerors, who leave behind
Nothing but ruin whereso'er they rove,
And all the flourishing works of peace destroy
MILTON.

Gentlemen of the Jury,—What say you
to the Crusades?
J. G. R.

Philosophers have puzzled themselves how to define man, so as to distinguish him from other animals. Burke says, "Man is an animal that cooks his victuals;" "The says Dr. Johnson, "the proverb is just, 'There is reason in roasting eggs.'" Dr. Adam Smith has hit this case. "Man," says he, "is an animal that makes bargains: no other animal does this. One dog does not change a bone with another."

Politics.

SHOULD NATIVE PRODUCE AND INDUSTRY TO BE PROTECTED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In these days of bold speculation and extensive enterprise, when charts of the world are as familiar as county maps, and science persuades the distant hemispheres to fellowship, we must not examine questions of universal interest in the manner of old ladies peering through spectacles. Free trade and protection are not peculiar terms of English phraseology; they express ideas which interest every nation upon earth; and if we think that by excluding from our discourse all reference to foreign influences we can secretly monopolize the advantages of commerce, we shall presently learn that there is an experience on such matters wider than that of the platform. The best precaution against deception in the consideration of fundamental questions of importance, is a simple and comprehensive examination. Arguments held in a corner about intricate trifles perplex the mind: sophistry is never so successful as when it inveigles an opponent into minute discussion. In order to avoid such danger, we push our way through conflicting statistics to seek elementary truth.

Wealth consists of the produce of the earth, gathered, combined, and cultivated by the industry and ingenuity of man. The amount of the produce is proportioned to the fertility of the source and the expenditure of labour and skill. Those communities are the most wealthy which, favoured by local advantages, exercise an incessant industry, strengthened and guided by science. There are, indeed, instances in which entire populations are deprived of their due recompense by the oppression of power or the cunning of superior knowledge, but these are accidental exceptions, opposed to the tendency of the natural system; they will disappear at the approach of liberty and enlightenment, and will not be adopted in debate by those who prefer justice to the aggrandizement of dominant races.

There is no political district of the globe which can furnish, from its own territory,

all the necessaries of civilized life. The most favoured region must seek the luxuries of commerce. The whole world is thus connected by one interest, for since the universal produce is destined to a universal distribution, the general prosperity is identical with individual gain. Every circumstance, therefore, which tends to enrich the human family, deserves the approbation of the constituent members. Under a well-directed cultivation the bounty of the earth is adequate to satisfy a high civilization diffused through every continent. The greediness of protection implies a distrust of this providential goodness. It implies a selfish rapacity to appropriate a choice abundance, lest the horn of plenty should be prematurely exhausted. Hence arrives the absurd and iniquitous doctrine, at the root of every protectionist system, that Providence annually throws a scanty handful upon the earth, which is to be scrambled for, the prize of the most knowing and most powerful. Then follows the equally absurd corollary, that a nation is not happy in the possession of sufficiency while a neighbour flaunts in superfluity. Despising the fears of such extravagant husbandry, which would allow a whole continent to lie fallow, let us go on to consider in what manner the productiveness of all lands may be increased for the profit of all people.

The cultivation of natural advantages by communities corresponds to the division of labour among individuals. The same familiar arguments establish the efficacy of both. Resources are economized, perfection is attained, and production multiplied. There are few regions so destitute as not to furnish some staple peculiarity for the market of the world. Where the soil is barren, the mines may be rich, the waters prolific, the situation favourable, or the inhabitants persevering. The sterility of the ground may be compensated by ingenuity of mind; or, sometimes, fortune, enticed by accident, may be established by the precedent of custom. At least,

it is the wisest policy of mankind to encourage the production of useful articles in the hands to which they are indigenous, or in which they attain indisputable superiority, rather than by clumsy expedients to attempt to supersede them. A large and steady demand for any commodity tends to the improvement of its quality and the reduction of its price; and whether it is advantageous to obtain things plentiful, cheap, and good from the distance of our planet's diameter, in preference to the dear and villainous substitute of the shop round the corner, may be safely left to the decision of an old-fashioned housewife. Countries rich by nature, whose inhabitants can think hard and work hard, will support their pre-eminence with ease, and obtain the luxuries of every climate, in exchange for their coveted goods. Countries poorly endowed will gladly purchase, at a low price, the commodity they despaired of obtaining until the genius of commerce brought it to their shore. The entire world—those who sell and those who buy—will mutually benefit; not, as simple folks believe, at the expense of one another, but at the expense, so to speak, of the all-giving earth, stimulated to new generosity at the prayer of industry.

Against the promising simplicity of this scheme patriotism erects itself, exclaiming that native industry will be annihilated and the country ruined. How a country can be ruined by buying cheap instead of dear goods is somewhat paradoxical, since the difference in price is a clear profit on every item of purchase; or how a country whose industry is annihilated, can gather enough money to pay for foreign importations, throws suspicion upon its honour. Commerce is the very embodiment of *quid pro quo*: there must be an error in the patriotic argument, since it reduces itself to an absurdity.

Foreign competition can scarcely destroy native industry in its own home, unless there be such an original disproportion in the capacity of the rivals as to make the victory of the foreigner an advantage to them both. Most countries, as we premised, have pretensions to superiority in one or more productions which should form the substratum of their merchandize. Many of the necessities of life, and articles of minor consumption, are produced with such equability of cost throughout the world, that the attempt

to supplant native industry would be vain. Further, convenience, the influence of habit, and even pride, will retrieve the slightly fallen balance, and give to home-made goods, though a little extravagant, a preference over the goods of the stranger. From these causes foreign competition will not permanently prevail, except upon terms too advantageous for the purchaser to grumble. The defeated native had, perhaps, been accustomed to exorbitant profits, and deserves his fate: otherwise he must economize, employ more skill, take advantage of the benefits which a consistent free trade opportunely offers to himself, and, if these endeavours should fail (which experience declares they seldom have done), he must transfer his capital to another occupation; at any rate, his individual misfortunes, retrieved or hopeless, must not taunt with injustice the thousands who have gained by the discomfiture of his domestic monopoly.

The patriot, again, objects that free trade may place a country at the mercy of an enemy for the supply of its subsistence or the materials of its manufacture. But it must be borne in mind that free trade, when its success shall have been practically demonstrated, will make converts. Universal free trade will place every nation in one category; the same terror will hang over every head and persuade a reconciliation. The extreme supposition requires the correspondence of extreme circumstances. A country would seldom be embroiled with the four quarters at once; what an enemy refused, a friend might supply; and, finally, we recur to our assertion, that the cost of the production of staple food, when at its natural level, does not vary sufficiently to induce the belief that populous nations will ever trust their subsistence wholly to foreign supplies. Nor, while war continues a probability among mankind, is it likely that ministers of war will place the national commissariat in such jeopardy.

Protection starts with the assumption that there are no houses in the street but its own. It overlooks the political axiom, that commerce is mutual, and will flourish only while advantage is reciprocal. It is a great selfish error, which excites vexatious recrimination yet hopes, by a well-contrived tariff, to overreach its neighbours. The falsity of its principles is apparent from the consideration

that the prosperous thrive at the expense of the unfortunate. The quantities of the equation are simply shifted from *minus* to *plus*, from *plus* to *minus*. Protection is wasteful; for what is the essential operation of any undue tax but to divert capital from its original busy destination, to place it in the idle hands of wasteful governments, fine gentlemen, and luxurious monopolists? Whatever tax is not expended upon objects of utility, is, in the view of political economy, so much power thrown away. Protection, in the abstract, is a sham, which presumes to have amassed wealth because it has concentrated it in heaps. These heaps want to be scattered; there can be only partial germination till the sun of free trade sheds its warmth upon every atom.

The article of correspondent A., to the surprise of the reader, resolves itself into one argument—that the English people, possessing industry and an inquiring spirit, being famed for untiring toil, and assisted by inventions, require the further protection of legislative enactments. This is an honest John Bull blunder of a past age. It belongs to the era of the French war, King George, and top boots. Correspondent A. must have fallen asleep when the policy of Pitt led the nation to ruin, from which it was saved by extraordinary resources developed by the accidents of science. He wakes in the days of the policy of Peel; he beholds unexampled wealth, more equitably distributed, dominion extended, and power consolidated. The interval has elapsed in unconscious slumber; he attributes the consequences of to-day to the antecedents of fifty years ago. While he has slept, a great change has affected social institutions and national relations. Opinions have adapted themselves to the altered circumstances; the world looks forward, and not hindward as it used to do, and pursues destiny, instead of being driven by it. Among other speculations, an opinion is abroad that nationality is a remnant of barbarism, which, having bestowed its rude benefits upon the world, must accept the gratitude accorded

by philosophical historians to the Crusades and the feudal system. It has been discovered that nations, like the Olympic charioteers, endanger their own safety by malignant rivalry upon a narrow road. These opinions are yet in the bud, but they are quickly expanding beneath the breath of an irresistible experience. In England, at least, the old yeoman superstition, "Let us first be Englishmen," is receding before the faith that we are first human beings. Manchester spinners, on the brink of starvation, cling to common sense, and leave to the ridiculous three described in the fourth letter of the Citizen of the World, the honours of patriotism. When the time shall have come that the whole inhabitants of the globe, like a cordial family, shall reciprocate the scattered blessings of Providence, in the fulness of universal prosperity, how insignificant will appear the antiquated claims of national pre-eminence! Who, when the feast is at its height, regards the quaint armour that embellishes the convivial hall? The greatness and the happiness of a people are not correlatives. No sober-minded man believes it; but the protectionist legislator generously assumes the responsibility of starving a kingdom for the sake of making it "loved at home, revered abroad." With what result, let the past history of the people declare.

In this brief exposition of our opinion we have rested the claims of free trade upon the broad principle of fellowship. Unity is strength as well in peaceful as in warlike transactions. We are aware of the excuses which are suggested by the discordant aspect of the world. But the apparent disunion of governments must not be mistaken for want of sympathy among the people. Besides, free trade is young; the demonstration of its benefits, even upon a partial trial, is limited to the experience of a few countries. Let a full development discover its worth; and if some governments are obstinately blind to conviction, let the system be mutual among wise nations, to the qualified exclusion of the unsociable and selfish. H. T.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

Among the political questions which have of late years agitated the land, none has been more obstinately debated than the propriety of a change in our late commercial policy.

The previous questions which had engrossed the national attention—Catholic Emancipation and the Reform Bill—had for their object the granting of legislative power to classes

hitherto unenfranchised, and the consequent diminution of the influence of those who were formerly its sole possessors. With such prizes at stake, it cannot be wondered at that the contest was vigorous and protracted; but, on the question of protection, no motives were avowed which could account for the tenacity and zeal with which it was attacked and defended. A philanthropical motive—the wish to provide cheap food for the poor—was the only inscription on the banner of free trade. It may, perhaps, be uncharitable to suspect that the real motive of the agitators was the same as in the other political contests—the elevation of themselves and their order by the depression of the landed aristocracy; but it certainly does seem strange that men belonging to a class not celebrated for tenderness or consideration for their subordinates, should have been induced, by their benevolent feelings alone, to spend thousands of pounds in procuring cheap food for their poorer neighbours. But as, of course, the right or wrong of any question must be decided on its own merits, without regard to the motives of its assailants and defenders, I shall now endeavour to prove that protection in England was both just and expedient.

And, first, as to its justice. It is, obviously, the duty of every community to see that each of its citizens, with regard to commercial advantages, shall be placed on at least equal terms with foreigners, and that no class shall be depressed for the sake of a momentary advantage to the rest of their fellow-countrymen. To be just, protection must be proved to be in accordance with these principles. In a new and lately-settled country, whatever restrains the freedom of trade is injurious. The taxes being generally insignificant, and the population scanty, any protective duty can only cause capital and labour to be diverted from their legitimate channels. But in an old-established, populous, and wealthy state, where taxes are high, living costly, and profits reduced by competition to a very small per centage, there will always be abundance of capital and labour for every prudent speculation; and it then becomes necessary for the government to interfere to prevent the lightly-taxed and cheaply-paid foreigner from underselling the heavily-burdened native producer. Though this may increase the price of the

article protected, yet it is no robbery of the many for the benefit of the few; it is merely a means to prevent those burdens which should be borne by all from weighing too heavily upon those whom their pressure has disabled from competing on equal terms with strangers.

When we consider the causes of the decline and fall of most commercial states, I think the expediency of protection will be as evident as its justice. They have generally been—the destruction of the smaller capitalists, the proximity of great wealth to great poverty, and the preponderance of the commercial over the territorial interest. Protection to every branch of native industry is an antidote to the first two of these evils; to the last the duty on foreign corn affords a check. By protecting the smaller manufactures in this country, the glovers, the bootmakers, the hatters, &c., we are both rescuing an honest and respectable set of men from poverty, and preventing the absorption of the small capitals employed in these trades into the hoards of the mill-owner. If, however, by the admission of low-priced foreign goods, we destroy this middle class, we do not benefit the working class. Food and clothes may, indeed, be cheap, but wages will be cheap also. The hands formerly employed in these ruined trades being thrown on the labour market, naturally lower the rate of remuneration, till it reaches the lowest sum on which starvation can be prevented. It may be said that free trade opens out fresh markets, and thus, by giving additional employment, keeps up the price of labour. This might be true if all nations consented to adopt free-trade principles; but we do not find that our adoption of them has induced others to imitate our example. We fancy, because we are a commercial nation, that the great ambition of foreigners is to exchange their corn, cattle, brandy, and wine, for our calico goods and broad-cloth. But we are mistaken, especially as to the continental powers. France, for instance, would not give up the hope of revenging Waterloo and the double occupation of Paris for any commercial advantages we could offer her. Free trade is not the cause of our present prosperity: it has not opened to us a single market which we did not possess before. It has, certainly, cheapened food; but it would likewise have

cheapened labour, if a vent for our surplus population had not been discovered in California and Australia. We have also had a succession of good harvests, which have, in some measure, lessened foreign competition with our farmers. But we cannot always expect to be fortunate. Let the tide of emigration stop; let there be one or two bad harvests; let there be a general European war—none of which events, especially the last, are by any means improbable—and we shall reap the disastrous fruit of our imprudence. With wages at starvation point, their best customers—the landholders and middle classes—ruined, the foreign markets closed to them by another treaty of non-intercourse, fierce and hungry mobs clamouring for that food for whose supply we have become dependent on our foes, our manufacturers will then have time to regret the infatuated and grasping avarice which

induced them to consent to the destruction of their most constant and largest consumers, in the vain hope of monopolizing the trade of the world, and the misplaced confidence that, if we made large concessions to foreigners, they would be equally ready to reciprocate. Protective principles—those principles which teach us to prefer our own country and countrymen to foreigners—carried England with honour and success through the most costly and protracted war of ancient or modern times: it remains to be seen whether, under similar circumstances, free trade would do the same. The crisis has not yet arrived; but its distance no one can predict. God grant that, when it comes, England may not share the fate of her predecessors in commercial greatness, whose wealth has been their weakness, and their insatiate cupidity its own punishment.

S. A. J.

Social Economy.

IS THE CONFESSIONAL IN HARMONY WITH INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL FREEDOM OR SOCIAL WELL-BEING?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

We must say we delight in the intellectual discussion which debate affords, yet in our ardour we would not wrest the truth for the sake of degrading any subject, nor would we knowingly suffer our judgment to be misled by preconceived notions: the remarks of X. on this point are apposite, but too exclusive; he seems to think that the writers on the negative only are subject to party feelings, and perceives not that he himself yields to them in the same paragraph.

C. C. F. has replied so fully and so ably to the attempt of "Confessarius" to graft the confessional on scripture, that we need not pause to combat again his arguments on this point. We shall address ourselves to the arguments offered by the other writers, and we may incidentally have a word with him. "The confessional," says J. B., "is an institution coinciding with a law of our nature." To this assertion we cannot assent. There is some truth in his after remarks, when he alludes to the relief experienced in the un-

burdening of the soul to those in whom we confide, but that surely affords no pretext for the establishment of a *public* confessional—a regularly organized institution, in which the entire inhabitants of a parish confide in one man, and that man armed with authority to compel those, under penalty of excommunication, to reveal to him their sins, and who claims to be invested with power to remit or retain these sins according to the pleasure of his own will. In the one case confession is optional, and made for personal satisfaction only, to one who we are sure feels an affectionate interest in our welfare; in the other it is obligatory—is associated with future rewards and punishments, and made to one who cares not for our personal confidence: the differences are too grave to secure belief in the proposition, that the tendency to confess to one another is the reason for its establishment.

Further on he says—"A candid confession allows a person a starting-point for a new

course of moral rectitude; he is a 'new creature;' he has done with the past, and the future may be full of hope." This certainly is an attractive aspect of confession, and would be uncommonly convenient; but if intended to apply to the confessional, it is a merely fanciful speculation: so far from the confessional being an institution calculated to promote and maintain sinlessness of soul, it serves merely to cozen the confessed into forgetfulness of sins which otherwise might be a source of mental anguish; as the conservator of conscience, it ought to be a check on violations of moral and religious duty; yet, in contrasting non-confessing countries with countries in which the confessional is attended, the result, despite the special pleadings of Bishop Maginn, is highly flattering to the former, and presents an irresistible proof that the principles in which the confessional is founded are erroneous. That attendance at this tribunal does not conduce to "newness of life," is a fact painfully illustrated in the experiences of Roman Catholics. No sooner do they leave the tribunal than they relapse into their former habits, and so continue sinning and confessing their sins from year to year, without any amendment of heart being effected. In the primitive church, when a member sinned so as to lose communion, he was not readmitted until assurance was given, by a long course of irreproachable conduct, that a permanent improvement had taken place; but in the Romish church the penances, consisting of a vain repetition of psalms and paters, or it may be a pecuniary consideration, affords no certainty that amendment has been superinduced; indeed, the penance is so inadequate to the offence, that the passions are not restrained by fear of punishment. He who perceives that he has infringed the divine command will, if he be sincerely repentant, change his mode of life without the interposition of a confessor: the penitence which such inspire, whether by censure or rebuke, by exhortation or expostulation, may be violent at the time, but it is quite unfit to be accepted as a reason that the sins committed should be forgiven, even granting that that functionary does possess the power to remit or retain which he claims to have had delegated to him. He must be credulous to an extraordinary degree, who can believe that those who have life long been accustomed to

confession and absolution, are, on each occasion, duly inspired by a sincere repentance or a genuine love of God. The confessions made, it is to be feared, are but partial revelations; those delinquencies to which the penitent is attached are in danger of being concealed, as also such as are darkly complexioned and stain the moral character. Whatever a man's character may appear to be, he is himself conscious of many specks upon it of which the world is ignorant; and so it is with the penitent, his confessor does not know all: notwithstanding the man's knowledge that concealment is sacrilege, that self-respect of which he cannot wholly divest himself (and which if he could, society would be deprived of its surest guarantee for his conformity) prevents him from humiliating himself so far as to unbecom every dereliction of duty, more especially such as tend to lessen him in the estimation of others; thus wavering between the instincts of nature and the fancied claims of a fictitious duty, he is accustomed to stifle conscience, and he becomes gradually hardened by this course of concealment. Such is the natural result of the confessional. Its inutility is shown in the uncertainty to which class sin may belong: with an austere man, that may be accounted a grave offence which, with a man of easier disposition, would be considered trivial. And, further, it is inconsistent in its terms; for we are told that absolution is valid only after a minute and "circumstantial declaration of every sin;" and history records that whole armies, *en masse*, have been absolved without any such declaration.

"It is impossible it (the confessional) ever could have been established in the christian world but by the command of Almighty God himself," or "to assign any other beginning to it than that of Christianity itself:" such is the inconsiderately bold language indorsed by X., while the historical fact is, that previous to 1215, there existed no recognised public confessional, and that at that date a most important change was effected; till then absolution had been dependent on the performance of penance; since then "forgiveness attends the act of confession." It was owing to this change that auricular confession, which has conferred so much power and influence on the church, was adopted. Considerable address was mani-

feasted by the Lateran council in decreeing absolution to follow confession, who rightly reasoned that men would submit with less reluctance to the change, if by it they secured an immediate instead of a prospective pardon. At this period "the Roman church, having become preponderant from her numerous usurpations, aimed only at extending her dominion. By imagining a new system of confession and penance, by augmenting the catalogue of sins, and modifying their nature, and by reserving to herself the right of giving or refusing absolution, she has grasped at the consciences of nations and of kings. For this purpose it was necessary to render pardon as easy as sin is attractive."* Its introduction is merely another instance of the ecclesiastical hardihood of popes, and does not transcend their accustomed arrogance. It was not until confession was exalted to the dignity of a sacrament, that Rome assumed that lordship over conscience which results in the excommunication of sovereigns, the establishment of inquisitions, and the moral enslavement of the peoples over whom her sway extended; and had it not been for the imbecile policy of the continental governments, that cherished it as a means of checking sedition in the germ, it had not survived till now to "blast the human flower."

The question is asked—"Is the confessional in harmony with intellectual and moral freedom?" And we cannot reply more fittingly than by asking, in return, whether he can enjoy intellectual and moral freedom who suffers himself to be cajoled by intimations of a priest—whose mind is burdened by restrictions and prohibitions—whose memory is tasked recollecting a multitude of observances, and treasuring up against the next approach to the confessional a catalogue of real and fictitious sins? Whether he is an intellectual and moral freeman who renounces his right of judgment in the most important concerns of his spiritual nature, and accepts as heaven-inspired truth every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of a priest? Whether he is intellectually and morally free who permits a court at Rome, or anywhere else, to decree what books he may, and what he must not, read? Is he

not rather in the depths of mental and moral serfdom, who dares not read his bible, unless he have a licence from a priest? No, "Confessarins;" it is by no means clear that the confessional permits us to "do as we choose," even although that be "associated with the determination to do as we ought;" we must do as the priest prescribes, and not what our own opinion of duty may dictate: for instance, to read Milton, or study Newton, would not, in the view of any sane man, be construed into a violation of duty; it so happens, however, that the works of both these illustrious sons of light, in company with those of many of our best writers, are comprehended in the expurgatorial list, to read from which is an unpardonable offence. The absence of restraint incites to activity, but when penance may be incurred by the study of subjects, unless under priestly sanction, men are discouraged from engaging in mind-invigorating pursuits. So far as regards intellectual growth, the Romish church has a grand antidote in the unreasoning faith with which she requires every tenet of hers to be accepted; her adherents are taught that they cannot discern truth for themselves; that the attempt is impious.

X. complains that "in regard to the relation of the confessional to social well-being much has not been said." We shall endeavour to satisfy him. That the church intermeddles with political affairs cannot be denied. Now, whatever movements it has interested itself in supporting or defeating, the priests have uniformly promoted or opposed, by granting or denying absolution according as their penitents favoured or retarded their views. We cannot forget the active part which the priests take in the Irish elections, nor the threats by which their parishioners are menaced should they dare to be refractory. We know that in the continental countries, when the interests of the church did not run parallel with those of the state, the confessors did not hesitate to improve the opportunities afforded by the confessional to inculcate doctrines subversive of the civil power, and to enjoin the formation of secret societies, compelling those who approached their tribunal to become members, by refusing absolution on any other terms, and binding them to secrecy lest their own seditious designs might be discovered. In reference to this subject we quote the following paragraphs from Vol-

* "Hist. of Aur. Conf.," by Count C. P. de Lasteyrie.

taire—an authority to which our opponents cannot object, for “Confessarius” himself has pronounced him to be “an impartial and true witness:”—

“The good which confession has done is, that it has sometimes procured restitution from petty thieves. The ill is that, in the internal troubles of states, it has sometimes forced penitents to be conscientiously rebellious and blood-thirsty. The Guelf priests refused absolution to the Ghibellines, and the Ghibellines to the Guelfs.

“The counsellor of state, Lénét, relates in his memoirs, that all he could do in Burgundy to make the people rise in favour of the Prince of Condé, detained at Vincennes by Cardinal Mazarine, was ‘to let loose the priests in the confessionals’—speaking of them as bloodhounds, who were to fan the flame of civil war in the privacy of the confessionals.

“At the siege of Barcelona, the monks refused absolution to all who remained faithful to Philip V.

“In the last revolution of Genoa, it was intimated to all consciences, that there was no salvation for whosoever should not take up arms against the Austrians.

“This salutary remedy has in every age been converted into a poison. Whether a Sforza, a Medicis, a prince of Orange, or a king of France, was to be assassinated, the parricide always prepared himself by the sacrament of confession.

“Louis XI. and the Marchioness de Brinvilliers always confessed as soon as they had committed any great crime; and they confessed often as gluttons take medicines, to increase their appetite.

“A fanatical assassin, thinking that he serves God by killing his prince, comes and consults a confessor on this case of conscience; and the confessor commits a sacrilege if he saves his sovereign’s life.”

Is it, think ye, “incapable of tampering with public liberty?”

The confessional assists in defeating justice. If a Roman Catholic has been guilty of any crime, and has confessed, he may with perfect truth, according to Liguori, declare before any civil court that he is innocent of the crime with which he is charged, because by confession the crime has been taken away.

It is needless to say that the oath is the recognised mode of arriving at truth in judicial proceedings. We nevertheless find in these theological works prevarications reduced to a science. How detestable, for example, is the morality inculcated by Liguori in the following extracts:—

“It is a certain and a common opinion amongst all divines, that for a just cause it is lawful to use equivocation in the propounded modes, and to confirm it with an oath.”

Again: “The accused, or a witness not properly interrogated, can swear that he does not know a crime which in reality he does know, by understanding that he does not know the crime concerning which, legitimately, he can be inquired of, or that he does not know it so as to give evidence concerning it.”

And further, in reference to all oaths—“Let them be ever so valid, they can be relaxed by the church.”

Now, we appeal to the judgment of our readers, whether teachings of this nature are calculated to promote the well-being of society, or whether, on the contrary, they are not certain to introduce a universal faithlessness?

The only means by which to gain an adequate idea of what this moral nuisance—the confessional—really is, is to peruse the works employed in training confessors for their duties; and yet this is a proceeding not to be hastily recommended. One may indeed become versant with the iniquities of the confessional, but in doing so the imagination sustains pollution without counter-vailing profit.

Judge, then, whether “the confessional is,” as J. B. asserts, “a sort of quarantine for the mind, by which it is purified from pestiferous contact with the world of sin.” We consider it, in the hands of unmarried men, educated as the priests are, as the most diabolical institution which has ever existed for the perversion of mind and morals. How truly did Paul foreshadow the nature of the institution under review! “The time will come,” he says, “when they will not endure sound doctrine; but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears; and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned into fables.”

ARISTIDES.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

As one of the openers of this interesting debate we gladly avail ourselves of the right of reply, although our task will be very light, from the nature of the arguments used by our opponents, and the efficient services of the gentleman who followed us on this side of the question. And here we may observe, that it is instructive to notice how X., with a few bold strokes, utterly demolishes the fine-spun theories of "Aristides" and W. G. Verily, error may be potent, but truth is omnipotent!

The lengthened and laboured remarks of C.C.F. do not require much comment. His strictures upon our quotations of scripture are without point, as we would have it carefully noted that they were adduced by us rather to establish the *principle* of confession than anything else. That principle J.B. has, with much ability, shown to be in harmony with man's mental and moral nature; and we think even our opponent will admit that we have shown it to be sanctioned by the word of God. The question then comes, in what institution of the church is this principle embodied, if the confessional be abolished? We own our inability to say, and we would ask our readers if they can furnish a reply; if not, let those opponents who believe the confession of sins to be enjoined in the scriptures, tell us how that injunction is obeyed by the various sects of Protestants at the present day?

With regard to the bearing of the confessional upon social and intellectual well-being, we deem the dangers referred to by W. G. and others as more imaginative than real, and would refer to the evidence already adduced as to what the confessional has done, and what it has done. But our position here we may support by other considerations.

We are all well aware that the jealousy of the various sects is very highly developed, and that they keep a continually watchful eye upon the movements of those parties to whom they stand opposed. The more powerful the opposing party, the more jealous and strict is the scrutiny of their dealings. Now, the world there are tens of thousands of confessionals, the doors of which are almost continually open, affording the intending penitents free ingress and egress, and hun-

dreds of thousands of persons of both sexes pass these portals. Can we imagine, then, that the lynx-eye of jealous sectaries would not, long before this, have accumulated a ruinous catalogue of crimes, with full and particular proofs attached thereto, were the confessional that place of sin, that hell of iniquity and corruption, which our opponents represent it to be? We think not. Nay, does not this very consideration make it probable that, even in those few cases which are reported, there may be a little spice of that exaggeration with which religious zealots and bigots have been too familiar? If crime walk barefaced through the land, and each priest is in himself a moral leper to the neighbourhood, how comes it that there is so little authenticated proof of this moral delinquency? Is there so little rivalry and jealousy amongst the sects—is there so little resentful feeling in the bosom of a female injured in "her honour's nicest part," as to render this impossible? Is there so much guile, cunning, and hypocrisy in each priest as to enable him to conduct his "*amours and liaisons*" unobservedly and unobstructedly? and is there so much latent viciousness and criminality, so much detestable moral passivity, so little regard for virgin honour, in the soul of woman, as to render this probable? We cannot believe the libel on humanity. Let not the evidence against an Achilli be referred to. We denounce the man.

Again. Against the alleged moral delinquency there is arrayed all the parental affections and family ties, as X. has very properly hinted. The parental feeling is, perhaps, the purest and strongest which causes the heart-nerve to vibrate; and the fraternal affection especially between brothers and sisters is almost angelic in its purity. Can we, dare we think, then, that all these feelings may be carelessly and ruthlessly infringed without a wild, rebellious outcry, which would be sufficient to sweep from amongst existing things any institution in connexion with which such wrongs were habitually committed? Can the generous love and the warm instincts of a mother's heart be so warped by priestly craft that she would train up her daughters to sacrifice

their honour to a vicious and immoral priest—one, perhaps, by whom she was herself betrayed? Can a father's sense of right be so thoroughly outraged, and yet there be no hand upraised to smite the spoiler? Could he tamely submit to see the opening woman's charms nipped in the bud by a cool, calculating monster? Can the valorous heart of youth consent to see his sister become "one of the sorriest things that walk the earth," and not be tempted to pour red-hearted destruction on the head of the villain who did the deed? Who would believe all this? Sooner would we believe that the sun's rays could freeze the heart's blood of a hero into

eternal ice than that any form of religion could so systematically succeed in erasing from the soul its normal instincts. And if this be not so, then the confessional is not that destructive thing to morality which our opponents would insinuate, and we are bound to believe that the cases quoted in "Anti-Romish Controversies" are slanders.

Reader, peruse the arguments again on both sides of the debate; do not cherish bigotry nor cling to old prejudices, and we think you will come to our conclusion—that the confessional is in harmony with intellectual and moral freedom and social well-being.

CONFESSARIUS.

The Societies' Section.

ESSAY ON HISTORY.

(Continued from Vol. II. p. 471.)

THE life of humanity is neither easily written, nor easily studied. So numerous are the influences which act upon man—so diverse are the phases in which he appears—so different are the stages through which he has successively passed—so varied are the actors in the great world-theatre—so multitudinous are the events to be detailed—so intimately interblended are causes and effects—so multiplex and almost sumless are the agreements and antagonisms to be chronicled—so manifold the passions, interests, manners, customs, habits, states, actions, &c., which are to be brought together in harmonious combination before the "mind's eye," that it is difficult indeed to give unity, coherence, proportion, and artistic beauty to the whole. To amplify details without losing sight of the general congruousness and consonancy of the whole, is far from being easy. An equal difficulty, perhaps, attends the attempt to constrain the attention—to hold before the mind the multifarious and ever-differing influences, circumstances, personages, and actions which require to be regarded as mutually active and reactive. These difficulties, however, may be surmounted—largeness of view may be obtained—concentration of intellect may be acquired. Resolute mind-discipline must, of course, be resorted to, and a strict enforcement of self-control is necessary: these being unswervingly and unwaveringly put into operation, success is certain. Nor is the benefit to be derived from this stern and decided mental subordination trivial. "The school of example is the world; and the masters of this school are History and Experience. I am far from contending that the former is preferable to the latter. I think, upon the whole, otherwise; but this I say, that the former is absolutely necessary to prepare us for the latter, and to accompany us whilst under the discipline of the latter, that is, through the whole course of our lives."—"Experience can go a very little way back in discovering causes, and effects are not the objects of experience till they happen."—"Experience is doubly defective; we are born too late to see the

ning, and die too soon to see the end, of many things."—"History prepares us for science, and guides us in it."—By it "we are cast back, as it were, into former ages; live with the men who lived before us, and we inhabit countries that we never saw. Time is enlarged, and Time prolonged, in this manner; so that the man who applies himself early to the study of History may acquire in a few years, and before he sets his foot on the world, not only a more extended knowledge of mankind, but the experience of more centuries than any of the patriarchs saw."* "Nature gave us Curiosity, to excite the industry of our minds;" and the study of History affords us full scope for all our mental activities. "The truth that progress is the very end of our being must not be received as a tradition, but comprehended and felt as a reality."† As a great element in self-culture History is invaluable, not only for the knowledge which it gives, but also for the discipline which it enforces. Expansiveness of mind, keenness of thinking, clearness and consecutiveness of reasoning, closely-applied attention, perspicuity of judgment, and mental vigour of mind, are some of the chief advantages which are necessarily produced by the exertions of mind for which it calls.

We are, of course, aware, that in speaking thus we allude more to a manner of writing and studying which *ought to be* rather than *is*, although a few modern authors have adhered upon the main features which we desiderate in historical composition; of this, however, we shall have occasion to speak again; meanwhile, it must be remembered that we do not now of those indiscriminating chroniclers—those registrars of rumours—those categorizers of mere events—those weavers together of fiction and reality, superstition and truth—those prosing dullards, who have so often been honoured with the name of historians unjustly. All respect due to them as the accumulators of much hidden wealth, the value of which they knew not, we cheerfully grant them; but their immense cabinets of rubbish, mingled with the gold-grains of truth, we cannot dignify with the name of history. Nor do we now refer to those collectors of mere inventories of the births, ages, thoughts, and deaths of

"Conquerors and kings,
Founders of sects and systems; to whom add,
Sophists, bards, statesmen, all unquiet things,
Which stir too strongly the soul's secret springs"—

the twaddlers, whose chief delight it is to blazon forth the so-called glories of those stupid curses of their kind who have occupied the vanguard in "the social savagery of the age," whose writings almost ignore the existence of the people as a source of power—an element in the constitution of a state—an element in humanitarian progression—an immense multitude of souls formed in the image of God, striving after the perfectionment of their natures, and with no ascertainable limits to their intellectual, moral, and religious development—as anything else, in fact, than "hewers of wood and drawers of water"—human hell-creatures thirsting for each other's gore, labour-machines for the production of the luxuries and necessities of life for their taskmasters—as serfs of an ignoble breed, whose only duty

The preceding extracts are, *disjecta membra*, culled from Bolingbroke's excellent essay, "Of the Study of History," a work which every intending student should read with care. See Manning's "Self-Culture."

it was to live and labour while they were required—graphic delineators of the gorgeous grandeur and super-exalted excellence of despotic dynasties and war-encounters; but of the critical school of historians which has lately arisen, of whom we shall only name at present, as examples, Montesquieu, Vico, Schlegel, Niebuhr, Grote, Schlosser, Guizot, and Macaulay—men who recognise the divineness of

“This strangely-given gift of human life,
Compassed by mystery, as the stars by night”—

who cannot believe that men were created merely to “float adown the fretful tide of circumstance,” aimless and wind-piloted—who regard the people as immortal beings, by whom the True is to be sought, the Good to be striven after, the Right to be practised, and the Beautiful to be realized—who combine in one view the great events which have taken place among the nations, and ask wherunto they have tended, “whether to freedom or to despotism, to one or another form of civilization”—who aim at the perception of human destiny, watch the course of man’s progress, collect from large inductions the causes by which this grand object is furthered—who, while perceiving and acknowledging the fact that

“Crushed from our sorrow, all that’s great in man
Has ever sprung,”

do not fling doubts up in the face of heaven of the benignness of its purposes, but rather carefully demonstrate that

“The statesman’s toil,
The patriot’s war—all progress that we make,
Laborious, slow, earned at tremendous cost,
Have solely for their end to guard, diffuse,
And purify the simple joys of home.”

“How sweetly on the ear such echoes sound!” Would that the time were come when the great lessons thus enunciated were capable of being learnt by all the children of men! O that it were in our power to aid in the formation of student-thoughts such as these, and to assist in the diffusion of that critical sagacity and skill which seem to us so much required in the student of humanity’s world-life! Somewhat we have already assayed, and something more we shall now attempt.

On the very threshold of historical studies, conducted as we have indicated in the preceding paragraphs, we require a knowledge of some large well-grounded principles to form “the light of all our seeing.” “History involves in its composition many different and distinct objects, and has many different ends in view. In the execution it receives from the pen of the historian many graces and embellishments; and from the interest which man always takes in the concerns of man, it becomes a species of writing the most instructive to the mind and the most pleasing to the imagination. Divested, however, of these adventitious considerations, and logically viewed, it is *the investigation of facts through the channel of testimony*.”* This being the case, the lone student of History must give the laws of probability an early and important place in his preparatory mental exercises.

The doctrine of probabilities, so far at least as it regards that belief which is requisite

* Tatham’s “Chart and Scale of Truth,” vol. i. p. 315.

in History, has been so excellently treated of by Locke and the authors of "The Port-Royal Logic," that we do not think it necessary to do more at present than lay before our readers a concise summary of the observations which they have made on this topic. Locke defines "probability" as "likeness to be true." It is intended "to supply the defect of our knowledge, and guide us where that fails." The two foundations of probability are—"1st. The conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. 2nd. The testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the latter is to be considered—1, the number; 2, the integrity; 3, the skill, of the witnesses; 4, the design of the author, when it is a testimony out of a book cited; 5, the consistency of the parts and circumstances of a relation; 6, contradictory testimonies."—"The mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against, any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it; and upon a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive it with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other."—"As the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition, *in itself*, more or less probable."*

Of the chapter of the Port-Royal Logic containing "some rules for the right direction of reasoning in the belief of things which depend on human testimony," the following is a brief abstract, viz.:—Things are of two kinds, the *changeless* and the *changeable*. Of the former, all truths are necessary, and hence universal; if any predication therefore is false, in any one instance, it is false in all; of the latter, most truths are contingent, hence universals may either be true or false according to circumstances and the nature of the thing. It is therefore necessary to attend to all the circumstances—internal and external—connected with an event: internal circumstances are those which belong to the consistency of the parts, or the probability of the nature of an event *in itself*; external circumstances are those which relate to the testimony on which we believe it. If the circumstances are such as are rarely the concomitants of falsehood, we have good grounds for belief; if not, we must either remain in suspense or doubt. When, however, possibility and probability unite in support of one account of a matter, the *fact* of which is sufficiently attested, although the mode of the fact is divergently stated, we ought to believe the one so supported rather than any other.† We are perfectly aware that against the whole doctrine of probabilities the lines of Agatho—

"Τάχ' ἂν τις εἰπὼς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λόγῳ
Ἐροτοῖσι πολλὰ τευχίειν οὐκ εἰκότι,"‡

may be quoted with some truthfulness. In order that we may present a correct idea of this matter, we beg further to extract the following quotation from Britain's greatest logician:—"We must remember that the probability of an event is not a quality of the

* Locke's "Essay," book iv. chap. xv.

† "La Logique, ou l'Art de Penser," liv. iv. cap. xiii.

‡ These lines have been elegantly translated thus—

"Even this, it may be said is *probable*,
That many things *improbable* should happen in human life."

event itself, but a mere name for the degree of ground which we or some one else have for expecting it. The probability of an event to one person is a different thing from the probability of the same event to another, or to the same person after he has acquired additional evidence. . . . Yet this makes no difference in the event itself, nor in any of the causes on which it depends. Every event is, *in itself*, certain, not probable: if we knew all, we should either know positively that it will [or did] happen, or positively that it will [or did] not. . . . Bearing this in mind, I think it must be admitted, that even when we have no knowledge whatever to guide our expectations, except the knowledge that what happens must be one of a certain number of possibilities, we may still reasonably judge that one supposition is more probable to us than another supposition, and if we have any interest at stake, we shall best provide for it by acting conformably to that judgment.”*

We have now placed in the hands of our readers some information regarding the preliminary *criteria* of historical truth; in a future portion of this paper we shall notice some of the circumstances in our world-life which, although too generally regarded with indifference, in the composition as well as in the study of history, yet exercise a mighty influence on the life, happiness, and destiny of the human race. S. N.

* J. S. Mill's "Logic," book iii. chap. xviii. p. 60.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Westminster Athenæum.—The third annual meeting of this institution was held on Monday evening, October 11.

Tea having been provided for the members and friends, the business of the evening was opened by Mr. J. P. Sealiff, who was unanimously voted to the chair. The chairman commenced his observations by remarking, that he believed the objects of the society were generally well known; and although it had been denominated the Westminster Athenæum, it was founded on the principle of mutual improvement, and this was promoted mainly through the medium of lectures and discussions, and the use of a library. That the society was progressing in the sphere of its operations, and becoming of greater importance, might be gathered from the fact, that its last anniversary took place in a building, the limits of which could not possibly have afforded accommodation to the present audience. Having made other appropriate remarks, the chairman concluded by calling upon the secretary for a report of the society's proceedings during the past year.

Mr. E. Round, on rising, confessed that he looked with feelings of pleasure and satisfaction on the assemblage before him. To a mind that loved to revel in the joys which wisdom afforded, and to cull the wayside flowers of intelligence which the incidents of every-day life profusely strews in our path, a meeting like the present, composed of the earnest, the thoughtful, and the young, furnished the means of the noblest and sweetest enjoyment. What more interesting than to be surrounded by those with whom we were journeying in our passage up the mountain of literary acquisition, who, when some apparently insurmountable obstacle threatened to intercept

our course, would help us to surmount it, and who, as new beauties rose within the pale of their mental vision, revealed them to our notice, making us participants in the treasures their vigilance had won. This was but an imperfect description of the advantages arising from the system of mutual improvement; let the diversified fancies of those he was addressing impart to it an additional amount of colouring, and it would be found to possess additional charms. As the result of his own short experience he would say, that, vigorously pursued, it was a system conducive to real and efficient progress.

The report was then read, at the close of which Mr. E. Round continued as follows:—

“Having recently been favoured with a communication from the Editors of the *British Controversialist*, in which they express a desire that their journal should meet with greater publicity among the advocates of literary effort, I feel, as far as my limited influence extends, that I cannot better promote the object of their correspondence than by introducing the subject to all connected with this institution on the present occasion. The papers I am about to read will convey to such as are unacquainted with the work some idea of its contents and character.”

The table of contents of the half-yearly volume, together with “a statement of the history and present condition of the *British Controversialist*, with projects for its improvement,” having been read, the speaker brought his remarks to a close by adding, that he was satisfied of the value of the work, and had recommended it to many of his personal friends. To those in quest of truth, eager to escape the shoals and quicksands of error, he would say, support the *British Controversialist*.

sialist. Certainly, no member of the Westminster Athenæum ought to remain without it.

Mr. G. D. Welsh then rose to move, "That the *British Controversialist* be regularly provided for the use of the members," and went on to speak in high terms of the able and impartial manner in which it was conducted. It was a work of great worth, if considered only on account of the arguments it contained on various momentous subjects; but he especially esteemed it for the unsectarian and unprejudiced position its editors assumed. He would urge every one present to encourage it.

Mr. J. E. Williams seconded the motion, and briefly bore testimony to the value of the magazine, adding, that he had derived from it much benefit and assistance.

Mr. R. J. Brand, after glancing at the course of lectures to be delivered during the present quarter, in an interesting manner observed, with reference to the *Controversialist*, that he should not only peruse it frequently himself, but should introduce it to the domestic circle.

The Chairman (who was the first to introduce the work to the members of the Athenæum) put the resolution, which was carried unanimously.

Mr. H. Hayward, in an eloquent address, dwelt on the pleasures and advantages to be derived from mental pursuits, remarking, that if "knowledge" was "power," ignorance was power also, and that it needed the salutary influence of societies like the one he was addressing to counteract the evil and immoral tendencies which illiterate minds diffused. The influence for good that had gone forth from this society was incalculable, and he questioned whether any of the members were arithmeticians enough to compute it. There were no bounds to the pleasures learning bestowed. True, there existed a class of persons whose rusted and time-worn prejudices would not permit them to countenance such institutions, who were alarmed at the spirit and enterprise manifested by the young of the present age, and who fancied that the achievements of science and the revelations of philosophy would shake the bulwarks of truth. Religion had nothing to dread in the march of science and the investigations of philosophy; on the contrary, it had everything to hope for.

This, with an eulogium on the sympathetic and friendly feeling ever animating the members of the Athenæum, by Mr. H. W. Monro; a compliment paid to the exertions of the late secretary by Mr. J. K. Worrall; a few sentences from Mr. A. J. Round; recitations by Messrs. James and Fowler; and votes of thanks to the retiring officers and the chairman, terminated the evening's engagements.—A. J. R.

Manchester.—George Street Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The first annual party in connexion with this society was held on Friday evening, the 17th of September, in the Wesleyan schoolroom, George-street, Hulme, Manchester. About one hundred persons sat down to tea. Subsequently, on the motion of the Rev. J. D. Brocklehurst, the president (Mr. E. Harrison) took the chair, who, after a short introductory speech, called upon the late secretary (Mr. J. W. Williamson) to read the report. This stated, that there were twenty-two members in connexion with the society; that during the last session many papers on various subjects had been

read, and the following, among other questions, had been discussed:—"Would the Adoption of Vegetarianism benefit the Human Race?" "Ought Capital Punishment be Abolished?" "Was the Execution of Charles the First Justifiable?" &c. The society, upon the whole, was in a prosperous condition. The chairman then called upon Mr. E. Sowerbutt to address the meeting, who, after making a few remarks on the report, &c., moved that the "report now read be adopted," which was seconded by Mr. Lewis, and supported by Mr. R. F. Allen, and carried unanimously; after which the following resolutions were adopted:—Moved by Mr. J. T. Slugg, and seconded by Mr. T. Pearson, "That at the present time an increased amount of education is particularly needful among the youthful population of Great Britain." Moved by Mr. H. Summersett, and seconded by Mr. W. Jones, "That such societies as the one of which we are now celebrating the anniversary will be among the various agencies to effect so desirable an object, therefore this meeting pledges itself to support them." Moved by the Rev. J. D. Brocklehurst, and seconded by Mr. Dalley, "That whilst the members of this society will use their greatest exertions to attain more knowledge, they humbly acknowledge the necessity of the blessing of God to make their institution effectual for the ends for which it was established."—J. H.

Manchester.—Rusholme Road Young Men's Improvement Society.—This society celebrated its ninth anniversary on Wednesday, the 6th of October, in the schoolroom connected with Rusholme-road Chapel. About 200 members and friends partook of tea, coffee, &c. These preliminaries having been disposed of, the president, Mr. Darling, took the chair, and commenced the more important proceedings of the evening by calling on the secretary to read the report, from which it appeared that there were thirty-five members and sixty-eight honorary members connected with the society; that during the year fifty-two meetings had been held, which had been well attended, and at which questions of a more interesting nature than usual had been discussed; that the library, which comprised about 200 well-selected and valuable works and most of the leading reviews of the day, was in a most efficient state. The following resolutions were submitted to the meeting by members and students of the Lancashire Independent College:—First resolution, moved by Mr. McFall, seconded by Mr. Wilde, and supported by Mr. Pion—"That the present position of this society, as detailed in the report, calls for increased and energetic exertions from all the members to sustain the character and to extend the usefulness of an institution so eminently conducive to their moral and intellectual improvement." Second resolution, moved by Mr. Bumby, seconded by Mr. Hague, and supported by Mr. Reed—"That this society is entitled to claim the attention and support of young men generally, because, by the peculiar advantages which it possesses, it is eminently adapted to qualify them for acting an intelligent part in the great social and political changes evidently so near at hand." Third resolution, moved by Mr. Shillito and seconded by Mr. Birch—"That sanctified intelligence being the most potent auxiliary for good, it is important that this society should ever recognise, and constantly seek, that divine

agency, without which 'nothing is strong, nothing is holy.' The meeting was also addressed by the Rev. James Griffin, who expressed the deep interest he continued to feel in the society. It was said by some that the effect of such societies was to engender sceptical notions and sentiments, but he could safely say such was not the case with respect to this society. On the contrary, it had been a most efficient means in the spread of truth. He exhorted the members to steadily pursue their useful course; for so long as the kind and fraternal spirit, which had hitherto been manifest amongst them, should continue to exist, their society would be the means of accomplishing still greater good. In the course of the evening desert, consisting of the various fruits, &c., in season, was placed on the tables, and freely partaken of by the company. The proceedings, which had progressed most satisfactorily, and which appeared to afford enjoyment to all present, terminated shortly after ten o'clock.

Manchester.—*Lever Street Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.*—On Friday evening, October 8, 1852, the members of this society, with their friends, partook of tea, in the bandroom adjoining the schoolroom. The Rev. Wm. Jackson, president of the Wesleyan Society, took the chair. In concluding an able and eloquent speech, he said, that some persons were of opinion that more harm than good resulted from associations of this sort, in originating in the minds of some young men a wrangling disposition and a captious spirit; but he believed that the benefits arising from such societies very greatly preponderated over any evil that might be connected with them. He exhorted young men in particular to read that class of books that required the most thought—books upon mental and moral philosophy. After the chairman's address, the members were expected, as their names occurred on the list, either to make speeches, give recitations, or read some interesting extracts. Several of the members spoke on the nature, necessity, and means of self-improvement. The meeting was concluded with an earnest address to the young men present, by Rev. G. Robinson, the superintendent of the Lever-street circuit of the Wesleyan Association.

Hirwaun Mutual Improvement Society, formed in connexion with the *British Controversialist*. The first meeting of this society was held on Tuesday evening, October 12th, and proved very successful. It was numerously attended by the young men of the place; the chair was occupied by Mr. J. Sims, who delivered a short address, showing the beneficial effects of such societies. The object of the meeting was to elect the officers and adopt the code of rules, &c. The following gentlemen were elected officers for the first quarter:—Mr. J. Sims, chairman; Mr. W. Williams, treasurer; Mr. Leyson Rhys, secretary; Messrs. Evan Evans, Evan Rees, and D. P. Davies, committee-men. The newly-appointed secretary introduced the *British Controversialist* to the notice of the members, and recommended it "to all young men in pursuit of useful knowledge." He also mentioned the editors' kindness in sending circulars, &c. It was agreed that the society should order all the volumes already published of the *British Controversialist*, and that the members should take it in monthly.

Chipping Sodbury Mutual Improvement So-

ciety.—A soiree of the members and friends of this society was held on Tuesday evening, October 12th. After a social tea, the committee were enabled to present a very favourable report of the progress of the institution since its establishment in July, 1851, and an encouraging statement of its present position and prospects. The detail of the original essays and lectures of different members, and the discussions on various subjects carried on during the past year, was such as to prove that the society had not failed in the accomplishment of its professed object, and furnished grounds of cheering anticipation for the future. The engagements of the meeting were pleasantly varied by the introduction of an excellent desert; some interesting and encouraging addresses were given, and the party separated after an evening's enjoyment which will long be remembered with gratification. It appears by the report that the society numbers about twice as many members as at the corresponding period of last year, while its balance of cash in hand is also nearly doubled, notwithstanding the expenses consequent upon the establishment of a library and reading-room in connexion with it since that time. On the whole, the society has reason to congratulate itself on its past success and present condition, and may look forward hopefully to the occupation of an increased and extended sphere of usefulness.

Birmingham.—The annual meeting of the *Birmingham Debating Society* was held at the Philosophical Institution on Friday evening, October 1st. The chair was taken by J. T. Chance, Esq., president, who delivered an address, in which he dwelt upon the apparent hopelessness of permanently establishing such a society, when so many had failed. The rules of the society, however, afforded hope that it would be more permanent than its predecessors, since it excluded no class, and permitted free discussion to persons of every opinion. The election of officers was afterwards proceeded with, when Mr. G. Jabet was elected president, and Mr. W. J. Allen, secretary.

On Wednesday evening, October 6th, the seventh annual meeting of the *Edgbaston Debating Society* was held at the Hen and Chickens Hotel, Birmingham. After an excellent repast, the president, Mr. Thomas Martineau, commenced the business of the evening by a brief but appropriate address. Mr. W. Hudson read the secretary's report, from which it appeared that the number of members was thirty-two; that the average attendance was fifteen; that fourteen meetings had been held; and that the privilege of introducing strangers to the debates had been found to work well. Mr. Izod read the treasurer's report, showing a small balance in favour of the society. After the election of officers, and votes of thanks to those who retired, thirteen new members were proposed, and several interesting discussions announced.

Falkirk Literary Society.—A number of gentlemen residing in Falkirk and its vicinity held a meeting in the Red Lion Hotel there, on the evening of Tuesday, 5th October, for the purpose of establishing a society, having for its object the dissemination of knowledge and the cultivation of a taste for literary pursuits among its members, by means of essay reading and debates. A society was accordingly constituted under the above name, which, it is hoped, will supply a desideratum long

felt in the district, and be instrumental in carrying out the designs of its promoters.

Glasgow.—Manuscript Journal.—This journal was originated about six months ago by a few young men, anxious for their mutual improvement in composition, &c. All articles are sent to a committee, appointed for the purpose of examining and correcting them, and if approved they are inserted, and if not, they are returned to the authors, with such remarks as may be useful for their future efforts. It is based on thoroughly literary principles, as will be seen from the following articles, which appeared in the October number:—Review of the Past Month; the Duke of Wellington; History of English Literature, Art. IV.; Sonnet; the Sweetest Flower, a poem; Review of "Uncle Tom's Cabin;" Essay—Poetry, No. 2; Cholera. The benefit which the contributors have already experienced they unanimously confess to exceed their anticipations; and desirous that more should enjoy the benefit, they take the liberty of directing the attention of those readers of the *British Controversialist* who may be resident in Glasgow to it. A small annual subscription to defray expenses is the only condition of membership. All articles and correspondence to be addressed to Mr. David Mitchell, 61, Grove-street.

British Guyana Mutual Improvement Association.—The third anniversary of this association was celebrated by a soirée on the evening of the 3rd of September, 1862, at the spacious residence of J. C. Devonish, Esq., Hadfield-street, Werk en Rust, city of Georgetown, on which occasion a large number of ladies honoured the members with their presence. At eight o'clock the proceedings were opened with the "Grand State March," performed by the Misses Devonish on the pianoforte; after which Mr. J. C. Devonish, Jun., president of the association, was called to the chair, who made a few appropriate remarks in reference to the progress of the association during the preceding year. The honorary secretary, Mr. Isaac Smit, then read the report of the committee, which stated that the following ten useful and important subjects were discussed at the association's hall, viz.:—

1st. Who had the greater right to the British throne, Prince Arthur or King John?

2nd. Was Wat Tyler's rebellion justifiable?

3rd. Were the Americans justified in becoming independent?

4th. Is an hereditary monarchy preferable to an elective one?

5th. Had the Saxons, in the time of Alfred, a superior right to the Danes to possess the throne of England?

6th. Which was the greater general, Hannibal or Napoleon Bonaparte?

7th. Which best merited the title "great," Henry IV. or Louis XIV.?

8th. Which did more good to his country, Charlemagne or Alfred the Great?

9th. Whose claim to the throne was just, that of Edward IV. or Henry VI.?

10th. Was the deposition of Louis XVI. justifiable?

Three essays were also written by members: the first, by Mr. Ernest Tennent, on "Time;" the second, by Mr. George White, on "Friendship;" and the third, by Mr. Archibald Devonish, on "Printing." A lecture on "Anatomy" was delivered to the members by Allan Houston, Esq., M.D. The number of members belonging to the association at present is twenty-eight, almost all being natives of the colony, and of African descent.

The business of the past year having been brought to a close, the president vacated the chair, and the Rev. E. A. Wallbridge, patron of the association, was called to the same, who presided the remainder of the evening with his accustomed ability. After a few remarks made by him congratulatory of the association's attaining its third anniversary, the following gentlemen were unanimously elected office-bearers for the ensuing year:—Mr. J. C. Devonish, Jun., president; Mr. S. W. Dummett, vice-president; Mr. Isaac Smit, honorary secretary; Mr. James Hoby, assistant-secretary; Mr. John Cook, treasurer; Mr. Alexander Cumming, librarian; and Messrs. A. Devonish and George White, members of committee.

At the conclusion of the election the following songs were sung with great effect:—"The Sea!" by the president, and "Come o'er the moonlit sea," by the president and Miss M. Devonish.

The patron then called on Mr. John Cook to speak to the first sentiment, "The Past." This was followed by an instrumental piece of music, "Rousseau's Dream," performed by Misses Taylor and Van Sirtema. Mr. Isaac Smit spoke to the second sentiment, "The Present." This was also followed by another piece, "O dolce concerto," with variations, performed by the Misses Devonish. Mr. Samuel W. Dummett spoke to the third sentiment, "The Future." This was also followed by another piece, "Sound the loud timbrel," performed by Misses Taylor and Devonish.

Votes of thanks having been tendered to the ladies for their presence, and to the Rev. E. A. Wallbridge for presiding on the occasion, the meeting wound up with the national anthem, sung in parts by five members and four strangers. All parties separated in good humour, highly gratified with the evening's entertainment.

J. C. D., Jun., President.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

131. I should feel much obliged to any of your readers who could give me any information concerning Photography, construction of apparatus,

preparation of plates, &c. Also of that branch of the above, in which prepared paper is used instead of metallic plates, called, I think, calotype.—J. M.

132. Can any of your correspondents inform me why the eldest son of the Duke of Buccleugh

is not entitled marquis? All the eldest sons of Scotch dukes, with this, I think, single exception, are by courtesy called marquis; but in the case referred to the title is Earl of Dalkeith.—PIERRE.

133. Will S. N., C. W., Jun., or any other of the talented readers of, and contributors to, this excellent periodical, be kind enough to furnish "A Student" with rules or directions, showing him how to cultivate a habit of attention? He is one whose mind is apt to wander from the subject he is studying; and the attention, by being so diverted, causes the eye to wander over the pages, without the facts being fully understood or impressed upon the memory. Are there any studies specially adapted to remove this weakness; and, if so, what are they? As this is a subject of incalculable importance to all seeking to further their own education, as well as to the inquirer himself, any rules given will doubtless be thankfully received by many of the subscribers to this work.—A STUDENT.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

111. *Hereditary Insanity and Matrimony.*—

Insanity, or mania, is a disease on which much is still to be learnt. We have had an opportunity for a considerable amount of observation; but there have been cases (although rare) which have not been traceable to any apparent cause. In fact, sometimes we have found no morbid condition of the brain whatever, although generally, on post-mortem examinations, we have that morbid state of the brain which the French term *ramollissement*, or softening. The causes which produce insanity are various: it may be originated by causes diametrically opposite. 1st. From an excessive amount of action imposed on the brain by the exertion of the mental faculties, i.e., an over-exertion from mental power, as in the case of Southey, &c. 2ndly. From inactivity, producing partial idiocy. How often do we find a low state of intellect (terrible to behold) where there is no apparent thought or mental action, excepting for the gratification of the passions, reaping a passing pleasure; the mental power by such inactivity becomes weakened and degenerates. But the most common cause is, 3rdly, what I may term breach or over-extension of moral law; or a better definition would be, a departing from or going beyond healthy bounds and correct limits; as, for instance, *perversion of judgment, eccentricity, monomania*. We find a man of decided talent and respectability possessing a wrong judgment on one particular subject, for which we cannot account—another having a certain notion or dogma on religion or politics, &c. These are but stepping-stones to the more severe form of deranged intellect—mania. All these morbid or abnormal conditions have been caused by the intellect having taken a false view, or wrong channel. I think medical men will soon be able to gather much valuable information on this disease by studying moral law more closely. That there are hereditary constitutions and diseases is a fact beyond dispute; for example, the scrofulous diathesis is decidedly hereditary, the patient, consequently, being predisposed to phthisis or consumption. Insanity is considered to be hereditary; but the cases on record where it has descended from parent to child are very few, so that it can

only be considered hereditary to a slight degree. Can the offspring eradicate this predisposition inherited from the parent? This is a question on which there is much difference of opinion; but the majority of pathologists give their evidence in favour of the affirmative, in which opinion I most decidedly coincide. I am well aware that phthisis and the scrofulous diathesis, or king's evil, have remained dormant in the second and third generation, and appeared with increased virulence in the fourth; a fact which tends to nullify the opinion above stated. But in hereditary diseases there is one circumstance that ought never to be lost sight of, viz., the similar or contracted habits of the offspring. For instance, it is said that gout is hereditary. We find a nobleman who possesses a very large estate leads a very active life, spending much of his time in foxhunting, shooting, and other active exercises, living above par, and indulging in the luxuries of the table, drinking port, &c. If his active career is out short, or any circumstance should happen to prevent this activity, and cause him to lead an inactive and indolent life, as by old age, &c., he is, as a natural consequence, attacked with gout. When he dies the estate is left to the son, who is placed in the same circumstances and the same temptations as his father, with the same influences acting upon him. He will, most likely, lead a similar life, and contract the same habits, as his father; and consequently, when compelled to live in an inactive, indolent state, gout appears. Can the scrofulous taint be induced into a constitution entirely free from it? This is a question which does not admit of doubt. Mr. Benjamin Phillips, F.R.S., surgeon to Westminster Hospital, has written a valuable work on scrofula, in which he says, that if you were to give him the most healthy child born, he could induce a decided scrofulous diathesis. And now to answer the question of your correspondent. To the first question, as to whether he should be deterred from contracting matrimony? If this affliction has not attacked the parents for generations back, I answer, *No!* and I repeat it most *emphatically* and *unhesitatingly*. Neither will any moral culpability attach to him. To complete the answer, the only fear that exists is, the offspring of the *afflicted parent being born* more or less idiotic. I have, perhaps, enlarged too much; but I have done so because I know of no work that would exactly suit the inquirer. There is a small work published by Churchill, and written by Dr. Millingen, on the treatment and management of the insane. There is another work, entitled, "Insanity Tested by Science," showing the disease to be rarely connected with organic lesion of the brain, by C. M. Burnett, M.D., published by Highley and Son, 32, Fleet-street. There is a work by Dr. Conolly, but, as I have not read it, it would not become me to speak as to its merits or demerits.—ARTHUR SCATLIF, M.R.C.S. and L.S.A.

122. *Dissenting Colleges.*—"Earnest" is informed that the requirements for entering dissenting colleges are so various, that no general standard can be laid down. If he contemplates entering one he must be guided by his own circumstances and attainments in making a selection. The following extract from the "Regulations" of one of considerable standing may be of service to him:—"The plan of education has been arranged to meet the circumstances of two distinct classes

of students—those of advanced general education, and those whose requirements are more limited. It therefore comprises two separate courses of study: one properly theological, which occupies four sessions; and one comprising Hebrew and the Aramaean dialects, Greek and Roman classics, English literature, mathematics, and mental philosophy, in which students remain as long as may be necessary to prepare them, in the way of information or discipline, for the studies more immediately connected with the ministry. In conformity with this arrangement, applications are received from young men who, either at a university or elsewhere, have attained a proficiency in the branches of study just enumerated for admission to the theological course only; and from others, for admission to both courses. Every application for admission must be made by letter, addressed to the Chairman of the Board of Education, and must state briefly, but explicitly, the candidate's age, his belief, the length of time he has made a religious profession, his motives for desiring the ministerial work, his previous education, and the extent to which his education is advanced. It should be accompanied by a letter of recommendation from his pastor, a certificate of health from some medical practitioner, and such other testimonials as he may be able to procure." New College, London, in connexion with the Congregational body, is a most important institution. It has recently been formed by the amalgamation of several distinct colleges. Its principal is Dr. Harris, the author of "Mammon," "The Pre-Adamite Earth," &c., &c.; who is assisted by Professors W. Smith, LL.D.; Philip Smith, B.A.; J. H. Godwin; E. Lankester, M.D., LL.D., &c.; and Maurice Nenner. Other information may be had on application personally, or by letter, at the College, Finchley-road, St. John's Wood; and prospectuses may be had at Jackson and Walford's, St. Paul's Churchyard, London.—A. C.

124. *The Best Method of Studying Mathematics, with Advice to Students.*—It will not, I hope, be supposed that an endeavour to supply the information which "A Lover of Nature" needs, implies any presumption of being entitled to rank with the gifted few whom he appears to consider as alone competent to reply to his queries; or that the following statements, based as they are partly on my own limited experience as a student, partly on the testimony of others, are not liable to be controverted by a more extensive and careful induction of particulars.

In the study of mathematics, the analytical method, or method of resolution (which is probably that by which most propositions and theorems in the pure mathematics were first discovered), is considered by many scientific men to be the most useful as a mental discipline; although the synthetical, or method of composition, being in use in the schools, and better adapted for rapid progress, is preferable for a member of a university, especially if he be ambitious of a high place at the examinations. In the working of examples, however, and proving deductions even, he will frequently find it convenient, and even necessary, to resort to analysis. In both methods the pen should be constantly in hand; propositions synthetically proved, which have been committed to memory, should be written out, without book, once at least, and it is utterly impossible to follow

out any long analytical processes without writing. Numerous examples of both methods are given in Mr. Potts' admirable university edition of Euclid, which, together with Goodwin's "Course," and the "Collection of Problems and Examples," forms a complete and harmonious curriculum of elementary mathematical study. The latter work is the best of its kind, and, for the particular object with which it was written, there is no other. A few alterations might perhaps be advantageously made; but most of the propositions are concisely stated and clearly proved, and are free from unnecessary illustrations and deductions, which only serve to bewilder and discourage the student. The treatise on astronomy, however, is *too elementary*, has not illustration sufficient, and should be replaced by Sir J. Herschel's "Outlines"—a masterpiece of its kind, and which has completely thrown into the shade all previous popular works on the same subject.

The study of mathematics is not, generally speaking, to be regarded as detrimental to the health of persons whose constitutions are sound. Combe affirms it to be conducive to longevity, inasmuch as it calls into operation the reasoning faculties alone, and is opposed to that wild play of the imagination and exaltation of feeling which, in poets, priests, artists, and others, whose province lies amid works of imagination and fiction, occasionally terminates in madness. I am happy to give this testimony in favour of mathematics, as, from some remarks made in answer to S. E. E. (p. 397), it might appear that I thought the study *per se*, prejudicial to the health. They were suggested by the circumstance of a friend, who is extremely subject to headache, and otherwise of sickly constitution, having been ordered by an eminent physician never to open a mathematical book, nor read a proposition, at the risk of losing that inestimable blessing for which Juvenal tells us we should pray—the *mens sana in corpore sano*. He consequently left college altogether. Nevertheless this study, considered with reference to the nervous system, is undoubtedly, to persons of strong, clear intellect, less irritating than the generality of literary pursuits. Abercrombie, in his "Intellectual Powers," tries to prove that mathematicians are generally credulous and superstitious; but the evidence he offers is inconclusive. There is an able, though partizan, and therefore one-sided, view of mathematical study as a means of education, in Sir W. Hamilton's "Philosophical Transactions," recently published. It appears needless to say, after what precedes, that no person, be his constitution sound or weak, would think, if he were wise, of devoting two years, or one year, or even a single month, to the *exclusive* study of abstract science. The mind, under such treatment, would become cramped and lose its elasticity. It cannot be idle; nor can it be occupied for twelve hours in the day with mathematics; and if nothing else is offered to its attention, the inference is plain—it will fall to castle-building, a most pernicious habit. Six hours a day of close, absorbing study, is amply sufficient, even for those who aspire to the highest honours Cambridge has to confer, and for the majority, who are less ambitious, three or even two hours a day is enough, according to capacity. None should study above two hours at the same sitting. The attention, chained down too long to one subject, wearies, and should be refreshed, either by physical exer-

cise, or by turning for a time to works of a different character—history, travels, biography, mental and moral philosophy, and especially poetry. Works of natural history, and of human and comparative physiology, also offer a delightful resource to the student during the intervals of severer study. But in choosing a course of reading from among the numerous branches of literature which offer themselves, with their minor ramifications, it is necessary to exercise discretion. Happily for university students, this is done for them to some extent, inasmuch as all are required to pay some attention to the classical writers of ancient Greece and Rome, the fountain heads at which nearly all the great minds of modern times have drunk largely. But other elements, besides mathematics and classics, will necessarily enter, more or less, into every student's intellectual nutriment, in the selection of which, as of food for the body, he must be careful to have one staple preponderating element, to which all the others should be subsidiary, and to vary the preponderating element seldom, but the subsidiary as often as occasion requires. It is not, however, absolutely necessary that the minor elements should be invariably subsidiary to the staple, but departures from the rule should be few and of short continuance. Nothing weakens the powers of invention more than desultory miscellaneous reading, especially if performed in a careless, irreflective manner. Every one should have some definite object in view in reading, and, as much as possible, make every book read subservient to that object. There is some useful advice on this subject in Todd's "Student's Guide" (cap. iv.); and in a work by G. Combe, on "The Constitution of Man Considered in Relation to External Objects," general rules are given for the proper disposal of one's time (cap. iv.); both of which works I would earnestly commend to the attention of all who keep the physical, intellectual, and moral improvement, of themselves and of mankind, constantly in view. Upon those also who have one foot on the threshold of the temple of science, but who stand in doubt whether they have any right to enter, or whether any advantage is to be gained by doing so, I would strongly urge a careful and attentive study of Sir John Herschel's "Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy."—A TRINITY MAN.

126. *The Pharmaceutical Society's Examinations.*—In reply to the former part of W. B.'s question, respecting the kind of examination required to be passed for admission as a member of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain, I think the following may be relied on, the writer having himself passed the ordeal. The candidate must send a notice to the secretary a month previous, of his intention to present himself. The Board of Examiners sit the second Tuesday in the month. The candidate must possess a very tolerable acquaintance with the Latin language, and be thoroughly familiar with physicians' prescriptions. Chemistry occupies an important place, especially that of the Pharmacopœia; he

must be conversant with the symbols and atomic weights of the elementary bodies, the doctrines of the science, as well as the method employed practically in the manufacture of all the chemicals that enter a chemist's shop. Under the branch of materia medica he will be expected to know at sight the botanical name and natural order of any drug presented to him, its medical properties, dose, and the mode of its procuring. In botany he must know the specific name and natural order of all the medical plants in a fresh state, write the determinate characters of a few of the more common natural orders, and be acquainted with the scientific names of the different parts of a plant. In addition to the above, he must be familiar with the use of tests, whether for adulterations or poisons, and be ready with the best antidotes and treatment for the latter. The expense, provided W. B. is up in these branches, will be one guinea. If not, the best books he can study will be Phillips's "Translation of Pharmacopœia," Fowne's "Manual of Chemistry," Pereira's "Materia Medica," Lindley's "School Botany." But far better than books alone would be attendance at the School of Pharmacy, Bloomsbury-square, where he will have the advantage of lectures on these subjects, a capital museum, admission into the Regent's Park Botanical Gardens, and the acquisition of practical chemistry in an excellent laboratory, under the direction of Professor Redwood, whose eminence as a pharmaceutical chemist is only equalled by the respect entertained by all who have had the privilege of his assiduous tuition. The expense for five months is £15 15s.; let W. B. enter for that term, he will then be in a position to know if further study will be requisite to pass.

In reply to the second question, there is not at present any body examining in chemistry solely. The London University, by a recent charter, has the privilege of instituting examinations, and giving degrees in different departments of science, but it has not yet been carried into effect. The degree generally obtained by chemists is that of Ph. D., from one of the German universities.—J. L. H. D.

128. *Mercator.*—In answer to your correspondent, "Irene," who wishes to know about Mercator, I may observe:—Gerard Mercator was a distinguished Flemish geographer and mathematician, born in 1512. After receiving an excellent classical education, and taking the degree of M.A. in the University of Louvain, he began at the age of twenty-four to learn the art of engraving, and his first production was a descriptive map of the Holy Land. In 1541 he made a terrestrial globe, which procured for him the patronage of the Emperor, Charles V., by whom he was employed to construct several maps, globes, and mathematical instruments. He published several maps of the world, Europe, France, Germany, the British Islands, &c., and died in 1591, at the age of seventy-nine.—J. B.

Thinking leads man to knowledge. He may see and hear, and read and learn, whatever he pleases and as much as he pleases: he will never know anything of it, except that which he has thought over, that which by thinking he has made the property of his mind.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. X.

1. Point out the difference between a personal pronoun and a relative.
2. Point out the difference between a relative pronoun and an adjective pronoun.
3. Give instances of words which are both personal pronouns and adjective pronouns at different times, and show why they are so.
4. Give the origin of the words *its*, *him*, *his*, *her*, *its*, *that*, *what*, *which*, and *such*.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—IX.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 32. $\frac{4}{a} + \frac{4}{b} + \frac{4}{c} = 1$ (1)

$$\frac{5\frac{1}{2}}{b} + \frac{5\frac{1}{2}}{c} = 1 \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{6}{a} + \frac{6}{b} = 1 \quad (3)$$

$$3\text{rd} \times 2 \dots\dots\dots = \frac{12}{a} + \frac{12}{b} = 2$$

$$1\text{st} \times 3 \dots\dots\dots = \frac{12}{a} + \frac{12}{b} + \frac{12}{c} = 3$$

$$\text{by subtracting} \dots\dots\dots \frac{12}{c} = 1$$

$$\text{substitute } 12 \text{ for } c \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{5\frac{1}{2}}{b} + \frac{5\frac{1}{2}}{12} = 1 \\ \times \text{ by } 12b \dots\dots\dots 66 + 5\frac{1}{2}b = 12b \\ \text{transposing, \&c.} \dots\dots\dots 6\frac{1}{2}b = 66 \\ b = 10\frac{2}{3} \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{substituting } 10\frac{2}{3} \text{ for } b \text{ in third equation} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \frac{6}{a} + \frac{6}{10\frac{2}{3}} = 1 \\ \times \text{ by } 10\frac{2}{3}a \dots\dots\dots 60\frac{2}{3} + 6a = 10\frac{2}{3}a \\ \text{transposing, \&c.} \dots\dots\dots 4\frac{2}{3}a = 60\frac{2}{3} \\ a = 14\frac{1}{2} \end{array} \right.$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{A, in } 14\frac{1}{2} \text{ days;} \\ \text{B, in } 10\frac{2}{3} \text{ days;} \\ \text{C, in } 12 \text{ days.} \end{array} \left\} \text{—Ans.}$$

D. D. S.

Question 33. Here $\frac{100 \times 3}{98} = £3\frac{1}{4}$ interest in the

Three per Cents. at 98; put x = required price;

then $\frac{100 \times 2\frac{1}{2}}{x} = \frac{250}{x}$ interest in the Two-and-a-Half per Cents. at x ;

$$\text{whence } 100 : 105 :: \frac{150}{49} : \frac{250}{x}$$

$$\text{or } 20 : 21 :: \frac{3}{49} : \frac{5}{x}$$

$$\therefore \frac{63}{49} = \frac{9}{7} = \frac{100}{x} \text{ and } 9x = 700 \text{ and } x = \frac{700}{9} =$$

$$77\frac{7}{9} \text{ the required price.}$$

W. D.

Question 34. $£100 : £30,000 :: £5 : £1,500$, amount of rent;
 $£100 : £80 :: £1,500 : £1,200$, the amount to be assessed;

6d. | $£\frac{1}{10} \mid \frac{1,200}{£30}$ the produce of rate. W. D.

Question 35. $7x + 8y = 127$ (1)

$$8x + 7y = 128 \quad (2)$$

subtracting (1) from (2) $x - y = 1 \therefore y = x - 1$ (3)

$$\text{substituting in (1) the value of } y, \text{ and reducing}$$

$$15x = 135$$

$$\therefore x = 9$$

$$\text{and } y = x - 1, \text{ or } 9 - 1 = 8.$$

P. T.

Geometry.

Question 16. The curve surface of a right cone is half the product of the perimeter of the base into the slant side; hence this product, added to the area of the base, gives the superficial content required.

$$\text{Slant side} = \sqrt{20^2 + 8^2} = 21.54;$$

$$\text{curve surface} = \frac{21.54 \times 16 \times 3.1416}{2} = 541.360512;$$

$$\text{area of base} = 16^2 \times 7854 = 201.0624;$$

superficial content,

$$= 541.360512 + 201.0624 = 742.422912 \text{ sq. in. —J. K.}$$

Question 17. Put x for diameter of smaller circle, or that described by the inside wheel, then diameter of circle described by outer wheel $= x + 11$. Now, the circumference of the outer circle is to circumference of inner circle as 3 to 2, and the diameters are in the same ratio,

$$\therefore x + 11 : x :: 3 : 2 \therefore 2x + 22 = 3x \therefore x = 22 \text{ ft.}$$

$$\therefore \text{Circumference of inner circle,}$$

$$= 22 \times 3.1416 = 69.1152 \text{ feet;}$$

$$\therefore \text{circumference of outer circle,} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} = 33 \times 3.1416 = 103.6728 \text{ feet.} \end{array} \right\} \text{—Ans.}$$

$$\text{Question 18. Circumference of base of cylinder,}$$

$$= 2.5 \times 3.1416 = 7.854 \text{ feet}$$

$$\therefore \text{superficies of cylinder,}$$

$$= 7.854 \times 20 = 157.08 \text{ feet. —Ans.}$$

$$\text{Or, if we add the area of the two ends,}$$

$$= 4.90875 \times 2 = 9.8175;$$

$$\text{the total superficies,}$$

$$= 166.8975 \text{ feet. —Ans. C. D. S.}$$

Mechanics.

Question 15. We leave this question open another month.

Question 16. The pressure of water on a given part of the vessel containing it = the weight of a column of water whose base = in area the given part, and whose height = the mean height of water above that part.

$$\therefore 6 \times 10 \times \frac{1}{2} \times 62\frac{1}{2} = 18,750 \text{ lbs. = pressure on flood-gate.}$$

W. H. R.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—XI.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

40. In what time will five shillings become five pounds, at five per cent. per annum, simple interest?

41. In what time will five shillings become five pounds, at five per cent. per annum, compound interest?

42. A house, garden, and field, are, together, worth a rental of £180 per annum; the house and garden, £150; and the garden and field, £90. What is the rental of each?

43. $3x^2 + 17y = 317$, and $3y^2 + 17x = 173$, to find x and y .

Geometry.

20. Required the weight of a hemispherical copper bowl, when filled with water, whose internal diameter is 18 inches, and the average thickness a quarter of an inch, the specific gravity of copper being 8.878?

Mechanics.

19. It has been found that the resistance to a train of eight carriages is 50 lb. when the train moves at the rate of 10 miles per hour. Required the horse-power necessary to convey a train of that size, and weighing 50 tons, at the rate of 50 miles per hour.

Notices of Books.

The Autobiography of William Jerdan, with his Literary, Political, and Social Reminiscences and Correspondence during the last Fifty Years. Vol. II. London: Hall, Virtue, and Co.

We regard this volume as unequal in interest with its predecessor. At the onset Mr. Jerdan devotes too much space to criticizing his critics. In his first volume he made, as we stated, some humbling remarks on literature as a profession, and made them in such a way as to imply regret that he had pursued it. This has drawn upon him the censure of some of his brethren, who, standing up for the dignity of "our order," have freely suggested that the error might lie in the complainant, and not in his profession. Now, it appears to us that here, as in many other disputes, there is some truth on both sides. That literature and literature receive the support which is their due few will maintain; while that William Jerdan was not a very prudent or provident man the readers of this volume must admit. In fact, he confesses some faults, and appears conscious of others, as he exclaims—

"O! would some power the giftie gie us,
To see oursel as ithers see us;
It would frae mony a blunder free us,
And foolish notion."

After Mr. Jerdan has rebuked his rebukers, he favours us with a further history of his connexion with the *Sun*, which terminates in a long account of anything but a creditable quarrel between himself and his partner, and which was wound up by serious litigation and loss. As we read the sickening details we could not but feel that the practice of a few elementary lessons on friendship and forgiveness would have prevented all this. In 1817 Jerdan, having left the *Sun*, became editor of the *Literary Gazette*, and connected with Messrs. Pinnock and Maunder, two of the world-wide names of literature. He presents his readers with some notices of his contributors, and many short extracts from their writings. It appears that Barry Cornwall made his debut in the *Literary Gazette* for 1818; and we find the following beautiful lines among his earlier pieces:—

"Gone from her cheek is the summer bloom,
And her breath hath lost its faint perfume,
And the gloss hath dropt from her golden hair,
And her forehead is pale, though no longer fair.

"And the spirit that sate on her soft blue eye
Is struck with cold mortality;
And the smile that played on her lip hath fled,
And every grace hath now left the dead.

"Like slaves they obeyed her in the height of
And left her all in the wintry hour; [power,
And the crowds which swore for her love to die,
Shrank from the tone of her last sad sigh.
And this is *Man's* fidelity!

"'Tis *Woman* alone, with a firmer heart,
Can see all these idols of life depart,
And love the more, and soothe, and bless,
Man in his utter wretchedness."

Under Jerdan the *Literary Gazette* appears to have increased in circulation; but this was probably as much owing to the efforts of the contributors as those of the editor himself. Strange as this opinion may seem, it naturally arises from noticing the names and reputation of many of the former, and the evident carelessness of the latter. If a man can allow himself to be indifferent to the literary execution of a work like the present, he would not be more attentive to one of a less permanent character.

Let not this judgment be deemed harsh, for in it we give our author credit for ability where it has not been displayed, and attributed that to carelessness which might have been put down to a want of discernment. The following extracts we hesitate not to append, in order to illustrate our meaning, and afford a suggestive lesson to our "neophyte" writers.

Speaking of the editor of the *Standard*, he says:—"His son, Dr. Giffard, is now one of the ablest political writers of the age; and, educated under such a father, it is not surprising that he should be as zealous as he is powerful; as is testified by the *Standard* newspaper, and everywhere else where his pen is wielded."

Referring to duelling he remarks:—"Party spirit rages, as it too generally does, in Dublin at this time, and was ATTENDED by CONSTANT duels, in superseding which there is undoubtedly some improvement."

Of Mr. Chalmers he bears this testimony:—"He had a thorough enjoyment of the good things of social life, to which his conversation contributed the appendages of pleasurable intelligence and instruction."

The exiled Princess of Condé, his "proximate neighbour" at Little Chelsea, is the inelegant subject of the following laughable description:—"The daughter of the murdered King of France dressed little better than a milkmaid, which rank, indeed, she much resembled in form, and walking about in thick-soled boots."

Space warns, or we might have given "a perfect shower of radiant suns" which have fallen from our author's "shivering quills," but we prefer bidding him adieu for the present, and, with a good-tempered smile, leaving him—to use his own figure—"like a peacock, the hero of his own tale" (tail?).

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XII.—ON STYLE.

SATIRE, to be pungent, must contain a considerable amount of truth; hence the causticity of the wit of him who said, Language has three purposes to subserve—1st. To conceal thought; 2nd. To conceal the want of thought; 3rd. To reveal thought. With what a keen eye must he have looked upon and seen through the falsities, the hypocrisies, the corruptions, the shams, of our ordinary social life! How accurately has he perceived the tedious malignity of scandal-mongers—the wordy eloquence of the dull and thoughtless! How cleverly has he peeped behind the veil of politic cozenage, sentimental nothingnesses, and hollow-hearted pretence! But no satirist, however "*acerbis fucetis incidere solitus*"—accustomed to scoff with bitter jestings—can be true to his vocation without being at once a humourist and a moralist, so that we must look beneath the surface of the words for the moral truth contained in this *jeu d'esprit*. It appears to us to imply that thinking is the true function of human life—that, as Intellectuality is our highest prerogative and most God-like attribute, its proper use ought also to be our holiest care. This entirely accords with our own opinion. Language should be the exponent not only of what is true, but also of what *ought to be* so. He who absorbs himself wholly in worldly gratifications—in those delights which belong to him as "the quintessence of dust"—is deaf to "the voice of God," with which the universe resounds—destitute of a due appreciation of the purest and most ecstatic joys which have been allotted to the tenants of this "nether globe," and guilty of soul-suicide. Man is essentially "a being breathing thoughtful breath." Truth is the aliment which his soul desires; and "Truth is thought which has assumed its appropriate garments, whether of words or actions." Truth-search and thought-utterance, these are the great duties of man. The world has endorsed this opinion by crowning with "blessings and eternal praise" the thinking members of the human race, whether their thinkings have resulted in the immortalization of marble, by imparting to it the visible presence of beauty—upbuilding the quarried rock into architectural sublimity—touching "the kindling canvas into life"—tracing the orbit-path of distance-hidden stars—performing the various chemical manipulations—the achievement of patriot deeds—adding to the comforts and conveniences of existence—making "the glittering arrows of the Almighty the medium between soul and soul hundreds of miles apart"—or revealing, in "the sweet music of words," all that transpires in the "fairy-land of thought." To think is an eternal necessity of the mind; to express the conceptions which pass within us is an irrepressible desire. That which ~~must~~ be done we ought to endeavour to do well. Hence arises at once the need and the use of our instructions in Style. We grant you that in giving these we have been dull

and prosaic; but not more so, we hope, than the necessities of the case warrant; for, as Father Malebranche remarks, "it is impossible in all discourses to move the senses and imaginations of others; nor ought it always to be done. * * * Writers of comedies and romances are obliged to please, and so procure attention; but for us it is sufficient if we can instruct even those that labour to make themselves attentive."* But to our task, with cheerfulness and care.

IV. STRENGTH.—Strength is the power of moving others at will. In enabling us to move, excite, and persuade men, words are peculiarly efficacious. Perspicuity, Conciseness, and Unity, are all elements in Strength, which latter supposes language to be animated with an earnest and intensified purpose, and to be so selected and disposed that the end in view may be efficiently wrought out. Strength, then, is that quality of Style which presents our ideas with the greatest possible force to the minds of those whom we wish to move. Upon the selection and arrangement of words the Strength of a sentence depends. "If words have all their possible extent of power, three effects arise in the mind of the hearer. The *first* is the *sound*; the *second* is the *picture* or representation of the thing signified by the sound; the *third* is the *affection of soul* produced by one or by both of the foregoing."† When all these *three* effects are produced, language has done its utmost. How these may be produced is the problem before us. The senses are the primary sources from which knowledge is derived, and hence the opening mind can only be intellectualized by being led to see Truth through a sensuous medium. The *real* is much more easily apprehended than the *ideal*. In the choice of words, therefore, those which are most specific and most clearly expressive of circumstantialities ought to be preferred to those which are abstract and general. "The more general the terms are, the picture is the fainter; the more special they are, it is the brighter." It is only by a judicious selection of what may be called picturesque words—words which place ideas before the mind with a vivid embodiment, an appearance of circumstantial actuality—that a strong impression can be made. "To make words *paint*, as if with brush and canvas, is a very high effort of literary art." "Picturesque language," says Emerson, "is at once a commanding certificate that he who employs it is in alliance with Truth and God." Specificity of terms renders tortuous circumlocution unnecessary, vapid redundancy impossible, and ambiguity of phrase unachievable if attempted. Terseness, brevity, and clearness are needful, if we desire forcefully to impress, mightily to move, or earnestly to urge on the human mind. The flatulent, the flippant, the frothy, the bombastic, do not move—to anything but laughter and contempt. Direct, straightforward, and sustained, must be the force which is intended to persuade to thought or action. Vagueness, generality, feebleness, and obscurity, are all adverse to this. Every phrase and figure employed must be so chosen and so disposed as to impress the mind strongly, and set the ideas before it clearly and completely. Precision of terms and brevity of expression, in opposition to whatever is ambiguous or superfluous; effective disposition and impressive arrangement, in opposition to nerveless and languid carelessness, is what must form the main object of study to him who would express his ideas strongly, or impress his hearers or readers vividly. Some

* "Recherche de la Verité," liv. iii. cap. i.

† Burke, "On the Sublime and Beautiful," part v. sect. iv.

observations regarding "what to aim at and what to avoid" we subjoin, in order to give form and precision to these otherwise disjointed remarks:—

1st. Be concise. Eschew verbosity: concentration of force is always advisable. Strength is employed in the empire of mind for the same purposes as force in the realms of matter—1, to counteract opposing force or forces, and thereby to produce equilibrium; 2, to overcome inertia, and produce motion. The more directly, therefore, the force is brought to bear upon the right point, the better. Mere epithets, and the profuse relation of unnecessary circumstances, are condemned by this rule.

2nd. Place the more important words in such situations as shall ensure the greatest attention. It is a principle of the human mind that the most vivid part of any thought—that which most strongly affects the speaker, or occupies the greatest prominence in his mind—demands utterance first; hence great attention may be secured for an important word or clause by placing it at the beginning of a sentence; *e. g.*, "*Great* is the Lord, and of great power."—" *They sank*, as lead, in the mighty waters." But if it be desirable to detain the mind, to sustain the attention, and pique curiosity, it is advisable to place the important word or clause at the end of the sentence; *e. g.*, "All these things will I give thee, *if thou wilt fall down and worship me.*"—"I confess it sometimes makes me shudder to see a young rake clasp his arms round the waist of a pure and innocent girl."*

3rd. So arrange the various clauses of sentences that they may appear in the order of their relative importance; *i. e.*, let them rise in a climax. No weaker assertion should succeed a stronger one as corroborative of it, for the natural properties of speech in general require that the proof adduced should be stronger than the thing sought to be proven by it. It is bad policy to put out all one's strength at the onset; the force which increases in power as it is exerted is more valuable than that which becomes weaker by expenditure.

4th. Employ specific words, when suitable, in preference to general or abstract ones. If a whole class of sensible objects can be described by an individual member of it; if an intellectual subject can be illustrated by a reference to sensible objects, or an abstract idea made more readily intelligible by an analogy between it and any perceptible quality in objects; a more striking impression is made upon the mind than if we neglected these means of definitely representing our thoughts to the mind; *e. g.*:—

———— "O'er many a dark and dreary vale
They passed, and many a region dolorous;
O'er many a frozen, many a fiery Alp,
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and shades of death—
A universe of death."

5th. When resemblance or contrast of ideas requires expression, a similar or contrary mode of construction should, in general, be employed; an equal number of correlative words, appropriately adjectivized, should be used in each of the antithetical clauses, and these ought, as nearly as possible, to be of equal length. This antithetical uniformity will be found beautifully exemplified in Johnson's comparison between Dryden and Pope, as well as in the following sentences, *viz.*:—

* Longfellow's "Hyperion."

"Virtue is like precious odours, most fragrant when they are incensed or crushed; for prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity doth best discover virtue."—*Bacon's Essay, "Of Adversity."*

"The joys of parents are secret, and so are their griefs and fears; they cannot utter the one, nor will they utter the other. Children sweeten labour, but they make misfortunes more bitter; they increase the cares of life, but they mitigate the remembrance of death."—*Bacon's "Of Parents and Children."*

6th. Never, if able to avoid it, terminate a sentence with an undignified word or phrase; *e. g.*, "That is a matter I shall require to think of."

7th. Let your thoughts be closely knit together, and never introduce expletives or intervening clauses, unless when absolutely necessary to strengthen the desired impression. See that you be not of those to whom Swift says—

"Epithets you link,
In gaping lines, to fill a chink,
Like stepping-stones, to save a stride,
In streets where kennels are too wide;
Or, like a heel-piece, to support
A cripple with one foot too short."

V. VIVACITY.—Vivacity is the result of a combination of many excellences, such as novelty, uncommonness, contrast to common-place, geniality, heartiness, and sprightliness of language. These give a smack to composition which makes the reader relish and admire it. Novelty is always delightful to man's fickle and changeable humour; the strange, or that which lies beyond our own experience, excites and attracts attention; anything opposed to the routine or habitual use and wont of ordinary life awakes the thought-powers of man. The manifestation of warm, loving, sympathetic feelings, large-heartedness, genuine philanthropy, and racy good nature, as they excite similar feelings within us, please and gratify our nature. Anything that strongly affects the human susceptibilities, and stirs unitedly the affections and the intellect, adds to the vivacity of Style, because it originates an intensified power of apperception in the reader or hearer. Thoughts are thus introduced at once to different faculties of the intellect, and when their interest is simultaneously gained, the capacities of idea-reception are increased. An easy, animated, flowing, figurative, and refined colloquiality tends much to the production of a vivacious Style. Of course, we mean that the Style should be adapted to the thoughts to be expressed, and do not at all wish to be understood as advising an affected familiarity and jocularly of expression on unsuitable occasions; we merely recommend the acquisition of that humanity of spirit which, expanded by love to all, and glowing with tenderness towards all, imparts a healthy heartiness and genuine cheerfulness to every effort which we make to inform or reform others. We have already more than once asserted that Thought and Style are twin-children of the Intellect; and all we can pretend to do here is to recommend a few directions for rearing them healthily, and enabling them to get over the diseases incident to the immaturity of infancy and youth. Vivacity of Style, therefore, will chiefly result from the inner nature of a man. If he feels as well as thinks—is emotive as well as intellectual—his Style must be vivacious and striking. There will be a loving sort of enthusiasm interblended with his greatest thoughts, and common-place will not befog his compositions; but a gratifying earnestness, a sympathetic kindness, a kind of continual good-humouredness, will suffuse all that he does or says.

There are, therefore, few directions regarding verbal usages required under this division of our subject: the heart which seeks to affect me must previously have been affected itself. The grasp of a death-cold hand will not warm my blood, neither will a dry, feelingless prosaicality arouse my emotive nature. Look to your own hearts; feel there, then express yourselves.

1st. Avoid an overstrained dignifiedness as much as a low, vulgar chit-chatiness and babblement.

2nd. Think clearly, then choose the most expressive terms to embody your thoughts. The man who merely "blunders round a meaning" can never write with vivacity.

3rd. Avoid a drawling, expletive, loquacious verbosity of speech or writing.

4th. Choose those figures of speech or illustrations which will be most likely to interest those whom you address, and that phraseology which is most suitable to the topic under your consideration.

VI. HARMONY.—Harmony refers to those melodious cadences which give agreeability to Style. It depends upon the choice and arrangement of words. Some combinations of letters are more easily pronounceable than others, and such words are, in general, more gratifying to the ear than those of more difficult articulation. Euphonism is certainly a high attainment in composition, as it is necessary that there should be an accordance between the sound and the sense, a sort of correlative symphoniousness between the thought and the words employed to express it; yet we would never advise the sacrifice of expressiveness to harmony. Whenever harmony can be introduced as the auxiliary of the foregoing qualities of Style it is right to introduce it; but, unless clearness is to be added to our conceptions by the use of harmonious and cadenced words, we ought rather to avoid their use. To attempt to express anger, indignation, or invective in the namby-pamby versification of Waller, or soul-nerving enthusiasm in the cold classicality of the Addisonian prose, would simply be ridiculous, and could only be paralleled by the folly of an endeavour to utter the airy gracefulness of Moore in the sonorous periodicity of Johnson. There seems to be a natural felicitousness of expression in some authors, which suits so exactly with their general strain of thought, that no contrast between the ideas and the expression is ever felt—no incongruity of matter and manner is ever experienced. This is an excellence which the student should diligently labour to acquire. The intimate connexion which exists between ideas and language seems to make the necessity for attention to harmony obvious. Discourse, to be attractive, must be pleasing, not grating and repellant. Quintilian truly remarks, that "nothing can enter into the affections which stumbles at the threshold by offending the ear." *Rythmus*, or the adjustment of the measure of sounds to the ideas which we intend to express, has a very powerful influence in determining the reception which these ideas shall receive. Every sound, syllable, word, and phrase, ought to be attuned to the sense, and have a relation to the moral purpose of the writer. If we would do this effectually, we must avoid a stiff and stately diction, strained syntactical inversions, pedantic and erudite terms. We must make nothing singular for the mere love of singularity. True harmony does not result from the adoption of the most decidedly musical sounds which we can find, but in the choice and fitting arrangement of those successions of vocables which possess the greatest possible *relative* melody; that is, such as are most nearly indicative of the feelings which

ought to be originated by such thoughts. Not the most melodious sounds, but those most consonant to the topic of discourse, constitute what rhetoricians denominate Harmony; hence the harshest hurly-burly of vocables may be, in their own places, as accordant with the principles of Rhetorical Harmony as the choicest "concord of sweet sounds."

The following passages may be quoted as illustrations of the accuracy of the foregoing remarks, viz.:—

1.

"Blue-eyed girls

Brought pails and dipped them in the crystal pool,
And children, ruddy-cheeked and flaxen-haired,
Gathered the glistening cowslip from its edge."—*Bryant's "The Fountain."*

2.

"Above them,

High in the air, perched on the precipice,
My fair enchantress spied a little flower—
A solitary rose—which bloomed distinct
Against the sky, and on its tender stalk
Held to the glorious sun and the wide heavens
Its leafy, nectared chalice;—held it there,
With laughing boast and bold fragility,
High o'er the head, beyond the reach of all.
She drew her rein a moment to admire
The little dauntless covetable flower;
And my brave knight, whose eye still follows hers,
Caught at the half-formed fancy; setting spurs
To his astonished steed, made up the height;
He tore his desperate course, and plucked the toy.
The lady shrieked; but, ere the blood had time
To quit that lovely cheek it revels in,
He brought the panting courser to her side.
The rose was hers."—*Smith's Dramas—"Athelwold."*

3. "And at night so cloudless and so still! Not a voice of living thing—not a whisper of leaf or waving bough—not a breath of wind—not a sound upon the earth, nor in the air! And overhead bends the blue sky, dewy and soft, and radiant with innumerable stars, like the inverted bell of some blue flower, sprinkled with golden dust, and breathing fragrance."—*Longfellow's "Hyperion."*

4.

"Now swells the intermingling din. The jar,
Frequent and frightful, of the bursting bomb;
The falling beam, the shriek, the groan, the shout,
The ceaseless clangour, and the rush of men,
Inebriate with rage. Loud and more loud
The discord grows; till pale death shuts the scene,
And o'er the conqueror and the conquered draws
His cold and bloody shroud."—*Shelley's "Queen Mab."*

5. "He has the indisputablest ideas; but, then, his style! In very truth, it is the strangest of styles, though one of the richest; a style full of originality, picturesqueness, sunny vigour: but all cased and slated over, threefold, in metaphor and trope; distracted into tortuosities, diallocations: starting out into crotchets, cramp turns, quaintnesses, and hidden satire."—*Carlyle's "On Mirabeau."*

The chief rules for Harmony are those which follow, viz.:—

1st. In the choice of words avoid, unless where absolutely necessary for expression, the use of harsh, grating, and unmelodious words; e. g.—(a) Those which contain a concurrence of the same vowel, as, re-estimated, co-ordinal, &c. (b) Those which contain two or more

rough-sounding consonants; *e. g.*, chroniclers, grudged, perturbed, attacked, &c. (c) Those which have frequently recurrent letters or nearly similar syllables, as, pre-reactionary, sillily, externalily, farriery, &c. (d) Lengthy compounds, when more fluent and equally expressive synonymes can be found, as, shamefacedness, tenderheartedness, distressfulness, &c. (e) Such lengthy words as have their accented syllable placed so near the beginning as to cause a difficulty in pronouncing them, as, réceptacle, arbitrarily, extra-mundaneity, &c.

2nd. In the arrangement of words, those collocations should, in general, be preferred by which the greatest euphony is producible; hence the following ought to be carefully guarded against, *viz.*:—(a) Successive words beginning with aspirated *h*, as, his historical genius. (b) Words ending with one sound succeeded by words beginning with that sound, as, sterile illiteracy—accuracy, assiduity, and care, &c. (c) Words ending in vowel sounds succeeded by words whose initial syllable has a vowel sound, as, Though all do owe you honour; Go! no evil will accrue to you, &c. (d) Words having a consonant ending similar to the initial consonant sound of the succeeding word, as, Who dares tax Xerxes with injustice? Strike, Iconoclast! Bring gingham! &c. (e) Words whose first syllables have the same sound, or the final sound of which is similar to the first syllable of the following words, as, I can candidly canvas Canterbury; You likewise wisely chose, &c. (f) Words of similar terminational sounds, as, I confess with humility my sterility of fancy and debility of judgment. (g) A succession of monosyllables, as, Do not go on on this road far, father, &c.

3rd. In distributing the clauses of a sentence, we should so arrange them that the whole may be easily and readily pronounced, and thus convey an agreeable impression to the ear:—(a) Clauses should neither be too long, nor disproportionately assorted. (b) The various clauses should be arranged in the order of their length and importance, *i. e.*, form a climax—this, of course, supposes that the length of the clauses is to increase with the importance of the thought. (c) Monosyllables ought as seldom as possible to end a clause, and terminational monosyllables ought never to be emphatic.

4th. In composing a paragraph, long, short, and intermediate sentences ought to be judiciously intermingled. Short sentences are conversational, and long ones are oratorical. Composition, to be good, ought to combine as much conversational ease and idiomaticity as is consistent with the calm dignity and elevation which are expected of the writer.

5th. Be natural and unaffected. It is true that, “with many readers, brilliancy of style passes for affluence of thought; they mistake buttercups in the grass for immeasurable gold mines under ground;” but “the natural alone is permanent.” “In Style, as in all things else, simplicity is the supreme excellence.”* “Unnatural utterance hinders usefulness. From aiming at peculiarity, or from too artificial a training, language becomes disjointed in a great variety of ways. Some men, in pursuing thoughts, forget harmony; while others seem to set their ideas so completely to music, that their hearers or readers lose sight of the subject in listening to the sweetness of the melody. Occasionally we find a man who speaks or writes as if his soul stuttered, so as to form a hundred

* We quote the above extracts from memory; we believe they are from Longfellow's “Kavanagh,” chap. xiii.

periods in a page. The jet from the fountain comes in fits, so many times a minute. The conjunctions are all disjunctive. It is a strange piece of music. It has startling variations. It is staccatoed throughout. There is a rest at every bar. It is emphatic; but it is apt neither to be understood nor remembered. Others take no breath, and rush on like a cataract, impetuous, unproductive, dangerous, destructive, wasting their rough energy in noisy violence; and, bounding headlong to an unknown end, they confound the waters of life into foam, and lose themselves in whirlpools. Sober reason instinctively adopts the medium, and measures her eloquence by the nature of the subject and the state of feeling proper to the occasion. The cause of so much ineffective utterance is found in the fact, that the thoughts and the feelings do not flow together. They are sought apart, and kept apart in spirit and in power, although seemingly wedded together by sound—*vox et præterea nihil*—(it is a voice, and nothing else). A natural ear can always detect an unnatural eloquence, and none but the habituated lovers of listening can feel the truth inviting them except from lips ‘touched with a live coal from off the altar.’

“Truth and right feeling have an order of their own; but an affected mannerism is the disguise of a false and rigid animation. * * * The living fires burn with a lambent harmony and freedom, and, like the luminous waves that clothe the sun, need no cincture to bind them to their places. The laws of light are those of beauty, and clear thoughts require but little art for their proper exhibition.”* They become harmonious, clear, strong, concise, and vivacious in expression, in exact proportion as the mind of the speaker or writer really feels, and utters what he feels just as he feels it. A play of shadows in the realms of fancy, however lovely, will never move like the actualities of earnest thought vigorously expressed; for,

“As the sun transmutes the sullen hues
Of marsh-grown vapours into vermeil dyes,
And melts them later into twilight dews,
Shedding on flowers the baptism of the skies,”

so does the heaven-given energy of earnest thought adorn our ideas with beauty and enable us to utter them in music.

Another year will soon have joined “the past eternity,” and during that period we have been companioning together. Have we rightly considered our relative responsibilities while so connected? and have we been earnestly striving to fulfil the poet’s imagination:—

“Stay, stay the passing moment, and impress
The mark of wisdom on its shining wing?”

Have we remembered that

“Whatever man possesses God has lent,
And to his audit liable is ever,
To reckon how and where and when ‘twas spent?”

If so, it will be well; if not, *now* is the fit time for “changing the fashion of our spirits.”

In the hope of meeting again, we say, Farewell, reader, till Time’s new babe be born.

* Moore’s “Man and his Motives,” p. 182.

History.

WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE CRUSADES FAVOURABLE TO THE
CIVILIZATION AND MORAL ELEVATION OF THE PEOPLE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THERE are considerations affecting, in a degree the most stupendous, the moral and social well-being of society, which are nevertheless, to ordinary minds, a complete blank. If, indeed, to such minds they become matters of cogitation, they are looked upon as mere sentimental moonshine—an unaccountable anomaly in human nature, fit thoughts of persons in love or elderly bluestockings. For example, what is more common than to hear people laughing at what they term “superstitious fears,” without considering that they are dealing with the most recondite questions in human nature. There is an awful gloom which encompasses, to all rightly-constituted and powerful minds, all mysteries of death and the grave; it lives within them, and forms no inconsiderable portion of the moral forces of their nature. And nothing, in our opinion, is more preposterous than the attempt to substitute dry, scientific knowledge for this education of the imagination and mind—to drive all these sacred terrors from the mind—and, instead, to furnish us with the history of the steam-engine, or experiments in chemistry or natural philosophy.

It may, indeed, be urged that the unreality of these things has been demonstrated. This we beg leave to doubt. There are many things which do not admit of scientific demonstration, yet which, nevertheless, exist as motive and active power in this world. Nay, it might, no doubt, be demonstrated, with apparent logical correctness, that the sun does not shine; but would this avail? The glory of its beams would still continue to fall on tree and tower—the lake would still glitter, mirror-like, in the summer evening sunset, and *coups de soleil* would not be the less frequent. And how little avails the sceptical objections of material science against these freezing horrors—accompaniments of Nox and Erebus—reminiscences of lonely walks by midnight on haunted moors, when

the moonbeams burst from betwixt broken clouds! All these live not in the human mind without a purpose. Emerson, I think, speaks of the death of children as stimulating and awakening the higher nature of the parent—as linking him more closely with the invisible and infinite. And this is also the office of those supernatural terrors of which I have spoken. They, notwithstanding their being ignored by a few individuals destitute of an inner nature—by sceptics, defective in their emotional nature—fulfil a most important function, not only in the education of individuals and communities, but of the whole human race. That function is, to awaken the inner consciousness of man; in other words, they teach him how to THINK. They are the means which enable man to arrive at the highest privilege of his nature—the power of self-knowledge.

It might also be shown that this is the nursery of the sciences; in short, of all that has sprung from the reflective nature of man; but this I shall content myself with affirming.

But the scepticism of which I complain is not confined merely to that to which I have just alluded; it is extended to well nigh all the moral phenomena of man's nature, from religion downwards. But among the great moral forces, of which the existence has been doubted in more than a common degree, is that class from which has sprung great convulsions in the history of mankind; *e. g.*, the French Revolution of 1792; or, greater still, the Crusades. It is true, there is some ground for this among philosophic observers of history, these outbursts of mental force having interfered in a very sad and reckless manner with speculations and conclusions of the most promising character. Indeed, for a genuine old Tory to believe other than that this said French Revolution was incited by the Radicals would be considered tantamount to apostacy from his political faith.

Of these great mental impulses—heroic moments, as Emerson would call them—in the history of our globe, perhaps the greatest is the Crusades. It was a period of deep feeling, when the human race seemed to awaken to a sense of responsibility—when death and danger were disregarded, so that man could but perform the mission that was before him. Not but on such occasions he ran into great follies; nay, doubtless, in such moments of abandonment these were predominant; the motive and the mental condition alone were nobler. This mighty movement, so greatly remarkable for the absence of selfishness in its leaders, was perhaps, at the time it occurred, the most advantageous possible for Europe. The nations were then young—newly organized; they required pressure from without to consolidate and establish their power upon a firm basis, and this they found in the Crusades. What other movement than this—which united the strongest faith in the cross with the greatest courage and self-exertion in the individual—could have filled the heart of Europe with poetry—could have developed that noble institution, chivalry? And, doubtless, it was the holy and religious impulses which led the way to this war, that softened the hearts of the rude warriors to the gentle influences of women. Here was a holiness—a devotedness—which,

however foolish they may appear to us in the nineteenth century, were, nevertheless, of the very highest importance to the age of the Crusades—to the rude, unlettered barons, and men at arms. Courage and faith, are they not the twin pioneers of civilization—courage, the strong, self-helping arm upon earth; faith, the sanctifier, the spirit that comes from heaven? The one without the other is grasping selfishness or helpless inanity. The objection which is constantly urged against the Crusades by observers in the nineteenth century—that they were without practical results—is wretchedly unphilosophical. No age properly admits of comparison with any but itself. It is enough that the motives appeared sufficient for our forefathers. It is the purest arrogance to believe that, had we lived then, we should have been wiser. The positive direct benefits of these precipitations of Europe upon Asia are to be found in the strong faith which was evoked, the consequent deepening of the human consciousness, and thus a general awakening of the moral nature. That these benefits have not been more clearly seen; indeed, that the present subject is matter of debate at all, arises from the imperfect knowledge which we have of moral forces, and the difficulty of arriving at a correct estimate of them. HAROLD.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"The principle of the Crusades was a savage fanaticism, and the most important effects were analogous to the cause. The belief of the Catholics was corrupted by new legends, their practice by new superstitions; and the establishment of the inquisition, the mendicant order of monks and friars, the last abuse of indulgences, and the final progress of idolatry, *flowed from the baleful fountain of the holy war.*"—Gibbon, "*Decline and Fall*," chap. lxi.

WHILE the Crusades have been a theme of exultation or regret to many, according to their feelings or prejudices, they have ever been the subject of astonishment to all. That so many human beings should, by the tale and tears of a solitary and despicable monk, be aroused from the sluggish habits of their social life, and fired with a spirit of daring enthusiasm—that the whole priesthood should have unanimously espoused his cause—that monarchs and merchants, princes and peasants, chieftains and slaves, fiefs and their vassals, and even maids, and mothers

with their children, should have at once entered into a scheme for leaving their fatherland and their possessions, and marching to an unknown country, cannot fail to arrest the attention of the student of history. That this enthusiasm should for such a length of years have continued to animate the minds and influence the conduct of the whole of the European nations, is indeed a matter of astonishment. That men who had hitherto led lives of the most widely different description—the unlettered boor, who had lived quietly in his humble cot; the robber, whose abode was the fastnesses of the mountains; and the haughty aristocrat, who had enjoyed the luxury of property and the services of vassals—that all should have suddenly given up their peculiarities, and have joined together, actuated by the same motive, and impelled by a like frenzy, to set out on a perilous expedition to free the Holy City

from the Turk, is certainly a subject which may well engross the attention of mankind, and from which they may be willing to learn. That this could not all be effected without producing deep and powerful organic effects, even where society was rude and unformed, no one will presume to deny. That these effects were unfavourable to the civilization and moral elevation of the people, we shall now attempt to prove by the following considerations:—

First. The causes and the motives which led to the Crusades. We have been at some pains to inquire into the history of these wars, and we fearlessly say that we can discover in their origin and prosecution the evidence of no worthy or ennobling motive. They were the product of rude ignorance, of treacherous cunning, of martial rapacity, and of frenzied fanaticism. The end seems to have been held to justify the means. There was the first and grand appeal to the people to enter the lists against the enemies of the Saviour, to succour and avenge their injured pilgrim brothers, and to redeem the Holy City from the possession of the Mussulman. In this they were deceived by "cunningly-devised fables" respecting "lands flowing with milk and honey—of mines, and treasures of gold and diamonds—of palaces of marble and jasper." These were to be the rewards of the pilgrim; and the wealth of the infidels was regarded as the fair and legitimate object of plunder; and even the flavour of the wines and the beauty of the women were held forth as incentives to the march. Promises of pardon for the deadliest crimes, and the sure possession of eternal happiness, was to be the reward of a pilgrimage to the East, with the destruction of the infidel, and the recovery of the tomb of the Saviour. How sadly was everything holy in the faith and practice of true religion perverted, and what sickening horrors were perpetrated in the name of the Prince of Peace!

Secondly. The character and conduct of the Crusaders forbid them being regarded as aids to civilization or moral elevation. "At the voice of their pastor the robber, the incendiary, the homicide, arose by thousands to redeem their souls by repeating on the infidels the same deeds which they had exercised against their christian brethren," and the "terms of atonement were eagerly

embraced by offenders of every rank and denomination." None were refused admission to the saintly army. The prince was honoured, the peasant flattered, the young and stalwart, whatever their character or crimes, were welcomed to the ranks, and even women and children were allowed to swell their numbers. To prisoners a general amnesty was granted, and to debtors a freedom from the diligence of creditors. Before all earthly ties and considerations was the call of the church and the battles of the cross. It was enough that they were filled with hatred to the followers of the false prophet, and longed to wreak vengeance on all who resisted the Pope, and were willing to hasten to the redemption of the holy sepulchre.

Such were the elements of the army that marched to Palestine. Men ignorant, avaricious, and bloodthirsty; not themselves the subjects of civilization or enlightenment, and certainly very unlikely to teach these to others. Their conduct was such as might have been expected from such an army placed in such circumstances. Wherever their march was opposed, or their hopes of plunder excited, their revenge was fearful, and their rapacity boundless. Oppression and cruelty were their concomitants, and a butchered people and a devastated country were in the track of their progress. Nor were they able to restrain the workings of strife and cruelty amongst themselves. The strong trampled on the weak, the married state was violated, and such scenes of rioting and debauchery were witnessed in their midst, that Gibbon says, "Seldom does the history of profane war display such scenes of intemperance and prostitution as were exhibited under the walls of Antioch."

Thus did the conduct and character of the Crusaders exclude the possibility of their doing any good to the nations they visited. "Heedless and unreflecting, they consumed with prodigality the stores of provisions and the water which they had. Like the plague of the locusts, they ate up and destroyed every article of food in the inland country which they traversed. The people among whom they marched either hated them and their designs with a deadly hatred, or were fain to flee before their cruel or rapacious brethren, and they were reduced to awful straits from thirst and famine. In the ex-

tremity of their sufferings they were sometimes compelled to roast and devour the flesh of their infant and adult captives, and acquired the character of cannibals, which was carried abroad and confirmed by spies, who discovered several human bodies preparing for food in their camps." This report the Normans were zealous to spread, in order to heighten the abhorrence and terror of the infidels. Thus debasing was the influence of the Crusades on all with whom they came in contact. Tell us not, then, in bitter mockery, that the "Crusades unfolded a Christian Europe," or were likely to carry the blessings of *enlightenment*, or respect for the social relations, to those with whom they came in contact.

Thirdly. The *results* of the Crusades show that they were not favourable to civilization and moral elevation. If we trace the course of the Crusaders, we find that it was one series of error, misfortune, and crime, ending in their own dispersion or destruction. The doom of the first expedition was a mournful one. "The populace who departed under the conduct of Peter the Hermit, without preparation and without guides or chiefs, and who were followed, rather than led, by some obscure knights, after traversing Germany and the Greek empire, dispersed or perished in Asia Minor."* "Thus perished (says another writer) 300,000 persons of the first Crusaders, ere their more thoughtful brethren had completed their preparations. Yet, so inefficient was the lesson, that vast numbers still flocked under the same standard to encounter the same fate." The savage countries of Hungary and Bulgaria were whitened with their bones, their army was cut in pieces by the Turkish sultan or the Grecian emperor, and myriads perished by the climate, fatigue, and the dangers of the way, the more insuperable as they were unforeseen to these ignorant fanatics. And of the few who returned, they had learned no laws of love, they had been schooled by no kindness, and they settled down in their former state, to their former pursuits, still more gloomy and unlovely than before.

They neither accomplished the object for which they were ostentatiously undertaken, nor produced any enlightening or ennobling effects on the nations. Let us hear the tes-

timony of history further on the matter. Gibbon says:—"As soon as the arms of the Franks were withdrawn, the *impression*, though not the memory, was erased in the Mahometan realms of Egypt and Syria. The faithful disciples of the prophet were never tempted by a profane desire to study the laws or language of the idolaters, nor did the simplicity of their primitive manners receive the *slightest* alteration from their intercourse, in peace or war, with the unknown strangers of the West; and, if the Greeks showed a less inflexible disposition, it was *only the warlike propensities* of their antagonists they emulated." Again:—"The ardour of studious curiosity was awakened in Europe by *different causes and more recent events*; in the age of the Crusades they viewed with careless indifference the literature and learning of the Greeks and Arabians."* To set forth their effects in England we may use the language of a writer in the "Edinburgh Review," who, speaking of the romances which were employed to celebrate the feats of King Richard and the Crusaders, says, "This romance (of cannibalism, which is revoltingly reiterated) is also valuable as a curious example of the *CHANGE for the WORSE* which the religious wars introduced into the European character. The Crusader discarded from his bosom all that was amiable and mild in the spirit of chivalry. The other exploits of King Richard in the Holy Land were in a similar taste with this cannibal entertainment; and we are of opinion that, when such feats were imputed by way of praise and merit to the hero of the Crusaders, and received, as doubtless they were, with no small applause by the audience, the fact will go a great way to ascertain *whether the European character was improved or debased by these Eastern expeditions*."† Add to these the proofs and authorities founded on, in the negative articles of G. N., J. M. S., and J. G. R., and we have abundant evidence to show that "*the Crusades retarded the march of civilization, thickened the clouds of ignorance and superstition, and encouraged intolerance, cruelty, and fierceness*."

The principal method by which our opponents attempt to prove their position is by

* Guizo, "History of Civilization," sect. viii.

* "Decline and Fall," chap. lxi.
† "Edinburgh Review," vol. iii.; article on English Romances.

asserting that, notwithstanding the manifest calamities of the Crusades, national unity was established, and an important reaction took place, and many indirect advantages accrued favourable to the civilization and moral elevation of the people. C. W., Jun.,—with a research which on this and many other subjects does him great credit, and entitles him to the thanks of the readers of this magazine—cites several authorities, yet completely fails to prove that the debasing effects of the Crusades were balanced by the good that resulted from them. In the selection of the authority of Gibbon, as one who “is likely to have given the subject mature consideration,” we consider him singularly unfortunate. We have gone deeper into the “Decline and Fall” than he in his extracts, and have shown what was really the opinion and testimony of Gibbon, and we will yet risk another quotation from him, to show his real sentiments, as opposed to the idea conveyed by C. W., Jun., in his *half* sentence:—“Great was the increase, and rapid the progress, *during the two hundred years of the Crusades*, and some philosophers have applauded the propitious influence of these holy wars, which appear to me to have *checked* rather than forwarded the *maturation of Europe*. The lives and labours of millions who were buried in the East would have been more profitably employed in the improvement of their native country; the accumulated stock of industry and wealth

would have overflowed in navigation and trade, and the Latins would have been enriched by a pure and friendly correspondence with the climates of the East.” The quotation from Hume proves *nothing* but what all admit—the unsatisfactory state of society in the eleventh century. Macaulay’s testimony is very meagre, and is as much a defence of monkish lore in general as of the Crusades in particular. He certainly does not show us that those who returned reared such buildings as they said they saw, or in any way improved our science or our art. The boasted *equality* of the Crusades is by no means sustained. Even on Guizot’s own showing, monarchs still claimed their sovereignty, princes and chieftains still retained command, the wealthy took money to provide luxuries, and their hawks to beguile the tediousness of the way by hunting; the strong tyrannized over the weak, and the distresses of the journey were most heavily felt by the poor. Thus was there no good resulting, even in this boasted matter, from the temporary release of the bondsmen, for “they who returned from the holy wars resumed their old occupations, consequently *Europe gained nothing by the matter*.” But we must now leave the question. It has been well discussed in the able articles of G. N., J. M. S., and J. G. R., and we think enough has been advanced to prove the correctness of our negative position.

A. T.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

“It would be a mistake to suppose that, because the Crusades failed in their *immediate* object, or because they were conducted at an immense expense of human labour and human life, *therefore they were without beneficial influence on modern society*.”—*Chambers’ Tracts*.

If the amount of energy thrown, either into the advocacy of a cause, or the opposition to it, could be shown to form a criterion of its real merits and truthfulness, then we must most assuredly be content to let the flag of victory wave high over the heads of our opponents in this present question. Luckily, however, the fact is not so. There are two occasions, at least, in which unusual manifestations of zeal may be expected: the one, when the cause of truth, and truth only, is at stake, and when the advocate, inspired by the importance of his

position, becomes elevated beyond himself, and pours forth with irresistible eloquence the lofty promptings of his truthful heart; the other occasion is, where the advocate finds he has the wrong side of the case—where the *facts* are against him, although some plausible reasoning be still left at his command. It is then that zeal assumes the form of *desperation*. Facts have to be concealed or misapplied—inferences distorted and disguised, and sound reasoning abandoned for sophistry and artifice. Under these circumstances usually recognised truths and principles are overlooked; and, as we have said, a species of desperation is manifested. We hope we may not be deemed uncharitable if we place the zeal of our opponents in the present instance under the

latter head: we think we can "show cause" for doing so.

Those who have perused the first papers which appeared on this question will, most likely, have noticed that, when we opened the affirmative side of the debate, we were cautious to back *all* our assertions with historical authority. In an historical debate, we hold that no other course can be properly pursued. It is quite possible to fill a volume with arguments to prove that certain causes *could* never lead to certain results; but, such is the force and purpose of history, that one line from any of its usually admitted authentic sources showing that the result sought to be disproved *did* happen, will at once consign to the shades all the arguments ever penned to the contrary! If, indeed, such were not the case, controversies could never be settled, and the end and aim of history would be for ever destroyed.

But the point to which we desire to direct more especial attention is this:—Nearly all the negative writers have made it a chief point to quibble with our authorities. By one they are characterized as "an array of names and opinions;" another says "they are mere assertions;" and a third scatters them to the right or left, as it may best suit his purpose! Well, after such an utter disdain for *authorities* in this matter, we were anticipating with anxiety the expedients which should supply their place. It occurred to us that, perhaps, some special process might have been discovered by which facts even of very long standing could be brought clearly to light without the intermeddling, vexatious interference of historians, or the absurd conclusions of philosophers! But, when we first cast our eyes down the negative columns, and saw what we believed to be sundry "inverted commas" and "foot-notes," we began strongly to suspect the accuracy of our vision! How could those who despise authorities so far forget themselves as to seek their aid, and apparently rejoice in the fact of so doing? We looked again, and suspicion flashed across our mind. It was a matter of convenience to abuse our old and familiar authorities, for that afforded a pretext for introducing a number of minor and more secluded ones, to whom a glimpse of daylight was a much greater treat! Well, then, on the ground of *humanity* we will forget the circumstance,

merely observing that it would be gratifying to know the claims on which the second-class authorities adduced against us are entitled to more ready credit than our own! It may be on the known principle that *strangers* are generally best received!

We have been endeavouring to discover the real bearing of our opponents' arguments, and to learn wherein we really differ. While admitting and lamenting the many baneful influences which were rife during the period of the Crusades, we have (with the other affirmative writers) endeavoured to penetrate beyond the immediate scene of action, and trace the changes and effects which followed, in order to see how far the latter were either dependent upon, or associated with, the former. This is a test which the philosophy of history plainly teaches us to apply, and without it we should despair of ever arriving at an enlightened and accurate conclusion. The negative writers have thought proper to confine themselves to a narrower, and, in our estimation, less philosophic basis. They put before us, in vivid colours, scenes of bloodshed and cruelty which are said to have characterized the Crusades; and, with an air of injured virtue, they then ask, "Can good come out of evil?" "Can you expect that such atrocities would do more than call down just retribution upon the heads of the offenders?" We answer that history, both sacred and secular, affords abundant evidence that the means employed frequently have no influence, either for good or evil, upon the result sought to be brought about. The former are not unfrequently the result of *accident*. The fruit being ripe, the first blast of wind brings it to the ground, irrespective of the quarter of the compass from which it may blow. So, prior to the commencement of the Crusades, domestic oppression and feudal tyranny were at their height; and, by turning attention to, and directing the energies of the feudal barons to another quarter, the Crusades *did* prove favourable to the progress of civilization; and the very *fierceness* which our opponents deprecate so strongly tended to make the result certain, by exterminating those whose existence could only retard the march of human progress!

The great error of our opponents appears to us to lie in their looking away from the question, instead of at it. We are asked, "Were the effects of the Crusades favourable

civilization?" not "Were the operations of the Crusaders in accordance with the generally recognised principles of human action?" We all admit that the state of society was bad before the commencement of the Crusades. "Well, the Crusades occurred; and, as if by magic, the bondsman's chains began to break and fall asunder. The feudal system relaxed—the sovereign power was coerced and reduced—Magna Charta was

gained by the people—personal bondage gradually declined—mental and moral slavery were exposed by Wickliffe, and the other successors of the holy men who called Europe into arms, and from that time civilization took firm footing in Europe!"

How say you, reader? Were the effects of the Crusades favourable to this improved civilization or not? We still maintain the affirmative.
C. W., Jun.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

AFTER what has been said so ably on both sides of this question, we think, with a preceding writer, that "Enough has already been advanced to prove the correctness of our negative position." We shall, therefore, content ourselves by giving a very short article in reply to our opponents.

The first writer on the affirmative side of this question is C. W., Jun. This writer has quoted largely from Gibbon, Macaulay, Guizot, and others, in support of his views. Among the most prominent of the passages which he has given, and placed in italics, is the following:—"Great was the increase, and rapid the progress, during the two hundred years of the Crusades." Do we inquire in what was there progress? He informs us, that "Among the causes that undermined that Gothic edifice (feudalism) a conspicuous place must be given to the Crusades," for "the estates of the barons were dissipated, and their race often annihilated, in these costly and perilous expeditions." The sum and substance of this passage is, that they favoured liberty; for if it should be proved, after all, that, on the whole, these wars did not benefit the people in this respect, it was of little avail that they loosened the yoke of the feudal lord. A change of masters is not necessarily an advantage; it may be an evil.

Now we think that, from the nature of the case before us, no real advantage could possibly accrue. Here was the whole of Europe engaged in a war; but it was a religious war;—a war, by engaging in which combatants expected to attain everlasting life. Sins of the very worst description were to be pardoned—nay, cancelled—by the act of merits, and licence given to commit more sins, if the person engaged in this war. It was he who was it that had the power to pardon

sin? The priest. By whose authority was the priest able to do that? By the authority of the Pope. Then the tendency of the Crusades was not to liberate the people. No! it was to turn their allegiance over from the feudal lord to the Pope. This was the object which the Crusades were calculated to accomplish, and did accomplish. And which is the most to be feared, a *spiritual* or a *temporal* despotism?—a despotism which can only sustain itself by a fear of temporal punishment, or a despotism which can sustain itself by a fear of spiritual and eternal punishment? And yet it was to such a despotism that the masses of the people were more fully committed by the Crusades.

But, according to this writer, the liberty of the subject was not the only advantage which resulted from the Crusades; for, quoting from Guizot, he tells us that "*the Crusades unfolded a christian Europe.*" If this were really the case, it follows that the Crusades were favourable to the development of Christianity, otherwise the Crusades could not have "*unfolded a CHRISTIAN Europe.*"

A perusal of the paper of J. M. S. will convince the reader, if he is not already convinced, that a principal cause of the Crusades—a ruling principle in the minds of the Crusaders—was, gross superstition. They expected to merit the forgiveness of sins, and a consequent entrance into eternal happiness, by engaging in these wars. According to C. W., Jun., then, gross superstition, so far from being opposed to the religion of Jesus, may be a very ruling principle in its development. Nay, is it not fair to suppose that, since the Crusades were notoriously the unfolding of a *superstitious Europe*—as nothing but an age pre-eminently superstitious could ever have produced them—that, according to C. W., Jun., Christianity was the

superstition which the Crusades unfolded? in other words, that Christianity is itself a superstition, and, consequently, unworthy of the regard of intelligent men?

But the Crusades were pre-eminently *cruel* wars. According to the principles which induced and maintained them, it was a very saintly act to kill an infidel, no matter how it was done. The most solemn engagements might be made and falsified, the most solemn oath broken through, so that the infidel were killed. The article of J. G. R., we think, abundantly proves this. If so, and the favoured passage of C. W., Jun., be correct, Christianity is not only a superstition, but a *cruel, a very cruel, superstition*.

Now, we maintain that Christianity is not a *superstition*, but a religion which invites examination. It has been tested in all times, and by all lights. Reason has tested it, and it has been proved entirely reasonable; philosophy has tested it, and it has been proved to be highly philosophical; but, more than all, experience—the experience of the world—has tested it, and it has been proved capable of standing experiment. It is not a superstition, but a great fact.

If, however, Christianity is not a *superstition*, much less is it a *cruel* superstition. So far from according eternal life as a reward to those who destroy its opponents, its language universally is the language of love. It suffereth long, and is kind. Its injunctions are—Love your *enemies*. Bless them that curse you. Pray *for* them that despitefully use you and persecute you. Whatsoever ye *would* that men should do to you, *do ye even so* to them. But the Crusades were based upon an entirely different principle, and carried out in an entirely different spirit, and therefore it is a *libel* on Christianity to say that “the Crusades unfolded a *christian* Europe.”

F. J. L. concludes that the Crusades were, on the whole, favourable to religious liberty, on the ground that the particular enormity which first struck the mind of Luther with horror originated with them. According to this kind of logic, almost every great evil may be regarded as a great good. The tyranny of the Stuarts, which induced Charles the First to levy taxes without the consent of parliament, was a great good, inasmuch as it led to the establishment of the government on a more equitable footing; Charles, therefore, was truly a martyr, for he was one of the greatest benefactors of England. The American stamp act was a boon to America, for it led to the revolt, and ultimate independence and prosperity, of that great country. The abuses of West Indian slavery were very beneficial, for they led to the liberation of the slaves of that part of the British empire. The horrors of the middle passage were advantageous, for they have led to the partial suppression of the slave trade. What a number of benefactors is our race indebted to according to this style of reasoning! How few of these persons have been rewarded as they ought to have been!

But is it true that we have to thank tyranny for the blessing of good government, which has been founded upon a revolt from it? or error for the blessings of truth, which has been elicited by its exposure? We think not. Whatever advantages *we* may, or *Europe* may, have derived from the Reformation, it was still an evil that a reformation should have been necessary.

Taking these views of the matter, we still maintain that the effects of the Crusades (a great evil) were, and could be, nothing but evil, although the effects of the truth which has been brought to bear upon their enormities have been very great good. G. N.

The common fluency of speech in many men and women is owing to a scarcity of matter and a scarcity of words; for whoever is a master of language, and has a mind full of ideas, will be apt, in speaking, to hesitate upon the choice of both; whereas common speakers have only one set of ideas, and one set of words to clothe them in; and these are always ready at the mouth: so people come faster out of church when it is almost empty than when a crowd is at the door.—*Swift*.

It would be a considerable consolation to the poor and discontented, could they but see the means whereby the wealth they covet has been acquired, or the misery that it entails.—*Zimmerman*.

Politics.

SHOULD NATIVE PRODUCE AND INDUSTRY TO BE PROTECTED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS ?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HAD the human race, at its birth, found itself scattered over the face of the earth, with all the differences of manners, religion, and dialect characterizing it at this stage of its existence; and had mankind the liberty of choosing the manner in which all those things which are either useful, agreeable, or necessary, should be distributed, man's short-sighted policy, warped by a love of ease, would, no doubt, have suggested that each district should produce all that a highly-civilized state can desire. To man the idea would appear absurd of so portioning out the various products of nature that the pathless ocean should be traversed in order to minister to the wants of civilized life. Consulting his love of ease, man would have thrown together in the same district the wines and fruits of the south; the coals, iron, and timber of the north; the silks and spices of the east; the cotton and sugar of the west; and all those varied articles of minor importance which, scattered abroad upon the earth, fill up the measure of comforts, and give birth to commerce. An omniscient Creator, however, thought otherwise. With a deeper knowledge of man than man has of himself, the Creator knew and supplied the best means for working out the ends of a brief sojourn here. In what, at a cursory glance, appears to be the height of improvidence, in giving an *unnecessary* amount of labour, there will be found involved on examination, as in every department of creation, a regard to the strictest economy. As in the animal economy, to economize space, particular organs are made to perform different, and even opposite, functions, so in the social economy, the simple act of supplying physical comforts is also made to subserve higher and holier purposes, carrying out one of the grandest objects of man's existence. Of these objects two seem more peculiarly interwoven with the distribution nature's favours. PEACE and PROGRESS, the offspring of Commerce, are indissolubly

bound up in its soul-stirring embraces, standing out in bold relief a monument of creative wisdom. And shall man arrogantly thwart the wise intentions of Providence? Shall he with impunity erect his artificial barriers in defiance of the *impressed* will of God? Yet man dares to erect these barriers. And does the Creator suffer from the rashness of his creatures? No! The insane act,

"Like a devilish engine, back recoils
Upon himself."

Till within a few years man's history is little more than a recital of wars and devastations. Cooped up in particular districts, and separated from each other by religion, manners, or dialect, man had learned to consider all without the bounds of his own country in the light of natural enemies, and even extending these antagonistic feelings—less strongly, indeed—to inhabitants of different districts of the same country. These "nationalities," coupled with the love of gain, gave full play to all the worst passions of human nature, leading man into all those enormities which disfigure his history. Blinded by prejudice, man strayed from the path of happiness, and, by an improper use of the love of gain, defeated the very means which the Creator had instituted for his happiness. How different the modern use of the love of gain! How different the rivalry springing up between nations! Instead of competing in the horrors—we mean the honours—of war, the market of the world is now the field of honour. Feats of arms are giving place to trials of distributing, at the cheapest rate, the comforts of life. Man has, at last, discovered that his interest lies not in destroying, but in preserving, "foreigners;" not in plundering, but in an equitable exchange of the products of their respective labours. Mutual interests unite the whole race. Antagonism, in whatever form, is fatal to commerce—fatal to the interests of all. A knowledge of this is levelling those barriers which once separated nations, and

gradually binding all in those bands which once bound each to a *particular* centre. Under the name of "protection," a moiety of mankind still unwittingly strive to ignore the designs of Providence, creating, by their restrictive policy, national animosities between nations whose joint interests are obviously bound up in peace and free exchange. But, awakening to the fact that *peace* is involved in the great principle of free exchange, their ranks are thinning, and their opposition weakening. "Dependence on foreigners" is now seldom heard in a protective sense. Man is opening his eyes to the fact that *all* are dependent, and that his true interests lie, not in striving to make himself independent, but in extending his dependence. It is the great instrument by which the Deity carries out the watchword of the Founder of Christianity, "Peace on earth, good-will toward men." Aware of man's short-comings, the Creator has made his interests subservient to his happiness. To give stability to the happiness of his creatures, he has so distributed his gifts that man's interests restrain his *lawless* desires; and make peace, consequently happiness, depend, not on refusing, but on giving, every facility to exchange. This principle is too obvious to escape notice. Independent of the great body of consumers, the number of those merchants directly concerned is in proportion to the extent of the trade, and the extent of the trade proportionate to its freedom, thus increasing the number and strength of *PEACE* securities by every paling knocked down from our "legislative fence," and diffusing more liberally the comforts of life. *PEACE*, therefore, demands, that not only should every paling of our "legislative fence" be knocked off, but the rails removed, and the posts *dug up*.

Having assumed that the distribution of nature's favours was instituted by the Creator, in accordance with that rigid economy everywhere discernible, for the purpose of carrying out ends superior to the mere supply of physical comforts; and having seen that the peace of the world is the more firmly cemented in proportion to the ease with which different and independent districts can exchange these favours; we shall now see that the *PROGRESS* of mankind in civilization is proportionate to the freedom with which nations interchange in commerce is free. But, previously to dis-

cussing this point, we would remark that A. seems to have mistaken the real question. As a problem in political economy, the question is put universally, whereas A. has given it only a particular application, selfishly assuming that it is a matter of indifference what becomes of others, so long as *we* fare well. It would, however, be an easy matter to show that the *interests of all* are intimately blended with, and dependent upon, the progression or retrogression of each particular nation. One grand law governs all the works of creation. A defect in the motions of a planet would disturb the harmony of the solar system; an irregular action of *one* organ of the animal system would derange the *whole assemblage* of organs; so, if only *one* nation neglects to supply the rest with what the genius of its people, or the capacity of its soil and climate, will produce, or by legislative enactments prevents the free interchange of its peculiar products, a discord in the social economy is the consequence. Sympathy is a ruling principle. One part cannot perform its functions irregularly without the rest sympathizing, and thus progress is retarded. Not only every nation, but every individual, must contribute his share to the essential principle of progress, for man's puny mind is not comprehensive enough to grasp all knowledge. It is only by long and close attention to a particular subject that man has made those strides which characterize our age. The finest intellect—a mind which, if its powers had been brought to bear on one subject, would have wrought out grand results, is entirely dissipated, and its powers stultified, by grasping too much. Divide and conquer is the secret of success in more senses than one. Man would not have emerged from barbarism if each had continued to supply his own wants. A division of labour is the key to success. But the principle of division acquires additional force when applied to nations; for, independently of carrying out fully the principle of division, differing soils and climates, and the varied genius of the human family, allow some to produce with ease what others can but imperfectly produce with an immense amount of trouble. England's iron and coal, and the energy of her people, give her a pre-eminence in those manufactures which have conduced so much to her present proud position. The climate and soil of the south

of France, Spain, and Portugal, bring to perfection those delicious fruits, from one kind of which wine is made. The West Indies is best adapted for sugar, cotton, &c.; the East for spices, silk, &c. The mind of a single nation would be distracted in producing everything required by a highly-civilized people, even if its soil and climate were favourable. We require the wines and fruits of Spain, Portugal, &c. These, of an indifferent quality, could not be produced by us without the greatest difficulty and immense expense. These nations require our manufactures; but a want of coal, and the scarcity of iron, would make it more difficult and expensive for them to produce them in a very imperfect state, than it would for us to produce their fruits and wines. The same with the sugar and cotton of the West, the spices and silk of the East. In these examples it will be seen that it is not impossible to produce all the different products in each place mentioned; but, where each can be well supplied with all by the present order of production, and each particular branch carried to a higher share of perfection, all of them would be very meagrely supplied, and progress would be known only by name, were each to produce *all* these commodities. This law will allow of no exceptions. Wherever a commodity can be produced best and cheapest, however trifling the difference, the common weal—the interest of mankind—points out that spot as the place of its produce; and there is no habitable portion of the globe which could not produce, better than all the rest, some article which the rest require. It is this territorial division of the task of producing *all* those commodities which are either necessary, useful, or agreeable to man, coupled with another important principle—one that has been entirely overlooked in assigning causes for the superior energy of the Anglo-Saxon race,

security of property—that gives speed to progression. Now, protection has a tendency to, and really does, force mind and capital into channels for which, in particular localities, they are not adapted, and diverts them from those channels which the genius of the people and the soil and climate point out as the more natural courses, thus frittering away valuable time and capital in pursuits which others can follow easier, better, and cheaper for us, and proportionately neglecting those pursuits which the nature of things show to be our legitimate spheres of action. If the order of nature is inverted—if, to the neglect of what they *can* do, a people, desirous of doing everything, attempt what others can do better for them, is it not clear, from the *limited* capacity of the mind of man, and from *natural* disadvantages, that progress must be retarded? To non-protectionists this conclusion seems inevitable from the premises; and we deem ourselves right in standing by that conclusion till those premises are shown to be false and unsupported.

We think there has been sufficient said to show that PEACE and progress *hinge* on this question of free trade—that those legislative enactments, purporting to protect, form a sliding scale, by which PEACE and PROGRESS are *eked out* to mankind. If protection is in the ascendant, peace and progress are in the descendant, gradually shifting the balance, as protection relaxes its deadening gripe, till, by thrusting protection to the bottom of the scale, PEACE and PROGRESS are paramount.

Protectionists may, however, have some other principle, more important than peace and progress, upon which to base their policy; if so, we hope some “friend” to “native produce and industry” will unfold it. A. has not even hinted at a principle, except we allow his doubtful means of *self-aggrandizement* to be a principle.

H. P. H.—s.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

INSANELY unmindful of the probability that some witty contributor to the *Controversialist* may compliment us on our Quixotic chivalry in coming forward “at this time of day” to champion the “worn-out fallacy of protection,” we will nevertheless—such is the hardihood of our prejudice—venture to confess ourselves one of those deluded mortals

who presume to call in question the soundness of Manchester theorism; and, further, not content with this lamentable extremity of infatuation, will even proceed, with the editors' courteous permission, to defend our criminality, by offering to our free-trade friends some few considerations, which appear to our distorted vision “very like” reasons

for our persisting in such a course. We cannot presume to say they are *new*: few controversies have been more nearly exhausted than this: nor do we affect to *understand* all the economical questions involved, and must, therefore, needs surrender such an admission to the adverse polemic for what it is worth; but we have *thought* on the subject, if that is anything, and our thoughts have led us to conclusions to which, until demolished, we must continue to adhere. For space' sake our opinions must dispense with further heralding, and make their bow at once.

I. "Ought native produce and industry to be protected by legislative enactments?" First, we shall view the question *theoretically*, and answer, Yes; because a contrary policy is *unnational*. Ought a nation, then, to isolate itself from all others, abjure foreign trade, and Britain, for instance, make the sea which surrounds her a barrier rather than a highway? By no means. "Free trade" (so called) owes half its laurels to mistakes—we will not say, that we may avoid unnecessary skirmishing, misrepresentations. Protection does not mean monopoly. When it becomes a premium on monopoly it defeats its end, and we, for ourselves, disown it. Correspondent C. W., Jun., quotes M. Soy, who observes:—"A government which *absolutely prohibits* the importation of certain foreign goods creates a monopoly in favour of those who produce such commodities at home against those who consume them." Of course it does. But who asks for any such "absolute prohibition," or for any fiscal policy so rigid as practically to amount to it? What we advocate is, such a regulation of the import system as may reasonably balance the native producer's disadvantages (if any) as against foreign producers, without so far shielding him from the salutary influence of competition as that, if exorbitant or negligent, his foreign competitor might not counterweigh the balance and displace him. We found this on the proposition, which appears to us totally indisputable, that it is *the duty of every nation to develop, to the utmost of its power, its own industry and resources*. We confidently ask, is this to be done by leaving things alone? Commerce being unregulated, will not every foreign commodity which is cheaper than that produced at home be patronized in preference by all whose in-

terest is their only rule of action, or whose intellects cannot see beyond *£. s. d.*? Consequently, will not every branch of home industry be discouraged, but those very few (in some cases there would be none) in which, from local advantages, they chanced to excel above all others? Nay, might not some departments of industry be totally unworked which, while they could not in their early stages compete with those in more favourable circumstances, would *ultimately* excel? Now, how pitiable is the condition of that community which is dependent upon other communities for all it consumes, save in the one or two sections of industry in which it can defy rivalry! How inglorious in peace—how dangerous in war! How ruinously expensive at all times! An empire cannot afford to live in furnished lodgings; for home trade is necessarily more profitable than foreign. Nothing, therefore, should be done without which can be done within. It is a bootless bargain if A, a partner in the firm of A, B, and C, purchase goods for his private use of D and Co. which his own firm could supply, and the profits of which would augment the common fund, because D and Co. sell them a few shillings cheaper. But, to say nothing of the capital flowing *from* a country in foreign trade which in home trade would flow *into* it, it has missed the opportunity of developing its natural resources, producing at home, working more labour, and thus *creating* additional capital and additional plenty. "But," says the economist, "restrictions create a monopoly for the producer against the consumer." And non-restrictions give the foreign producer a monopoly against both. Which (allowing the first assertion to be true) is preferable? The second we conceive to exhibit a disadvantage which no superficial cheapness will counterbalance. "Buy in the cheapest market" is, says the author of "*Sophisms of Free Trade*," "a recommendation perfectly sound, provided you are sure that every one will be fully and permanently employed in producing the means of purchase." But, by discouraging home industry, you destroy this producing-purchasing power; and what, then, becomes of the imaginary advantage? If, then, the proposition at the head of this paragraph be admitted—and we see not how it can be denied—we only ask here one question more, Are the resources of the British empire

exhausted? Is one-half of them developed? No empire has had such advantages; none has employed them, proportionately, less. And what a commercial aspect does it now present to the world? It *might* be trading amongst its own members, producing and exchanging the commodities of every climate under heaven, constantly reproducing its capital, fully employing its own labour, trafficking in its own ships, worked by its own seamen. It is throwing open to all the world markets all the world is only too glad to avail itself of, without return; suffering noble colonies, each a princely domain in itself, to lie in ruins, whilst expecting an allegiance every interest counsels them to refuse; its capital flowing abroad, its labour half employed, its poor in unions instead of fields and factories, its commerce brought in foreign ships, worked by foreign seamen. Can a contrast be greater or more suicidal? Half-a-dozen years of accidental prosperity will not settle this question.

Secondly. Unregulated commerce is *unavoidable*. "Free trade" would be a pretty fancy for Madame Tussaud's, but is ill adapted to the social verities of the world as it is. Like all other theories of equality, it ignores the fact that the world is by nature full of inequalities. A certain great monarch could not make all his clocks strike together; nor could fifty make all soils produce, or all mines yield, alike. It is ~~one~~ stubborn fact, that some countries *have* natural and local advantages over others, which in most cases will prove commercial advantages too. It is another stubborn fact, that the less favoured have also their mines and their soils. Are they to be neglected? Impossible. But, if worked equally well with the others, their products will still have the odds against them, for an advantage to one without a disadvantage to the other is an absurdity. Where are the remedies? There are only two. The less favoured may depress labour, and wring his countervailing profit from a nation's very sinews—its working classes. Few will recommend that. Few would like to see the standard of the British labourer reduced to that of those men by whom some of the grain which appears in our markets is cultivated. What then? If the mountain will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet must go to the mountain. The two must be equalized by a reasonable protection to

the less favourably circumstanced. We must confess ourselves amazed at seeing C. W., Jun., affirm that "restrictions deaden the commercial spirit, and confine trade to particular spots." We believe the contrary to be the truth. The tendency of "free trade" is to localize commerce in favoured spots. It leaves local advantages and local disadvantages to take their course: a protective policy equalizes them. Supposing universal "free trade" to prevail for a century; where, at its close, would half the industry of the world be? Inevitably swamped by the other half. "*Free trade*" *actually creates a monopoly in favour of some communities against others, of the few as against the many!*

Thirdly. It is *unreal*. It has not, and cannot have, a genuine existence. Trade cannot be free where one man is in unrestricted competition with another who carries half his burden. It would not be so if all the world adopted the policy. Much less is it so when the foreign competitor retains the artificial privilege in addition to the intrinsic. "The revenue must be raised," too; and if the stranger does not bear his fair share in return for commercial privileges for which the native pays handsomely, the native must bear all, with the penalty, if he be not as humble in his demands as his premeditated competitor, of surrendering the market to him. An equitable arrangement, truly! Sure free trade is an impossibility; but a partial and mischievous parody of it is not.

II. We now glance at the subject *practically*. We believe "free trade" to be not more fallacious as a theory than deceptive as a fact. We charge it with being—First, *Inequitable*. We have asserted that it would be justly thus characterized, even if its prevalence were universal; but it is not, nor is ever likely to be. Yet England, kindly studious of the interests of mankind at large, and forgetting the sphere assigned by proverbial philosophy to the commencement of charity's labours, throws herself, after a few exciting debates, into a line of policy admitted by many of its advocates to be safest when most general. The classes whose property is thus carelessly jeopardized expostulate in vain, or are generously instructed in the elements of their professions by those whose entire ignorance of them so well fit them for the office. We suppose it will not be denied that the British agriculturist, for instance,

is not so advantageously circumstanced as that no foreign agriculturist is more so. The character of our soil and climate, and of our labouring class, as compared with some others, must be fancies which we have mistaken for facts if it be so. Can he, then, compete on equal terms? If not, shall we put him on equal terms? The protective principle says "Yes;" the non-protective, "No." Which is the most equitable? The British producer, beaten in his own market, is shut out from every other. The colonist sees his grounds lying waste, while every gale bears past him to his mother country the produce which he might send thither. The seaman looks at the coming vessel, and feels that *he* should have worked her. The starving labourer sees the stores of grain, and reflects that they should have been the result of *his* labour. And the thoughtful purchaser knows he is paying into the aggregate floating capital of another country that which would have found its way into the pockets of the British producer, the British seaman, and the British labourer; and, by helping them *again* to produce and transport, have doubled its own value.

Secondly. *Inconsistent*. It does but "rob Peter to pay Paul;" the Peter, however, being just he who ought not to be robbed, and the Paul just he who ought not to be paid at his expense. There is, virtually, a protection to one party or other in either policy. If A and B, as producers, be on equal terms, then "free trade," which takes something away from one, makes them unequal; if they be already unequal, the taking away that something increases the disparity. Furthermore, it denies protection to one class which it tolerates to another. The protected classes of the present hour are just those who have least to fear from foreign competition. Some of those who clamour loudest for "free trade" are at this moment filling their purses with the profits of protection! We believe, that of those who now call themselves free-traders, probably one-half are, more or less, protected, and would complain loudly if that protection were removed. Yet what becomes of consistency if it is not? Where is consistency, if that which gives one man a loaf of bread deprives another of the means of obtaining it?—if that which professes to relieve the labourer is continually diminishing the market value of his labour?—

if that which supplies the poor with cheap sugar supplies the man-bazaar with cheap slaves? Where is consistency, when the following facts and figures are taken into account? In the year 1850 the gross amount of the public revenue was £57,000,000, which was contributed in the following proportions:—property and income tax, 5½ millions; assessed taxes, 4½; stamps, 6½; post-office, 2½; sundries, 1; *customs and excise*, 37!

In the strange inconsistency which is manifest between predictions and results, or results among themselves, the free-traders betray the shallowness of their theory. Our flourishing state as a manufacturing community is appealed to. It is our manufactures which are most protected! Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, have not their rivals in the world. True; and they *became* Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham before 1846! Protection cramps and depresses trade and commerce! Yet during its reign our merchant princes and mill princes, including the great foes of protection, accumulated their wealth. Protection is an aristocratic device, and an agency of class-domination! Yet America is rigidly protectionist—Turkey a free-trade country! It is only suited to the feudal ages! Yet the United States have risen marvellously with it in half a century! It degrades and debases industry! Yet wretched Ireland has perfectly free trade with the greatest markets of the world. Protected manufactures are sickly! Yet they are beginning to beat others in free-trade markets. Protectionists are short-sighted, narrow-minded men! Yet Colbert, Talleyrand, Napoleon, Alexander of Russia, Washington, Clay, Cromwell, Walpole, Chatham, were protectionists. We are told in one place that protection was the enrichment of one class at the expense of the rest; in another, that to remove it is doing that class a great service. In short, we might fill an article with inconsistencies of this character.

Thirdly. *Unsafe*. Few free-traders deny we are making a great experiment. Experience to guide us there is none. The policy of all countries and ages has been generally protective. Discretion is the better part of valour; and whether Great Britain is exactly the laboratory, and her commercial interests the agents with which to experiment, remains

to be seen. We repeat, a few years will by no means refer this question to the oblivion to which, in their ill-concealed tenderness for its being canvassed, the friends of free imports would have it consigned. "Protection is dead" is a very good joke for the platform; but it will take a long, long course of years, exhibiting results decided and unmistakable (we have a right to ask this, for such is the evidence of a past protective policy), to make it a fact. Meantime, we deny that the aspect of the last three or four years is satisfactory. The enormous increase of emigration proves two things—distress, in, at all events, some quarters, for people seldom fly *from* prosperity; and a considerable (relative) decrease in the number of hands to be employed and mouths to be filled at home. If "free trade" be what it claims, we should have been at least *as* prosperous as we are had these remained at home. Who will assert it would have been so? The vast number of British seamen in the American service proves another thing—on which the less said the better for our national credit, except that it tells tales regarding a protected and an unprotected navy respectively. The widespread diminution of the value of labour (which we are prepared to prove) proves another thing. But space compels us to pause. We will simply throw a few facts together here without comment. Increased exports no proof of increased prosperity:—In

1820 the exports of printed cotton amounted to 134,688,144 yards, the value being £7,742,505; in 1834, to 271,755,651 yards, value, £7,613,179. Injustice:—We import cotton to the value of ten millions which our own colonies might supply. The number of acres of arable land under cultivation in Ireland decreased one-half between 1846 and 1848. In 1850, as compared with 1849, imports in British shipping decreased by 202,268 tons; foreign, 30,580: exports—British shipping, increase, 173,245 tons; foreign, 333,604. 1851, compared with 1850, imports—increase, British, 215,054 tons; foreign, 740,791: exports—increase, British, 132,940 tons; foreign, 446,832. Labour and pauperism:—Reductions of wages since 1846—Nottingham, 45 per cent.; Staffordshire, 50; Banbury, 25. At Manchester, when corn was at 50s., the poor rate was 50 per cent. lower than now. In 1845, 8,839 were in the unions there; in 1851, 13,317. In Glasgow, the union expenses in the same years were £20,000 and £110,000 respectively.

These facts might be multiplied; but we must leave that to others. Our client must dispense with a peroration. Reader, close your eyes to political prejudice and popular excitement, and give a true verdict according to the evidence. Say if native produce and industry ought *not* to be protected?

J. S. J.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"A freedom of trade is alone wanted to guarantee to a country like Britain, abounding in all the varied products of industry—in merchandise suited to the wants of every society, from the possibility of a scarcity. The nations of the earth are not condemned to throw the dice to determine which of them shall submit to famine. *There is always abundance of food in the world. To enjoy a constant plenty, we have only to lay aside our prohibitions and restrictions, and cease to counteract the benevolent wisdom of Providence.*"—*Encyclopædia Britannica.*

THAT there are none so blind as those who *will not see*, and none so deaf as those who *will not hear*, are truths so plain and palpable, that scarcely the most hardy *controversialist* would dare to deny them. Surely, then, when any man, or any body of men, will come forward, and, in the face of the most direct evidence to the contrary, openly declare that "the tendency of free

trade is to localise commerce into favoured spots" (J. S. J.), or that free trade "has not opened *one single market* which we did not possess before," we may be forgiven if we associate such persons as among those who "will not see," and "who will not hear!"

Of course, it is not to be expected that, while the din of the great battle of "free trade *versus* protection" is still in our ears, the vanquished party should sink quietly down in their defeat, without levelling a single stray shot at their victors. This would be contrary to the usual characteristics of human nature. The protectionists feel upon free trade as the French are said to feel regarding *Waterloo*; they would like to have the chance of one more conflict with us. Well, when the one happens we may

expect the other. The chances are about equal.

The position of this debate forcibly reminds us of some lines by Tom Moore, written during the time that political and party feeling was running high upon the momentous question before us:—

“Write on, write on, ye barons dear;
Ye dukes, write hard and fast!
The good we’ve sought for many a year
Your quills will bring at last.
For, never since the precious use
Of pen and ink began,
Did letters writ by — produce
Such precious good to man!”

“Write, write, ye peers, nor stoop to style,
Nor beat for sense about;—
Squires, think not reason worth your while,
But still your nonsense spout.
Oh, ne’er since — spoke before
Such miracles were done;
Make but a few such speeches more,
And Free Trade’s cause is won!”

We should be very sorry to assert that all the allusions here made apply to the circumstances of the present case. We will do our opponents the justice to state that they have brought forward *some* of the strongest arguments we have ever seen advanced in support of protection; but at the best we believe them to be bad. We charge the affirmative writers with having fallen into an error in the treatment of this subject. We understood, at the outset, that the *principle* of affording legislative protection to native industry was to be discussed, and not how far any particular country, standing alone, might be affected! If such a consideration ought to be involved, it certainly should be only a secondary, and not the primary, object of the discussion.

The first affirmative writer, A., plainly admits that *he* does not “advocate the abstract principle of protection as of *universal applicability*!” He says that, “at certain stages in a nation’s progress,” it may be “properly,” or even “beneficially,” applied. We will not deny the fact that isolated instances will spring up where a temporary advantage may arise from protective restrictions; but we will by no means admit that such *special cases* prove the universal soundness of the principle. On the contrary, if any country becomes involved in circumstances which render it desirable for it to exclude the products of other countries in order that its own may rise in price, it be-

comes clear that the commerce of the countries so excluded must suffer to a proportionate extent; and it becomes also clear, that the greater the number of countries which adopt any such restrictive policy, the greater will be the disadvantage to the other countries usually trading with them. This truth seems so obvious to us, that we are sorry to have to occupy any space in proclaiming or defending it.

The principles laid down by free traders are these:—That, in certain parts of the world, certain commodities can be produced at a much smaller cost than the same commodities can be produced elsewhere:—that every country possesses some peculiar advantage of this sort:—that it is an advantage to the consumer to have all commodities produced at the cheapest remunerative rate; and that countries can exchange their several and respective commodities to as much advantage mutually as individual traders exchange theirs. They maintain that, by this mutual principle of interchange, commerce becomes more extended and diffused—that a wholesome stimulus is imparted to manufactures, and that individual losses are far more than compensated for in the national gain! At present we have met with no sound argument to the contrary.

We cannot help expressing our regret that men of education and ability should combine to lend their countenance to a policy which the greatest commercial country in the world has declared to be erroneous in principle, if not absolutely ruinous in its tendency. The plea that other countries still adhere to a protective policy has no weight whatever. They, like England, may have entered upon a wrong policy; and, like her, they will have to retrace their steps, or prepare to suffer the consequences of their own folly. But the conviction has already come home to many of them. Let the reader take the pains to glance at the recent alterations of the tariffs of Belgium, Spain, Russia, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Holland, the Two Sicilies, Tuscany, Sardinia, the Roman States, and Mexico! Let him do this, and then answer if he does not see something “looming in the distance?” Every one of the above countries, kingdoms, and states, have considerably reduced their restrictive policies since England set them a just an example.

We know that it is to the temporary in-

terests of our class legislators to keep up the delusion of a returning protective policy; but with how little calm consistency such a course can be persisted in, those who watch the current progress of events can best determine. "We are all free-traders now," said Mr. Cobden on the hustings at the last election for the West Riding.—"I think it my duty," said the president of the Board of Trade to the electors of the county of Oxford, "to tell my agricultural friends in different parts of the country that there is no chance of a change; that there is no intention on the part of any man to propose that parliament should restore any laws which the voice of the country has completely rejected."—"Gentlemen," said the son and heir of Lord Derby at Lynn, "the question of protection is set at rest, and I am glad of it."—"Why," exclaimed Mr. Disraeli at Bucks, "no one can suppose that the present administration *has any intention, or ever had any intention*, of taxing the food of the people, or of bringing back the laws repealed in 1846!" Here, then, we see protection be-

coming truly "small by degrees, and beautifully less!"

The landowners have been, and no doubt for a time will be, "loud in their wail" at the change of fortune which has overtaken them. But let them look back to the days of their prosperity.

"They knew no interest but their own;
They shook the state, they shook the throne;
They shook the world; and God alone
Seemed safe in his omnipotence!"

Their day has now come.

We have nothing more to say, or to ask, than that our readers should examine well the *whole* question. We have endeavoured to do so, and the result is, that we are prepared to assert, with that champion of the people, Charles James Fox, that, "if a weaver in Lancashire produces a piece of cloth, and a husbandman on the banks of the Ohio grows a quarter of wheat, these two men ought to be at liberty to exchange their respective products, *and that no law ought to prevent such an interchange!*"

C. W., Jun.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

THE importance of this question has been fully acknowledged by the interest taken in its discussion by the editors and readers of the *Contrroversialist*. We have had some very good *pro* and *con.* articles in point of argument, more in point of diligence, and still more in point of literary talent. We should have liked to have seen the respective arguments of each more minutely examined, had the writers confined themselves to a more limited sphere, exhausting it instead of roaming over the whole continent, and picking up only a few stray facts and arguments. In this reply we shall confine ourselves solely to the consideration of our opponents' papers.

C. W., Jun., opens the debate by presenting us with one of the hollowest and most palpable fallacies ever imposed on the credulity of mankind. He tells us that "scarcely any country contains in itself all the natural productions for the physical necessities and enjoyments of life." Granted; but where is the bearing of this proposition on the question? When we ask legislation to protect native industry, we do not thereby wish them to exclude the importation of those

goods not native, but which are essential for their existence, or expedient for their comfort. Trade as much as you like with foreign nations; but when the same articles are to be had at home, if foreign importation is not to be *wholly* prevented, such restrictions, most assuredly, should be made upon it, as that native commercialists may not be placed beyond the power of competition, or native industry checked, and eventually destroyed.

"Again:—The prohibitive restriction of importation creates a monopoly in favour of the producer, and hence against the consumer." Not at all. It is not necessary that foreign agencies be introduced in order to originate competition and prevent monopoly. These will naturally spring up of themselves, and do so continually. We deny the illustration. It is not principally because France is a warmer country that she excels us in silk manufactures, but because we are not sufficiently protected to be able to compete with her. Give us proper legislative protection, and England will soon develop her stores of silk, as well as her "inexhaustible supply of iron."

Come, then, and "look at the matter in detail." "Unrestricted commerce has a tendency to promote manufactures, and cover the earth with industry." Proof? It is an old principle. Yes; but we have no great faith in antiquity. It is an almost universal axiom, that opposition whets the blunt power of action in man—strengthens the weak, and develops the latent. It is so with commerce also. Let it proceed in a calm, dull, unopposed course, and it will lull its keepers asleep, and exhaust its own strength; but give it something to grapple with—give it something that must necessarily elicit exertion, and every second triumph will be the precursor of another, and every successive defeat stimulate to redoubled efforts, and lead to ultimate success.

"Protected manufactures have almost always been found in a languishing state." Indeed! Certainly, the illustrative figures quoted are a little alarming; but figures in these modern times, we have been told, are merely a cunning corner in which to couch an *ignoratio elenchi*, so we are on our guard. The evil result mentioned—is it not more probable?—should be traced, not to the fact that these manufactures obtained legal protection, but that the one was protected at the expense of the other. That is not our idea of protection. We wish *all* species of native industry protected, and all *equally*.

Here we take leave of C. W., Jun. He proceeds to his peroration—a part of a speech at which we have a particular dislike; and, of course, this cannot be done with proper *eclat* without a few flashes of poetry—

— "Nec mihi talium
Res est aut animus deliciarum egens."

A few words with H. T. His first argument resolves itself into the leading idea of our last *adversarius amicus*, which we have already shown to be irrelevant to the point; and, examined logically, a flagrant *petitio principii*. We admit that Britain requires much from other countries necessary for the maintenance of "civilized life;" but this

argues nothing against the expediency—nay, necessity—of protecting by legislative enactments the products of native industry. "The selfish rapacity" of protectionists, forsooth!—of men whose grand aim and object have always been to maintain Britain in that lofty position among the nations of Europe which she has so long adorned—men who have sacrificed time, talent, and substance, to preserve our country from an inglorious grave; a *rapacity* which has snatched from invading enemies the British standard when on the point of being torn to shreds—a rapacity which has seized on every honourable and honest opportunity to preserve the name of Britain unsullied, and her institutions sacred and stable. If H. T. calls these men, and such rapacity, *selfish*, we would like to know from whose vocabulary he extracts the term. But, passing over this gentleman's other arguments—as the one quoted is a fair specimen, and to refute would only be to recapitulate—let us glance a minute at the *John Bull blunder*. The fact that Britain is notorious all the world over for her industry and enterprising spirit, we repeat, *does* argue very much for the principle of protection. It was under a *faulty system* of protection that she attained that character. To what height would that character rise under a wiser system of protection? We wish to try the experiment; but our opponents make confusion more confounded, and aim at depriving us altogether of those resources from which we have extracted all the treasures that have enriched our nation and enhanced its character.

We have done. Let our non-protective opponents weigh considerably this momentous question. We speak from the depths of our heart when we exclaim, Alas! alas! for Britain! Alas! alas! for British industry, when deserted by its own friends! when forsaken by all guards, and exposed to a ruthless world!—the consummation which all who reply to this question in the negative seem to long for. Gentlemen, this is our answer. A.

Nothing can be a greater check to the wantonness of power than the privilege of unfolding private grievances at the bar of the public. Thus the cause of individuals is made a public concern, and the general indignation which their wrongs excite forms at once the severest punishment which can be inflicted on the oppressor, and one of the strongest bulwarks that can be raised in defence of the unprotected.

The Societies' Section.

MECHANICS' INSTITUTIONS, AND PROJECTS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT.

THERE are about 750 institutions in the United Kingdom bearing the names of Literary and Scientific Institutions, Mechanics' Institutes, Athenæums, Mutual Improvement Societies, and the like.

The Mechanics' Institutions were originally established for the instruction of working men in the arts they practise, and in those branches of science which are applied more particularly to the manufactures in the locality of the institution. This has been a complete failure; the object sought has not been realized in a single instance; and the mechanics' institutions have passed out of the hands of the artisans and become the meeting places of the better middle classes. Lectures were at one time very popular, and they were then given in courses, and to a great extent were instructive. They have, however, suffered a lamentable decay; and single lectures, or courses of two or three only, are now usual. One week a lecture on science is delivered, and, since it must be essentially popular, it not unfrequently happens that truths are told with very considerable adornment: then follows a lecture on literature; next, one on the drama; then, probably, a concert, or some entertainment of the lightest order. By this system the institutions have been committing a self-slaughter: they introduce exciting food for the mind; and, like stimulants for the body, appetite for them increases. The result of this was exemplified in a speech from one of the delegates to the Society of Arts, who said—at his institution, when the best scientific lectures were given, five shillings were taken at the doors; but, when any amusing matter was introduced, as many pounds were received. Acting upon this principle, the institutions have entered on a career of competition with the theatre and the concert-room, in which they must eventually be the losers; and, the value of the lectures estimated by their power to draw paying audiences, the clown must beat the chemist at this. Indeed, all the institutions are now suffering from the consequences of their own folly and mismanagement. They were established as the means of adult instruction, and they have degenerated into theatres of amusement. We have now before us announcements from two of the most *successful* of the mechanics' institutions, that concerts will be given during their autumn course, in which Mr. Sims Reeves and his wife will appear. Lectures on music are eminently appropriate, provided the vocal or instrumental accompaniments are introduced as illustrations of the science of harmonics, the tendency of which is of the most soul-refining character. But the institution is not the place for a concert; and, by accustoming the members to such excitements, healthful though they be in their proper place, the result proves that they unfit them for lectures of a purely instructive character, which are, for the most part, voted "dry."

"It is interesting," says Dr. Hudson, "to trace the career of the popular literary societies of the country, and to compare their operations and their results with the expectations entertained by their first promoters. The founders of literary and mechanics' institutions assumed that these associations would effect three great purposes. *First*.

The rapid promotion of general science, by the greater number of persons engaged in the observation of its phenomena. The lower ranks, who are chiefly engaged in manual labour, have frequent opportunities of making observations on certain peculiarities in the processes of art which often escape the notice of observers of a superior rank, and thus the labouring classes of society would be rendered mutually useful in uniting and concentrating the scattered rays of genius, which might otherwise be dissipated and lost to the scientific world. *Second.* An extensive diffusion of rational information among the general mass of societies; for, by means of lectures and popular discussions, those narrow conceptions, superstitious notions, and vain fears, which so generally prevail among the lower classes of society, might be gradually removed, and a variety of useful hints and rational views suggested, promotive of domestic convenience and comfort. *Third.* The creation of intellectual pleasures and refined amusements, tending to the general elevation of character. The frequent intercourse of men of different parties and grades of life, for the purpose of promoting one common intellectual object, gradually vanquishing those prejudices and jealousies which almost universally exist, even in cultivated minds, is, unquestionably, an object to be cherished and encouraged. By such means a taste for rational enjoyments may be produced, and those hours generally spent in listlessness and in foolish amusements may be converted into periods rendered precious by the inculcation of enlightened and elevating principles. Habits of order, punctuality, and politeness, would be engendered, and flow from thence into all the other relations and departments of life."

In any attempts which may be made to introduce a national system of industrial instruction, the failure of this in the mechanics' institutions must not be forgotten. It was suspected that much knowledge would have been derived from the observation of workmen. This has not been the case. Why? The answer is simple: they have never been taught to observe. The powers of observation require as large an amount of training for their development as any faculty of the mind; and this teaching *to observe* has been entirely forgotten. It appears to us that classes for cultivating habits of observation might be made by far the most attractive features of an institution, and might lead to the establishment of local museums, which would be extensively useful. The several members, grouping themselves according to their tastes, might collect a large amount of useful information. To gather the flowers of every hedge-row, and the plants of hill and valley, determine their locality and period of flowering, should be the task of one class; to collect examples of the geology or mineralogy, the occupation of others; the fauna of the district might fall to the hands of another section; and so on. Then meteorology, archaeology, and statistics, would furnish exercises for many others of the most interesting kind. And having been trained in classes, which should meet and determine all doubtful points, the artizan would be prepared to notice and register facts, which, although constantly occurring in his own daily vocation, have been as constantly passed unnoticed.

The Society of Arts, as far as their plans have been developed, contemplate the division of the country into unions, the institutions of each district appointing their centre, the central institute being in immediate communication with the great central committee of the Society of Arts. The business of this metropolitan centre will be to register the names of all approved lecturers, their subjects, and their terms. The institutions withi

my union having determined upon the number of lectures they require in any quarter of the year, selected their subjects, and adjusted the order of these with the local centre, the secretary of the union communicates with the secretary of the Society of Arts, and he is to endeavour to adjust with the lecturers on their list that they set forth on their itineration in such order that within a set time their mission of instruction shall be performed to the 750 institutions in the kingdom. The only charge made to the institutions for this task of arrangement is two guineas per annum—the president of the institution becoming a member of the Society of Arts. The promise to the institutions, as implied rather than expressed, was to provide them with lecturers of a superior class, and at a cheaper rate than they are now supplied with those of an inferior character. How this is to be effected does not appear. We find, upon careful inquiry, that the average price of lectures is three guineas; some few of the institutions pay five guineas, and several gentlemen of eminence refuse to lecture under this sum; but we find this is, even in their case, greatly reduced by the number of lectures. They made a free gift to institutions under some pressure of temporary difficulty.

That some improvement must be made in the popular institutions of England is certain. They have done much good, and the general diffusion of useful knowledge, and the almost universal desire for improvement which is manifested throughout the length and breadth of the land, are mainly due to mechanics' and literary institutions.—*British Quarterly Review*.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Chelsea Mutual Improvement Society.—The first annual meeting of this society was held in the schoolroom of Marlborough Chapel, Marlborough-square, on Friday evening, October 8th. Tea was provided, after which the business of the meeting was opened by the chairman, Mr. John Cuthbertson. After some introductory remarks, the chairman called upon the secretary and treasurer to read their reports, which indicated that the society was in a prosperous condition, and that there was every probability of future success. The officers for the ensuing year were then elected; after which Mr. J. P. Scatliff, the president of the society, in a brief but impressive speech, urged upon the audience the necessity of mental culture, and showed the advantages that would result therefrom. He remarked that he did not place man's highest interest in a cultivated intellect alone, or chiefly. He believed that the pursuit of science or knowledge was really and abidingly advantageous only when associated with a healthy moral and spiritual condition. He would say to them, Be imitators of Christ—of his purity and benevolence—of his holy aspirations and kindly impulses; but next to this, which he called God-like greatness, he would urge them to the attainment of intellectual greatness. With a mind thus disciplined, the whole universe would come an entirely different thing to us; we could find

"Books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything."

Mr. W. Rabbitts next addressed the meeting on the following subject—"Science and religion are

kindred." He concluded a powerful speech with the following remarks:—Christianity needs not the cover of darkness; it desires not the dark mantle of ignorance; it welcomes science and literature when subordinated to itself, and applied to the realization of its own glorious purposes. I cannot think how any bearing the name of Christians can frown upon such institutions as these. It has been said by one who could not err, "Wisdom and knowledge shall be the stability of thy times, and strength of salvation." If we have had a Laplace, a Voltaire, a Bolingbroke, a Gibbon, and a Hume, who have tried to undermine the faith of the Christian, and to set at variance God in nature and God in the Bible, have we not also had a Newton, a Butler, a Chalmers, a Pye Smith, a Buckland, and a Harrison, who have torn into shreds their miserable sophistries, and shown that every development of nature is a confirmation of the mighty power, matchless wisdom, and infinite goodness, of the great God of heaven and earth?

Mr. H. Hayward referred to the advantages that had already accrued to the members from their connexion with this society. He said:—We have improved ourselves; faculties that were dormant have been developed and brought into exercise. We have acquired much useful information, and feel ourselves all the more competent to discharge the duties that devolve upon us as men and as Christians. He then urged the young men present to avail themselves of the advantages which this society offers. Rise above (said he) the trifles which engage little minds. Believe that you were born for something

higher and nobler than merely to chat, and laugh, and smoke. Men who are engrossed in these trifles, like the butterflies of a summer's day, soon pass away and are forgotten. None can say they are the better for their existence. Let it not be so with you. Watch passing events—trace them to their causes. Impress yourselves with the character of the age in which you live; and, as you stand surrounded with its vast realities, ask yourselves what there is for you to do. Qualify yourselves for its performance, and set about it with true earnestness of purpose.

Mr. D. Watson followed with an eloquent and forcible address upon the freedom of thought and expression. He remarked that, for most of the blessings which we enjoyed as a nation, we were indebted to freedom of thought and expression. Where there was not this freedom of thought and expression there was despotism; where there was despotism there was mental imbecility, and men became unable either to appreciate or pursue truth. He implored them, if they would take their place and do their duty in the stirring times in which their lot was cast, to think, and speak, and act like men. He would remind them of the words of the poet:—

"You may chain the eagle's wing,
No more on clouds to soar;
You may seal the mountain spring,
That it leap to light no more:
But the mind let none dare chain,
Better it cease to be;
Born not to serve, but reign—
God made it to be free!"

"Then guard the gift divine,
Than gems of gold more rare;
Keep watch o'er the sacred shrine—
No foe must enter there.
Oh, let not error blind,
For passion rule o'er thee;
Keep the freedom of the mind—
God made it to be free!"

A vote of thanks to the chairman, and a few concluding remarks from that gentleman, terminated the proceedings of the evening.—H. H.

Wotton-under-Edge Mutual Improvement Society.—This society, which meets during the winter months only, has just entered on its second session. It was established last winter with about twenty members, since which time it has been gradually increasing, and now numbers nearly forty. The following subjects have been discussed:—"Have the novels of Sir Walter Scott a beneficial tendency on the minds of the public?" "Was the execution of Charles the First justifiable?" "Was Oliver Cromwell a sincere man?" "Ought capital punishment to be abolished?" "Is there more pleasure in the pursuit than possession of a desired object?" "Is capital or labour the most valuable instrument of production?" with many others equally important.

The annual meeting of the members was held in the Town-hall on Tuesday, October 5th, when

the Rev. J. T. Feaston took the chair. The report having been read, a vote of thanks was passed to Mr. J. R. White, the late secretary, for his valuable services during the past year. The following gentlemen were chosen the committee for the ensuing year:—Mr. F. W. Fisher, secretary; Messrs. J. W. Chapman, J. Gawn, R. Hodges, W. Perrin, Jun., and J. R. White.

An interesting discussion took place in the Town-hall on Tuesday, October 19, on the question, "Is the profession of arms conducive to the well-being of a state?" Mr. F. W. Fisher opened the debate in the negative, dwelling on the great evils attendant on the "honourable profession," such as "the awful destruction of human life," "the misery which our battles entails upon so many families at home," "the tremendous cost, not only of actual war, but of supporting a standing army," &c. &c. Mr. J. W. Chapman (the opponent) replied with his usual eloquence. He said, "that though every one knew war to be a very great evil, still he considered that, just as the taking of nauseous medicines is necessary in order to avert more serious consequences, so war is necessary to prevent greater evils, &c. &c." There were, also, some very excellent remarks made by Messrs. Gawn, Perrin, and White. The question, when put to the meeting at the close of the discussion by Mr. J. Walker, the chairman for the evening, was decided in the affirmative by the majority of one.

Edinburgh Temperance Mutual Improvement Association.—On the evening of Friday, the 8th of October, the members of this association held their usual half-yearly soiree, when a large number of their friends assembled with them. After tea Alexander Frazer, president of the association, opened the meeting, by delivering an excellent address, in which he alluded to the benefits derived from such associations, and when so many such societies were arising in different parts of the country, together with many other means of cultivating the intellectual and moral character of man. As the prosperity of the country depends almost entirely on the rising generation, it must afford deep feelings of happiness to every well-wisher of the community to see such institutions prospering so rapidly, although they have not flourished to that extent which from their noble object they might have expected; but, when the pen was being raised so high above the sword, and the press was issuing its powerful mandates throughout the length and breadth of the land, he would call upon young men, while youth and health were smiling upon them, to join such institutions, and by so doing help forward the chariot of intellectual progress. Addresses were then delivered by three of the members on the following subjects, viz.:—"Personal and social duties," "The age we live in," and "Sociality." Interesting recitations were given by several of the members, and songs and choruses by a party of the "Edinburgh Abstainers' Musical Association," who had kindly consented to be present.—W.

The more any one speaks of himself, the less he likes to hear another talked of.—*Lavater.*

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

94. *Scotch Law Conveyancing.*—Up to this time no answer appears to have been given to the question of "Lex," forming No. 94 of the "Inquirer." I myself have been benefited by consulting the "Inquirer," and I should wish, if possible, to do as I have been done by. I only regret that I did not attempt to answer the question of "Lex" when it was first put, as then I should have had facilities of reference on the subject much more numerous than I now possess.

"Lex" may possibly be aware that, four or five years ago, a series of statutes, which were introduced into parliament by the then Lord Advocate, McNeill, and his successor, Rutherford, passed into law, by which the whole system of Scotch feudal conveyancing was remodelled. While the principles of conveyancing remained unaltered, the forms were, by these statutes, greatly shortened and simplified. The alterations thus effected were hailed with satisfaction by every member of the legal profession in Scotland. Since the passing of these statutes the enactments on conveyancing have passed, in a great measure, out of date. However new and improved the two principal of them—the *Scotch Feudal Deeds*, and the *Juridical Styles*—have been, they are now being published, as revised editions, in the law. I refer to the works edited and issued to the system of conveyancing, by the Edinburgh Society of Editors, and published by Messrs. Dalgleish & Co., 10, St. Andrew's Place, Glasgow.

The *Scotch Feudal Deeds*, first published in 1867, and now revised and reissued, is a work of some 200 pages, containing all the forms of conveyancing, from the simple conveyance of land, to the most complicated transactions. It is a work of which it is advertised that "it will be found of great service to the lawyer, the judge, and the layman." The *Juridical Styles*, originally consisted of three volumes, the first of which contained "Heritable Rights," the second, "Moveable Rights," price £12s. 6d.; the third, "Styles of Summonses, &c., in the Court of Session," price £11s. 6d. The last volume may be dispensed with by one who seeks to gain a knowledge only of conveyancing. Part I, vol. i., of a new edition of the "*Juridical Styles*" has already been issued, at the price of 12s. 6d.

Mr. Duff's plan is, to take a deed clause by clause, and explain the legal meaning and effect of each of the clauses; while in the "Juridical Styles" forms of clauses are given for almost every conceivable variety of circumstances. I can really recommend the above-named works; and I speak from experience when I say that from them, taken by themselves, a competent knowledge may be acquired of the principles of Scotch conveyancing.

A S. L. S. SUBSCRIBER.

131. *Photography*.—In reply to question 131, I wish to inform J. M. that he may find a good description of the apparatus required for the practice of photography in the manuals published by the opticians in London; for instance, T. and R. Wallis, 25, Ironmonger-lane; Knight and Sons, Foster-lane, Cheap-side; or almost any other respectable house. The price is 1s. for the manual

on the Daguerreotype, and the same sum for that on the paper process. Should J. M. be inclined to learn the art (which is rather expensive to commence), you may give him my name and address, and I shall be glad to answer any questions on the subject.- A. C.

133. *How to Cultivate the Habit of Attention.*—
“A Student,” and others who may be desirous of
cultivating the habit of attention, will find that
this faculty, like all others, grows and improves
by exercise. It is absurd for any to say that they
cannot exert this as much energy, for every rational
being is endowed with the power of paying ex-
clusive attention to one or several interests him.
There are no such things as degrees of it; and
these, therefore, which are the cause of the
improvement seen in his faculties, endowments
which we do not differ from others in. Nothing
could strengthen more carefully and
successfully of the faculties “elements” (books
which contain the elements of some science) are some)
which make any
one of them need to be used; for in-
stead of being a book for his sermons; or,
perhaps, for his course of lectures to commence with,
the “Elements of Theology” contains an
abstract of the whole of the matter, which
is so interesting to those interested, and
which is so valuable to the student, owing to
its great simplicity, and the interest of its
nature. But, however, let it be
adopted as a textbook, is infinitely preferable to
sentimental or dogmatical, let it be thoroughly
studied; and again, almost exclusively,
until the student is enabled that he has completely
mastered it, and can answer any questions put
to him out of it. If now he would sit down, and,
without looking at the book, write out an abstract
of the contents—the arguments *pro* and *con*.—he
would find all his faculties, especially those of at-
tention and memory, greatly strengthened, and
would perform any necessary mental operation
with much greater ease and vigour.

A TRINITY MAN.

To acquire a steady fixation of attention is of vast importance to every student. This is not, however, so easy to be done as, perhaps, may be imagined. It must be acknowledged that, hitherto, no other way has been discovered to keep our thoughts close to their business but the endeavouring as much as we can, and, by frequent attention and application, getting the habit of attention and application. Now, in order to gain a greater *facility of attention*, your correspondent, "A Student," would do well to observe the following rules laid down by Dr. Watts:—

1. Get a good liking to the study or knowledge you would pursue.
2. Sometimes make use of sensible things, and corporeal images, for the illustration of those notions which are more abstracted and intellectual.
3. Apply yourself to those studies, and read those authors who draw out their subjects into a perpetual chain of connected reasonings.
4. Do not choose your constant place of study by the finery of the prospects, or the most various and entertaining scenes of sensible things.

5. Be not in too much haste to come to the discrimination of a difficult or important point.

6. Have a care of indulging the mere sensual passions and appetites of animal nature; they are great enemies to attention. Yet this one exception must be admitted, viz., if we can be so happy as to engage any passion of the soul on the side of the particular study which we are pursuing, it may have a great influence to fix the attention more strongly to it.

7. It is, therefore, very useful to fix and engage the mind in the pursuit of any study, by a consideration of the divine pleasures of truth and knowledge, by a sense of our duty to God, by a delight in the exercise of our intellectual faculties, by the hopes of future service to our fellow-creatures, and glorious advantage to ourselves, both in this world and that which is to come.

The above rules will, I believe, supply the information required by "A Student."—H. S. W.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS. SOLUTIONS.—X.

Arithmetic and Algebra.

Question 36. First find how many cows could summer on the field.

As 14 sheep : 5 cows :: 87 sheep : $31\frac{1}{2}$ cows;
then, $31\frac{1}{2}$ cows + 19 cows = $50\frac{1}{2}$ cows the number;
As 5 cows : 14 sheep :: 19 cows : 53 $\frac{1}{2}$ sheep;
then, $53\frac{1}{2}$ sheep + 87 sheep = 140 $\frac{1}{2}$ sheep the number; and, As 9 cows : 7 horses :: 50 $\frac{1}{2}$ cows : 38 $\frac{1}{2}$ horses.
S. T. B.

Question 37. Let x = no. of pounds at 8s.;
 y = no. of pounds at 4s. 6d.;

then, $x + y = 112$... (a) } y question.

and $8x + 4\frac{1}{2}y = 5 \times 112$ }

Multiply (a) by 8.

$$8x + 8y = 896$$

$$8x +$$

$$\therefore 3\frac{1}{2}y = 336$$

$$\therefore y = \frac{336}{3\frac{1}{2}} = 96 \text{ lb. at 4s. 6d.};$$

$$\text{and } x = 112 - y = 112 - 96 = 16 \text{ lb. at 8s.}$$

F. J. L.

Question 38. Let r be the interest of £1 for 1 year. Then the amount at the end of 1 year is $1+r$; and, since £1 produces $1+r$, $1+r$ will produce $(1+r)^2$ for 1 : $1+r$:: $1+r$: $(1+r)^2$

\therefore The amount at the end of 2 years is $(1+r)^2$, and at the end of n years $(1+r)^n$; and \therefore for £700, £700 $(1+r)^n$; but this per question = £1,400.

$$\therefore (1+r)^n = 2$$

$$\therefore n = \frac{\log 2}{\log 1.04},$$

which is found by the tables = 17,673, &c., the number of years.

Note. Hence it appears that any sum. at 4 per cent. compound interest, will double itself in the same time.

J. C. M'C.

$$\text{Question 39. } 3x + 11y = 104 \quad (1)$$

$$3x^2 + 11y^2 = 782 \quad (2)$$

$$\text{square (1) } 9x^2 = (104 - 11y)^2 \quad (3)$$

$$\text{multiply (2) by 3 : } 9x^2 = 2346 - 33y^2 \quad (4)$$

$$\therefore 2346 - 33y^2 = (104 - 11y)^2$$

$$= 10816 - 2288y + 121y^2;$$

$$\text{or } 151y^2 - 2288y = -8470;$$

$$\text{or } y^2 - \frac{104}{7}y + \frac{2704}{49} = \frac{2704}{49} - 55 = \frac{9}{49}$$

$$\therefore y = \frac{52}{7} \pm \frac{3}{7} = 7\frac{6}{7}, \text{ or } 7;$$

$$\text{and } x = \frac{104 - 11y}{3} = \frac{104 - 11 \times 7\frac{6}{7}}{3} = 5\frac{6}{7},$$

$$\text{or } = \frac{104 - 11 \times 7}{3} = 9. - \text{Ans.}$$

W. D.

Geometry.

Question 39.

and 7854×7.0686 , area of the stone;

$7.0686 - 1.9635 = 1.9635$, area of waste;

$6.87225 - 7.225$, area of part used.

Then, $\frac{6.87225}{3} = 2.29075$

and $7.0686 - 2.29075 = 4.77785$, part used by A;

and $\sqrt{4.77785} = 2.1858$, diameter which B began;

and $\sqrt{2.29075} = 1.5135$, diameter which C began;

then, $\frac{6.87225}{5} = 1.37445$, part used by D;

$\therefore 4.77785 - 1.37445 = 3.4034$, area when C began;

$\therefore \sqrt{3.4034} = 1.8448$, diameter when C began;

then, $\frac{6.87225}{7} = .98175$, part used by C.

$\therefore 3.4034 - .98175 = 2.42165$, area when D began;

$\therefore \sqrt{2.42165} = 1.5563$, diameter when D began.

R. M., St. C.

Mechanics.

Question 17.

Depth of mine in feet = $140 \times 6 = 840$;

space and time generally expressed by

$$S = t^2 \times 16\frac{1}{2}$$

$$\therefore t^2 = \frac{840}{16\frac{1}{2}} = 52.2,$$

$$\text{and } t = \sqrt{52.2} = 7.2 \text{ seconds.}$$

Question 18. The time a body will take to fall 180 feet is found, by the method adopted in the preceding example, to be 3.345 seconds.

$$\therefore \text{Distance} = 200 \times 3.345 = 669 \text{ feet.}$$

J. B. S. K.

THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

IMPARTIAL INQUIRER:

ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A SUITABLE MEDIUM FOR THE
DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIAL
ECONOMY, ETC.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

"Truth only needs to be for once spoke out ;
And there's such music in her, such strange rhythm,
As make men's memories her joyous slaves,
And cling around the soul, as the sky clings
Round the mute earth for ever beautiful."—*Anon.*

"Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the
field, we do injuriously to doubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple! Who ever knew
Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?"—*Milton.*

VOLUME IV.

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PREFACE.

NOT more welcome is the evening twilight to the wearied tiller of the soil, than is the near approach of the close of another year to many a writer for periodical literature. But this similarity of feeling flows from different sources; for while one anticipates with pleasure the close of the day that he may enjoy the sweets of repose, the other desires the close of the year that he may mark the progress of his work, complete one part of it, and address himself, with increased experience and renewed vigour, to that which still remains. If it is thus under ordinary circumstances, with much greater reason is it when he who has directed the "thought-tracing quill" has done so with a frame shaken by sickness, or a brain busied with care. The corps editorial, like their fellow-mortals, are subject to the varied vicissitudes of life, and liable to all the "ills that flesh is heir to;" but these the nature of their profession necessitates them to bear in solitude, and endure unknown to their readers. These thoughts, with their somewhat sombre hue, have arisen in our minds while recalling the circumstances by which we were surrounded during the preparation of a portion of our present Volume; and we could not, in justice to our feelings and position, have withheld this reference to them. But the foregoing words will suffice on this subject; for we can speak in the past tense of all that is personally painful, and do now rejoice that through it we were able to hold on our course, to discharge our duties, and to prepare a Volume which, we believe, will be found to be no unworthy companion of its predecessors.

There is not much, perhaps, in the present Volume that in its distinctiveness requires special notice. Again have we brought questions of deep and enduring interest before the attention of our readers; and again have we been gratified with the earnest spirit in which their discussion has been carried on. If there has been any fault here, it has been in this earnestness occasionally developing the tendency to introduce a little of that personality the absence of which is so desirable in the prosecution of all important inquiries. Some of our contributors certainly appear not only to have

" Felt their strength, but made it felt;
They might have used it better, but allured
By their full vigour, sternly have they dealt
On one another."

We have referred to this subject here, because we are anxious to check even a budding evil; and because, in endeavouring to do so, we are supplying the best possible answer to an objection to our work which has been made by some would-be-thought wise ones, namely—that the opposing articles which appear in our pages are not the *bonâ fide* contributions of different individuals, but the varied productions of the same pen. Now, however complimentary such an opinion is to the versatility of our own talents, we are anxious to correct it, because it is not true, and because its wide belief would greatly weaken our influence for good. The writers in our pages, so far as we know them, are men who have formed intelligent opinions on the subjects they discuss; and in stating the reasons which have led them to arrive at those opinions, and the arguments by which they consider them supported, they are assisting us to perform a great public service, and are helping on the glorious cause of truth. The amount of silent influence which our united labours are exerting it is not for us to estimate; but we have the means of knowing that it is wide-spread, powerful, and beneficial. It has been well said that "The detection of an error—the dissipation of a doubt—the extirpation of a prejudice—the establishment of

a fact—the deduction of a new inference—the development of a latent principle—may diffuse its beneficial consequences over every region of the world, and may be the means of lessening the misery or increasing the happiness of myriads of unborn generations. The great interests of the human race, then, demand that the way of discovery should be open—that there should be no obstructions to inquiry—that every possible facility and encouragement should be afforded to efforts addressed to the detection of error, and to the attainment of truth; nay, that every human being, as far as he is capable, should actively assist in the pursuit.” To afford new facilities for this was the original object of the Editors of this Magazine, an object which they have not failed steadily to keep before them during their four years of literary servitude.

In addition to the pursuit of this object, and in connexion with it, we have endeavoured, with increased interest and enlarged means, to assist our readers in the work of mental improvement and self-education. This we have done not merely by giving general precepts, but by furnishing individual counsels and improving exercises. To our various class operations we cannot but refer with pleasure, for though they have entailed upon us an amount of labour but very inadequately indicated in our monthly records of progress, we have in it all enjoyed the consciousness of carrying on a great and good work, and been cheered by the unmistakeable evidences given by our students of increasing knowledge and growing power.

With regard to the measure of outward success which has attended our labours during the past year, we shall be expected to say a few words; and we can do so now, as on former occasions, with a considerable amount of satisfaction, for though the circulation of our magazine has not equalled our expectations, we have found much encouragement in the flattering notices of our critics, and the gratifying expressions of our readers. With the former the public are familiar; and that an adequate idea may be obtained of the character and value of the latter, we may be permitted here to give an extract from a letter recently received from a distinguished professor at one of our ancient seats of learning. He says: “By this publication I consider you are doing a most important service in the work of mental education; and you have my most sincere wishes for the increased success of your well-directed labours.” Such an unsolicited testimonial as this from such a man is indeed gratifying and stimulative. Surely none could have earned, as we have, the confidence and approval of thoughtful men of all classes, sects, and parties, without feeling, as we do, the honour of the position, and its responsibilities too.

But there is a future before us, and for that we must prepare: we hope to bring to the performance of our duties in it not only enlarged experience, but augmented zeal. We should be traitorous to the past, with its suggestive lessons, were we not to do this. We confess that we have not realised our ideal, either in our work or in its circulation; but while we strive to do it in the one, we must trust to our readers to aid us to attain it in the other. They have ever been ready to render us their co-operation; and now we solicit it once again. We are aware that our progress is opposed by many foes, under such forms as ignorance, prejudice, and party spirit; but we shall count them only as vanquished ones, if all our friends will but join hands in a cordial confederation, and—

“Not bate a jot

Of heart or hope; but still bear up and steer

RIGHT ONWARDS!”

INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
RECTORIC:—		PHILOSOPHY:—(Continued.)	
.....	1	Which was the greatest Poet, Milton or	
.....	41	Shakspeare?	
.....	81	1	300
..... 121, 161		309
..... 201, 241, 281		2	333
War.....	321	337
..... 361, 401		375
.....	441	376
		429
RELIGION:—		433
.....		448
..... of a Sabbath as		452
Incumbent			
.....	8	HISTORY:—	
.....	10	Is the Character of the Duke of Wellington	
.....	48	
.....	50	20
.....	88	22
.....	91	50
.....	127	58
.....	133	95
.....		97
..... a Practice in		140
.....	246	143
.....	254	206
.....	289		
.....	292	POLITICS:—	
.....	327	Ought the Grant to Maynooth to be With-	
.....	329	drawn?	
.....	367	25
.....	371	26
.....	408	61
.....	414	69
		109
PHILOSOPHY:—		119
Would Education Gradually Crime?		145
.....	14	148
.....	16	184
.....	53	179
.....	55	History and Present	
.....	95	Attempted Invasion of	
.....	97	180
.....	179	1.....	192
.....	184	214
.....	138	2.....	220

	PAGE		PAGE
POLITICS :—(Continued.)		SOCIETIES' SECTION :—(Continued.)	
Negative Article, 3.....	257	Glasgow—The Clyde Literary Society	156
Affirmative Article, 3.....	263	" Zetetic Society.....	72
Negative Reply	305	Hebden Bridge Mutual Improvement So-	
Affirmative Reply	310	ciety	70
Ought the Law of Primogeniture to be		Hull Mutual Improvement Association ..	435
Repealed ?		Inverness Young Men's Mutual Improve-	
Affirmative Article, 1.....	383	ment Association	352
Negative Article, 1.....	385	Kilmarnock Young Men's Biblical Associa-	
Affirmative Article, 2.....	428	tion	29
Negative Article, 2.....	431	Kirkintilloch Young Men's Mutual Im-	
Affirmative Reply	456	provement Society	272
Negative Reply	458	London Mutual Improvement Society, St.	
SOCIAL ECONOMY :—		Paul's-square	116
Is the Use of Oaths for Civil Purposes		Madras Young Men's Literary Society....	32
Right and Expedient ?		Manchester—All Saints Mutual Improve-	
Negative Article, 1.....	194	ment Society	231
Affirmative Article, 1.....	197	" Elm-street Mutual Improve-	
Negative Article, 2.....	224	ment Society	229
Affirmative Article, 2.....	226	Merion Literary Society	32
Negative Article, 3.....	266	Milgavie Mechanics' Institute	72
Affirmative Article, 3.....	268	Mold Mutual Improvement Society.....	435
Negative Reply	340	Monkton Young Men's Literary Society, 71,	155
Affirmative Reply	342	Neophyte Writers' Society	69
Ought Transportation to be Abolished ?		Newcastle-upon-Tyne Discussion Society .	154
Affirmative Article, 1.....	344	Newport Young Men's Society	155
Negative Article, 1.....	347	Paisley Artizans' Institution	272
Affirmative Article, 2.....	388	" Young Men's Debating Society ..	72
Negative Article, 2.....	393	Pontefract Mechanics' Institution	30
Affirmative Reply	464	Preston Mutual Improvement Society....	435
Negative Reply	468	Runcorn Mutual Improvement Society ..	31
SOCIETIES' SECTION :—		Sheffield Wesleyan Mutual Improvement	
Books and Reading	66	Institution	70
Means of Mental Improvement	64	Skipton Young Men's Mutual Improve-	
Poetry—What is it?	150	ment Society	70
Studies for Law Students.....	349	Stockport—Essay and Elocution Class....	352
The Right Use of Books	312	" Young Men's Mutual Improve-	
REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT		ment Society	71
SOCIETIES :—		Sunderland Polemical Society	352
Airdrie Young Men's Society	73	Walthamstow Mutual Improvement So-	
Altrincham Zetetic Society	229	ciety	352
Alresford Mutual Improvement Society ..	434	Wigan Discussion Society	351
Auchterarder Young Men's Mutual Im-		Wolverhampton Mutual Improvement So-	
provement Society.....	116	ciety	229
Birmingham Debating Society	153	THE INQUIRER :—	
" Wesleyan Chapel Mutual		Questions Requiring Answers :—33, 73, 117,	
Improvement Society	32	156, 232, 273, 315, 353, 394, 435.	
Bromley Young Men's Mutual Improve-		Answers to Questions :—	
ment Society	156	A Camera Obscura.....	354
Chalmers Society	30	A good Law Book	119
Cheltenham Mutual Improvement Society		Alford's Greek Testament	353
" 69, 352		Ancient Languages	368
Chertsey Mutual Improvement Society ..	116	Arabic Orthography	316
Colchester Mechanics' Institute.....	230	A Student's Library	75, 315, 354
Dowlas Mutual Improvement Society	352	Bomilear, Ox of Melcarth	472
Dundee Literary Societies' Union	30, 352	Building Societies.....	472
Edinburgh Albion Mutual Improvement		Cause of Mist and Fog.....	117
Society	351	Conversation	472
" Controversialist Society	72	Decomposition of Water	34
" Temperance Mutual Improve-		Foreign Exchanges	396
ment Society	231	How to Harmonize Colours	120
" Young Men's Literary Union, 231, 351		How to make a Cheap Telescope	74
" Young Men's Association.. 71, 434		How to obtain Ease and Power in Debate	
Frogmore Young Men's Literary Society..	155	" 157, 232, 273	
		How to study the Poets	472
		Logically True and Practically False	
		" 76, 118, 272	
		Manuscript Magazine	235
		Mathematical Studies	358

PAGE

THE INQUIRER:—(Continued.)

Monmouthshire not in Wales.....	33, 74
Nature of the Sun's Body	277, 435
Order of Studying the Sciences	316
Paraphrase of Milton	359, 397
Phenomena of Light	396
Photogenic Paper	354
Size of the Solid Bulk of the Earth	77
Solution of a Geographical Problem..	238, 277
Spinoza's Philosophic System	358
Studies for the Scotch Bar	355
The Ancient Britons.....	472
The Construction of an Ellipsis.....	354
The History of Sunday Schools.....	158
The Laws of Heat	354
The Three most Rising Poets.....	34
The Pendulum Experiment.....	356
The Universities.....	437
Two American Orators.....	316
Why Lord Palmerston does not sit in the House of Lords	119
Works for Drapers.....	437
" on Astrology	234
" on Law.....	234

THE YOUNG STUDENT & WRITER'S
ASSISTANT:—

LOGIC CLASS:—Exercises on the "Art of Reasoning," 38, 78, 120, 158, 199, 238, 278, 317, 359, 397, 438.
GRAMMAR CLASS:—Exercises in Gram- mar, 36, 78, 120, 158, 198, 238, 278, 317, 359, 398, 438.
MODEL EXERCISES:—159, 198, 239, 279, 217, 359, 398, 438.
MATHEMATICAL CLASS:—Questions for Solution, 38, 78, 160, 200, 240, 280, 318, 360, 400, 439.
Solutions, 37, 160, 199, 239, 279, 318, 360, 399, 438

PAGE

NOTICES OF BOOKS:—

A Dictionary of the French and English Languages	40
An Outline of the Laws of Thought	440
Aristotle's Organon	440
A Story of a Family Party	40
Autobiography of William Jerdan.....	79
Bacon's Novum Organum	440
Cassell's Edition of Euclid	40
Christianity and Secularism	240
Comte's Philosophy	440
Dictionary of the English Language.....	40
Elements of Psychology	439
Elocutionary Manual	40
Fireside Harmony.....	40
Greek and Roman Philosophy	439
History of the Sunday School Union	439
Holyoake Refuted	320
Home Thoughts.....	400
Juvenile Atlas.....	320
Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin	320
Meditations of Descartes	440
Michaud's History of the Crusades	40
Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy	439
Museum of Classical Antiquities	400
Phonographic Examiner	430
Poems by Alexander Smith.....	319
Religion and Education	280
Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments	440
Table Turning and Table Talking.....	320
The Art of Reasoning	440
The Elements of Euclid	40
The New Quarterly Review	80
The Pilgrim's Progress	400
The Sexuality of Nature	200
The Social Position of Book-keepers and Clerks	39
The Youthful Thinker	80
The Youth's Magazine.....	400
Wellington and the Pulpit	320

CONTRIBUTORS' SIGNATURES.

	PAGE		PAGE
A. C.	396	H. P.	62
Annette.	292	Irene	13, 138, 431
Anti-Zeno.	275	J. A. C.	135
A Quondam Student.	437	J. B.	357
Aristides	25, 60, 145	J. B. M'C.	316, 339
A. S.	150	J. C. M'C., Jun.	63, 194, 311
Benjamin.	375	J. F.	91, 271
B. S., 119, 158, 224, 235, 277, 299, 337, 392, 463, 468		J. F., <i>Birmingham</i>	229, 338
B. W. P.	19, 34, 179, 423	J. G. R.	107, 112, 189, 219, 283
C. E.	198, 314	J. M. P.	328
Cosmopolite	53, 97, 423	J. M. S.	349, 471
C. W., Jun.	58, 152, 351	J. N. C.	214
Dromo	55	J. W. W.	371
E. D.	226, 267, 302	L'Ouvrier, 29, 109, 116, 184, 254, 305, 395, 414, 455	
E. S. J.	76	G. M.	38
E. S. P.	354	Φιλαλήθης.	349
Etna	157	Rolla	75, 119, 192, 234, 310, 385, 438
E. W. S.	196, 342, 349, 452	S. A. J.	56
Excelsior	337	Saxon	378
F. J. S.	76, 76, 102, 235, 238, 354, 355	Sigma	149
F. S., M.A.	437	Stanislaus	148
F. T. A.	34	Theophilus	237
G. H.	120	T. U., <i>Edinburgh</i>	356, 434
Glowr.	50, 256, 419	T. W.	22
G. W. W.	16, 94, 175	Walter	278, 355
Harold.	10, 132	W. G. S. H.	265
H. B.	383	W. H. T.	439
H. J. R.	77	X.	26

ERRATA.

Page 221, col. 2, line 11, for "enimici," read, inimici.
Page 222, col. 1, line 42, for "fills," read, frets.
Page 222, col. 2, line 10, for "Guéron ére," read, Guéronnière.
Page 348, col. 1, line 47, for "emigration," read, transportation.
Page 411, note, for "Miselma," read, Mischna.
Page 412, col. 2, line 18, for pistensosi," read, pisteusosi.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XIII.—THE IMAGINATIVE FACULTY.

"TIME is like a ship that never anchors." "*Dum loquimur, fugerit invida ætas.*"*
The old year has "gone to his death-bed," and is mingled with *the unrecallable*. Now is the time for serious reflection—for taking counsel with our own souls. Have we remembered that

"While we give the unguarded hour
To wine and revelry in Pleasure's bower,
The noiseless foot of Time steals swiftly by,
And ere we dream of manhood, age is nigh?" †

Have we reflected with due care upon the great truth, that

"Time is eternity,
Pregnant with all that makes archangels smile,"

or all that is ruinous to human souls? Solemn consideration! May we resolve wisely regarding *the coming time*, and act worthily in it! Be ours the motto inscribed on the tombstone at St. Gilgen:—"Look not mournfully into the past: it comes not back. Wisely improve the present: it is thine. Go forth to meet the shadowy future without fear, and with a manly heart."

"Labour, then,
Fellow men;
Up, brave hearts, try again!
Ours is no struggle for might or domain;
Ours no ignoble strife;—
Aiming at *purer life*,
Front we all hardships, all trial, all pain."

Hath not the poet spoken a solemn truth, to which all earnest men should listen, when he uses these words?—

"Say, why was man so eminently raised
Above the vast creation; why ordained

* "Even while we converse envious age hastens on."

† "*Dum bibimus, dum sarta, unguenta, puellas
Possimus, obrepit non intellecta senectus.*"—*Juvenal*, Satire 9.

Through life and death to dart his piercing eye,
 With thoughts beyond the limits of his frame ;
 But that the Omnipotent might send him forth
 In sight of mortal and immortal powers,
 As on a boundless theatre, to run
 The great career of justice—to exalt
 His generous aim to all diviner deeds—
 To chase each partial purpose from his breast—
 And through the tossing tide of chance and pain
 To hold his course unfaltering ; while the voice
 Of truth and virtue up the steep ascent
 Of nature calls him to his high reward—
The applauding smile of heaven ? ”

May we so labour that this reward may be ours ! May we, with Horace, be able to

“ Quid verum atque decens curo et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum :
 Condo et compono quæ mox depromere possim.
 Ac ne forte roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter ;
 Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.”—Epi. i. 11—14. *

Let us engage in the search after wisdom and virtue with our whole souls earnestly strive to live up to the grand *ideal* of human life. May we avoid

“ The morbid revel and the shameless mate—
 The tabled hues of darkness and of blood—
 The published bosom and the crowning smile—
 The cup excessive ; and if aught there be
 More vain than these and wanton,”

and carefully train ourselves in the belief

“ That there is nought on earth worth being known,
 Save God and our own souls.”

As a means of furthering this wise and moral mind-culture, we purpose devoting the present paper to a consideration of the nature, powers, and pleasures, of “ the imaginative faculty.”

We believe that the present season is appropriate to the discussion of this topic, and we think that it is possible to prove that the imaginative faculty is able to supply the most refined gratification which the human soul is susceptible of enjoying—the pleasure which it is able to communicate as far transcends those derivable from “ desires, delights, and loves,” as the appearance of a sister newly verging into womanhood surpasses in loveliness a “ dry, ungainly skeleton.” It is not often we indulge in homilies or assume the voice of the preacher ; but we could not banish these thoughts from our mind as we sat reflecting on the topic now to occupy our attention, and they found themselves into utterance. May reader and writer be fully impressed with the solemn

* The above passage may be thus translated :—“ I study and inquire what is true and we are wholly engaged in this ; I lay up and collect rules which I am afterwards able to act up to. I am, perchance, you should ask me under what leader, or into what school, I have entered as a pupil, I answer, I am inclined to resign myself implicitly to the sayings of no master.”

such thoughts — thoughts which should be recurrent at seasons like this, when a new branch is added to our "tree of life."

In the immediately preceding papers of this series we have treated of the most important of those laws which are applicable to every species of composition. Such evidence as seemed to us to prove that thought and speech are correlates have been presented to you; the necessity of acquiring dexterity in the accurate use of language has been advocated; the laws which ought to regulate our efforts at thought-expression have been laid down and illustrated; and the means by which exactitude and harmony of diction have been, so far as in us lay, consistently with the space at our disposal, demonstrated to be not only reasonable, but practicable. We are desirous now of entering into the consideration of those departments of Rhetorical study which concern themselves with the higher developments of thought, viz., those which relate to "the poetic faculty in man."

The external universe has been created "all beauty to the eye and music to the ear," "and truly a volume of nature it is, whose author and writer is God. To read it! Dost thou, does man, so much as well know the alphabet thereof, with its words, sentences, and grand descriptive pages, poetical and philosophical, spread out through solar systems and thousands of years?" And yet to read this book is a necessity of our nature. Our present state of being is *educative*; and the meaning contained in "the thick-crowded, inextricably-intertwisted hieroglyphic writings" which appear around us, it is our business to discover. Reason and Imagination are the two eyes which we employ in these investigations. Poetry is the result of the conjoined operation of the Imagination and the Emotions; Science is the product of the combined labours of the Imagination and the Intellect. Poetry, in its highest development, is the synthesis of the good, the true, and the beautiful; Science concerns itself solely with the *true*. Science is the *realization* of nature; Poetry the *idealization* of it. The Imagination is "ever the mother of deep truth." The world is emblematic, and the human soul is so constituted that it yearns to discover the analogies which subsist between the spiritual and the material.

"In nature's frame the great Artificer portrays
His own immense idea;"

and the grand problem given to the mentality is, from the *data* of sensation to discover the laws of being and destiny. Sensations are the *known* quantities through which the mind, by a peculiar *calculus* of its own, endeavours to acquire a knowledge of those all-important topics. Man is primarily a sensuous being, but he cannot long continue so. Sensations are only the nutriment of thought. It is Imagination which sheds upon the sensuous that "heavenly alchemy" by which it becomes the glory-hued symbolism of spiritual truth. This is the power by which we are enabled to turn

"The sunny side of things to human eyes."

It "extracts and concentrates, as it were, life's ethereal essence, arrests and condenses its volatile fragrance, brings together its scattered beauties, and prolongs its more refined but evanescent joys;" while on the external world, and the objectivities of which it is composed, it throws

"The gleam—
The light that never was on land or shore—
The inspiration and the poet's dream."

To analyze the operations of the imagination is a work of considerable difficulty, nor do we flatter ourselves that we are capable of overcoming it; but great ends are only attained by being greatly daring. That power which

“ Adds a precious seeing to the eye,”

and is the birth-source of those delight-giving aspirations which develop themselves into the sister graces of the soul—Poetry, Painting, and Music—has not heretofore been demarcated with sufficient philosophic accuracy from other though kindred mental faculties. The word Imagination is employed to signify—1st. That capacity of the intellect which calls before it any of those sensations which may at any time have impinged the sensorium and passed into the perceptual treasury; i. e., instead of conception, or voluntary memory. 2nd. The power of conjoining fantastic notions capable of stirring and exciting the mind—Fancy harlequinading in the dress of Wit. 3rd. Fancy—who is only the younger sister of Imagination—

“ A violet in the youth of primy Nature;
Forward, not permanent—sweet, not lasting;
The perfume and suppliance of a minute:
No more.”

4th (and accurately). The faculty from which all poetry proceeds—that marvellous conjunction of perceptive acuteness, liveliness of memory, correctness of judgment, purity of taste, and readiness of abstraction and generalization, which enables man to cull the fairest portions of individual and separate existences—to blend these together and colligate their various parts into new wholes more accordant with the ideal of perfection which arises in the mind on the contemplation of those differing objects. Imagination has been truly and accurately described as “a complex power.” It includes in its signification an exquisite nicety of sensational activity, to convey to the perceptivity a critically exact representation of *the without*—a just and delicate extension of the capacity of perception—a ready, powerful, comprehensive, and accurate memory, that the objects of perception may be promptly placed at the service of an equally-balanced and energetically-acting judgment—a judiciously-selective taste, precise in its notions of qualities and circumstances—well-practised powers of abstraction, and a capacity of combining all these together with skill, carefully appropriated and adapted to the emotional excitement which agitates the mind. Thus it will be seen that “we do not merely *perceive* objects, and *conceive* or *remember* them simply as they were; but we have the power of combining them in various new assemblages—of forming at our will, with a sort of delegated omnipotence, not a single universe merely, but a new and varied universe with every succession of our thoughts. The *materials* out of which we form them exist in every mind, but they exist only as the stones exist, shapeless in the quarry, that require little more than mechanical labour to erect them into common dwellings, but that rise into palaces and temples only at the command of genius.”*

The most glowing and beatific idealisms with which poetry surprises and delights us

* “Brown’s Philosophy of the Human Mind,” lect. xlii.

are only the refinements which our own minds have been able to make upon the world without. Imagination is a purifying and exalting power.

“Thought and affliction, passion, hell itself,
She turns to favour and to loveliness.”

“Fancy,” says Wordsworth, “is given to quicken and beguile the temporal part of our nature; Imagination to incite and support the eternal.” Though the daughter of Sensation and Memory—a humble parentage indeed—Imagination has had a numerous and honourable offspring. She is the mother of Genius, Hope, Love, Poetry, Music, Sculpture, Painting, and every other possible embodiment or revelation of “the good, the beautiful, and the true.”

The rarest fancies by which poets strive to witch the world derive their primal elements from the sensuous nature of man, and are constructed out of the raw material received into the mind through the senses, and laid up in Memory’s

“Immortal shrine,
Where they for ever uncorrupted dwell.”

But *the sensible* is ever transitory and evanescent; sensations appear for a little moment only, and then pass away—it may be for ever—from the perceptive powers, and yet the mind possesses the capacity of treasuring even its slightest sensation, and weaving it into the web of its own thoughts, and Imagination bestows upon it the immortalization of beauty.

“Doubtless this could not be, but that she turns
Bodies to spirit by sublimation strange;
As fire converts to fire the things it burns,
As we our food into our nature change.
From their gross matter she abstracts the forms,
And draws a kind of quintessence from things
Which to her proper nature she transforms,
To bear them light on her celestial wings.
Thus doth she when, from individual states,
She doth abstract the universal kinds,
Which when re-clothed in diverse names and fates,
Steal access through our senses to our minds.”

It may seem strange to many of our readers, that while a herd of authorlings are bewailing the antagonism of Poetry and Science, that we should have endeavoured to maintain their near relationship, and to predicate that they are not enemies but kindred. Yet we doubt not but that those who pursue the thoughts suggested to them in the present paper will agree with us upon this point. To show that there is a self-consistent coherency in our views, although perfectly unpremeditated by us, we may be permitted to refer to our article on “The Investigation and Discovery of Truth,”* as an illustration of the opinion herein insisted on. It is therein proven, that in order to discover truth the mind “subpones or underlays an hypothesis or imaginary explanation of the causes which superinduce any given series of phenomenal manifestations;” that “thus the understanding gives them a *supposititious* oneness,” and a caution is given not “to neglect that ‘magic light’ with which the soul illumines nature.”

* “Art of Reasoning, No. XI.,” Vol. II. page 81.

It is therein asserted, that "Hypothesis strives to classify the results of Observation under some general (*supposititious*) law; when this law is postulated, systematized observation—i.e., Induction—is called into action, to compare the results which would flow from this (*imaginary*) law with the actual processes of Nature. If these agree, the Hypothesis is correct, and becomes Theory — i.e., the means by which the mind may contemplatively survey any series of facts, and from the laws discovered as ruling amongst these, can deduce new facts or infer new truths." Imagination is the primordial element alike in Science and in Poetry, and upon this ground we disagree with the *dictum* of that mighty metaphysical mind—Coleridge—when he asserts that "*Poetry* is not the proper anthesis to Prose, but to *Science*." They are but parts of one great series of progressive thought—Science gaining a knowledge of mere *truth*, Taste discovering the hidden *harmony* and *beauty* of the co-linked elements with which Science has been dealing, the Emotional faculties perceiving their connexion with the good, and Poetry fusing all these together by the intense heat of the Imagination. Hence it is that the harmonious co-working of all the human faculties is required to constitute a great poet. Hence it is that the great poet has won for himself the admiration of all men; for, in so far as he is really and truly a poet, he is the nearest approach to a perfect man. Who can be more perfect than he to whom the mighty realms of truth, beauty, and goodness, are given as a perpetual inheritance, and who is continually permeated with the influences which proceed thence? Is not this what Tennyson means, when he says of "The Poet"—

"He saw through life and death, through good and ill—
He saw through his own soul.
The marvel of the everlasting will
An open scroll
Before him lay : with echoing feet he threaded
The secret'st walks of fame ;
The viewless arrows of his thoughts were headed,
And winged with flame.

* * * * *

"Thus truth was multiplied on truth, the world
Like one great garden showed,
And through the wreaths of floating dark up-curled
Rare sunrise flowed."

Is there no poetry in the star-garb of night—and did not Newton enable us to listen to the music of the spheres? Is there no poetry in the records of a bygone creation—and have not these splendidly-descriptive rock-pages been read to us by the geologist? Is there no poetry in the seemingly all-potent ocean—and shall we deny the poetry of the scientific powers by which man has made it subject to his will? Is the lightning-flash only poetical when, like a destroying angel, it flits through the heavens and strikes the earth dumb with terror?—and does it become prosaic only when it links soul to soul in messages of love, and becomes the arbiter of peace? Is there no poetry in the huge leviathan-like fire-fed draught-steed which man harnesses and guides with perfect ease and safety wheresoever he wills? Is architecture a science, and are not cathedrals minsters, &c., "fossil poetry?" If inventive genius belongs to the poet, does it not also belong to the scientific inventor or discoverer? If Imagination is "the light of all our

seeing," does it not illumine the geometrician as well as the poet? Is the poetical only displayed in the invention of fairy tales, mind-moving fictions, gorgeous imagery, or in describing "cloud-land," and not also in the invention of nation-improving mechanisms, or the description of the splendid scenery which abounds in the *terra firma* of scientific fact?*

The *real* is the parent of the *ideal*. *Science* the origin of *Poetry*, and, *vice versa*, *Poetry* the origin of *Science*; for the *true* must be productive of beauty and goodness; and whatever is productive of the good and the beautiful must be true—not, perhaps, truth in a veritable present embodiment, but a portion of that eternal truth, of which all fact-truths are only parts. We do not say that *Science* is *Poetry*, but that it is a member of the progressive series of which *Poetry* is the result.

"For when the different images of things
By chance combined, have struck the attentive soul
With deeper impulse, or connected long,
Have drawn the frequent eye; how'er distinct
The external scenes, yet oft the ideas gain
From that conjunction an eternal tie,
And sympathy unbroken. * * *
By these mysterious ties the busy power
Of memory her ideal train preserves
Entire; * * *
At length, endowed with all that nature can bestow,
The child of Fancy oft in silence bends
O'er these mixt treasures of his pregnant breast
With conscious pride; from them he oft resolves
To form he knows not what sublime reward
Of praise and wonder."

This class of ideas, relations, and emotions, is the raw material from which Imagination elaborates—according to the predisposition of the mind, its general culture, inclinations, and associations—*Science* or *Poetry*. In one mind external things become the seeds from which springs forth *Geometry*—in another, they become "The Seasons;" in one, they produce an historical treatise—in another, "The Course of Time;" in one, *Moral Philosophy*—in another, "Paradise Lost;" in one, the science of *Geology*—in another, "The World before the Flood;" in one, the *Nuova Scienza*—in another, the "*Divina Commedia*;" in one, "Cosmos," or "The Architecture of the Heavens"—in another, "Night Thoughts," or "The Excursion;" and so on, in every case under the "shaping spirit of Imagination," each mind elaborates that portion of the true, the good, and the beautiful, of which he is the most capable expositor.

"It sports like hope upon the captive's chain;
Descends in dreams upon the couch of pain;
To wonder's realm allures the earnest child;
To the chaste love refines the instinct wild;

* See further illustrations in Lord Brougham's "Discourse on the Objects, Pleasures, and Advantages of Science."

And as in waters the reflected beam
 Still where we turn glides with us up the stream;
 And while in truth the whole expanse is bright,
Fields to each eye its own fond track of light."

Religion.

IS THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF A SABBATH, AS ENJOINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, INCUMBENT UPON CHRISTIANS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

BEFORE proceeding I must positively object to the emblazonment of the colours under which I am about to fight. No Christian, I am sure, can logically support the Jewish sabbath, with all its formalities, under the christian dispensation; it suffices for him to support the claims of the day to a sacred character, and to show his reasons for this, first, from those sacred writings admitted by Christians to possess authority in the matter; and, secondly, from the constitution of things, or its suitableness—not to man, as an animal merely possessed of a physical constitution, requiring certain periodical supplies of bread and butter, and the compliance with certain natural laws, which seem to be pretty nearly the Alpha and the Omega of our utilitarian friends; but to man as a being who can bend in adoration before the throne of the Eternal—who on the wings of imagination can explore

"Happy fields,
 Where joy for ever dwells,"

or descend to

"Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
 And rest can never dwell;"

who joins to his physical and intellectual a *moral* nature also.

But, before proceeding further, let me beg to assure my friends that I am not an Agnewite; not that I entertain any especial horror towards the memory of this, I believe, sincerely christian and philanthropic gentleman; but in indulgence to the feelings of the opposition, on whom symptoms of incipient convulsions appear at the bare mention of his name.

Now to our case. I wish to affirm that *it is agreeable to the word of God, and con-*

sonant with the principles of enlightened reason, that the sabbath is a day set apart not only for rest—for quiescence from physical labour—but a day for bringing the soul into closer communion with her Creator—for awakening and elevating the spiritual or moral nature of man.

Before entering, however, upon the scriptural argument in favour of the sanctity of the sabbath, my utilitarian friends must permit me to indulge in a quiet cachinnation at their admirable argumentative tactics under this head. "Look you," says their champion to his supporters; "I don't care a fig for this argument from authority; in fact, between you and me, it's all fudge; but, then, won't I trounce the sabbatarians nicely with their own weapons! The sword is a wooden one; but I can beat them off as easily with this as the Damascus blade of reason." Well, my tricky friend, as we are not going to settle the truth of Christianity, but whether the sanctity of the sabbath is recognised by it, let us have at thee with this sword which thou believest wooden.

I. The citadel of the scriptural argument lies in the fourth commandment; and, to Christians, the only question that can arise from the admission that the Jewish dispensation has been superseded by the christian is, Does this dispensation abrogate the former with respect to this command? That the ten commandments, or those laws which were written by the finger of God upon the two tables of stone, were, by the special manner in which they were delivered, and their foundation in the moral nature of man, lifted far above the common ceremonial laws of Judaism, no Christian who receives the scriptures implicitly momentarily doubts

Ten glorious announcements! marked as with lightning upon the front of an abyss of darkness, revealing the conditions which God had impressed upon the moral nature of his creature, man, and received as such by all pure and noble minds under whose understanding they have come since, in spite of all that thou mayest affirm, my sneering, utilitarian friend. professor of the bread-and-butter creed! Of these ten commandments not one jot or tittle has passed or shall pass away while the moral constitution of man remains as it is. Let us see. Has the first, or the second, or the third, or fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, commandment been abrogated? Has the christian dispensation enabled its believers to dispense with the exclusive worship of one Jehovah—with the worship of this Being, not by symbolic representations, but in immediacy of spirit and truth—with the cultivation of a reverential spirit towards him personally, and the things connected with him or his worship—with the honour due to parents, and the obvious relations of society springing out of this, the primitive—with the preservation of the lives of themselves and their neighbours—with that purity of heart and life, and that regard to the property of others, which it is the boast of Christianity to inculcate—with that regard to truth, of which witness-bearing before the sacred tribunal of the laws is the appropriate symbol—with that quenching of those evil desires within the heart which lie at the bottom of all outward sins—ah! and had I forgot?—with the observance of a special time, when the soul, shaking off, or endeavouring to shake off, the burden of worldly affairs, strives to drink more deeply of the fountain of all goodness, purity, and truth?

But *where* is this commandment abrogated? Do the walkings of Jesus and his disciples through the cornfields on the sabbath, and plucking a few ears of corn to satisfy their hunger—does the healing of the sick on the same day—prove its abolition? On the contrary, our Lord justifies these practices by the existing Mosaic law, rejecting only those needless and formal commentaries which had been added to the law in the form of Jewish traditions. Has St. Paul intimated its abolition, when he says (Col. ii. 16), "Let no man judge you in respect—*of feasts or of new moons or of sabbaths?*" Bethink

thyself, my utilitarian friend; these are but scanty proofs for the abrogation of a commandment standing in the centre of a code which, if thou dost not consider binding upon Christians, then for ever I hope to forswear thy Christianity. It is unnecessary to point to many things which were repealed by the introduction of the gospel; nor is it enough to say that the spirit of the latter dispensation has modified, to a considerable extent, that of the former. This, however, cannot render evident the repeal of a positive law. Let us see, my utilitarian friend, how thy reasoning looks cast into a syllogism:—

1. *Some* things belonging to Judaism were abolished by Christianity.
2. The sabbath belonged to Judaism.
3. Therefore the sabbath was abolished by Christianity.

Methinks there's a screw loose in the connexion between the major and minor propositions, my friend! I fear the syllogism would scarcely pass muster before Mill or Whately.

Before leaving this part of the argument, allow me, my friends of the opposition, to express my wonder how you, who are all for the spiritual liberty of Christianity, become, when the change of the sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, falls under consideration, so very strongly attached to the letter; or how, even admitting that the change is faulty, it follows that we ought, therefore, to keep no sabbath at all? But, granting that the change has taken place in a manner hardly definable, we Christians believe that the resurrection of the Son of God and Saviour of mankind—the consummation of the hopes of fallen humanity—was an event sufficient to justify the first day of the week being held as the sabbath instead of the seventh. So much for the scriptural argument.

II. In the second place, suppose it is granted that there is a God—a personal God, and not merely a system of material laws; seeing, moreover, that all mankind *worship*; seeing that worship is, or ought to be, the struggle of the mind to approach nearer perfection, which is embodied in God, what dreadful impropriety is there in maintaining that there should be special times when the soul should shake off the burden of its material environments, and endeavour to rise higher and higher in spiritual attain-

ments? And to this an instinctive feeling of its propriety has universally compelled mankind, so that even among the most debased idolaters we find special periods set apart for peculiar devotion before the shrine of that being whom they worship. In the Jewish and christian religions, which are, indeed, but two parts of a great whole—in these true and divine religions, which have lived, and will continue to live, in all ages, we therefore naturally expect to find adequate expression for this laudable desire of the universal mind. This, accordingly, we have, first, in the strict formality of the Jewish sabbath, agreeing with the objective character of the times, when all impressions must come to the infant mind from without; and, second, in the greater liberty, but equal sanctity, of the christian sabbath, when more was left to the active mind, and the discretion of a thoughtful manhood. As for the sabbath in its phase of a day of rest, I demur to the mental process by which my utilitarian friend arrives at the conclusion that rest means *refreshment*, and *refreshment* means *recreation*, and *recreation* is the noble, truly enlightened, and philosophic enjoyments of a Parisian sabbath; yet, indeed, how can we but agree with him, when we observe the noble conduct, the strict regard to truth and

morality, the admiration of all that is *really* great, and wise, and good—above all, that exemplary solidity and greatness of character which attention to religious duties in general, and their observance of the sabbath in particular, has induced in our neighbours of the *Grande Nation*?—agree closer with him still when we see that “bright and occidental star”—that pink of morality—that pattern of the household virtues—that monument of patriotism—that Washington in the field—that Solon in the cabinet—that Alfred in administration, whom the united suffrages of the French nation have raised to the dignity of their emperor? But, if recreation is required—and undoubtedly it is—has it never occurred to my utilitarian friend that man might possibly not be ordained to labour six days in the week—that five days of labour ought to be sufficient for man; and then we might have a day for recreation as well as one for religion?

In conclusion, I beg to advance and support the doctrine, that the sabbath ought still to be kept holy; and, though no man can be forced to do so, yet that every man should be allowed to exercise the choice of his conscience, even although he belong to the proscribed class of railway and hackney-coach drivers.

HAROLD.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

You need not, my worthy friends, entertain the idea that the institution of the sabbath day is in any imminent danger of destruction. You need not fear that the present, nor, indeed, any amount of public discussion will materially tend to shake its foundations in society, and to precipitate its violent and speedy overthrow. The sabbath day, whether as a day of rest, of recreation, or of worship—as the uniter of families, the restorer of health, the only opportunity to thousands for united spiritual exercises—has entwined itself too strongly and closely around the human heart to allow such an event to be thought of as even possible. The sabbath is older than Christianity—is older than Judaism; it is as old as the creation, and sprang into existence with the human race and with time; it is, therefore, not a violent nor an unreasonable supposition that its divine Author will preserve it to run its race with both, and will continue it on the

earth till man shall cease and time shall be no more.

It seems to be the opinion, however, of a large and respectable section of society, that the only means of securing a consummation so devoutly to be wished is by insisting upon a strictness of observance which is repugnant to the tastes and feelings of the great majority of the people, and which is, in fact, not very consistently carried out by some even of the most eloquent and active asserters of it.

In the frequent discussions which attend the assertion of such views it is pretty generally admitted that there is nothing of a *preceptive* character by which such strictness can be enforced to be met with in the *New Testament* scriptures; recourse is therefore had to the *Old Testament*; and it is undeniable, if the law there laid down has now full force, that we are not only wrong in our principles, and guilty of very great sin, but

that our opponents also are really in as bad a situation as ourselves.

The following list will be found to comprise all the passages in the Old Testament having any direct reference to the observance of the sabbath day:—Exod. xx. 8—10; xxxi. 14, 15; xxxiv. 21; xxxv. 2, 3; Deut. v. 12—15; Jer. xvii. 21, 22; Numb. xv. 32—35. Our space forbids a quotation of these, except as we require them in the course of our remarks, and we therefore recommend the reader to write them out and carefully to read them, so as to ascertain the general scope of their requirements, before proceeding any further with the discussion.

Before proceeding to discuss whether these passages contain that which is binding upon us as Christians, we wish to draw attention to a point upon which we are inclined to lay considerable stress; it is—that the enactments contained in these several passages constitute *one* law, *not* many laws; that is to say, we regard the notion—sedulously inculcated by some—of one general sabbatical law, addressed to, and binding upon, all mankind; and of others, addressed exclusively to the Jewish people, and containing enactments and particular applications of the law not included and comprehended in the general one. We think there is no particular application or enactment mentioned which is not legitimately implied in the terms of what is known as the fourth commandment. This conclusion requires no further illustration or argument than is furnished by the fate of the man who gathered sticks on the sabbath day. There was, certainly, no *express* command against gathering sticks on the sabbath, and therefore, unless upon the ground that such prohibition was clearly enough implied in the law delivered on Sinai, where was the justice of the man's death? We, therefore, certainly consider that sabbatarians are not warranted in asserting the divine authority of *one part* of the Jewish sabbatical law, while they reject and refuse to reduce to practice any other of its requirements. *Do* they not do so? How many Christians advocate the sinfulness of kindling a fire, and of partaking of hot tea or coffee, on the sabbath day? But, not to continue this line of remark, we proceed to state the reasons for the "negative" faith which is in us.

We object, in the first place, that a strict observance of a sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, is impracticable, and that the law itself is obsolete. The terms used in the enunciation of the law are of the most positive and unqualified nature:—" . . . In it thou shalt not do *any* work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates."—" . . . For whosoever doeth *any* work therein shall surely be put to death."—" . . . Whosoever doeth *any* work on the sabbath day, he shall surely be put to death."—" . . . In it thou shalt not do *any* work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gate; that thy man-servant and thy maid-servant may rest as well as thou." Here the terms are seen to be perfectly absolute and unqualified; as, indeed, it seems necessary they should be, when the penalty for disobedience was so tremendous. But, as if to exclude even the possibility of doubt, we further read, in connexion with the last quotation but one, "Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations upon the sabbath day;" and subsequently there is the account of the man who was put to death for gathering sticks on that day. The fair inference, then, from all these passages is, that any and every kind of work on the sabbath day was a breach of the sabbatical law; and the particulars supplied by the sacred text show that by "work" was intended, not merely work for hire, and the ordinary occupations of life, but also every kind of labour and exertion whatever.

Now, we say that the observance of the sabbath, to anything like this extent, is impracticable. The usages of civilization render many things absolute necessities to us, which to Jews dwelling in the Arabian desert would, no doubt, have been gratefully received as absolute luxuries. Besides, some things, again, are rendered necessary by circumstances over which we can exercise no effectual control. To take one instance out of many that offer, the nature of the climate in these kingdoms renders it absolutely necessary that we *should*, through a great part of the year, "kindle a fire throughout our habitations." Some other things might be named, had we space, which are as necessary

to the most ordinary degree of comfort, and which involve even more labour than lighting a fire. If, then, this presumed duty be evidently impracticable under our circumstances, it is no less than a libel upon the wisdom and goodness of God to assert that he has laid the performance of it upon us.

But we also say that the law which enjoins it is obsolete. Any law, to the infraction of which pains and penalties are annexed, becomes obsolete so soon as the penalties proper to it cease to be, or to be able to be, inflicted. As a case in point, I may be allowed to mention that, according to a clause in the Uniformity Act of Charles II., cap. 4, any person found present at any form of worship other than that contained in the Book of Common Prayer is liable to six months' imprisonment for the first offence, to twelve for the second, and for the third imprisonment for life. That act has never been repealed, but it is obsolete. Why? Because it is no longer possible to enforce the penalties due to the infringement of it. We, therefore, contend that the Jewish law of the sabbath is obsolete, because it is no longer possible to inflict the penalty denounced against disobedience to it. The power to inflict it passed from the Jewish nation when they ceased to be able to administer their own laws; and this power so lost has never been recovered by, nor delegated to, any other power on earth.

But it may be said that the "moral duty" to strictly observe this law remains, even though it be true that it cannot otherwise be enforced. This argument rests upon the assumption that the Jewish sabbatical law is a "moral law," or is a fundamental element in what is called, *par excellence*, "the moral law" of the commandments. But we deny the soundness of that assumption. The definition of a moral law—a definition furnished by sabbatarian divines—is, that it is a law which possesses force and vitality under all circumstances, and in all times and places. It is one of the first principles of moral science: it is to morality what an "axiom" is in metaphysics: it is a law which springs directly from considerations connected with the moral government of the universe, and is as eternal as the moral nature of the divine Being.

Now, it is at once evident that the sabbatical law does not fall within the terms of the definition. Clearly, obedience to it as a

law could not be claimed before its promulgation. It could not be binding before it was made known, nor after it to any to whom it remained unknown. It is, therefore, not a moral law, but an *institution*. But take a law which does fulfil the conditions of the definition. Take, "Thou shalt not kill." He would deserve to be set down as a hopelessly wrongheaded man who should argue that it was *right* to commit murder before the delivery of this prohibition, or that, in the observance of it, it would be right still. It is a law written in the human heart. Even the Greenlander feels its force, and instinctively shuns the presence of one who is stained with guilty blood. Not so, however, with the sabbatical law. It fulfils none of the legitimate conditions of a moral law. It possesses for us, in fact, no higher sanction, no greater authority, than that possessed by the *sabbatical year*, or even by the regulation of the proper trimmings for the priests' garments.

But we go further, and say that, even as an institution, it does not rest upon *moral* grounds. The children of Israel are commanded to hallow the sabbath day, **BECAUSE**, as stated in one place, "in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and rested the seventh day;" and in another, "Remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty hand, and by a stretched out arm: **THEREFORE** the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day." Now, if there is anything of a moral nature in these considerations regarded as the basis of the sabbatical institution, we profess ourselves unable to point it out, and magnanimously leave it to our friends on the opposite side to give the world the benefit of the discovery.

In the next place, we deny that the strict observance of a sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, is incumbent upon Christians, because the Jewish sabbatical law was abrogated and annulled by the advent of the christian dispensation. We infer this, first, from the practice and teaching of Christ; and, secondly, from considerations connected with the peculiar character of the christian religion. Our limits, however, will only allow us to notice, and that briefly, the first of these. We have already attempted to show that all the various general and par-

ticular enactments of the law of the sabbath are to be included in, and considered as forming, *one* law. It was also shown, by reference to the fate of a certain sabbatical sinner, that the breach of the law, even in a trifling particular, was considered to merit the punishment due to even the most flagrant violation of it. In accordance, then, with this principle, we shall consider our case established, if we adduce but one direct and unmistakable violation by Christ of the sabbatical law.

The case we shall particularly refer to is described at length in John v. 1—9. It is that of the man who had an infirmity thirty-eight years, and whom Christ cured on the sabbath day. According to Jewish notions, by so doing he *defiled* the sabbath; and there can be no doubt, according to the terms of the law, that such was the case. But this was not all. Christ not only broke the law himself, according to the popular interpretation of it, but he caused the man to sin against it, according to one of the express and definite forms in which it was delivered. Turning back to Jer. xvii. 21, 22, we read:—“Thus saith the Lord; Take heed to yourselves, and *bear no burden* on the sabbath day, nor *bring it in by the gates of Jerusalem*; neither carry forth a burden out of your houses on the sabbath day, neither do ye any work, but hallow ye the sabbath day, as I commanded your fathers.” Now, we are not allowed to believe, from the very nature of the whole case, that Christ was ignorant of this command, and of its consequent obligation upon the Jews; yet we find him, in the most direct method of opposition possible, commanding the man to “take up thy bed and walk.” And, by what we feel ourselves perfectly unjustified in regarding as a mere accidental coincidence, this was done immediately outside one of the gates of Jerusalem, and of course, in “bearing his

burden” home, he would be compelled to “bring it in by the gates of Jerusalem.” Therefore, we do say most emphatically, looking at all the circumstances of this case in connexion with others, such as Matt. ii. 23; iii. 1—6; xii. 1—13; and John ix. 1—12, and regarding them all in the light of the peculiar character and mission of Christ, that he could not more effectually have abrogated and annulled the Jewish sabbatical law than by the methods here displayed; and, as a consequence, that such abrogation was intended and designed.

We take leave to say, however, in parting, that, because we refuse to submit our necks to the yoke of a law at once oppressive, obsolete, and impracticable—a law which comes to us with the authority of no moral obligation, and which the Founder of Christianity has himself taught us to disregard—we do not necessarily put ourselves in a position of hostility to the sabbath itself. We regard it with a sincere and earnest regard. We often feel that without it our journey through life would be intolerable; that without it life would be a burden, and existence itself a curse. We believe, also, that to the sincere Christian it is a sweet memento of divine love—a convincing argument for one of the most important facts which form the basis of his belief, and a constantly-recurring remembrance of that glorious immortality and everlasting rest which will be his reward hereafter.

But to what extent it should be observed by the *Christian*, and by what means sought to be preserved, are questions which, in this view, do not properly enter into this discussion, and in the investigation of which, if they did, we should receive but little light and assistance from the study of a subordinate element in a worthless and discarded economy.

IRENE.

If any man possessed every qualification for success in life, it is probable he would remain perfectly stationary. The consciousness of his powers would tempt him to omit opportunity after opportunity to the end of his days. Those who do succeed ordinarily owe their success to some disadvantage under which they labour; and it is the struggle against a difficulty that brings facilities into play.

Genius was originally deemed supernatural; the happy possessor was supposed to hold converse with a superior order of beings, and it was thought that the Genii themselves immediately inspired him with his supereminent powers.—Cogan.

Philosophy.

WOULD EDUCATION ERADICATE CRIME?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

BUT too well founded is the reproach with which the English as a nation are met, of spending vast sums annually for the punishment of crimes, to the perpetrators of which no preventive inducement has been held out. We are very careful to keep up all the paraphernalia of vengeance—jails, chains, and gibbets, with their accessories, constables, policemen, and soldiers, by which the *majesty* of the law is upheld; but a very inadequate sum is supplied to train the moral teachers—to prevent the infringement of those laws, on the inviolability of which the happiness of the nation depends. Thus, “irrespective of local taxation, we are at present paying £2,000 every day in the year for prisons and convict establishments at home and in the colonies, and at the same time only £350 per day goes to promote the education of the people of England, Wales, and Scotland; the Millbank Penitentiary takes nearly £1,000 a year more for the confinement, watching, and keep of 1,300 prisoners, than 284 schools in Lancashire and Cheshire take for educating 40,000 children; while Van Diemen’s Land, with a criminal population of 6,000, costs the country more by £600 than the whole education grant to Ireland, under which nearly half a million of children are now being educated; and more than £1 per head per annum is spent on the religious instruction of these same 6,000 convicts, while in the heart of Liverpool there are as many people, happily not yet convicts, whose spiritual destitution and ignorance of religion is so great, that a clergyman labouring in the neighbourhood is forced to say with sad truth, that the majority are simply not Christians.”* But, as the evil exists, let us try to obtain a glimpse of the cause of crime, and the relation of education to the criminal.

What, then, is the cause of crime? We

are all more or less inclined to indulge in acts that we believe will promote our happiness. The high-toned morality of one class may lead to the eliciting of the moral and religious feelings. Its members may enter warmly into such an object, and find much pleasure in the sacrifice of leisure, convenience, and taste, to such an end. The intellectual faculties of another class, united to a benevolent nature, leads its members to teach and expound the details of science and intellectual truths, and finds as great a pleasure in it. But, unfortunately for society, there is a third class, who seek personal aggrandizement and the gratification of their lowest emotions and feelings alone, to ensure their happiness. The *ego* with them is the highest and most worthy object in the universe, and its pleasure, its apparent advantage, is to be obtained at all hazards, and at any expense. The fact will now and then obtrude itself, that such a predominance of self cannot be maintained without detriment to society; but it is considered as unimportant unless detection follow the act. The punishment is feared, not the act. Such self-gratification is the aim of their existence—the chief incentive to action. This is the source from whence arises the first class of criminals. Another class arises from those who, possessing a generous and an upright character, overcome by circumstances, by the heat of the moment, by the stimulants, either physical or mental, are led against their better instincts into an act, or a course of actions, for which they repent immediately after. Crime may be far from such men’s minds and intentions, until, led by drink or excess of passion, or other mental disarrangement, to forget duty and their native love of goodness, or even the necessary consequences to themselves or to others; and while thus led away they commit crimes abhorred by men, not excepting murder. And then there is another and very large class, who infest society with their black deeds through ignorance. Ignorance

* See Chambers’s “Papers for the People”—Education Movement. Note, page 3.

of the laws, divine and human, that govern the world and society, is a fruitful cause of their infringement by hundreds who have the genius within, that, if cultivated, would make them its highest ornaments as men and as Christians. These have been to no school—have received no education, save that obtained in the world of infamy and vice in which they have ever moved. They see there exhibited none but the worst and blackest characteristics of our nature, and is it surprising they should think the whole world the same? What does the world for them? When brought in contact with it, it is as an enemy that seeks to wreak its vengeance on their heads, and adds to their already demoniac training the unchristian punishment of the jail—a just compliment to that already received. And thus it will be found that the cause of crime is threefold: first, from a predominance of the animal nature; second, from external excitement; and, third, from ignorance.*

And, now, what is the aim of education, and what is its relation to the criminal? Education is a very comprehensive term. In its highest phase it is essentially a religious act. It is the development of the religious feelings and emotions in the heart—a continual cultivation of reverence, veneration, and obedience to God, and love to our fellow-creatures. It is impossible for a teacher in England to give other than a religious education, if he appreciate at all the end and object of his vocation; and hence the non-religious educator is an abstraction. There is much misapprehension with respect to religious education. Too often is mere training in connexion with some of the numerous denominations of Christians implied by it—instruction in a credal catechism, or a verbal repetition of various texts of scripture. This may go on without any good results; while, at the same time that these formalities may be dispensed with, a good and loving man, whose heart is in the task, will be able to accomplish the higher aim; nay, can do nothing less. We are too instructional in our schools, and possess teachers, but not educators. We have something more to do than to make merely knowing men; we have to help them to be

men, true, just, and beautiful—to develop a love for truth, justice, and beauty. Be not satisfied with a boy's virtue because he refrain from evil from a fear of conviction, or of the consequences of such an act. This is not virtue. A virtuous lad acts virtuously from an essential love of virtue. This is the primal aim—to evolve this virtue-loving faculty. When evolved, food must be obtained for it: this is the work of the instructor; and its nourishment is freely obtained in the every-day life of the student. But the educator is not confined to the moral and religious sphere, although, when employed in the development of the intellect, he will carry with him religious motives and a religious atmosphere. There the educator has to create an appetite, and the instructor to supply the appetite with information. The educator and instructor united must develop a healthful and progressive spirit, and point out and cause the pupil to appreciate his true position to his fellow-men and the world. Having the highest aspirations aroused, the pupil will carry with him into all his experience, into every avocation in which he may engage, their elevating influence. This, then, is the aim of education—the evolution of the highest emotions, thoughts, and faculties, in harmony with the religious, intellectual, and physical nature of man.

What relation does such an education bear to the criminal, and to the repression of crime? The first class of criminals, or those who commit crime from a preponderance of the animal nature, from their very partial development, will require the highest kind of educative training by which a harmonious whole may be obtained. Their religious, moral, and intellectual natures must be brought into activity, and evolved so that the animal nature may no longer usurp the sway that legitimately belongs to the higher phases of the being. Care must be taken not to produce merely show, as cunning or cleverness, in which most of this class will be found to excel. We are very zealous in turning out from our schools good accountants, good geographers, good linguists; and their quality as good citizens is tested by the manner in which these abilities conduce to the gain of wealth, rather than by the amount of real worth they are able to set afloat in the world. But it must be clear that if an

* This classification will be found similar to that proposed by Combe. See "Constitution of Man," chap. vi.

educational course be practised, having the aim of development, and of making whole instead of partial characters, it would meet the wants of this portion of our unhappy fellow-beings, by doing away with the very cause from which they sin. Of course educational processes in this sense will be more influential with the young than with those more advanced in age; but those grown aged in sin must not be hopelessly abandoned, but all our relations with them should have an educative rather than a punishing and degrading tendency. It should be ever kept in mind, that all improvement is the result of a growth; it never comes instantaneously; all God's laws are opposed to such a result.

Then, with regard to those who have not sufficient command over their feelings and actions when under excitement, such an educational treatment would do much to strengthen their beings, and make them able to withstand the temptation of the moment. Many of this class revolt, when in a sane state, against anything like crime; but they want firmness to withstand the exciting cause. I know it will be asserted by many that we can do no good thing of ourselves — that we must go to God in prayer as the only means of gaining freedom from crime. I desire by no means to give to man more power than he really possesses, nor to depreciate the real power of God; but it will be found that a certain degree of self-reliance will almost inevitably carry with it a reliance upon the power that is above self, and that God helps those alone who desire to help themselves. An utter reliance upon another power, while we stretch out no arm to help ourselves, arises from a morbid feeling, that entirely opposes the growth of goodness in the soul, and is, consequently, the means of a vast amount of misery in the world. Nor would I for one moment depreciate the prayerful spirit. That earnest desire to overcome evil, and to trust implicitly to the guidance of Goodness and Truth, from an intense yearning for those spirits, by no means opposes self-reliance; but, forming a constant

strain on those portions of our being which may require strengthening, is in reality the highest educational process to which we can possibly submit ourselves. Let us cultivate such a spirit in ourselves, and strive ever to evolve it in others, and it will be found education does more than we imagine in the prevention of crime.

And, with the ignorant, no one will deny that even a mere course of instruction will obtain for them an immunity against crime, if they be placed in circumstances that do not call too forcibly to their criminal natures. For such the instruction should include, besides its general routine of school lessons, a more expanded view of the universe and society—of the laws by which God governs the world, and man society. This class requires more particularly that their common sense shall be brought into activity, and their intellectual faculties guided by a mind and a soul that can gain a sympathetic hold of their hearts. They require teaching what is right and what is wrong, as being in accordance with, or in opposition to, the laws of truth and goodness. Such a teacher will also develop in them a love for learning, and an inquisitiveness for knowledge, that will be carried with them into the world, and will give a healthful tone to their common sense. And one thing should not be omitted. They should be taught how they may honestly earn a livelihood; for it must not be lost sight of, that an immense amount of vice and crime has its origin in want and poverty. Criminals sent over to Australia and Van Diemen's Land, removed from the temptation of committing crime by having the means within their reach of getting a good and honest living, leave their old course of sin and become respectable citizens.

Thus I have briefly attempted to show that each individual requires a judicious and separate training. It must be borne in mind, that no limited mechanical routine will give a worthy result; but, if taken in hand in an earnest and universal spirit, it will be found that education will eradicate crime.

G. P. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THERE is an immediate consciousness upon directing the mind to this subject—and a melancholy consciousness it is, too—

that the term "crime" needs no definition. The thing expressed by it, however mysterious when metaphysically considered, is yet

among the most familiar objects of our acquaintance; and so numerous and palpable are its manifestations, moreover so costly—the quality which, above all others, obliges observation—that we may not even preserve that dignified indifference with which we demean ourselves to disagreeable intruders, but are compelled to a humiliating recognition. Our multitudinous array of preventives and penalties, the enemy himself withal, in spite of them, ever about our dwellings, living at our expense, with a careless disregard of our means and feelings, are annoyances we would gladly know less of. Regarding the whole system of things with which we are encompassed as an open-spread lexicon, every statute-book, every policeman, every shilling of the county rate, every transport ship, every encounter with depravity in the streets, and with villainy brought out from its secret chambers, is each a definition of *crime*, in some one or other of its abundance of inflections.

Without venturing to speculate upon the nature of crime, it may yet be desirable for our purpose to premise this much concerning it—that it is *not a product of the intellect*. Crime is an offence strictly against moral law, hence is the moral nature alone concerned in the production of it. Intellect is subservient to it; so is the animal being. These do but mould, direct, mature, like those outer influences which subtend the development of a plant, and direct its tendencies. Crime, then, has its root in the moral part of man; if this, the soil, be well tilled and purified, then is the rank and noxious weed subdued; if there be no such treatment, then does it luxuriate in wanton vigour, healthful as the blade or the blossom which has grown for a better use, because it can as readily as they seize all the advantages of outer influences, and make them the instruments of its purpose. In other words, crime—or rather, if we may so speak, the *preparedness* of man to commit crime—rises or falls with the state of his moral being. You may call the phenomenon an error, an excess, a natural development, or what you please, the disposition to it in man is invariably in a fixed ratio with the condition of that being; and when this condition is favourable to, and meets with opportunities of, production, then are the intellectual and animal faculties made available as instru-

mental aids, their very cultivation and finish increasing the effectiveness of their use.

Crime being, then, not the offspring of the intellect—nor, indeed, for its existence dependent upon any state of the intellect—how could the most careful, the most refined training of the intellectual powers abate, or, as the question is, eradicate the evil? What sum of the four processes of arithmetic, what problem of Euclid, what statute of syntax or syllogism, is your talismanic agent? Astronomize, botanize, Bucklandize, bring down the stars with your telescope, and crack the sandstone with your antiquarian hammer; yea, let all the arts and sciences be granted you, and what is your recompense at last? A riddance of crime? Nay. You have made your subject a wiser man, it is true; but will these mental riches with which you have endowed him make him a better man? or have you armed him with a shield wherewith to defend himself in the hour of temptation? In some respects your mental culture will frequently be of advantage. An educated man is conscious of the higher position his attainments have raised him to; his self-respect and desire to retain his position are beneficial incentives to the moral qualities of his being. But then you cannot rely upon the efficacy of education with that implicit confidence which would warrant you in certifying its ability to eradicate crime. Where the moral principle—the innate barrier between right and wrong—has been broken down, your means are not sure to restore; and where there has been no such loss of rectitude, they are not sure to preserve. You avouch, perhaps, the diminution of crime in proportion to the spread of education; but the diminution of crime which your statistics prove is among the regular phenomena of the moral world, in which crime has its fluxes and refluxes, according as a variety of causes may dispose to excess or reduction. Law, by operating upon the fears of the community, tends to a diminution. Prosperity and plenty, by inducing contentment of mind, are followed by the same result. Give us a cornucopia, and we will be bound to keep good order among a population more effectually than it could be accomplished by a whole batch of modern Gamaliels. But we would not underrate the eradication of crime by any of these methods. Your statistics prove the very point at issue. They show that the

educated do err, notwithstanding the enlightenment which reading, writing, and arithmetic, and even your "superior education," are supposed to afford. They show that education, in relation to crime, is but an accident, exercising an influence, it may be, but only beneficial when subordinate to high moral principle. As long as the moral nature is debased, so long will the intellectual condescend to pander to its desires; and so long as the will to do right is paramount, so long will crime be in subjection, and this irrespective both of the absence and the possession of knowledge. The Haleys and Legrees of society (and they are not confined to slave-dealing America), supposing their acquisitions from books to be commensurate with their talent for wrong-doing, will remain the oppressors and murderers of their race, their callous hearts insoluble even under this landed emollient; but their victims, the Uncle Toms, who, poor souls, are yet rich in better possessions than belong to their masters, and who, thank heaven! are likewise to be found of every country and colour, are bright examples of virtue independent of intellectual culture; and it is difficult to conceive what process or polish could improve a nature, morally considered, so rich in its native worth, and sanctified by the spelled-out maxims of the Bible.

"But education," we shall be told—"the education we demand as a safeguard against criminal practices—is not what you, with many others, mistakenly suppose, but is an education so comprehensive as to meet the demands of an entire nature, unfolding and directing, in beautiful harmony with his other faculties, the *moral* capabilities and character of man." We do not, then, stand singular in this error. It is doubtless true that to multitudes "education" is but a limited idea. They will discourse upon it, contribute their guineas for its support, patronize it in a hundred ways, and shake their heads with remarkable sagacity of confidence when expatiating upon its merits; but seek of them an explanation, and whether it be the old *régime* of the dame-school (most likely this, if early associations are hallowed to the memory), or that of the more modern academy, or a public system of "secular education," or as perfect an adaptation of influences to the cranium as George Combe himself could have wished

for, or the most earnest philanthropist of the day longs for, which forms the mysterious notion of the something which these people call education, you will remain as unenlightened as themselves. Yet *this* is the panacea as popular amongst us as the one-and-three-halfpenny nostrums, so like as to provoke comparison. The "secular education," the mere intellectual training, the qualifying for the counting-house, will do as well as anything else. It is education, and will, therefore, do wonders. There is no telling what it will effect. We are persuaded that this is the notion of numbers of well-meaning persons, who, nevertheless, may be shielded from severe censure by the fact that the more important concerns of their daily life have sufficient matter in them for their severest study.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not, as some do, condemn secular education, or education exclusive of the mental faculties. We have no sympathy with those who cry it down as "godless"—"impious." On the contrary, however dangerous an instrument we may deem cultivated intellect to be when insubordinate to the laws of God, it is an instrument we would place in the hands of every living being, supposing we could furnish him with no better, trusting to an honourable and right employment. What we complain of is the "preventive" doctrine of this merely intellectual culture. "But," say our friends who oppose us, "this is not our doctrine. Our preventive would be the true education, based upon an acquaintance with human nature, and the various relations it sustains in the economy of the universe." Very true; but it is an important thing to bring up the stragglers, and this, our object, will be attained, if among our readers there shall be any whose ideas of education have been somewhat vague and obscure, but who by these remarks shall be assisted towards a definite, settled position; for we prefer definiteness against us to uncertainty and *anything*. Now, to our friends who differ from us we would say, Your theory is condemned by a settled principle of experience. You are aware that *mere knowledge is insufficient to ensure obedience*. For nineteen centuries has the purest system of morals we can conceive of been in existence in the world. It is a system of no secondary, inferior character. Whatever of good was contained in the pre-

rious systems, whether of divine or human law, of philosophic precept, and of motive to right conduct, was imported into and incorporated with this. This system of morals has been studied in the cloister, preached in the church, reasoned in the schools, till every part of it has been made manifest, and sets of theology have become the bulkiest volumes on our book-shelves. Not dry ethics, either, possessing no attribute of allurements, but law taking the form of love, as that most likely to win compliance. Besides these, there have been sister influences at work, seeking to captivate the heart of man; blessed visions have these been of heavenly purity, seeking to conquer by this same power of love. The poetic sentiment has clothed his dwelling-place with beauty; the very stars of heaven, as well as the flowers of earth, have breathed of love—the love of him and their Creator. The affections, like bright angels, have clustered around him; and the jasmine porch, the cheerful hearth, the look of love, and the touch of trusting tenderness, has each symbolized the love of his heavenly Father. Even science, cold and uninviting in general, has lent her aid, by investing the institute with attractions superior to those of the tavern. Thus has man been forced to know, while the very strongest motives which can affect his nature have sought to ensure obedience. Despite of all, crime exists, an unsubduable specimen of earthliness. Educated men have fallen so low in the depths of crime, that the phrase “educated villains” has become a hackneyed expression.

Education, we presume, has no better materials to work with—no stronger motives to win obedience. She may call morality, when drawn from the Bible, cant; she may despise the teachings of nature as beneath the tradition of letters, but she cannot improve upon them; her cardinal virtues will not be more virtuous. Supposing her to be a more skilful preceptor, her best teachings will not excel. Mankind will be no wiser upon the rules of right and wrong, though many things to be governed by them, and hitherto hidden, may be brought to light. And we question whether education can

command motives to morality even equal to those at present existing. Let Manchester open her free libraries—all honour to her for the deed!—let benevolence, with all those advantages which blue-books and inspectors—abounding as they do in moral and industrial plans of reform—can afford her, as well as all those means which her remarkable fertility of invention can create, devise such a master scheme of education as shall be the most appropriate to the end in view; let her not be bound by precedents nor parties—if English ideas on the subject be too diffuse, too self-reliant, let there be an infusion of continental uniformity and centralization—if there be too much tightness already, mellow the composition with an importation from the other hemisphere; henceforth let duty not be chance-work—a course that depraved men may stumble into or not, the probability being that they will not—but a course which the light of knowledge shall show forth with distinctness and beauty, and what follows? A favourable but partial effect upon your statistics—that is all. You had hoped that men fully alive to the dangers of disobedience and the rewards of obedience would, as it were, have been panoplied against temptation; but you find there is a joint in the harness through which the fatal shaft has winged itself. Your system of education, so adapted to the nature of man, and, moreover, so strongly urging him to adapt his conduct to its dictates, is, as far as it can effect a *cessation* of crime, as complete a failure as were the simpler remedies of bygone times, among which we have a reminiscence (and we assure our readers nought but a pleasant one, since we never underwent the operation) of a system pursued by an honoured dame, comprehending in its remedial provisions a ferule for the pilferer, and a *pinch of cayenne pepper* for the tongue of the storyteller!

That crime can be eradicated from the present constitution of things may be doubted; that it will be eradicated may be hoped; but of the means which we deem destined to this desired end, if it be ever to be accomplished, it is not within our province to speak.

B. W. P.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON WORTHY OF ADMIRATION ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

ALTOGETHER regardless of the opposition which may be directed against us by those whose judgments are warped by certain notions concerning the repulsiveness of war, and who are firm believers in the "good time coming," when peace shall wave her "olive branch" over the whole world, we are induced to appear in the present debate to take up arms in defence of England's departed hero, the greatest among her sons who have led her armies to the battle-field, and assisted in laying the foundations of that almost irresistible power which enables her fleets to ride triumphant over every wave, and to rear her victorious standard in every quarter of the globe. The brave commander, with keen eye and cool decision of purpose, by whom the barbarian armies of Mysore and Mahratta, with the nomadic hordes under the apparently invincible Dhoondiat, were successively routed and destroyed; he before whom the conquering French, with their marvellous chief, were at last compelled to bow, we now intend to vindicate. Not that we would for one moment be thought to sanction the introduction of war as a means for obtaining peace in cases of international disputes, or to countenance the perpetration of its sanguinary cruelties under any circumstances whatever. Far be such a relic of the usages of the middle ages as this from having a place within our esteem. We would heartily join with the most devoted admirers of peace, and cordially unite with those of our brethren whose earnest hope is to see men "beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks," and for war, with all its attendant horrors, to be banished for ever from the earth; but still we cannot refrain from offering our tribute of respect to one *who, in our opinion, possessed a degree of purity in his general character which it would be derogatory to none to imitate, though military, and therefore necessarily*

destructive, engagements constituted his greatest achievements. We wish, therefore, at the outset, to be regarded not as the champions of war, but as the vindicators of one who, apart from his warlike pursuits, was an able and a strictly moral man, and the possessor of a character worthy of admiration. The whole career of the Duke of Wellington upon the battle-field was, so to speak, a manifestation of merciful and heroic feeling. Though a warrior, we find in him no traces of that barbarous ferocity and savage cruelty which has characterized so many of those who have followed his profession. Though on many occasions sorely pressed by want, and apparently doomed to starvation, we do not see him ravaging the country he was employed to defend, or making undue demands upon the inhabitants thereof for the necessaries of life.

Throughout the whole Peninsular war, as well as in his earlier Indian expeditions, the Duke of Wellington was placed in circumstances, and surrounded by influences, pre-eminently calculated to test the real tendency of his character, both as a soldier and as a man. At one time open to the probability of speedy destruction, with the whole of his army, and at another crowned with glorious successes over his enraged and insatiable opponents, we see him, not resorting to the height of extravagance in revengeful actions, or exulting over his foes with cruel rapacity or horrid butchery; but, on the contrary, manifesting steady and unflinching adherence to the stern mandates of justice, and tempering all his movements with merciful consideration. He toiled on perseveringly in his campaigns, leading his brave though sorely battered English warriors through dangers and difficulties which captains of inferior abilities would have pronounced insurmountable, and buoying up their energies under circumstances beneath which many would have fallen prostrate in

despair. His military genius proved fully adequate to the requirements of every emergency; and the nobleness displayed in his general character on all occasions is worthy of enthusiastic admiration and eulogium. The amount of forethought evidenced by him in all his services, together with that prompt decision, that unwearied perseverance and strict regard to the requirements of duty by which he was ever characterized, render him deserving our respect. He never suffered procrastination to prevent the immediate discharge of every order he had received; neither did he award to such duties merely a fragmentary portion of his attention. His heart was ever in his work; and hence we feel that he was worthy of admiration even as a warrior engaged on the battlefield, delivering nations from the thralldom of the oppressor's yoke. In our opinion, none but those who have become the victims of misanthropic prejudices can refrain from awarding to "England's departed hero" that tribute of respect which is the due of all the glorious achievements and honours of his life.

We now turn to a brief consideration of the claims of the character of the Duke of Wellington to our admiration more directly as a man. We have shown, we think, that his character as a warrior presents nothing but what we might without injury apply to ourselves; and we now proceed to a concise analysis of that portion of his life which more especially relates to his actions as a member of the legislative body of our country. We may be asked, What has the Duke of Wellington effected in this country worthy of our admiration? This question certainly carries with it much apparent significance, and would seem, upon a first glance, to present difficulties of a somewhat serious nature. We must confess that his parliamentary career certainly does not present many features calculated to awaken in the minds of others perceptions of greatness as characteristic of his legislative capabilities; but still an attentive observer cannot fail to distinguish throughout his senatorial proceedings, as well as in his military transactions, such qualities, and such manifestations of virtue and justice, as constitute the general tenor of his character worthy our admiration. Though altogether destitute of the powers of persuasion and captivation pos-

sessed by the orator, he nevertheless had a degree of influence and power over his contemporaries which it has been the lot of but a few others to realize. Always performing every duty in "true military style," and imparting to the whole of his proceedings an air of the minutest precision, he was looked upon by his colleagues in the legislative functions as a competent leader; one to whom, from his known extended experience, they could confidently appeal in matters of doubt and uncertainty. It has been said of him that "he imported into the peaceful struggles of parliament the tactics of war; always fighting to the last in defence of every position, and only abandoning it when he found it no longer tenable."* This is a truth fully substantiated by the evidence deducible from a close observation of the leading features of his political life. On all occasions his sagacity and foresight were remarkable; and his warning voice was ever heard when projects of a doubtful character, and presenting uncertain conclusions, were under public notice. As a Conservative, he could not, from his principles, become a ready respondent to the popular voice, or a willing accedent to the wishes, and in some instances to the rights, of the people; but, nevertheless, we find in him ideas of a much more liberal and comprehensive caste than in the majority of those professing a similar political creed. He appeared ever to be strongly actuated by the claims of necessity; and it was not until fully satisfied that certain measures of reform were actually necessary in order to maintain social order and national prosperity that he would, upon any occasion, accede to their demands. In illustration of this fact we may adduce the circumstances under which he passed the Catholic Emancipation Act, assisted in obtaining the repeal of the corn laws, &c.

In conclusion we would remark, that the "Iron Duke," though belonging to a section of politicians notoriously averse to all progressive measures, still displayed, in all his numerous actions as a member of the legislative body, an amount of common sense which we may look for in vain in the conduct of many others who have occupied an equal or higher position in the English senate. Though by mental organization, and from

* "Biographical Magazine," November, 1852.

the effects of early training, his capabilities pre-eminently qualified him for the routine of a military life, he nevertheless possessed much that rendered his civil services valuable to the government of this country. A great statesman he certainly was not; but his position in the ranks of those illustrious individuals was by no means that of a mere cipher, or of one who by inferiority is subordinated to the will of those above them. Indeed, very rarely in the world's history are instances on record of men, renowned as warriors and conquerors, possessing at the same time the necessary tact and ability to constitute them efficient civil governors of

the countries which they have conquered. Napoleon himself was exceedingly deficient in this particular; hence his continual complaint that he was always immersed in warfare, and prevented from carrying out his plans as a ruler, and so "fulfilling his mission." In our opinion, Wellington was far in advance of his great opponent in this respect; and the fact, we think, is fully proved by a reference to the accounts of his various campaigns. We here close our tribute to the memory of the "hero of a hundred fights," fully convinced that his character is *worthy of admiration* as a soldier and as a man.

T. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

POSTHUMOUS praises ought to be accepted with extreme qualification. The dead are for a time invested with an immunity from reproach; there is a degree of sacredness associated with the event, which causes one instinctively to shrink from giving utterance to thoughts calculated to dim the lustre of their memory. The wail for their loss is burdened with eulogy, and the proper discrimination which would reduce such eulogy to its just limits is for the moment forgotten; and thus, while their shortcomings are overshadowed by a becoming sorrow, their virtues and their merits appear in unreal proportions: this tendency leads to the belief that mankind are more amiable than the truth justifies. With so pleasing an illusion we would not quarrel, were its influence confined to ordinary life; but when historical men—men whose memories are to be enduring, and whose lives are likely to be recommended as models after which the career of others ought to be shaped—when these come to be considered, their merits and their demerits should be dispassionately canvassed, and an estimate of their characters given accordingly; by this means only can the purity of history be maintained, and equivocal characters debarred the prerogatives of the worthy. Yet a little while, and a reaction *will* come of the panegyric so boundlessly lavished on the late Duke of Wellington.

Naval and military greatness is a species of fame much cherished in the British heart, and has had attached to it a disproportionate degree of honour. So much has this been the

case, that our histories are full to repletion with recitals of wars, or rather victories; and the first biography sought by our youth is that of some of our greatest captains; and their earliest enthusiasm is to enter our naval or our military service. Our almost uniform ascendancy affords incense to national pride, and begets that pugnacity by which our relation to foreign powers is characterized. There is a certain largeness in the combinations, and an energy, a heroism, an astuteness required in war, calculated to win admiration, and well suited to the genius of our country. Nevertheless, our peaceful are more glorious than our warlike triumphs; and no encouragement, however indirect, or however insignificant, should be given to fan the too spontaneous flame. Though we do consider it a necessary evil, yet, to us, it is one so dreadful, that to foster the passions that conduced to it, or to render men less reluctant to engage in it, appears the darkest criminality. There are, and we admit it, occasions on which "the cause by right is sanctified;" on which, if we would preserve our rights as a people, or as subjects, we must vindicate them by the sword—we must hazard its fearful chances. Yet the fulsome adulation of Wellington, in so far as it tends to glorify or to perpetuate war, we feel bound to condemn. It is to its being made a trade, to live and grow rich by, that we object to war, for then it is degraded from the high office of maintaining and defending the right, to be an instrument to serve the purposes, right or wrong, of the government in whose pay the armed force is: and the defence of right, the only justifi-

ble motive for engaging in war, being supplanted by a pence-motive, the army becomes neither more nor less than homicide in general to the state. We are talking of the moral relationship which subsists between the soldiery to the questions which their agency is called in to decide; and no one who recalls the events of the past few years, can fail to perceive a confirmation of this view in the war waged by Austria against Hungary.

"Our great captain" was peculiarly fortunate in serving a liberal nation; the policy of the government regulated his conduct, so that, had that not been liberal, his great military talents might have been as signally successful if turned against the cause of freedom, as they were in promoting its advancement; in this event he would still have been eminent, but it would have been the eminence of infamy. To obtain victory over the enemy was his aim; with the moral or the political bearings of the issue, if professional success were secured, he had nothing to do. His own words are self-condemnatory:—"I have ate of the king's salt, and therefore consider it my duty to serve, with zeal and promptitude, when, or wherever, the king, or his government, may think proper to employ me." This was his reply to a friend who, on his return from the expedition to Spain, in the command of which he had been superseded, asked how he, who had had the command of forty thousand men in India, had been knighted, and had received the thanks of parliament, could submit to be reduced to the rank of brigadier of infantry?

To secure our concurrence, the admirers of Wellington must present far other merits than those exhibited in the matchless and accomplished tactician, or even the scientific warrior; these are claims which will be conceded by all who have attentively perused the narrative of his Peninsular campaign; but neither his skilful combinations, his artful manœuvres, his inflexibility of purpose, nor his personal valour, can command our admiration, unless these be yoked to a good cause, and that cause itself be the only, or at least the chief, motive, for engaging in it. It must be shown that it was love for the cause, and not a political sense of duty, that actuated him; otherwise, if he were on the side of right, he was but accidentally so, and had no merit in it; and his splendid gifts, and unwearying solicitude

in the performance of duty, were but talents ill applied, and energies worse than uselessly exhausted: unless they establish this, his defenders secure for him the praise, merely, of being the "ablest architect of ruin." Now, throughout his entire military career, we have no intimation of refusal, on his part, to undertake any command given by his Majesty's government. The language which Byron addressed to him still retains all its point:—

"Though Britain owes (and pays you too) so much,

Yet Europe doubtless owes you greatly more:
You have repaired Legitimacy's crutch—

A prop not quite so certain as before;
The Spanish, and the French, as well as Dutch,

Have seen, and felt, how strongly you restore;

And Waterloo has made the world your debtor—
(I wish your bards would sing it rather better.)"

"If you have acted once a generous part,
The world, not the world's masters, will decide.

And I shall be delighted to learn who,
Save you and yours, have gained by Waterloo?"

"Never had mortal man such opportunity,
Except Napoleon, or abused it more;
You might have freed fallen Europe from the unity

Of tyrants, and been blest from shore to shore;

And now what is your fame? Shall the muse
tune it ye

Now—that the rabble's first vain shouts are o'er?

Go, hear it in your famished country's cries!
Behold the world! and curse your victories!"

"You did great things; but not being great in mind,

Have left undone the greatest—and mankind."

For political life his training had not been such as to render him fit, by the comprehensiveness of his views, the philosophical cast of intellect, or a generous sympathy with popular interests, to touch that "highest point of all greatness"—the liberal-minded senator. His position had not been such as to develop these nobler traits—he had imbibed the prejudices of his class; and, accustomed to command, when called to the legislature, he could not undo the habits of a life. It is true he had exercised administrative functions before, but the scene was India; it is true he had acquired an insight into civil affairs during his secretaryship in Ireland, and in his relations with the Spanish and Portuguese governments; yet he was very

far from being an enlightened statesman. He is guilty of some heresies against the plainest precepts of political economy. For instance, we hear him assigning as the cause of the depressed state of our manufactures in 1830, home and foreign competition, and what's worse, improvements in machinery, and the substitution of steam power for manual labour. No; as a statesman, a high place cannot be assigned to him. It is to the out-of-door agitation we are indebted for the concessions made during his administration, rather than to the ministry; so far as his own opinions were concerned, he was stoutly opposed to them; but the excitement throughout the country was so intense, so irresistible, that no alternative was left to ministers, if they did not concede, but to relinquish office. We find him in the attitude of resistance towards the three momentous questions which then agitated the kingdom—the repeal of the corn laws, religious disabilities, and parliamentary reform; and, if he could have had his way, no modification would have been granted. I present the facts. During the Canning administration he succeeded, by very disingenuous means, in carrying an amendment to a proposed modification of the corn laws, continuing the prohibition till the price should reach sixty-six shillings per quarter. In the discussion of the Test and Corporation Acts, he manifested great anxiety to show, that he could not without inconsistency vote for the bill, and yet oppose the abolition of religious disabilities. "There is no person in this house," said he, "whose feelings and sentiments, after long consideration, are more decided than mine are with regard to the subject of the Roman Catholic claims; and, until I see a great change in that question, I shall certainly oppose it." Allusion had been made by Earl Grey, in moving the address from the throne, to parliamentary reform, and the Duke in reply said—"The noble earl has alluded to something in the shape of a parliamentary reform, but he has acknowledged that he is not prepared with any measure of reform; and I have as little scruple to say, that his Majesty's government is as totally unprepared as the noble lord. Nay, on my own part, I will go further, and say, that I have never read or heard of any measure, up to the present moment, which could in any degree satisfy

my mind that the state of the representation could be improved, or rendered more satisfactory to the country at large. I am fully convinced that the country possesses at the present moment a legislature which answers all the purposes of legislation, and this to a greater degree than any legislature ever has answered in any country whatever. Under these circumstances I am not only not prepared to bring forward any measure of this nature, but I will at once declare, that, *as far as I am concerned, as long as I hold any station in the government of the country, I shall always feel it my duty to resist such measures when proposed by others.*"

He had been called to the premiership on the tacit understanding that, being opposed to Catholic Emancipation, it should not be entertained, and he resisted, as long as resistance was possible, so that though that measure was eventually passed, the credit is not due to him. He had no liking for it; it was thrust on him. We grant at once, that of all men he was the fittest to conduct that measure to a successful issue, when once satisfied it was a duty; but, as in his military, so in his political, career, we must look to the *tactics* by which his designs were accomplished, rather than to the principles involved, for it was neither the justice nor the salutariness of the measure that enlisted him—it was a state necessity.

His memorable declaration against reform, subsequently made, and which we have already quoted, took the country by surprise, and ended, very properly, in the overthrow of his administration. The Duke's unpopularity at this time, aggravated as it was by his unwise proceedings against the press, was not without good reason. The people were instant for reform. Here was a vicious system of representation which demanded adjustment, yet he was unyielding, if not antagonistic. Had the change been hazardous, such dogged persistency might have found an apology; but no state risk was involved, as he might have seen, if he had that foresight, that discernment, that far-reaching intellect claimed for him by his admirers. The necessity, the justice, the moderation of the popular demand was clear, and needed not to have incurred so much hostility, even although signs of restiveness were manifested. As space compels us for the present to forbear, we content ourselves

by saying, that no order of greatness, however dazzling, or however much in repute with the world, can secure our admiration, unless

it be *moral* greatness—a quality with which, so far as we have seen, the late Duke was but indifferently endowed. ARISTIDES.

Politics.

OUGHT THE GRANT TO MAYNOOTH TO BE WITHDRAWN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

MAN has been defined as a "religious animal," and certainly it is one of the strong tendencies of his nature to acknowledge his dependence upon some higher power. We learn that this tendency was manifested in the earliest ages of the world, without going to the sacred writings, for we find it evidenced in ruined temples, mouldering altars, and rudely-sculptured stones. And this tendency is not only antique, but it is universal; for, under whatever sky man may have reared his tent, there he has bent before the shrine of some supreme being whom he has worshiped as "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord." These acts of devotion he has felt to be solemnly obligatory upon him, while they have developed his higher nature and ministered to his internal peace. But his religion has not stopped here—it has taken cognizance of his social relationship, enjoined upon him the performance of certain duties, and the pursuit of a given line of conduct. These may have been various, sometimes opposing; but in Christianity holiness has become incarnate in the most perfect form, and righteousness enforced by the weightiest and most solemn considerations. No wonder, then, that the importance of religion to a community should ever have been recognised, and that rulers should always have felt it to be their duty to encourage it; and if it has been thus with the false, we might presume it would be thus with the perfect and the pure.

The duty of the government to provide for the religious wants of the people is fully recognised in the British constitution, and hence we have an established church, and "grants" for other denominations. The character and claims of our English establishment we shall not now discuss, for we believe that it is supported by government, not on account of any merits it may possess, but because it did maintain, and

perhaps still maintains, the opinions held by the majority of the people. This is the only principle on which any government can consistently act, in taking any church under its patronage; and that it is this principle on which our own government has generally proceeded, is shown by the fact, that while we have Episcopalianism established in England, we have Presbyterianism in Scotland, and Catholicism in some of the colonies. But there is one part of the United Kingdom in which the anomaly is presented of the church of the minority being established by law, and the members of the church of the majority made to yield her pecuniary support. We need scarcely say that it is Ireland to which we refer—poor, misgoverned Ireland; yet still

"The fairest flower of the ocean,
The first gem of the sea."

Yes, it is in Ireland, with her teeming Catholic population, that that greatest injustice of modern times has been witnessed—an English Protestant church established in a Catholic country. Here for years the Catholics, who formed four-fifths of the population, were subject to pains and penalties on account of their faith, and compelled to render support to the church that persecuted them.

With regard to the provision made in Ireland for the religion of the people, it has been well said by the "Edinburgh Review," which no one will charge with Popish predilections—"That the episcopal palaces, the episcopal estates, the chapter estates, the parsonages, the glebes, and the tithes of the whole country should be given over to one-tenth of its population; that another tenth should receive a regular provision for its clergy from the imperial revenue; and that the remaining four-fifths should obtain no public aid in supplying their spiritual wants, except a trifling sum for a seminary; that the endowed

minority should be the richest, and the unassisted majority the poorest, portion of the community; that the minority should be the intruders into an endowment of which the majority were the ancient founders and possessors—all this some may think an injury, others, among whom we find ourselves, *an insult and injury combined*; some may suppose that it is the unhappy but necessary link by which Great Britain and Ireland are united; others that it is the wedge which is to separate them: some may believe that it is one of the outworks of the Church of England; others that it forms the platform from which that church can be most easily attacked. But no British statesman, whether Tory or Whig, Conservative or Radical, however he may think it ought to be dealt with in practice, dares to defend or even palliate it in principle. No one ventures to affirm that, if the past could be recalled, he would propose such an institution—no one would tamely submit to the imputation of such folly and such injustice—no one, in a word, conceals his regret that our ancestors were guilty of such an injustice and such a crime. If such are the feelings of bystanders, what must be those of sufferers? If Protestants are filled with shame and remorse, what can be expected from Catholics but indignation and hatred?"

These words are weighty with truthful import, and yet, in the presence of such a state of things as they depict, and while only one Catholic college has been endowed with a small portion of the money extracted from Catholic pockets, there are not wanting multitudes of would-be-thought friends of right and justice, all the world over, who cry out that the government has done a wicked deed, and that the grant to Maynooth ought to be withdrawn.

How such a conclusion can be satisfactorily arrived at we are at a loss to know. Is it that the college is not properly fulfilling the purpose for which it was endowed? The

proposal made in the last parliament for "an inquiry," seems to indicate a suspicion of this; but institutions, like individuals, ought to be treated as innocent until they are proved to be guilty. In the case before us there is not much probability of an inquiry leading to an adverse result, as the testimony of opponents shows. We have before us a letter from John Macgregor, hon. sec. of the Protestant Alliance, entitled "An Hour at Maynooth," in which we find the following remarks:—"Yesterday I visited the College at Maynooth, carried thither by curiosity and the Mullingar Railway. Dr. Russell, the professor of Ecclesiastical History, received me very courteously, and was most kind in his attention, *answering every inquiry without hesitation*. . . . The students appear healthy and cheerful. . . . I found a number of young men in the library—a very cold room—in which, Dr. Russell said, *there was a bible, and each student had a copy*. . . . *Now there is no need at all of inquiry in the matter*. The plain fact is, that England pays for a large and successful school and college of Popish priests, and the more thriftily the money is expended, the more extensively and practically are the effects of this college felt. *I have no doubt that the funds are laid out by the Pupils scrupulously according to their avowed intention of applying them*. Inquiry would be needful only under surmise of misappropriation of the money, or carelessness, or profuseness of expenditure.

"There is nothing very startling in the foregoing account of Maynooth. No tale of horrors, or discovery of dark chambers or thumb screws. Any person who chooses may see for himself what I have narrated."

Such, then, is the testimony of a sworn opponent to the college, who went out to visit it in the hope of being enabled to make some "startling disclosures;" but how different the result! We commend this fact to the attention of our thoughtful readers, and leave the subject for the present. X

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN the discussion of the present question unusual care is necessary to preserve equanimity of temper, calmness of reasoning, and freedom from exaggeration. It is proverbial that religio-political questions are "*questionis rextatus*;" but he who advocates truth from

the love of it need not become irascible and petulant when his darling is assailed by sophistic reasoning and hyperbolic assertion, as neither will supply the place of facts and argument: his code of honour does not recognise these weapons of warfare "in the battle

of reason and the clash of words;" he is sheltered by no glass house, therefore he fears not the throwing of stones.

Being a lover of truth myself, I take part in the present discussion with a strong hope that no personal feeling will be indulged on either side—"principles, not men," must be our "*mot du combat*." Pardon me, therefore, my friends, if, in stating my reasons why the grant to Maynooth College ought to be withdrawn, I should not look at the matter from the same point of view as yourself, or arrive at the same conclusions. Be pleased to weigh the matters stated, examine the arguments used, and test the inferences drawn; if anywhere you detect error, kindly set me right, and you will lay me under great obligation; but if I am correct, if my conclusions are properly drawn from sure premises, then embrace my views cordially, and we will happily walk together in the path of truth.

Religion denotes a system of truths of which God is the great subject—a system of affections and conduct of which God is the supreme object. Although truth in an abstract manner may exist necessarily and independently of all other existences, yet, in the sense in which it is here employed, truth, even in its simplest form, involves observation and perception of it as truth received by man. Observation and perception are voluntary efforts of the individual mind—actions which cannot be performed by one for another; thus, all the sensible qualities of physical objects must be observed by the senses, and be perceived by the mind, before their nature can be understood by man. If, then, matters of fact cognizant by all the senses, which are the simplest forms of truth, must be made the objects of observation and perception, how plain is it that that important system of truths of which God is the great subject must be a personal and individual concern.

Religion is also a system of affections and conduct. The affections are powerful attributes by which man expresses his love or hatred, desire or aversion, veneration or abhorrence. Conduct is understood as the performance of deeds, good or evil, &c. Now all these things are of a moral character, and, as such, the possessor or subject of them can alone receive the merit or demerit which naturally attaches to them. No one can love

or hate, do good or evil, for another; his moral feelings and actions are his own property, and he cannot alienate them; they are strictly personal; therefore religion, either as a system of truths, or of affections and conduct, is essentially a personal matter. In accordance with this reasoning is the declaration of Him to whom all Christians meekly bow, when He says (Mark xvi. 16), "*He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be condemned.*" In the epistle to the Romans (x. 10) we read, "With the heart man believeth." So (Jas. ii. 17), "Faith without works is dead." Herein belief is the inward, mental perception of the truths of the gospel. Baptism and works are the practical exposition of the affections and conduct having God for their object, the union of faith and works as a personal, individual matter. The sinner, having received divine grace into his soul, seeks to make known to others the religion he has found so valuable to his own happiness, present and prospective; and this religious exertion, having its source in the gratitude of the saved sinner, is consequently voluntary—that is, dependent on the will of the individual Christian.

The church of Christ is an assembly or association of individuals who have exercised repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and, consequently must be characterized by those principles and feelings which are possessed by the individual Christian; hence it must be a voluntary institution, whose nature, government, and action are also voluntary, in accordance with the well-known axiom, "*The whole is made up of the sum of its parts.*" Thus, religion is not only a voluntary matter as it affects the thoughts, feelings, personal conduct, and growth in grace of the individual Christian, but also extends to all institutions formed by Christians for the propagation of Christianity.

Let us now apply these remarks to the religious college of St. Patrick at Maynooth, and its support by government aids. The origin of Maynooth College was in this wise:—"Drs. Troy and O'Reilly petitioned for permission to erect a college for the education of Roman Catholic priests, and in the year 1795 an act was passed in the Irish parliament 'for the better education of persons professing the Popish or Roman Catholic

religion.'"^{*} In accordance with this permission Maynooth College was erected by the Roman Catholics. The original design of the institution is thus shown to be the education of religious priests and others in matters connected with their religion. This constitutes it a religious institution. But I have previously shown that all effort, personal and institutional, made by Christians for the propagation of their religion, to be in accordance with reason and the fundamental truths of the Christian religion, must be voluntary; therefore the government grant in support of Maynooth College ought to be withdrawn, all grants being destructive to the voluntary principle, which is essential to all religious institutions.

Another point of view from which this subject may be satisfactorily examined by the truth-seeker is found in the history of the endowment. As I have before intimated, at the first liberty or permission only was asked to erect a college, and the act of 1795 makes no permanent engagement or promise of government aid; the act only *permits* the commissioners of his Majesty's treasury to issue any sum, not exceeding £8,000, "towards establishing the said academy," as a matter of donation, at the discretion of the commissioners; no annual grant, no continued support of the institution after it was set in operation. In accordance with this view are the remarks of the late Duke of Wellington in a debate on the question, April 28, 1808. He said:—"The fact was, that when the Maynooth institution was first established, it was not intended that it should be maintained by the public purse; the memorial presented previously to the foundation of that establishment prayed for a charter in order that the funds might be better secured." In this act of 1795 was the first violation of sound principle; and from less to more our rulers have proceeded, until the act of 1845 has placed the institution on its present ample and secure footing, in direct opposition to the wishes of the majority of the Queen's subjects in Great Britain and Ireland. Hence, by the withdrawal of the grant there can be no breach of the public faith—no dishonour to the legislature,

as it would only place the Roman Catholics in the position they asked to occupy in their memorial of 1795; that would be withdrawn which was not originally asked, nor intended to be given. By the existence of this simple fact a whole host of high-sounding objections to its withdrawal, which otherwise might be raised, are entirely prevented.

The teachings in this college are such as render the withdrawal of the grant necessary. The number of Roman Catholics in Great Britain and Ireland is, according to the best authorities, about ten millions, while the numbers opposed to Roman Catholicism amount to more than sixteen millions; yet the whole of these sixteen millions are required to contribute to the support of an establishment, to the amount of £26,360^{*} per annum, for the express propagation of that which, in their estimation, is error of a vital character, and injurious to the temporal and spiritual well-being of mankind.

The president of the college in 1826, Dr. Crotty, together with the professors, made a return to the royal commissioners of the books used as class-books in the college, and of the standards referred to by them in the course of their instructions. In this list no mention is made of the *Bible* as a class-book, nor as a standard for reference, both of which it ought to be in an institution for the education of teachers of the christian religion. Further, according to this list it appears that the doctrine is taught in this college "that there are five causes which take away the obligation of an oath;" one of said causes is, "the prohibition of a superior;" another cause is, "the making of the oath void to him to whom the swearer is subject;" and, observe, it is understood as *spiritual superior and spiritual subject* in these sentences, as is manifest by the illustration, "Thus the superior or general of all the orders of the monks can validly, even without cause, make void the oaths of his subjects," and his subjects are the monks of his own order, no matter where resident—in England, France, Germany, or America; all are in the same subjection, and he is their superior; hence, while the superior resides at Rome, and is frequently a high dignitary of the Romish church and state, he can absolve his subjects,

^{*} This and the following quotations are from "The Bulwark," No. 8, January, 1852, to which all are referred who wish to see more on these points.

^{*} The amount paid from the revenue between January, 1861, and January, 1852.

the monks, from the obligation of their oaths and their allegiance to their sovereigns.

It is also taught in this college, that, "as forgers of money, and other malefactors, are delivered by secular princes to death, much more heretics, from the time they are convicted of their heresy, can not only be excommunicated, but be justly slain;" and *heresy* must be understood as *any deviation from the decrees of the Romish Church*, either in religion or science. Galileo was declared an heretic because he affirmed the now recognised fact that the earth revolves on its own axis, and in its own orbit round the sun.

Again, it is taught in this college that "the spiritual commonwealth (that is, the Romish Church) may command the temporal commonwealth (the state), *which is subject to it, and compel it to change its administration and depose its princes* and set up others, when it cannot otherwise defend the spiritual good of the church."—"If, therefore, a prince, from being a Christian (that is, a Roman Catholic), becomes a heretic, the pastor of the church can shut him out by excommunication, and at the same time order the people not to follow him, and so deprive him of dominion over his subjects."

On these grounds I affirm that the grant to Maynooth College ought to be withdrawn.

For the sake of distinctness, I will briefly recapitulate. The grant ought to be withdrawn—

Because government aid to religious institutions is contrary to the nature of the christian religion, to reason, and to revelation.

Because, by the grant being made from the general revenue of the country, a majority of the Queen's subjects in Great Britain and Ireland are compelled to pay for the propagation of error.

Because the religious teachings of Maynooth are not made from the only valid source of the christian religion, viz., the holy scriptures.

Because the teachings of Maynooth are *immoral*, in that they teach men to disregard their plighted word, or oath: they are *persecuting*, for they teach that men may be punished—yea, even murdered—on account of their religious thoughts and feelings: they are *seditious*, as they teach that subjects may be released from their allegiance by the command of a fellow-man and a foreigner.

The whole of these conclusions I believe to be fairly proven by the foregoing testimony. Allow me, then, to conclude, dear reader, with the wish that, as we believe "*Magna est veritas, et prævalebit*," you will join with me in hastening the time when we may see, not only the grant to Maynooth College withdrawn, but every governmental grant to any and all institutions pretending to be christian, being assured that Christianity is only vital and healthy when it is voluntary.

L'OUVRIER.

The Societies' Section.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

The Kilmarnock Young Men's Biblical Association held their first annual soirée in Nelson-street schoolroom on Wednesday evening, Nov. 3, the president, Mr. John Stewart, in the chair. Mr. Samuel M'Gavin, the secretary, read the half-yearly report, from which it appeared that the association was in good working condition. He also read an essay on "The Prophet Samuel," drawing from Samuel's biography many excellent and practical lessons. After a service of fruit, Mr. William M'Whirter and Mr. James Rankin made some very pointed and practical remarks on the subject of the essay. After another service of fruit, Mr. Robert Kerr, vice-president, read a short address, in which he dwelt upon the great influence which every material object has upon another, and the greater influence that every man has upon his fellow, and the still greater influence that great men have upon the people—such were the

poet, the philosopher, the statesman, and the warrior. Samuel was a great man, and possessed a great influence over the people; but that influence was exerted for the glory of God and the nation's weal. As he owed that influence to his mother, primarily, the mothers present were urged to do as Hannah did; and the young ladies of Kilmarnock were exhorted to form themselves into an association similar to that on whose account they had met that evening. Samuel would acquire much of his mental excellence in youth, in an ordinary way, under the guidance and tuition of good old Eli, the high priest; and from this he took occasion to address his fellow-members on the importance of mental improvement; first, because it is *the mind* that constitutes the man; and, second, because *time is short*. In conclusion, he urged them ever to strive after mental excellence, and not to be content with present

attainments. The president offered a few practical observations, and closed a very interesting and happy meeting. May the association have many such!—R. K., Jun.

Dundee Literary Societies' Union.—*Lecture by the Rev. George Gilfillan.*—On Wednesday, Nov. 24, the Rev. George Gilfillan, president of this union, delivered, in Tay-square Chapel, the first of a series of lectures to young men. The subject of the lecture was, "The Characteristics and Prospects of the Present Age." After prayer, the reverend gentleman proceeded as follows:—"Before entering on the main subject of this evening's lecture, I mean, first, to propound and to reply to one or two objections which may meet me on the threshold of such a theme. It may be said, for instance, that it is a subject too large for the grasp of any mind, particularly in the compass of an hour; and so it would be, did any mind attempt wholly to grasp it, especially in a period so brief; but this I am not foolish enough to try. I wish simply to touch on some of the topmost summits of various things, gleaming out from that mist which, more or less, enwraps all our valley of vision. I leave the cavities and the windings of the lower glens to be explored by them that have more insight, more leisure, or more love for the perilous and perplexing survey. And, although it is impossible to exhaust in any lecture, or in any library of lectures, all the aspects of our wondrous mother age, yet, perhaps a stray sentence—a word in season here and there—may cast a little useful and precious light upon some side-angle or corner, or even hidden depth in the great whole. Another and a more formidable objection to any such survey, as I propose, lies in the extreme rapidity with which the most momentous changes are at present succeeding each other. The aspects of the age! Why, every year now is itself an age—every day, and even hour, is crowded with events—such as of yore were thinly sprinkled throughout centuries. How, then, keep up with such a swift and startling motion? How compute the revolutions of such a rapidly revolving and tremendous wheel? How daguerreotype the features of a Proteus, who is assuming every moment a new face? Believing, however, as I do, in the prevalence of general laws, of fixed trade-winds of tendency, and steady currents of progress, or to use other and better words—in the control, constant superintendence, and all-informing influence of a Divine mind, whose spirit at once impels and moves in the advancing wheels of society—I do not think myself presumptuous in asking, however imperfectly I may answer the questions, whither are we apparently bound?—what are the general characteristics, and the probable prospects, of the present age? Among the prominent characteristics of the age, I name—1st. Its disregard for antiquity growing in proportion to its knowledge of the ages that are past. 2nd. Its intense consciousness of itself, of its own merits and faults, weaknesses and powers. 3rd. Its universal restlessness, excitement, and irritation. 4th. Its tendency to run into extremes. 5th. Its strong assertion of individualism strangely co-existing with an appetite for great general united movements. 6th. Its desire to intermeddle with all knowledge, and to press that knowledge, if possible, into a unity, and to find for it a centre. 7th. Its thirst for change, especially in political, moral, and religious matters. 8th. Its

far-shooting mechanical energies and commercial movements, and spirit of universal enterprise. 9th. Its recognition of the vast importance of the popular element, and of the supreme necessity of attending to the wants, listening to the voice, and elevating the condition of the labouring classes; and, not to multiply characteristics unduly, I mention, lastly, the earnestness, the doubt, the hope, the fear, and the uncertainty—all of which are combining, in unequal proportions, to form our present strange and anomalous religious attitude and aspect. From these I select what seem to me the most peculiar, and which will be seen, ere I close, to bear most powerfully upon the main object which I have in view in the whole of this discourse. And they seem to me the following:—1st. The insulated position of our age. 2nd. Its exceeding restlessness. 3rd. The way in which its knowledge is increasing at all points, and seeking for a unity which hitherto it has not been able fully to find. 4th. Its singular state as to religion." On these various heads the reverend gentleman amplified in a long and eloquent address, which was frequently and loudly applauded.

Chalmers Society.—The second anniversary of this society was celebrated, on the 9th of December, at its place of meeting, the City School, Blackfriars, London—the Rev. C. F. Chase, rector of Blackfriars, in the chair. Tea being concluded, and the chairman having addressed the meeting, the report was read, from which it appeared that the general results of the society's operations were very encouraging. The number of members on the books was thirty-eight. During the year thirteen papers had been read, and three devotional meetings and eleven discussions held, the latter on the subjects of Lord Palmerston's retirement; universality of the Deluge; the Crystal Palace and the Sabbath; Wellington and Napoleon compared; the social influence of Calvinism; and the others on subjects suggested by this journal, in the course of which seventy-seven speeches had been made. Two of the members had emigrated, one of whom had filled the office of secretary, and hoped to spread operations of the same character. Addresses were then delivered by Mr. J. Davis, on "The Society;" Mr. J. S. Jones, on "The Christian Aspects of the Age;" and Mr. W. Stock, on "The Future;" in the intervals of which passages from *Henry VIII.* and Tupper's "Dirge on Wellington" were recited by Messrs. Stock and Silverlock with much taste and feeling. The second speaker took occasion warmly to recommend the *British Controversialist*, the influence of which is already manifest amongst the members. The proceedings concluded with the national anthem.—J. S. J.

Pontefract Mechanics' Institute.—The annual soiree of the above institute was held in the town-hall on Wednesday, 15th December. The hall had been tastefully decorated under the superintendence of James Rhodes, Esq., surgeon, and presented a most imposing appearance. At the hour of tea all available space was occupied, and we may state that double the number of tickets could have been sold if there had been sufficient accommodation. After tea, Thomas Routledge, Esq., mayor, having been called to the chair, addressed the meeting in a brief though pertinent speech. After alluding to the pleasure it gave him in meeting such a numerous company, and

touching upon the advantages of mechanics' institutions—the gratification it gave him in knowing that this institution was in a prosperous condition, and that it was progressing and enlarging its influence, he concluded with a truth telling appeal for practical support to the institution.—The report was then read by the secretary, Mr. J. E. Robinson, and showed that the institution was progressing, both as regards its subscribers and its operations. The Rev. S. Simmons then addressed the meeting, and was listened to with breathless attention during the course of a long address, in which he expatiated in a most eloquent and masterly manner on the advantages of such institutions, touching upon their beneficial, moral, social, religious, and intellectual tendencies.—Mr. Traice, from Leeds, followed in his usual happy and humorous manner, keeping the audience almost in a continued state of laughter; but yet throwing out some of the most sound, useful, and practical remarks.—Mr. Heaton, of Leeds, then followed in a speech the most earnest and practical we ever remember to have listened to, and concluded with that noble poem of Longfellow, "Excelsior."—The Rev. T. Dennison, the Rev. C. Ellis, and other gentlemen, afterwards addressed the meeting, and were listened to with the deepest attention and delight. We must not forget to mention that the members of the Wakefield Madrigal Society were in attendance, and that they, along with our talented pianist, Mr. Jeremiah Rhodes, contributed much to the evening's entertainment. Though our new and highly-popular member for the borough, B. Oliveira, Esq., was prevented by his parliamentary duties from being present as announced, yet, we think, never has there been a more interesting meeting of the Pontefract Mechanics' Institution; and never has there been so large an attendance of all classes, from the highest to the lowest.

We may state that the institution has a good library, news-room, reading-room, discussion class, &c. &c. The latter-named class meets every Tuesday evening, and proceeds as follows:—One Tuesday evening, debates; the next Tuesday evening, recitations, and readings from the works of our best authors; the next evening, debate; and the fourth evening, an essay from one of the members, &c. Our next topic for debate is the Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington. The *British Controversialist* is supplied regularly, and several of the members of the institution are also its regular subscribers, the number of which, we are happy to say, is on the increase.—J. N. C.

Runcorn Mutual Improvement Society.—The history of this society presents us with notices of many changes of fortune; for, although at times the society has been loudly cheered, and the members were numerous and industrious, unfortunately, when the charm of novelty passed away, many left the society to join their old associates and pursuits; yet through all this, and through many other difficulties, the committee, with increasing energy, determined to continue the society.

In February, 1850, there was no institution in the town of Runcorn for the improvement of young men. This lack was felt by some who were desirous of improving themselves in reading, writing, and the elements of a sound education. A meeting of the young men of Runcorn

was called, and attended by about thirty of the "working class." The object of the meeting was stated; rules for a society were suggested; plans, &c., brought forward; but nothing definitely arranged. Another meeting was called, at which there was a larger attendance than at the previous one, and rules were adopted for the future management of the society. It was resolved that two nights a week should be allowed for mathematical instruction and the reading of historical and scientific works; and that on Friday evenings essays should be read, and occasional lectures delivered, by the members. The number of members increased very rapidly; in April, 1850, they numbered 250; but the grand misfortune was, that our place of meeting was too small. Our times of meeting were limited to three nights. In this prosperous condition we passed the summer and autumn of 1850. In the spring of 1851 the number of members began to decline. The committee, seeing this, was determined, if possible, to revive the interest by establishing a reading room, which was supplied with newspapers and periodicals. This did not secure that lasting success which the committee anticipated, and the members gradually left the society, with the exception of about eight, who were determined not to give it up. They decided upon calling a special meeting, at which only eight were present; when it was thought fit to remodel the society and put it altogether on a different footing. To accomplish this fresh rules were necessary, and we have to thank you for the model rules in your journal, which is the framework of our own. We determined to devote Tuesday evenings to mathematical instruction; Thursday evenings for a discussion class (the most attractive feature in the society); and Friday evenings to elocution exercises, under the care of the ex-vice-president, Mr. Dillon. The number of our members kept very steady until we decided upon the delivery of lectures. Two of these, on "Polynesia," were given by the Rev. J. T. Jesson, late missionary in Tahiti, and president of the society, and secured for us a few new members. After the lectures a discussion ensued, viz., "Was Oliver Cromwell justified in signing the document for Charles to be beheaded; and was he a Christian?" The next questions for discussion were, "Was Napoleon or Wellington the greatest general, and which was most deserving of our esteem?" "Which most deserves the esteem of mankind, the Poet or Legislator?" "Is Universal Suffrage just or desirable?" "Would the Ballot be beneficial in its effects?" "Supposing the War between the English and Kaffirs be won by the English, would it be beneficial to England in a commercial point of view?" When these discussions were closed, a lecture was delivered on "India" by the Rev. John Edmonds, of St. Helen's, late of India; after which the first social party of the society was held in the Bethesda schoolroom, at which tea was provided; and two essays were read by Messrs. Nield and Slade, followed by several speeches and recitations of a pleasing character. The subjects of our next discussions were—"From which do we derive the greatest amount of pleasure—Hope or Memory?" "Would an Extension of the Suffrage be beneficial to England?" Mr. Brown next gave a lecture on the "Currency." A second social party took place, and was well attended. An essay was read by

Mr. D. Speakman, secretary, "On the Advantages derived from the Study of History." After which, Mr. Brown delivered an eloquent address on the beneficial effects of Mutual Improvement Societies, and a second essay was read by Mr. R. K. Naylor on "Biography; comprising more particularly Milton and the Men of his Times;" at the conclusion of which recitations were given by the members, which added much to interest the company. Mr. Pritchard delivered a discourse on "Hope and Perseverance."

The last quarter opened with a lecture "On the Advantage arising from the Study of English History from its earliest sources," by Mr. Brown, when an interesting discussion arose; this was followed by another on the question, "Was Julius Cæsar justified by any act of honesty in invading the land of our forefathers? What was his aim? Was he desirous of elevating the people, or was it for his own personal ambition and aggrandizement?"

On Friday evening, Nov. 26, the third soirée for the present year was held in Bethesda school-room, the Rev. J. T. Jesson, president of the society, in the chair, when about 120 members and friends sat down to tea. After tea the intellectual business of the evening commenced by a speech from the president, who dwelt at some length on the importance of such societies. Longfellow's "Excelsior" was then given by one of the members—(from this poem the "motto" of the society is taken). Mr. Brown gave an appropriate address "On the Advantages of being connected with Discussion Classes;" after which numerous pieces were recited by members of the society. The recitations were selected from the works of Shakspeare, Darwen, Byron, Mackay, C. Matthews, Colman, Addison, Campbell, Hood, Longfellow, Wilson, &c. &c. The room was profusely decorated with evergreens, enclosing appropriate mottoes. After a hearty vote of thanks to the ladies for their kindness in presiding at the tables, the president closed the meeting, and the company separated, highly delighted with the entertainments.

The number of members now in connexion with the society is twenty-six, all young men of the working class, and we have the prospect of many more joining us. Several of the members are subscribers to the *British Controversialist*. It will afford us great pleasure to extend its circulation as far as possible, as the benefit derived from it is very great.—D. J. S.

Birmingham.—*Wesley Chapel Mutual Improvement Society.*—The yearly tea meeting of this society was recently held, and presided over by Mr. J. W. Felvus, who in the course of the evening delivered an eloquent speech on knowledge. It appeared, from the report read by the secretary, that during the past year thirty-five subjects have been discussed, and seventeen other evenings have been devoted to improvement in elocution. Many of the members spoke on the subject of "Improvement Classes," showing their necessity for extending knowledge and training the mind. A plan was also suggested for extending the society by public lectures during the winter months, and the money realized by such means to be laid out in books for the use of this society. The society takes in two numbers of the *British Controversialist*, and several members are in possession of the two yearly volumes. I

need hardly remark that all have been greatly benefited by their perusal.—J. G. F., Sec.

The Madras Young Men's Literary Society.—I am sure that you, your readers, and all interested in the intellectual advancement of mankind, will be gratified to learn that even in India, which English people call the land of darkness and heathenism, literary societies have been founded, for the advantage of persons in the middle and lower walks of life. Here, at Madras, the second city of British India, a Young Men's Literary Society has been in existence for the last four years. At first its prospects were dreary; but now, I am happy to say, they are cheering. At the last anniversary meeting of the society, Sir Christopher Rawlinson, Knt., our chief justice, presided, and was well pleased with the progress and state of the society. Sir W. Burton, Knt., our puisne judge, the Bishop of Madras, Mr. Advocate-General Morton, Dr. Alexander Hunter, the founder of the School of Industrial Art at Madras; Mr. Henry Mead, the able editor of the *Athenæum*, the leading paper of our city, and several other influential gentlemen, have kindly supported the society.

The object of the society is the mental and moral improvement of the young men of the city, and this is to be effected by means of lectures, classes, and a suitable library.

Lectures are delivered before the members once a month, or as often as lecturers can be procured. There are not many in Madras who are capable of lecturing, and those who possess the capability are diffident to face an audience; hence great difficulty is experienced, for lecturers are not paid for their trouble, as in England.

There are three classes in connexion with the society—the Discussion, the Political Economy, and the Tamil classes. These classes meet weekly, each on a separate day. They are well attended, but not so well as they deserve. At the first-mentioned class topics of a local or general nature are discussed, and the debates are, at times, particularly interesting. The text-book used in the second-named class is Burton's "Social and Political Economy," one of Chambers's series. This class is conducted on the mutual instruction principle, for the want of an efficient teacher. In the Tamil class the Tamil language is studied under a competent moonshee, or native teacher. The Tamil—or Malabar language, as it is commonly called—is the vernacular of the city of Madras and nearly one-third of the Madras presidency, and is spoken by upwards of ten millions of souls.

I am sorry that I cannot give a favourable account of the library of the society; however, measures are now in course of execution for placing this department of the society's operations in an efficient condition.

We have also a reading-room, open daily, and supplied with nearly all the local periodicals and newspapers. The *Illustrated London News*, *Punch*, the *Weekly News and Chronicle*, "Chambers's Edinburgh Journal," and the "Edinburgh Review," are received regularly from England. The "Calcutta Review" is also in the reading-room. Your excellent periodical is subscribed for by several members of the society, and they are greatly pleased with its contents. Several of the debated subjects have been discussed in the proper class.

To create a general interest in the discussion class, quarterly réunions are held, and certain members of the class play prominent parts in them.

I forgot to say the society entirely excludes sectarian views on religion, for it has among its members Christians of every denomination—Europeans and their descendants, who are called Eurasians, or East Indians; and Hindoos and Mahometans—men of every religion, caste, and

colour. Each member pays, monthly, eight annas, or one shilling.

I have, I think, given you sufficient information respecting the Madras Young Men's Literary Society, and trust that you will kindly insert this letter in the "societies" portion of your interesting publication, for the information of all well-wishers of literary and kindred associations, seeing that it has travelled ten thousand miles!—A MEMBER.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

134. C. C. K. would be exceedingly obliged to any of the readers of this periodical if they could inform him how to set about making a telescope of sufficient power to render the satellites of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, visible, &c.; the price, the amount of power, and every other necessary information to be known upon this subject.

135. I have for some time felt it necessary that I should pursue some systematic course of reading, but have been deterred from doing so by not knowing which would be the most proper books. Perhaps some of your numerous readers would be kind enough to direct me as to the most proper books a Sunday school teacher should engage his attention to, as I wish to make all my studies subservient to my Sunday school teachings.—EDWARD.

136. Will any of your numerous correspondents be kind enough to furnish me, through the medium of the magazine, with a list of books in law and general literature, which may be read by a young man who is not restricted to time, but can devote at least eight hours a day to close and continuous study?—A LAW STUDENT.

137. Perhaps some of your correspondents, who so kindly assist the studious, can descend to a trifling matter, but one which is sometimes a course of considerable vexation to those who read through the winter, and inform me, what is the best lamp for reading by? I want one which is economical and gives a good light and little trouble. I have tried camphine, which answers the two first particulars, but requires constant attention to prevent it from smoking, and thus takes the mind from the book.—L. T. L.

I should be greatly obliged if any of your correspondents could furnish me with answers to any of the following questions:—

138. What is the cause and nature of fog and mist in cities as well as in the country? Are the effects arising from them prejudicial to health? and if so, why? Why does the breath and all kinds of vapour become so easily visible in foggy weather?

139. Which is the most correct way of writing and pronouncing the name of the Arabic impostor and his followers; and of that body of men who formerly ruled the land of Egypt, the *Mamelukes*?

140. The other day a friend of mine stated that what was logically true was sometimes practically false, and as a proof of his assertion stated that he could prove the monstrous absurdity that the minute hand of a clock will never overtake the

hour hand. He said, "Suppose the time by the clock is 5 minutes to 1 (or any hour you please); by the time the minute hand has moved over that 5 minutes, the hour hand will have moved over $\frac{1}{12}$ of 5 minutes (for the hour hand moves $\frac{1}{12}$ as fast as the minute hand). By the time the minute hand moves over that $\frac{1}{12}$ of 5 minutes, the hour hand will have gone over $\frac{1}{12}$ of $\frac{1}{12}$ of 5 minutes. When the minute hand has got over that space, the other will have moved over $\frac{1}{12}$ of $\frac{1}{12}$ of $\frac{1}{12}$ of 5 minutes, &c., &c. And so we might go on for ever, and still the minute hand would never overtake the hour hand." Can any of your correspondents detect the fallacy in this?—HOMO.

141. I shall feel much obliged if some of your numerous talented correspondents would be so kind as to furnish me with a philosophical answer to the following query, viz., Is the earth at the present time any larger than it was when Adam and Eve were its only inhabitants? I think it will not be denied that an affirmative reply would be somewhat plausible, when we take into consideration the innumerable myriads of animals and vegetables, the race of mankind included, which have existed on its surface since the creative fiat of the Almighty organized the primitive chaotic mass into the beautiful and endlessly-diversified arrangement which we now behold. For my own part, notwithstanding the attempt of a friend to settle the question negatively, I am still inclined to the affirmative opinion. There can be no doubt that the greater portion of the remains, animal and vegetable, of the intervening ages of the world having become resolved into its original elements, will have returned to fill up the vacuum, so to speak, occasioned by its abstraction and appropriation to the requirements of organized existences; yet, it appears to me that, although the disposal of by far the largest portion may be thus accounted for, there will still remain something over and above this, which must necessarily augment very considerably, in the course of ages, the solid bulk of the earth. As I have not yet met with any one with whose explanation I have been satisfied, I hope some of your correspondents will do me the favour of answering this question.—J. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

[The questions to which the numbers refer will be found in Vol. III.]

103. *Monmouthshire not in Wales.*—Those who feel interested in the recent notice having

reference, in part, to the annexation of Monmouthshire to England, will, doubtless, be amused with the following indignant repudiation of the connexion, which I extract from a letter which appeared in the *Star of Gwent* newspaper of the 10th October:—

"Whereas Cambria never did *shut out* her own beautiful Gwent from the principality; but, by the bonds of historical recollections—of national spirit and of native language, has held for centuries, and will hold for ever, her thirteen counties united.

"In the reign of King Henry VIII. the jurisdiction of Monmouthshire was separated from that of Wales, and included in the circuit of the English judges; therefore, say some, it became an English county! In the present day, all the Welsh counties are taken into the circuits of the English judges; therefore, according to the same process of deduction, it must follow that the whole principality is veritably extinct, notwithstanding its native population, and the title still derived from it by the heir to the British empire!

"Gwent is still the Welsh name for Monmouthshire; and the district comprised in that county has, through all ages of the country's authentic history, been included within the varying boundaries of the territory of Gwent, or especially distinguished by that local appellation. Its inhabitants have, from immemorial time, been reckoned among the undoubted descendants of the ancient Britons. The etymological distinctions of the Cymric race, the hereditary preservation of their national authors, the continued traditions of the thirteen counties of the principality, the works of the bards, and the pedigrees deduced from the four royal and fifteen noble tribes, constitute altogether a mass of incontestable evidence, against which an act of parliament, passed by a despotic Tudor, opposes itself in vain. So long as Monmouthshire continues to be inhabited by its ancient Cymric race, it must still continue to be acknowledged by the other twelve counties as an integral part of the principality."—B. W. P.

114. *The Decomposition of Water.*—Water is a chemical compound of two elements—hydrogen and oxygen—in equal proportions. If we add to water another element capable of overcoming the affinity of its constituents for each other, and combining with one of them, it is then decomposed. Hydrogen may be obtained from water by the following method:—Procure from a tinman's shop three or four pounds of zinc clippings, and melt them in a ladle; pour the fluid metal into a mould made in some *damp* sand, so as to form a cylindrical bar; fasten a piece of copper bell-wire to the end of the bar, and continue it in a spiral coil to the other end, leaving a space of the eighth of an inch between each coil. Place the bar thus prepared in a wide-mouthed glass bottle, and half fill it with clean water; then add one-fourth of the quantity of water of sulphuric acid by measure. The oxygen of the water combines with the zinc, forming the oxide of zinc, and setting its co-atoms of hydrogen free, which are attracted by the copper wire and evolved from it. The sulphuric acid removes the oxide of zinc from the surface of the bar, forming the sulphate of zinc, which is held in solution by the undecomposed portion of the water. Hydrogen will be given off until the water becomes saturated with the sulphate of zinc; but upon adding fresh water the action re-

commences. Hydrogen will be evolved from the zinc without the copper wire, but not so fast or so pure. The copper wire causes a current of galvanic electricity to be generated, which increases the action upon the zinc, and facilitates the removal of the hydrogen. The expenditure of one ounce of zinc will yield 676 cubic inches of hydrogen. The gas is easily collected by fitting a cork in the mouth of the bottle, with a tube through its centre, which may convey the gas into bladders furnished with stop-cocks, or into the pneumatic trough, which latter is the more preferable mode. Water is also decomposed by an intensity-current of galvanic electricity. The positive and negative wires of a battery should be connected with platina wires immersed in a vessel containing acidulated water. Oxygen is given off from the positive wire, and hydrogen from the negative, both gases being in a perfectly pure state. They may be collected separately by suspending over each wire a small glass funnel, mouth downwards. The volume of hydrogen will be found to be double that of oxygen. There is very little danger of the explosion of the gases if care is used in the management of them. They should be kept in separate reservoirs, and a portion of the pipes leading therefrom should have a bundle of fine wire-gauze stuffed in tight, through which the gas will pass, but flame cannot. Hydrogen is not explosive in itself; but when mixed with atmospheric air, or in combination with oxygen, on being ignited the gases will explode violently. These gases have a great affinity for each other, or tendency to unite *mechanically*, in the proportion of two volumes of hydrogen to one of oxygen. On passing an electric spark through a tube containing the gases in those proportions they will explode, and unite *chemically*, forming water.—F. T. A.

129. *The Three most Rising Poets of the Present Day.*—According to the adage, "One half the world knows not what the other half is doing," the assertion in the "Ecclectic" respecting the avocations of our "three most rising poets" "seemed strange" to many readers of that journal besides our friend "Drumwhannan." The author of that beautiful and glowing tribute to the "Prince of Dreamers" is one of the most eloquent, genial, and discriminating critics of the day—George Gilfillan, of Dundee. In proof of this, his contributions to "Hogg's Instructor," "Ecclectic Review," "Tait's Magazine," "Critic," and "British Quarterly," together with his "Galleries of Literary Portraits," and "Bards of the Bible," need only to be referred to. Upon the publication of his first and second "Galleries" his fame as a literary portrait painter extended far and wide; but, when the "Bards" came to light, the religious and critical world were taken by surprise, and the volume was pronounced by many competent judges as the best work of the kind that had appeared.

The assertion, therefore, by coming from such a quarter, need not startle us; for one who can portray the bards, prophets, and apostles of "God's peculiar people" with such beauty, power, and success, and limn the mental visages and brainwork of the "great ones" of our own Israel with such insight and faithfulness, ought surely to know, if any one is capable of knowing, who are destined to be the greatest sons of Apollo in our own day. By referring to Mr. Gilfillan's

writings we can learn who he considers these persons to be—and they compose a noble triad—viz., Philip James Bailey, author of "Festus;" Sydney Yendys, of Cheltenham, author of "The Roman;" and Alexander Smith, of Glasgow, author of "A Life Drama." All three compositions are in the dramatic form. "Festus" is taken from the old legend of Dr. Faustus. "It is," says Gilfillan, "an original production. Some, indeed, have called it a mere cento from Goethe, Byron, and Shelley. We grant at once it bears a striking resemblance to some of the productions of those great three; but the resemblance is only of a kindred subject, and a kindred elevation. It is a new comet in an old sky. As well call 'Manfred' a copy of 'Faust,' or 'Faust' of 'Job,' as trace 'Festus' to any slavish imitation of any preceding poem. It takes its place instantly as the lawful member of a family of sublime eccentrics, who have pierced more or less boldly into forbidden regions 'beyond the solar path and milky way,' and whose fiery tresses tell, on their return, that they have neared the ardour, now of the light that is full of glory, and now of the flames that shall never be quenched. In all these, however, the argument and object are different. 'Job' contains a solution of the grand problem of the reconciliation of individual man to God, and to the difficulties of the universe through a divine medium. 'Faust' is a fragmentary attempt to settle the same question, apart from supernatural aid. 'Manfred' howls back to both that such a reconciliation is impossible, and that the riddle of the universe is absolutely illegible by man. Shelley's 'Prometheus' is the argument of 'Job' extended from man, the individual, to man, the species; while Bailey's 'Festus' is the argument of 'Job' applied in like manner to the whole human family. 'Festus' is a type of the fall and recovery of all men. The scene of 'Faust' and 'Prometheus' is in earth; that of 'Job' and 'Festus' is (essentially) in all eternity." Speaking further of "Festus," our author says:—"Its evident earnestness—its holy, yet charitable spirit—its inexhaustible fountains of imagery—its individual thoughts of splendour, like spots of sunshine lost, yet living amidst the dark forests around—its long, sweeping passages, which seem to grow visibly and audibly before you—its infinite variety—the spirit and music of its songs—the living aspect of its characters—the bold but striking generality of its descriptions—the simplicity, or force, or beauty, or languor of its language—the broad picture of life it presents—prove it, apart from its theological pretensions, the poem of the age's hope, even as 'Sartor Resartus' is the prose record of the age's experience. We should, perhaps, forbear to add that, besides the warm verdict of the thinking youth of the country, it has gained the praise of Bulwer, Montgomery, Wilson, Tennyson, Binney, David Scott, Professor Nichol, Samuel Brown, and others of equal note."

In concluding the article on Bailey, from which we have quoted, Gilfillan, in noticing other poetic spirits, says:—"But our greatest hope is fixed on Sydney Yendys, of Cheltenham. This young gentleman has written a drama, still in MS., of which Shelley himself would not have been ashamed."—"The scattered scenes of it which we have seen are very beautiful. Some of the present day, and its expected restoration to liberty,

is the subject, and is treated with genuine poetic feeling and patriotic fire."—"With something of the exaggeration of youth it has a richness of thought, a felicity of language, a copiousness of imagery, a music of versification, not easy in any first effort to be paralleled. It contains passages of beauty or power which absolutely startle you, and specimens of every variety of excellence, from the lofty declamation to the melting ballad. We stake whatever critical reputation we have on the prediction, that no recent poem, save 'Festus,' shall make a profounder impression upon the lovers of poetry, when it appears, than 'The Roman.' It is a very conflagration of genius, as well as, in many parts, a high triumph of art." Two years after Mr. Gilfillan, in a note, says:—"Since the above was written 'The Roman' has appeared, and its reception has fully justified our expectations. Critics of all sorts and sizes have vied in doing it homage. Its author, like Byron, 'awoke one morning and found himself famous.' He is destined yet to do greater works than this—yea, the very greatest." And now, to prove further that these are two of "the three," our author, in his "Sixth Bundle of Books," thus commences:—"Foremost amongst them let us put our beloved Bailey's 'Angel World'—beloved although we never had the pleasure of seeing his face in the flesh, or hearing one of his crackling puns, or listening to that long and significant silence which is his ordinary mood. *He and our yet dearer friend, Sydney Yendys, are undoubtedly the two rising poets of the age.* Now, why we prefer Yendys even to Bailey is, that he seems of a healthier mould. His thought, when it descends from heaven, never sinks till it be lost hissing amid the brushwood. It clears and burns a space around it. You can track every furrow of the thunderbolt."

Having already been longer than we anticipated, we must crave "Drumwhannan's" patience "a little longer," whilst we say a word respecting the "third rising poet." In Gilfillan's "Ninth Bundle" he reviews "The Glasgow University Album" for 1851, and thus says:—"A young man, Alexander Smith, belonging to their own city, who never entered a single class, nor once sat on the black stone, has written some poetry, in our estimation *the finest we have read since 'The Roman,'* and certainly better than any we have seen from the west for many a long year. It should arouse their generous emulation as well as their civic pride." Again, in the "Eclectic" for October, 1851, article "Recent Poetry," which we believe is from the pen of Mr. Gilfillan, we have a more full account of Mr. Smith:—"The last poem in our list," says the reviewer, "is, in many respects, a very remarkable one. In the first place, it is still in MS. Secondly, it is of great and peculiar merit; indeed, we have read nothing in MS., and but little in print, *equal to it, since we had the honour of overlooking 'The Roman' in its embryo.* Thirdly, its author, Mr. A. Smith, is just twenty-one, and, from the age of ten, has been employed ten hours a day in a commercial employment in Glasgow, and has only the spare hours rescued from daily drudgery for cultivating his mind and muse. And yet, amid all these difficulties, he has contrived to give himself a tolerable education, to read poetry extensively, and to write it beautifully. . . . The leading poem he has sent us is entitled 'A Life Fragment,' and is an attempt to 'set his own life

to music.' It has no plot. 'Life,' says Bailey, 'has none.' Nor is its plan peculiarly artistic. Its beauty and power lie in the exquisite thoughts and images, which are scattered somewhat too profusely over its pages." After giving some beautiful excerpts, the reviewer mentions "The Garden and the Child," "which poem must be published, although not here nor now. It reminds us of the style of Wordsworth's finer ballads, and has made us both weep and thrill." A similar sentence occurs in the "Tenth Bundle," and thus concludes:—"We must, however, have done. And now . . . we simply ask the public if they are to permit a youth of this calibre and promise to pine away amid mechanical drudgery, and, perhaps, go broken-hearted to an untimely grave? We ask especially our Glasgow friends, ever generous and warm-hearted, to look to it, that they neglect not one of the finest poets, perhaps—indeed, one promising to be the finest since Campbell—their good city has produced. Let not the sermon long ago preached over the dried-up spirit, crushed heart, water-written name, and

daisy-covered sod of John Keats, need to be so speedily repeated." Such, "Drumwhannan," is an outline of "the three," and of their works. Three mere youths; but on what themes have they written! Bailey says—

"When I the boyish feat began,
Which numbers now three years from its plan.
Not twenty summers had imbrowned my brow."

And this "feat" was a poem on the final salvation of universal man. Yendys, too, was comparatively young when he caused a "sensation;" but he had been up and doing ere this, for at the age of seven he wrote good verses, and read the deepest philosophy." When twenty-five, his "Roman" appeared, and the hitherto unknown youth had laudations and eulogies showered upon him, and was acknowledged as nature's child and freedom's bard. Smith writes not of the universe, nor yet of a nation, but the history of his individual mind. May the blessing of God rest upon them, and may all expectations respecting their future efforts be realized!—G. M.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

This section of our magazine was opened with the commencement of Vol. II., in January, 1851. Its object was to afford educational assistance to young people "resolutely determined on self-instruction and mental improvement." For the first year it embraced only a "Logic Class;" but, such was the interest manifested in it, that, with 1852, we opened classes for grammar and mathematics, and immediately enrolled nearly three hundred students. The majority of these have steadily pursued their labours up to the present time, and we have just had the pleasure of awarding upwards of fifty "prizes" and "certificates of merit" to those who stand highest on the registration lists. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of labour which these classes have entailed upon us, we are anxious to continue them, and willing even to increase their number and popularity, and we cordially invite the attention of our readers generally to the following outline of our plans for 1853:—

RULES.

1. Every reader of this magazine wishing to become a student shall, with his first exercise, forward his name and address in full, and also the initials, or *nom de plume*, under which he wishes his exercises to be registered on the wrapper of the magazine, and also state the class or section which he wishes to enter.
2. All letters must be posted within eighteen days of the publication of the exercises which they contain.
3. All exercises must be legibly written on foolscap or post paper, and on one side only.
- Each sheet must be headed with the writer's name or cognomen, and each exercise numbered and dated with the heading given in the magazine.

5. The exercises for each class must be forwarded in separate envelopes, and directed thus, with the name of the class distinctly written:—

The Editors of the British Controversialist,
65, Paternoster Row,
London.

* * * * Class.

6. Each communication must be prepaid in full, and no extraneous business referred to.
7. Violation of these rules will entail the passing of exercises unregistered.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Plans for 1853.

The tutor of the grammar class, in looking back upon the labours of the past year, feels convinced that his efforts have not been altogether in vain; on the contrary, he is assured, by the numerous communications which he has received, and the exercises he has examined, that many, both ladies and gentlemen, who, up to the time the class was established, had scarcely given the subject a thought, have, during the year, made no inconsiderable progress in this science; and he doubts not but, during the coming year, still greater progress will be made by a far greater number of pupils than during the past.

Though our labours of the past year have been great, we cannot hide from ourselves the truth that they must have been far greater had it not been for the kindness of the majority of our students in adhering to the rules laid down at the commencement of this class. We trust that they will not be more remiss during the present year.

The course which we intend to adopt during the ensuing year is—

- 1st. To introduce a *Junior Division*, who will take in order the exercises of the past year.

- 2nd. To continue our course of exercises for the benefit of our present students, and such as choose to enrol themselves in what we shall denominate our *Senior Division*.
- 3rd. In connexion with these divisions, to publish, from time to time, *Model Exercises* for the benefit of students, after the plan of the "*Solutions*" which have been published for the use of the mathematical class.
- 4th. With the monthly registration we shall, from time to time, give the *model number*, i. e., the number of marks accorded to a correct exercise. This plan, we hope, will obviate the difficulty which has frequently arisen during the past year with regard to these numbers.

Junior Division.

Perform "Exercise in Grammar, No. I.," contained in the *British Controversialist* for February, 1852.

Senior Division.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XI.

1. Make a form like the one given, and arrange the verbs under their proper heads:—

Active Transitive.	Active Intransitive.	Neuter.	Passive.

As the wind was boisterous, the captain ran the ship into harbour. The thief ran quickly, but was overtaken by the police. The Amazon was running at the rate of thirteen knots an hour when she took fire. The sloop was run down in the Channel. The Queen rules over Great Britain. The Bible is the proper rule of conduct. The last lines you ruled were not ruled straight. Rule the next better. The ruins of Kenilworth Castle are very fine. That drunkard will ruin his family, as he has already ruined himself. Did you hear the bells ring? They were rung in consequence of the wedding. This ring was given me by a dear friend. The return of Richard was hailed with delight. When do you return home? I have returned the books some weeks since. If they had not been returned before this I should have been fined. "They parted my garments among them." When do you part from your brother? Poor Hodges' part of the prize money was but small. Learn grammar, and you will be able to write grammatically. "Learn of me." They will land the cargo at the Cape of Good Hope, but we land at Port Philip. If you wish to insinuate that my friend is dishonest, say so. Being from home when the doctor called, I could not see him. Nothing is more erroneous than to suppose a man to be learned because he can talk fast. The boy made haste on his errand, and brought a message back. The laws of England are made by the parliament, and assented to by the Queen. Nature and revelation alike speak to us of God. The houses of parliament are being erected at an immense cost. The son was returning to England when he heard of the death of his mother. When the ship had reached Portsmouth

- the men were paid off. Nothing tends to rot wood sooner than for it to be alternately wet and dry. Many sheep have taken the rot through the wetness of the season. That post is rotting through want of paint.
2. Write out the following sentences, and underline the *generic verbs*:—
- You can come to-morrow. Your brother was here yesterday. Do come, if you can. I had your money. The man had heard of the catastrophe before I could reach him. I am going into the country at Christmas. Did you see the procession? I did. You might have seen it if you had chosen. Josiah must call at the office to-morrow, as he may be wanted. Thou art learned, but I am illiterate.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

- In this class we contemplate certain changes, which it may be well here to indicate. These changes are the following:—
- 1st. The adoption of numbers in the Registration, as in the grammar class.
- 2nd. The abolition of the old divisions of Arithmetic and Algebra, Geometry, and Mechanics, and the introduction of new ones, which will be five in number, and be named the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions. The work of each will be as follows:—
- 1st Division. The mechanical working of Questions in Arithmetic, and in Algebra to Equations of one unknown quantity.
- 2nd Division. Arithmetic as above, with a statement of the principles of the operation, and Algebraic Questions of two unknown quantities.
- 3rd Division. The work of the *Second*, with questions in Plane Mensuration, and Equations of three unknown quantities.
- 4th Division. The work of the *Third*, omitting Arithmetic, and including Quadratic Equations, the Mensuration of Solids, and Mechanics.
- 5th Division. The work of the *Fourth*, omitting Equations of one unknown quantity, and including questions requiring the use of Logarithms.

SOLUTIONS.—XI.

[The questions will be found in the number for November, 1852.]

Arithmetic and Algebra.

- Question 40. Subtracting the principal from the amount (100—5), we have the interest, 95s. Now, in 1 year 5s. produce, at the given rate, 3d.
- ∴ 3d. : 95s. ∴ 1 year : 380 years, the time required. R. T.
- Question 41. Here $p=5s.$, $a=100s.$, $R=1.05$;
- $$\log. a - \log. p = \log. 100 - \log. 5$$
- $$\therefore n = \frac{\log. R}{\log. 1.05}$$
- $$1.30103 = \frac{\log. R}{\log. 1.05}$$
- $$= .02119 = 61.398 = 61\frac{1}{2} \text{ years nearly. T. B.}$$
- Question 42. Let x = the rent of the house ;
- $150 - x$ = the rent of the garden ;
- $90 - (150 - x)$ = the rent of the field.
- Now, $x + 150 - x + 90 - 150 + x = 1.0$;
- from this we get $x = 90$, the rent of the house ;
- $150 - x$, or $90 = 60$, the rent of the garden ;
- $90 - 60 = 30$, the rent of the field.

Question 43. $3x^2 + 177 = 317$,

$$\text{or } \left(y = \frac{317 - 3x^2}{17}, \text{ or } x^2 = \frac{317 - 177}{3} \right) (1)$$

$$3y^2 + 17x = 173,$$

$$\text{or } \left(x = \frac{173 - 3y^2}{17}, \text{ or } y^2 = \frac{317 - 17x}{3} \right) (2)$$

Substitute value of y in 2nd equation $\left\{ 3 \left(\frac{317 - 3x^2}{17} \right)^2 + 17x = 173 \right.$

$$\text{or } \frac{301467 - 5706x^2 + 27x^4}{289} + 17x = 173$$

$$\times \text{ by } 289 \quad 301467 - 5706x^2 + 27x^4 + 4913x = 49997$$

$$\text{Transpose, \&c., } 27x^4 - 5706x^2 + 4913x = -251470$$

$$\text{Substitute differ- } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 301467 - 323347y^2 + 867y^4 \\ \text{ent values of } y, \quad - (602934 - 323347y^2) \\ y^2, \&c., \text{ for } x \dots \end{array} \right\} + (49997 - 867y^2) = -251470$$

$$\text{Trans- } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 867y^4 - 867y^2 + 323347y^2 - 323347y^2 \\ \text{pose } \end{array} \right\} = -301467 - 49997 - 251470 + 602934$$

$$\text{Contract } 867y^4 - 867y^2 = 0$$

$$y^4 - y^2 = 0$$

$$y^4 = y^2$$

$$y^2 = 1$$

$$y = 1$$

$$\text{Substitute } y \text{ in } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3x^2 + 17x = 173 \\ 17x = 173 - 3 = 170 \\ x = 10 \end{array} \right.$$

$$x = 10 \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} 3x^2 + 17x = 173 \\ 17x = 173 - 3 = 170 \\ x = 10 \end{array}} \right\} \text{Ans.}$$

D. D. S.

Geometry.

Question 20. Solidity of hemisphere,

$$= \frac{18 \cdot 5^3 \times 5236}{2} = 1657 \cdot 619425 \text{ cubic inches;}$$

solidity of cavity,

$$= \frac{18^3 \times 5236}{2} = 1526 \cdot 8176 \text{ cubic inches;}$$

\therefore solidity of shell,

$$= 1657 \cdot 619425 - 1526 \cdot 8176 = 130 \cdot 801825 \text{ cubic in.;}$$

weight of shell,

$$= \frac{130 \cdot 801825 \times 8878}{1728} = 672 \cdot 024634 \text{ ounces;}$$

weight of water,

$$= \frac{1526 \cdot 8176 \times 1000}{1728} = 883 \cdot 575 \text{ ounces;}$$

\therefore weight of bowl with water,

$$= 1553 \cdot 599634 \text{ ounces} = 97 \cdot 224978375 \text{ lb.}$$

W. D.

Mechanics.

Question 15. When the steam is cut off, the re-

$$\text{istance of the atmosphere} = 33 \times \frac{50^2}{10^2} = 825 \text{ lb.};$$

$$\text{friction} = 8 \times 100 = 800 \text{ lb.};$$

therefore, the work of the train,

$$= \frac{825 + 800 \times 50 \times 5280}{60} = 7150000.$$

After the steam is cut off, the mean velocity of

$$\text{the train} = 50 + 2 = 25 \text{ miles per hour;}$$

mean resistance of atmosphere,

$$= 33 \times \frac{25^2}{10^2} = 206 \cdot 25 \text{ lb.};$$

$$\text{friction} = 800 \text{ lb., as before;}$$

therefore, the distance the train will go before

$$\text{stopping} = \frac{7150000}{206 \cdot 25 + 800} = 7105 \cdot 59 \text{ feet.}$$

W. H. R.

Question 19. Resistance at 50 miles per hour,

$$= 50 \times \frac{50^2}{10^2} = 1250 \text{ lb.};$$

$$\text{velocity per minute} = \frac{50 \times 5280}{60} = 4400 \text{ feet;}$$

$$\therefore \text{horse power required} = \frac{1250 \times 4400}{33000} = 166 \cdot 666.$$

W. H. R.

Note. In this question no account is taken of resistance due to friction.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.

1. If 3 lb. of tea at 4s. be mixed with 8 lb. at 7s., what will 5 lb. of the mixture be worth?

2. A garrison of 870 men is served with provisions for 18 weeks; but, after 51 days, a reinforcement of 500 men arrives. How long will the provisions serve from that time?

3. A man bought a number of sheep for £397 16s.; but, if he had given 3s. per head more for them, he would have had 17 sheep less for the same money. How many did he buy?

4. What will £20,000 amount to in 20 years, at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum, compound interest?

5. Required, the area of a triangle, whose sides are 756.871 and 965 feet respectively.

6. Also, the area of a sector, whose radius is 27 feet, and the angle $47^\circ 38'$.

7. What is the solid content, in feet, of a right cone, the height of which is 20 feet, and the length of the side 25 feet?

8. What amount of work would be required to raise the material for the erection of a cone of granite of the dimensions of the above on a pedestal 10 feet high, supposing granite to weigh 166.5 lb. per cubic foot?

9. Required, the angles of the triangle in question 5.

. Answers with solutions only will not be registered.

LOGIC CLASS.

In opening for Session 1853 our logic classes, we cannot avoid congratulating ourselves upon the interest which our labours have excited amongst that large and important section of our readers— young self-educators. Self-congratulatory, however, we would not dare to be, were we not sensible that the very points upon which we feel proud were those which redounded most to the advancement of the highest interests of man. We are glad that it has fallen to our instrumentality to be productive of such vast results. But we are insatiable in our desire to be useful. We labour joyously in the cause of human elevation; and albeit that, from over exertion of mind, pain has begun to sack the citadel of life and thought, we are determined to go on our course untiringly. We do hope, of course, that our recovery is near at hand, and we believe that, through the exertions of our readers and our students, that most valuable of all gifts may be made ours, a due modicum of that leisure through which the mind may gain strength. We want not to *rust* in inglorious ease, but “to spend and be spent” in the “*excelsiorization*” of humanity. We hope sincerely that our students will be animated with like spirit as ourselves.

“The noblest mind the best content'ment has.”

OUR "JUNIOR CLASS" is intended to be composed of those who are merely "learning to think," learning to gain command over their intellectual faculties—desirous of acquiring close power of attention; from those we do not wish original thought or composition, but we shall be contented with intelligent answers in the words of the articles on "*The Art of Reasoning*." Not that we would proscribe these highly valuable qualities, but that we desire to secure such a classification of students as shall be most equable. Those possessed of the power of original thought, and the capacity of composing with tolerable correctness, ought to join the Profection Class.

THE PROFECTION CLASS will be called upon to perform the exercises already given to the students of the logic class during session 1851-52. Implying original thought and composition; it being optional whether the opinions contained in the articles referred to be in all cases adhered to. Parties not highly distinguished in last session ought to resume their studies in this class.

THE SENIOR CLASS will imply originality of thought—power of metaphysical speculation, capacity of thought-utterance, and generally a talent for the formation of thought, the following out of investigation processes, and the ability to utter in words the workings of the mind. Intending students must send their names and addresses, in full, with their first exercises, by the 18th inst., and continue to forward them regularly under penalty of loss of marks for each absence.

JUNIOR CLASS EXERCISE.—No. I.—By what means has man's present position been attained? What is incident to humanity? What would life be without the aid of reasoning? In what

branches of life is the art of reasoning unrequired? How can the utility of logic be proven? On what does every "art" depend? What does logic signify? What is truth? What are the intellectual powers engaged in its discovery? What is perceptivity? Judgment? Ratiocination? Method? What are their respective offices? These queries are to be answered with reference to the page of the edition of the first volume of the *British Controversialist* used by the student.

PROFECTION CLASS EXERCISE.—(See Vol. II. p. 40.)

SENIOR CLASS EXERCISE.—What are the evidences of the existence of *mind*? (See Payne's "*Elements of Mental and Moral Science*," chap. ii.; Young's "*Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy*," lect. iii.; Brown's "*Philosophy of the Human Mind*," lect. ii.; Reid's "*Inquiry*," chap. i. sect. ii.; "*Intellectual Powers*," Essay i. chap. v.; Jouffroy's "*Method of Philosophical Study*," preface to his translation of Dugald Stewart's "*Outlines of Moral Philosophy*;" Abercrombie's "*Intellectual Powers*," pp. 19-24; Lord Brougham's "*Discourse on Natural Theology*;" Dugald Stewart's "*Active Powers*" and "*Elements of the Philosophy of the Mind*," &c., &c., for proofs and illustrations.) Reference must be carefully made to all quotations.

We hope a large number of our readers will at once determine upon joining these classes, and perseveringly labour throughout the course. Such studies are vastly useful. Thoughts are the seeds of actions. Contemplation ripens them, and we become qualified to do our part in the theatre of the world.

Notices of Books.

The Social Position and Claims of Book-Keepers and Clerks Considered. By J. S. Harrison. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

We have here a pamphlet, written in a plain but earnest style, on what must be regarded as one of the social evils of the day, viz., the underpayment of clerks and book-keepers. The writer shows that the qualifications usually required of these individuals are, that they should be men of respectability, education, and address; but that, at the same time, their remuneration is frequently most meagre. He also depicts the effects of this evil upon family relationships, social duties, and intellectual improvement; and concludes with a few sensible remarks respecting society generally. The following extract will illustrate the line of argument pursued by the writer:—

"It must clearly be advantageous to employers that their book-keepers and clerks should, to a reasonable extent, be placed beyond pecuniary care and anxiety—that they should exercise a spirit of satisfaction and devotedness toward their interests, and feel identified with business duties. The more freely a man can apply himself to his engagements without any withdrawing cause, the more fully will his efforts be successful.

"But, instead of the encouraging effect arising from such helpful source, the low remuneration too frequently given of necessity oftentimes in-

duces, even in the most careful and truthful minds, a feeling of decided separateness, disaffection, and indifference. A stern, austere, and scolding pressure, with the view of keeping up application and effort, is neither so humane nor so just, nor, with respect to right-minded persons, is it likely to be so fully successful, as that referred to above. It may be mentioned that, as low-priced articles are often anything but really cheap, so it may be greatly questioned whether principals really derive any ultimate advantage from adopting low salaries.

"Many in this occupation, owing to the great difficulty they have in honourably living, continue in a state of unsettledness and indecision. They are prevented from giving their undivided energy to their engagement from the pressure of social difficulties and the necessity of watching for some means of bettering their situation, or by which they or their wives might earn something additional wherewith to provide reasonable and needful comforts—it may be sometimes even necessities. Tradesmen in dealing with commercial travellers, after having canvassed the quality and price of goods or samples which may have been offered to their notice, on being assured that the state of the market will not allow of a lower figure being charged, sometimes say, 'Well, we wish to live and let live,' and proceed to give their order.

This principle bears its own currency with it, and is the creed of every one theoretically; but, as applied in its bearing on some of the class under consideration, however different may be the intent, the effect is rather nominal than real."

The wide circulation of the pamphlet amongst employers cannot but be productive of good.

A Dictionary of the French and English Languages. In Two Parts. French and English, English and French; with Vocabulary of Proper Names for the use of Schools and General References. By G. Surenne. London: Oliver and Boyd.

This will be a useful work to those of our readers who are attempting to master the mysteries of the French language. It may inspire confidence if we state that the author is a French teacher in Edinburgh, French Master in the Merchants' School, and Lecturer on Military Antiquities in the Scottish Naval and Military Academy, Corresponding Member of the Grammatical Society of Paris, and author of the Standard Pronouncing Dictionary of the French and English Languages.

Cassell's Edition of Euclid. The Elements of Geometry; or, the First Six Books, with the Eleventh and Twelfth of Euclid, from the Text of Simpson.

Euclid for One Shilling! Few expected this; but it does honour to the enterprise of the publisher, and speaks well for the growing intelligence of the people. Where a supply is offered on such terms an immense demand must be realized or serious loss will be inflicted: to prevent this, we thus spontaneously draw the attention of our readers to the volume, and recommend it especially to the junior members of our mathematical class.

Uncle Tom's Cabin; or, Negro Life in the Slave States of America. By Harriet Beecher Stowe. Various Editions.

It would be simply absurd to attempt to introduce this work to the majority of our readers; but it is just possible that some friends in remote parts of the country may have but a very imperfect idea of its character and fame. We well remember the glowing terms in which an American traveller referred to it some time before it made its advent in our hemisphere; our expectations were raised very high, but they were more than realized in the perusal of the work. In character and reputation it is the most wonderful book of the age. Although so recently a stranger amongst us, it must now number its readers by millions, and these are of every age and class. If any "Rusticus" has not read the book, we should recommend him not to think of appearing in any social circle during the present season, lest the fact should come out to his own disparagement.

The Elements of Euclid for Beginners. Designed for the Upper Classes in Elementary Schools. By Jacob Lowres. London: Longman and Co.

Although this little work was primarily intended for pupil-teachers in the third year of apprenticeship, it is an excellent first book for junior stu-

dents in geometry, and will well serve the purpose of an introduction to advanced works on geometry.

A Story of a Family Party; embracing the Familiar Things of Christmas. London: Hall and Co.

This is a book for the season, full of suggestions for innocent mirth and improving pastime.

Fireside Harmony; or, Domestic Recreation in Part-Singing. By Helen S. Herschell. Third Edition. London: Partridge and Oakley.

"Fireside Harmony." We like the title, and believe that the little work is worthy of it. We commend it to the notice of all harmonious families.

Michaud's History of the Crusades. Translated from the French by William Robson. Three Vols. London: Routledge.

This is a good translation of a valuable work—a work which will be perused with interest by all the readers of our recent debates on this subject.

Elocutionary Manual; the Principles of Articulation and Orthoepey, the Art of Reading and Gesture; illustrated by Tables, Notations, and Diagrams; with Exercises in Expressive Delivery, and a Copious Selection of Extracts, Emphasized, and Rhetorically Punctuated, embodying the Language of the Passions. By A. M. Bell, Professor of Elocution. Hamilton and Co.

We have been frequently asked to recommend a good work of this character, and we have much satisfaction in drawing attention to the one before us. It contains many rules for young Rhetoricians, which they would do well to study, but not slavishly follow.

The Universal, Etymological, Technological, and Pronouncing Dictionary of the English Language, with all Terms used in Science, Literature, and Art. Vol. II. By John Craig, Esq. London: Routledge.

This is an important work, and will be highly valued by all who are fortunate enough to obtain it. The author says that he found the existing dictionaries of the English language quite insufficient for the purposes of scientific lecturing, as they did not elucidate the terms made use of in the various branches of natural history and science. A perception of the deficiency led him to attempt to supply it, and he undertook to compile a dictionary comprehending all the scientific terms introduced into the language since the days of Johnson and Walker, and also to represent the pronunciation in a more simple manner than had hitherto been adopted. Such was our author's object, and we think he has satisfactorily accomplished it. His dictionary contains all the terms used in medical science, law, botany, sea terms, zoology, mineralogy, and other sciences, while special attention has been given to trade and commerce, with a view to meet the wants of the operative, the engineer, the clerk, and the shop-keeper. The author tells us, it has been his object to render the work useful "alike for the workshop, the counting-house, the class-room, and the study." The work is comprised in two volumes of 1,100 pages each, and its price is two guineas.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XIV.—POETRY.

"Song," says Campbell, "is the eloquence of Truth;" and Wordsworth affirms that Poetry is "the finer spirit of all knowledge, the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of Science." Having such vouchers for the accuracy of the opinion promulged in our previous paper, we think we need have little fear of being regarded by our readers as

"One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling
Nor form nor feeling great or small,
A reasoning, self-sufficing thing,
An intellectual all-in-all."

There are periods in the life of every human soul when the emotions and the intellect are simultaneously stirred, as leaves by summer winds, and when it feels that it is dull

"To live in the common world, and talk in words
That clothe the feelings of the frigid herd."

When we have acquired some grains of truth-gold; when wonder, admiration, worship, love, enthusiasm, "joining their fire-tipped wings," form a heraldic device in our souls, which we desire to accept as our life-badge; when all things talk thoughts to us; when everything seems good, and lovely, and immortal, and our minds are quick with the thunder thought and lightning will, Poetry lives in and permeates us.

"Oh, I remember well,
When, like a sea-shell with its sea-born strain,
My soul aye rang with music of the lyre,
And my heart shed its lore as leaves their dew—
A honey-dew—and throve on what it shed.
All things I loved; but Song I loved in chief."

Though all do feel poetic thoughts animating them, yet to many, very many, they must, by the necessities of their condition, almost ever remain sources of seldom analyzed delight; and though many may be able to say of Poesy,

"She doth tell me where to borrow
Comfort in the midst of sorrow,
• • • • •
She could more infuse in me
Than all nature's beauties can
In some other wiser man,"

yet "the power to make others see these objects in the same poetic light is wanting," while it is only on a chosen few that Nature bestows not merely "the vision and the

faculty divine," but also the ability to embody their thoughts in language as melodious as the whispering of streams in heaven.

We have asserted that "Science is the origin of Poetry"—that all real Poetry has *fact* for its primary *substratum*—that its foundations are built upon the eternal granite of Truth. But man is both a ratiocinative and emotive or imaginative being. The totality of the human soul demands culture. While we maintain that an accurate knowledge of the Science and "the Art of Reasoning" ought to be acquired by the people, we are by no means desirous of excluding the emotional elements from cultivation, or subordinating them to any other partial mind-culture. We believe that Poetry is

"only heard
When the soul seeks to hear; when all is hushed
And the heart listens;"

and therefore that the mind ought to be trained to appreciate the melodies which all things utter to the earnest soul. The mind of man is not all made up of Logic; but the whole of the faculties are under the dominion of the logical powers. Not even in the wildest brain-fancy can we be emancipated from the necessity that is laid upon us to obey "the laws of the Reason." We may, indeed, assume as premises whatever facts we choose; we may operate with or upon any existences which the imagination is capable of fabricating out of the elements furnished to it by experience; but the actions which they perform, and the effects produced upon them by the influences and events which the poet employs, must be rigidly consistent with the logical perceptions of the mind. Hence even Poetry must be logical. "Everything really elegant or sublime in composition is ultimately referrible to the principles of sound Logic; those principles, when readers little think of them, have still a latent force, and may be traced, if sought after, even in the politest of writers. By reasoning of this kind an important union is established—the union between taste and truth. This is that splendid union which produced the classics of pure antiquity; which produced, in times less remote, the classics of modern days; and which those who now write ought to cultivate with attention, if they wish to survive in the estimation of posterity. Taste is, in fact, but a species of inferior truth. It is the truth of elegance, of decoration, and of grace; which, as all truth is similar and congenial, coincides, as it were, spontaneously with the more severe and logical, but which, when destitute of that more solid support, resembles some fair but languid body—a body specious in feature, but deficient in nerve—a body where we seek in vain for that natural and just perfection which arises from the pleasing harmony of strength and beauty associated."* Fancy may be luxuriant, and Genius prolific; but Reason, however silently and imperceptibly she may work, has to prepare and correct the natural fertility of the soil, and to assist in nourishing the production till it ripens into its full maturity. It has to adjust the propriety of the inventions, to rectify the falsities of taste, to arrange the order and succession of the parts, and unite them into one consistent whole.† We differ in our opinions upon this topic from Lord Bacon, when he says, "Poetry is a kind of learning generally confined

* Harris's "Philosophical Arrangements," p. 468.

† Tatham's "Chart and Scale of Truth," vol. i. chap. vii. sec. iii. p. 297.

to the measure of words, but otherwise extremely licentious, and truly belonging to the Imagination, *which, being unrestrained by laws*, may make what unnatural mixtures and separations it pleases."* The Imagination is not lawless. It is true that it can make such "mixtures and separations as it pleases;" but it is not correct to say that these may be "*unnatural*." Neither is it accurate to say that Poetry is "generally confined to the measure of words;" this were to make the poet a mere word-mechanist—a numberer of syllables and arranger of lines, learned in dactyles, spondees, and iambics, rather than God-inspired, and fed

"With daintiest Castaly's most silver dew;"

a spinner of word-net-work, rather than

"Bravely furnished all abroad to fling
The winged shafts of truth."

The poet looks upon Nature with a critical eye, and passes it through the alembic of his mind in order that it may be purified and refined—that the evanescent may be purged wholly therefrom, and that the absolute may remain. He selects, combines, and concentrates all those elements of external objects which are agreeable to the emotion by which he is at the time ruled, and excludes all those which would interfere with the harmony of the external and the inward. When all those exquisitely-chosen elements are colligated together they constitute the ideal, in which the poet delights. It is all Nature; but it is Nature perfectioned—Nature beautified and glorified by emotion—Nature harmonized and made congenial to desire—Nature

"Conversing with the mind, and giving it
A livelier impulse and a *dance of thought*."

Poetry may be defined as the vocal expression of human emotion, heightened and perfected by the co-operation of the intellectual faculties, for the purpose of producing that commingled emotive and intellective pleasure which is denominated delight.

We do not, of course, propose this as an all-perfect definition, but as an approximation towards correctness. It would be easy for us to fly into rhapsodies, and define Poetry as a distillation of all that is ethereal in humanity—the concentrated essence of thought—the rose-odour of the intellect—the breath of the divine in man—the *aurora borealis* of the soul—the effluence of genius—the lingering remnants of paradisaical bliss—the marriage of the lightning of thought with "the music of the spheres"—the daughter of the angel-tribes who people the celestial galaxies—shreds of the songs of the seraphim—

"A bridge of rainbows, thrown across
This vale of tears and sighs;"

but, as such similes can convey no definite notion to the mind, and merely offer the phantasms of fancy for the instruction of the intellect, we refrain from employing them, and prefer confining our efforts to an endeavour to give such a definition as may enable us to draw a boundary-line between Poetry and every other species of composition. That this is a difficult task we admit, because human nature, as a whole, is poetical. In

* Bacon's "De Augmentis Scientiarum," The Distribution of Knowledge in Particular Sciences, sect. ii.; Works, vol. i. p. 56.

each exertion of its activities the emotions act also; and thus there are few intelligent acts which may not give rise to poetical expression.

The chief themes of poetry are innocence, love, rurality, and piety: other passions, darker and of guiltier kind have found, and may find, expression in verse; but, to be truly poetical, they must, like the shades in a picture, be employed to give greater prominence to the pure emotions—

“For our divine affections, like the spheres,
Move ever, ever musical.”

We shall now endeavour to point out a few of the demarcating characteristics of Poetry

I. *Poetry must be Emotive.*—Man, though fallen, can never wholly lose the impress of divinity—can never wholly become dead to the perception and appreciation of moral truth. The temple of the human soul is a ruin; but, ah! how glorious even in its desolation and decay! Though the shrine is desecrated, the voice of the oracle may yet be heard within it—though deserted, some memorials of its holiness remain. Moral greatness is certainly not ours, but our sympathies gravitate towards it—it is the magnet which can attract the precious, though concealed, riches of our hearts out of the valueless mass of semi-pollution in which it lies. Our higher nature repudiates impurity even while our lower nature wallows in embrutedness. Were we wholly vile, Poetry were powerless; were we perfect, all would be Poetry. It is because man vibrates between the godlike and the demoniac that Poetry is necessary. Poetry, by calling forth his emotive energies, becomes a thing of power. By inflaming the soul with desires and aspirations connected with the beautiful and sublime in morality, it makes us feel enjoyments immeasurably superior to any sensual pleasure which can ever be partaken of by mortal man. The mystery of sin and sorrow, strange as it may seem, is closely connected with the Poetic. The etheriality of Poetry would have been the reality of life and emotion, and desire could have had no place in the mental economy of man, where all was superfluity of bliss—a perfectly exhaustless treasury of joy. Bacon was right when he said of Poetry, that “it has something divine in it;” and this same sentiment has been repeated by Philip James Bailey, in his “Proem” to “Festus,” thus:—

“All great lays, equals to the minds of men,
Deal more or less with the divine, and have
For end some good of mind or soul of man;
And it is joy to think that in every age
The greatest works of mind or hand have been
Done unto God. So may they ever be!
It shows the strength of wish we have to be great,
And the sublime humility of might.”

This divine and godlike effluence, which permeates Poetry, results from the emotions. These enable the poet to shape his sensuous imagery into spiritual meanings, and “to incorporate the everlasting reason of man in forms visible to his sense, and suitable to it.” Under their commanding control, the materials laid up in his imagination are so disposed and arranged as to add to the intrinsic value of his thoughts by the fulfilment of an exalted purpose, viz., the elevation of the human race to the perfection of their nature. The “informing purpose” of the poet results from an organization of mind peculiarly sensitive towards the relations which subsist between things moral and material objects.

“ The world is full of glorious likenesses.
 The poet's power is to sort these out,
 And to make music from the common strings
 With which the world is strung; to make the dumb
 Earth utter heavenly harmony, and draw
 Life clear and sweet and harmless as spring water
 Welling its way through flowers.”

II. *Poetry must be Truthful.*—Truth may be considered in several points of view, viz., physical, moral, and philosophic truth. The first is the truth of science, the second of goodness, the third of beauty in its most extensive sense, viz., the perception of the harmony of creation. These form a progressive series, each higher presupposes the lower. The truth of reality is the foundation of the truth of morals; for morality is called into action by real things; and the truth of Poesy, colligating the moral feelings with the external realities which excite them, produces a new truth, the truth of harmony. It looks upon the world without, and, under the emotion which then rules the soul, gives to

“ One brief moment caught from fleeting time
 The appropriate calm of blest eternity.”

Poetic truth originates in reality, and man becomes emotive and harmonic.

“ It is the possible compared
 With what is merely positive, and gives
 To the conceptive soul another heaven—
 A higher, ampler heaven than that wherein
 The nations sun themselves.”

Has not Shakspeare refined historical truth into Poetry in “Macbeth” and “Lear; Milton, moral truth in “Paradise Lost;” Hood, social truth in “The Song of a Shirt” and “The Ladies' Dream;” Tennyson, metaphysical truth in “Locksley Hall?”

“Facts are indisputable things;” but their reasons, tendencies, and consequences, are disputable. Now this is exactly the point at which Morality and Poetry take the facts from Science. Diderot truly says, “The connexion of events often escapes our observation in nature, for want of knowing the whole combination of the circumstances; in real facts we only see an accidental occurrence of things; but the poet wishes to show, in the texture of his work, an apparent and sensible connexion; so that, though he is really less true, he has more the appearance of truth, than the historian.” The connexion of the visible, the moral, and the intellectual worlds, is exhibited by the poet in graceful interfusion,

“ And space and time
 Vanish before that energy sublime.”

The truth which is required of the poet is the truth of probability and possibility—a logical consistency between the influences produced, the circumstances in which they are produced, and the characters upon which they are produced.

“ He who the vanishing point of human things
 Lifts from the landscape—lost amid the sky,
 Has found the ideal which the poet sings—
 Has pierced the pall around his senses thrown
 And is himself a poet—though unknown.”

The highest praise which the *matter* of Poetry can receive is, that it is *true*; true to the conditions, given or received, which the understanding accepts as influencing the beings or circumstances which the poet creates. The more closely the poet adheres to Nature and Reason, the higher is the praise deserved and given, provided it be Nature emotively viewed, i. e., idealized; otherwise, prosaicality is not the worst name it deserves and gains.

III. *Poetry must differ in its Language from Prose.*—Science exhibits truth in the abstract; Prose is the expression of the truths of science as seen by the Intellect; Poetry is the expression of science as viewed by man's emotional nature. Reason is the *primum mobile* in the one; Feeling in the other. The transparency and straightforwardness of Prose is, therefore, alien to the spirit of Poetry. Poetry differs in its language from Prose in the following among other particulars:—

1st. *In the Choice of Words.*—The emotions are the mainsprings of many, if not all, of our most interesting associations. Hence the effect of words in recalling associations, and thus re-exciting emotions, is great. The strangely magical power of diction depends upon its capacity to produce emotive activity—to stir the heart—

“As if with unseen wings
An angel touched its quivering strings.”

As a general rule, therefore, it may be said that, in Poetry, all such words as are not capable of strongly exciting the desiderated emotion ought to be avoided.

(a) Terms relating to commerce, trade, business, professions, mechanical or artistic arts; in short, all technicalisms, and words expressive of the familiar relations and circumstances of life, are, in general, unfitted for poetical compositions.

(b) Phrases current in ordinary life, newspaper phraseologies, and those polite refinements of obnoxious terms prevalent in society, are, as a general rule, to be excluded from the poet's lexicon.

(c) Studiously simple phraseology is equally unfit for giving expression to poetic thought as frothy, far-fetched, and pompously-inflated verbosity.

(d) Although generic terms, and such as possess a comprehensive signification, are not improper in verse, it ought always to be remembered, that the more specific the meaning of a word, or collocation of words, is, the more vivid is the impression made on the emotive faculties.

(e) Such terms as are specially connected with associations of the kind sought to be produced ought to be preferred to any others.

(f) Words possessed of harmony of sound and sense ought specially to be adopted. Vivid emotional sensibilities, a correct and extensive knowledge of words and their meanings, an acute ear, and a well-cultivated taste, must, however, in all cases, lead to the employment of the most suitable language.

2nd. *In the Collocation of Words.*—Greater freedom of collocation, more violent inversions of the grammatical order of words, and greater variety of syntactic structure, is permitted to Poetry than Prose, because the different emotions are greatly unequal in their mode of expressing themselves; e. g., anger is rugged, abrupt, and disconnected; grief is slow, monotonous, and reiterative. To give to words that emotional expressiveness, the poet

is privileged to make certain departures from the usual prosaic structure. The *manner* of thought is different, and the *form* into which the thought fashions itself differs likewise. Hence originates *verse*. The same emotions are always similar in their manifestations. To create symmetry of expression is, therefore, a necessity of the soul. As the tide of feeling rises or falls, so does the structure of the verse ebb or flow. The voice and the heart consentaneously co-operate, and the ear, partaking in the general sympathy, communicates a perception of its gratification. Poetic harmony, or rhythm, is the responsiveness of the sound to the sense; in other words, the suitability of the language to the emotion. Into the mechanism of versification, however, we cannot, in this brief series of articles, enter. It seemed to us necessary to signalize the cause of the verse-structure of Poetry.

3rd. *In the use of Figurative Language.*—The Emotions look upon things in the *concrete*—Intellect in the *abstract*; hence the vivid reality which poets give to their thoughts as compared with prose writers. The use of figures is certainly not denied to the prose writer; but they must be used sparingly. They are the staple of the poet's mode of thought-communication, which is "of Imagination all compact." A constant and perpetual implication of intellectual perceptions in sensible signs—an interfusion of speculation and perceptual phenomena, embodied in and expressed through the objects of sensation—pervades the whole of Poetry, and is a markedly differentiating feature between it and Prose. We refer to a future article on "Figurative Language" for a fuller development of our ideas on that topic than can be accorded it in an incidental notice like the present.

The several species of Poetry may be thus exhibited in a tabular form, preparatory to a more lengthy exposition of the peculiar qualities of each, which on a future occasion we may attempt, viz.:—

POETRY.

1. <i>Lyric.</i>	2. <i>Epic.</i>	3. <i>Dramatic.</i>
Odes.	Historical.	Tragedy. } Tragi-comedy.
Ballads.	Semi-historical.	Comedy. }
Songs.	Fictitious.	Melo-drama.
Sonnets.		Farce.
4. <i>Didactic.</i>		5. <i>Descriptive.</i>
Satiric.		Pastoral. { Undramatic.
Narrative.		{ Semi-dramatic.
Fabulous.		Nautical.
Inscriptive. { Epitaph.		Reflective.
{ Epigram.		
Sacred.		

Our closing remarks must be few. In treating such a subject as the present, great temptations were certainly held out to us to perpetrate some of those turgid sentences which critics of a certain class are desirous of having regarded as proceeding from "the divine insanity of genius," but which ought truly to be denominated the fever-frenzy of the would-be fine writer. Some of our readers may wish that we had done so. We have chosen the more useful, if the less dazzling, course. In speaking of Poetry, it is easier to dash together a multitude of confused and contradictory epithets of astonishing sonoric power, than to sit patiently down, bring it under the scrutiny of the reflective powers, and attempt to trace the logic of its birth, and the constituent elements which compose it.

This we have endeavoured to do. We are quite sensible of our shortcomings in its treatment; nor shall we attempt to apologize for them. "Such as I have give I unto you." It is not to be supposed that in this paper we have been giving a recipe for the manufacture of Poetry. We believe that Nature makes poets, but Art brings them to perfection. To those who possess the proper emotive sensibility our hints may be serviceable in the culture of the intellect. To such we would reiterate the poet's advice—

"Look, then, into thine heart, and write."

To others our observations may be useful, in enabling them to judge more truly, and appreciate more readily, the Poetry both of literature and life. At least, what we have said may stimulate reflection and lead to the discovery, by some greater mind, of the true theory of Poetry. Meanwhile we maintain, with Longfellow, that—

"When storms of wild emotion
Strike the ocean
Of the poet's soul, ere long,
From each cave and rocky fastness,
In its vastness,
Floats some fragments of a song:
From the far-off isles enchanted,
Heaven has planted
With the golden fruit of Truth;
From the flashing surf, whose vision
Gleams elysian
In the tropic clime of youth;

"From the strong will and the endeavour
That for ever
Wrestles with the tides of Fate;
From the wreck of Hopes far scattered
Tempest-shattered,
Floating waste and desolate;
Ever drifting, drifting, drifting,
On the shifting
Currents of the restless heart;
Till at length in books recorded,
They, like hoarded
'Household words,' no more depart."

Religion.

IS THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF A SABBATH, AS ENJOINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, INCUMBENT UPON CHRISTIANS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

OF late years nothing has exhibited the declension of spiritual religion more clearly than the depreciative conduct of the generality of our fellow-countrymen towards the sabbath. Cheap Sunday trains, Sunday amusements, and Sunday newspapers, are among the novelties of the age. To a serious mind the contemplation of this state of things is really painful. The fact of vast multitudes greedily seizing these cheap commodities, and setting at nought the divine command respecting the observance of the sabbath, is serious indeed. But, besides these open pollutionists, there is another portion of society who, while they profess great regard for all divine injunctions, do, in our opinion, invariably transgress the law of the sabbath.

But we must say that we believe they do so conscientiously or inconsiderately, and not from any disregard to the command of the Most High. If, reader, you do so from a conscientious opinion that "the strict observance of a sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, is not incumbent upon Christians," we earnestly solicit your company through this debate. If, on the contrary, you violate its holiness inconsiderately, without inquiring if you are justified in so doing, we would ask your patient and impartial hearing of the case; and, should we still differ in our opinion, we crave your forbearance from ranking us among the "bigoted enthusiasts of the old school," because the conclusion we have arrived at is

the result of a careful induction of particulars as contained in the inspired record; and we consider these writings the criterion whereby we are to judge of the truth of our deduction on all subjects like this.

Two things let us premise. First, that it is immaterial which day of the seven we observe as the sabbath; whether the seventh, according to the Jews, or the first, as observed by Christians. God, in sanctifying the seventh day, is not to be understood as imparting any essential sanctity to the day itself, but as resting from the work of creation, and appointing it as a day to be observed in a sacred manner by men. Secondly, it is not expected that we should observe those rites and ceremonies which appertained to the Jewish religion—the sacrifices, offerings, &c.—as these were all abolished by the appearance of the great antitype; but the observance which we maintain as enforced upon us is the abstaining from all sensual indulgences, bodily recreations, and worldly pleasures, and also a total cessation from all manner of labour, domestic or commercial, which may in any way prevent the mind from meditating on the important topic of religion. Having said thus much, the basis upon which we argue is apparent to all.

When the Christian dispensation was established, all injunctions relative to the ceremonial law were abrogated, while others of a different kind were placed in their stead. The sabbath, however, is not to be considered dependent for its holy observance on that law, as the other religious festivals of the Jews, for it was primarily instituted by the Infinite Creator, at the close of the Mosaic creation, as a day of rest for man and beast; and the duty of sanctifying it was subsequently proclaimed with God's own voice, and written with his own finger on tablets of stone, as one of those unchangeable laws which were to govern his moral kingdom in all ages and climes. The sabbath, therefore, was to be no mere ceremonial observance, which after a while was to be annulled by the introduction of the gospel dispensation, but was appointed as a divine ordinance to be strictly observed by man, and the observance of it constitutes part of his duty until the end of time.

It was also intimated in the Old Testament, that, after the Jewish dispensation should be brought to an end, the sabbath

would continue to be observed in a sacred manner. The fifty-sixth chapter of Isaiah must evidently be understood as implying this permanent sanctity. In this chapter the Lord promises the eunuch *that kept his sabbath* a place in his house, and an everlasting name better than that of sons and of daughters. Now, eunuchs were forbidden, under the law of Moses, to enter the congregation of the Lord; so that these verses must indicate some future period when the law of Moses would be annulled and the sabbath still kept. This said law was not made void until the gospel dispensation was instituted; therefore the verses in Isaiah obviously imply that at this future period (the time of the gospel dispensation) all persons *who revered the sabbath* would participate in equal religious privileges.

Neither does the New Testament leave us without examples and intimations which favour our opinion. Christ hallowed the day with superior sacredness. True, he claims to be Lord of the sabbath; but not for the purpose of transgressing its holiness, or performing any act derogatory to its sanctity, but for the purpose of rescuing it from the abuses and traditions of the Pharisees, who objected to the performance of deeds of mercy on that day. The apostles, also, after the ascension of their Lord, observed the sabbath with equal punctuality, reverence, and zeal, abstaining from all things which might in the least degree disparage its holiness, and in all their instructions concerning it they assumed its sanctity as indisputable.

If, then, the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, together with the conduct of our Saviour and his apostles, do all testify that the new dispensation did not repeal the law of the sabbath, upon what grounds are we to believe that its former sacredness has been in the least degree abated? Were Christianity to intimate this, it would be in opposition to itself; it would, by so doing, avert its direct aim. Purposing to sanctify the world—to prepare mankind for the realms of infinite holiness, by instilling into their minds a yearning desire for the attainment of holiness—to be free from all impure notions and carnal desires, and by carrying forward the work of sanctification in our hearts,—it would be incompatible with its glorious and benevolent design were it to withdraw the least sanc-

tity from the only day of the week which holy writ enjoins us to observe. Indeed, it would be more in accordance with its heavenly design were it to enforce the observance of the first day of the week in addition to the seventh, than were it to unsanctify any part of the seventh. Instead, however, of that, God requires only one day out of seven to be set apart for his service, but that one must be dedicated to that work solely. No part must be given to the world and its labours and pleasures, as we have the other six for these things.

Having shown that the sabbath was not repealed by the introduction of the christian dispensation, but is a perpetual ordinance of God, it follows that whatever degree of sanctification attached to it under the old dispensation belongs to it still, unless the scriptures intimate to the contrary. We have failed to find any such intimations. True, St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Colossians, cautions Christians against being enslaved by those persons who seek to build up their self-righteousness by observing what they eat and what they drink, and in what manner they kept their festivals, striving to amalgamate the numerous feasts, &c., formerly observed by the Jews, with Christianity. We must not, however, infer from this that he deprecated the one holy sabbath. If, then, secular labours were formerly inconsistent with the sanctity of the sabbath, they are so now; if journeys, luxuries, &c., were prohibited on that day then, they are now. The so-called *necessities* of commerce are not sufficient reasons for transgressing the divine command. Neither health, wealth, nor happiness must be purchased at the expense of profaning the holy day of God. Amusements and pleasures must in no wise be obtained by desecrating the sabbath. We are exceedingly grieved that so many are forced to pass their days, from "early morn to dewy eve," in large cities, and close, crowded

rooms, far from the benign country air, and unable to participate in its refreshing influence; yet such circumstances do not justify their desecrating the sabbath by strolling in the country on that day instead of attending the house of prayer. Indeed, those who spend their sabbaths in such a manner do not seem to endure unhealthy situations better than the persons who devote its sacred hours to the service of the Lord. "What a contrast," says an editor, "is presented on Monday morning between the sabbath breaker and the Sunday school teacher! While the features of the former indicate the effects of the most depressing reaction, and show that his sensual gaieties have failed to give him inward ease, the serene countenance of the latter, and his firm, elastic step, give evidence that his constitution has suffered no violence, and that his conscience is at peace. How infatuated are those who add to the heavy burden of labour the heavier burden of guilt! How pleasant to begin the duties of the week after a well-spent sabbath!"

The conclusion we have now unavoidably arrived at is this, that the sabbath is an institution ordained by God to be exclusively and permanently consecrated to the service of the Lord, "with the sole exception of works of charity, piety, and necessity." The divine injunction in the fourth commandment being so clear and plain in enforcing on all mankind the essential duty of keeping a day holy to the Lord, the scriptures supplying us with no intimations implying the rescindment of the sabbath's sanctity at the close of the Jewish dispensation, and the inconsistency of the idea that Christianity repealed an institution which directly subverts its glorious and desired end, we cannot but again reiterate our opinion that "the strict observance of the sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, is incumbent upon all Christians."

GLOWE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In endeavouring, by the investigation of the question before us, to discover a wise and true answer thereto, the most expedient method to be followed appears to be—1st. To glance at the nature of the sabbath, and the position it occupied under the Jewish economy. 2dly. To view the institution in the altered aspect which it presents when seen by the superior light of the christian dispensation. 3rdly. By the light of christian revelation to determine the question—Whether the observance of the sabbath, according to the letter of the inferior economy, be incumbent upon Christians? or,

in other words, Whether it be incumbent upon the full-grown man to conform his limbs to the habiliments of the child?

1st. Under the Jewish dispensation the sabbath appears to have combined the three-fold characteristic of a commemoration, a symbol, and a law. The event it commemorated was the completion of the natural creation. The Architect of nature had gradually completed his work in six successive periods. Man, the top stone of the building, had been laid. As nature's masterpiece he was produced. In man were united the perfection of the natural creation and the germ of the spiritual. The Creator having thus finished his work, in the seventh or present period he rests, and of this rest the Jews were beautifully and appropriately reminded by the consecration of every seventh day as a day of cessation from bodily toil.

One of the most obvious characteristics of the present state of being is its instability. Life is a tempest-tossed ocean, whose waters can only be preserved from stagnation and corruption by means of the ceaseless activity engendered by the warring and conflicting of surrounding elements. Man appears as a voyager thereon seeking for a distant land, a blissful shore, "where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest." He works in hope of rest. He believes that all the turmoil, cares, and distresses of the present will be swallowed up and forgotten in a calm infinity of being; in a repose eternal and unbroken. This idea of future spiritual rest was symbolized to the Jew by means of the sabbath. This was in perfect harmony with the nature of the Jewish religion, whose object was to commend spiritual truth to the notice of earth-born man by means of outward forms, and earthly but significant institutions; and thus, by reflecting from terrestrial substance a portion of celestial light upon benighted humanity, to anticipate and prepare the way for the rising of the Sun of Righteousness.

While the sabbath was thus to the individual Jew a symbol of the future rest of his soul, to the human species also it bore the aspect of a promise; it spoke of its deliverance from the burden of outward law, and of the rest in store for the weary and heavy laden. It also had a direct tendency to withdraw the human mind from earthly pursuits, and indirectly to lead to the con-

templation of spiritual realities. It found the human race spiritually degraded. Its mission was to raise and purify. To this end its observance was enforced by such motives as were most capable of influencing the beings for whose benefit it was intended. By the base motive of fear was degraded humanity, at this period of its history, most easily moved; therefore the observance of those institutions, among which was the sabbath, and which were the harbingers of the rising of that Sun whose light was that perfect love which casteth out fear, was enforced by that motive. The keeping of the sabbath was commanded by law; the penalty attached to its infringement was death. Thus was death made subservient to life; law became the pioneer of liberty, and fear the precursor of love.

2nd. It now devolves upon us to view this institution by the superior light of christian revelation, in order that we may thereby discover whether or not, in its character of law, it retains any authority over the mind of the Christian. It is natural to suppose that the Jewish sabbath, which we have seen to be commemorative of the completion of the natural creation, and typical of the spiritual rest which the true worshipper would possess under the christian dispensation, would, under the advent of the spiritual creation, lose all its interest as a memorial of that which was natural, and as a type would be useless when the thing typified was possessed. We see in human nature—as regards all embodiments of spiritual truth—a constant tendency to lose the spirit and exalt the form. Very strikingly is this tendency manifested in the past and present history of the sabbath. None of the actions of Christ excited against him more bitter hatred and hostility than those which rebuked the superstitious reverence entertained by the Pharisees for this institution. The Pharisee regarded the sabbath as a kind of deity—something before which the wretched worm, man, was to bow and afflict his soul—to which his wants were to be subservient, and the strict observance thereof as one of the ends of his being. Christ thought man to be better than the sabbath—something unspeakably more precious than any worn-out systems, rights, and observances. He could recognise within him the image of the eternal God, and he came,

with a mighty hand and a sympathizing heart, to destroy all that hindered his upward progress—to place his feet on the indestructible base of truth—to surround him with a moral atmosphere of purity and freedom, and to sweep from before him the accumulated superstitions and rubbish of ages. The exalted spirituality of New Testament doctrine teaches us to regard the sabbath as existing only for the sake of man; apart from man it has neither value nor sanctity. The mysterious inner nature which the Christian feels yearning within him has its wants, and those wants are mighty. Outward society, prosperity, and pleasure, can never satisfy them; these are but shadows; the soul is substance, and for kindred substance it seeks with unutterable desire. The sabbath is a time set apart for this momentous search—a time for holding communion with the boundless Being who pervades and comprehends all things—for the apprehending of that substance which every shadow implies—for the acquisition of those truths which every appearance indicates; a time when, retiring from society, we may study, amid the solitudes of nature, the symbols of truth and wisdom with which she is filled; and these, amid her unbroken silence and desert wilds, catch upon the inner ear the still, small voice of God. Wise are they who can thus appreciate and use the sabbath. When those whose whole being is engrossed in providing for the body are reaping corruption and the grave, those who thus sow to the immortal spirit shall, in the kingdom that cannot be moved, have reaped life everlasting. Yes! We believe, with the great Socrates, that a time exists in the future when the seeker of wisdom, who passes here for a pursuer of shadows, will grasp substance—the seeker of wealth and power, who passes here for a pursuer of substance, will grasp a shadow.

3rd. We now come to the pith of our argument—Is the observance of the sabbath, according to the letter of the inferior economy, incumbent upon Christians? Our reasons for concluding that it is not are the following:—

1. The books of the New Testament, being the only recognised directory and rule of faith to the christian church, supposing any part of the Jewish law to be still binding upon Christians, we should naturally

expect to find the New Testament recognising its authority and enforcing its observance. That such is not the case with regard to the sabbath we suppose every intelligent reader of the New Testament must be aware.

2. Not only is its observance not enforced by the New Testament, but, in those few places in the writings of the apostles where it is mentioned, the opinion of its existing authority is evidently discountenanced; as, for example, Col. ii. 16, where we find it classed with the other ordinances of the Jews, such as the observances connected with meat and drink, and the celebration of the new moon, which ordinances, we are told, were blotted out and taken out of the way by being nailed to the cross of Christ.

3. The fourth commandment expressly states the seventh day of the week as the day to be kept peculiarly holy; but we find the followers of Christ, from the commencement of the christian dispensation to the present time, have universally neglected to observe this day. The motive with the original Christians we believe to have been a conscientious one; they refused to observe this ordinance of the Jews for the same reason that they rejected every other; they regarded them as shadows of good things to come, which things they possessed in Christ, Christ being the end of the law to every one that believeth. It is when we view this Jewish ordinance in its character of law that its incompatibility with the spirit of the higher dispensation appears most glaring. The Christian is not under the law, but under grace. He is no longer a servant, but a son. He who was subject to tutors and governors is now their Lord; “therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the sabbath.” To make christian liberty subject to Jewish law is to exalt the means above the end, for liberty is the end of law. But there are some who will argue that the authority of the fourth commandment was, after the death of Christ, transferred from the seventh day of the week to the first. From what source they obtain this piece of information I am at a loss to conjecture; certainly not from the Old Testament! That they obtained it from the New I am equally disinclined to believe, never having myself discovered it, either as explicitly stated or as indirectly implied.

The boundless Being, whose "throne is established in the heavens, and whose kingdom ruleth over all," is the only true sovereign and lawgiver to the Christian. He that bows, therefore, to human authority in religious matters knows but little of that freedom of spirit which truth bestows upon those who know and reverence her. In deciding, therefore, whether we are bound to keep the first day of the week with the strict observance enjoined in the Old Testament to be given to the seventh, we ask, Has the Father of spirits imposed any such law upon his worshippers? We conclude that he has not, never having discovered such a law, either through the medium of the New Testament, or as more directly inscribed upon the hidden tablet of the heart. If, then, no such law has proceeded from God, it follows that every Christian must have unrestricted liberty either to observe the day or not to observe it, according as he may think most conducive to the welfare of humanity and the glory of God. He that in these matters endeavours to coerce the minds of his fellows is so far an enemy to christian liberty, an officious intermeddler with another's servants, and an encroacher upon the prerogative of God. He that submits to such dictation wrongs the authority of his true Sovereign, and compromises the freedom of his own soul. The Christian being no longer subject to ordinances, ordinances, so far as they are conclusive to the development of the inner and higher life, must be subject to him. It is his high prerogative to use or reject all religious rites and observances, according to the dictates of his conscience, and under all circumstances to mould his outer life according to the decisions of his enlightened judgment. In the vision of the New Jerusalem

there was no temple discovered therein, for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple of it. Neither had the city any need of the sun or moon to shine in it, for the glory of God did lighten it, and the Lamb is the light thereof. From which vision we learn, that to the spiritual believer all places are equally holy, and none peculiarly so, seeing that infinity is full of God; and as with place, so with time. The sun and moon, with their times and seasons, exist not in the realm of spirit. God is the changeless light, the unsetting sun thereof. The true worshipper rejoices ever in his meridian beams, and sees and feels that all times are sacred with the presence of him who inhabiteth eternity.

When we review the past, we perceive that the sabbath has been, to a considerable extent, an object of superstitious reverence, and a clog to the feet of liberty. To a much greater extent has its true nature been misunderstood, and its worth unknown; and very appropriately might the voice of the apostle ring in the ears of the present the words of warning, "Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." But the sky of the future is radiant with the bow of promise. God is at work among the nations, and his work must abide. God is light, and light must triumph. God is love, and into the law of love must all other laws be resolved. God is a spirit, and it is of necessity that the spirituality of the christian revelation should not be in bondage to the formality of the Mosaic. We may rest assured that the son of the bondwoman cannot be heir with the son of the free.

COSMOPOLITE.

Philosophy.

WOULD EDUCATION ERADICATE CRIME ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

MUCH has been said of late respecting education; and nothing has given us more pleasure than hearing so important a question discussed with such ardour and freeness by

the legislators of our country. We are truly glad to see the *Controversialist* revert to it, after having so ably and satisfactorily debated the subject of the proper parties for

providing it.* The effects of education partake more of the speculative than the former, but yet are not less interesting and important, and must in some degree be ascertained before education itself can be placed on a permanent and positive basis. We hail, therefore, with delight the discussion question, "Will education eradicate crime?" and trust that it will be treated with the same candour and energy which has characterized the discussion of all the subjects brought forward in the pages of this magazine.

Conviction compels us to answer this question in the affirmative. Yes; we do think that education would eradicate crime. What is crime? Is it not the offspring of a barbarous age? Is it anything but the effect of ignorance? Did ever a well-educated man commit a crime; we mean any of those disgraceful commissions that evoke legal punishment—any of those gross outrages on humanity which so frequently stain the annals of history? Never. In vain you tell us of a Bacon, who prostituted justice to personal aggrandizement, and who repaid generous friendship with a cold, hollow ingratitude. In vain you tell us of kings and noblemen, who sat on the very summit of Parnassus with the Muses—patrons of education—having done actions at the implication of which even beggars would blush. In vain you tell us of a Rush or a Manning swinging on the gallows for wielding the assassin's knife. Yes; in vain all that is told us, for these are not cases in point. An intellectual education is not a complete education; it is the least important part of an education. Bacon, and the rest of these, it may be, had attained the very acmé of intellectual perfection; but their souls all the time were grovelling in ignorance. Nay, we repeat our assertion, and dare any one to deny it—give a man a full education—an intellectual, moral, religious, and practical education—and that man will detest crime, and shrink from it.

"As one who spies a serpent in his way,
Glistening and basking in the summer ray."

We have heard cold-blooded philanthropists talk about giving our country a *purely* secular education. Ay, cold blooded they are, unworthy to be called philanthropists. *We have always regarded them as Jesuits—*

as wolves in sheep's clothing. They say that this method alone can eradicate crime; as if religion was a patron of crime!—as if Christ came not to destroy but to inculcate sin! The reason crime is so prevalent is, not because religion forms a part of our education, but because *religion is not properly taught*. For many years past we have had, not christian, but sectarian doctrines taught in our schools. When the day comes that a new order of things prevail—sectarianism supported by pure religion—then the children, upon becoming men, will consider crime as not only an outrage upon man, but an outrage upon God; and first hate, and then shun it. Then shall the great moral change take place which poets and legislators see in futurity, though through different media. Then crime will be talked of as a thing that was.

The authority of such a philosopher as Locke on the subject of education must have some influence, even with our opponents. Listen, then, to what he says:—"Under whose care soever a child is put to be taught during the tender and flexible years of his life, this is certain, it should be one who thinks Latin and languages the least part of education; one who, knowing how much virtue and a well-tempered soul is to be preferred to any sort of learning or language, makes it his chief business to form the mind of his scholars, and give that a right disposition, which, if once got, though all the rest should be neglected, would in due time produce all the rest; and which, if it be not got, and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages, and sciences, and all the other accomplishments of education, will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man."

In addition to the above arguments, the following have induced us to answer this question as we have done:—

1. Make a man not only know, but *feel* the performance of a certain action to be a crime, and he will abstain from it. This is involved in a thorough education. Lull the conscience and blunt the feelings, and then nothing will restrain a man from committing the vilest deed. Knowledge certainly is one of the springs of action, but frequently it loses its power; but sensibility is irresistible, its power is omnipotent.

2. Let a child be taught not only to abhor

* See Vol. II.

vice, but to practise virtue, and when a man he will not abstain from doing the same. This also is involved in a thorough education; and is not only an experience-proven, but a divinely-attested truth:—“*Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it.*”

3. What has, in time past, lessened the extent of crime? Has it not been education? Without doubt there is a less amount of crime in civilized society than in a community of savages; but civilization is nothing but the result of education; and the reason

why crime is not wholly eradicated is because civilization is imperfect; and this is the case because education is imperfect. A perfect education is the precursor to perfect civilization, and perfect civilization is again the forerunner of the perfect eradication of crime.

We now rest to see how our opponents will support their opinions, and to hear what they shall say of these we have now laid down. We trust they will receive all due consideration, and be allowed their legitimate force.

DROMO.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“**KNOWLEDGE is power,**” is an aphorism continually in the mouths of those who imagine that in education they have discovered the elixir which is destined to heal every infirmity, and purify every corruption of fallen humanity. When speaking of war, of crime, of superstition, or any other of the evils which the sin of Adam has entailed on his posterity, they say, “Such things must speedily disappear before the march of civilization and the progress of enlightenment; like the bats and owls, which seek obscurity before the rays of the noonday sun, so shall these relics of ignorance and barbarism vanish before the light of education and the increase of knowledge.” Because they see that intellectual progress has destroyed or lessened many physical inconveniences by the application of steam, gas, and electricity to the ordinary purposes of life, they consider that the same power would be as able to remove the evils of the moral as of the material world. They forget that education may, indeed, make the head more capable of devising, and the hand more skilful to execute; but that it cannot affect the passions, the inclinations, and the desires, alike common to the king and the beggar, the philosopher and the clown, and to which, when unrestrained, every power, both of mind and body, is but an obedient slave.

But, besides these general arguments, there are particular and practical ones advanced by those who maintain the affirmative side of this question. They point to the prison returns and criminal statistics; and, appealing to the disproportion in the numbers of educated and uneducated convicts, triumphantly ask if this is not suf-

ficient evidence in their favour? If it could be proved that the educated were, from their position in life, exposed to the same temptations as the ignorant, it would certainly place the matter beyond dispute. But, since the most prolific parent of crime is poverty, combined with strong passions, which cannot be gratified without infringing on the rights of others, the great majority of criminals will always be found in the lowest classes of society, to which education has not yet penetrated. Until it reaches these dangerous classes we cannot fairly apply these prison statistics; for it is admitted that men will not commit crime unless tempted; and, as educated men at present mostly move in a sphere above temptation, there will necessarily be but a small number of well-informed criminals. Under the pressure of extravagance or misfortune the educated fall as easily as the ignorant: perhaps more so; for their very intelligence suggests to them ways of committing and concealing their evil deeds which do not occur to the latter. What talent, what adroitness, what profound knowledge of human nature, is sometimes displayed by professional swindlers and blacklegs! They must be both educated and talented men, who, having lost character and substance by their excesses, are obliged to resort to plunder to keep up their debaucheries. We can scarcely take up a copy of the *Times* without seeing some complicated and ingenious fraud, furnishing an additional testimony to the fact that intelligence is merely a very powerful tool, which it is optional with its possessor to employ, either for good or evil. Education will certainly refine crime. It will diminish its

brutality, but increase its contrivance and premeditation. There will be fewer Goodes and Greenacres, but more Cartouches and Duvals. The bludgeon and pistol will give way to chloroform and the garotte. Robbery will be reduced to a science, in which ruffian violence will be superseded by dexterity and skill.

These are momentous times. Everywhere, throughout the length and breadth of the land, we hear the cry, Educate! educate! Is it wise to make those classes, now content with their present position, because ignorant of a better, discontented and intelligent? Is it well to implant in them new desires they cannot gratify—a thirst for pleasures they cannot obtain; to fill them with envy at those above them, and at the same time to place in their hands new resources for attacking the social edifice? It may be said that education, if rightly applied, would teach them contentment and a philosophical resignation to the different ranks of society. True; but most men are not philosophers, and never can be made such, and therefore will not make a right application. Men generally believe what they wish to be true; and the example of the French Socialists might inform us, that though a man with a

good amount at his banker's might be perfectly well convinced of the sacredness of property, and the respect due to authority, the same man in rags would be equally certain that property was a robbery, and all government a usurpation.

History teaches us that the most intellectual age of a nation has always been its most profligate. An educated populace poisoned the bowl for Socrates. The refinement, the civilization of Rome, gazed without shuddering on the bloody sports of the circus. The art-loving populace of Paris spared the Swiss guards who had climbed up the statues in the palace gardens for shelter, not from compassion, but lest their bullets should injure the sculpture.

The influence, then, that shall eradicate crime, must appeal to the heart as well as to the intellect. That influence is religion. It alone can calm and regulate man's turbulent ambition, assuage his restless avarice, and allay his gnawing envy. A people whose head and whose heart are alike educated will, indeed, approach as near as mortals may to an ignorance of crime. Educate the one and leave the other neglected, and you create a hell; educate both, and you come near to a terrestrial paradise.

S. A. J.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"Lives of great men all remind us
We may make our lives sublime;
And, departing, leave behind us
Foot-prints on the sands of time:
Foot-prints which, perhaps, another
Sailing o'er life's stormy main—
Some forlorn and shipwrecked brother—
Seeing, may take heart again."
Longfellow.

THE present moment seems peculiarly suited to the present discussion. There is, however, this disadvantage, that so much has recently been said upon the question, that it is almost hopeless to expect anything new. Under these circumstances we shall content ourselves with making the best use

in our power of the materials which have come before us.

We are of the number of those who consider the character of the recently departed Duke of Wellington worthy of admiration. In saying this we speak of the man apart from his vocation. The fact of his having been successful in war adds nothing to our estimation of him. Such a man would have been successful in any calling. It is true, some professions afford greater scope for the triumphs of genius than others. The military profession, at the period at which our hero entered it, presented an opportunity for the development and display of generalship

which has rarely before occurred. In this respect it was truly "the hour for the man." The age required a hero: Wellington supplied the want of the age.

That Wellington was successful in most that he undertook is *not* the reason why we award him our praise. It is because he combined in his character the certain and essential elements of success that we admire him. What was his prominent feature in his character? Chiefly a strong determination of purpose. But this was associated with a true knowledge and perception that no great purpose can be *thoroughly* accomplished without steady perseverance, patient industry, calm thought, and deep and earnest reflection. These were all characteristics in the great Duke. Obstacles were no discouragement to him, provided he could only see an object to be gained adequate to the energy required for their removal. Even ceasure proved no barrier, provided he felt that circumstances would ultimately justify him in his course. And, finally, a love of country, coupled with a sympathy for the faults and failings of his fellow-creatures, caused him at once to be just, but yet merciful.

This view is fully borne out by the writer of the *Times*' memoir of the Duke:—"Other commanders," says he, "have attained the highest pitch of glory when they disposed of the colossal resources of empires, and headed armies already flushed with the conquest of the world. The Duke of Wellington found no such encouragement in any part of his career. At no time were the means at his disposal adequate to the ready and certain execution of his designs. His steady progress in the Peninsular campaigns went on against the current of fortune, till that current was itself turned by perseverance and resolution. He had a clear and complete perception of the dangers he encountered; but he saw and grasped the latent power which baffled those dangers, and surmounted resistances apparently invincible. That is precisely the highest degree of courage, for it is courage conscious, enlightened, and determined."

When men, by virtue of the qualities we have described, have raised themselves to greatness and honour, their characters are always worthy of study. They live, as it were, their life again, the purpose of which is that their virtues *may be imitated*, and

handed down in memory to future generations. Westland Marston beautifully expressed this fact when he said—

"Let the body perish! not with its decay
The life and office of true greatness ends:
Its inspiration dwells enshrined in act.

The thought that they were men, makes other men

Exult in manhood.

And thus the sons
Of Genius have prerogative to stand
Exempt from Time's decree, immutable."

Another feature worthy of note in the character of Wellington is this, that after he had achieved his mighty conquests, and had settled down to receive the greatest homage of the greatest nation, the real characteristics of his former self never left him. Unlike Napoleon and other great warriors, he never became either lost, or even absorbed, in his own greatness. He was the same business-like, steady, and thoughtful man in prosperity as he had been during his progress towards it. Pride and the pomp of power seem never to have laid hold of him; and hence with his increasing years there gathered round him an increasing admiration, which could only be measured or expressed in the deep anguish of a nation's tears when the hour of his departure arrived.

How truly did the *Times* interpret the feeling of the great body of our fellow-countrymen on the close of the Duke's career:—"If aught can lessen this day the grief of England upon the death of her greatest son, it is the recollection that the life which has just closed leaves no duty incomplete, and no honour unbestowed. The Duke of Wellington had exhausted nature and exhausted glory. His career was an unclouded longest day, filled from dawn to nightfall with renowned actions, animated by unflinching energy in the public service, guided by unswerving principles of conduct and of statesmanship. . . . In him at least posterity will trace a character superior to the highest and most abundant gifts of fortune. If the word "heroism" can be not unfairly applied to him, it is because he remained greater than his own posterity, and rose above the temptations by which other men of equal genius, but less self-government, have fallen below their destinies."

Our readers will observe that we base our admiration of Wellington upon two positions,

both of them we conceive equally meritorious: the first being in respect of those qualities of mind and habits of industry which led him on to greatness; the second being that true nobleness of nature which guarded him from falling a victim to those *ambitious propensities* which have so often overtaken other great men.

"What, though Ambition holds its power
To life's extreme but certain hour;
Is not its most exalted joy
Encumbered with some base alloy?
And on its proudest, loftiest height,
Say, does it always find delight?
Say, could it ever guard its heart
From Fear's assault, and Envy's dart?
It cannot shut the averted eye
From passing Life's mortality.
E'en from the most aspiring brow
It must behold a grave below."

We must think it was mainly to the absence of this vice that the hero of Waterloo owed the peaceful serenity which attended his later years, and added an additional lustre to his well-earned fame.

We know there are some, perhaps many, who, with "Aristides," will see cause to differ from the views we have expressed. When we knew less of the character of the Duke, our own views concerning him were different from those we now entertain. There need be no diffidence in discussing the question freely, and there is something to be learned by doing so. Let us hope the discussion may prove at least not the most un-

interesting of those which the present volume of this magazine introduces to its readers.

When speaking or thinking of the departed Duke, let us ever remember that, "unvanquished in the field, his sword was never drawn for territorial conquest, but for the independence of Europe and the salvation of his country. Raised by the universal gratitude of Europe, and of this nation, to the highest point of rank and power which a subject of the British monarchy could attain, he wore those dignities, and he used that influence, within the strictest limits of a subject's duty. No law was ever twisted to his will; no right was ever sacrificed by one hair's breadth for his aggrandizement. There lived not a man, either among his countrymen or his antagonists, who could say that this great Duke had wronged him; for his entire existence was devoted to the cause of legal authority and regulated power. You seek in it in vain for those strokes of audacious enterprise which in other great captains, his rivals in fame, have sometimes won the prize of crowns or turned the fate of nations. But his whole career shines with the steady light of day. It has nothing to conceal—it has nothing to interpret by the flexible organs of history. Everything in it is manly, compact, and clear—shaped to one rule of public duty, animated by one passion—the love of England and the service of the crown."

C. W., JUN.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WHEN T. W. professed a disregard for the opinions of those who are attached to peace principles, we naturally inferred that he was disposed, at least, to tolerate war, convinced, like ourselves, that the time has not yet arrived when it may altogether be dispensed with; instead of seeing this evinced, we find the most marked confusion of thought. He first repudiates the opinions of peace men, and, in a sentence or so, he is glorying in our martial achievements; he next stigmatizes war on account of its "sanguinary cruelties," then applauds him who was identified with war, and slanders those who dissent from his opinion, as "victims of misanthropic prejudices;" all the while avowing attachment to the principles of peace.

We shall devote ourselves to a consideration of a few of his statements as they occur.

Wellington, it is insisted, "possessed a degree of purity in his general character, which it would be derogatory to none to imitate;" and farther on, a little way, that he was "a strictly moral man." Now, without going further than his public acts—acts by which, from their being public, he seemed willing his character should be judged—we find him, while in power, placing his mother on the pension list. We do think that had he been inspired by the slightest spark of filial affection, such a humiliation would never have been offered to his parent. His own official salaries, and his various bounties, were surely sufficiently munificent to have enabled him to have secured her who bore him from being degraded into a state pauper; but in whatever light this may be viewed, the fact that he transferred the duty of sup-

porting her—supposing such to have been necessary—from himself to the nation, is not one which redounds much to his credit for the faithful administration of the public funds: had no other motive weighed with him, one would have thought that a reluctance to have his relatives become burdensome to a country which had dealt liberally with himself might have prevailed; but though delicate scruples of that nature would have deterred finer souls, they did not operate with him, for there was a pension granted to another and more exceptionable lady; and what stamps the entire affair with moral obliquity is the fact that the *larger* of the two pensions was conferred on the lewd-limbed mistress. There is an act of his administration which remains yet to be explained—we refer to his treatment of his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley. It remains to be shown why, on his accession to power, he deprived his brother of office—that brother who, to promote him, had sacrificed his own prospects, and it is to be feared his duties too, and who, when governor of India, gave him precedence of more experienced soldiers, and forwarded him in his professional career by every means in his power; it was to him, it has been said, that, next to Providence, he was indebted for the opportunity of first signaling himself both in India and the Peninsula. It could be no slight occasion which estranged, for a series of years, a brother so devotedly attached.

Duelling—that unchristian mode of clearing one's reputation—received the sanction of the Duke, even when prime minister. The Earl of Winchelsea had rashly imputed to the Duke insidious designs on Protestantism, and refused to retract in a public manner the libellous statements which he had made public. Winchelsea was undoubtedly wrong. The belligerent parties met, and *the Duke fired*, while Winchelsea withheld; and afterwards discharging his pistol in the air, tendered the apology, the refusal of which had caused the absurd affair; though neither of the parties was wounded, the immorality of the act still clings to them.

We must say that, instead of feeling called upon to express our admiration of the moral character of Wellington, we turn from the contemplation of it with regret, that one whose character is so shaded should be the subject of such unmeasured laudation.

T. W. is lost in admiration of Wellington as a soldier, and, indeed, to be candid, we think it the least objectionable phase of his character; nevertheless, we cannot subscribe to the statement made by our opponent, relative to his military career. "Upon the battle-field," says he, "he was, so to speak, a manifestation of merciful and heroic feeling." Not pretending to an acquaintance with military affairs, we submit, most deferentially, to the opinion of one competent to judge, even Napoleon himself, premising, however, that the same opinion occurred to ourselves when perusing the accounts of the actions. "The immense sacrifice of men," says he, "at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz was by no means compensated for by the capture of those places."

We cannot pass without comment T. W.'s perversion of the word "*duty*." Duty is not the serving of another wherever one's abilities may be employed with advantage; nor, as the Duke seems to have defined it, implicit obedience to the orders of government. *Duty*, in its true signification, is *the best application of the capacity of the individual for the general good*. Wellington erred grossly in taking too low an estimate of duty, in believing it to be the carrying into effect the instructions of government; irrespective of the moral complexion of the actions in which he was to be engaged, he was ready to stand by the government, "through good report, and through bad report," whether in subduing the discontent of the Irish people, or in quelling an outbreak of the Chartists in the metropolis.

His political career is one from which men of liberal principles turn with dissatisfaction, for there they see his entire energies directed to the maintenance of the aristocracy and government. In relation to politics, we *do* ask, what the Duke of Wellington has effected worthy of admiration? and contend that it is a question of much more than *apparent* significance. We shall be delighted to learn what liberal measure he ever projected, or what liberal measure, when projected by others, he did not oppose. The truth is, he was singularly obtuse in perceiving, or if he perceived, slow in acknowledging, the adaptation of popular measures to popular wants. In the arena of politics, as in the tented field, he displayed nothing but "the tactics of war, always fighting to

the last;" he seems to have had, in this respect, quite a *canicular* capacity. The very positions on which T. W. takes occasion to praise the Duke, affords indubitable evidence that, as a politician, he was a very small man; for had he been the possessor of the sagacity and foresight claimed for him, he would have immediately detected, and exposed, the mischievous elements in the doubtful projects brought forward, so that his *warning* voice would have been quite out of place. As it was, however, so remarkable were his sagacity and foresight, that he could not be satisfied that the removal of disabilities was necessary till the country was threatened with the horrors of a civil war, nor could he be convinced that certain reforms in parliament would not endanger government until these reforms were actually brought about. We cannot even think he had the large measure of common sense attributed to him, for such a gift would have given him the power of seeing it in others; yet, although the country at large pronounced in favour of reform, he could not perceive that they had reason on their side. His legislative capacity is represented by *nil*. He granted nothing until forced to it; he seemed to pride himself in withstanding the popular demands, as if, forsooth, his single arm, however puissant in the field, was capable of coercing the popular will.

We feel strongly disposed to give the negative to the attempt, vainly made by T. W., to elevate Wellington above the great Corsican; viewed as generals, we dare say Wellington would not lose much by the comparison; but the merit is due to Napoleon of originating the peculiar tactics pursued by both. In their capacities as legislators, the superiority of Napoleon is indisputable; his was no commonplace regret as to having always been engaged in war, for so far from being defective in this respect, his capacity for the conduct of civil affairs was second to that of military affairs only because less exercised, as his public undertakings, his political reformatations, and above all his code of laws, abundantly testify. Yet all the while "his hand was against every man, and every man's hand was against him." Judging from what he did (though it is often a fallacious gauge), we may conjecture what miracles he would have accomplished had he enjoyed thirty-five years' cessation

from the toils of war, for he had an opulent mind: but we have before us the fruits of Wellington's retirement, and have already estimated them at what they are worth.

Towards the conclusion of his paper, T. W. brings in that happy, because appropriate, *soubriquet*, the "Iron Duke," a phrase finely denotive of his sympathy and general feeling, both of which were rather ambiguous; in this respect he was almost a nondescript, being, as it were, devoid of an emotional nature. In matters which feeling would have decided in ordinary men, he was perfectly stolid; to pity, he was a stranger. Although the wife of Marshal Ney threw herself at his feet, imploring the exercise of his influence on behalf of her husband, he remained unmoved by her entreaties. Rarely was he animated by generous impulses to assist the weak or overawe the strong; in his view his exalted station carried with it no moral responsibility of such a nature; he was for ever separated from the danger of being magnanimous by his unconcern for the happiness of others.

What, then, can have convinced T. W. "that the character of the Duke of Wellington, as a soldier and as a man, is worthy of admiration?" Is it his administration of the public money or his ingratitude to his brother? Is it the Don Quixotism of the duellist or the dauntlessness of the general on the field, as he "ravaged kingdoms and laid empires waste?" or is it his equivocal attempts at statesmanship? If none of these, is it his austerity, his stoicism, his insensibility to warm emotional feelings, which enlist the sympathy of T. W.? Hero worship has surely been carried to a dangerous excess, if the Duke of Wellington is to be regarded as one having claims to our admiration for other than his successful campaigning. We grant, at once, that in the minor traits of frankness, courage, decision, promptitude, unceasing activity, persistency of purpose, his life forms a pleasing contrast to that presented by the lives of many more highly gifted men; yet these, as they involve not great principles, cannot elicit our admiration of a public man, so marred by other deficiencies; though on the traits pointed out we would not be frugal of praise, but for the influence which that might give to his career as a whole.

ARISTIDES.

Politics.

OUGHT THE GRANT TO MAYNOOTH TO BE WITHDRAWN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

I REJOICE that the question at the head of this paper is to be considered in a political point of view. For, however strongly "L'Ouvrier," or our great "Protestant champions," may attempt to give it a religious aspect, still it remains, before the face of the whole world, a question involving most important *political* principles, principles equally important with those anti-christian contentions which are too frequently carried on between the rival sects of religionists in this our day. I am not inclined to view this matter as a question of power between the two great "churches" of the times, but as one of right, of justice, of uprightness, and of national honour. And, sir, I believe that there are thousands of my intelligent countrymen who are, with me, unwilling to receive the "No Popery" arguments of the opponents to Maynooth. I believe that there are thousands of Protestants who, while they are sound at heart, and truly Protestant in principle, dislike to hear the old and threadbare cry of "No peace with Rome!" "Down with her, down with her, even to the ground; she is unfit to live!" This, I repeat, is not the feeling of England as a nation, however loud and boisterous some of our enthusiastic agitators may be in their denunciations of the Papacy. Why, sir, if one were to ask them what is the distinguishing characteristic of Rome, many of them would unhesitatingly reply, "Intolerance and persecution!" And yet it seems to me that their increasing jealousy towards the Catholics of England and Ireland savours very much of the same spirit of "intolerance and persecution." I rejoice that we are not subject to the powers of the "Inquisition," and the thousand means of torment that we read of Rome. But I never can allow that this should be a reason why we should retaliate, in any degree, the cruelties of Rome. God forbid that such a spirit should ever be received by the people of England! And, while we are so manifestly the recipients of the choicest blessings

of heaven, shall it be said that we have imbibed the spirit of our great opponent? Shall it be published to the world that we, as a people, are content to follow in the wake of persecution, while, in theory at least, we profess to detest its principle? No; the inquiring spirit of the times will not, cannot allow this.

But I may be told that this is not the desire of the opponents to Maynooth. They tell us that Maynooth doctrines are erroneous, and therefore it is their duty to prevent their inculcation. Indeed! What man art thou that shalt thus presume to be arbiter between thy fellow and his God? Liberty of conscience, liberty of thought, is the undoubted right of every man; and the liberty of the Bible is not opposed thereto. And, I would ask, is it lawful—nay, can it be allowed—that one man shall compel another to interpret scripture, and to understand the will of God, as he thinks proper? And yet our opponents claim to themselves this power, and pronounce an adverse judgment on Rome and all it teaches. This, I submit, is not what we have a right to expect from the people of England. There are so many things, both in nature and revelation, that are beyond the finite power of man's understanding, that it would be presumption of the darkest character to expect that the powerful shall bind the powerless in thought. Justice, not power, is what we profess to seek. Right, not might, must be the word

"In the good time coming."

And how much the evil is aggravated, if we attempt to bind a man in things that are eternal! If men are inclined to receive the doctrines that are taught in Maynooth, if they are willing to interpret holy writ in the same manner as the Church of Rome, if they are content to be bound by the shackling ordinances of her priesthood, what is that to us? or would it be just in the government to annul this their manly prerogative? Certainly not; and unless it can be proved

that the people of Ireland are not generally Roman Catholics, it would be the worst of all policies to let *one-fifth* rule the remaining majority. Oh! but we are told, the *nation* is Protestant. I grant it. Thank God for it! But we are not legislating for the nation, but for Ireland. Ireland, that has been down-trodden so long by her powerful rulers—Ireland, that has poured her thousands on to the field of battle to bleed and die for England—Ireland, that has been and is insulted so vilely for her religion—Ireland, that has been so misgoverned for centuries; but still Ireland, the ally, the friend, the companion, and supporter of her haughty and imperious neighbour.

Suppose you that her sons cannot think? Think you they have no reason? Have they not a share in the revenue of the country? Have you not in late years marked her

dissatisfaction? But even in her turbulence you may have perceived a lurking but a strong fondness for our land. Conciliate her. Use her as your equal, and not as your slave. Hold out to her the right hand of fellowship and charity. Give her "civil and religious liberty," hackneyed though the phrase be, and she shall still be your supporter in all national difficulties. Not from fear but from love will she serve you. Thus the glory of our national constitution shall be strengthened, and we shall still be a people, prosperous, contented, and happy.

I regret that space will not permit me pointedly to controvert all the other points of "L'Ouvrier." But, to me, they appear shallow in the extreme. And I have hope that their plausibility will be duly exploded, and truth be triumphant thereby.

H. P.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"Whate'er is false, deceitful, foul;
Whate'er antagonist to truth;
The bigot's heart, the tyrant's scowl,—
Thou art their native soil, Maynooth.
And shall we still the nuisance nurse?
Still feed a death-diffusing pest?
No! rise, exterminate the curse;
The gangrene starve on Ireland's breast."

As the *history* of the endowment of Maynooth was given in the last number of this magazine, it is not necessary to recapitulate it here; we shall, therefore, at once proceed to substantiate the position we have taken in the present debate. We believe the grant ought to be withdrawn for the following reasons:—

First. Because the endowment has totally failed to accomplish that which it was intended to accomplish. Foolish and short-sighted, indeed, our legislators must have been to suppose that Rome could be bribed to quiescence! Ireland is as unhappy now, as wretched now, as poor now, as ignorant now, as seditious now, as ever she was. And no wonder; for it is Popery that makes her so, as it makes all other nations; and how can the effect be removed by augmenting the cause?

Mr. Gifford, in his "Life of Pitt," states that within three years of the establishment of Maynooth many of the students joined in the rebellion; and Dr. Hussey, the first president, was charged with treason, and was

obliged to fly the kingdom, and died in exile. Read, also, a description given of the priests educated at Maynooth by their organ, the *Dublin Freeman's Journal*:—"A national priesthood, sprung from the people, and educated at home, could not remain passive in the struggle for religious equality. They lent a moral discipline to the millions whom O'Connell led; and he exclaimed repeatedly, 'Without such a clergy we never could have won.'"

Secondly. Because doctrines are taught at Maynooth opposed to the well-being of man. Let us hear what one of the Romish newspapers says of what the priests are taught at Maynooth:—"We admit, at once, that the priesthood must be taught things which are unfit for the knowledge of women or of men; that they have books, and that they must read them, wholly unfit for circulation among young people. These books, however, are not written in the vernacular language of any country, and a very small part of them is occupied with the subject in question. We also admit everything that the Protestant can say against certain treatises of moral theology, except that they are written for an evil end, or that they are erroneous. Let these books be bad, full of language which cannot be spoken; let them be, as they are said to be, unfit for man's reading, and unbecoming a circulating library.

We admit it all, and much more; but we hide them as much as we can from the eyes of all, and permit their use only to those who are bound to know them."—*Tablet*, August 14. Now, here it is admitted that the priests at Maynooth are instructed in a kind of knowledge as disgusting as was ever alleged by any Protestant. They cannot now deny these abominations, and therefore they attempt to vindicate them, by telling us that they hide them as much as possible. But if the knowledge is acquired in secret, the uses it is put to are public and open. Instead of keeping it from the ears of men, it pours it into the ears of women in the confessional; so that all those nations where Popery is dominant are sunk to the lowest level of human degradation. "Language which cannot be spoken" is poured into the ears of the young and beautiful "by the bachelor priests of Rome, till it has become a very Sodom." Verily he was a true linner that described Rome as the "Mother of harlots, and the abomination of the earth!"

But view the subject in another light. All persons naturally detest murder, and reckon it, as indeed it is, the most horrible sin a man can commit; yet Ireland's sons can regard it with indifference; and, though they see a murder committed, can look on without compassion, and can swear before a judicial tribunal that they never had beheld the deed! How is this? It is because of the teachings of the priesthood, and that priesthood is educated at Maynooth. The teaching at Maynooth is hostile to liberty, either civil or religious—is opposed to pure morals and virtue, and is dangerous to the lives of our fellow-men. Surely the British government ought not to support an institution which teaches such lessons as these!

Thirdly. Because doctrines are taught at Maynooth opposed to the word of God. This immediately follows from the preceding reason, but may be enforced by the following testimony of one of the priests educated at our expense at Maynooth:—"Now, I assert, with all the solemnity of an oath, that while I lived in that college, during a period of six years, and was educated for a priest in the Church of Rome, I had no bible in my possession from the college; nor am I aware that

any of my class-fellows thus possessed a copy of that sacred book; *nor was it a class-book in our divinity course*, even in a dead language! After the usual career in college, I was ordained by the Most Rev. Dr. Murray, from whom I still retain my letters of orders."* Pretty preachers of the gospel Romish priests must be, who never see a bible through all their college course!

Fourthly. Because punishment awaits all those who have any connexion with Rome. In Rev. xvii. 1, we read, "Come hither; I will shew unto thee the judgment of the great whore that sitteth upon many waters." The evangelist-prophet then goes on to describe the woman, and the beast on which she sitteth, which is described as having seven heads. And in the ninth verse it is said, "The seven heads are seven mountains, on which the woman sitteth." And, "The woman which thou sawest is that great city, which reigneth over the kings of the earth." Now, at the time when John wrote, no city would or could answer this description but Rome; and not pagan, but papal Rome is referred to in the *prediction*. In the fourth verse of the next chapter there is the summons, "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not *partakers of her sins*, and *that ye receive not of her plagues*." We obey the summons; we leave her to herself; we abandon her to destruction. Her ruin is approaching; she is on the verge of that awful precipice over which she must one day fall; and shall we, Protestant Englishmen, take hold of the skirts of her scarlet robe, and let her drag us over the precipice also? Shall we, the only really free nation of Europe, pay our money to foster a slavery the most horrible? Shall we, the inhabitants of a land of bibles and gospel light, suffer a grant to be made to foster a system opposed alike to virtue and the Bible? God forbid. If we have already done so, shall we withdraw it? Yes! "Yes!" re-echo all the heroes who have fought and bled for their own and their country's freedom. "Yes!" re-echo all the martyrs who have died in vindication of the pure gospel of Jesus Christ. "Yes!" re-echo our liberty, our power, our religion. All join and swell the cry of one universal affirmative.

J. C. M'C., JUN.

* From a speech of Mr. Patrick O'Brien.

The Societies' Section.

MEANS OF MENTAL IMPROVEMENT.

PRESUMING that our readers are acquainted with the three leading branches of knowledge (reading, writing, and elementary arithmetic), their object should be to render present attainments subsidiary to further advancement.

Reading contributes greatly to mental improvement, and to increase the student's stock of intelligence. But it will not have much tendency in this way if the reading be gone over too hastily, nor if the time of the reader be devoted to light and trifling works, which are written for the sake of entertainment. Reading, to be really beneficial, should be pursued with studiousness, combined with a habit of reflection; and a selection of books should be carefully made, to meet the chief intellectual wants of every individual. In making this selection it is very unwise to pander to the imagination and the fancy; but it is more satisfactory and safe to read such books as are calculated to build up the judgment, and to influence and direct the reasoning faculty.

Time for reading may be obtained, notwithstanding the pressing calls of business and family affairs, by adopting a suitable arrangement of work for every passing hour, so as to leave intervals which should be employed with avidity for the sake of improvement. Sometimes favourable occasions for the perusal of books will occur, while at others the fragments of hours will require to be seized upon with earnestness, that they may not pass away unprofitably.

A plan for reading should be drawn out to suit the student's special circumstances, which, as a matter of course, would embrace articles and works on education; and these should not be laid aside without repeated perusals. It should also include select courses of general literature, history, biography, voyages and travels—natural, mental, and moral philosophy, natural history, and particularly biblical literature, and the evidences of Christianity. To which should be added, for the sake of study and reference, some works on geography, topography, and chronology. All these should be judiciously procured, according to the means that students may possess, either by purchasing works to constitute a library of their own, or by availing themselves of the use of such libraries of reference or circulation as they can have recourse to with most convenience.

Have a book always at hand, that you may thus improve the leisure hours as they pass. 'A love of reading has always distinguished the wise and intelligent of mankind. No acuteness of observation, no closeness of reasoning, no brilliancy of imagination, or power of invention, can enable man well to dispense with this habit.' If such remarks be true when men of ability and talent are considered, then how much more forcibly do they apply to those whose capacities are of an inferior order. Let time be economized, let means be judiciously employed, let the fragments of the day be gathered up, and many a book may be advantageously read.

Conversation with a friend on the contents of books that you may read is an admirable method of deepening the impression of what may have been learnt, and of being more fully satisfied of the truth of the statements that may have been read, or of detecting any errors.

that may occur in the publications, either through heedlessness or design on the part of their authors. By this method mutual progression in knowledge is also promoted.

Writing, as a means of mental improvement, is of still greater importance. There is a definitiveness, an exactness, and yet there may be a flexibility about written exercises, that serve most materially to train the understanding to accuracy and activity in the pursuit of intelligence. The revision, too, of such exercises, at short periods after they were written, tends much to render them more clear and truthful.

Should the student be deficient in grammatical information, he can take any standard grammar, study the rules, and write out the examples. By this simple method, continued with perseverance, improvement may be greatly promoted.

The art of composition is a most desirable acquirement. This can be managed by taking an elementary work on the subject, and from it learning the nature of sentences, both simple and complex, with their constituent parts; namely, the subject, predicate, and object, together with their adjuncts; also, the proper combination of sentences into paragraphs.

By means of frequent exercises of this kind the student's vocabulary will be much enlarged, and he will attain to considerable skilfulness in the right choice and use of words. To acquire a correct style of writing, it is a good plan to read a paragraph from any celebrated author two or three times over; then shut the book, and try to reproduce it in writing; when this is done, open the book again, compare your own production with the original, and correct any errors that may appear, both in the punctuation and sentences. Many persons, by following these plain directions, have most agreeably polished their style, both of writing and speaking.

Improvement in the knowledge of geography is best obtained by drawing maps in outline. First, the boundaries of the country; second, its divisions, with the mountains and hills; third, the lakes and rivers; fourth, the cities and great towns; and, lastly, fill up with as many more cities and towns as may be desirable.

A course of history and biography should be studied in connexion with geography. The writing out of lists, in chronological order, of the various lines of sovereigns, and of the most remarkable events in the reign of each, and the times in which celebrated individuals lived, serves to impress this knowledge more deeply upon the memory. The regular study of history, by suitable courses, in company with a friend, or in a class for mutual instruction, is very advantageous. But, of all studies pursued for the sake of mental improvement, reading will afford most aid; while writing will contribute greatly to the accuracy with which innumerable truths and facts may be retained; and conference with other persons will promote an aptness for the proper use of knowledge whenever it may be required. The brief statement of Lord Bacon is worthy of perpetual remembrance:—"Reading maketh a full man; writing, an exact man; and conversation, a ready man." Let all students, then, gird up their minds to this threefold excellence.

Popular lectures may be regarded as a special means of mental improvement. They have the great advantage of giving information, in the space of about an hour, that would require days of reading to get the same together. In many of these lectures, too, much intelligence is received which would escape the general student by reading only; and the mind, through their delivery, is not unfrequently set with earnest desire upon the mastery

of subjects that may prove extremely useful and profitable, and which, but for the lecture, might have been overlooked. To read from some approved work about the lecture before hearing it is a good means of rendering it additionally pleasing and advantageous while attending to its delivery.

Every course of study should have a twofold object: first, to enrich the student with the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; and, second, to distribute this kind of wealth among others for their lasting benefit. Our eager desire should be to gain knowledge for the sake of happiness and usefulness.—*Teachers' Magazine*.

BOOKS AND READING.

LET us then introduce you, gentlemen, into a Library. I do not mean into one of the great national collections, like that of the British Museum, or the Bodleian at Oxford, or the Red Cross Street Library of London, where the volumes range from fifteen thousand to five hundred thousand volumes; though there is some advantage to be derived from merely gazing upon such a collection. John Foster has truly said, "There are more ways to derive instruction from books than the chief and the direct one of applying the attention to what they contain." The sight would suggest to a thoughtful mind a variety of reflections; some, perhaps, like these—What a number of our busy race have deemed themselves capable of informing and directing the rest of mankind! How many of them mistook their power! What a number of them were disappointed, and sunk beneath the load of calamities peculiar to authors! How many of them were really honest and hearty in their advocacy of truth? How many of them have ceased to feel an interest in all that is now done under the sun! And if we thus reflect on the authors, what crowds of ideas may float before the mind respecting the contents of their books, and the influence they have had for good or evil on the minds of their readers!

Grave and even painful thoughts of this order may be readily diversified on entering other libraries. You go into some circulating collection of novels, and, looking at their motley titles, from the travels of Baron Munchausen to the haunted castle of Mrs. Radcliffe, you feel that it would be no loss to the world if the whole contents were cast into the ocean, or the other side of the breakwater; and, indeed, that no calamity would have been sustained if they had never been called into existence. You enter into some elegant library, where books appear arranged for ornament rather than for use, and you feel regret that so much of external beauty meets the eye, when the more valuable contents are seldom if ever looked into. It was while waiting for a nobleman in such a room, that Burns, the poet, took down a splendidly-bound volume of Shakspeare, and wrote on one of its fly-leaves the keen and biting stanzas—

"Through and through the classic leaves,
Ye worms, pursue your windings;

But, oh! respect his lordship's taste,
And spare the golden bindings."

My remarks, however, have reference, not to public or large libraries, but rather to some of the small collections which may be found in almost every dwelling of any moderate respectability. Let a young man, who has preserved his school-books, and out of his yearly earnings laid aside some suitable sum for the purchase of books, make additions from time to time as his means increase, and he will in the course of time have a collection

which will be an honour to his meridian life, and a comfort to his declining years. Such a library, amounting eventually to a hundred and fifty or two hundred volumes, would be an inheritance worthy of transmission to his children's children. Let us try and indicate what such a collection might or should be.

A volume on bibliography, which embraces a description of the character and value of books in general, would, to say the least, be useful. One might recommend Dibdin's "Library Companion," Hartwell Horne's treatise on the same subject, and Isaac Taylor's "History of the Transmission of Books from Ancient to Modern Times." A glance at cheap catalogues would have its use, and a frequent lounge in old book shops, provided the lounge has courage to keep his money in his pocket, will, at a cheap rate, enlarge his acquaintance with books in general. Reviews may be read, but not to be trusted implicitly. It is said that some reviewers commend books without reading them; and political party or personal considerations, we well know, often give an unfair character of blame or praise to an author and his productions.

A good library, however small, should have in it some works on mental and moral philosophy. These subjects have respect to our mind and conduct, to the laws and motives which regulate the one and the other, and therefore are vastly important to us all. On mental philosophy I may mention, Locke "On the Human Understanding"; Stewart's "Philosophy"; Mackintosh's "History of Mental Science"; Dr. Thomas Browne's "Mental Philosophy," and Cousin's "Exposition of Eclecticism." In the latter department of inquiry, Paley's "Moral Philosophy," and Wardlaw's "Christian Ethics," are books not to be read only, but to be studied.

A christian man, in forming a library, should have due regard to some valuable works on the evidences of natural and revealed religion. Books of all sizes and prices may now be obtained on this important subject. Paley's "Natural Theology," edited and improved by Lord Brougham, merits a careful perusal. Butler's "Analogy of Religion" is a masterly production, and should be read alike for its vigorous thinking, its conclusive reasoning, and its sound theology. The edition to which an Essay by Dr. Wilson, the bishop of Calcutta, is prefixed, is the best. M'Culloch on "The Attributes," and Chalmers on "The Evidences of Christianity," are both good books deserving attention.

Books which relate to history, including geography, topography, and chronology, must not be omitted in our list. Ancient histories, as Rollin and Gibbon, should be read. The reflections of the former are religiously good, but somewhat heavy and superfluous; the spirit of the latter, it is well to know, is decidedly sceptical. Grote's "History of Greece," and Fergusson's "Roman Republic," with Dr. Arnold's "Histories of Rome," are all valuable, the first and last-named works especially so. Mackintosh's "History of England," Sir W. Scott's "History of Scotland," T. Moore's "History of Ireland," and Warrington's "History of Wales," may all be recommended to persons who wish to obtain a knowledge of the United Kingdom. As a History of Modern Europe, the recent work of Alison, though rather prosy in detail, and decidedly Tory in spirit, is the best we have. Dr. Arnold's "Lectures on History" are valuable. Hales' "Chronology," a costly book in four volumes, contains a vast amount of information on history, geography, and prophecy, and is written in a candid christian spirit by a scholarly man. Countless volumes of modern travels offer a selection to all readers, guided by their taste and predilections.

Well-written biographical works are at once attractive and instructive. It is an evil of this book-making age that works of this order are often so attenuated and prolix as to fail of their object. Johnson's "Lives of the Poets" are a fine specimen of brief biographies, and of what they ought to be. Franklin's autobiography is very instructive; and a volume called "The Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties" may be read with advantage by all persons, but especially by young men.

In referring to general literature, some treatises on language and grammar are indispensable. Your lecturer would recommend a little work on "The Origin and Progress of Language," published as a monthly volume by the Religious Tract Society, if he were not the author of it. Dr. Latham on "The English Language" is an admirable production; and Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric" are very instructive. In the spirit of the old English adage, which says,

"Let every foreign tongue alone,
Till you can read and write your own,

I would urge you to make yourselves fully acquainted with the principles and wealth of the English language. Whately's "Rhetoric" will aid you in using the knowledge thus acquired; and the mention of his name reminds me that in speaking of the laws of mind, I ought to have commended Whately's "Logic," and Mill's work on the same subject, with Taylor's "Elements of Thought."

Poetry has no charms for some minds; but most educated persons feel it not only to be a luxury, but a blessed and necessary element, intended to meet a want of their higher nature. Coleridge said, "that the love of it had proved to him its own exceeding great reward." Our language is rich in poetic compositions, from Chaucer and Spencer, down to Tennyson and Browning. Some great names are amongst us familiar as household words. Who would be ignorant of Shakspeare, or plead unacquaintance with Milton, or Pope, or Cowper? Amongst modern writers we have Byron, who, alas! is not unexceptionable; Moore, whose remains were only recently committed to the tomb; Montgomery—not he of satanic celebrity, but the quiet christian poet of the modern church—Hood, whose poems of wit and humour have pathos in them to melt the heart—whose "Song of the Shirt," and "One more unfortunate, weary of breath," are justly recited with emotion in the cottage and the palace.

But I must conduct you from the enchanting ground of poetry, and alight for a moment on the more earthly material of scientific knowledge. The science of government is growingly important, and every young man ought to read De Lolme or Custance on "The Constitution," with Lord John Russell on "The English Government." Political economy claims attention, and Adam Smith on "The Wealth of Nations" is a good book to have and to read. A few books on Natural History, and such as embrace Geology, Chemistry, and Astronomy, ought not to be forgotten in forming a library, for all these departments of inquiry display the works of the Creator, and exhibit his wisdom, power, and goodness.

I mention last, but not as least, a good commentary on the Bible. It is the book of books. Its poetry and philosophy, its histories and parables, its doctrines and duties, its promises and revelations, are all incomparable. A good copy of it, with marginal references, and another with Scott's or Henry's "Commentary," will make the man of God complete, "furnished unto every good word and work."

Thus have I indicated to you some of the sources of knowledge open to the English student; and he who has read and comprehended the greater part of the books now enumerated will neither be superficial nor vain, neither ignorant nor self-satisfied. He will not feel that he has already attained, or is already perfect; nor will he feel paralyzed in the endeavour to press forward; but rather, like the philosopher who thought of himself as a child playing with pebbles on the sea-shore, he will gird himself up to the task, and launch out into the ocean of intelligence which on every hand expands itself to his view.—*Rev. Geo. Smith.*

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Neophyte Writers' Society.—The northern section of this prosperous society held its first meetings in Glasgow on the last day of 1852 and the first day of 1853. It met for important business and mutual gratification. The time chosen was suggestive—satisfactory thoughts of the past brought congratulatory discourse, and also hopeful "second-sight" into the future. On New Year's Day the principal meeting was held, presided over by the hon. president and umpire, the author of "The Art of Reasoning," and the code of laws for the society was then set on a permanent basis. At all the meetings the "flow of knowledge" and the "flow of reason" were sweetened with the enthusiasm and fraternal love characteristic of the Neophytes. The book, too, occupied the place of the bottle. Nor was it all in-door enjoyment. The "lions" of St. Mungo were seen; and a sail down the Clyde and a ride on the rail brought some of the Neophytes to the margin of Loch Lomond. The members of this section, it may be mentioned, are the most widely separated, geographically, of all the sections in the society. They reside in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Kilmarnock, Manchester, and Liverpool; the other four sections include members resident in Wales and the midland and southern counties of England. Against great obstacles of space and time the Neophytes have very successfully impracticalized the idea of an educational and literary institute knit together by postal communication; and, although as yet not many months old, it bids fair to become an instrument of great usefulness; so of the Neophytes, with "Festus," it may be said,

"That it is they
Who set their shoulders to the stall'd world's
wheel,
And give it a hitch forwards."

R. L. S.

Cheltenham Mutual Improvement Society.—This society held its second half-yearly meeting on Tuesday, November 30, 1852, when about 200 members and friends were present, and partook of an excellent social repast; after which the Rev. Dr. Brown was called to the chair; and, having made some very eloquent and practical remarks on the name of the society, and the mutual principle in general, concluded by calling on the secretary (H. W. Lusty) to read the report for the past half-year, which stated that the society was rapidly progressing, exceeding the most sanguine anticipations of its best friends. The number of members had increased to sixty, being an

increase of forty since the last report. Numerous discussions had been held on important topics, among which were the following:—"Has Government any right to interfere in Education?" "Can Christians, under any circumstances, take an Oath?" "Was Cromwell justified in the Massacre of Drogheda?" "Was the Government justified in introducing the Militia Bill?" "Is the moderate use of Intoxicating Liquors to be condemned?" "Ought Capital Punishments to be abolished?" "Which is the most Degraded State in Europe?" "Is the use of Musical Instruments in Divine Worship to be condemned?" "Does the Stage Benefit or Demoralize Society?" "Ought the First or Seventh Day of the Week to be regarded as the Sabbath?" "Was the Nation justified in Deposing and Beheading King Charles I.?" "Are Works of Fiction beneficial?" "Were the Crusades beneficial to Europe?" "Is the Character of Queen Elizabeth deserving of Admiration?" "Which is the best form of Government for a State to possess—a Limited Monarchy, an Absolute Monarchy, or a Republic?" Lectures had been delivered on "The Tendencies and Results of the Crusades," by Mr. Whittard; "The Assyrian Antiquities," by the Rev. W. G. Lewis; "Central America and its Remains," by the Rev. Dr. Brown. Interesting monthly meetings had been held for miscellaneous purposes, devoted chiefly to reading essays, or selections of prose and poetry, and recitations. The library had been greatly increased, and various classes established. Great efforts had been made to establish a reading-room, and such arrangements made as would secure in a few days the desired object. The report concluded by calling on the members for renewed and strenuous exertions for the good of the society. The following members then spoke on resolutions prepared by the committee in a manner which, while it highly gratified the audience, gave indisputable evidence of the benefits to be derived from mutual improvement societies:—Messrs. Keen, D. Channon, C. H. Channon, Pye, Trotman, Steel, Harrison, Beard, Workman, and M. Michael. The resolutions were followed by some excellent remarks from Messrs. Baker, Winters, the Rev. Mr. Rawlinson, and others. The subjects were handled admirably, and drew forth the frequent applause of a delighted assemblage. The chairman then terminated the meeting by a necessarily brief address.

The history of this society exemplifies in a striking degree what may be done by exertion. Twelve months ago the society numbered but six individuals, who were without any great amount

of personal influence, but continued holding their weekly discussion meetings for one month without the slightest increase; at the end of which time one person joined them, and in another month two more joined them, making the total number of members at the end of three months, nine. Since that time the society has gradually increased until the present time (January 10, 1853). It now numbers one hundred members, possesses a reading-room (open every evening from six till half-past ten), well supplied with the requisite papers and periodicals; a valuable library of circulation; classes for the study of music, phonography, mathematics, and English grammar; and all the requisites for a permanent and useful educational establishment. The committee are now engaged in securing a course of lectures, which will shortly be published. The society is entirely unsectarian, and independent of support from any persons except members.—H. W. L.

Hebden Bridge Mutual Improvement Society.—The members of this society held their annual festival on Saturday, January 1, 1853. After the removal of the trays, the Rev. T. J. Walker was called upon to preside. The secretary, Mr. J. Clegg, then read a report of the past year's proceedings. During that time upwards of thirty lectures had been delivered, including a valuable course of eight lectures on the Lord's Prayer by the Rev. T. Hisk; eight on theology, by Mr. Thomas Walton; six on chemistry, by Mr. H. W. Horsfall; and five, by Mr. J. H. Robinson, on various scientific subjects. In addition to the lectures, one evening in each month had been devoted to recitations of prose and poetry. The library now contains about 114 volumes of choice and valuable books.

The persons comprising the society are divided into two sections, termed shareholders and members. The former pay a weekly subscription of one penny each, and possess an equal share in the property. The latter pay a penny per month, and enjoy all the benefits of the institution, but have no share in the property, and no vote in the purchase of books, apparatus, &c. Any member or other person wishing to join the former section can do so by paying a certain per centage on the amount already paid up by each shareholder, together with the weekly subscription. After the report had been read, the meeting was addressed by the Rev. G. Greenwood, Messrs. Walton, Cockcroft, Horsfall, Robinson, Barker, and others. We trust that from this occasion the society will receive a fresh impetus, and will go on with increased vigour and success.

Skipton (in Craven) Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society, Zion Chapel.—This society was formed in October, 1851, and at its commencement consisted of eight members, but has increased during the past year to forty. The history of the class from its formation has been one of steady progress and growing interest, and it has been of much benefit to its members.

A meeting for discussion is held every Tuesday evening, presided over by the Rev. R. Gibbs. Each question is introduced with an essay written by the proposer of the subject. During its existence twenty-seven essays have been read, and the subjects of them discussed. The following, among a number of other subjects, have elicited animated discussions:—1. "Is the character of Oliver Cromwell worthy of admiration?" 2. "Ought

Railway Trains to run on the Sabbath?" 3. "Are the English justified in the taking and retaining of British India?" 4. "Had William the Conqueror any right to the Throne of England?" 5. "Is the character of the late Duke of Wellington, as a Statesman, worthy of applause?" 6. "Is the Militia necessary and just?" 7. "Was the Execution of Charles I. justifiable?" 8. Was Monachism beneficial or injurious in the Times it existed, and did it ultimately prove such to European Society?" The president, the Rev. R. Gibbs, has delivered four lectures to the members and friends of the society on the following subjects:—1. "Self-cultivation." 2. "Bunyan and his Times." 3. The relation of the Bible to Civil and Religious Liberty, and the Rights of Conscience." 4. "The character of Zwingli, the Swiss Reformer."

On Tuesday, January 4, 1853, the members and friends of the society held their first annual tea meeting, in the British schoolroom, kindly lent by John Dewhurst, Esq., when upwards of 140 persons partook of an excellent tea. A public meeting was afterwards held, when several members gave addresses upon self-cultivation, and the benefits to be derived from connexion with such institutions. The president closed the evening's proceedings with a powerful and stirring speech, in which he adverted to the steady improvement he had witnessed among the members, and expressed his desire that they should persevere; not resting contented with present acquirements, but to go on determinedly in the pursuit of truth. The meeting broke up about ten o'clock, highly gratified with the evening's entertainment.

At a general meeting on the 11th instant the following resolution was passed unanimously:—"That the society take in the *British Controversialist* and "The Literary and Scientific Lecturer," monthly; and, also, that the volumes already published of these periodicals be purchased in the monthly parts."—D. S.

Sheffield Wesleyan Association Young Men's Institute.—On Thursday, December 30, 1852, the young men connected with this association held their annual tea meeting, in the large room belonging to the institute, Tudor-place. Considering that the meeting was open only to members and candidates, the attendance was good, although not so large as the year before. From the report it was found that the society now numbered ninety-two members and candidates; and, although the average attendance has not been so good as it ought to have been, still it was better than in some previous years. During the year a spirited and friendly competition had been carried on in the various week-night classes. Cruden's "Concordance," and a work entitled "Lights of the World," were awarded to brother William Griffiths as the first prizes in the English grammar and composition classes. The Tract Society's edition of Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," and a pocket commentary on the New Testament, were awarded to brother Alfred Lawley as the second in the above-named classes. Dr. Dick's "Celestial Scenery," and "The History of Jerusalem," were awarded to brother James Pearson as the first prizes in the arithmetic and second grammar classes. After the report was read, the meeting was addressed by the Rev. James Ward (the chairman), Mr. Charles Wardlaw, Jun., Mr. T. B. Shuttleworth, and Mr. E. Lister, on the impor-

ance of classes of this description, the necessity of improving the mind, and exhorting the young men to use their utmost endeavours not only to improve their own attendance, but also to bring others with them, and thus be the means of increasing the usefulness of the institution, and extending the sphere of its labours. The evening was enlivened with various recitations given by members; and, after a vote of thanks to the chairman and the ladies who had kindly presided over the tea, the meeting broke up, all seeming well pleased with the unanimity and good feeling that had prevailed throughout the evening.—W. G., Secretary.

Monkton Young Men's Literary Society.—On the evening of Thursday, December 30, the members of this society gave a soiree within the parish schoolroom at Monkton. The audience was large and respectable, numbering about 200. In the absence of the Rev. Dr. Lawrie, minister of the parish, from indisposition, the duties of chairman were very efficiently discharged by the Rev. Robert Pollock, of Glasgow, supported by the Rev. John Forbes, of Ayr, and Mr. Fleming, Jun., of Troon. The Rev. Mr. Pollock, having opened the proceedings with prayer, gave a short introductory address, interspersed with a few very interesting anecdotes. The company then partook of a service of tarts; and, having been entertained for a short time with singing, the Rev. John Forbes rose and addressed the meeting at considerable length on the necessity of combining secular with religious education, and the benefits accruing therefrom. A few select songs were then given, after which Mr. Fleming rose and addressed the meeting on reading, and in a lengthy and very interesting address, which was listened to throughout with marked attention, pointed out the books which ought to be read, the manner in which they should be read, and the advantages to be derived from such reading. Mr. Fleming, having spoken for a considerable time, sat down by saying that, amid all the changes going on by migration, &c., we may rest secure upon Him who is the Rock of ages; and hope, joy, and light would animate our souls when we know that "there is no other name under heaven given among men whereby we can be saved, but the name of Jesus Christ." Another service was then given the company, and a few more songs sung; after which the chairman made a few concluding remarks. He was sure the company would agree with him when he said that the manner in which the entertainment this evening had come off was highly gratifying. Everything had gone on exceedingly well, and reflected great credit on the young men the members of the society. He also congratulated the vocalists for the admirable manner in which they had done their part; and, before sitting down, he begged to move that a vote of thanks be given to the Rev. Mr. Forbes and Mr. Fleming for the excellent addresses with which they had been kind enough to favour the company. Mr. Cowan then moved that a vote of thanks be tendered to the Rev. Mr. Pollock for his kindness in attending the soiree that evening, and for the very excellent manner in which he had discharged the duties of chairman. Both motions having been carried with acclamation, the company separated.—S. C., Secretary.

Tunbridge Wells.—High-street Debating Club.—We are happy to learn that this is another so-

ciety which owes its existence to the suggestions contained in our magazine. It is established for the discussion of all questions except religious ones, and very animated debates have already taken place on the subjects of phrenology and the mentality of woman. The meetings are held every Thursday evening, from eight till ten o'clock.

Stockport.—Orchard-street Chapel Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—On Christmas-day last the second annual gathering of the members of this society and their friends took place in the schoolroom. Tea was served, to which nearly 200 sat down; but, that room proving too small for the company, they adjourned into the chapel, where they passed a very comfortable evening. The president of the class (the Rev. A. Clarke) took the chair. The secretary's report was very favourable, and a discussion was ably carried on by four of the members as to "Whether England would decay like the ancient nations had done?"—after which the members contributed very successfully to the enjoyment of the evening.—W. B.

Merion Literary Society.—The second soiree of the above union was held on Christmas evening, in a spacious room adjoining the town-hall, Bala, at four o'clock. A party of about 250 highly respectable ladies and gentlemen sat down to an excellent tea.

At the commencement of the meeting, after tea, the party was greatly augmented. A little after five o'clock, Mr. G. Jones was called to the chair by the unanimous voice of the meeting. His address was concise, but very appropriate for the occasion. He then called upon the representatives of the different branches to read their reports, which showed them to be in a very flourishing and hopeful condition. In the course of the meeting several addresses were delivered; some very pathetic, and all tended to the enjoyment of the audience. The addresses were intervened by glees, sung by the choir of the society, and the reading of adjudications upon subjects laid out by the society for competition, both in prose and verse. The prizes were awarded to the successful candidates. The proceedings of the evening terminated about nine o'clock, and every one present appeared to be well satisfied with them.

We have to thank the editors of the *British Controversialist* for the great benefit we have derived from their invaluable magazine; and we entertain the strongest hope of seeing a magazine of this description started in the Welsh language, and do sincerely believe that it would be the greatest boon which could be conferred upon the principality, especially if conducted in a candid and truth-seeking spirit.—E. J.

The Edinburgh Young Men's Association.—This association has been in existence for nearly three years. The session was opened on the first Friday in October by a lecture to young men by the president, and subsequently by addresses from the Rev. R. W. Fraser, on the study of science, and James Simpson, Esq., advocate, on secular education.

The association held its half-yearly soiree on Friday, the 7th ultimo, when a large company assembled. The chair was occupied by Mr. T. Usher, president, who opened the proceedings by a rhythmical address. Addresses were also delivered by Mr. William Danks, on "Emigration;" Mr. Alexander Brodie on "The Business of the

Association;" Mr. John Wilson, jun., on "The Social Influence of the Female Sex;" and by the chairman, on "Sociality." Mr. Turner, sen., and Mr. Templeman, the latter of whom represented the Edinburgh Temperance Mutual Improvement Society, also addressed the meeting. Mr. James Turner delivered a poetical address, and a number of the ladies and gentlemen present entertained the company with songs and recitations. The propriety of union with other societies, by means of quarterly social meetings, or to pursue some other united course of action, was strongly urged, there being a conviction that the strength of such societies is not sufficiently exerted among the moral instrumentality of the age.

The Edinburgh Controversial Mutual Improvement Society held its monthly meeting on Wednesday evening, January 12, in Sinclair's Temperance Hotel, South St. David-street. The following gentlemen were chosen the office-bearers for the ensuing year:—Mr. T. Usher, president; Mr. J. B. Robertson, vice-president; and Mr. James Cowan, secretary and treasurer. The next meeting takes place on Wednesday, February 9, when one of the members will read an essay on "Cowper." The attendance of friends is respectfully invited.

The Glasgow Zetetic Society held its quarterly meeting, in Buchanan's coffee-house, on the evening of Wednesday, December 29, 1852, for the purpose of electing office-bearers for the ensuing year. After the appointments had been made, and refreshments served up, several of the members delivered eloquent addresses on subjects bearing upon the benefits which are derived from literary associations. Two of the honorary members, in giving in their testimony as to the advantages which accrue to young men on being members of such a society as this, made some very appropriate and practical remarks. In connexion with this society there is a manuscript magazine, which is issued on the first of every month; only the members contribute, and all the articles must be original. The subjects which have already graced its pages are various, both in prose and verse. The society meets once a week, and the exercises have consisted of opinions, debates, essays, sketches, and lectures. The following questions are to be discussed during the present session:—"What are the best means for developing the resources of Australia?" "Were the Crusades beneficial to Europe?" "Is Poverty or Luxury most productive of Crime?" "Have we a right to take possession of and colonize any Island we may discover?" "Was the Execution of Mary Queen of Scots justifiable?"

Paisley Young Men's Debating Society.—The first half-yearly supper of this society was held in the Saracen's Head Inn, on Friday evening, Dec. 10, 1852—Mr. G. Graham, president *pro tem.*, in the chair; and Mr. R. L. Henderson, croupier. After the removal of the cloth, the president delivered the closing address of the session, and subsequently the report of the secretary was presented and adopted, and the treasurer's account read. Toasts to the following effect were given and responded to:—"The Royal Family;" "Prosperity to the Paisley Young Men's Debating Society;" "Poetry and Music;" "Town and Trade of Paisley;" "The Ladies;" "The Press;" "The Fine Arts;" "Kindred Associations." These were interspersed with some choice musical

effusions. This society is one of the offshoots of the modern abridgment of the hours of labour, and we trust has been in the short period of its existence (six months), and will continue to be, an invaluable boon in the hands of youth desirous of mental improvement; and—acting as it does as a check to the floodgates of vice and immorality, so destructive to the welfare of society. We trust it will be appreciated in a coming session, and go on in its noble career, conquering and to conquer, in the region of mentality, having its stakes strengthened, and its cords lengthened, by the addition of a vigorous and healthy membership, and an able staff of office-bearers, anxious to promote the best interests of society, and thus render it the means of breaking up the fallow ground of ignorance and mental inactivity, and of directing the tendencies of a young and rising generation in such a direction as shall promote the best interests of self and country.

Milngavie Mechanics' Institution.—On Friday evening, the 7th of January, the members and friends of the above institution held a social festival in the Congregational Hall. The president (Mr. R. Crawford) occupied the chair, and delivered an appropriate address on "Sociality." The following members addressed the meeting:—Mr. T. Douglas, on "Self-duties;" Mr. J. Hyalop, on "The Liberty of the Press;" and Mr. H. Carmichael, on "The Age we live in." The latter gentleman, after a few preliminary remarks, directed attention to the achievements of these three great civilizing agents—the railway line, the ocean steamer, and the electric telegraph. Who had not felt a thrilling emotion in attempting to comprehend the significance of that one fact, that intelligence is conveyed from London to Paris at the rate of 200,000 miles in *one* second of time, a speed that would go round our earth about 480 times in a minute? But wishing to speak of the more obvious characteristics, the first would be that time and distance were all but annihilated. In proof of this, he contrasted the past with the present, and went to show that the age is teeming with beneficial changes, which have scattered amongst all ranks of society the most varied and delightful blessings. Secondly, it was an age of restless activity in every department of human enterprise. Who did not see everywhere around them the monuments of our gigantic strides in the progress of civilization? Mountains had been pierced, and valleys had been spanned; the earth was encircled with a network of railways, and the seas had become the busy highway of nations. In dilating on the unequalled progress which the useful arts had made in this country, and the national opulence and greatness of which they had been the prime source, he contended that there are yet other and greater conquests in prospect to bless her, and through her, the world. It was no overstretch of the imagination to recognise in the things of futurity, science, with piercing eyes and torch in hand, penetrating still further into the arcana of nature, and opening up to human gaze mysteries unrevealed from the foundation of the world. But, thirdly, the present was a reading age. And doubtless this thirst for knowledge had contributed more than any other circumstance to the well-being of society; the tendency of such a spirit being to open up new channels of communication between man and man. Verily, many

were running to and fro, and knowledge was being increased. Would that he could say of it all, how beneficial in operation, how valuable in possession! But while the larger portion of it bore the "guinea stamp," there was no small quantity of base and spurious metal in circulation; for there was a peculiar class of authors of the present day, who, taking advantage of a growing taste for reading, were disseminating a certain popular kind of writing, which not only stimulated the worst passions of our nature, but pandered to the lowest and most debasing appetites. What would be the result of such deleterious stuff upon the uneducated mind? It was vain to deny the startling and awful conclusion, that, like all other poisons, it would produce a moral deadness, which comes to look at everything vicious as not only harmless, but pleasant, and ultimately to practise it unhesitatingly. With such means at work, he had strong faith in the ultimate triumph of our cheap moral literature—"thoughts that breathe, and words that burn;" and he rejoiced in the fact, that nothing had contributed more than mechanics' institutions to place the pleasures and recreations of pure literature within the reach of all true seekers, furnishing them with the best companions when alone, and sweetening and elevating the social and domestic circle. In conclusion, it was an age of progress, and its tendency was onward—right on. Happily we did not require to leave our own shores to know what progress was. Our country presented the most magnificent exhibition of progress in the world—a nation which, in spite of the boasts and threats of others, had long reigned the sole mistress of the seas, and her flag now floated over the richest provinces of the world. But there was a time when darkness covered our land, and gross darkness the minds of the people—a time when scenes were enacted in our midst which go to darken the bloodiest pictures in the book of time. He called special attention to the great tide of emigration which had distinguished 1852. Who would draw aside the curtain of the future, and permit them to gaze upon Australia fifty years hence? None would attempt the super-human task; still he anticipated a glorious prospect. Who did not feel it to be an elevated and noble work to plant the foot of British enterprise, and extend her sceptre by the banks of streams unnamed, and over fertile regions yet unknown? and a yet nobler work to diffuse over a new created world

the spirit of our free institutions, the language of our Shakspeare, the morals of our Milton, and that christian religion, the last great heritage of man? Australia possessed all the advantages and facilities which contribute to greatness and strength. And, perhaps, before the young men who so recently left their own village to find there a home have grown old, Australia might become a great, free, and prosperous nation. In conclusion, he urged all to bestir themselves, and not to allow the world of mind to linger in its course, holding out the incentive, that there was no real genuine progress, but as the result of more extended knowledge; and was there not an exciting hope in contemplating the tendency of the age, breaking up old landmarks, chasing away the fogs which now obscure the intellect, and clearing the moral perceptions of mankind, so that those who have faith in the truth that a good time is coming, can afford to overlook any remaining vestiges of darker times, and see them sink beneath the brightening rays of a brighter future. The proceedings of the evening were much enlivened by two pieces of recitation, given in excellent style by Mr. H. Ross, Jun.; also songs and duets from two deservedly popular vocalists, Mrs. McMinn and Mr. W. Locke. Pastry and fruit were served to the company at intervals during the evening, and the meeting, which was a very interesting one, passed off with the greatest eclat.

Airdrie Young Men's Society.—The members of this society, with their male and female friends, to the number of seventy, held their seventh annual soiree on the evening of Wednesday, the 12th January; Mr. Thomas A. Macfarlane, the president, in the chair. After a service of tea, and the singing of a hymn by the meeting, the chairman opened the proceedings in an able address on "The Young Men of Airdrie, their Position and Prospects." Addresses were afterwards delivered by Mr. W. Hutton, on "Self-Improvement;" Mr. W. Brown, on "Biography;" Mr. John Hunter, on "Music;" Mr. A. Leal, on "Byron;" and by Mr. J. W. Gillespie, on "Mutual Improvement Societies." The intervals between these addresses were agreeably occupied by glees, duets, songs, and recitations, and by the enlivening strains of a small instrumental band. The meeting separated shortly after one o'clock, having spent a most harmonious and instructive evening.—W. B., Sec.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

142. After some months' experience in debating I have greatly felt the want of a more systematic mode of *thinking*, from my inability to reply to the arguments or objections brought forward by the opposite side in a debating society in the specified time required. The subject-matter of the evening generally appears to my confused mind enveloped in mystery, as if I was deprived of my intellectual powers; whilst the delivery of my

prepared speeches is characterized by an excellent style. As I wish to arrive at a degree of efficiency in the art of speaking, and as I believe myself to be deficient in that most fundamental part of it, viz., to think quickly, will any of your correspondents be pleased to suggest any plan likely to meet my requirements?—TIMON.

143. Will some of your readers be kind enough, through the pages of your valuable periodical, to assist a scriptural student by supplying him with the information of the price, and names of the

THE BANK OF ENGLAND
 has been authorized by the
 Government to issue a new
 series of bank notes, and it is
 expected that the new notes
 will be issued in the course of
 the next few months.
 The object sought is to
 provide a more secure and
 convenient medium of exchange,
 and to increase the circulation
 of the currency.
 The new notes will be issued
 in denominations of £1, £2,
 £5, £10, £20, £50, £100,
 and £1,000.
 The Bank of England is
 authorized to issue a new
 series of bank notes, and it is
 expected that the new notes
 will be issued in the course of
 the next few months.
 The object sought is to
 provide a more secure and
 convenient medium of exchange,
 and to increase the circulation
 of the currency.
 The new notes will be issued
 in denominations of £1, £2,
 £5, £10, £20, £50, £100,
 and £1,000.

Commercial men?

BANK OF ENGLAND RETURNS.

Act 7th and 8th
 ending Saturday,

Notes issued, 34,890,275		£
Government		
debt.	11,015,100	
Other securi-		
ties	2,984,900	
Gold coin &		
bullion	20,640,121	
Silver bullion	10,154	
		£34,890,275

BANKING DEPARTMENT.		£
Proprietors' capital . . .	14,553,000	
Reserve	3,127,453	
Public deposits . .	5,973,210	
Other ditto	12,367,009	
Seven day & other bills	1,507,161	
		£34,890,275

297,547,012

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till you have made a tolerably thick tube. Let this tube be left to dry in the open air, and, when perfectly dry, cover it with cape-skin. A quarter of a cape-skin will cover two or three tubes, which may be had for 1s.; and then you have, cheap and plain, your second tube. On this tube repeat the process as on the wooden roller, frequently sliding up and down the inner tube, to prevent them sticking together. By this means you will obtain the first tube, into which the second will slide tightly when covered with the cape-skin. For the other two or three tubes repeat the process on a thick schoolroom ruler, carefully pressing all creasings out. Now you only have to make the fittings for the object and eye glasses. This is equally easy. Make the second tube two inches and a half longer than you need; cut off those two inches and a half of the tube, and in the piece fit your object-glass in a gutta percha frame, which will slide into the first tube. Fix the eye-glass in a gutta percha frame also, and insert it in the end of the last tube. By this means you may adjust the focus of the eye-glass to the focus of the object-glass. When this is done you have an instrument which will open to your vision the higher grandeur of the solar system. All this you may do, as "Rolla" assuredly did, to his infinite satisfaction and delight, with what—£3 to £10?—oh! no; 5s. or less, and a little ingenuity and patience. The second way is to do this with zinc sheeting, or send it with directions to a clever plumber and glazier, which may cost you 5s. or 6s. This is not so light, of course, as paper, which is not so well for astronomical purposes.—**ROLLA.**

C. C. K. will find it much cheaper to buy an astronomical telescope ready made than to make one himself, the chief expense being caused by the larger of the two lenses, which, being very difficult to make, costs about two-thirds the price of the entire instrument. The best are made in Germany. For other information (on magnifying power, field of view, &c.) I would refer to Codrington's "Optics," or to the article on telescopes in Goodwin's "Mathematical Course."—**L.**

135. *A Sunday School Teacher's Library.*—We are glad to have an opportunity of answering the inquiry of "Edward," for he appears to be one who has a just impression of the importance of sabbath school instruction, and a laudable desire to prepare himself for efficiently carrying it on. The work in which he is engaged is worthy of all the attention he can give, and it will amply repay his most self-denying efforts. To the inexperienced and unearnest it may appear destitute of any attractions; but to the faith-loving, persevering teacher it will have manifold charms. But to "Edward" these remarks are evidently unnecessary, and we shall proceed to give him the directions he solicits.

For conveying correct ideas of the nature of the instruction which should be given in Sunday schools, with copious directions for conducting these institutions, we can confidently recommend Mrs. Davids' "Sunday School," price 4s.; Collins's "Teacher's Companion," 4s.; Todd's "Sunday School Teacher," 1s.; and Inglis's "Sabbath School," 2s. 6d. The latter we hesitate not to pronounce to be the most practical work on the subject in the English language.

If "Edward's" class is composed of elder scholars, he may, perhaps, derive benefit from

consulting Cooper's "Senior Class," 1s. 6d.; Hall's "Crisis," 1s.; and Watson on "Senior Classes," 6d.; but if, on the contrary, he has a junior class committed to his care, he should peruse Reed's "Infant Class," 1s. 6d.; "Lessons to Infant Classes," 1s.; and Green's "Sunday School Addresses," 1s.; in which some of the great truths of scripture are set forth in language the most simple, and in a manner the most interesting.

If, in addition to works of this character, "Edward" desires to be recommended to some that will assist him in the preparation of his lessons, and the explanation and illustration of scripture, we would refer him to the following, the value of which we have tested by experience:—Barnes's "Notes on the Gospels," 4s.; Gurney's "Dictionary of the Bible;" "The Jewish Nation—Manners and Customs, Rites and Worship, Laws and Polity," 5s.; "Scripture Manners and Customs," published by the Christian Knowledge Society; and Mimpriass's "Treasury Harmony of the Four Evangelists."

If no regular course of lessons be pursued in the school to which our friend belongs, we would recommend him to adopt those in the annual list published by the Sunday School Union, and to obtain their suggestive "Notes on the Lessons," published monthly at 1d. each; or he might take as his guide in this matter Althaus's "Teacher's Assistant," 1s., which contains 160 scripture subjects, with doctrinal and practical lessons from the Old and New Testaments.

Any or all of these works will prove valuable aids to "Edward," if he use them aright, and not allow them to prevent the development of his own independent thoughts.—**J. A. C.**

135 and 136. *A Student's Library.*—The following list contains some of the works in divinity, science, and general literature, usually found in a student's library:—1. The classical authors of Greece and Rome—the editions of Tauchnitz are the best; 2. Andrews's Latin Dictionary; 3. Arnold's Greek and Latin Exercises; 4. Bacon's Essays; 5. Beatson's Greek Iambics; 6. Bible, with marginal references; 7. British Controversialist, Vols. I., II., III.; 8. Burton—History of Christian Church; 9. Butler's Analogy of Religion; 10. Butler's Sermons, with preface by Whewell; 11. Buttman's Greek Grammar; 12. Cicero's Verrine Orations, by Long; 13. Cruden's Concordance to the Bible; 14. De Morgan's Arithmetic; 15. Donaldson's New Cratylus; 16. Donaldson's Varronianus; 17. Donaldson's Theatre of the Greeks; 18. Easley's Annotations on the Gospels; 19. Euclid, large edition, by R. Potts; 20. Findlay's (or Arrowsmith's) Classical and Modern Atlas; 21. Giles's English-Greek Lexicon; 22. Goodwin's Course of Elementary Mathematics; 23. Goodwin's Examples and Problems; 24. Gradus ad Parnassum (Arnold's Anticleptic); 25. Greek Testament, by Alford, 3 vols.; 26. The Oxford Greek Testament, with references, &c.; 27. Hall's Differential and Integral Calculus; 28. Hitchcock's Religion of Geology; 29. Hooker's Works, with Walton's Life, 2 vols., Oxford; 30. History of the Christian Church; 31. Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, 4to.; 32. Liturgy compared with the Bible; 33. Macaulay's Essays; 34. Maurice's Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy; 35. Müller's Literature of Ancient Greece; 36. Paley's

Evidences and Home Pauline, edited by Potts; 37. Plato—Stallbaum's text best; 38. Prayer Book (Church of England); 39. Riddell and Arnold's English-Latin Lexicon; 40. Rogers' Essays; 41. Schlegel's Philosophy of History; 42. Schlegel's Philosophy of Life and Language; 43. Schlegel's Lectures on Dramatic Literature; 44. Schmitz' Histories of Greece and Rome; 45. Shakspeare—Collier's edition; 46. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities; 47. Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, 3 vols.; 48. Snowball's Plane and Spherical Trigonometry; 49. Sophocles—Wunder's edition; 50. Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy; 51. Tables of Logarithms (Hutton's); 52. Tacitus, edited by Ritter, 4 vols.; 53. Taylor (Jeremy)—Holy Living and Dying; 54. Thirlwall's History of Greece, 8 vols.; 55. Thucydides, by Arnold, 3 vols.; 56. Todd's Student's Guide; 57. Todd's Index Rerum; 58. Voltaire—La Henriade, &c.; 59. Welchman—the Articles of Religion; 60. Westcott's Elements of Gospel Harmony; 61. Whewell's Mechanics; 62. Whewell's Elements of Morality; 63. Wood's Elements of Algebra; 64. Wordsworth's Theophilus Anglicanus; 65. Zumpt's Complete Latin Grammar, translated by Schmitz. Of these, the most necessary for "Edward" would be Nos. 6, 8, 18, 26, 30, 32, 36, 38, 50, 53, 59, 60; and, before all, 64. For "A Law Student," Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 12, 17, 19, 31, 33—35, 39, 41, 44, 46 and 47, 54, 57, 62, 64, and 65. It will be observed I have omitted all mention of books of poetry, travels, &c., which cannot strictly be considered educational; but no one who wishes to be well read, and to master the English language thoroughly, should fail to read, as opportunity occurs, the works of Herbert, Milton, Addison, Pope, Young, Akenside, Southey, Tennyson, &c.—of Bryant and Longfellow. The works of the Rev. Robert Wilson Evans, especially his "Ministry of the Body," with Wordsworth's "Theophilus Anglicanus," would be a great help to Sunday school teachers; and in "Warren's Law Studies" "A Law Student" will find a fund of admirable advice with respect to every part of his profession.—L.

140. *Logically True and Practically False.*—"Homo" does not require proof that if, of two bodies, one moves twelve times faster than the other, and both round the same circle, one will overtake the other. He is satisfied that the swiftest will certainly overtake the slowest; yet some specious stumbling-block has hidden this plain truth in the case to which he refers; therefore does he admit, like Berkley, that though he can see, feel, and modify material things, he still has no proof of material existence. The only difference is, that, while the argument to prove the non-existence of matter is incontestable, the argument to prove that a swift motion is no faster than a granted slower one is evidently open for debate. But I would express a doubt as to whether it is not the absence of logic that has brought what "Homo" calls the logical conclusion, just as the absence of a pendulum from a clock will destroy the usual properties of a clock, or the absence of a chain from the windlass will remove the natural effects of labour at the winch; for logic professes to be either a mere instrument, or to tell us *how* to act; it does not profess to supply pendulums for measuring our evidence, nor chains for connecting cause with effect, and

instrument with object. Logic is a code of laws and cautions. These are intended to guide and instruct. There is nothing magical about them. In no way are they connected with alliteration, key-writing, or chemistry. They always inform and enlighten, but never rule the judgment. How, therefore, anything can be logically true and practically false must be determined satisfactorily by those who place logic in the office of the dictator. The fallacy appears to be this, that, after "Homo" has allowed the hands to move their respective distances, and in the stated time, he thinks there still remains $\frac{1}{12}$ of 5 minutes to the minute hand. No $\frac{1}{12}$ remains. Thus:—The minute hand is at 5 minutes to 1, and the hour hand at $\frac{1}{12}$ of that distance to 1; while the minute hand moves at a speed twelve times greater than the hour hand. Such is the statement. It may be well, for the case of clearness, to suppose that the 1 o'clock is a certain definite spot to which both hands are approaching; one from a distance twelve times farther than the other, but moving at twelve times greater speed. These, then, are the terms; and the grand question evidently is, Will the hands simultaneously attain the above suppositional spot? Certainly they will. The proof is as positive as that of anything in geometry. Here are two objects; each is moving towards the same spot; the time is common; one has twelve times farther to go than the other, but to counteract that it moves twelve times faster. Now what is the inference? Evidently this, that the motive power, in relation to time, is, for the period at question, balanced; and, therefore, the two hands will be parallel immediately at the expiration of the time for which they were set; and, being parallel, they must also point to the same spot. Where, then, the $\frac{1}{12}$ of 5 minutes is to be found remaining to either hand at this part of the motion does not appear; and it is in supposing that such time has not been accounted for that the fallacy originates.—E. S. J.

Allow me to inform your correspondent "Homo" that the logic of his "friend" is founded upon a "monstrous absurdity," or it could not be opposed to a well-known *fact*. If it could once be proved that logical deductions were fallacious, there would be an end to the progress of society; for who would be led by that which could be proved to be a blind leader? Every man under this conviction would be guided by his external senses, the same by which the beasts are guided; and, like them, he would make no progress. The logic by which "Homo's" friend proves the "monstrous absurdity" is founded on the supposition that any given space can be divided into *infinity*, which is anything but logic. Infinity of space does not exist; because any given space is limited, but infinity is unbounded.—A LABOURER.

In reply to "Homo" I have two remarks to make, either of which will expose the pleasantry of his friend; for "pleasantry" I cannot but think it is.

1. By his ingenious "suppositions" he leads his bearer into a labyrinth of misconceptions as to the nature of a clock's motions. The minute hand of a clock, as "Homo" may perceive by looking at the next clock he sees, moves by successive intermittent jerks or jumps, always passing over the same distance at each jump. Hence, to suppose various times and distances of motion, as

his friend has done, is, in fact, to suppose a clock is not a clock. I shall perhaps better illustrate my meaning and its application by taking a real and ordinary example. In many clocks the minute hand "jumps" or moves forwards once in every half minute, thus passing over 1-120th part of the circumference of the dial at each "jump." "Homo" will, therefore, perceive that when the minute hand (in the case supposed) has arrived at five minutes past one, the next real motion will cause it to jerk past, and so overtake the hour hand. His friend supposes a non-existent and impossible kind of clock; no wonder that, with such a latitude of supposition, he should prove logic untrue.

2. Even if we pass by the above-noticed misrepresentations, yet we must at once completely and emphatically deny the "logical truth" of the reasoning of "Homo's" friend. I have said "reasoning" is *compliment*, but I defy any one to put it into the shape of argument, *i. e.*, logical reasoning. I regret to say that I am entirely unacquainted with the terms of logic, or I think I could immediately substantiate this position; still, trusting in the logic of common sense, I fearlessly challenge "Homo's" friend to exhibit, if he can, his plausible suppositions in the shape of *strict logical argument*, and I pledge myself to point out its logical fallacy in return. What is logically true, never was, nor ever can be, practically false.—H. J. R.

141. *The Size of the Solid Bulk of the Earth.*—I cannot agree with J. S. in thinking it a plausible idea that the earth is now larger than in the time of Adam and Eve. I would ask, where is the new matter (forming the increase in which he believes) to come from? By direct exercise of creative power on the part of the Deity? Or from some more distant planet? I presume J. S. does not believe in the *self-creation* of matter, though his words seem to imply that idea when he speaks of "the greater portion" of animal and vegetable remains "becoming resolved into its original elements," and returning "to fill up the vacuum caused by its abstraction." Now, unless the remaining portion of "remains" was created out of *nothing*, the vacuum evidently cannot be filled up until it is also resolved into its original elements.

Whatever now forms a portion of organized existence, animal or vegetable, formerly was, and hereafter will again become, a portion of the inorganic "original elements" of the earth. The chemists tell us that by far the greater bulk of all known productions, both organic and inorganic, especially of the latter, are composed almost entirely of the four elements—oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon. These elements are combined and set free, compressed and expanded, in every action of nature. Thus, for example, we respire the air around us, its oxygen combines with our blood, and we reject in exchange carbonic acid; while, on the other hand, the vegetable tribes give forth oxygen and retain carbon. In this way the whole creation is linked together in mutual bonds; life feeds on death, and death feeds on life. The earth and "all that therein is" is ever changing, yet ever the same; the elements of which it is formed changeless, the forms in which those elements are combined ceaselessly changeful. It was a humorous exemplification of this doctrine when the poet said—

"Imperial Caesar dead, and turned to clay,
May stop a hole to keep the wind away."

Nay, the living Caesar in his manhood may tread beneath his feet, may breathe and feed on, what was once a part of his youthful frame.

The above thoughts may suffice to point out, in a brief and cursory manner, the philosophical reasons for believing that the "solid bulk of the earth" is no larger than it has ever been. I use the phrase "solid bulk" in the meaning which J. S. seems to put it, *i. e.*, the aggregate mass of matter. That the *solid* bulk of the earth as opposed to its *fluid* portions is every day increasing, those who, like me, believe in the theory of central heat will not readily deny.—H. J. R.

The Size of the Solid Bulk of the Earth.—There is no reason whatever to suppose that the *solid bulk of the earth* has been *augmented very considerably* since the time when our first parents lived upon it. J. S. should have defined strictly what he understood by "larger." If he meant simply that the same quantity of matter in the earth occupies more space now than then, it might be difficult to prove the contrary, although I believe geologists and scientific men generally consider the earth smaller, as having been brought, by the action of the law of gravitation, "through the course of ages," into a more compact and regular form; but if, as is evident, he intended to express that there is actually a greater amount of matter in the same, or perhaps larger space (*i. e.*, that the earth's substance is either denser, or of the same density, but greater size), we have no reason to conclude that the earth is, in this sense, in the smallest appreciable degree larger. A very trifling quantity of solid matter has, indeed, as Sir Isaac Newton supposed, and as observation has since proved, been added to the earth's crust by the fall of meteoric stones, brought either by their own motion or the earth's within the sphere of the latter's attracting influence. But the vegetable and animal matter *current* (if I may be permitted to use the term) at any period upon the earth's surface never has made any addition to that surface, owing to the constant reproduction and renewal going on contemporaneously with the decay and dissolution of animal and vegetable life. From the soil spring up the herbage and plants which feed the herbivorous races; these in their turn, many of them, become food for the carnivorous races; and some kinds of the latter supply the necessities of others; and all eventually return again to mother earth, only to undergo once more the same series of mutations. It does not, indeed, necessarily follow that exactly the same particles of matter are now *current* in the animate and inanimate organic world as ten, twenty, or sixty centuries ago. Some portions of the bodies—the earthy phosphates of the bones, for instance—of bygone generations, probably, have remained quiescent in the earth's surface, and have never entered into new forms of life; but other portions (of earthy phosphates, &c.), which at that time formed part of the earth's inanimate crust, are now endued with life. In short, as chemistry acquaints us with the fact that nothing can be absolutely destroyed, but only transformed, so physiology, aided by analogy and our conception of the divine character, leads us to believe that there is nothing absolutely new—that no fresh particles of matter have been added

of the earth, properly so called, and inquire
 this to be all assimilated into one compact mass
 inquires if it be larger now than formerly? I
 would reply, No—of the same size. But, if he
 takes the earth apart from the present animal
 and vegetable kingdoms, and inquire as before, I
 would still reply in the negative, but with this
 difference, that the earth is now decidedly smaller
 than ever. And the argument is this—Nothing
 in nature wastes. Change of form is the common
 property of everything material. We all know
 that the water which is spilt upon the ground,
 though not susceptible of being gathered up, will
 ever be water still, but in another form. The
 fuel that produces heat and gas, the heat that

The Young Student and

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. II., Vol. III p. 119.

Senior Division.

Exercises in Grammar No. XII.

Make a form like the one given, and arrange
 the verbs in *Exercise XI.* according to their
 moods:—

VERBS.

nature's sole interpreter, and how does he become so? What are the rules regarding ideas?

Protektor.—Exercise, Vol. II. p. 79.

Senior.—What are the media through which mind becomes related to the external universe? See Wyld on "The Senses"; Abercrombie's "Intellectual Powers," part ii. sections i. and ii.; De Morgan's "Formal Logic," chap. ii.; Macvicar's "Inquiry into Human Nature," chap. vi.; Young's "Intellectual Philosophy," sect. viii.—xv. and xlix.; Thomson's "Outline of the Laws of Thought," part i., paragraphs 47—50 and 64—66; Kant's "Critik of Pure Reason" (*Kritik der Vernunft*), *transcendentule elementarlecture*, part ii. book i. pp. 67—125; Brown's

"Lectures," xxx.—xxxiv.; Scott's "Intellectual Philosophy," chaps. i.—iv.; Hamilton's "Reid" Inquiry, *passim*, and note B.; Hamilton's Discussions, "Theory of Perception," pp. 38—97, or "Edinburgh Review," October, 1830; Mill's "Logic," book i. chap. iii. paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 14; book iv. chap. iv. par. 4; Malbranche's "Recherche de la Vérité," vol. i. book i.; Moore's "Use of the Body in Relation to the Mind"; Cairus' "Moral Freedom," part i. chap. iii. sect. ii.; part iv. Destutt de Tracy's "Elemens de Ideologie."

"European Philosophy" is still unavoidably omitted. We hope to be able to present it to our readers in our next issue.

Notices of Books.

The Autobiography of William Jerdan, with his Literary, Political, and Social Reminiscences and Correspondence during the last Fifty Years. Vol. III. London: Hall, Virtue, and Co.

Mr. Jerdan both opens and closes this volume with references to the dispute between himself and some of his reviewers on the position of literature as a profession; he also deigns to notice some unfavourable criticisms on his productions, and speaks of one writer in the following not very dignified manner:—"The name of an individual has been communicated to me by good-natured friends as being the writer of several malignant articles against me, not against my book, in more than one periodical. I never sought the information, nor would have gone three steps out of my way to acquire it; but, if it be true, it shall be my business to gibbet the worthless ingrate for public infamy; and show, from papers in my possession, that his own early childhood was cherished by me—that his own family and his nearest relatives by marriage are under great obligations to me." This threat is truly terrible, and enough to strike with dumbness not only the individual it is intended for, but all other censors. Surely after this Mr. Jerdan may act "Sir Oracle," and not fear the barking of any cur when he does "ope his mouth."

This volume consists principally of pen-and-ink sketches of the contributors to the *Literary Gazette*, and narrations of incidents of varying interest respecting them. The chapters which will be turned to with the greatest interest by the majority of readers are those referring to the lamented "L. E. L." It seems that Miss Landon was a "proximate neighbour" of Mr. Jerdan at Old Brompton. It appears that his first recollection of the future poetess was that of "a plump girl, grown enough to be almost mistaken for a woman, bowling a hoop round the walks, with the hoopstick in one hand and a book in the other, reading as she ran, and as well as she could manage both exercise and instruction at the same time. The exercise was prescribed and insisted upon; the book was her own irrepressible choice." Her earliest poetic effusions were submitted to Mr. Jerdan for friendly criticism; and, encouraged by him, she made her *début* in the *Literary Gazette*. In her first piece, on "Rome," there was, amidst

many crudities, high promise of future ability; and her next little effusion, on no higher subject than a "Michaelmas Daisy," was characterized by much beauty and simplicity. We subjoin it:—

"Last smile of the departing year,
Thy pensive charms are flown;
Thy pensive wreath is still more dear,
From blooming thus alone.

"Thy tender blush, thy simple frame,
Unnoticed might have passed;
But now thou com'st with softer claim,
The loveliest and the last.

"Sweet are the charms in thee we find,
Emblems of Hope's gay wing;
'Tis thine to call past bloom to mind—
To promise future spring."

This was followed by a piece of blank verse poetry, in which much greater power was exhibited. We extract the following beautiful scrap of descriptive scenery:—

"Is not this grove
A scene of pensive loveliness—the gleam
Of Dian's gentle ray fall on the trees,
And, piercing through the gloom, seems like the smile

That pity gives to cheer the brow of grief:
The turf has caught a silvery hue of light
Broken by shadows, where the branching oak
Rears its dark shade, or where the aspen waves
Its trembling leaves. The breeze is murmuring
by,

Fraught with sweet sighs of flowers, and the song
Of sorrow that the nightingale pours forth,
Like the soft dirge of love."

Mr. Jerdan's care bestowed upon the youthful poetess was more than repaid, for she became one of his effective colleagues in the conductorship of the *Gazette*, and did much to raise the journal to that measure of popularity which it attained.

The present volume, amidst much that is commonplace, contains interesting notices of Bernard Barton, Theodore Hook, John Murray, and other magnates of literature.

The New Quarterly Review and Digest of Current Literature. London: Thomas Hookham.

This new serial is really what a review—according to its name—should be. Instead of the old reviews performing the purpose which their names imply, it has come to be the fashion of their contributors to write learned dissertations upon various branches of science, history, or philosophy, placing the book nominally reviewed at the top of the page, and very often not telling us of its actual contents and merits.

None can more fully appreciate than we do the great erudition displayed in these publications; and none would be more sorry than ourselves to be deprived of their perusal: but we would much rather they should come to us under a proper title, and not under false pretences. The promoters of the work now under notice seem to recognise the existence of a feeling like this, and have therefore established a review which is nothing *more* than it professes, and we are happy to add nothing *less*. It professes to be an index and digest of current literature. It will present a record of all books published for the three months preceding its issue, and will tell us something *of* the books as well as *about* them. To those who have but little time for reading it will furnish material enough to keep up a knowledge of the doings of the literary world, and also afford some pleasant and instructive reading; while to those who read more, it will prove a valuable guide as to what books will most deserve their attention. A sight of one of its numbers will be a better recommendation than anything we can say regarding it.

In the first number there is a well-executed summary of the literature of 1851, of which it gives some interesting particulars. We find, for instance, that the total literary offspring of the "Exhibition year" was 6,055 volumes, large and small; and that the book-clubs and reading societies of the United Kingdom take off 750 volumes of any book written to their pattern.

We may state that the new review is not quite half the price of the old ones: and by way of concluding, we present our readers with the following remarks upon some recent biographies:—

"Alas! biography is losing its rank in the system of our literature. From a station immediately next after history, it has fallen to very nearly the lowest place of all. It has lost its independence, its impartiality, its high prerogative of judging the just-buried dead; it has become a twaddling gossip, a bookseller's hack, a nervous panegyrist.

"This course of the new fashion, by virtue of which every man of the least note has all the contents of his old drawers swept off into a bookseller's shop, while some very near relative, or some dependant of the family, sorts out the mass, suppresses everything which is in the least degree unfavourable, and sticks all the rest

together with a glutinous paste of praise. Neither impartiality nor literary capacity are necessary to produce a biography of this kind; the first would be a crime in the author, for what should we think of a son, or a brother, or a widow, who revealed all the secret faultiness of a just departed relative? The second is not so catching, that it is likely to be found in the next akin of its late possessor. The Italians have a proverb, which says, 'He lies like a tombstone.' Now modern biographies are neither better nor worse than tombstones. They are written by the same person and for the same object."

We give one specimen of the reception authors of a certain class are likely to meet with.

"Bertha: a Romance of the Dark Ages. By W. Bernard MacCabe. 3 vols. London: 1851. —This is quite refreshing. A romance in the good old-fashioned Minerva press style. Forests, thunder and lightning, persecuted damsels, shocking bandits of the O. Smith-walk, castles with concealed doors, mysterious paternities, terrible priests, a heroine who can only be described 'by the hackneyed term angel,' as Mrs. Radcliffe always says, and a hero who is beautiful as Adonis, brave as Ajax, chaste as Origen, and towards the end of the story rich as Croesus, and nobly-born as Patroclus—in a word, a book for sempstresses to sob over, and for people of sense to shun.

"Mr. MacCabe some time since produced a history of England, by cutting out and then pasting together the old chronicles, a piece of patchwork that was rather curious than pleasant to work upon. Whether he has produced his romance by the same process we do not know; but if there are any of the old stereotype plates of the old Minerva press about town, we would be bound to produce something very like it, at very small cost, and in a very few hours."

The Youthful Thinker. A Monthly Miscellany of Science, Literature, and Religion. London: Partridge and Oakey.

We like the title of this magazine, but cannot say that the first number is fully worthy of it, for it is destitute of that distinctness of character which its name seems to indicate. We expected that the editor would have presented his readers with some original thoughtful counsels, accompanied with appropriate exercises for training the reasoning powers of those who were to look up to him for instruction. But nothing of the sort is attempted, and not even is an opening address given. This we regard as a serious omission, for unless new candidates for public favour have distinct and well-defined grounds on which to base their claims, they must not be surprised if in this busy day they encounter neglect and experience failure.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XV.—THE EMOTIONAL NATURE OF MAN.

DID we believe that our readers, generally, consisted of the "heathens of mammon," men who practise the "idolatry of the pocket," and consider it more profitable and more ennobling "to wash in sand and mud for gold-dust than to search the heavens for the discovery of far-off worlds," to study the poetry of life, or to attempt gaining a knowledge of man's emotional nature—we should certainly not have chosen to address them on this subject. We should have contented ourselves with conning over in our own mind the following pithy sentences of Douglas Jerrold, and they would have taught us to refrain from embarking in the hopeless undertaking:—"With these idolaters everything may be converted into something profitable, save and except the human heart. To study its emotions—to be alive to its appealing sympathies—to know its power for good and evil—to consider its relationship, if beating in the breast of misery and want, to the millions of hearts touched into music by the hand of GOD and throbbing for the one eternal home—to learn and feel this, is, with the pagans of the money-bag, to waste the hours of a spendthrift, to feel only the emptiness of most unprofitable folly. In the commerce of these idolaters, what is the mere, the naked human heart? There is, of course—it is readily taken upon trust—some adroit piece of machinery in every man, that is the spring of motion; that sends forth the current of life; that enables the human animal to walk from counting-house to warehouse, from warehouse to bank; there is, it is allowed, some such clever piece of clockwork, and it is called the heart. What more is, with the world's idolaters, known of it? What *can* be known of it? Who that would thrive would seek to know more?—would lose his time, and the golden-minted fruits of time, pondering the slim-drawn theories of fools and philosophers? Men of business know better!" But we do not believe so! Verily, No! We feel assured that we speak to earnest souls, whose favour and humanity are ever active, and who think, with us, that

"The spacious west,
And all the teeming regions of the south,
Hold not a quarry, to the curious flight
Of knowledge half so tempting fair
As Man to Man ;"

and hence it is that we invite you to listen to us awhile, as we attempt the decipherment of what is written in "the heart of man, that strange and mystic scroll," so far as that is necessary in the study which we are at present conjointly prosecuting.

Although we are aware that some philosophers have made a distinction between Emotions and Passions—defining the *former* as mere agitations of the mentality, occasioned by some inward or outward cause, and the *latter* as those same agitations intensified and made

active by *Desire*—we prefer employing the term Emotion as *generic*, embracing in its signification the four following classes of mental manifestation, viz.:—

I. **APPETITES**; those recurrent states of mind which primarily result from our nervile constitution, are involuntarily excited to exercise by the presentment of suitable objects, create uneasy sensations until indulged, and are satiated for a time by gratification.

II. **DESIRES**; those conditions of the mind which supervene when we regard some object as worthy of attainment on account of its real or supposed capacity of contributing to our future enjoyment. They imply continuance of feeling, amounting sometimes to yearning, and voluntary activity.

III. **AFFECTIONS**; those sympathetic or antipathetic dispositions which influence our conduct towards persons.

IV. **PASSIONS**; those highly intensified states of the mind when the whole heart is absorbed in the attainment of gratification for any appetite, desire, or affection. The differentiating features are the intellectual perturbation, the heedlessness of consequences, blindness to moral responsibility, and headlong, unreasoning zeal for indulgence which the misled Will occasions.

We do not wish it to be inferred from the above definitions that we regard these *species* of Emotion as palpably distinct and radically different: if they were, they could not be included in the same *genus*. We are more inclined to believe that, if looked at with logical precision, they would seem to be in reality mere variations of the same mental states, differing in intensity and recurrent power, much influenced by the laws of suggestion, and forming a sequence of emotive activity, rising higher and higher in the scale of morals, and becoming more and more powerful as influensive agencies in working out the well-being of the human race. We are so constituted that nervile sensations are the occasions of thought-excitation, and that certain conditions of our powers of feeling imperiously demand that the powers of the intellect shall enter into "a committee of ways and means" for their indulgence. It is in the power of the Intellect, however, to elevate these feelings into desires of a nobler character than mere sensual appetances. The universe of objectivities in which man is resident become within him not only the excitants of ideas, but of sentiments and emotions; they become not only the ministrants of pleasure, but also the awakeners within the soul of *desires* which call for the renewal of those pleasures, *affections* which aim at their continuance, and *passions* which result from their gratification or deprivation. In the autobiography which Memory writes for every human being this process may be distinctly traced. There needs no learned metaphysic ken to perceive in the record of life many instances in which the root of appetite has successively ripened into desire, affection, and passion. Nay, it is most desirable that it should do so, for it is only when this process commences that we cease to be mere animals, and become really and truly human. The undeveloped state of the emotive powers we call sensualism; the fully developed condition of these powers produces *the poetic* in man. The lower degrees of intellectual exercise are produced simultaneously with the appetites; the higher degrees of mental excitement terminate in Emotions. Indeed, it has been asserted by many eminent men that the production of Emotion was the final cause of human existence; nor do we find any reason to disbelieve this; for as the agreeable Emotions result in happiness, because they are the divinely-appointed rewards of well-doing, and happiness is the

universal craving of humanity, we can scarcely doubt that the bringing of our emotional nature into co-operating harmony must be the end for which we have been called upon to people the universe of God. However this may be, it seems to us pretty evident that the Emotions form a very important portion of the human mind—that, as the *media* whereby the Will is exerted, they merit peculiar attention—that, as the recipients and producers of much of our happiness, we ought to be peculiarly alive to any means which may enable us to call them into beneficial exercise, or restrain them from acting prejudicially, either to ourselves or others.

Two characteristics of the Emotions seem particularly deserving of consideration in a treatise on "Rhetoric," viz.:—1. Emotions are not directly under the control of the Will. We cannot directly determine by the Will to entertain at a given time a given feeling, nor can we at any moment of time Will that any particular Emotion shall exercise itself or cease to do so. When circumstances present themselves, either to the perceptual or associative faculties, capable of originating Emotions, they will and must arise. 2. Emotions are indirectly controllable by the Will. Though no sheer effort of Will can cause the bosom to beat with Emotion, it can direct the current of our thoughts, place us in such real or imaginary circumstances as shall lead to the entertainment of any peculiar Emotion. These two facts should teach us that we can only reach the Will by indirect means—that these means can only be effectual when they include intellectual conviction and emotional agitation—that a mere appeal to Reason will not suffice to produce action of a given kind, but that, conjoined therewith, we should evoke the action of the emotional powers, and through them the preferential activity of the Will.*

It is to the emotional powers that the Imagination, in the structure of figurative language, continually appeals. The "accepted of God" are said to "*hunger and thirst* after righteousness." David says, "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God;" and Burns beautifully sings his gratitude in the following words:—

" The bridegroom may forget the bride
Was made his wedded wife yestreen ;
The monarch may forget the crown
That on his head an hour hath been ;
The mother may forget the child
That smiles sac sweetly on her knee ;
But I'll remember thee, Glencairn,
An' a' that thou hast done for me."

This, however, will more fully appear in a future article on "Figurative Language." In the meantime, without professing, or even attempting, to construct an exhaustive tabular arrangement of the Emotions, we may place the following *scheme* before our readers:—

* Further information on "The Emotions" will be found in Chalmers's "Sketches of Moral Philosophy;" Cairn's "Moral Freedom," part i. chap. iv.; Payne's "Elements of Mental and Moral Science," pp. 217—320; Upham's "Elements of Mental Philosophy," division iii.; Schruoker's "Psychology," part ii. chap. i. and iii.; Reid's "Active Powers;" Stewart's "Philosophy of the Active Powers;" Abercrombie's "Philosophy of the Moral Feelings;" Beattie's "Elements of Moral Science;" Cogan, "On the Passions;" Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," book i. sec. ii. chap. xi.; Brown's "Lectures," xvi.—xviii.; Dr. Sayer's "Disquisitions, Metaphysical and Literary;" Warburton's "Divine Legation;" Kames's "Elements of Criticism," chap. ii.; Malebranche, "Recherché de la Vérité," liv. iv. chap. i.; Cousin's "Works," *passim*.

I. APPETITES.	II. DESIRES.	III. AFFECTIONS.
1. <i>Nervile.</i>	Life.	Relational. { Parental. Fraternal. Filial. Conjugal.
Sleep.	Power.	
Heat.	Wealth.	
Activity.	Knowledge.	
Hunger.	Approbation.	Sympathy. } Friendship.
Thirst, &c.	Pre-eminence.	Esteem. }
2. <i>Nervo-mental.</i>	Sociality, &c.	Gratitude.
Beauty.		Patriotism, &c.
Sublimity.		
Surprise.		
The Ludicrous, &c.		

IV. PASSIONS.

1. <i>Agreeable.</i>	2. <i>Disagreeable.</i>
Love	Hatred.... { Resentment. Anger. Revenge. Retaliation.
Desire	Aversion .. { Cruelty. Malice.
Hope	Fear..... { Despair. Melancholy.
Joy. { Serenity. Cheerfulness Delight.	Grief..... { Regret. Remorse.
Self-esteem, &c.	Shame, &c.

It is not our province, in the present series of papers, either to give a brief compendium of moral philosophy, or to define particularly each of the mental states exhibited in the foregoing paradigmatic exposition, but to offer some general observations on the management of the Emotions, a power which demands from an author a degree of skill that can only be acquired by ardently-pursued study, and to point out the widely-ramifying relations which Rhetoric bears to all the cognate mind-sciences, and thus incidentally to impress the mind of the young writer with an idea of the necessity of forming correct opinions on metaphysical topics.

The great aim of every author must be to bring the minds of other men into a similar state to his own. To convince is only one-half of this work; to persuade is the other. Conviction operates on the Intellect; persuasion on the Emotions. To think correctly does not always mean to act correctly. To bring thought and action into congenial co-operation is the grand problem which every author attempts to work out. If not, wherefore does he write? If not solicitous of influencing men's minds, what need is there of disturbing his quiescence by such laborious toil? If desirous of doing so, surely the means best adapted for the accomplishment of the end in view are those which he ought to adopt. Can he influence man without understanding the nature of man? No! "Human nature is a complicate machine, and is unavoidably so in order to answer its various purposes." He who would manage and work that machinery to the attainment of his own ends, or—what is, perhaps, as difficult an undertaking—resist the mismanagement of others, must thoroughly comprehend the nature and structure of that which he would influence. As

human nature is twofold, *intellectual* and *emotional*, so the duties of the rhetorician are twofold, viz., to convince the Intellect, and bring the Passions into play. "Passion is the mover to action, Reason the guide." When, therefore, persuasion is the end—and when is it not?—the Emotions must be called into action. It is necessary that the author should at all times be able not only to present to the understanding a clear view of the truth, but also

"Verser dans tous les cœur ce que ressent son cœur." *

Truth enlightens, Imagination adds brilliancy and effect, Emotion animates; these three conjoined constitute the perfection of Style.

There are three qualities of mind which are absolutely necessary in him who would successfully appeal to "the emotional faculties of man," viz., Feeling, Imagination, and Discernment. It has been said of old by one who combined in himself the qualities of lyrist, critic, and satirist—

"Si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi; tunc tua me infortunia lædent;"†

and the whole world has endorsed the truth of the statement. To establish sympathy, one must himself be in earnest, labour under conviction, be thoroughly and cordially zealous in the propagation of his opinions. "As iron sharpeneth iron," so does the real enthusiasm of the speaker or writer give edge to that of the hearer or reader. To feel keenly is one of the chief elements in enthusiasm; and by an intelligent enthusiasm an author is enabled to bear away the soul of the reader whithersoever he pleases; can change, as if by enchantment, heedlessness into zeal, languor into activity, callousness into sensibility, and careless calmness into ungovernable fervency and warmth. How strange is the power of words which, under the direction of feeling, can thus make the heart tingle, enflame the soul with ardour, and throw the intellect into a lively and impassioned state! The writer who covets mental power must *feel*. No elegance of collocation, no harmonious periodicity, no bombastic "froth and fury," will atone for the want of genial sensibility. Nothing else will thaw the frigidity of the unsympathizing soul, except the glow of fervid feeling which the writer evinces. "Soul is kindled only by soul." If this be so, how careful ought each man who aims at influencing his fellow-men by the utterance of his thoughts be in the regulation of his heart and life, lest, perchance, the feelings with which he leavens his discourse should be "of the earth, earthy," rather than of that exalted nature with which the human soul ought continually to be filled! If it be in the power of eloquence to excite or to calm, to urge onward or to restrain, ought not those who aim at the employment of such a power to watch sedulously their own modes of feeling, and guard against the evil impulses which too frequently operate within a heart which is "deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked"? If we undertake to supply motives to men, let us urge these upon them through the media of the nervo-mental appetites, the desires, affections, and agreeable passions, rather than through the nervile appetites and the disagreeable passions; let the emotions to which we appeal be those which are honourable to humanity, not those which approximate him in nature to the lower grades of animal existence. In this one thing, viz., Earnestness,

* "To pour into all hearts that which affects his own."—CORNEILLE.

† "If you would have me weep, you yourself must be grieved; then your misfortunes injure me."—*Horatii Flacci Ars Poetica*, lines 102, 103.

do we subscribe ourselves admirers of the apostolate of Carlyle, if thereunto we may be permitted to attach the following conditioning terms, *viz.*, in doing good. Earnestness in *that* is the path of human duty, "wherein whoso walks and works it is well with him."

But something more than mere earnestness, mere emotional activity, is necessary—lively colouring, reality, pictorial effect, or statesque elegance must be given—accurate *resemblance*, ideal presentativeness, mental embodiment must be imparted. For this a highly cultured conceptive power, a richly-endowed memory, a keenly-observant attentiveness, a readiness of combination and felicitous manner of word-descriptiveness—the picturesque of expression—are necessary. Hence originates the necessity for the second quality, which we regard as a *desideratum* in the writer who would efficiently influence the human mind. The high imaginative capacity which can enchain attention, call before the mind a train of images which show "the form and fashion" of those objects which are capable of educing Emotions, describe the varied sequences of a series of affecting events, or otherwise create in the mind such an intense feeling of reality as shall stir the mind, is an essential element in successful authorship. The man who can talk or write with frigid languidness regarding the ravages of a pestilence—the monstrous brutalities which occur at the sacking of a city—the dread upheavals of an earthquake—the mingled blaze and darkness, the boiling madness, and the tempest-eddies of a storm at sea, will neither be listened to nor read. Indifferentism is at a discount; and the trials of virtue, the heroism of human life, the miseries of city existence, the horrors of oppression in every shape or form, the emotions which stir in the bosoms of the various sections of humanity, must be appreciatively interpreted and vividly set forth by the man who would touch the feelings, move the heart, or excite the intellect. Liveliness of imagination, a ready sympathy, a capacity of placing one's self in the position of others, and perceiving the feelings which must burst into birth under these circumstances, infallibly add to the accuracy as well as the attractiveness of a composition. One of two things must be done—either we must place ourselves *en rapport* with the parties we address, or place them in the same sympathetic relation to us. A lively and energetic imagination is equally necessary for either. If we attempt the former, we must endeavour to catch up vividly the point of view from which our auditors or readers are regarding the subject, enter upon the consideration of it there, where their enthusiasm is already excited, and then guide them whence we will: if the latter, we must so explain and illustrate the peculiar aspect in which the topic presents itself to our mind, that the parties addressed can have no difficulty in turning their thoughts into the channel we have cut for them, and being borne along upon the current which we have led within the embankments. If we do not manage this our whole course shall be "in the wind's eye;" we shall require to beat up against many adverse influences, and may, perchance, be carried beyond the harbour which we sought.

Earnestness amounting to enthusiasm, an imagination glittering with similes, metaphors, and all the other *et ceteras* in which mere imagination indulges—pouring forth a perfect profusion of beauty—may be found in an author, yet will he not succeed. Discernment is required. *Tact* is necessary. Without *that* one may feel all the pains of

"Envy wan, and faded Care,
Grim-visaged, comfortless Despair,
And Sorrow's piercing dart;"

or have his heart filled with the almost inexpressible joys which result from the evoking of the more delicious emotions which are occasionally excited within the human soul—

“The stir, the animation of this world,
Friendship and love’s sweet ecstasy”—

may have an imagination capable of imparting to his thoughts those

“Gorgeous dyes
Which paint the bird of paradise,”

and of adding to all in heaven or earth a fresh perfection, fairer far than ever mortal eye had aforetime beheld, and yet be unsuccessful. There is a danger to be avoided. We must remember, that

“To gild refined gold, or paint the lily,
Is wasteful and ridiculous excess.”

Hence it is that taste, discernment, tact—call it what you will—that regulating power by which the writer “in the very torrent, tempest, and as I may say whirlwind,” of Emotion, secures him from either making “the unskilful laugh,” or “the judicious grieve;” and enables him “to beget a temperance that may give it smoothness.” Our Emotions must not master us, we must master our Emotions. If we wish to be successful helmsmen, we must steer for port, with earnest aim indeed, but free from all unsuitable excitement. Earnestly intent upon the accomplishment of our purpose—yea, yearningly anxious, we may be, but our own presence of mind must never forsake us—our own self-control must never yield to the onswEEPing current upon which we have persuaded others to embark with us. “The thoughts, the metaphors, the allusions, and the diction, should appear easy and natural, and seem to arise like so many spontaneous productions, rather than as the effect of art or labour.” But while this is the rule, we must not forget that the haste, precipitancy, and violence of Emotion, prevent clearness of thought, accuracy of expression, coherency of style, and consecutiveness of reasoning. To feel is indeed necessary; to imagine vividly is requisite; but to be ourselves the mere slaves of feeling or imagination, the undiscerning utterers of whatsoever they thrust into our mouths or convey along “the gray goose-quill,” will never produce aught but vague astonishment or keenly-felt regret that the treasures of these noble faculties should be wantonly squandered without the working out of any great and worthy purpose—the performance of anything that might

“Health and vigour to the soul impart,
Spread the young thought and warm the opening heart.”

It has been calculated, that if twelve men were employed for twenty-four hours a day, allowing neither for sleep nor meals, reading at the rate of eighty words per minute, they would barely keep up with the volumes published in London alone. In this tracts and sermons are included; but if magazines, reviews, and newspapers were added to the task, it would require upwards of forty men. The proportion of books which pay for the expenses of printing and publishing is small; of those which leave profit very small; of those which reach a second edition, not one in 1,840; of those which pass through more than two, not one in many thousands.

If a man empties his purse into his head, no man can take it away from him. An investment of knowledge always pays the best interest.—Franklin.

Religion.

IS THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF A SABBATH, AS ENJOINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, INCUMBENT UPON CHRISTIANS?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

HAVING impartially examined the question under discussion, we hesitate not to say that the strict observance of a sabbath—not the Jewish sabbath, but a sabbath analogical thereto—is incumbent upon Christians. Mark the term!

The word *sabbath* is a Hebrew word, the appellative signification of which is, a *cessation*, or *ceasing from labour*. In the Old Testament scriptures the term is variously applied;—to the seventh day of creation, on which God rested from his work—to every seventh day of the week—to the feast of unleavened bread—to the tenth day of the seventh Jewish month—to every seventh year, and to every fiftieth year, which was the sabbath of jubilee. In the New Testament it denotes a whole week, Matt. xxvii. 1; Luke x. 12;—an eternal rest, Heb. iv. 9.

It is the seventh day, or sabbath of days, with which we have to do in this article; and the word sabbath, when applied in this controversy to Christians, must be divested of all its Jewish appendages and notions, save that it signifies the sanctification of a seventh portion of our time to holy and religious purposes. This septenary portion of time is sometimes called the sabbath in reference to the Jewish sabbath; sometimes Sunday, in allusion to the notion and name of it among the heathens; and sometimes “the Lord’s day,” and “the first day of the week.” By the latter names it is denominated in the New Testament, and very properly, too; also in the writings of the christian fathers.

And it is the thing signified by the name, rather than the name itself, with which we have to deal at present. Concerning this we say, that the sabbath enjoined in the Old Testament, and the Lord’s day mentioned in the New Testament, signify the same thing, namely, a seventh portion of time, sanctified or set apart from the remaining six by the triune God himself for special and religious purposes. For the present we will call this

sanctified portion of time the sabbath day. We acknowledge that it is an institution, or positive precept; but, more properly, a moral-positive command; and our opponents must acknowledge, on the other hand, that it is a divine, a moral, an equitable, and a religious institution. *Irene* denies that it is a “moral law,” because it does not, says he, fall within the terms of the definition of a moral law, which are these:—“It is a law which possesses force and vitality under all circumstances, and in all times and places.” Now, the remark of *Irene* may be correct so far as it respects the time of the institution; but it will not hold good with respect to the main thing, the spirit and substance of the sabbatical institution. That God should be worshipped is a moral law; that he should be worshipped in such a manner as can only be done by a strict observance of the sabbath is, to my mind, equally moral; and that he will be thus worshipped by his faithful creatures for ever there is no question: hence the soul and substance of the revelation-sabbath is a great and moral law; and, perchance, the greatest that comes under the notice of man. As it respects the time, which is of divine appointment, it is a positive institution; and as such it is as much obligatory on man, when known, as what a moral law can be. It has the same claim to the name of “a moral law,” and is entitled to the same amount of obedience and reverence from man as what the first three laws of the decalogue are. And since God has commanded men to worship him only, to make to themselves no graven image, and to take not his name in vain, they are as much obliged to do these things—ay, and more so—than they are to refrain from stealing. Then, if legally and morally bound to observe the first, second, and third commandments, we are equally bound to observe the fourth.

The sabbatical institution is not a ceremonial law, much less a Levitical one. It

existed anterior to the embryo state of the ceremonial law of Moses. Its origin is coeval with man's creation; it is based on man's nature and requirements, and comes into the same category of positive laws as does that of the institution of marriage. Both these laws were made by God, near the same time, for the same persons, and both are equally obligatory on man generally. We repudiate the idea that Moses spoke prophetically, or by way of anticipation, of the sabbatical institution, in Gen. ii. 2, 3; for it is expressly said that God, there and then, "blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it." That is, he divided the seventh day—the day after the six in which he had created all things—from other days, and set it apart for religious purposes exclusively.

That this institution is of paradisiacal origin is apparent from what follows:—1. In Gen. ii. 3, it is said, "God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it." And at a subsequent period Jehovah, referring to this inauguration of the sabbath, assigned it as a cardinal reason why men should "remember and keep the sabbath day holy." 2. That the patriarchs observed and sanctified the sabbath is morally certain from the fact that a holy race of men proceeded in a direct line from our first parents, to whom this institution was first and solemnly given, and with whom many of those good men were contemporary for some hundreds of years. The institution seems to be tacitly alluded to in Gen. viii. 8—13; xxix. 27, 28. And that it is not expressly mentioned in the book of Genesis is not more strange or indicative of its non-existence in the patriarchal times, than that it is not mentioned in Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1 Samuel, 2 Samuel, and 1 Kings; yet we know it existed and was honourably observed at the time the latter books were written. Besides, had a knowledge of it not been transmitted from Adam, whence had Moses his information respecting God's institution of the sabbath? 3. From Exod. xvi. 5, 25, 26, it is demonstrably certain, the word of God being true, that the children of Israel had a knowledge of the sabbath, and that it was respected by them, before their reception of the law at Sinai. The mention of the sabbath in Exod. xvi. was made on the fifteenth day of the second month after Israel had left Egypt, whereas the law of Sinai was given in the third

month. 4. The Targum, Aben Ezra, Maimonides, Abarbinel, Ben Israel, and many other learned rabbins, maintain the paradisiacal origin of the sabbath. Moreover, the Jews have a maxim to the effect that "he that denies the sabbath is like to him that denies the whole law." 5. Christ expressly says, "The sabbath was made for man;" not for Jews only, but for man generally. It was made for man at the time of his creation, so that all men might share in the benefit of it.

That the sabbatical institution respects all men, especially those who are favoured with revelation, will appear from these particulars:—1. Its origin is coeval with man's creation, and it was given to the first pair of the human family, that a knowledge of it might descend to all their offspring. At that time Jew and Gentile were unknown, and the sabbath was a beneficent institution common to all Adam's progeny. 2. The reason assigned in the decalogue why men are to remember and keep holy the sabbath day is one of a general character, "For in six days," &c. A reason of this latitudinarian nature necessarily respects all men. When speaking to the Jews only, another and a more personal consideration is adduced, viz., "And remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt," &c., Deut. v. 14, 15. 3. Our Saviour says, "The sabbath was made for man;" which saying, fairly construed, must be understood of all mankind. 4. A day of rest. A seventh day of cessation from all bodily labour is necessary to the well-being of man and beast in a physical point of view. 5. The temporal benefits of this institution are to extend to all men, and to all beasts under man's control. 6. The sabbath and the scriptural observance thereof, either partially or wholly, either by the few or the mass, is essential to the preservation and perpetuation of the true worship of God in the world. And the religious observance of the sabbath is the grand theometer (to coin a word) by which may be ascertained the religious temperament of man, society, and nations. 7. Its incorporation with the moral precepts in the decalogue is, in my humble opinion, an incontrovertible proof that the sabbath respects all men; and if all men, it respects them at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. Why is the sabbatical law placed in the category

of these laws which are morally, generally, and perpetually binding, if not of the same kind in substance? Does *Irene* think the Bible is the progeny of chance, or the digest of an erring novice? Does he not know that even the sagacious Moses was the mere amanuensis of the great unerring Spirit, whose first law is order? Does *Irene* know better how to classify God's laws than God himself? "Charity hopeth all things."

Again: We deny that a strict observance of a sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, is irksome, oppressive, and impracticable. It may be so to those whose minds are not properly imbued with divine grace, which alone can enable them to put a correct estimate on the ordinances of Jehovah. The duty of worshipping God at all "is repugnant to the tastes and feelings of the great majority," while in a state of nature and alienation from God; but this is no proof that the enjoined duty is illegal, oppressive, or impracticable. The sabbath was instituted while man was in innocence, and its observance was obligatory on him in that state; and does *Irene* maintain that the observation of it then was oppressive, and repugnant to man's feelings? No. Well, then, let man imbibe now, as far as he can, the feelings and sentiments which he had then, and the strict observance of the sabbath will be congenial to the best feelings of his best nature—his mind. By the way, if a sabbath was necessary then, to keep the soul right with God, how much more necessary now? Let *Irene* answer. If it was incumbent on man to observe the sabbath in commemoration of the creation; and on Israel, in addition to this, to observe it in commemoration of their exodus from Egypt; how much more is it incumbent on Christians to observe it in glorious commemoration of the completion of man's redemption by Christ?

Touching the impracticability of the subject we may remark, that the observance of the sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, was as follows:—It was to be kept holy. How? *Negatively*, by doing no kind of servile and secular work, such as gathering manna, the harvest, sticks, treading the winepress, buying and selling, going from home to buy food, &c., and kindling fires. Oppressive as these things may seem to *Irene*, they were not oppressive enough to Israel,

who, by their additions and traditions, make them a thousand times more so. *Positively*, by holy convocations of the people, by offering sacrifices, by singing psalms, by reading and expounding the word of God, by praying, by meditating on God, and by doing what was necessary, charitable, and good.

There is nothing impracticable in all this; nothing but what a holy man would delight in doing. *Irene* is startled at what is recorded in Numb. xv. 32—35, respecting the gatherer of sticks on the sabbath day being put to death. This was not the effect of any penalty annexed to an infraction of the sabbatical law, for no penalty was annexed to the breach thereof. The people did not know what to do in the case until they had consulted God; and it was by God's command, there and then given, that the man was stoned to death; see ver. 34. Hence it appears that the sabbatical law is one thing, and the penalty consequent on a breach thereof is another. Besides, the man here punished was a presumptuous sinner, as may be inferred from ver. 30, 31. He acted in open defiance of God's positive and known law; and, according to the Mosaic law, every man that did aught presumptuously was to be put to death. Another thing at which *Irene* stumbles is, the prohibition placed on the children of Israel not to kindle a fire on the sabbath day. Now, how does *Irene* know but this may allude to an ordinary fire, or such a one as was kindled for profit—in furnaces for fusing metals—in kilns for drying bricks, corn, or for cooking and baking? That such a fire is intended the Jews are almost generally agreed. However, this is not a portion of the sabbatical law, but a Jewish ceremony to be observed on the sabbath. The Jews were commanded to do many things on the sabbath day which we are not, and *vice versa*. The Jews, on *Irene's* showing, could do without fires on the sabbath day; hence, not to kindle them was practicable. The more northern nations cannot do without them; hence, to kindle them is to do good; and the Lord of the sabbath has told us that it is "right to do good on the sabbath day." God never intended that the formal and ceremonial observance of the sabbath should be the same at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. The very nature of things repudiates such a notion. Neither does the

question under discussion involve such a thing. The strict observance of the sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, amounts to this much—to devote as much of ourselves and ours to God on that day as we reasonably can. The injunction, “in it thou shalt do no manner of work,” is to be understood with a degree of limitation. For instance, the priests and Levites, officiating in the temple service on this day, had to work as hard again on it as what they had on ordinary days; for on the sabbath day the sacrifices were doubled, and all then had to be slain, flayed, divided, boiled, or burnt, &c. See Numb. xviii.; Lev. xxiii., xxiv.; Matt. xii. 5. Many of the Jews entertained the same erroneous notions respecting the right observance of the sabbath that *Irene* seems to do; but Christ set them right, or tried to do so, on this subject. See Matt. xii. 11; Mark iii. 4; Luke xiii. 15. Not being a ceremonial, but a moral-positive law, the Saviour did not abolish it; but reformed it, changed it as regards time, and tacitly enjoined the observance of it on his church. On this day especially he publicly instructed the people; he sanctified it by doing good on it; by his resurrection he changed the sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week; and in one place he declares himself the Lord of the sabbath (Luke vi. 5), thereby intimating that it was a part and parcel of his kingdom—an institution perpetually binding on all his subjects. In keeping with all this, the apostles observed this holy day, on which they met together to celebrate the Lord’s supper, and on which they made public collections for the poorer saints. See Acts xx. 7; 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 2, where it is significantly called “the first day of the week.” John calls it “the Lord’s day.” This day was religiously observed by the immediate successors of the apostles and primitive fathers of the church. Our limits preclude us quoting largely on this point. Suffice it to

say, Justin Martyr,* Tertullian,† Cyprian,‡ Victorinus Petavionensis,|| Clemens Alexandrinus,§ Barnabas,¶ Ignatius,** Dionysius,†† Augustin,‡‡ Athanasius,§§ &c., all speak of this day as being the Lord’s day, and devoted to religious uses; and were we at liberty to make extracts from their writings, we could do it greatly to our own advantage.

There is just another point, and we have done. *Irene* says:—“Any law, to the infraction of which pains and penalties are annexed, becomes obsolete so soon as the penalties proper to it cease to be, or to be able to be, inflicted.” From these premises and an accompanying illustration, *Irene* draws a mighty conclusion, viz., the abrogation of the sabbath. To tolerate such reasoning as this would lead to serious and disastrous consequences; for by the same process we might show that the laws of adultery, idolatry, cursing fathers and mothers, incest, witchcraft, &c., are all abrogated. Under the Old Testament law the penalty of all these things was death; but this penalty is not inflicted now in these cases, yet the laws against such things are in full force. In some instances the violation of these laws is punished by man, in others by God. It does not fall within man’s province to punish the breach of moral laws, the sabbatical law amongst the rest; but the breach of these laws, if finally persisted in, will be punished, and that by One who has said, “Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.”

J. F.

* Apolog. ii., p. 98.

† De Anima, cap. iii. p. 530; Apolog., cap. xvi. p. 608; De Idololat., p. 623.

‡ Cyprian, Epist. xxxiii., p. 77.

§ De Fabric. Mundi, apud D. Cave, p. 103.

¶ Stromat. lib. vi. p. 492; *Ibid.*, lib. vii. p. 535; *Ibid.*, lib. v. p. 437.

§ Epist. Cathol., sec. ii. p. 244.

** Ad Magnes., p. 35.

†† Apud Euseb., lib. iv. cap. xxiii. p. 142.

‡‡ Epist. cxviii.

|| Socrat., lib. v. cap. xxii.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

I HAVE just laid on one side the February number of the *British Controversialist*, after perusing the article on the sabbath by “Glowr.” He has by a most extraordinary course of reasoning reached as extraordinary conclusions; and, notwithstanding your notice that you have sufficient articles on this subject, I

cannot avoid jotting down a few thoughts as they occurred while reading his article. And I would commence with his first sentence, which contains an assertion of a “declension of spiritual religion,” which declension is manifested by the “depreciative conduct of the generality of our countrymen towards

as, in reality, it is, perhaps, the over-enthusiasm of a people long made with us. I am sure, however, that under the poor, over-wrought, and smoke-begrimed artisan into a purer and more enlivening atmosphere, inhaling of which new thoughts and reminiscences of bygone days arise, and renew the tone of health and happiness that is well nigh lost in the battle with the world. And are they boisterous and merry when inhaling the country air, albeit it is Sunday? Well, I trust that that God, which I hope both I and "Glowr" reverence, will appreciate the joyous mirth as unconscious gratitude to him for the refreshing draught. Such true and hearty thanksgiving is more worthy than many who, under the shadow of a magnificent building, thank God, in all humility of spirit, that "they are not such as these poor men."

As to the second class, those "who, while they profess great regard for all divine injunctions, do, in our opinion, invariably transgress the law of the sabbath," in which class I must place myself, I now, in their name, thank him for giving us credit for conscientious motives. We have accepted his invitation, as far as regards the arguments he has adduced, and must confess

shelter for a single second of sabbath. It reveals at once the world, which for ages and answering to this law, is no any more than when it took it but is only now in the course. But if this is so, and I maintain bears me out in the assertion Creator sanctify one day as what never took place? It for Moses, as a lawgiver and tician, to reiterate to the nation an old tradition, but it will to palm it off on the descendant enlightened period.

And, even if this part of were granted, I think "Glowr" difficulty in proving that is implied as being imparted to. The whole weight of sin is broken of the seventh day, kept all other days holy. choice for the observer of commandment must keep holy the seventh other would have done, suggestion true, and it is to completion of the world; for these traditionalists, on no other completed.

In the second premise "

day, not because the Creator rested on the seventh, and also because it is necessary for man to rest from his labour, and have a period devoted to recreation and the renewing of his strength. This necessity is based in the wants of his nature; and these several events, whether it be the creation of the world or the resurrection of Christ, are only used by general consent to gain one day in the seven, and that all may alike rest on that day. Thus I perfectly agree, with "Glowr," that "the sabbath was to be no mere ceremonial observance, which after a while was to be annulled, but was appointed to be strictly observed by man, and the observance of it constitutes part of his duty to the end of time." And I see no objection to devoting the day to religious exercises; on the contrary, it ought to be so; but then I am afraid "Glowr" will not join me in declaring that seeking for health, giving those organs and limbs with which God has intrusted me full scope and play, is essentially a religious act, and that by doing so, viz., any act that renders me more of a man, healthy in body, mind, and feelings, I am rendering a worthy, and I believe an acceptable, offering to my Maker.

We are next led to consider a passage in Isaiah, in which God is represented as saying, "The eunuchs that keep my sabbaths, even unto them will I give in mine house, and within my walls, a place and a name, better than of sons and of daughters." I really cannot understand this passage; and all I can make out of it is, that eunuchs are told if they will keep the sabbaths, which is impossible (for the Jewish observance of the sabbath consisted entirely of ceremonies from which they were excluded); if they will perform this impossibility, they shall receive a name better than sons or daughters. Sons and daughters of whom? Of God? We are apt to attribute the highest glory to Christ, because he is the Son of God; but these eunuchs will be put first, and receive a better name than sons of God!

But, having interpreted this passage to his own satisfaction, "Glowr" invites us to inspect the New Testament. This was hardly necessary; for, if he will look at it without prejudice, he will find but very little said on the subject at all there, and certainly nothing in favour of a sanctified day. We do find, indeed, that Christ preached on

the seventh day; but so he did on the first and second. He may have more often entered the synagogue on the seventh; but we have no reason for believing he did so for any other reason than that it was a leisure day, on which he found the larger congregation to preach to, united, perhaps, with a desire on his part to join the people, as far he was able, in their common usages. Indeed, what is said in the New Testament proves, if it proves anything, that "the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath," and that man was not to make himself a slave to any ceremonies of the past, which were supposed to have the authority of God, and to none of the present, which have merely the sanction of man.

Upon such reasoning as I have tried to expose he comes to the conclusion, that "whatever sanctity attached to it under the old dispensation belongs to it still. If secular labours were formerly inconsistent with it, they are so now; if journeys, luxuries, &c., were prohibited then, they are now. . . . Neither health, wealth, nor happiness must be purchased at the expense of profaning the holy day of God." One would really imagine that God only took notice of our actions on this one day, and that we are permitted to follow our inclinations on the others. And the prohibitions of old times are prohibitions still! The prohibition against lighting fires on that day remains in force at the present. Does "Glowr" ever sit by a fire on a Sunday? It is not a necessity, and should never be lit as a convenience. I fear devotional exercises will not generate sufficient heat on a winter's day to keep the body warm all day long.

And then we are favoured with an extract from "an editor." Is it to show his genius or good sense? He says:—"What a contrast is presented on Monday morning between the sabbath breaker and the Sunday school teacher." True, if the former has spent his Sunday in debauchery, drinking, or in any actions that are opposed to the health of the body, then I can understand the next sentence, and will easily believe that the difference will be on the side of the Sunday school teacher; not so, however, if he has spent the day in the pure air, and under the exhilarating influence of a country life; he will not then commence the week's labour with a pallid cheek, but with a

healthy tone, and a renewed energy, very different from many a teacher, especially if the poor fellow is doomed to toil in a shop or in a counting-house for six out of every seven of those "early morns" to the same number of "dewy eves" that "Glowr" talks about. But let us not lose sight of our editor. He goes on to say, "While the features of the former (the sabbath breaker) indicate the effects of the most depressing nature, and show that his sensual gaieties have failed to gain him inward ease, the serene countenance of the latter (the Sunday school teacher), and his firm, elastic step, give evidence that his constitution has suffered no violence, and that his conscience is at peace." Can this editor, or "Glowr," tell me when it happens, on Sunday or on Monday, that "sensual gaieties" will not leave their mark on the enjoyer? It is the "sensual gaieties," not the day chosen for their enjoyment, that affects the constitution. But, from reading the above extract, one would imagine that a mark had been set on the forehead of every one not attendant on a place of worship on a Sunday, as God set a mark on Cain the murderer, that all men should know him. Can anything be more preposterous? If "Glowr" or his "editor" can point out all the sabbath breakers they pass on their way to business, methinks they must possess something more than the common power of sight of us mortals. Is it clairvoyance? And can they not detect also those who carry their bodies into the temple, but break the sabbath by leaving their minds in their counting-house, in the affairs of the week, or in the secular habits of their life? How is it that these deficiencies do not set their mark in the countenance, as well as "sensual gaieties," if the evil consists in breaking the sabbath?

On the whole, although I certainly desire to gain a right conclusion on the subject, I do not find that "Glowr" has helped me much on the road. We have merely a number of arguments that are baseless, at least to me, premises that I cannot admit, and conclusions that fall to the ground in consequence of the weakness of their support.

Nor can I see that "Harold" has been much more successful. I perfectly agree with him that none of the ten commandments, as far as they depend on "the moral constitution of man," can possibly be abro-

gated. But if he argues for the sanctity of the day because based alone in the moral want of the human constitution, I can scarcely see how he can escape the conclusion that it is only to be kept sacred to afford rest to the body and mind. It is of little consequence whether the day be the first or the seventh, the third or the fourth. The moral want remains the same, and while it lasts the necessity for a cessation from labour will exist. As such let it be kept sacred; or, as "Harold" suggests, let us have two such days, if such arrangement can be made. There is no fear of our devoting too little time to worldly avocations, and a sacred day of rest should be hailed as a boon; but this, remember, is the moral argument.

And his observations on the existence of a God, worship, &c., are very good. I see no objection in one whole day being spent in the worship of God; no, nor in spending the whole seven days so; it is incumbent upon us that we do so. We are to "pray without ceasing;" and whatsoever we do, whether it be eating, or drinking, or anything else, we are to do it to the glory of God. Let us do thus. Secular habits are not irreligious; but, on the contrary, into the minutest action of life we can throw a religious spirit; a religious man must, as a necessity of his being, do so; and if we enter into any engagement into which we cannot throw this life, that is antagonistic to such a spirit, it shows a dereliction of duty on our part. This worship, that Christ and his apostles demanded, did not consist of one day; they did not preach on one day alone; but, for and in every day and minute of our life we should thus show forth the indwelling of God. That such a being should be led on a Sunday to worship with the people, and according to common custom, is likely enough; but that it should lead him to avoid a search for health, and all consideration for pleasure, is not at all within the limits of a conclusion from such arguments. Nor does it necessarily follow that such a man should enter at all into the worship of the people; he may very legitimately converse with God in nature, and uplift his heart to his Creator in company with the innocence of creation, instead of with those who acknowledge that they of themselves can think no good thing.

G. W. W.

Philosophy.

WOULD EDUCATION ERADICATE CRIME?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In the discussion of any question, true wisdom would teach us to approach it in a spirit of earnest and impartial inquiry; our aim being rather to find the answer of truth, than to maintain unaltered our preconceived opinions. If we, being thus the children of wisdom, are led with boundless faith and hope to devote our powers to the acquisition of truth, we shall, as a consequence of this devotion, rest satisfied with no answers to our inquiries but such as are comprehensive and complete.

In order to discover a correct answer to the question before us, it is expedient, first, to acquire a clear conception of the nature and source of crime. Secondly, to understand the nature and object of education. And, lastly, from a consideration of the relation existing between crime and education, to discover an answer to our present inquiry.

First. As regards the nature of crime. The common idea of a crime is, that it is an unrighteous action performed by an intelligent and accountable being. Now, right and wrong, good and evil—as moral qualities—have not their source and residence in actions; their abode is in the spirit. A man's actions are not the cause of his spiritual state, but the effect. Crime is the embodiment of a sinful spirit. Would we prevent the effect, we must eradicate the cause. As lambs cannot bear grapes, so, by no amount of ingenuity, can righteous action be tortured from an evil spirit. "Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt." As one tree bears much fruit, so does the evil principle display itself in an infinite variety of actions. The actions are many, the crimes are multitudinous; but the sin is one. As electricity equally exists whether it sleep in the cloud or flash to the earth; so a sinful spirit is equally sinful, whether it bear abundantly the fruit of crime, or whether the moral corruption lurk in the heart, disguised by the look of a sanctimonious exterior. Sin (of which crime is the embodiment, as we have

seen) consists not in a certain course of conduct or action which may be discontinued or modified at pleasure; but, being a principle residing in the spirit, and entwining its roots about the foundation of our being, it behoves us, if we would find a specific for the disease, to first obtain a knowledge of its essential nature. To this end we inquire, What is sin? which naturally suggests another question, Whence is its origin? We regarded it just now as a principle. Now a principle, or original cause, can have no origin; for if regarded as an effect, it ceases to be a principle. In fact, there can be but one absolute principle, or first cause—namely, the self-existing God. But God and evil not being one, evil, if an existence at all, must be a subordinate one; and, as such, must necessarily be a product of the only original cause. But this cannot be. God being absolutely good, cannot be the author of evil. If evil, therefore, be neither a self-existing power, nor a subordinate existence, the only rational inference which can be drawn is, that it has no being. Evil has no being! Surely reason must here have led us astray? Whence and what then are all the guilt, misery, and death, to which human nature is subject? Are not these evils, and have they not existence? The answer suggests itself. Evil is non-entity. As darkness is the absence of light, ignorance the absence of knowledge, death the absence of life; so evil is the absence of good. It is non-existence as opposed to God, who is an absolute, limitless being. Depravity is the ebb of spirituality: sin a void in the soul, which was wont to be the abode of the great I AM.

In further pursuit of this subject, we now inquire, What is education? By the term education is commonly understood that amount of culture and instruction which is requisite to adapt a person to that particular station in society which it is intended he should occupy. This kind of education is supposed to be carried on and completed during the period of youth. But such a

Supreme. The object of education is not outward society, but spiritual life. The value of society or a political community consisting in its subserviency to the attainment of this end. The period of education includes the whole duration of the present state of being: education or culture being a design, running like a thread through life, and entering the regions of the unseen and eternal, is lost to mortal sight, and ends we know not where. In short, the term education, in its full and comprehensive sense, signifies the leading out or unfolding of all the powers and principles of our nature—from the inferior, or animal faculties, up to the superior attributes of our spiritual nature. It makes us conscious of powers that grasp infinity of life deep and boundless, merging and mingling with the essential being of God. The means of education are varied, abundant, and universally available; the process is momentous, and its aim incalculably high. They comprise all the sensations, perceptions, and experience, of which our peculiar state of being is susceptible. All objects speak of that kindred substance which the progressive soul is seeking. All the evanescent appear-

and good.

The arguments and remarks brought forward by part of an opposite conclusion mostly sound and good, as Had it not been our previous the culture of the intellect sufficient remedy for the evil we should probably have been enlightened by the perusal of the article. We quite agree knowledge of human hearts acquaintance with the physical not recompense its possession of crime." At the same true knowledge exerts a moral and purifying influence upon the character of him who attains it. It is not, Would the most of the intellectual powers be cultivated, or, Would education, a "limited idea of the multiplicity of which they contribute to produce this result? But education eradicate crime? To the conclusion, that imperfect education are inadequate to

has clothed his dwelling-place with beauty; the very stars of heaven, as well as the flowers of earth, have breathed of love—the love of his and their Creator. The affections, like bright angels, have clustered around him; and the jasmine porch, the cheerful hearth, the look of love, and the touch of trusting tenderness, has each symbolized the love of his heavenly Father. . . . Despite of all, crime exists an unsubduable specimen of earthliness.” But why does crime exist, in spite of these heavenly influences? Is it not that the criminal is deaf to their voice, blind to their beauty, and unconscious of their existence? And does not crime decrease in exact proportion to the subjection of the human heart to these purifying agents? And again, we must remember that these high influences are not education, but the means whereby education is effected. An education trans-

cending all human conception of which all may be the subjects who in the simplicity of faith abandon themselves to these divine instructions—and which none are totally incapacitated from receiving, for in every breast there still exists the traces of the Creator's image—

“The darkest night that veils the sky,
Of beauty hath a share;
The blackest heart hath signs to show
That God still lingers there.”

This lingering of God in the soul is a sure ground for hope and confidence in the ultimate recovery of humanity. The specific for moral evil is the influx of eternal love. Education is the process of its application. The education of humanity into love, and truth, and right, is the means, and the only means, whereby crime may be eradicated.

COSMOPOLITE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Thomson, “Castle of Indolence,” Canto XLI., li. 60, 61; and Plato's “Meno.”

THE deep and thrilling interest attaching at the present moment to questions of this nature, in all their aspects and bearings, might well make one pause and reflect anxiously before giving utterance to opinions which may influence hundreds of thoughtful minds, and thus eventually tell upon the interest and happiness of thousands. For if one respectable, thoughtful, and earnest member of society can do much for the removal or alleviation of the moral and physical evils which he sees in operation among his poorer and less intelligent neighbours; if, by retrenching his own luxuries and superfluities, he can cause their privations to be less keenly felt, and by his influence and example can improve their moral character, then solemn is the responsibility which rests on those whose office it is to mould the judgments of such men; for it is not difficult to perceive that the conclusions they form upon this question must materially affect their conduct in private life: if wrong, they will bias their judgment, marshal their energies in the cause of evil, and direct their charities into a wrong channel. Now if, on the one hand, the affirmative is held in all its entirety, there is danger of one's being led to regard the development of the intellect—the mere fruit of scholastic instruc-

tion—as a specific for all the social evils connected with crime—as the *summum bonum* on which statesmen and legislators, on which parents, tutors, and guardians of the young, should henceforth fix their exclusive attention; while, on the other hand, extreme views of the opposite nature are calculated to produce a conviction that scientific and literary education is a thing of little or no worth, as not conducing to individual or social prosperity, but, on the contrary, fostering “an undue and overweening self-conceit, leading men to doubt the immortality of the soul, and to scoff at revealed religion.”* This latter error, through the influence of pride, ignorance, and prejudice, has at one time done much mischief in this country; and, its dangerous tendency having been fully tested, the case is now reversed, and too much instead of too little value appears to be set upon education as a moral agent. Hear Sir A. Alison:—“It was said that education would lay the axe to the root of crime—that ignorance was the parent of vice; and by diffusing the schoolmaster you would extinguish the greater part of the wickedness which afflicted society; that the providing of cheap, elevating, and innocent amusements for the leisure hours of the working classes would prove the best antidote

* Sir John Herschel.

to their degrading propensities ; and that then, and then only, would crime really be arrested, when the lamp of knowledge burned in every mechanic's workshop, in every peasant's cottage. The idea was plausible, it was seducing, it was amiable, and held forth the prospect of general improvement of morals from the enlarged culture of mind. The present generation is generally, it may almost be said universally, imbued with these opinions; and the efforts accordingly made for the instruction of the working classes during the last twenty-five years have been unprecedented in any former period of our history. What have been the results? Has crime declined in proportion to the spread of education? Are the best instructed classes the least vicious? Has eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge diminished the power of the tempter? So far from it, the consequences, hitherto at least, have been melancholy and foreboding in the extreme. The criminal returns of Great Britain and Ireland for the last twenty years demonstrate that the uneducated criminals are about a third of the whole; in other words, *the educated criminals are to the uneducated as two to one*. In Scotland the educated criminals are about *four times* the uneducated; in England just double; in Ireland they are nearly equal. Nay, what is still more remarkable, while the number of uneducated criminals, especially in Scotland, is yearly diminishing, that of educated ones is yearly increasing.* This passage, extracted from an essay of absorbing though painful interest (on crime and transportation), backed as it is by a variety of well-authenticated statistics, would of itself be sufficient to decide the question in the negative; but the facts they indicate are to many so new and startling that it will be useful to see how far they are borne out by the authority of scripture, the testimony of antiquity, and the principles of mental philosophy and social economy.

In the first place, then, scripture, as all who are familiar with its pages know, speaks everywhere of mankind as being in a fallen, degenerate condition, the result of the transgression of the common progenitor of all,

the first man, Adam, of which condition it tacitly supposes the active existence of crime to be a necessary element—that “by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned” (Rom. v. 12). It further represents men as unable, by their own will or act, to raise themselves from that fallen estate (1 Tim. ii. 5; also, see Article X. of the Church of England), asserting that their restoration to the lost image of their Maker, by which alone they can become incapable of crime, is to be accomplished only by the mediation of the second Adam, the Lord Jesus Christ, and that this restoration will not be perfected till his second coming to judge the world; at which period, if we receive some passages of scripture in their ordinary interpretation, we have reason to believe that infidelity and crime shall be more than usually rampant (Luke xviii. 8; 2 Pet. iii. 3, 4; Rev. xix. 8, 9); that then, and not till then, shall be produced that change in man's nature which no system of human education could have effected. The language of our Lord himself on various occasions—as, for instance, in the parable of the tares and the wheat (Matt. xiii. 24—32), and of the seed sown, i. e., the word preached (Mark iv. 14—20)—evidently points to the conclusion that not even that most effective of all educations, the preaching of the gospel, should ever be able completely to regenerate mankind and redeem them from sin and crime.

The historical parts of the Bible also teach the same great truth; for the moral and ceremonial code delivered to Moses—which was, in every sense of the term, a moral discipline, or education for the Jewish people—failed in saving that unhappy race from falling into the most loathsome and debasing superstitions, the most foul obscenities, the most horrible crimes. In the impressive language of the great apostle of the Gentiles, they “changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator;” or, as a powerful champion of the cause of popular education puts it, “The revealed law of God in the midst of them, the prophets and other organs of oracular communication; religious ordinances and emblems; facts made and expressly intended to embody truths in long and various series; the whole system of their

* “Essays,” vol. i. p. 566. See, however, Sir E. B. Lytton's “England and the English,” book iii. chap. iii.—v.; and specially note p. 324, ed. 40.

superhuman government, *constituted as a school*, all these were ineffectual to create so much just thought in their minds as to save them from the vainest and vilest fancies, delusions, and superstitions.* And the words of St. Paul in various places would seem to indicate that crime had found its way into the christian church even in his own time, when it might have been supposed most free from all taint of corruption (1 Cor. xi 18—22; 2 Cor. xii. 20, 21; xiii. 1—5, &c.; and also Acts v. 1—11). Sufficient has now been adduced to show the teaching of holy writ on this point; but as there are, probably, some who would not regard the Bible as an authority at all, and others, perhaps, who think its utterance not sufficiently distinct to set the matter at rest, it will be useful to widen the range of discussion, by considering it next in reference to man's moral, social, and intellectual nature.

Let us, however, previously see what light history can throw upon the matter. Does she teach the positive theory? Far otherwise. The gigantic intellects of the philosophers of old, who flourished in the most brilliant period of the earth's intellectual history, and who, amid a race which has never been surpassed for the political wisdom of all its sons, though regarded as oracles of learning and wisdom, were unable, by the light of nature alone, to construct a system of education which should have the desired effect.† And is it not a sufficiently triumphant refutation of the positive theory, that every page of the world's history is but a catalogue of crimes? Having witnessed, then, the total failure of the Hebrew polity, with its theocracy, its stern unbending morality, its constant reference to a higher power than man's; having witnessed the failure of the Greek philosophy and the Roman legislation—the most perfect of their kind, founded upon the profoundest views of human nature and the varying conditions of society—one might well be pardoned for a slight degree of scepticism as to the efficacy of any merely human education, or system of natural religion, in restraining or eradicating the innate propensities of man, which uncontrolled must, in some cases, find their

limit in crime. But, having seen what history teaches, let us, in the next place, inquire what is the simplest, the most natural, meaning of the term "education?" Is it not an educating, or drawing out and strengthening man's innate* faculties? And do we not, by a *good education*, understand also a weeding out, as far as practicable, his innate vices? Or is it not implied in saying that a person is to be taught to be truthful, honest, courageous, temperate, forgiving—that the opposite vices are to be kept in check—that they exist, in fact, and need to be kept under? And what does the necessity for such a training for a moral agent imply? Clearly that there is a strong *natural* tendency in man, if left wholly to himself, to fall away from moral rectitude—to lapse eventually into crime. And as this tendency is natural, it must cease only at the death of the individual. It may, indeed, be restrained—may be kept latent by a concurrence of circumstances; but it can never be wholly eradicated. All men are, occasionally, sorely tempted; and the purest, most virtuous, and best instructed, have sometimes yielded to temptation. This being the case, the education must continue in force during the whole course of a man's life—must, in fact, be law; nothing short of law can reach a man at every period and turn of his existence, and act as a continual restraint upon the natural tendency of his inborn impulses. Now, I have no objection to consider law as a kind of education. But suppose the wisest laws, framed by the acutest intellects, to be in full operation. Could they possibly provide for every contingency that should occur? Could they anticipate and obviate every temptation to transgression which every subject in all future time should meet with? Could they prevent occasion of quarrel arising between the community they governed and others, and the natural consequences, war, bloodshed, rapine, retaliation? "The laws of this country, including the acts of the legislature and the decisions of our supreme courts of justice, are not contained in fewer than fifty folio volumes; and yet it is not once in ten attempts that you can find the

* J. Foster, "Essay on the Evils of Popular Ignorance," sect. i. p. 13, 2nd edit.

† Schlegel's "Philosophy of Life," pp. 2, 248. (Bohn.)

* Locke's theory ("Essay on the Human Understanding," chap. i., ii.), that man has no innate mental or practical principles, has been overturned by Reid and subsequent philosophers.

vicious actions, and the contrary, to
 to work with their own proper reward for
 to do good that has not to be feared and
 of nature, a teacher that will say to him
 every doubtful turn, "This is the way, wa
 go in it." I answer, that natural laws ha
 never, in any time or country, had sufficien
 power on the minds of men to prevent crim
 for the obvious reason that their influence
 felt only with the bitter experience of the
 certainty—that their action is unobserv
 until crime has been perpetrated; and, s
 condly, that the question evidently h
 reference to an education instatuted by h
 man authority.

Again: In every country there are
 cessarily different classes; some must till
 soil, some trade to other countries, so
 prepare clothing, some build; others will
 required to fulfil the arduous but honour
 duties of state officers, to transact peace
 war, carry on foreign correspondence, se
 the administration of the laws, &c.; w
 some few would, probably, be exempt
 every kind of involuntary labour; b
 obviously, very different kinds and de
 of knowledge and skill would be requ
 Should all parties, then, receive the
 education or not? and would that kin
 degree of education which would be suff

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self-reproach, in the checks and pauses of their career; and by men in the near prospect of death and judgment expressing, in bitter regret, the acknowledgment that they had persisted in acting wrong while they knew better." To such acts all, at times, have strong inducements; for instance, to intemperance, licentiousness, revenge, &c.; and such inducements being frequently the results, so to speak, of the operation of the natural laws of man's constitution, we have no reason to expect that they will be, in all cases, successfully resisted, especially by those who have no higher motives than the sanction of human teaching and human laws to oppose to them. Thus scripture, history, and philosophy unite in proclaiming the falsity of the positive hypothesis.

And now briefly to advert to some of the more plausible objections of our opponents. I find that the arguments of G. P. W. and "Dromo" have been in a great measure met by what precedes. I observe, further, that although it may be perfectly true that man's moral nature is trainable to a great extent (and it is, no doubt, a sacred duty for every one to advance the cause of general education to his utmost), yet it is not made to appear from the affirmative articles that training of any kind will in every case, and under all possible circumstances, be successful; on the contrary, experience has proved the fallacy of such expectations; by experience I mean that of all ages as recorded in history, for I find not from any ancient or modern author that in any state, at any time, under any polity or public system of religious or secular discipline whatever, crime was utterly unknown; and I appeal to the evidence of that experience, which is positive, as conclusive against that of mere theory, which is merely negative. When "Dromo" asserts that religious education of some kind will eradicate crime, which he admits to be prevalent because religion is not properly taught, he forgets to inform us *how* he would have it taught, and what description of it. To which, for instance, of all the denominations described in John Evans's sketch would he award the palm of superiority in this noble work? For individuals of every shade and shape of religious opinion, and of the highest possible intellectual endowments to boot, have been convicted of the most revolting crimes. And the objection that their heads,

not their hearts, were trained, is futile. To take one instance out of thousands, was the heart of King David properly trained? Who that has ever held silent converse with the "sweet psalmist of Israel" would deny it? Yet did he never fall into crime, crime of the most horrible nature, crimes abhorrent from the purest sympathies of the heart, as well as the dictates of the reason? Until, then, "Dromo" can prove that an ideal religion of his own will accomplish, in the hands and by the agency of man, what no religion, christian or pagan, monotheistic, or polytheistic, or pantheistic, has yet accomplished, his arguments fall to the ground. Again: G. P. W. makes the assumption (it is defended by nothing deserving the name of argument that I can discover) that ignorance is a principal cause of crime, and bases on it the conclusion that therefore a mere course of instruction will eradicate crime. His minor, however, is not included in his major premise. Supposing a criminal act ever to be a result of sheer ignorance, which in this country, at least, of christian and Protestant enlightenment is extremely doubtful, it does not necessarily follow that the removal of that ignorance will destroy crime, for it cannot remove the criminal nature which leads to it. The crime may be changed in kind, as S. A. J. has remarked, perhaps also in degree, so that one who in a state of ignorance commits murder, theft, arson, incest, without compunction, might, when taught that these acts were opposed to "laws divine and human," still be guilty of selfish ambition, of forgery, fornication, or fraud of some kind or other, from destitution or the force of evil passions. Poverty, hatred, lust, ambition, pride, avarice, have repeatedly led men to crimes, of the nature of which they were so fully aware that many have surrendered themselves to justice immediately after. Once more:—It is difficult to conceive how G. P. W.'s fine-drawn distinctions between the kinds of education advisable for persons of different characters and habits could be carried out in practice. Parents are, undoubtedly, the best judges of the dispositions, as well as the most efficient instructors, of their offspring; but how seldom will a parent admit that there exists any very vicious tendency in his young children, how seldom correct it properly when aware of its existence! Now, physiologists and

teachers are pretty well agreed that the moral character is, in most instances, formed at ten years of age, although the natural timidity and bashfulness of the young may wholly conceal the darker shades of character till much later in life. Thus a revengeful and unforgiving temper is often formed, there is reason to believe, as early as seven; but for want of an object to call it prominently forth it may remain in abeyance, and be unsuspected by any but the owner, till seventeen.* It is thus impossible to form an accurate judgment of a person's character when young; and yet, if it is to be effective, education must then commence. How, then, as G. P. W. suggests, could an appropriate education be selected for each individual? for since, as we have seen, the character cannot be known except by its outward effects, and therefore in most cases till manhood, how could the education be applied before the commission of crime? and how, in such a system, could crime ever be effectually eradicated?

But enough has, perhaps, been said to convince even G. P. W. and "Dromo" of the utter inefficiency, not to mention the impracticability, of their plans.† Until they or some one else devise better, we have small reason to hope for the regeneration of society.

But what is the cause of the fearful prevalence of crime in this country at present, if not ignorance? I believe the true answer to this question will be found in the following passage from the already-quoted "Essay" of Sir A. Alison, which, in conclusion, I request the thoughtful and philanthropic reader most seriously to ponder; it is pregnant with meaning (pp. 561, 562):—

"Degraded and sensual men have an instinctive aversion to religious truths, and a still greater distaste for religious restraint. The carnal man is at war with God. When will this great truth, so loudly proclaimed in every page of the gospel, be practically acknowledged and acted upon, even by those who proclaim it most loudly from the pulpit? To those who are acquainted with the ana-

tomy of crime, and who see exemplified in real life the courses of the wicked, its truth becomes not only evident, but of overwhelming importance. The strength of the world consists in its pleasures and enjoyments. It is the vehemence of the desire for these pleasures and enjoyments which constitutes the fearful force of its temptations. The whole progress of society, the whole efforts of man, the whole accumulations of wealth, are directed, in its later stages, to augment these desires. Necessities, in a large portion of society, being provided for, pleasures only are thought of. Civilization increases them, for it augments enjoyment; commerce, for it multiplies the wealth by which it is purchased; ingenuity, for it adds to the instruments of luxury; *knowledge*, for it spreads an ardent and often exaggerated picture of its gratifications. The whole efforts of man in civilized life are directed to the increase of human enjoyment, the incitement of human desire. Need we wonder, then, if religion, which prescribes an abstinence from the pleasures of sin, which enjoins continence to the sensual, sobriety to the drunkard, reflection to the unheeding, gentleness to the irascible, restraint to the voluptuous, probity to the avaricious, punishment to the profligate, meets in such an age with very few votaries? Some, doubtless, will always be found, who, disgusted with the profligacy with which they are surrounded, are led only the more rapidly to a life of rectitude and duty by such vice; but how many are they amidst the crowd of sensual and unreflecting? Perhaps one in twenty. The great mass pass quietly by on the other side; they do not say there is no God, but they live altogether without God in the world."

I regard, then, the opinion of Aristotle and of his followers—that virtue is of two kinds, intellectual and moral, of which the intellectual arises from teaching, the moral from the right formation of habits[•]—as false in theory and dangerous in practice, leading eventually to downright materialism. And my readers may think this not so improbable, when they remember that the revival of the Aristotelian philosophy in Germany and elsewhere, has been contemporaneous with the spread of rationalism and scepticism. F. J. L.

* See Foster, on a man's writing memoirs of himself.

† A more plausible plan is that of Kay—"Social Condition and Education of the People," vol. ii.—throughout; but see an answer to it, "Eclectic Review," vol. iv. pp. 261—279.

• Ethics, book ii.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"I am one of those who have probably passed a longer period of my life engaged in war than most men, and principally in *civil war*; and I must say this, that if I could avoid, by any sacrifice whatever, even one month of civil war in the country to which I was attached, I would sacrifice my life in order to do it. I say, there is nothing which destroys property, eats up prosperity by the roots, and demoralizes the character, to the degree that civil war does: in such a crisis the hand of every man is raised against his neighbour, against his brother, and against his father; servant betrays master, and the whole scene ends in confusion and devastation."—*The late Duke of Wellington*.

"The Duke of Wellington's despatches are a monument of sagacity, devotedness, patience, confidence, decision, humanity, temperance, modesty, justice, courage, firmness, and pure patriotism, for which we may seek in vain in the annals of our own or any other country."—*J. H. Stquer*.

"I am resolved to tell plainly and honestly what I think, quite regardless of the odium I may incur from those whose prejudices my candour and sincerity may offend. I am here to speak the truth, and not to flatter the prejudices and prepossessions of any one."—*Duke of Wellington*.

"If the world were governed by principles, nothing would be more easy than to conduct even the greatest affairs; but in all circumstances the duty of a wise man is to choose the lesser of any two difficulties which beset him."—*Duke of Wellington*.

"The man is gone, who seemed so great,—
Gone, but nothing can bereave him
Of the force he made his own
Being here, and we believe here
Something far advanced in state,
And that he wears a truer crown
Than any wreath man can weave him.
But speak no more of his renown,
Lay your earthly fancies down,
And in the vast cathedral leave him.
God accept him, Christ receive him."

Tennyson.

GREAT men are rare. Deputed, as it were, by the Omnipotent, to develop some new theory or principle, to achieve some mighty or stupendous project, or to be the deliverers of their country in the time of peril, they are, fortunately, ready when necessity calls for superhuman assistance. On the other hand, as if to diversify human nature,

and to exhibit a dissimilarity between them and those of common or mediocre grade, they are invariably endowed with some bright qualities, which tend in a great measure to elevate them above mankind generally. But the frequent observer cannot but be struck with this fact—that, in proportion as great men become pre-eminently distinguished by their moral excellencies and social status, they are certain to have enemies and despisers, whose dislike to them will exactly correspond with the favour and high position which such patriots may obtain. No sooner are such men as Wellington laid in the dust, than past offences, errors, and opinions are rooted up, commented upon, and exposed to the greatest indignities. The blighting effects of such a man's faults on his character are soon investigated and prominently set forth by his enemies, and whilst they are unsparingly exposed to the lash of condemnation and keen criticism, his better, brighter, and more pleasing traits of character—his virtues, his mental powers, and his noble achievements—are passed over unmentioned; and, instead of candidly acknowledging that these mitigate, or entirely expiate, his faults, they are stealthily, and apparently wickedly, concealed from view, as if to show posterity the more effectually what a hardened and morose villain such a man had been! These pseudo-biographers take good care that they will so transform the character of "good men and true" that

"The evil such men do" shall "live after them,"
and that any good they may have done

"Shall be interred with their bones."

But no; truth shall be *triumphant*, and give the lie to slander; for

"No falsehood can endure
Touch of celestial temper,
But return of force to its own likeness."

The fable of the "Old Man and his Ass" would not be an inappropriate illustration in the present case. The poor old Duke endeavoured to carry out practically and zealously the injunction of Nelson, "To do his duty;" but, in spite of all his efforts to accomplish all that could be and was expected of him, it appears he failed, for he has not succeeded in pleasing our fastidious friend, "Aristides." For my own part, I am glad that he was satisfied with the whispers of an approving conscience, endorsed with and by the approbation of his Queen, his country, and the major part of the states of Europe. To quote extracts illustrative of his character would exhaust the limits of this article: the testimony of those who knew him, and a few anecdotes, must supply the place which a good-sized volume would alone effectually succeed in recording—a record of his life.

We cannot attempt to give anything like a sketch of the Duke's character; but we must remark upon "Aristides," who turns from the "consideration" of it with regret. It would have been more reasonable, had he stated that he "turned from the consideration" of that avowal with regret. Many instances there are illustrative of the moral character of the Duke, and his kind regard both for relatives and strangers. On taking possession of Strathfieldsaye he made the remark (alluding to the barrenness and sterility of the soil), that "any person less wealthy than himself would have been ruined by it." Before the land could be rendered fertile we find that it entailed immense expense; and, referring to this fact, the Duke said, "that he did not consider himself entitled to lay by one shilling of the rental of Strathfieldsaye." "I am a rich man," said he; "my son is not so; therefore he shall receive his patrimony in the very best condition to which I can bring it." It is said of the estate, "that, go where you would; go far or near, you would nowhere see a body of tenantry better lodged, better furnished with offices, better supplied with all manner of conveniences for the prosecution of their calling, than those which call the Duke of Wellington their landlord."

His charity and benevolence, always unobtrusive, was most gratifying. One or two instances, selected from the many, will suffice. When, as Colonel Wellesley, he quitted

India, he adopted the son of the hostile brigand, Downdin Waugh, and left £700 for the boy's benefit.

There are numerous examples of his providing liberally for those who had suffered through misfortune, and of his placing them in a respectable position in society. One young married man, who had been unfortunate, applied to him for a situation as barrack-master in Canada. Being unable to provide his outfit, the Duke furnished it, provided him with other necessaries, paid his passage for him, as well as for his wife and family, and gave him a handsome sum of money. The young man died before his arrival at his destined place. His disconsolate widow returned home, sought an interview with the Duke, related her unhappy case, and withdrew. The Duke next day sent for her, established her in a respectable house and school, carefully attended to her wants, and recommended the school of the widow referred to.* His biographer says, "he loved to do good by stealth, and did not care to find it fame." His generosity caused him to be victimized occasionally by misrepresentation; *but he rather preferred being swindled to magnifying the importance of his bounty by too minute an inquiry into the justice of the application.* Nor was the Duke's charity confined to his "pecuniary largesse." He employed it in its largest and noblest sense—"to cover a multitude of sins." "He reproved gently and sorrowfully, endeavoured to find excuses for the erring, and never allowed himself to repeat the evil words which found currency at the expense of others. Look at his despatches and orders; the name of every man whom the Duke found occasion to praise is given at full length; the name of every object of reprehension is carefully concealed from public view. Was not this lofty, magnanimous, the highest effort of the noblest charity?"—"In the disposal of his patronage the Duke was just; and, more than this, recommended justice to others. There was scarcely an officer who served under him, and remained in the army long enough to be eligible for responsible command, who did not secure some token of the Duke's approbation. They were either appointed colonels

* The anecdote of the Duke and his valet's eldest son will not be forgotten.

of regiments, or commanders of districts, divisions, and branches of the army in India, or good service pensions were granted them. If officers and soldiers did well, who so ready to land them in the House of Lords as the Duke, making amends by the warmth of his commendations as a peer for the brevity of his approbation as a general in the field? If ill, or erring from misconception, who so prompt to vindicate them to their country?" Not only was he a munificent supporter of charities in and about London, but he frequently held some office in them. Debts were no sooner contracted than discharged. He was temperate, sober, regular in his habits, and punctual in the exercise of his religious duties. The frequent announcement in the *Court Circular* that "the Duke of Wellington attended *early* (seven o'clock) morning service in the Private or Royal Chapel, St. James's," will be familiar to my readers. He always evinced a laudable anxiety that the soldiery should have the assistance of chaplains of orthodox principles and exemplary conduct. To conclude this head, these instances will suffice to illustrate his moral, social, and domestic character; but, to understand him still further, recourse must be had to the numerous works which contain anecdotes illustrative of his everyday transactions, and which "Aristides" has so carefully avoided noticing. It is to be hoped, however, that the above will be sufficient to convince the reader of the falsehoods contained in the negative articles, of the true character of the source whence that information is derived, and of the *animus* which "Aristides" entertains in his own mind towards "the Duke." Before I dismiss the subject, let me give him a little advice, which will, probably, prove beneficial to him when he criticizes the characters of notable individuals in future, viz., to dismiss all prejudice and foretaken opinions from his mind; to read with impartiality *all* the evidence on the question; and, when summing up their characters, let him not, in the antipathy and disgust which he may justly entertain for their vices, forget to enumerate some of their virtues; for it is, fortunately, the common lot of humanity, that, whilst possessing a share of the reprehensible, they are also gifted with those parts of character which oftentimes more than counterbalance their evil dispositions and bad habits.

The political life and character of the Duke is certainly the most discouraging and lamentable part of it. Being from birth connected with the aristocracy, he held their prejudices and opinions with a tenacity which was only equalled by the zealous and persevering manner in which he carried them into effect. His determined and headstrong opposition to the three great measures of reform referred to by "Aristides," until impelled by necessity to assist in passing them, is a striking illustration of the school in which he received his political education. That he acted from disinterested and purely conscientious motives, however, admits of no doubt, despite the severity with which "Aristides" assails him. His opposition to the Roman Catholic emancipation bill was *not* on account of his religious belief, for bigotry formed no part of his character. His own words explain his views:—"He considered the question (he said) merely one of expediency, and he grounded his opposition to the measure *not on any doctrinal points*, but on the church government of the Roman Catholics. Nobody could have witnessed the transactions which had been going on in Ireland during the (then) last thirty-five years without being convinced that there was a combination between the laity and the clergy, which was daily gaining ground. . . . He *wished to see real distinct securities proposed* before he could consent to give any vote in favour of those claims," &c. &c. On the corn laws he said:—"They worked well, and he was convinced they could not be repealed without *injury to the country*." This shows that his opinions were regulated and modified by circumstances—to be easily *abandoned* if circumstances required a change in the law. It was not that he had no sympathy with the sufferings of the people that he opposed them, for he says:—"If he (Lord Stanhope) supposes that I do not feel for the distresses of the people, he is utterly mistaken, as I can sincerely avow that I have as strong sympathy on this subject as any noble member of this house." He did not, as many suppose, and as "Aristides" would probably have us to infer, oppose the emancipation bill from a hatred of the Romish creed, but from other and secondary causes. This remark applies also to the other great bills referred to. The Duke always entertained serious apprehensions that any altera-

tion in the laws would materially affect, and probably injure, the interests and prosperity of the kingdom at large; but when he saw that disastrous results were likely to follow unless certain remedial measures and alterations were proposed and carried into effect, he sacrificed his convictions, however dear, and, forgetting what might be a violation of his principles and feelings, cheerfully assisted in carrying out any measure calculated to promote the general welfare. He always acted as a disinterested party, and there is but one impression which is irresistibly conveyed to the mind of the reader of his life, viz., his earnest devotedness to his country—that he would sacrifice his life, and all that he possessed, if it would be successful in contributing to the public good; and the last prose extract which heads this paper explains in a great measure the policy which he ever pursued in his legislative capacity.

Here a charge of inconsistency is brought against him in the article of "Aristides." He says, "His (the Duke's) position had not been such as to develop those nobler traits (of statesmanship). He had imbibed the prejudices of his class; and, accustomed to command, when called to the legislature, he could not undo the habits of a life;" and then, after thus, as it were, making mention of an apologetic reason for the mal-legislation of the Duke, he places the most illiberal, selfish, and narrow-minded construction on all his acts. The falsity of this will be evident to those who give the Duke's life and speeches an impartial consideration. One of the most atrocious, and certainly the most untrue, accusations made by "Aristides" is, that he *legislated for self*. On the contrary, we find the Duke, both by speech and actions, declaring his love for his country, and his earnest wish to serve it by all the means in his power. The reply of Emilia to Iago, in Shakspeare's "Othello," would not be inapplicable to "Aristides" on this head. I by no means approve of the Duke's legislative acts; but I have shown, and would, if space permitted, show still further, that the Duke's single aim was the advancement of his country's good; and although in the opinion of myself, and probably of the great majority of the world, he adopted a most extraordinary course to achieve his object, yet that is no proof whatever that he

was not sincere when expressing his desire to serve his sovereign.

I might notice other strictures contained in "Aristides' papers, but space forbids. Posterity will, doubtless, confirm in a great measure the opinions entertained at the present day by the admirers of Wellington. That there will be any "reaction" in the laudations of the "departed Duke" is doubtful; nay, it is more probable that a "reaction" will take place in the opinions held by "Aristides" and his friends. A little more impartial and disinterested research may witness the conversion of that gentleman, hopeless as the case now appears.

The Duke's unwise proceedings against the press was somewhat justified. Stouquer says, "The information which it (the press) conveyed to the public during the Peninsular war, although of the deepest interest to the British community, was offensive to him, because the same information reached the enemy, whom it was of importance to keep in ignorance of the operations of the English army, and the disposition of the troops. Moreover, the press libelled him without mercy, giving publication to the grossest falsehoods, and assigning the worst motives to those acts which proved to be the result of the most consummate judgment, the most profound forethought, and the purest patriotism. But he took no steps to procure the punishment of the libellers." "Whether yielding to the advice of his colleagues, or acting on his own spontaneous will, the Duke caused Mr. Alexander, the editor of the *Morning Journal*, to be prosecuted for his libels, and the result was the punishment of that gentleman with fines and imprisonment." It can scarcely be urged that no steps should be taken for the suppression of such foul calumnies, although, perhaps, silent contempt would have been the best rebuff to such charges as the foregoing.

Whatever may be the blemishes on the character of the Duke of Wellington, they are of so trivial a nature that they will do little towards tarnishing that reputation which he so justly merited and obtained. Those who are conversant with his history cannot but admit that the lines addressed to Gonzalvo di Cordova, the Spanish prototype of Wellington, are equally applicable to our hero:—

"He died,

As he had lived, his country's boast and pride.
Warrior, who with patient toil,
Scant and exhausted legions taught to foil
Skill, valour, numbers. *One who never sought
A selfish glory from the fields he fought—
Lived, breathed, and felt but for his country's
weal,*
Her power to 'stablish, and her wounds to heal;
The dread of France when France was most the
dread."

"He undoubtedly had failings, in common with the rest of mankind; but they were almost lost to ordinary perception in the presence of the numerous virtues which adorned his existence, and which, more than his successes, raised him to the unexampled pre-eminence he enjoyed for nearly half a century."

In conclusion:—If there be any aspirants to fame amongst the readers of this magazine who are desirous to possess eccentric and limited notions and opinions of what should win our "admiration," and are also disposed to become possessed of that gauge by which "Aristides" measures and determines how far a man is right, and to what

extent he should go, in the routine of his daily transactions; if they are at all inclined to acquire a fastidious taste for appreciating character, I would respectfully refer them to "Aristides," as he will, doubtless, be fully competent to give them complete instructions. I will not, however, fail to warn them that, if they follow the advice of that gentleman, or mould their judgments in accordance with that which has dictated the two articles from his pen, they will be as sure to meet with disappointment, in proportion as it would be difficult to present a character which would win the "admiration" of all persons; for, although a man may do his utmost to discharge his duty, to himself, to his God, and to others, so he is as certain to have dissentients, who will condemn or find some fault with the course he has pursued.

The Duke of Wellington is one of that bright band of whom it may justly be said—

"Such souls are rare; and mighty patterns given
To earth; and meant for ornaments to heaven."

J. G. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

NOTHING is so common as for Englishmen to think well of the dead; none speak so loudly the praise of him who has passed to

"The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns,"

or so enthusiastically vindicate the character of the departed from slanderous aspersions. We rejoice in the name and national characteristics of Englishmen. We glory in the name of Wellington, and for his good works rejoice to give him the utmost praise which his most ardent admirers could desire; but we are fond of forming a rational and christian estimate of all things submitted to our judgment. Our view of the conduct of the late Duke in his public capacity is, that he acted well his part as a person sworn to a certain duty; but this is a different question to that now under discussion, therefore we beg to be exonerated from the charge of blaming the late Duke, as nothing is farther from our intention. We are particularly desirous to obtain a just estimate of his character, and to assist others in obtaining it.

What is character? When we speak of the solidity, immobility, and extension of a physical body, we understand by these terms

some necessary property of that body; but if colour, smoothness, and hardness be mentioned, we know that qualities of an accidental nature are implied. Just so in the moral and intellectual nature of man. Thought, will, desire, &c., are necessary conditions of his existence; they are properties of his nature; but whether these powers are good or bad, proper or improper, is of a contingent nature; hence we infer that the quality of a man's motives—the quality of those causes which determine his choice of the good or bad in the conduct of his life—is the only true index of his character; in other words, character is the moral quality of a person's conduct in relation to the motives from which that conduct springs.

We find in the *History* of the late Duke that he entered the military profession merely because it was, in the common parlance of fashionable life, an *honourable* profession; and, being of the youngest branch of an *honourable* house, this profession was an *honourable* means of obtaining the *honours* and good things of this life. No consideration of the propriety or impropriety of any duty imposed upon the soldier by his superior

is ever allowed to him; he is sworn to obey his superior in all things without hesitation; his moral action, in all its most important particulars, is bartered for an *honourable* profession, and he becomes a mere animal machine, for the purpose of performing the operation of phlebotomy upon patients nicknamed enemies, setting fire to gunpowder in a long iron tube, or stopping a flying bullet with his own head—a profoundly wise employment for a learned and intelligent man! Surely he who excels most in the army, that vast association of non-voluntary animal machines, must really be worthy of the admiration of all *Bedlam*! But seriously, my friend. As a soldier, the late Duke, on entering the military profession, resigned his power of moral choice in any of his professional conduct; the motives to action, the moving causes determining his conduct, were owned and exercised by another, to whom he had sworn military fealty, and to him rightly belongs the admiration or condemnation which necessarily arises from the character formed from those motives. Let us look a little into the signification of the term admiration. If any physical object is submitted to the human mind possessing a quality which is generally recognised as being uncommon—for instance, as being unusually great or small, strong or weak—it excites in us wonder or surprise; but if, in addition to this quality of newness or unusuality, it is good, it produces in us a combination of wonder and love, which we call admiration; hence intellectual and moral goodness, or their effects, are necessary additions to the quality of novelty, rightly to produce admiration in an intelligent moral being, such as man. Were intellectual and moral goodness and greatness in an extraordinary degree possessed by the late Duke? We say, No; and we fearlessly appeal to the flatteringly garbled history of his life and times in proof of our position.

History and the opinions of the panegyrists of the late Duke demonstrate with absolute certainty the fact, that his great first motive was duty to his king; this duty consisted in implicit obedience to his orders, and in the execution of these orders it was no consideration of his whether they were morally right or wrong, nor what might be the cost of property or life thereby: his duty was to obey.

But we have observed that the late Duke became a soldier because it was an honourable profession—that in doing so he bartered his moral freedom in all points affected by the duties of that profession; hence his chief motive, that of obtaining a fashionably respectable position in society, renders his character unworthy of our admiration; and his oath of military fidelity, as it takes away the power of choosing between obedience to orders, morally good or bad, makes his strict regard to military duty—the secondary motive of his life-action—a strong reason why we should not admire his character.

A kindred view may be taken of the character of the late Duke by rightly considering the position in which he was placed, the circumstances by which he was surrounded, and the object he sought to obtain. His position was peculiar to his time; he rose into life when full play might be given to the belligerent propensities of poor human nature. On entering the military service, by means of family and political influences he was elevated to various posts of command in the army. In such positions he had many opportunities of obtaining enlarged experience in military matters of every conceivable character. The numerous battles caused by the envious and unquiet dispositions of the various monarchies and powers of Europe had created a vast association of hardy veterans, practised in the dreadful work of rapine and bloodshedding. These men valued their own lives as little as those of their enemies; and, by the united effect of the cool determination of the English, the fiery ardour and impetuosity of the Irish, and the calculating precaution and hardy endurance of the Scotch, the late Duke had at all times under his command the means of executing the most hairbrained and extravagant schemes ever conceived with a certainty of success never before known; besides, to him the matter was of the greatest personal importance, because defeat rendered him liable to the worst humiliation—that of public trial, condemnation, degradation, and probable exile. Under these circumstances we are not surprised to see far greater numbers in the returns of the killed and wounded* than were suffered by our

* At the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, "the casualties on both sides were very great. The

enemies. While we achieved the victory by a human holocaust to the demon of war, they suffered the defeat with only a portion of our woe. We would say, give us defeat rather than victory, when the battle arises from such base and unworthy motives as individual honour, the upholding of a particular dynasty, and the suppression of popular advancement in the choice of governments.

Reference need not be made to the political character of the late Duke; this is patent to all, and respected only by a few mediæval personages, who boast of *the good old times*

allies lost 178 men killed, and 825 wounded." "In the horrible siege of Badajoz the losses on both sides were tremendous: the English and Portuguese had, of killed and wounded, 4,578, while the French casualties were about 1,200;" and, remark, this is our account of the matter; the French account would make it appear still worse for us. The same writer observes, "The gallantry of the victorious soldiers was outweighed, however, by the excesses committed by them on the two next days, which (to quote the words of Napier) were given up to the wild and desperate wickedness which tarnishes the lustre of the soldier's heroism. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty, and murder—shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and two nights in the streets of Badajoz." And who permitted this, do you ask? We answer, the general commanding, and whose character some would wish us to admire.—See "*Wellington, the Story of his Life*," &c., by A. B. Cooke.

of "merrie England." With such we have no sympathy. They look exclusively to the past as containing the *summum bonum* in social, political, and religious life. We delight to select the good of the past and the present, and with both form our future and the future of England. The maxims of those individuals to whom we have referred are—conserve, stand fast, be immovable, be narrow in intellect, stunted in morals, exclusive in religion; and of this class was the late Duke—an honourable specimen, truly, but a specimen none the less. Our hope, and the hope of the youth of England, is in *progress*; not anarchical turmoil and confusion—not the overturning of states and the uprooting of society; but a peaceable, intelligent, christian, and loving progress of men, of every name and of every clime: and while we, with Franklin, say, "God helps him who helps himself" in the work of civilization, we would lend the helping hand to all who are desirous to join under the banner inscribed—"Progress!—Onward!—Excelsior!"

In conclusion, we desire that the laurel wreath of *Fame*, and the praise of a rational and enlightened christian people, may be given, not to *the man who has slain his tens of thousands* and injured millions, but to the men who, like Birkbeck, Newton, and Milton, have sought to elevate their species, and fit them for pure enjoyment here and hereafter.

L'OUVRIER.

Politics.

OUGHT THE GRANT TO MAYNOOTH TO BE WITHDRAWN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

A CHURCH ESTABLISHMENT.—"The single end we ought to propose by it is the preservation and communication of religious knowledge. *Every other idea and every other end* that have been mixed with this—as, the making of the church an *engine*, or even an *ally* of the state; converting it into the means of strengthening or diffusing influence, or regarding it as a supporter of regal, in opposition to popular, forms of government—have served only to debase the institution, and to introduce into it numerous corruptions and abuses."—PALRY.

Of all the multitudinous topics and themes

of dispute upon which men are at logger-heads, I question whether one could be adduced, other than that now before me, in which I could so easily and consistently join the opposite side. What these are the reader will gather in due course; but of all the great questions which have of late agitated the political and religious world, there has been none so unfortunately productive of ill feeling, rancour, and animosity—so adverse to that social union which should unite all

as to the way in which it is to be settled, then we shall be in the prospect of a speedy and amicable settlement of the dispute with the cheerful consent of all parties, and we should have the gratification of congratulating each other on the absence of that ill feeling which is now so prevalent, and which is retarding the conclusion of the Maynooth controversy.

But how can it be otherwise? We are invariably impelled on this topic, connected as it is with religious matters, to look up to our brethren of the pulpit, and to ascertain from them how we should ourselves act. It is only natural that we should do so, and by their conduct shape our own course. We know that they are not immaculate, or less exposed than ourselves to inconstant feelings and turbulent passions; but we do expect that they should regulate their lives and sentiments by those laws which Christ laid down for our "rule and governance." Upon this principle we may remark on their conduct in reference to the matter before us. Deeply is it to be regretted that gentlemen, whose private characters for virtue, charity, &c., are unimpeachable, when speaking on the question of Maynooth, should exhibit all the animosity and prejudice with which Roman Catholics are so

unrelentingly every thing
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 step towards convincing hi
 different is the system now
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 on the grounds of the relig
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 nounce any further exten
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 Is this, then, the most suit
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 Does it not rather tend to
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 precisely the case with us
 that, when assailed in res
 ments which they may a
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 and cherished opinions in
 abuse lavished upon them

they would had no means been taken to procure its withdrawal; consequently, their opponents are frustrating the very object which they artlessly thought they were promoting.

But to examine the question from other points of view. There is either great blindness or inconsistency in those who advocate the withdrawal of the grant on religious grounds only. There are those who cannot adopt the *principle* of the *repeal* of all grants from motives of "expediency" or "convenience;" say who, "you must repeal a grant which is especially devoted to the maintenance and instruction of a body of young priests who are educated in a religion which is antagonistic to truth, justice, reason, to the Queen, to the Bible, and to our *glorious Protestant constitution*. They cannot be sincere Catholics without being enemies to our faith, to our laws, and to ourselves." But those gentlemen who argue in this manner cannot see that there is a principle involved in the whole question, or if they can won't say so, because it would not be "convenient." Like the Pharisees of old, they "strain at a gnat and swallow a camel." Sundry bishops and others, the clergy of the Established Church, know that their large stipends and dignities would be in danger of being revoked, and they being placed on smaller pay, with less power, more to do, and less to enjoy, if they sanctioned the principle that all religious denominations should depend upon their own flocks for their "supplies." This is no idle fancy or "phantom of the mind." A reference to the clerical list will show that there is a family connexion, or association, throughout the church, and that situations are not so much sought from motives of holy zeal and piety as from the expectation of receiving large incomes, and of enjoying a corresponding ratio of clerical power.

As I have heretofore stated, the question of the morality or immorality of the Romish religion is altogether foreign to the consideration of our topic. There is more or less error in all religions, and it is most ungenerous, and decidedly unfair, to clamour for the repeal on this ground only. The endowment of any particular religion by government almost amounts to a declaration that such religion is purer than the rest; and thus the unendowed, who have all an equal right to be similarly treated, are left

uncared for; hence enmity and religious asperity is provoked and engendered against their more fortunate, but not more deserving, neighbours. The fact is, that any religious body, when endowed by the state, is always certain to give dissatisfaction in some quarter, and this *difficulty cannot be obviated till all state aid is repealed*. The crusade against the Maynooth grant is, little as its opponents may suppose, involved in, and allied with, the momentous question of the separation of church and state; and the more this question is discussed will it be seen, that if the grant to Maynooth is to be withdrawn, that on the same grounds, and in order to obviate the complaints of the Roman Catholics, the Established Church must be placed on the same footing. It is of no avail to plead that it is a national church, and, consequently, must be supported by the nation at large; for, were this objection valid, the Roman Catholic religion ought to be supported in Ireland, with the same honours and dignities as those allowed to the Church of England here. If, therefore, Maynooth is not to receive her usual grant of money, whilst the Established Church is still in the receipt of her usual revenue, the question will again arise—How can you reasonably continue to endow the Church of England with funds to which all religious sects have contributed, and exclude other denominations from a participation in the same benefits, to which they have an equal and as just a claim? Until this question is satisfactorily explained, I, for one, would never be a party to the repeal of the grant.

Lest, however, any of my readers should suppose that I have any sympathy with the Romish system, I would assure them, on the contrary, that my detestation of it is extreme, and that there are no peaceable and legitimate means which I would not use in order to achieve its final extirpation.

I will, for the present, adjourn the consideration of this subject, reserving for a future occasion the further exposition of my sentiments, when I shall, in due course, bring other facts and arguments to bear upon it. There are several phases in which it can be very properly studied, but that of paramount importance is its relation to the endowment of the Church of England. There is not, and cannot be, any *separate* argument for the maintenance of either creeds by

which I do more towards the
separation of church and state than any
else.

To those who entertain any dread or
givings as to the safety of the Church
England, if separated from the state
account of the increasing assumptions
strength of the Church of Rome, I
whisper one word of encouragement. As
that subtle and stealthy foe there is a
though effectual and efficacious, re-
which all the efforts of the popedom c-
avert or neutralize, if energetically c-
out. Education is the antidote to, as
as the antagonist of, Popery. There
enemy which that church fears more,
which its coadjutors entertain a g-

AFFIRMATIVE

In my opening affirmative article I
shown that the grant to Maynooth oug-
be withdrawn, because it is contrary
nature of the christian religion, to r-
and to revelation. I now proceed to
from the nature of the institution itsel-
it is not rightly within the sphere of
legislature to make the grant. May-
is a religious institution, and that not
ordinary character: it is not design

from heaven? By what authority do our legislators presume to take the responsibility of providing the means of religious instruction of any kind or character? If they assume the power, I, as a Christian, certainly have the right to ask for their credentials; it is my duty to examine their pretensions to authenticity—to demand when, how, where, and to whom they were given, and by what means they came into their possession. Meanwhile the *onus probandi* is with them; but I deny their arrogant assumptions of power to interfere in religious matters. As, therefore, Maynooth College is a religious institution, in the strictest sense of the term, and as the legislature has power only in civil and criminal matters, the grant ought to be withdrawn, having been made without due authority.

It may be said that the constitution of this country provides for the establishment and maintenance of *a form* of religion; true, but the constitution is only a compact agreed upon by the contracting parties in the state, viz., king, lords, and people, specifying the form or order in which the affairs of the nation shall be conducted: and this, like all other human productions, may be a mixture of truth and error; therefore a law is not necessarily true and right because it is a part of the constitution. The question now under discussion is simply this—According to the principles of truth and justice, ought the grant to Maynooth to be withdrawn? I answer, Yes; for every Christian is required, by the nature of his holy religion, to affirm, at all risks, “I was not made to take law in spiritual things from any power less than *divine*—to think, or believe, or speak, or do, because bidden thereto by pastor, priest, or king. To *me* revelation addresses its solemn message, asks *my* judgment, claims *my* acquiescence. It is my prerogative to transact all business with heaven in my own person, and on my own account. To choose is mine, as mine will be the consequences of the choice.”* And if the grace of God is rightly received by a man, he will never think of asking for pecuniary assistance from his neighbour to propagate and perpetuate his religion in the world.

But, for the mere sake of argument, the

point may be conceded, that the provision for religious instruction by the state is expedient. This does not favour the negative of the question, for, as *Paley*, the champion of state churches and endowments, truly observes (p. 429 of his “Moral and Political Philosophy”), “A religious establishment is no part of Christianity; it is only the means of inculcating it.” At page 430 he says:—“The making of the church an engine or even an *ally* of the state; converting it into the means of strengthening or of diffusing influence; or regarding it as a support of regal, in opposition to popular, forms of government, have served only to debase the institution, and to introduce into it numerous corruptions and abuses.” Again he says:—“If the *provision* which the law assigns to the support of religion be *extended to various sects and denominations* of Christians, there exists no national religion or established church, according to the sense which these terms are usually made to convey.” If the state, therefore, is to support religion, and provide religious instruction for the people, it appears more reasonable that *that* religion should be uniform and according to the views entertained by the greatest portion of the people; under such an arrangement there could never be presented to the world such a striking anomaly in *Protestantism* as the *establishment* with miserable endowments—to the Presbyterians and Papists in England and Ireland—the Presbytery in Scotland—Romanism, Buddhism, and Hindooism in the colonies.

From the foregoing observations it is evident that in purely religious matters legislation is an evil; but when the religious professor, or any number of religious professors, commit any breach of public decency and order, they are brought within the prescribed limits of the civil law—that is, in the words of Blackstone, they are within “the rules of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in the state.” On these grounds I affirm the legislature ought to withdraw the grant from Maynooth. Far be it from me to lay it to the charge of the conscientious Roman Catholic, who in private life seeks practically to develop his soul-strivings after the good and the holy, all those base and iniquitous principles and practices taught in such seminaries as Maynooth, and so shamelessly gloried in by its pupils. I hope to meet in that bright world

* “Workings of Willinghood,” by E. Miall, p. 96.

above with many a redeemed soul who has for a long time sojourned here below, and held communion with the *Babylon* of scripture, having been kept by her under a strong delusion, yet not sufficiently strong to restrain their earnest yearnings after truth, or deprive them of the communion of grace.

The management of Maynooth, the instructions given, and the consequence of these instructions, are not matters proper for adjudication under the civil law. Permit me here to observe, that to withdraw the grant is to acknowledge the inability of the state to legislate on the subject, and cannot, by any amount of sophistry, be construed into *legislation* or to an infraction of the principle here laid down; it is simply undoing the wrong legislation of the past, and placing the matter in *status quo*.

It is of little consequence to the point at issue whether the management of Maynooth is entirely Papist or Protestant, or partly both: be that management what it may, it certainly is responsible for the selection of the order of study, the class books used, and of the masters employed to conduct the studies of the pupils. I made some remarks in the January *Controversialist* upon the moral quality of the instruction chosen by the managers of the college, to which I refer the reader, for the present giving "an extract from a letter found at page 44 of the report of 1827, addressed by the cardinal prefect of the college of the Propaganda at Rome, in 1796, to the Roman Catholic prelates who were trustees when the college was founded:"—"It is also our earnest desire that you will prove by your conduct the grateful sense you entertain for so signal a benefit (*viz.*, the grant). The inmates of the establishment should be sedulously admonished, by every suitable means, to be submissive to power and authority, so that no feelings of regret can ever be experienced for having conferred upon you such a benefit."* Such were the feelings with which the grant was first received by the Papists, and thus were they reasonably accepted by the Protestants as a pledge of the intention honourably to carry out the principles and practices of good citizens and loyal subjects, by inculcating the doctrines of honourable submission and due

respect to the constituted authorities and the established order of things in England and Ireland. Let us for one moment examine how this pledge was carried out. In 1792 the Roman Catholic prelates petitioned to this effect:—"With regard to the constitution of the church, we are, indeed, inviolably attached to our own: first, because we believe it to be true; and next, because, beyond belief, we know that its principles are calculated to make us, and have made us, good men and citizens. But as we find it answers to us, individually, all the ends of religion, we solemnly and conscientiously declare, *that we are satisfied with the present condition of our ecclesiastical policy*. With satisfaction we acquiesce in the establishment of the national church; we neither repine at its possessions nor envy its dignities; we are ready, upon this point, to give every assurance that is binding upon men."[†]

In 1808 the same assurances were repeated:—"Your petitioners most solemnly declare, that they do not seek or wish, in any way, to injure the Protestant religion as by law established."—"Have we not heard it stated in this house (the House of Commons), that nothing would satisfy the Roman Catholics of Ireland until the revenues of the church were taken from it, and distributed amongst the Roman Catholics?"[†] Mr. Gifford, in his *Life of Pitt*, states, not only that within three years of the establishment of Maynooth many of the students joined the rebellion, but that Dr. Hussey, the first president, published a pastoral letter, previous to the outbreak in 1798, charged with treason and rebellion, in consequence of which he was obliged to fly the kingdom, and is said to have died an exile. "I entertain no doubt," says a late writer, "that the disorders which originate in hatred of Protestantism have been increased by the Maynooth education of the Catholic priesthood. It is the Maynooth priest who is the agitating priest; and if the foreign educated priest chance to be a more liberal-minded man, less a zealot, less a hater of Protestantism, than is consistent with the present spirit of Catholicism in Ireland, straightway an assistant, red-hot from Maynooth, is appointed to the parish, and, in fact, the old priest is virtually dis-

* Speech of R. Spooner, Esq., in the House of Commons, May 11, 1862.

* Speech of R. Spooner, Esq., in the House of Commons, May 11, 1862.

† "Bulwark," p. 177.

placed."* The *Dublin Freeman's Journal* says:—"A national priesthood sprung from the people, and educated at home, could not remain passive in the struggle of their race for religious equality." Compare this with the following from "A Catholic Journal and Review," part xlv., September, 1851, which says:—"It is difficult to say in which of the two popular expressions—'the rights of civil liberty,' or 'the rights of religious liberty'—is embodied the greatest amount of nonsense and falsehood. . . . Let this pass, then, in the case of Protestants and politicians. But how can it be justified in the case of Catholics, who are the children of a church which has ever avowed the deepest hostility to the principles of religious liberty, and which never has given the shadow of a sanction to the theory that 'civil liberty,' as such, is necessarily a blessing at all? . . . Believe us not, Protestants of England and Ireland, for an instant, when you see us pouring forth our liberalisms. When you hear a Catholic orator at some public assemblage declaring solemnly that 'this is the most humiliating day in his life, when he is called upon to defend once more the glorious principles of religious freedom,' be not too simple in your credulity. These are brave words, but they mean nothing. He is not talking Catholicism, but nonsense and Protestantism. You ask, if he were lord in the land, and you in the minority, if not in numbers, yet in power, what would he do to you? If it would benefit the cause of Catholicism he would tolerate you; if expedient he would imprison you, banish you, fine you; possibly, he might even hang you. But, be assured of one thing: he would never tolerate you for the sake of the 'glorious principles of civil and religious liberty.'"† I have said the teachings of Maynooth are seditious, and given extracts from Bellarmine, as quoted by the editor of the "Butwark;" here is an illustration of the practical working of this instruction at Maynooth. The *Tablet*, some time ago, made the following statement:—"We respect the authority of the vicar of Christ infinitely more than we do any musty act of parliament. We consider our allegiance due to the *Roman throne* first of all, and second to that, and in an infinitely lower sense, to mere civil govern-

ments. We owe our loyalty to the holy Roman see; and perish the thrones of kings and queens of earth rather than that shall be in the slightest degree tarnished. As the spiritual power infinitely exceeds the temporal, so does our loyalty to the holy see that which we owe to the Queen." Reiffenstuel is a standard author at Maynooth, and is referred to both by tutors and pupils, in their studies, as an authority on the question of religious liberty and allegiance. Speaking of princes, he says (lib. v. tit. vii. p. 252):—"They are not to permit the exercise of their religion (that is, the religion of heretics); they are zealously to exterminate them to the uttermost of their power; they are to be sworn to do this. But if they shall be unwilling, let them be deprived of the honours they hold—be ineligible for other honours—be bound under excommunication, and their lands placed under an interdict of the church." And again:—"If, therefore, a temporal ruler, required and admonished by the church, shall have neglected to purge his territory of heretical filth, let him be bound by the chain of excommunication, by the metropolitan and other com-provincial bishops; and if he shall have refused to make satisfaction within a year, let this be signified to the Pope, that he may declare his vassals to be thenceforth absolved from their allegiance to him, and give up his territory to Catholics, who, without any contradiction, shall possess it, having exterminated the heretics from it."** I will conclude, for the present, by reiterating the language of the *British Banner*, in reference to Maynooth:—"What householder was ever so infatuated as to furnish duplicate keys to a burglar personally known, and avowedly intent on plundering his plate, jewels, and other valuables, and, it might be, taking his own life? Since the world began, what power was ever so insane as to subsidize an enemy, and thus furnish him with the means of its own defeat and humiliation? The religion of the Thugs is murder! Would any but a nation of Bedlamites not only tolerate the professors of that religion of blood, but actually supply, from the national treasury, the funds for supporting a manufactory of daggers? Such questions may

* Inglis's "Ireland," p. 341.

† Appendix to Speech of R. Spooner, Esq., May 11, 1852.

** Quoted in the speech of R. Spooner, Esq., in the House of Commons, May 11, 1852.

illustrations of the progress of the movement, is the fact that a mutual improvement society in a house of business is now a possible thing. It is a straw on the stream of time that indicates progress in the right direction. Our society, at Mr. George Hitchcock's, St. Paul's Churchyard, is an interesting specimen of this. It numbers upwards of a hundred members, and is in a very flourishing condition. The session extends over the last three months of one year and the first three months of the next. For two months our establishment is closed at six o'clock, and for four months at seven; so that we are privileged in regard to time for the purposes of mental discipline. Our leading operations (conducted every Friday) are, lectures, debates, and elocution classes; but we often vary these, principally to sustain the interest of the members, on which the success of such a society so much depends. Some of our most successful political debates have been conducted in the form of a senate. For the time being we resolve ourselves into representatives of constituencies, induct a ministry into office, organize an opposition, and, as far as possible, conform to the usages and customs of the House of Commons. At our last senate the opposition brought in a bill for the abolition of capital punishment, and the substitution of transportation, which was carried against the government by a majority of two. Another feature is the delivery of orations on such subjects as the Immortality of the Soul, Public Progress, and the Power of Public Opinion. Again, we have lately had a trial, by judge and jury, for a seditious libel in a newspaper, our object being to show the rights of a free press. The judge and

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be enslaved under the thralldom of *indolence*, but to make active and united efforts in pursuing the tortuous path of mental culture. What they could not do *individually*, they may effect *collectively*. A spur will be given to their intellectual faculties, and a laudable emulation will necessarily arise. Their strife will be all for a common object—their aim will be all for the common good. Advantages they had not even dreamed of may be derived; and, though difficulties may at first beset the way, and lowering clouds obscure the horizon, all will yet be made smooth and brilliant. Diligence and application must be their watchwords, and the motto to be emblazoned on their banners should be “Wise in planning—firm in carrying out.” A meeting was held on the evening of the 31st of January last, in the Masons’ Hall, for the purpose of organizing a society. Mr. Peter Paton was called to the chair, and explained the object of the meeting. Sixteen young men enrolled their names as members, and there is a good prospect of a considerable accession to that number. We were quite satisfied with so fair a start. Rules and regulations drawn up from the excellent *model* ones in the *British Controversialist* of February, 1851, were then read to the members, and, with a few slight

variations, approved of and adopted. The order of reading the essays (which are to embrace scientific and literary papers and historical and biographical sketches) was then laid down in terms of the rules, and lectures and social meetings also provided for. Each alternate evening is to be devoted to debates on interesting subjects; and, if time allows, recitations and readings from good English authors will be given each evening after the essays and debates. The following members were elected office-bearers:—Peter Paton, president; Robert Mailler, secretary; and John Thomson, treasurer. These, along with Messrs. John McGrouther, Peter Faichney, James Henderson, and Andrew Oswald, to be a committee of management; three to form a quorum. The ordinary meetings are to be held weekly, on Monday evenings. The success of the society depends altogether on good management, diligence, and perseverance on the part of the members, and punctual attendance. It is laid on a good solid basis; and if the members perform the requirements of duty, it cannot fail to enlist popular favour, and will undoubtedly prove of incalculable benefit to our rising youth. We hope to be able ere long to report favourably of its progress.—R. M.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

149. Would your clever correspondent, C. W., Jun., be kind enough, through the medium of the magazine, to refer me to a more extended list of books in law, science, philosophy, and general literature, than is contained in the last number of the magazine, as the works mentioned there are more applicable to a theological than a law student?—A LAW STUDENT.

150. Would any of your friends be kind enough to explain to me fully the science and practice of foreign exchanges, and the various influences which generally cause the exchanges to rule high and low between different countries? I recollect noticing a series of articles on exchanges in the *Economist*, about the year 1847. Could you inform me whether those articles were reprinted in a separate form? If so, please state price. I have no doubt, Mr. Editor, you will say, why did you not embrace the opportunity of noticing those articles for your permanent advantage? My plea is, that I was in my minor years.—W. U.

151. Would any of your correspondents be kind enough to suggest to me any books which contain information on the origin, progress, and history in general of Sunday schools, both at home and abroad?—J. F.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

103. *Monmouthshire not in Wales*.—B. W. P. regrets that “Hynafleithydd” should have reason

to complain of inaccuracies in that portion of his letter which was forwarded by B. W. P. to the *Controversialist*. He begs to assure “Hynafleithydd” that he was not cognizant of errors at all, it being the subject merely, and not verbal accuracy or inaccuracy, which attracted his notice, and induced the republication. The corrections made by “Hynafleithydd” in a following number of the newspaper he was not aware of. So far, however, from being “grieved,” as “Hynafleithydd” supposes, B. W. P. has great pleasure in expressing how gratified he felt on seeing the subject thus dealt with by different parties, enabling those to form a judgment upon it who, like himself, have few opportunities for research. B. W. P. may add, that the notion which gave rise to this correspondence was one which he had frequently encountered, but of which, till the appearance of these letters, the only solution he had received was from a learned editor (not the editor of the *Controversialist*), who so far enlightened his inquirer as to hint that “the schoolmaster must have been sadly abroad during his attendance at school”—an answer which was, of course, highly satisfactory!

138. *The Cause of Mist and Fog*.—Mist and fog I take to express two different degrees of the same natural phenomenon, a mist being a slight fog. The cause of mist or fog is evaporation, or the imperceptible formation of vapour, which takes place at almost all temperatures short of freezing. When the air is dry, this evaporation is absorbed as it rises; when the air is already moist, and there is no wind to carry these evaporative products away, they rapidly accumulate, so as to become visible, and are then termed mist or fog.

140 *Logically Ten and Twelve* a 10
 Your correspondent, "Hume," might have in-
 vented a case attended with fewer objections than
 the one given in your January number, and
 involving the same difficulty. For example, let
 us suppose that on perfectly level and smooth
 ice two perfectly round and smooth balls (A and
 B) are set in motion in the same direction, in the
 same straight line, and at the same instant of time,
 the one (B), 100 yards precisely before the other
 (A); let us suppose also that both move *uniformly*,
 and the ball A ten times as fast as the ball B.
 Does not the following statement appear true?
 When B has rolled ten yards, A will have rolled
 100; when B has rolled eleven yards, A will have
 rolled 110. While A is passing through the next
 one yard, B (by supposition) will have passed
 through another *tenth* of a yard. While A passes
 through this *tenth*, B will have advanced another
hundredth, and so on *ad infinitum*. Consequently
 A can never overtake B. Where is the fallacy of
 this? In answering this question, we may leave
 out of consideration the effects of *friction*, and of
 the *resistance of the air*, and also the possibility
 that the two balls could not both be set in motion
 so as to go on uniformly in a straight line. These
 things doubtless might practically render an ex-
 periment nugatory; but there is an *assumption*
 in the case supposed, the distinct apprehension
 of which may relieve some practical men. It is
assumed that the balls are mathematical *points*,
 having position, but not magnitude. Give them
 both a diameter of an inch, or any appreciable
 smaller magnitude, and collision becomes in-
 evitable. Let each thinker trace for himself the
 error of assuming a sensible magnitude

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reduced to the form of a syllogism. A is B, B is C, therefore A is C; and it adds other rules to ensure the accuracy of the syllogism. The reasoning in question cannot be put in syllogistic form, and hence at the very outset logic disowns and condemns it. The nearest approach to the syllogistic form of which the pseudo-argument is capable runs thus:—At a certain time (viz., five minutes past 1) the hour hand is $\frac{1}{2}$ of five minutes in advance. At a certain other time, (viz., $\frac{1}{2}$ of five minutes later) the hour hand is $\frac{1}{2}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$ of five minutes in advance, &c., whence "Homo's" friend concludes therefore at *all possible times* the hour hand is *something* in advance! Put into symbols, it reads thus: A is B, C is $\frac{1}{2}$ B, &c., therefore Y is Z. Logic triumphantly shows the folly of such sophistication.—B. S.

142. *How to obtain Ease and Power in Debate.*—Our friend "Timon" is in a dilemma common to most rising intellects, and often to minds of maturity. In order to give a satisfactory answer to his inquiry we must first remind him, that to conduct successfully a debate, and to deliver "prepared speeches," are two vastly different mental exercises. The speeches may as much lack the logical continuity as the social debates. The want is a radical one. It originates in a defective mental tuition. Debating and speechifying, if we may use such terms, are distinct things, and are generally the results of widely different mental habitudes. Generally, though not necessarily, in a speech we look for a good style, beautiful diction, sublime thought, energy, and pathos. A debate may lack all these, and yet be intrinsically excellent, *i. e.*, if it have logical continuity sustaining the harmony of the parts. In order to render prominent our meaning, we say that to the mind belong two distinct powers, which we shall here denominate the analytical and synthetical powers. The cultivation, and consequently the exercise, of the latter is the most natural, pleasing, and easy to the mind. "A little knowledge" is often enough to call it into exercise, and produce apparently great results. This is not the case with the former. The tuition and exercise of the analytical faculty is more difficult and nobler; it yields less fruit, but it has in quality what it lacks in quantity. If we look into the literature of the present time, we shall see a striking illustration of what we have stated. We see the workings of the synthetical faculty in the innumerable works of fiction constantly in the market, in which, taken as a whole, there is less intellectual power displayed than in any other branch of our literature. On the other hand, we see the working of the analytical faculty in a few "reviews," in which the display of intellectual power is colossal and immense. It is a statement which will bear investigation, that the intellect of the present century has made criticism the arena on which it has displayed its sublime might. Destroy the "reviews" of the past, and what is then left of the grand productions of such intellects as Foster, Hall, Jeffrey, Macaulay, and many others? They have given to the world their criticisms as the imperishable tablets of their immortality. We have illustrated our position. In debates there must be the exercise of this analytical faculty to ensure success; if it is wanting, "the subject-matter" may well appear confused and "enveloped in mystery." Without it there can be no intellectual power in debate,

any more than there can be logic without argument. We can easily read "Timon's" part-intellectual life in this inquiry. He has been cultivating the synthetical faculty with care and delight; and doubtless, were he to collect all his productions, he would be amazed at the quantity, considering the time and talent expended. But whatever be the number of articles, essays, volumes, &c., there is, we presume, little logical continuity, and perhaps not one sparkling scrap of pure criticism in the whole. Fiction, idealism, poetic flights, brilliant, laconic, but unconnected sentences, may, we doubt not, be found. These will not survive the storm of a debate, but rather confuse the mind and paralyze its powers *pro tempore*. Fast, logic, argumentation, continuity, can only attain the laurel in a great philosophic debate. What, then, is the conclusion, or what definite advice do we present to "Timon?" It is this:—Cultivate now, with great care and industry, the analytical faculty. Revert the order of your intellectual action. Exchange fiction for fact, and idealism for logic. You have long been learning to build, now learn to unbuild. You have raised the edifice, now take it down, and examine every stone with the care of an alchemist and the research of a modern chemist. Master the first six books of Euclid; fathom Locke; understand Bacon; and digest carefully Whately on logic. Become conversant with the simple principles of inductive philosophy; "remember Bacon, and abjure despair." When you have done this, then may you come forth into the arena of debate, terrible and mighty as a young lion from his lair. In conclusion, remember that your knowledge of the subject for debate must be as extensive and profound as your logical power is great in order to ensure success. You must not only be a great thinker, but a great and careful reader. In one of our leading reviews we find these words:—"No man can be a great thinker in our days upon large and elaborate questions without being also a great student. To think profoundly it is indispensable that a man should have read down to his own starting point, and have read as a collating student to the particular stage at which he himself takes up the subject." This change in study and mental action, combined with profundity of thought and knowledge, is, we think, the only remedy for the case before us.—ROLLA.

144. *Why Lord Palmerston does not sit in the House of Lords.*—By article 4 of the act of union with Ireland (39 and 40 George III., cap. 67), twenty-eight lords temporal elected *for life* are to represent the peers of Ireland in the House of Lords; and any peer not elected may, if he think fit, sit in the House of Commons. So by article 22 of the act of union with Scotland, sixteen lords temporal elected *for each parliament* are to represent the peers of Scotland. No *legal* English title is unrepresented in the House of Lords. Such titles as Lord John Russell, Viscount Maidstone, Marquis of Stafford, *et cetera*, are only titles *by courtesy*.—LEX.

145. *A good Law Book.*—An "Inquirer" will find Stephen's "Commentaries" to meet his wants. It is "partly founded on Blackstone," and is what Blackstone would have written had he now been alive; it is in its third edition (Butterworth, Fleet-street, 4 volumes, large 8vo). The whole system of English law is embraced and

treated clearly and comprehensively, though of course not minutely.—LEX.

The book that will fully answer "Inquirer's" purpose is a late edition of Blackstone's "Commentaries," in four goodly-sized volumes. These will require a six months' close reading, and then he will have but a very general and vague idea of what the law really is. I should be sorry to recommend him to buy the work *now*, or to commence reading it (except the first volume, which treats of the constitution), as owing to the very unsettled state of law matters, and the great and continuous changes going on, what is law now may not be law three months hence, and even then it may be again altered in a few months more. The printers of law works have been unable to keep up with the law reformers; and lawyers are now actually without any standard authority as to the *present* state of the law. Serjeant Warren published a few years since an abridgment of Blackstone for the use of schools (price 7s. 6d.), but I fear it would prove too elementary a work to be relied on; besides, many of its doctrines are now obsolete, and I have not heard of any new edition coming out. Let me take this opportunity of assuring "Inquirer" that there is no "royal road" to the study of the law; and that unless it be studied as a whole, time will only be thrown away in studying it at all.—J. L.

147. *How to Harmonize Colours.*—R. B. wishes to know how to harmonize colours, and the influence of colour upon colour produced by proximity. To harmonize colours is to use them in combination, in such proportions that, when seen at a distance, one neutralized bloom is produced; that is to say, that one colour shall not overpower another by being used in too great a proportion. No combination of colours can be perfect without the three primaries being present, and for them to harmonize well together, should be used in the proportions of three of yellow, five of red, and eight of blue; this is according to the experiments of scientific men, it having been proved that a prismatic ray of white light is composed of yellow, red,

and blue, in the above proportions. It is evident that the nearer we approach to this state of neutrality, the more harmonious will colouring become. From the three primaries—blue, red, and yellow—the three secondaries are produced, viz., purple, orange, and green, and these are the complementary colours to the primaries, in this way, that two of the primaries being combined in equal proportions to produce one secondary, the colour so produced is the complementary one to the remaining primary. Thus blue and yellow make green, which is the complementary of red; blue and red make purple, the complement of yellow; and red and yellow make orange, the complement of blue. The influence of colour upon colour is this, that when two tints of the same colour are placed in juxtaposition, the light colour will become lighter, and the dark colour darker; but when two different colours are used in proximity, the effect produced is double—first, as to their tone, the light colour appearing lighter, and the dark colour darker; secondly, as to their hue, each will become tinged with the complementary colour of the *other*. Thus, place pale red in close proximity with dark blue, and we shall see the pale red become paler, and at the same time be tinged with orange; and the dark blue will become darker, and be tinged slightly with green. There are only two perfect neutrals—white and black; one the extreme expansion of light and brilliancy into colourless light; the other the concentration of density into colourless darkness; their effects is to harmonize: thus, when only two colours are to be used in ornamentation, as red and green, by the interposition of white, an harmonious effect is produced. Black gives effect and preserves the integrity of colours: thus, ornaments of a *dark* colour upon a light ground should be outlined with black; and also gold ornaments upon any coloured ground. See also the lecture of Owen Jones, Esq., on Colours, delivered at the Society of Arts, which I should recommend R. B. to purchase, published by Bogue, Fleet-street, price 6d.; also Hayter's "Treatise upon Colours," price 2s. 6d. G. H.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. III., Vol. III. p. 158.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Art of Reasoning, No. III. Does man only receive knowledge? What are we able to do, in consequence of being endowed with lingual powers? What has been done by language? What are words? What are names? Of what advantage is the power of imposing names on our ideas? Do we name objects? Of what does all our knowledge consist? Define generalization, and explain its office. Give examples of generalization. Define the several species of names. Classify the objects able to be named.

What are the predicables? What rule ought we to observe regarding words?

Provection.—Exercise, No. III. Vol. II.

Senior.—What are the mental operations implied in ideation? (Ideation is a word invented by James Mill, Esq., and employed by him in his "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," 1829—which see. It is used here to signify the whole of the operations necessary to the formation of ideas.) See Destutt de Tracy's "Elémens d'Idéologie," Laromiguière's "Leçons de Philosophie," Cousin's "Histoire de la Philosophie," sect. xvii.—xxiii.; Hickok's "Rational Psychology;" MacVicar's "Human Nature," ch. ix.; Berkeley's "Principles of Human Knowledge;" Locke, Hume, Reid, Stewart, Brown; Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Discussions on Philosophy," and Notes on "Reid."

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XVI.—LITERARY ÆSTHETICS.

ÆSTHETICS is the term now generally employed to designate the philosophy of the Fine Arts; in other words, it is the technical name of the Science of Taste. The speculations in which it engages are of vast importance, inasmuch as a great proportion of the pleasure of human life results from the perception of the Beautiful, the Grand, and the Sublime, of the nature and objects of which perceptions this science takes especial cognizance. As every art depends on some theory, and is benefited or injured as the theory on which it reposes is correct or incorrect, it is evident that the accuracy or inaccuracy of the principles laid down as regulative of the Fine Arts must materially influence the gratification derivable from the products of these arts. Now, as Literature is that department of the Fine Arts most accessible to the public, and most extensively in demand amongst the people, any defects in the Theory of Literary Art must affect the executive skill of the labourers in that department, and may lead to the depravation of the taste, not only of that, but also of the succeeding age, we think it of some consequence to prelect at considerable length on Literary Æsthetics, i. e., on the Science of Taste, so far as that science concerns itself with Literature.

Two benefits will obviously result from the consideration of this topic, if prosecuted in a right spirit and to a practical end, viz.—1st. The work of criticism will become possible, easy, and definite. 2nd. Literary aspirants will be made aware of what qualities are requisite to commend their writings, as works of art, to persons of refined, delicate, and correct taste.

Many men content themselves with the belief that Taste is self-regulative, and unamenable to law—the result of “an intuition which cannot be analyzed”—

“A happy genial influence,
Coming one knows not how or whence.”

Indeed, this has more than once been articulately set forth, and nowhere more forcibly than in the works of Nature's genuine bard-nursling, Clare, who says—

“Taste is from heaven,—
An inspiration Nature can't bestow;
Though Nature's beauties, where a taste is given,
Warm the ideas of the soul to flow
With that intense enthusiastic glow
That throbs the bosom when the curious eye
Glances on beauteous things that give delight,
Objects of earth, or air, or sea, or sky,
That bring the very senses, in the sight,
To relish what we see; but all is night

To the dull clown ; Nature's unfolded book,
 As on he blunders, never strikes his eye ;
 Pages of landscape, tree, and flower, and brook,
 Like bare blank leaves, he turns unheeded by."

To this decision, however, many have refused their assent. They maintain that in the human mind nought is lawless, nought instinctive—that the Reason is the lawgiver of thought, the autocrat of the mental powers, and hence that all the processes of thought are logical—that our perceptions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, are processes of "calculation"—that

" All that is greatest, noblest, purest, best ;
 All that in man ranks higher than the brute ;
 All his fine passions—Love, Ambition, Fame,
 And *Beauty* and Religion—all are wove
 By subtle powers of thought from the same thread."

There are those who think that Taste is an original mental capacity, which enables man

" To feel
 The great and lovely, and the poetry
 And sacredness of things ;"

while others regard it as a derivative power, dependent for its existence upon the exercise of the feelings—that mental suggestiveness is the power that sheds a

" Dawn of beauty on the world ;
 Brightens the sky with benison to man—
 Tempers the wind with charitable thought—
 Yea, in the cloudy chariot of the storm
 Sees a sweet shape close folded in soft plumes,
 That prompts its thundering speed." *

We believe that neither of these theories is absolutely correct, but that in their synthesis the most accurate solution of the question may be found. Not by instinctive spontaneity alone, nor by relative suggestiveness alone, but by the united activity of both, as it appears to us, is this important problem solved. Taste is the *tertium quid* which results from their conjoint exercise. If Taste be wholly instinctive, it will be incapable of receiving education or practical training—will be, in fact, destitute of improveability ; if it be wholly the result of the laws of association, then it is capable of being educed and cultivated in all, in any direction—it is the mere creation of circumstances, as variable and changing as they—*taste* and *fashion* become convertible terms. Wrought out into its consequences, each theory seems indefensible. Is there any possibility of finding a third path ? We believe there is ; and shall endeavour, as briefly as possible, to present the outlines of

* Those who wish to prosecute the study of the different Theories of Taste may consult, most advantageously, the debate on the question, " Is Beauty a Quality inherent in Objects ? " in Vol. I, as well as an answer to a query regarding " The Theories of Beauty " contained in page 437 of Vol. II. These previous expositions of " the philosophy of the beautiful " necessarily and agreeably relieve us from fully traversing the field of exploration, and warn us, too, that our purely philosophic treatment of the topic is not likely to meet with much favour from those who have read with interest those prior prelections. Ours, however, is a different purpose, and merits a different judgment. We wish to review the topic in its relations as a *part* of a great whole, and must carefully guard against being led to give an undue prominence to any peculiar branch of " The Science of Thought-Expression."

a Theory of Taste, which appears to us unobnoxious to those objections which may be so strongly urged against the prevalent ideas entertained on this topic.

"The term Taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate; the thing which we understand by it is far from being a simple and determinate idea in the minds of most men, and it is, therefore, liable to uncertainty and confusion. . . . I mean by the word Taste, no more than that faculty, or those faculties, of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgment of, the works of imagination and the elegant arts. . . . And my point, in this inquiry, is to find whether there are any principles on which the imagination is affected so common to all, so grounded and certain, as to supply the means of reasoning satisfactorily about them. Such principles of Taste I fancy there are; however paradoxical it may seem to those who, on a superficial view, imagine that there is so great a diversity of tastes, both in kind and degree, that nothing can be more indeterminate."*

The foregoing quotation states the general question so clearly, and asserts so unequivocally the opinion that there are certain fixed laws of Taste, that we have no hesitation in adopting it, so far as it goes, as the expression of our own opinion. We purpose, however, to proceed to the substantiation of the propositions contained therein after our own manner, and most respectfully solicit the attention of our readers while we attempt to steady before their eyes, for investigation, that strange "something which floats between reality and fancy" to which the designation "Taste" has been given.

"If we are at all divinely souled," we must frequently have felt the joy arising from *Idealization*; and, if we minutely probe our consciousness, we may discover in it the mode in which that joy originates. Self-analysis is the *experimentum crucis* of every theory regarding the human mind and its operations; and if the theory be accurate, we shall find evidences of it running "through all the subtile texture of our souls." In *that* we shall either find "confirmations strong as proofs from holy writ," or evidence sufficient to show wherein lies the inaccuracy. To *such* deliberate tentation we ought to submit every new solution of the problems of mental science. We ought not to be so wedded to Theory as to prize it above Truth. If the solution be written in the author's soul, it should be in ours also; to *that*, therefore, we should refer as the test of every new opinion propounded. Such an intellectual assaying we hope you shall award to the following attempt to expound "the philosophy of Taste."

External objects are capable of producing various changes in us. The sensations which result from them originate conceptions. These are the *ideals* of external things. These ideal representatives are destitute alike of the defects which appear in external objects as well as of the particularization which they convey. Objectivities commend themselves to our mind in such a way that we irresistibly store up their representatives in our memories. They become associated into classes or groups possessed of similar or analogous qualities; that is, qualities capable of producing within us similar or analogous impressions. Like assimilates to like in the mental as in the material universe. Hence one of the grand laws of suggestiveness, or associative thought. Series of ideas become co-linked in the mentality in consequence of their resemblances to each other, either in

* Burke "On the Sublime and Beautiful"—Introductory discourse, pp. 6—7.

their power to impress the perceptivity in a similar manner, or in their capacity of causing pleasure or imparting joy. There are, hence, two phases of associative thought, viz.—1st. The Intellectual, in which ideas are connected together according to the approximation to sameness of the impressions they are capable of making, i. e., in consequence of being resemblant phenomena. 2nd. The Emotional, in which ideas are colligated according to their power of exciting within us similar or analogous emotions, i. e., in consequence of being emotion-consilient phenomena. This duplex colligativeness to which phenomena may be subjected we regard as an important fact given in the analysis of consciousness which bears most directly on the settlement of this much-debated question, inasmuch as it enables us to synthetize the two prevalent theories of Taste into *one*. We shall no longer require to maintain the inherency of taste-exciting qualities in external objectivities, or assert that the subjective emotions are subsequent, not simultaneous, results. We shall no longer be compelled to homologate the whole of the associative theory which the process in its entirety is considered as subjective. We shall perceive that the impression made on the perceptive faculties, and the pleasurable feeling educed in the emotional department of our nature are co-ordinate, not subordinate—that the intellectual and emotional are conjointly and contemporaneously excited—that the theories are not rivals, but are merely complements of one great whole, and that

“Through all the unbounded symmetry of things”

mental and moral pleasures are closely united. How truly speaketh the poet:—

“Oh, what a glory doth this world put on
For him who with a fervent heart goes forth
Under the bright and glorious sky, and looks
On duties well performed and days well spent.”

Taste, then, we would define as that state of mind in which the intellectual and emotional powers are most readily susceptible of being conjointly and simultaneously excited, by the same or similar objects.

This definition, we believe, would yield a philosophic reason for the diversities of taste existing among mankind, at the same time that it would impart unity to thought, and afford a test for judging of the merits of works of art, whether pictorial or literary.

Regarding the diversities of Taste, it would enable us to say that, as the intellectual and emotional susceptibilities and culture of each man differed from those of his neighbour, we could not but expect that minor diversities of taste should exist;—that, so far as men were similarly endowed and cultured, similarity of tastes would prevail;—that, as the majority of men are in the possession of all the great essentials of mental and moral capacity, we should expect, in all the great essentials of taste, a similar coincidence;—that, as national culture and habits of thought differ, we should expect to find national as well as individual diversities of taste;—and that, as there were different modes of artificial life to which men tacitly agreed, there should be found an artificial taste, i. e., fashion or mode. Now all these things we do find—things which lay as stumbling-blocks in the way of the reception of previous theories, but which explicitly prove the truth of *this*—prove *distinctly* that Intelligence and Emotion simultaneously excited are the two principles on which Taste depends; and that as either of these, whether intentionally or accidentally, differs in proportional power, so shall the accuracy or inaccuracy of our Taste be.

Regarding the standard of Taste, it would furnish us with the following law, viz.—that whatsoever by the majority of men of the highest intellectual and moral capacity and culture has been or is regarded as possessed of the power of exciting the emotions of Taste should be considered as the model or standard of Taste. It would likewise show that the tastes of an age change with the intellectual and moral habits in which they originate; but that throughout all ages there has been an unanimous verdict given regarding all enduring works of art, which proves that the general standard is never radically revolutionized. Indeed, it guarantees that this can never be, unless the human mind itself previously undergoes a process of change *fonte et origine*.

There is yet another important deduction which may be made from this theory, viz.—that Taste is improveable. It not only enables to do this—it does more; it informs us that the means which may be successfully adopted for its improvement are—

1st. The study of the classical works of taste of all ages and countries, so far as opportunity shall admit.

2nd. Keeping the intellectual and moral nature as pure as possible, i. e., retaining them in their highest possible state of efficiency.

3rd. The employment of such departmental study as shall improve that portion of our Taste which is defective. If the imagination is unduly active and extravagant, a logical culture will restrain and correct it; while, if the imagination is weak and inert, the study of the great imaginative minds should be perseveringly pursued. Culture will improve either if duly engaged in; though it must be remembered that no amount of culture can possibly produce first-class crops in a naturally barren soil.

Having, in the foregoing paragraphs, presented the reader with a key to the solution of several of the *questiones vexatæ* regarding Taste, we shall, in the subsequent portion of this paper, endeavour to explain the qualities of Taste which it is most requisite literary aspirants should possess.

Correctness and Delicacy are the chief characteristics of a really good Taste—a Taste, that is, which results from a highly developed intellectual and moral nature. Correctness of Taste proceeds from the exercise of a keenly-critical judgment, accustomed to regard the impressions made upon the mind with watchfulness and careful scrutiny. Here the intellect is active, ready to detect the slightest incongruity or want of harmony. Clear-sighted and capable of exerting minute inspection, it perceives even in trifles the origin of dissonance and disagreement. A lively consciousness, readily receptive of impressions and acutely self-analytical, can seldom, if ever, be incorrect in the formation of judgments of Taste. It needs not that the mind be knowingly sensible of this prompt habit of exerting its critical sagacity. The very rapidity induced by frequency prevents the likelihood of the *modus operandi* of thought so occupying his attention. But that the intellect necessarily performs a part of the process of Taste-excitement must appear peculiarly evident, when we recollect that the logical faculties chiefly concern themselves with the ideas implied in agreement and dissimilarity; and hence that, wherever the notion of congruity or incongruity can arise, judgment must be operative. Nor is this fact one of minor importance, for it shows that correctness of logical training is essential to the possession of a correct Taste, and may be rendered subservient to its education. When the Imagination is apt to run riot, and to throw out similes, metaphors, and hyperboles, as plenteously as shells are

heaved upon the ocean's shore, some discipline is certainly advisable. An unfitting ornament of style cannot gratify a Taste which has been logically trained,

"Though it were writ
With honey-dew, upon a leaf
With quill of nightingale."

Logical training bestows upon the intellect a clear and penetrating vision. The intellect so cultured cannot rest satisfied with obscurity, but must have everything presented in distinct and perceptible outline. A chaos of ideas and feelings will not fascinate or enrapture the soul which has undergone such discipline. Order, transparency, and definiteness, must succeed confusion, opacity, and vagueness. "A man of correct Taste is one who is never imposed upon by counterfeit beauties; who carries always in his mind that standard of good sense which he employs in judging of everything."* To compare the real with the counterfeit, and discriminate between them, demands, as we have said, a process of reasoning. Correctness depends on the intellect, not on the emotions. When, therefore, we wish to cultivate correctness of Taste, we must train the perceptive and reasoning powers rather than the emotions.

Delicacy of Taste is an emotional susceptibility rather than a process of the reason—depends more upon the liveliness, acuteness, and nicety of the emotional powers, than the logicity of the mental operations. Refinement and social progress aid greatly in the diffusion of delicacy of Taste, because they produce activity in and exercise for the emotional sensibilities of man. It delights not in

"A dim and dreamy imagery,
Shapen, half-shapen, mis-shapen, and unshapen,"

but requires chasteness and simplicity in every utterance of thought.

Grace, loveliness, harmony, and relevancy, may be discerned by the sensitive and intellectual faculties; but the degrees in which these should be proportioned to gratify the emotive powers demands this delicate act of Taste of which we speak. Purity of moral feeling, keen emotional sensibility, habitual self-constraint, living within "the golden mean," are most likely to bestow this delicacy; but even in the display of fiercest passions there is an artistic ideality—a refinement and elegance—a classical grace and unaffectedness which discriminates the nicely-minute shades of thoughts or the expressions in which they are couched. The *το καλον* can never be expressed in words, because it is felt by few, and words are made for and by the multitude; at least they take their patent from them. It is that exquisite delight which we experience in looking upon a work of art in which the sensuous awakens the emotions, and both in fine harmony of action gaze and gaze almost to fascination—while a quiet though deep-felt current of feeling flows through the mind, and we realize and acknowledge the truth of the poet's assertion—

"A thing of beauty is a joy for ever;
Its loveliness increases; it will never
Pass into nothingness;"

it is that feeling which we experience when we read a book in which intellect and emotion are equally excited,

* Blair's Lectures, II., vol. i. p. 28.

"As the twin tidal wave inarms the world,"

and all is wrought into perfection.

Delicacy and correctness imply each other. The equilibrium of sensational, intellectual, and emotional feeling, as it depends on the high and simultaneous culture of the knowing and feeling capacities, necessarily requires that delicacy, the nicety of the emotional powers, and correctness, the clear-sightedness of the intellectual powers, should be combined to produce that excitement of the mentality which is implied in the word Taste.

We expected to complete the treatment of this topic by illustrating the genesis of the emotions of Beauty, Grandeur, and Sublimity; this, however, we feel ourselves compelled to adjourn till another opportunity shall arise. We shall attempt to overtake it in our next issue; meanwhile we can only say with Gower—

"Albeit I sickness have and pain,
And long have had; yet would I fain
Do my mind's hest and business,
That in some part, so as I guess,
The gentle mind may be advised."

Religion.

IS THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF A SABBATH, AS ENJOINED IN THE OLD TESTAMENT, INCUMBENT UPON CHRISTIANS?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

In concluding this debate upon the sabbath, I intend to adopt the following mode of procedure—one according to which I think all discussions ought to be conducted. Having developed my *positive* views in my first article—on a polemical basis, it is true, because from the required brevity of the discussion this was necessary—I now proceed to criticize the arguments of my opponents, in order so to "ventilate" (to adopt a House of Commons word) the question, that I may modify my own vicious positions or expose the fallacies of my adversaries. This shall be done with the same weapons which my antagonists employ, for in equal warfare the combatants are armed alike: with those who confine themselves to the logical rapier, I contend with a similar weapon; while they who let fly the arrows of ridicule and sarcasm, must not complain if they find themselves a little galled by these in turn.

Before entering into isolated and individual objections, I think it will be admitted, by every competent person who reads and

judges candidly the entire discussion, so far as it has gone, that two fruitful sources of misconception and misunderstanding on both sides are to be found in the imperfect knowledge—1st, of the *relation* which the Old Testament holds to the New, and Judaism to Christianity; and 2nd, what constitutes a moral law. These misconceptions—or, more properly, misunderstandings—I shall attempt to remove.

I. We do not regard Christianity as a system erected upon the ruins of Judaism, but rather as the completion of a nobler building; not as a polity which not only superseded, but was, in its various enactments, opposed to, and destructive of, the former, both in letter and spirit. Such a view is plainly absurd, not only from the actual position of the latter dispensation with regard to its predecessor, but from the consideration* that both systems emanated from the same legislator.

If it be true, that every system of law

* I debate here only with Christians.

intended for the practical regulation of society must contain conventional enactments, having reference to those conventional modes which are found to prevail among that section of mankind for which it is to be used;* in other words, if it be true that there must be special injunctions framed to meet the necessities of that peculiar form of society for which the code is promulgated, then the abrogation of these clauses or injunctions no more affect the great central principles of truth or moral law upon which the general code is based, than the spilling of a little water, taken to quench the thirst of a single individual, affects the gushing fountain the waters of which it formed a part. We therefore maintain that all those instances in the Jewish code which had reference only to Jewish society and manners, formed to meet the temporary exigencies of life under peculiar circumstances, must virtually have ceased, as in all codes they *do* cease, when that which called them forth no longer continues to exist. In proof of this, and of the glorious fact that Judaism was Christianity as it existed anterior to Christ's coming, and Christianity Judaism as it exists after Christ, I need only quote the memorable and emphatic declaration of the Redeemer (Matt. v. 18), "For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."†

Having thus briefly explained my views of the relation of the Mosaic economy to the christian, views from their brevity neces-

* See Coleridge's "Friend," Essay iv. p. 64.

† I am aware that much cavilling might be raised against this judgment, and the interpretation on which it is founded; but here, I say again, that I argue only with Christians, since my opponents have admitted the authority of the scriptures upon this point. If, indeed, an attempt be made to invalidate my conclusion upon the ground that the word "*law*," used in the above passages, includes every item in the Mosaic code, and the clause, "Till heaven and earth pass," be understood to mean that the law, in this extended sense, should continue in force till the end of all things—then our Saviour will be made to speak not only contrary to fact, but contrary to his own declarations and practices. But understanding the passage thus, the difficulty vanishes. "While the world remains as at present it is conditioned, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, i. e., from a state of active enforcement upon the consciences of men, till all its purposes and requirements are fulfilled."

sarily incomplete, but still sufficient, I think, to indicate, when candidly understood, the general bearings of the question so far as is requisite for our present purpose; I now proceed to inquire, What is a moral law? This admits of brief reply. A moral law is a condition of man's moral nature, to which he must conform in his actions as he conforms to physical and organic laws in his corporeal nature, and the violation of which, equally with the other, produces an unhealthy state of the moral being; therefore it is impossible that a moral law can be transgressed with impunity: punishment follows with the linked certainty of cause and effect. Is, then, the observance of the sabbath enjoined by a moral law? We maintain that it is, on the following grounds:—1st. From the universality of sabbath observance, admitted even by our opponents to be coeval with man himself, existing universally in that oriental world whence has flowed the great stream of human life; its importance recognised even by the professedly atheistical republic of France. 2nd. From its beneficial influence, in enforcing, upon sacred grounds, a cessation from labour, to which otherwise the selfishness and cupidity of man would impel him not to submit, to the great waste and eventual destruction of his physical and mental powers. 3rd. Because religion being the highest concern of our nature, it is of paramount importance that man devote a special time* to the culture of his religious nature. 4th. Because this law stands in the centre of the moral code delivered by God to Moses, and is always enforced in the Old Testament, together with the other capital moral precepts—an argument of itself sufficient for Christians.†

* Why does not G. W. W. put his objections in plain, definite language? Are we to understand by the feeble hints (I speak considerably) contained in his last paragraph, that a seventh day, set peculiarly apart to the culture of the religious life, is unnecessary, because it is incumbent upon man to carry a religious spirit into his daily life and actions? (Will the *real Christian* who experiences the benefits of the sabbath day agree to this?) If so, with equal felicity (leaving the different constitution of man's moral and intellectual natures out of the question) might he argue that a special time for the cultivation of the intellect is unnecessary, because that must be exercised in our daily avocations.

† I may here deduce a consequence from my position with regard to the relation subsisting between Judaism and Christianity, for the purpose

These being the grounds upon which we maintain the obligations of Christians to observe the sabbath in a sacred manner, we now proceed to criticize in detail the arguments of our opponents. First, then, for "Irene," the leader of the opposition.

IRENE, PRO.

"You need not, my worthy friends, entertain the idea that the institution of the sabbath is in any imminent danger of destruction. You need not fear that the present, nor, indeed, any amount of public discussion *will materially tend to shake its foundations in society*, and to precipitate its violent and speedy overthrow. The sabbath day, whether as a day of rest, of recreation, or of worship—as the *uniter of families*, the restorer of health, the *only opportunity to thousands for spiritual exercises*—has entwined itself too strongly and closely around the human heart to allow such an event to be thought of as *even possible*. The sabbath is older than Christianity—is older than Judaism; it is as old as the creation, and sprang into existence with the human race and with time," &c., to end of paragraph.

"We regard it with a sincere and earnest regard. We often feel, that without it our

of meeting an objection urged against the christian observance of the sabbath (in relation to which see the able argument of J. F., in the March number, pp. 90, 91). I maintain that the whole moral code of Judaism not only descended to, but from the very first was considered as entering into, the very heart of the christian religion; as I have already said, the latter being simply the extension and completion of the former.

But we must be permitted to express our thanks to him for the assistance he has given us in answering himself, and shall be careful to avail ourselves of his labours.

IRENE, CONTRA.

"We, therefore, contend that the Jewish law is obsolete, because it is no longer possible to inflict the penalties due to its infringement. . . We deny the soundness of the assumption that the Jewish sabbatical law is a 'moral' law. The definition of a moral law—a definition furnished by sabbatarian divines—is, that it is a law which possesses force and vitality under all circumstances, and in all times and places. It is one of the first principles of moral science: it is to morality what an 'axiom' is in metaphysics; it is a law which springs directly from considerations connected with the moral government of the universe, and is as eternal as the moral nature of the Divine Being. Now, it is at once evident, that the sabbatical law does not fall within the terms of the definition. *Clearly, obedience to it as a law could not be claimed before its promulgation. It could not be binding before it was made known, nor after it to any to whom it remained unknown. It is, therefore, not a moral law, but an institution.* But take a law which does fulfil the conditions of the definition. Take 'Thou shalt not kill.' He would deserve to be set down as a hopelessly wrong-headed man who should argue that it was right to commit murder before the delivery of this prohibition, or that, in the observance of it, it would be right still. It is a law written in the human heart. Even the Greenlander feels its force, and instinctively shuns the presence of one who is stained with guilty blood. Not so, however, with the sabbatical law. It fulfils none of the legitimate conditions of a moral. It possesses for us, in fact, no greater authority than that possessed by the *sabbatical year, or even by the regulation of the proper trimmings for the priest's garments. . . . But we go further, and say that, even as an institution, it does not rest upon MORAL grounds,*" &c., to end of paragraph.

"We take leave to say, that because we refuse to submit our necks to the yoke of a

journey through life would be intolerable; that without it life would be a burden, and existence itself a curse. We believe, also, that to the sincere Christian it is a sweet memento of divine love—a convincing argument for one of the most important facts which form the basis of his belief, and a constantly-recurring remembrance of that glorious immortality and everlasting rest which will be his reward hereafter" (!!)

Now, we must be permitted to say, that we really cannot understand how the sabbath is "the uniter of families, the restorer of health, the only opportunity to thousands for united spiritual exercises;" how it is "older than Christianity—is older than Judaism, as old as the creation,* and sprang into existence with the human race and with time;" and yet the law upon which it is founded "possesses for us, in fact, no higher sanction, no greater authority, than that possessed by the *sabbatical* year, or even by the regulations for the proper trimmings for the priest's garments;"—nor how a law which "comes to us with the authority of no moral obligation, and which the Founder of Christianity has himself taught us to disregard," can form the basis of an institution "which is to the sincere Christian a sweet memento of divine love—a convincing argument for one of the most important facts which form the basis of his belief, and a constantly-recurring remembrance of that glorious immortality and everlasting rest which will be his reward hereafter." "Irene" will perhaps tell us that we have here misunderstood and misrepresented him, by not sufficiently noting his distinction† between the Jewish sabbatical law and the Christian sabbath. But that laboured distinction is shown to be wholly false, when we affirm, and dare the assertion of the contrary, THAT THERE IS NO POSITIVE INJUNCTION, COMMAND, OR LAW, FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF A SABBATH, TO BE FOUND OUT OF

law at once oppressive, obsolete, and impracticable—a law which comes to us with the authority of no moral obligation, and which the Founder of Christianity has himself taught us to disregard—we do not necessarily put ourselves in a position of hostility to the sabbath itself (!) But to what extent it should be observed by the Christian, and by what means sought to be preserved, are questions which, in this view, do not properly enter into this discussion, and in the investigation of which, if they did, we should receive but little light and assistance from the study of a subordinate element in a WORTHLESS and DISCARDED economy" (!!)

THE SCRIPTURES, NOR IN THE SCRIPTURES OUT OF THE MOSAIC CODE. Hence, if we disregard the authority of this code, we have no grounds, apart from considerations of mere utility,—no divine sanction by which we are justified in observing the sabbath.

But we must not pass "Irene's" definition of a moral law, which definition, we are told, is "furnished by sabbatarian divines." Common fairness surely ought to have dictated his quoting chapter and page from which it was derived. We must, moreover, demur to the assertion in this definition, that "a moral law is one which possesses force and vitality under *all* circumstances, and in *all* times and places."

We can conceive of a state of society where his example of a moral law, viz., that against killing, would neither possess force nor vitality.

Passing over his "triumphant" case of the violation of the sabbatical law by Christ, which a very slight acquaintance with scripture, and those exceptional cases which must occur under every law, will enable any person to refute, we come to his concluding paragraph; here we are informed that the sabbath law "comes to us with no moral obligation;" nay, previously to this we read, that the "sabbath, as an 'institution,' does not even rest upon moral grounds." If this be true, for what reason does "Irene" profess his sincere and earnest regard for it? His "last words," we must take leave to say, not only surprised but astonished us. After having done his utmost to cut away the ground upon which that sabbath—the absence of which, he tells us, would render "life a burden and existence a curse" (pretty

* His friend, G. W. W., if we may judge by his elaborate geological argument, will scarcely agree with "Irene" here.

† Distinction understood, not expressed.

strong "moral" grounds, one would think!)—he declines to console us with any equivalent (surely this is pure licentiousness of speculation!)—and ends thus—"In this investigation we should receive but little light and assistance from the study of a subordinate element in a WORTHLESS and DISCARDED economy!" I confess, when those words met my eye, I seized the pen and dotted the margin of the *Controversialist* over with marks of exclamation.

Enough has been said, and more than enough, I fear, for the space allotted me on "Irene's" article, and I must finally take leave of him by affirming, deliberately, that, had I sufficient time and space to go through his entire paper, I could show it to be little else than a series of errors and contradictions.

Of a very different character is the paper by "Cosmopolite." In truth, we almost entirely agree with him in the principles he has so eloquently enunciated in the first and second sections of his article. We wholly agree with him that "the sabbath is a time set apart for holding communion with the boundless Being who pervades and comprehends all things." But his third section, in which the argumentative portion of his paper is to be found, scarcely pleases us so much, looking at it purely from a critical point of view. We have already replied to the first and second divisions of his third section: to the first, in our exposition regarding the relation which the Old Testament holds to the New; to the second, in our first essay on this subject in the January number. We have also answered the former part of the third subdivision, but must say a few words respecting the argument in the concluding part of his article, which is founded on the assertion, that in the christian church ordinances are set aside, so far as concerns the duty of the Christian, to their imperative observance. This, however, we must demur to, because we believe, that while man remains as he is at present constituted, *form* is a necessity to him as well as *matter*; that religion, however spiritual, must have its own ritual; and that, even in the christian church, there are ordinances—such, for example, as that of baptism—to which it is imperative for the believer to conform.

Departing from reason to rhyme—

Permit me now to trouble you, trouble you,
With some remarks on G. W. W.

This gentleman has thought proper to employ a rather lengthy article in a guerilla warfare upon our friend "Glowr," giving ourselves a gentle admonition, by way of conclusion. He has characterized our friend as "reaching extraordinary conclusions, by a most extraordinary course of reasoning." We must be permitted to say that G. W. W. has reached no conclusion at all, by a very commonplace sort of reasoning. Commencing with "Glowr's" first sentence, we have a running fire of not very strong assertions, diminutive syllogisms, and would-be witticisms, which might, perhaps, be a little lively were it not that it reminds us of the conversational style of clever young ladies, who fancy themselves a great deal cleverer than they really are, and who consequently degenerate into (what our gallantry regrets to style them)—"bores." He is very strongly in favour of "sabbath trains," "sabbath amusements," and "Sunday newspapers;" and waxes poetical in a description of the progress of the "poor," "over-wrought," "and smoke-begrimed artisan" into a purer and more enlivening atmosphere, "inhaling" which (together with sundry pints of bee at little alehouses by the roadside), "thoughts and reminiscences of bygone days arise, and renew the tone of health and happiness that is well nigh lost in the battle with the world."

G. W. W. is fond of poetry; so are we.

Needy knife-grinder! whither are you going?
Rough is your road, your wheel is out of order;
Bleak blows the blast—your hat has got a hole in't,
So have your breeches!

Weary knife-grinder! little think the proud ones,
Who in their coaches roll along the turnpike
Road, what hard work 'tis crying all day, Knives
and

Scissors to grind O!

(Have you read the "Rights of Man," by Tom Paine?)

Drops of compassion tremble on my eyelids,
Ready to fall, as soon as you have told your
Pitiful story.

Knife-grinder answers.

Story! God bless you! I have none to tell, sir;
Only last night, a-drinking at the "Chequers,"
This poor old hat and breeches as you see were
Torn in a scuffle.

I should be glad to drink your honour's health in
A pot of beer if you will give me sixpence;
But for my part I never love to meddle
With politics, sir.

As the cheap Sunday trains we have the pleasure of knowing well, who are the public of the country, the country, and we also know that the cheap Sunday train is least occupied by them. *They do not wish to keep the numerous officials of a railway at work on the sabbath to gratify their selfishness; and if they go there, they go on Saturday evening.* G. W. W. is eloquent on the boisterous mirth of the poor artisan when "inhaling the country air" (and gin and water), "albeit it is Sunday."—"Well, I trust," he continues, "that that God, which I hope both I and 'Glowr'" (is careful to give himself the precedence) "reverence, will appreciate the joyous mirth, as unconscious gratitude" (very unconscious, when the subject is dead drunk) "to him for the refreshing draught" (of brown stout, probably). We are next informed that he professes great regard for all divine injunctions, but invariably transgresses the law of the sabbath. Very candid, no doubt!

Does G. W. W. devote his sabbath days to geological excursions? We fear he does; for his confession of being invariably a sabbath-breaker immediately, by an unconscious association of ideas, leads him into an elaborate argument against the sabbath derived from geology, proving triumphantly in the

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NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE had intended, in order to do full justice to both sides, as well as to carry out our mission of the object of a "reply," to present a brief but faithful digest of the arguments employed *pro* and *con*. in the course of this debate. But, having again carefully gone over all the articles, we really do not think it would repay us for our trouble to do so. The fact is, we have come to a unanimous verdict. The writers upon the affirmative side are careful and explicit in giving us to understand that it is not the Jewish sabbath which they wish to prove to be incumbent upon Christians; while the negative debaters are equally careful and explicit in directing their arguments exclusively against the Jewish sabbath. For instance, our comical and quizzical friend "Harold," of whom it may be said, that he is never so happy as when indulging in a "quiet cachinnation" at somebody's expense, leads the way by stating in the very outset, "Before proceeding further, I must positively object to the emblazonment of the colours under which I am about to fight. No Christian, I am sure, can logically support the Jewish sabbath, with all its formalities, under the christian dispensation." And in the commencement of the next paragraph he takes especial care to "assure my friends that I am not an Agnewite." Next, following this example, comes "Glowr," who tells us "that it is immaterial which day of the seven we observe as the sabbath; whether the seventh, according to the Jews, or the first, as observed by Christians;" and that, "when the christian dispensation was established, all injunctions relative to the ceremonial law were abrogated, while others of a different character were placed in their stead." And last and least comes "J. F.," who says, that, "Having impartially examined the question under discussion, we hesitate not to say, that the strict observance of a sabbath—not the Jewish sabbath, but a sabbath analogical thereto (!)—is incumbent upon Christians." Mark the term! On the other hand, the whole tenor of the remarks of "Irene," "Cosmopolite," and "G. W. W.," are directed against the *strict* observance of the sabbath as enjoined in the *Old Testament*, or, in other words, against the Jewish sabbath: and the former is at special pains, both in the beginning and at the close of his article,

to disclaim any hostility to *the* sabbath. He says, "We regard it with a sincere and earnest regard. We often feel that without it our journey through life would be intolerable; that without it life would be a burden, and existence itself a curse. We believe, also, that to the sincere Christian it is a sweet memento of divine love—a convincing argument for one of the most important facts which form the basis of his belief, and a constantly-recurring remembrance of that glorious immortality and everlasting rest which will be his reward hereafter."

Such being the state of the case, one side contending for that which the other not only does not deny, but seems anxious to affirm, it would evidently be superfluous on our part to add anything more by way of argument. For ourselves, in fact, we feel particularly obliged to the editors for bringing so unprofitable a debate to a speedy close.

But, apart from the direct issue, which seems to be settled by mutual consent, there are one or two things in the papers of our opponents which we should like to subject to a little friendly criticism. Those are some statements made which to us do not seem to prove that which their authors evidently intended to establish by them. For instance, "Harold" wishes to base the christian sabbath upon a Jewish foundation, and he begins thus:—"The citadel of the scriptural argument 'lies' in the fourth commandment." Now, we cannot help expressing, by the way, our astonishment that so hypercritical a personage as "Harold" should allow himself to speak of citadels as "lying" anywhere. We thought their natural position was to "stand," at least so long as they were useful for *defensive* purposes. Perhaps, however, we may be allowed to hope that our friend has been the victim of a malicious P. D. But we recognise a friendly truth, even in the mistake. We gladly believe that the "citadel" in question does "lie"—overthrown and in ruins—and to have so lain for eighteen centuries and a half. Prosecuting the same argument, "Harold" proceeds, in a strain of the finest eloquence, to discourse of lightning, a dark abyss, bread and butter, and the ten commandments; and concludes with an elaborate and entirely original argument—the argument of goodly fellowship. His own

statement of it is this:—The other nine commandments have not been abrogated, and are consequently now binding; the fourth commandment “stands in the centre of the roll,” and *therefore* it has not been abrogated, and is now binding likewise. The argument, it must be confessed, has a spice of ingenuity in it, and we only regret our inability to concede to it *anything more*. It strikes us, indeed, on the face of it, to be a little too bad to profess to determine the validity of a moral injunction as we would the character of a suspected thief—by the quality of the company kept. And the mention of a thief, too, suggests that if this argument of goodly fellowship were a sound one, Judas Iscariot should have been an honest and a very holy man. But the fact is, and we do not care to say so, we are astonished that any one, possessing the sagacity and good sense which our friend “Harold” ordinarily evidences, should ever have dreamt of such an argument at all. The utmost it can do is to lead us to a favourable presumption respecting the claim advanced in favour of the fourth commandment. To attain to anything like certainty we must adopt a different course. Granting, for the sake of the argument, that the other nine commandments are all now equally binding upon us, how do we arrive at that conclusion? Clearly enough, by a consideration of their intrinsic merits; by what our friend himself calls their “suitableness” to the nature and circumstances of man. Well, then, in our former paper we subjected this commandment to this test, and we found it wanting in all the elements which should characterize a law of universal application.

In taking our leave of “Harold,” we must venture the remark, that we really do think he has allowed his antipathy to “bread and butter” to carry him too far. In the first place, he has practically shown his dislike of the “utilitarian creed,” by contributing an article upon a question essentially different to the one proposed for discussion; and in the next, in defending the position he *has* chosen, he has rested his case upon an essentially unsatisfactory and unsound foundation. But there is one sentiment expressed by “Harold” in which we entirely concur, and we have sincere pleasure in giving it prominence. It is this:—“But granting that the *change has taken place*, in a manner hardly *defineable*, all Christians believe that the

resurrection of the Son of God and Saviour of mankind—the consummation of the hopes of fallen humanity—was an event sufficient to justify the first day of the week being held as the sabbath.” Exactly so; but in that case it concerns *Christians* only, and even then lacks the sanction of *authority*; and it is to get *that*, that rabid sabbatarians go back to an apostolic dispensation.

Next in order comes “Glowr,” and we had dotted down a few things to say to him. But “Glowr,” though not of English descent, is less rabid than “Harold,” and is not so amusing as J. F.; and as he has already engaged the attention of G. W. W., and we have very little space at command, we shall therefore at once pass on to J. F. Passing by a variety of definitions, distinctions, discriminations, references, and a little bit of antiquarianism, we come to the following remarkable piece of criticism on one of the preceding articles:—“We acknowledge that it (the sabbath) is an institution, or positive precept; but (!), more properly, a moral-positive command; and our opponents ~~must~~ acknowledge, on the other hand, that it is ~~a~~ divine, a moral, an equitable, and a religious institution. ‘Irene’ denies that it ~~is~~ a ‘moral law,’ because it does not, says he, fall within the terms of the definition of a moral law, which are these:—‘It is a law which possesses force and vitality under all circumstances, and in all times and places.’ Now the remark of ‘Irene’ may be correct ~~to~~ far as it respects the time of the institution; but it will not hold good with respect to the main thing—the spirit and substance of the sabbatical institution. That God should be worshipped is a moral law; that he should be worshipped in such a manner as can only be done by a strict observance of the sabbath ~~is~~, to my mind, equally moral (?); and that he will be thus worshipped by his faithful creatures for ever there is no question (?) = hence the soul and substance of the revelation-sabbath is a great and moral law; and, perchance, the greatest that comes under the notice of man.”

Now, we candidly confess, that when we read this passage we were filled with despair. We thought that any one who could so ruthlessly torture the Queen’s English, and so blindly pervert to his own destruction a plain and obvious distinction, must be utterly lost for all useful purposes of debate. And we

despaired of being able so to "enlighten the darkness," the dense Egyptian, double-milled darkness—what "Harold" would call the "abyss of darkness"—of such a mind, as to enable it to perceive the distinction between a fundamental moral law and a law which is simply moral. But, as J. F. somewhere observes, "charity hopeth all things," and we will therefore try.

We take it for granted that J. F. knows what is meant by physical laws—those grand, subtle, mysterious influences to which systems, stars, and atoms pay implicit obedience. Well, then, those fundamental "moral laws," to which our definition referred, occupy exactly the same position in the moral economy of the universe as do these in the constitution of material nature. They are a necessary result of the peculiar constitution of the moral nature of Deity, and they govern, guide, and control the workings of the moral nature of every moral agent in the universe. To take an example, the necessity to worship God—the moral Governor of the universe—is one of these laws. It springs directly from the relation established between the Creator and the creature, the Governor and the governed; and the moral nature of man is exactly adapted to act in obedience to it. And the spiritual exercise which is thus appropriate to our moral constitution is as essential to its health, as is exercise, amongst other conditions, to the health of any organ of the physical frame. And, further, this exercise of spirit, this worship, is *possible* under every imaginable circumstance, and is also *necessary*, in every imaginable time and place. Our moral nature remaining the same, it would be as necessary as now, were we removed to any other part of the universe; and it will undoubtedly be as necessary in the world to come, as it is in that which now is. In one word, we cannot conceive that it can ever cease to be appropriate and necessary so long as the human soul exists, and retains its identity. But this certainly cannot be said of the observance of the sabbath, or of that other imaginary law which, according to J. F., requires that "he (He) should be worshipped in such a manner as can only be done by a strict observance of the sabbath." Worship is essentially a spiritual exercise. It is the cultivation and development of the graces of the spirit. It is the keeping of God always

in our thoughts, and the constant endeavour to conform our actions to his known will. It is emphatically the work of life, and not of special days. And, besides, how can a sabbath of rest be *necessary* in that place where there is no labour; or special seasons of prayer, when life is one long service? And how can it be *possible*, in that city in which "there shall be no night there; and they shall need no candle, neither light of the sun; for the Lord God giveth them light?" But, after this, will J. F. continue to tell us, that the rigid observance of one day in seven for such exercises is absolutely necessary for the continued existence of devotion here; or, if so, that it will be also necessary hereafter? If not, then it is no "moral law," but simply a condescension to the infirmity of our nature, and a corrective of the adverse circumstances by which our earthly sojourn is surrounded.

These remarks will render plain what we mean when speaking of "moral laws." A law which is *moral* simply in the sense of its being proposed by it to secure certain moral ends—and we feel humiliated in being obliged formally to make so trite a distinction—is quite a different thing. In this sense, and for conversational convenience, the law against marriage with a deceased wife's sister may be called a moral law; but even J. F., we are persuaded, will not therefore consider it universally and eternally binding.

The passage we have quoted is, indeed, fruitful of hostile suggestions; but it is, at the same time, pervaded by such a delightful, lawyer-like ambiguity, that it would occupy more time and space to disentangle it than it is perhaps worth. We will therefore examine the remaining portions of the article, touching slightly as we proceed such particulars as we object to. J. F. commences the passage immediately following that just quoted, by saying, "The sabbatical institution is not a *ceremonial law*, much less a Levitical one." But then, with a good-natured liberality which does him much credit, he immediately refutes himself by saying, "For instance, the priests and Levites officiating in the temple service on this day had to work as hard again on it as *what* they had on ordinary days; for, on the sabbath day the sacrifices were doubled, and all then had to be slain, flayed, divided, boiled, or burnt," &c. Now why, we would ask, had

they to work twice as hard on the sabbath as "what" they had on any other day? What constituted the necessity? Why, of course, they were commanded so to do. And what then, we would again ask, constitutes a ceremonial law, if it is not, that accompanying the law itself are certain intimations, describing and regulating the minutiae of its observance? Again he says, "Its (the sabbath's) origin is coeval with the creation of man; it is based on man's nature and requirements, and comes into the same category of positive laws as does that of the institution of marriage." Well, that is exactly our opinion. But what is the institution of marriage based on? Did J. F. ever ruminate upon that, to us Benedicts, very nice point? Is it not upon the *imperfection* of man's nature? Is it not imposed as a check upon his lawlessness and lusts? A high authority has told us, that "in *heaven* there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage." We may therefore believe that it is unnecessary in a state of perfect humanity. Probably, too, had such a question been addressed to Him, He would also have answered, In *heaven* there are neither sabbaths nor rabid sabbatarians. J. F. next favours us with two tables of "particulars," from which, however, even with the application of "Glowr's" "specific induction," we find ourselves unable to draw any general conclusion, save one not flattering to the literary qualifications of J. F. The whole of these is wound up with three questions, addressed pointedly to ourselves, and designed to be disastrously overwhelming. They are, in fact, three little ironical daggers, designed to take the conceit out of us. We may say, however, for the comfort of our distant friends, that no disastrous consequences have ensued, owing, we think, to the fact that the little weapons were very blunt, and *badly tempered*. We come next to a misrepresentation. "The duty of worshipping God at all" is repugnant to the feelings of the great majority "while in a state of nature and alienation from God; but this is no proof that the enjoined duty is illegal, oppressive, and impracticable." Now, we never said it was. We left all such inconsequents to the exclusive use of J. F., who, we see, has plentifully availed himself of them. What we did say was, that the strict observance of the sabbath after the sabbatarian model was "repugnant to the feelings of the great ma-

jority of the people;" but we adduced our proof that "a strict observance of a sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, is impracticable, and that the law itself is obsolete," *from a consideration of the law itself*.

J. F. goes on to say, "Touching the impracticability of the subject we may remark, that the observance of the sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, was as follows:—It was to be kept holy. How? *Negatively*, by doing no kind of servile and secular work, such as gathering manna, sticks, and buying and selling and kindling fires."—"There is nothing impracticable in all this; nothing but what a holy man would delight in doing." J. F., however, not content with contradicting us, immediately sets about contradicting himself. He says, "The Jews, on 'Irene's' showing, could do without fires on the sabbath day; hence, not to kindle them was practicable. The more northern nations cannot do without them; hence, to kindle them is to do good; and the Lord of the sabbath has told us that it is 'right to do good on the sabbath day.' *God never intended that the formal and ceremonial observance of the sabbath should be the same at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances*. The very nature of things repudiates such a notion." Ha! thank you, J. F.; that will do. Balak "brought thee to curse his enemies, and, behold, thou hast blessed them altogether." But, says J. F. again, in the same suicidal fashion, "How does 'Irene' know but that this may (does?) allude to an ordinary fire, or (to) such a one as was kindled for profit—in furnaces, for fusing metals; in kilns, for drying bricks, corn, &c.?" Why, we answer, because Moses, the "amanuensis of the great unerring Spirit," told us so. The commandment runs, "Ye shall kindle no fire throughout all your *habitations*." We respectfully put it to J. F. whether the Jews in a warm climate—in the great desert—were likely to build "furnaces" for fusing metals, or "kilns for drying (!) bricks," in their *habitations*? Then, if that notion is too absurd to be entertained, it must have been ordinary domestic fires which were prohibited. Still, however, bent upon self-destruction, J. F. continues—" 'Irene' is startled at what is recorded in Numb. xv. 32—35, respecting the gatherer of sticks being put to death. This was not the effect of any penalty annexed to

an infraction of the sabbatical law, for no penalty was annexed to the breach thereof." Well, of course *we* are wrong, since J. F. seems so thoroughly acquainted with all the circumstances of the case. But will J. F. add to the obligation already conferred by this correction, by explaining into harmony with it the following passages, respectively in Exod. xxi. 14, 15, and xxxv. 2, 3? "Every one that defileth it shall surely be *put to death*: for whosoever doeth any work therein, shall surely be *cut off from among his people*:" "whosoever doeth any work in the sabbath day, he shall surely be *put to death*." If J. F. should ever succeed, perhaps he will communicate with us privately by post. And, in the hundred and twenty-fifth and last place, we would like to know what to understand by such a definition as this:—"The strict observance of the sabbath, as enjoined in the Old Testament, amounts to this much—to devote as much of ourselves and ours to God on that day as we reasonably can." "Devote as much of ourselves and ours"—that we think is clear enough. It means going to church twice a day, and giving liberally at the collections. But how are we to understand "reasonably can"? What, in such a case, is to be the gauge of "reasonable"? Will it allow us to lie in bed late if we have been engaged in business till one o'clock on the Sunday morning? Will it allow us to stop at home at night to nurse the baby in order to let its mother go? Will it excuse our attendance at "meeting" if it happens to be a rainy day and we have just done a new suit of superfine black, or should we unfortunately be afflicted with a pair of leaky shoes? We don't know; only we think, that if her Majesty's taxes were assessed upon people's own computation of a "reasonable" service, that the revenue would fall very far short of its present amount.

"Not being a ceremonial, but a moral-positive law, the Saviour did not abolish it." Now, in reference to this, and to the whole question of the obligation of the decalogue, we take leave to say, there can be no greater mistake than to suppose that it is binding upon Christians, if binding at all, for the same reasons which rendered obedience to it necessary with the Jews. To the latter it was "published by authority." They were not allowed to canvass its merits, and to obey it or not, according to the dictates of

reason and conscience. They were *commanded* to obey it, and that alone constituted the necessity which imposed obedience. The thunder and lightning, the smoking mountain, the audible voice, and the other accessories to the delivering of the two tables, were important and dreadful realities to the Jews; while to Christians they present themselves simply as historical facts, interesting, it may be, from their religious associations, but otherwise of no moment or signification. In fact, notwithstanding the very great difference ascribed as existing between the ten commandments and the ceremonial laws of the Jews, it is undeniable that they were bound by the same ties to obey the one as to observe the other. Promises and threats—the only inducements likely to operate with a rude people—constituted the motive power in both cases. In a word, the all-pervading incentive to obedience with a Jew was *authority*.

The advent of Christ, it is allowed on all hands, abrogated the Jewish dispensation. In what, then, it is important to learn, consisted the abrogation? One thing is plain enough. It was not a special repeal of every law in the Jewish code; nor yet a special relief from the weight of the ceremonial laws in general, for there is no intimation of either in our Lord's ministry. But it would rather appear to be a general absolution from the *authority* to which, up to that time, the Jews had been subjected. It was the removal of the great cause of religion into a higher court. Hitherto the Jews, in matters of religion, had been subject to the magistrate. Henceforth there was to be no intermediate agent, and the soul was to be responsible to God alone. The government of the Jews was what ours is not, a *parental* government. The "children of Israel" were treated much as the children of the human race ordinarily are. They were required to do certain things, not (even though they were so) *because* they were moral and right, but because a higher power than themselves required their performance. The advent of Christ, then, introduced the Jews to the freedom and responsibilities of manhood. They were not the less required to do whatever was moral and right in the old law, but they were required to do so from higher motives. Well, then, under the new economy, the ten commandments would cease to be religiously regarded as one code insepa-

rably bound together, and would simply be recognised as *ten* commandments, each of which would present itself and be received upon its own merits. IRERE.

Philosophy.

WOULD EDUCATION ERADICATE CRIME?

NEUTRAL ARTICLE.—I.

PROBABLY there is no modern question which has given rise to more angry debate, or has been so completely hackneyed, as the one to the consideration of which we now address ourselves. A wordy war it has proved itself to be, and an apple of discord in the social arena. Opinions the most opposite have been broached, and anticipations the most unreasonable have been formed on both sides.

Some triumphantly point to education as the grand panacea for all the moral evils which afflict society. This alone is to work a mighty renovation. Every part of the social fabric is to be brought under its talismanic influence; and then crime?—that will be a memento of the past: a perfectly happy, because thoroughly educated, people shall rejoice in the absence of that hideous relic of a less philosophical age.

Others, acting, as we presume, on the fallacy, that

“A little knowledge is a dangerous thing,”

pass by the great question, and content themselves with the simple affirmation, that education opens up so many additional paths for the commission of crime, and therefore it is better to keep the people illiterate.

Some, affirming that the heart is the seat of all crime, and that man's moral nature is altogether distinct from his intellectual nature, deny that the culture of the mind would check the evil tendencies of the heart; while others, calling in question the soundness of these statements, maintain that the moral and intellectual natures of man are so indissolubly connected, that to treat them as distinct is at variance with both reason and philosophy.

Happily, that class is extremely limited and uninfluential who are indifferent to the importance of education. The vast majority

strongly advocate some system; but this is the rock upon which they split. The extreme party of secular educationists are so wedded to their darling scheme, for which they claim the title of “National,” that in their hot zeal they would cause every other system—from the antiquated dame-school to that of Pestalozzi or Birkbeck in modern times—“to hide its diminished head.” “Our scheme (say they) is of itself amply sufficient to meet the demands of the population. We seek to engage them in the elevating pursuits of literature, to inspire a love for the beautiful in nature and art, and to afford scope for the exercise of natural ability, in order that their minds may become ennobled and purified.”

On the other hand, those who deny that education would eradicate crime, ask with the most enthusiastic zeal, “What sum of the four processes of arithmetic, what problem of Euclid, what statute of syntax or syllogism, is your talismanic agent? Astro-nomize, botanize, Bucklandize; bring down the stars with your telescope, and crack the sandstone with your antiquarian hammer; yea, let all the arts and sciences be granted you, and what is your recompense at last?”—and then triumphantly look down upon those unfortunate advocates of the opposite view, thinking them effectually silenced.

But enough of this. Let the champions on either side settle the dispute in the best way they can; we will in the meantime endeavour, to the best of our humble ability, to inquire, “Would education eradicate crime?”

It is a favourite expression with an honourable member of a certain house, well-known for his eccentricities, “I have no confidence in any party; and I am proud to be able to say that I stand alone upon this question.” Now, while we do not aspire to be in a minority of one, yet we cannot pro-

less allegiance to either of these great parties. This is not because we have a misanthropic feeling; but we do not servilely follow any one set of opinions simply because they are propounded by some of the world's great ones. We prefer to maintain a strictly neutral position, in the hope of avoiding those quicksands and rocks on which so many entertaining extreme views have foundered.

We may remark here that the writer of the first affirmative article has not taken that broad and comprehensive ground which we had anticipated. While admitting that "education is a very comprehensive term," he reduces its limits by confining his attention to one phase of it, which he rightly considers the highest. We had supposed, and suppose still, that the question referred to education in the ordinary and general meaning of the term. We were disappointed, therefore, in G. P. W. discussing it only on doctrinal or religious grounds.

We are not quite prepared to allow that "it is impossible for a teacher in England to give other than a religious education, if he appreciate at all the end and object of his vocation; and hence the non-religious education is an abstraction." Every one who believes in the divine origin of the gospel, believes also that it is capable of rendering man perfectly happy; that it is opposed to all moral and spiritual impurity, and that those things which now entail so much misery on mankind shall be eventually subdued by its all-constraining influence, and then peace with her attendant blessings shall be enthroned in a regenerated world. But G. P. W. confines himself to this; and, instead of writing an affirmative article on the question proposed, favours us with a disquisition to prove what no one denies—the necessity of scriptural instruction. To make this, however, the only true education, is, in our opinion, straining a point, and forcing religion from her high and sacred duties. *Educare* (to lead out) may be as reasonably applied to pure secular instruction as to the development of the higher emotions of the soul.

B. W. P. has kept closely to the subject; and, although we do not accept his conclusions, we are compelled to admire the general tone of his article. He appears, however, to be labouring under a false impression that

education, strictly speaking, is at variance with the teachings of the Bible; and because crime is still rampant, and such lamentable prostitutions of genius and education have been witnessed, he hastens to the conclusion that the "system of education, so adapted to the nature of man, and, moreover, so strongly urging him to adapt his conduct to its dictates, is, as far as it can effect a *cessation* of crime, as complete a failure as were the simpler remedies of bygone times." But gently, good, though impetuous, friend, and answer a simple question:—If education has failed to exterminate the monster evils of which you complain; if, "despite of all, crime exists, an unsubduable specimen of earthliness," yet, has it done nothing to check it? Is society in a worse position in consequence of the education which a portion of its members have received? We think not. Surely the modern reformatory system is more rational, and, we will venture to say, more beneficial, than the old plan of indiscriminate transportation or execution.

Man is, to a large extent, the creature of impulses, acted upon by outward circumstances, which doubtless act as a stimulus where an inherent propensity to crime already exists. The moral atmosphere which he breathes, and the peculiar temptations by which he is surrounded, have, we think, as much influence upon his conduct as his own innate propensities. If the man is invested by an impure atmosphere, surely one great incentive to crime would be removed if those moral plague-spots which infest it were uprooted. If he has debasing objects around him, surely, by directing his attention to higher and more worthy pursuits, he would of necessity, as it were, imbibe a love for the beautiful and the good. Education alone can do much to elevate his aims, to purify his motives, and to teach him that he has something to live for besides self-gratification. But there are, also, many other and important questions involved—*e. g.*, the state and prospect of the country, its international relations, &c.—into which we cannot now enter, but all of which exert a greater or less influence upon crime.

Perhaps it is not altogether unnecessary to give a word of caution. In deciding this question it is not fair to take a miscellaneous category of crimes, as arson, forgery, murder, petty larceny, criminal assaults, &c., and in-

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE RE

In offering a brief reply to our opponents in the present debate, we will at once proceed to analyze the various arguments which the several negative writers have adduced in support of their position.

First, then, we have "Aristides," to whom we are indebted for two papers illustrative of the faults and blemishes in the character of the Duke of Wellington. In our friend's first paper his chief object appears to have been to prove that "our hero" was destitute of *moral greatness*. He admits that the Duke possessed a certain amount of what may be termed *greatness*; but then he adds, that no "order of *greatness*, however dazzling, or however much in repute with the world, is not admiration, unless it be moral

in itself but we pre-en-pleting It lies as that *moral* to the inclin point, "void lingt is th the mind as th clust

soul—qualities which are absolutely necessary to all who would effect glorious achievements. He was wise in counsel and vigorous in execution—endowed with personal intrepidity in the highest degree—was indefatigable in activity and in constitution; but, above all, he possessed great moral courage, and a fearless determination to carry out all that the stern demands of duty might require. He was not to be deterred from executing plans which were submitted to him merely because difficulties apparently insurmountable stood in his way. No; he proceeded onwards, and, in spite of every attempt to crush his victorious arms, he succeeded in laying the iron rule of despotism and oppression prostrate at his feet. He has shown to the world that glory and renown are obtainable without arrogant assumptions of domineering sovereignty; and through the whole of his victorious course we see that, although “rudeness, falsehood, malignity, and revenge, have belonged in common to many great conquerors, they never were among the characteristics of this one great man.” His acts and despatches will remain a study for the young soldier to time immemorial; and when the heroes of the present will have merged into the mythic obscurity of the past, his name will continue to shine with resplendent lustre.

We could easily expatiate farther upon this branch of our subject; but the life of Wellington has nothing to gain from panegyric. The exploits of a Cæsar, an Alexander, or a Napoleon, were the offspring of unsanctified ambition, united, indeed, to consummate military genius, calculated to excite and fascinate mankind for a time, but afterwards lapsing into unregretted obscurity. But the actions of Wellington were of a totally different character. He fought not for the sake of conquest, but for the sake of his country, and to rescue Europe from the grasp of a despot. Throughout his whole career he adhered strictly to the rule of public duty: he was animated by a love for his country, and a desire to uphold the British crown.

We trust we have shown, in these somewhat discursive remarks, that Wellington possessed moral greatness; and we now hasten to notice briefly the second paper contributed by our friend “Aristides.” He appears at the outset to be somewhat dubious as to the

exact meaning intended to be conveyed in our former paper. We will here reiterate our conviction, in order that he may be enabled more fully to understand our assertions. We do not “repudiate the opinions of peace men;” but we do repudiate such notions as those indulged in by many, who because, in some instances, enormities revolting to human nature have been perpetrated by those who held the command of armies, at once include all other individuals engaged in similar courses of life in the same category. We do “stigmatize war on account of its sanguinary cruelties;” but we see no reason why, at the same time, we should stigmatize Wellington, as identified with war itself. Most undoubtedly the “principles of peace” are those we would advocate; but at the same time we lend our aid in defence of the great deliverer whose merits are at present under discussion.

We must hasten to notice the remarks of “Aristides” upon the political career of the Duke of Wellington. Do men of liberal principles turn with dissatisfaction therefrom? We fear that our friend judges of the principles of others by his own. We would respectfully insinuate that, were our friend actually endowed with the liberality to which he alludes, he would not turn with dissatisfaction from the political career of the Duke of Wellington.

We before stated our conviction that Wellington was by no means a great statesman. He was certainly no orator; but the vigour and striking originality by which he was characterized imparted to his language a power which few orators have surpassed. Not possessing a very widely-extended range of public policy, he nevertheless maintained his superiority over other men in this one particular—he fully empracticalized those ideas to which his mind gave birth, and perfected those faculties with which he was endowed.

Farther on “Aristides” attempts to disprove our assertion that Wellington was superior to Napoleon. Upon this point we retain our former conviction, feeling convinced that between the two no comparison can be made productive of other results. True, they both raised themselves from obscurity to the highest renown during the great revolutionary struggle; but we see a vast difference between them when looking impartially at their re-

adversaries. Apparently crushed at the outset, Wellington nevertheless eventually effected the defeat of the armies of his opponent, and baffled all his efforts and manoeuvres.

In their moral and intellectual features the two were still more strikingly different. Glory was Napoleon's only object, and he spared no quantity of blood in order to secure it; while Wellington acted solely from duty, fighting only when necessity compelled him to assume the defensive. Oppression and despotic tyranny proved the ruin of the former; while the judicious conduct and comparatively mild temperament of the latter induced all Europe to place itself under his guidance. Intellectually there also existed a vast difference between them. Bonaparte certainly was endowed with a vigorous and clear conception; but the brightness of his genius too often led him to mistake the fleeting phantom for the lasting reality. Wellington, on the contrary, though less original in his ideas, possessed a far greater power of discriminating between the true and the false. "The genius of the former shared in the same weakness of imagination, while the

NEGATIVE REPLY.

“The hero scourges not his age alone;
His name to late posterity is known.
He slays his thousands with his living breath—
His tens of thousands by his fame in death.”

WE cannot too severely deprecate the scope and tendency of the introductory paragraphs in the third affirmative article; they are calculated to discourage inquiry into the acts of public men, if they happen to enjoy a reputation with their countrymen for surpassing talents. We, on the contrary, think it proper to sift that reputation, and determine for ourselves whether or not it is deserved; the opposite practice is indicative of a servile, a disingenuous turn of mind. It is, assuredly, the glory which surrounds Wellington as a general that obscures the deformities of his character, private and political; and it would be nothing short of literary immorality to screen from deserved reprobation acts which, if performed by persons less exalted in station, would have incurred disgrace. Besides establishing an injurious precedent, it lowers the standard of our national morality; and, as regards ourselves, it is cowardly to consent knowingly to the misdirection of the public mind, and to shuffle from our duty to futurity, by allowing flattered portraits to obtain currency instead of genuine limnings. In our first paper we set forth the duties of individuals in estimating the characters of such illustrious men as were likely to influence largely the characters of those who live after them; and we take the liberty of directing J. G. R. to a reperusal of that portion of this debate, nothing doubting but that even he will agree ultimately in thinking that it is not over “fastidious” to require that candidates for our admiration should be morally as well as intellectually great. The test by which it is endeavoured to convince us of the rectitude of the Duke, viz., “the whispers of an approving conscience”—“the approbation of his sovereign and the major part of the states of Europe”—is fatally defective, inasmuch as a man’s conscience is not some incorruptible faculty, but one subject to modification from his principles and pursuits; and the stormy career of his grace was decidedly unfavourable to the development of one nice in its perceptions or scrupulous in its admis-

sions; and it is notorious that the Duke never was a favourite with the people at large, either of his own country or of the countries of the continent. He identified himself too closely with the interests of the aristocracies of Europe for that. It was their battles he fought; he was their supporter and abettor, and by them only is he looked upon with sentiments either of esteem or gratitude; and, if it were not so, his had indeed been a thankless office. J. G. R. has omitted to give a catalogue of the peculiar services rendered by the Duke which have placed the people of this country under such an eternal weight of gratitude. It cannot be his senatorial counsels, since these are by all parties very timidly praised; so that it must be his achievements in the field. Now, beyond all question, this is a very equivocal, nay, dangerous ground, on which to test his claims to our esteem or admiration; for, if it be insisted that his feats in India were such as have never been surpassed, not even by Marlborough, and that in his Peninsular campaigns he vanquished in turn every general sent to oppose him, and subsequently their imperial master too, still the question arises, Was he more than the instrument, and would he have refused to conduct the army in an unjust war? In this both negative and positive evidence is against him. As an instance in point, it would be difficult to vindicate our aggressions on India, as a question of right; and yet no man ever forwarded these more ably than him of whom we are now speaking. His expressed determination should not be forgotten either, that in the event of the Catholics of Ireland still manifesting discontent after the measures for their relief should be passed, he would not hesitate to come down to parliament and crave power to suppress it by forcible means. The memorable 10th of April, 1848, must be fresh in the recollection of our readers.

The indirect way in which it is attempted to bring the Duke in as a religious man deserves to be noticed. If the announcement quoted be familiar, we are very certain that his famous declaration that men who believe in the New Testament have no business in the army, will be equally familiar, and serve

to counteract any danger of mistaken views being entertained regarding the religious sentiments of his grace.

Injudicious friends, it is said, are worse than enemies; and we have another proof of the correctness of the aphorism in the defence which J. G. R. makes in favour of the Duke—a defence which detracts from his reputation for sagacity, instead of establishing it. It is in the doctrines of the Catholic Church that the greater danger resides, not in the government of it; the other is an argument which now-a-days is obsolete. The opinion of his grace on the corn laws which is quoted detracts still further, for never was there a repeal granted more sincerely prized by the country, or more beneficial to it, than the repeal of the duties on the importation of corn; but he had not the clearheadedness, the foresight, to see prospectively its operations; and hence his opposition.

It is very doubtful whether in his campaigns his duty to his sovereign, not to go higher, was the sole motive which actuated him. We have very certain information that he speculated not a little in the funds—the funds for paying the cost of his own wars. Now, any one who has observed the fluctuations of the money market, and inquired into the causes of the rises and falls, cannot but know that the successes and reverses of the army would materially affect its firmness, and Wellington could not choose but mark this too; so that it was an easy matter for him, by report or otherwise, to direct affairs at the seat of war in such a way as to enable him to buy in or to sell out to advantage. It is, perhaps, an ungenerous inference, yet it is quite possible that, but for this cause, his campaigns would have been of shorter duration, and of less expense to the country. As this is a position, however, which from its privacy is not susceptible of positive proof, we merely throw out the idea of this being a cause likely to exercise an unseen influence over his military career.

It is very generally believed that as a general he was invulnerable; but partiality has unquestionably done a great deal to gloss over errors in combination and rashness in attack. In perusing the narrative of his life, we are constantly meeting with accounts of engagements *hazarded contre les règles*; and, al-

though it must be admitted that success
efforts, still they are

not entitled to a higher name than, at best, "lucky blunders;" but partiality, which can admit of no modification of praise, sets these down as "felicitous aberrations from military rule which it occasionally belongs to high genius to make, and which men of common minds would have unsuccessfully attempted." Even in this light he manifested an indifference—a culpable indifference—for the lives of his soldiery. He has been censured, too, by very high authority for not following up the successes which the chances of war placed within his reach. Napier says of him, "In following up a victory, the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram—down went the wall in ruins—the battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood went pouring onward, covering all." The Earl of Suffolk says, in reference to the battle of Talavera, "I cannot call that a victory where a retreat immediately follows, and the wounded and the prisoners fall immediately into the hands of the enemy. Even the capture of artillery is not, in all circumstances, to be considered as a signal victory, as it might be convenient to leave them on the field." Earl St. Vincent says, "The battle of Talavera, if a victory has been purchased with the useless expenditure of our best blood, has told to no advantage, and has all the consequences of a defeat." Of the same engagement Lord Grenville beautifully says, "Gilded disasters are called splendid victories; and the cypress that droops over the tombs of our gallant defenders, whose lives have been uselessly sacrificed, are to be denominated blooming laurels."

Having quoted these authorities—professionals and contemporaries—we think it unnecessary to insist formally on a more reasonable estimate being taken of his talents, even in this his peculiar province, believing that that will follow as a consequence.

We have only to repeat, then, that, although unsurpassed as a commander of the force and although not altogether without merit as a statesman, even yet, when tried by the standard of true greatness, which supposes comprehensiveness of mind and unusual morals united to an expansive philanthropy, we need not say that he is found wanting—that he is not worthy of our admiration.

He was the aristocracy's hero, both in the field and in the parliament house; and at their instance, and by their influence, the titles and estates, the places and pensions, were granted as the reward of those services which contributed to secure them in their immunities and privileges. It was from an appreciation of this fact that his decease created among the majority of the people so little sensation: it needed the pageantry of a public funeral to finish consistently the adulation which had been heaped upon him by his titled debtors; but it was a display on which the people looked with little satisfaction, for he was not one of those whose names, being associated with unwearying efforts in the furtherance of popular privileges and popular

progress, are cherished in the memory of a grateful country. ARISTIDES.

J. G. R. indulges, to a large extent, in a rather inelegant sort of argument—a cheap mode of refutation—one infinitely more easy than searching for facts with which to rebut the statement of an opponent. Permit me to cull one or two of those graces of speech of which he is so bounteous. "He ('Aristides') places the *most illiberal, selfish, and narrow-minded* construction on all his (the Duke's) acts." "One of the *most atrocious*, and certainly one of the *most untrue, accusations* made by 'Aristides' is..." And so on. Now we submit that a more satisfactory way for him—so far as his readers are concerned—would have been, to bring forward counter-statements, supported by facts, instead of permitting himself to indulge in this sort of rabid rhetoric.

Politics.

OUGHT THE GRANT TO MAYNOOTH TO BE WITHDRAWN?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I HAVE read over several times the articles on this debate in the last three numbers, and regret that the editors should so soon think of closing it, for there is plenty of matter that could yet be called forth upon this question: and all the shallow, bigoted, and misconstrued arguments of "L'Ouvrier," and J. C. M'C., Jun., proved to be such. While I admire the more noble and liberal sentiments of H. P. and J. G. R., I would much prefer that some one tutored by the Maynooth priests had been heard. As such, and as a recent subscriber to your periodical, and anxious to take part in many a future debate, I request the favour of having this article inserted in your next number.

There are many arguments I might introduce in favour of my side of this question; but I think it more honourable to confine myself to the disproving of the charges already made against the endowment of Maynooth.

Thanks to the good sense and feeling of this country, as evinced the other night in the House of Commons by a majority in favour of this question. But I should not have been much surprised if the votes had been reversed; for there is a strong demo-

cratic party rapidly extending, and resolved upon having all grants from government to religious institutions withdrawn. Let but this class give some tangible proof that they can succeed in severing church and state, and then they will have the unanimous support of all Catholics. But till then it would be rather hard to expect that the Catholics of this empire, who have been so hardly dealt with these last 300 years by their Protestant masters, and who are at present forced, especially in Ireland, to pay so largely for the support of a religion they believe to be as false as their own is true, should reject even this small pittance (£26,360 per annum—see page 28 of this journal), and which they value but little in the light of £ s. d., but much as a manifestation of a more tolerant and less bigoted spirit evinced towards Catholics. We look upon it as an approach to "civil and religious liberty," though hackneyed the phrase may be (page 62). Yes, I say, in contradistinction to what is inserted in pages 29 and 112, there is no church more anxious that its support should depend on the voluntary contributions of its adherents than the Catholic church. Well does it know that

£20,000 per annum, and that the Catholics are required to contribute their share of that £20,360. Surely "L'Ouvrier" is sufficiently mathematical to sum up this cruelty exercised upon him and his fellow-Protestants. It comes very nearly to one farthing per head per annum. Oh, how happy would the Catholics of Ireland feel—yes, and Catholic Europe too—if our government would thus deal with them. By referring to page 25, you will find a passage quoted from the "Edinburgh Review," that proves it is not so. I shall say nothing now of the many parishes in Ireland in which a Protestant never sets his foot unless as a traveller or on business, nor of those parishes where there is no more of Protestantism than a church and parsonage. Surely this is enough to settle argument the second.

In the same page, 28, another charge is made respecting the lack of bibles in 1826, and in page 63 a similar one. But in page 26 we have the picture reversed. I do not mean to say it is used as a mere class-book (as in the Protestant schools, and, when old, sold to and used by the

power, which is the sweetest of the law goes on cases of this is false p a spiri certain ly is relig by you sary f superi from i waste instar doctri to oa conse serve enoug they J. C huns to h cour

crimes in the one are so much less than in the other, there must be some mighty influence at work; and if he knew that religion exerts the mightiest influence on the human mind, would he not at once attribute it to that cause? So much for charge the fourth.

In page 29 comes the next charge, which is comprised under the head of heresy. "L'Ouvrier" and his supporters, in making this charge, would do well to consider the time, place, and circumstances, where such threats against heresy were fulminated. That such threats, or similar ones, were fulminated in 1215, at the Council of Constance, I am aware, and I can fairly compare them to many an act of parliament, good and necessary in its day, but now obsolete. It may be considered bad reasoning on my part to compare the acts of an infallible church with a fallible parliament; but I shall briefly show the reason. The council of 1215 was rather a congress of Christendom than anything else. All the kings and princes of Europe were represented by their ambassadors. Affairs of church and state had to be regulated. For there were spreading then a host of people known as the Albigenes and Manicheans, whose object was the ruin and destruction of civil and religious society. They believed in two Creators, two Christs; taught that their souls were demons, prohibited marriage, with such-like vileness. To put down these, coercion was had recourse to, threats were fulminated against them, the civil power acceding thereto. Under these circumstances the threats were put into execution, and, with few exceptions, never since: hence my reason for comparing it to an obsolete act of parliament. In the next part of the same paragraph Galileo is instanced as punished for his improvement in science. This is false, for the Catholic Church has ever encouraged science; and so far from dreading it, she exults in its discoveries, and feels proud that her children hold the most conspicuous place as the inventors and discoverers of the most important arts and sciences. However, neither space nor place allow me to enlarge on this particular; I must pass on to the next,—respecting the expulsion of heretical princes, and setting up in their stead orthodox ones. This may be explained, like the last, and takes its date from an earlier time, when monarchs had the simplicity to con-

sider the Pope their head in temporal as well as spiritual matters—the popes being cunning enough to exercise such dominion when invested with it. I might here state, that when such power was withheld from the Pope by Henry III. of this country, he never afterwards sought it; but, as regards his spiritual sovereignty, he exercises in every country in the world where Catholics are found. I must take leave of the first affirmative article, and pass on to page 62.

"It is *Popery* makes Ireland *unhappy, wretched, poor, ignorant, and seditious.*" Space necessarily prevents me from being as prolix on each of these points as I could wish. "Unhappy!" I wish J. C. M'C., Jun., defined unhappiness, or intimated whether he meant temporal or spiritual unhappiness; that he meant temporal—that is, misery, wretchedness, poverty, and dissatisfaction—I have no doubt. Is he aware the same people, professing the same "Popery," as he chooses to call it, and located in America and elsewhere,* are neither miserable, wretched, poverty-stricken, nor dissatisfied; but are a happy, cheerful, prosperous, and industrious people? Is it not, then, manifest, that a bad government is the cause of it, and not "Popery"? Is it fair to charge her with ignorance, when, for hundreds of years, the English Protestant government of this country prohibited her teachers from instructing them, under the penalty of death, imprisonment, and fines? and, if I mistake not, there even yet remains on the statute-book a remnant of this enlightened law. "Sedition!" Does J. C. M'C., Jun., really imagine that "Popery," too, should deprive them of feeling, and prevent them, when the opportunity presents itself, unloosing the shackles that so unjustly bind them?

In the same page he says, "Secondly,"—and gives us a quotation from the "Tablet" newspaper, as illustrating the immorality of "Popery." What a blessing for J. C. M'C., Jun., that he lives in this immaculate country, and is preserved by the ties of Protestantism from communication with *Popery*! He certainly must never look at a newspaper (save the "Tablet"), else he would almost daily hear of criminal cases too abominable to be published—at least so say the Protestants.

* This empire excepted.

newspapers. I fancy, too, he stuffs wool in his ears, else they would be polluted by blasphemies and impurities, as he traversed these Protestant streets. No doubt, too, but he wears *green* glasses, so that his eyes may not behold obscenities. And I would rather be inclined to think, that it was from a certain trial, lately concluded, he learnt that "priests" (rather, a priest) "pour language that cannot be spoken into the ears of the young and beautiful." He concludes the paragraph with—"Verily he was a true limner that described Rome as the 'Mother of harlots, and the abomination of the earth!'" Surely he must not have been aware that there are at the present day only 80,000 such mothers in London alone, with their numerous accomplices and supporters. Nor shall I say aught here of the purity of the town of Oxford, or advert to the cause of it. Neither will I compare it to the unstained character of the town of

Maynooth—the seat of the Irish priesthood. So much for the purity of Protestantism.

I have already noticed the remaining part of his charges; and as space lacks me, I must bid my friend, J. C. M'C., Jun., good-bye, and again engage "L'Ouvrier," whose remarks this time are peculiarly shallow; and I find no objection worth noticing until I come down to the "Tablet," page 115, where manifestly he misconstrues the passages, and confounds spiritual allegiance with temporal allegiance. In the one, we are bound to the church, and thereby to the Pope, the head of that church on earth; in the other, there is no obligation to the Pope whatever.

The next charges respecting heresy and persecution I have already noticed. In conclusion, I apologize for the space I have occupied, and beg to assure my readers, that it is the love of truth that has actuated me in my remarks.

STANISLAUS.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I AM glad to find the subject now under discussion considered in the controversial portion of this magazine. With delight have I read the articles *pro* and *con.*; and the principles of "L'Ouvrier" especially call forth my admiration. I can perceive much beauty and justice in the theory of the voluntary principle with regard to religion, and cannot but condemn the compulsory manner by which the church-rates are extorted from persons who conscientiously disapprove of the governmental part of the Church of England. It is well, I think, that controversial subjects should be considered in every phase and in every view; and it is from coinciding with the ancient maxim, "*Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera, æquum licet statuerit, haud equus est,*" that I now view and argue the endowment of Maynooth in the aspect of the governmental recognition of a section of the church, and the support of that section by the state.

The negative writers have argued the subject as if Ireland stood alone, and formed a kingdom by itself; now this is positively incorrect, whatever they may desire. Ireland ought to be considered only as a portion of the kingdom of "Great Britain and Ireland." Ireland is but an integrant with Scotland and England, forming the integral whole.

This is the error which both X. and H. P. have fallen into, and which forms the basis of their argument. If it were *de facto* correct that Ireland was independent and isolated, and governed itself, and the legislature recognised and supported the religious tenets of the minority, then I should as thoroughly oppose such a proceeding, and condemn it as the height of injustice. In the preliminary remarks of J. G. R. I entirely agree, and regret greatly that so much animosity and hatred should have been produced from the injudicious zeal and warmth of many Protestants. I myself respect the theories and principles of all sensible men, and hope I can calmly hear and reason with a man who holds principles diametrically opposed to my own. The world and society are certainly improving, for we find many who do not take upon themselves to class all those who differ from them in opinion as holding *bona fide* error. In fact, what man in his senses has the audacity to put forward such an assumption? I propose to consider this question with one admission, i.e., that it is wise and expedient for the government of this country to recognise and support a religion; therefore I shall not argue the question before us as a religious, but purely as a political one.

The present condition of affairs in the

United Kingdom is on this wise:—The legislative body consists of monarch, lords, and commons; the latter of these is chosen from the electors, who comprise the upper, middle, and a great proportion of the lower, classes; the two former are filled under the law of primogeniture. These three forming a government, recognise and unite with a section of the church, and call upon the people to support that section, and this they consider most wise and expedient. The reasons for the adoption of such a policy are the following:—That, by recognising and associating with, and as a consequence assisting, a religion, the government will be established on a firmer and more truthful basis; for it is a law, that whatever a man, or a set of men, worship or admire, he or they will become assimilated to its character. The doctrines of the evangelical portion of the Church of England are admired by the majority of the people; therefore the association of the state with it stamps the character of the government, and it compels the people to support that church, in order that they might provide for the religious wants of the people, so that the poorest subjects may have the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the truth, and thus people and government work and prosper together in beautiful harmony. This is the principle of the present government, and they have recognised that religion which has by far the greater number of adherents in the kingdom. The number of persons in the United Kingdom who hold the Protestant principles exceed those who adhere to the Roman Catholic faith by two to one; therefore it is but politic and right that those principles should be supported which are held by the great majority of the people.

Now, providing it be granted that the principle of the union of state and church is expedient and wise in the present state of society, the question arises, Ought the grant to Maynooth to be withdrawn? This is the aspect in which I have placed the subject, and it is certainly the most favourable one for our opponents. In answer to the question, permit me to say, that (although a strong advocate for civil and religious liberty, for equity and justice being dealt out to all parties, irrespective of creeds) it is my unbiassed opinion that the grant to Maynooth should be withdrawn, and that for the following reasons:—1st. That the principles taught

at Maynooth have a tendency to destroy, and are in every way antagonistic to, the existence of *the* government which grants the annual endowment. Surely it cannot be consistent with sound policy for the legislature to assist and encourage *that*, which, if successful, would tend to its own downfall. If you ask me for proof of this assertion, I would direct your attention to the aggressive character which men educated at that college took in the insurrectionary movement, as well as the ultramontane doctrines which they hold. Another and more recent proof exists in the fact that, at the late election for Carlow borough, Mr. Sadlier, a Roman Catholic, was rejected for taking office under the government of the Earl of Aberdeen; and, moreover, was displaced by one of the followers of Mr. Disraeli. Does not this prove their hostility to any government not holding the doctrines of the Papacy?

2ndly. I object to the grant to Maynooth in consequence of the doctrines contained in the class-books of the college and taught and enforced on the pupils. The following are a few specimens:—That, under certain circumstances, it is lawful to steal. That, for a just cause, it is lawful to swear *with* equivocation. That it is right and good to *lie*, if by so doing it would be beneficial to the interests of the church. Servants are advised to obtain situations in the families of Protestants, *as Protestants*, in order that they may have the opportunity of converting some members of the family. And even murder, in some cases, is deemed justifiable. In fact, the following law gives latitude for the commission of all and the worst of crimes, and attempts to justify them:—“Everything must be sacrificed for the interest of the church; an oath is binding on the conscience no longer than is consistent with the interests of the church; and faith is not to be kept with heretics, if the interests of the church require the obligations of faith to be disregarded.” These are my reasons for thinking that the grant to Maynooth ought to be withdrawn; and you, reader, will find that I do not call in question the Roman Catholic faith, but have argued it purely as a political and social question, and should, in the same way, oppose a grant to a Protestant college, if its managers permitted the promulgation of their doctrines by similar dishonest means. I look upon the endowment

of Maynooth as an endowment for the propagation of vice, and believe the principles enumerated above not only calculated to jeopardize the well-being of man, but directly opposed to the harmonious working of society.

To the readers I leave to decide whether they approve of the legislature appropriating

a portion of the public money to enrich a section of society who hold and carry out (as far as lie in their power) the principle, that the end justifies the means; or, in other words, and in the broadest sense, of doing evil that good may come, I myself do not approve of this, and therefore hold the affirmative of this question. A. S.

The Societies' Section.

POETRY: WHAT IS IT?

Musing by the side of a rippling brook one beautiful summer's eve, while yet in our "teens," we asked ourselves (as thousands had asked themselves before), "What is poetry?" and Memory—"blest Memory"—supplied us with the following definition:—"All that is good, beautiful, or heroic in this our world, is poetry. All that the ideal soul thinks of an elevating tone and character, is poetry. All that bright spirits' deepest and most intense sentiments, affections, and feelings, are poetry. All that is, or ever has been, achieved by man, worthy of record—all the monuments of thought and action handed down to us from the dim past, are the spirit of the beautiful acting upon and working in man. Poetry may be termed the beautiful, as this is the source or fountain of all true and living poetry—the palpably and the ideally beautiful—the beautiful in thought and in action."

We pondered over this definition, wondering if it were *the* true one, or simply the bright fancying of some wanton genius! and, as our custom is, we sought for some further or additional testimony. Memory came again to our aid, and carried us back to some of our old familiar authors, who in imagination thus addressed themselves to us:—"It appeareth," said Bacon, "that poetry serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation." "Nature," said Sir Philip Sydney, "never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers poets have done, neither with so pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smelling flowers, nor whatever may make the too much loved earth more lovely. Nature's earth is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden one." "In every nation," said the learned Sharon Turner, "poetry is the child of feeling;" while Hazlitt stated, "that to it has been given the homage of pre-eminence." That elegant and refined writer, Dr. Blair, defined it as "the language of passion, or enlivened imagination;" while the celebrated orientalist, Sir W. Jones, considered "original or native poetry to be the language of violent passion expressed in exact numbers, with strong accentuation and significant words;" and stately Dr. Johnson far more felicitously described it as being "the art of writing pleasure with truth, by calling imagination to the aid of reason." Other voices joined in the chorus, and declared poetry to be "the marriage of truth with beauty"—"the music of passion and imagination addressed to the understanding and the heart"—"the high-wrought enthusiasm of fancy and feeling," or "the deep and earnest flow of the heart's wildest emotions blended in one phase, one coruscation of exquisite loveliness."

ets themselves next followed, and lent us their testimony. Here is one,

—
 “ Poetry is itself a thing of God ;
 He made his prophets poets ; and the more
 We feel of poesy do we become
 Like God in love and power.”
 —

“ The world is full of glorious likenesses.
 The poet's power is to sort these out,
 And to make music from the common strings
 With which the world is strung, to make the dumb
 Earth utter heavenly harmony, and draw
 Life clear and sweet and harmless as spring water
 Welling its way through flowers.”

sumes the strain:—

“ Call it not vain. They do not err
 Who say, that when the poet dies
 Mute Nature mourns her worshipper,
 And celebrates his obsequies ;
 Who say, tall cliff, and cavern lone,
 For the departed bard make moan ;
 That mountains weep in crystal rill ;
 That flowers in tears of balm distil ;
 Through his loved groves the breezes sigh,
 And oaks in deeper groan reply ;
 And rivers teach their rushing wave
 To murmur dirges round his grave.”

and other recollections rush upon us:—

“ The poet, to the end of time,
 Breathes in his works, and lives in rhyme.”
 “ Poets are all who love—who feel great truths,
 And tell them.”
 “ Poets, who on earth have made us heirs
 Of love and truth by their immortal lays.”
 “ Poets are, henceforth, the world's teachers.”

his be true of poetry and poets, we thought, how is it that the former is not
 deeper *study*, or that the latter have been so poorly rewarded; or, indeed, so
 neglected? We felt there must be a delusion somewhere. We resolved to
 make the matter for ourselves; and from that hour we have made the poets our study.
 ask, reader, what is the result? We will tell you. We have found the poets
 of life, love, beauty, and truth; and their misfortunes have constituted one
 of their greatness; for many of them have literally and truly

“ Learned in suffering what they taught in song.”

found poetry to abound in noble inspirations, to overflow with the milk of human
 and to be the especial vehicle of “ great thoughts.”

“ Poetry is
 The grandest chariot in which king-thoughts ride.”

"Who can mistake great thoughts?
 They seize upon the mind—arrest, and search,
 And shake it—bow the tall soul as by wind—
 Rush over it, like rivers over reeds,
 Which quaver in the current—turn us cold,
 And pale, and voiceless, leaving in the brain
 A rocking and a ringing—glorious,
 But momentary madness might it last,
 And close the soul with heaven as with a seal."

Most heartily, then, do we commend the study of poetry to our readers. We trust they may derive the same "amusement, instruction, and delight" that we have experienced, and well will they be repaid for what, at first, they may deem a sacrifice of time.

After thus heartily commending the study of poetry, we will not conclude without offering a little suitable, and we may say practical, advice.

When we advocate the "study of poetry," we mean that it should in reality be made a *study*. We have known those who have merely *read* poetry, and therefore have derived no advantage from it. To such, indeed, it has proved a positive injury; for, carried away by the day dreams in which poets are wont to indulge, such *mere readers* of poetry become unsettled, visionary, and impractical, and therefore by no means better fitted for the *practical* world in which we live. This is the abuse of poetry. "Poetry has to do with the common feelings and sympathies of men; it bears, subjectively, through these, on the actual life of the individual, moulding it, and informing it, and giving it direction and impetus. In proportion to the number of individuals on whom it thus acts, and the degree of power which it brings to bear upon them, it affects in like manner the condition and progress of communities." Poetry must, therefore, be made a study, in order that the benefits which it is capable of conferring may be fully attained.

"Of the five divine sisters—divine and mortal at once, like man himself," says a modern writer—"Poetry is the most familiar, and may be accepted as the type. Her utterance is in song, which she gives forth from inspiration;" and he proceeds to quote Shelley, who says, "Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what they understand not; the trumpets which sing to battle, but feel not what they inspire." From this we may infer that even the poets themselves scarcely fully understand their own mission, so great is it. But another writer completes the picture, by representing the poet as "standing at the altar, rapt, holy, impassioned, prophet-like, giving utterance to the inarticulate yearnings, feelings, and wants of his brethren; embodying their tendencies, mirroring all, and mirrored in all, the age produces; and the myriad hopes and fears that sway the minds of men breaking forth from his lips in passionate music." Can we conceive a higher vocation? Let us, then, commend more fully to our readers the productions of

"Nature's true sons, the friends of man and truth,"

the poets of the present and past ages.

C. W., JR.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Birmingham Debating Society.—Discussion on the Re-establishment of the French Empire.

—A public meeting of this society was held on Friday evening, January 28, 1853, Archdeacon Sandford in the chair. The subject for discussion was, "Whether the Re-establishment of the Empire was likely to be beneficial to France?"

The debate was commenced by Dr. Heslop, in the affirmative, who contended that France would not have the Bourbons, and was unfit for constitutional government; quoted from the Memoirs of Mallet du Pau and from Alison, to prove that the Bourbons had lost all influence in France; and to show the unfitness of France for constitutional government, referred to the late revolution; contended that no one in Europe had better right to govern France than Louis Napoleon; that he had the privilege of an illustrious name, and was thrice elected by seven millions of the people; that if a people was contented with its government, its happiness and prosperity were secured; denied that the conscription had disgusted the French with the empire, but that its evils had been forgotten by the glory of the code Napoleon and the victories of the empire. He would not defend the recent changes, if he thought it detrimental to the ultimate liberty of France; but he regarded it as preliminary to the freedom France would hereafter enjoy. France only wanted a time of order to develop the improvements of the last sixty years; and he concluded by remarking that he did not fear an invasion of these shores; that he had unbounded faith in the power of England; and that if Louis Napoleon should land in England, the English would achieve a victory which would not pale before the greatest which France could boast.

Mr. G. Dixon responded, and admitted, to a certain extent, that the Bourbon dynasty had worn itself out; that it had displayed lamentable incapacity; but he did not admit that no future Bourbon could rule France well. He referred to the choice of the younger branch of the Bourbon family, in the person of Louis Philippe; he considered the rulers of France had not been strong enough to keep down the mob of Paris, and that this had been the main cause of their failures. He did not admit the unfitness for constitutional government of a people who had done so much for liberty; he contended that the Bourbons were expelled because they attacked the constitution of the country. He admitted that the recent revolution had failed, and considered it not surprising that an ultra-republican government did not succeed, but contended that a pure constitutional government had yet to be tried. He did not think it likely that the present degenerate Bonaparte would accomplish anything like that which the great mind of the first Bonaparte suggested, and his energy achieved. He considered the great difficulties of France were the compulsory sub-divisions of the land; the absence of landed gentry, and of the middle class, as understood in England; the system of centralization; the number of officials at the disposal of the central power; the immense army, a great curse to France, as to many other con-

tinental nations; the domination of the priests, who were in the pay of the government, and educated the people; the government had not been blessed with large-minded and disinterested men. He contended that the empire deprived the people of the political power which they possessed—even under Louis Philippe; that the government was utterly ignorant of the true principles of finance; that it had established the credit mobilier to supply money at really less than it was worth; that France was going backward, her expenses were increasing, and her debt increasing too; that the press was gagged, and had less power than under the régime of the Bourbons; that the empire was a system of universal retrogression; that the head of the government was extremely selfish and unprincipled, or he would not have attempted to excite civil war by his expeditions to Strasburg and Boulogne; that he was a man of pleasure chiefly, a man of most tenacious will; that such a man at the head of such a nation was dangerous to the peace of France and of the world; that he had conceived and matured plans which he had now the power to achieve; and that, to retrieve his falling fortunes, he would sacrifice the interests of France, and use war as the last means to keep him on the throne.

Mr. T. P. Salt considered that the private character of Louis Napoleon had *per se* nothing to do with the question; showed that France had expelled the Bourbon younger, as well as the elder branch; showed that the French had rejected the middle course; that France required a strong government, which the republican form did not afford. Instability was the chief characteristic of the French, and a strong government was required to enforce the views of the majority; and their stringent and most despotic governments had been the most permanent, while the republican phases had not lasted long. The first violent, and the last more pacific, revolution had failed; France was divided into five parties, who struggled for the mastery; the last republic failed from weakness, and a strong government could alone succeed. The journalism of France was well represented in the chambers, and the newspapers contained the most demoralizing matter, which was extensively diffused, and had a most injurious effect on the people. The Legitimists and the Orleanists had joined to vote for Louis Napoleon in order to prevent the triumph of Red Republicanism and the anarchy which would ensue.

Mr. J. A. Langford denied that the Socialist publications were the true representatives of the people of France; showed that the vices of the rulers descended to the people; remarked that Louis Napoleon had had extreme Socialist opinions, and no man had done more to propagate the doctrines which Mr. Salt had denounced. He referred to the works of Schœrber and Victor Hugo to prove that more votes were announced than could have been given; described the method by which the votes were obtained; and denied that Louis Napoleon had been elected by the people's free will. Louis Napoleon had violated his most solemn oaths; had exiled all the great men of France; filled every place with Jesuits and priests; had placed some of the worst men around him; had gagged the press, and rendered

the condition of the people worse than it had ever been before.

Mr. Buckton considered that Louis Napoleon was likely to carry out his uncle's plans, from which his probable conduct might be inferred. The increase of the navy was preliminary to the extension of the French boundary to the Rhine. The empire was elective, and Louis Napoleon might abdicate or he might be expelled. In this respect the empire had an advantage over the other forms. He claimed Louis Napoleon as a free trader, the only French monarch who was disposed to carry out the *laissez faire* system; and he hoped that the unity between England and France would be long maintained.

On the motion of Mr. J. P. Turner, seconded by Mr. W. Harris, the debate was adjourned to Thursday the 10th proximo; and after a few observations by the chairman, the meeting dispersed. The debate appeared to afford much satisfaction to the numerous audience, who frequently testified their approbation by loud applause.

The adjourned debate on the question, "Whether the Re-establishment of the Empire in France under Louis Napoleon would prove beneficial to that Country?" was resumed on Thursday evening, February 10th, in the Philosophical Institution, the Ven. Archdeacon Sandford in the chair. The discussion was re-opened by Mr. J. P. Turner, who supported the negative view of the subject, contending that all civilized nations were better fitted for a free than for a despotic government, and that the French were especially suited to a free government. Would it not be a contradiction to say that the French nation, which was in the van of civilization, was unfit for the government best suited to civilization? The French under the first Napoleon enjoyed a larger share of liberty than under any former ruler, and during his reign were advancing in the right direction. But what was the present Napoleon? The whole course of his life had shown him to be a wretched imitator of his uncle. The people had had fifty years of progressive development, and had arrived at a truer appreciation of liberty since the time of the first Napoleon; and was it to be supposed that they would now cease their endeavours to obtain that liberty? With respect to the election of Louis Napoleon; even if he had been the choice of the nation, it only amounted to this, that the people had made a mistake in selecting Louis Napoleon's government as one which would give them liberty. When they found out their mistake they would upset his government. It might be depended on that the French, having once tasted the sweets of liberty, would not sit down quietly under the reign of despotism.—Dr. Nelson gave the reasons which would induce him to vote in the affirmative on the question under discussion. He thought the French, weakened by party and faction, and unwilling again to submit to the rule of the Bourbons, were justified in their election of Louis Napoleon, who, besides possessing a name which commanded the affections of the people, was believed to be the only man who could revive their military glory. Dr. Nelson contended that it was impossible that the votes for Louis Napoleon could have been falsified to such an extent as to materially affect the immense majority he obtained; and in defence of Napoleon's character, remarked that while he had never distinguished himself by any great act for the public good, he had never

perpetrated any great act of cruelty or immorality. He next contended that the peace and prosperity of a nation were not dependent so much upon the character of the head of the government as upon the religious principles pervading the people. In conclusion, Dr. Nelson said that Napoleon having, during his residence in this country, necessarily imbibed English ideas, they should look forward to his conferring some substantial benefits on society, and to his attempting some of those reformatory measures which were characteristic of this country. He therefore believed his reign would prove beneficial to France.—Mr. C. T. Saunders followed in the negative. Every government should be considered in relation to the people upon whom it was to operate. For nations emerging from barbarism a despotic government was perhaps best, but for a civilized nation the necessity for a free government must be apparent. He contended that the return of the Bourbons to the throne of France was not impossible, as the revolution of 1789 was not caused by disgust at the Bourbon family, but of the aristocracy. He protested against the foundation of an empire upon the destroyed liberties of a nation and an alliance with the Jesuits, and also protested against France, while labouring under the gigantic evils of centralization, receiving as her ruler the man most interested in the support of that principle. It was impossible that a government of a retrogressive character, founded upon an obsolete idea of military glory, and with such a ruler, could have a beneficial influence upon the nation.—Mr. Jabet directed his observations to the inquiry, "What form of government was best suited to the French people?" and contended that the question was intimately connected with that of races. The Celtic race had invariably shown itself incapable of constitutional government, and had always prospered better under a strong despotic rule than under a free government. The French people were sprung from that race, and had always shown themselves unfit for self-government; and he believed that the system established by Napoleon was that best suited to the French nation.—Mr. R. Wright, in the negative, controverted the statement that the Celtic race had uniformly proved to be unfit to govern themselves. France, under the constitutional government of Louis Philippe, had become a commercial country. It was not surprising that Louis Napoleon was elected when it was remembered how the votes were taken.—Mr. Salt, in reply, said that the question had been argued upon comparisons instituted with this country, which was not a fair mode of treating it. He then controverted the arguments used by the gentlemen supporting the other view of the question, and reiterated his conviction that the reign of Louis Napoleon would result in the permanent benefit of the French nation.—Mr. W. Harris also made some remarks supporting the negative view of the question, and was followed by Dr. Heslop, who closed the discussion by a very able reply to the principal arguments of his opponents; and contended that Louis Napoleon's government was the most likely to lead to the establishment of permanent liberty for France, but before that happy result was attained, a strong hand was required to overcome faction, and promote unity, peace, and order. The question was then put to the assembly, and carried in the

negative by a small majority.—A vote of thanks to the venerable chairman, moved by Mr. W. S. Allen, and seconded by Dr. Heslop, terminated the proceedings.

Newcastle-upon-Tyne Discussion Society.—A few enterprising young men have commenced a discussion class under the above name at No. 6, Market-street, as a preliminary step to still further advances in the cause of intellectual progression. Wherever we look, we see that intelligence is making permanent and rapid advancement. It is the characteristic feature of the times. The epoch of war as an amusement is past, and people are now awakening from the sanguinary hallucination to a consciousness of the absurdity of their past actions, and the necessity for present amendment. Oratory, in particular, has many enthusiastic students, all animated probably, like ourselves, with the healthy ambition of commanding at will the "applause of listening senates;" and, accordingly, instead of the tavern, small tenements, treatises on public speaking and debate, *British Controversialists*, and elements of elocution, are in great requisition. The prevalence of the epidemic, added to its eminent adaptation for intellectual recreation, must be our plea for adding one more to the already numerous institutions for its encouragement. If examples of the power of eloquence are desired, we need only examine history. Themistocles, Pericles, and the perfidious Alcibiades, are indebted to their oratory for the prominent position they hold in the history of Greece, and are only rivalled by, because less virtuous than, Aristides. Shakspeare's inimitable play of "Julius Cæsar," while it exemplifies the sickliness of the Roman *canaille*, is also highly illustrative of the power of eloquence; and the patriotic harangues of Brutus, and the impassioned oratory of Antony, there given, are deserving of the study of all who value histrionic display. These men performed greater wonders with their tongues than did the greatest of warriors with their swords. And may not even these be equalled? The emulation is noble, and the young men forming this society hope in a few months to be able to give a triumphant affirmative. We have, at present, no Ciceros among us, though we have several embryo Demostheneses, who need only an indulgent hearing and a little stimulating applause to act as did the sun-tints upon the statue of old, to cause them to come forth in all the luxuriance of their admirable proportions. Great anxiety and uneasiness was caused by the ominous nature of our first subject, "Will England decay as did the great nations of antiquity?" but at the conclusion of the discussion, notwithstanding the elaborate citations to the contrary, no anticipation of decay was experienced either for the nation, or, least of all, for the society.—J. H.

Newport Young Men's Society.—The first anniversary of this society was held on Thursday, the 17th of February, in the Independent Chapel. Upwards of 200 persons sat down to tea and dessert. Subsequently the Rev. S. Fairley, president of the society, after a few introductory remarks, called upon the secretary, Mr. G. Baillie, to read the report of the last year's proceedings, from which it appeared that the results of the society's operations were very encouraging. The society was commenced in the beginning of last year by about a dozen young men zealous in the work of

mental improvement; since then the numbers have increased to upwards of thirty. During the past year upwards of fourteen essays have been read by the members on various subjects, among which were the following:—"The Scenery of our Village and Neighbourhood;" "Difference between Animals and Vegetables;" "Improvement of Time;" "Motions of the Earth," &c. Numerous discussions have taken place upon the following questions:—"Ought Capital Punishments to be Abolished?" "Are Tavern-keepers Promoters of Iniquity, Robbers of Society; and, as such, ought they to be denounced and stigmatized by all true Patriots, Philanthropists, and Christians?" "Whether has the Poet or the Legislator been of most benefit to Mankind?" "Is it Impiety for Legislators to endow Religion?" "Is Universal Suffrage just or desirable?" "Was it the Policy of Louis Philippe that caused the French Revolution?" "Is Man the Child of Circumstances?" "Is Conscience a True Monitor of Right and Wrong in every case?" Specimens of original poetry have also been given by some of the members. Lectures have been delivered on "The Means and Resources of Knowledge," by the Rev. D. Thompson; "The Steam-Engine," by Mr. Roy, mathematical teacher, Dundee public seminaries; "The Majesty of the Solar System," by Thomas Dick, LL.D.; "Nineveh: its History—its Remains—its Lessons," by the Rev. N. Macleod. A manuscript magazine has also been established by the society. The report concluded by urging the members to renewed efforts in the behalf of the society. Interesting and able addresses were then delivered by the Rev. D. Thompson, on "The Gold Regions of Australia;" the Rev. T. Just, on "The Importance of Young Men holding Right Views and Sentiments;" the Rev. N. Macleod, on "Decision of Character;" and by two of the members—Mr. J. Kidd, on "The Present Condition and Prospects of the Society," and Mr. J. Smith, on "Progress." A vocal choir contributed much to the enjoyment of the evening, and the meeting separated at a late hour.—J. K.

Monkton Young Men's Literary Society.—The third quarterly meeting of this society took place in the parish schoolroom of Monkton on the evening of Saturday, the 5th ultimo—Mr. S. Cowan in the chair. The secretary read his report for the last quarter, from which it appeared that five new members had been admitted, and that the following subjects had been debated:—"Is the Moderate Use of Alcoholic Liquors injurious?" "Whether is the Miser or Profligate most injurious to Society?" "Whether is the First or Last Six Months of the Year most Pleasant and Cheerful?" "Has Machinery benefited the Working Classes?" The treasurer then presented his statement; after which the meeting proceeded to the election of the following office-bearers:—Messrs. S. Cowan, chairman; G. Smith, vice-chairman; R. Strathdee, secretary; and P. Paterson, treasurer; with a committee.

Frogmore, Devonshire, Mutual Improvement Society.—This society is one of the many daily springing up in the remote villages of this county. A few persons of the neighbourhood, deploring the vast amount of ignorance prevailing therein, and the want of means for mental improvement, called a meeting in December last. Mr. William Percy took the chair, who called on Mr. R. Couch to explain the object of the meeting,

viz., the formation of a mutual improvement society. After a few remarks from the chairman, eleven members were enrolled, and a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and committee of management, were elected. Rules and regulations previously drawn up were then submitted, and, with a few exceptions, approved of and adopted. But a difficulty seemed to arise in the want of a suitable place for meeting in, but that difficulty was speedily overcome by Mr. Price, the president, kindly offering the British school-room, which was thankfully accepted. The members meet every alternate Monday for the discussion of literary and scientific subjects, and the delivery of lectures, &c. A small library has also been formed for circulation, in which the *British Controversialist* occupies a conspicuous place. The society has now enrolled sixteen members, which, considering the small number of inhabitants, is equal to present expectation.

Bromley Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—We have received a copy of the last annual report of this society, from which we are happy to learn that it is in a healthy working condition. In addition to the public lectures which have been delivered, several of the members have given private ones, on such subjects as the following:—"Influence"—"Contentment ver-

sus Fame"—"The Wonders of Vision"—"Alfred the Great"—"A Journey to Jerusalem"—"Trifles; what they are and what they are not"—"Examples of Perseverance," &c.

Clyde Literary Society.—A social meeting of the members and friends of the above society was held in Buchanan's Coffeehouse on Thursday evening, March 3. Mr. William Adameon occupied the chair. After an abundant supply of tea, cake, &c., the chairman, in neat and appropriate terms, alluded to the benefits, both of a moral and intellectual nature, to be derived from connexion with such associations, and considered the interest taken in meetings of the kind to be one of the best features of the times. He concluded by urging the members to increased zeal in making mutual improvement societies beneficial. Mr. Robert Moore spoke on "The Value of Time," and gave some sensible and pointed suggestions as to the proper improvement of this precious boon. Mr. Alexander Laing delivered an eloquent address on "The Four Evils which afflict Mankind, viz., Idolatry, War, Slavery, and Intemperance." Mr. William Scott, in a felicitous manner, spoke on "Female Influence, and the position which Woman ought to occupy." The meeting, which was enlivened with numerous songs and recitations, broke up at an early hour.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

152. Having heard lately a good deal of manuscript magazines, could any of your kind correspondents give me some general information concerning them?—I. O. U.

153. I am desirous of possessing a theodolite, and other instruments requisite for efficient tuition in surveying; will some one of your intelligent readers have the goodness to inform me where such instruments may be had; and, further, what are the respective prices of really good ones? A recommendation of a good elementary work on drawing is also respectfully requested.—J. T.

154. Will some of your readers be kind enough to answer the following question:—Is it a fact that in Russia, when the emperor has reigned twenty-five years, the ceremony of coronation must then be gone over again, the officials and troops also again taking the oaths of allegiance, the same as in the case of a new emperor?—IRENE.

155. Will some of your readers be kind enough to inform me, through your valuable magazine, of the most systematic or best mode of taking up the several branches of education—grammar, geography, history, algebra, mathematics, &c.—so arranged that the study of one will be subservient and introductory to the next higher, just as the first step in a ladder is to the second? Can they state anything by way of encouragement to an associate, who is already upwards of thirty, of the possibility of making himself tolerably acquainted with the above?—Z. A.

156. Will any of your readers furnish me with the processes, &c., relating to enamelling?—J. R.

157. Near the close of chapter viii., book ii., of Dr. Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric," some mention is made of certain "ingenious contrivances" which have from time to time been brought forward in connexion with the "scholastic logic;" could any of your correspondents favour me with some further account of these "contrivances," or refer me to some work easily got at from which I can obtain the desired information?—NEOPHYTE.

158. Two travellers set out at noon from Greenwich to go to the opposite side of the globe. The one travels due east, the other due west. Mr. De Morgan (in his treatise on the globes, p. 72) shows that, supposing each traveller to take 300 of his own days for the voyage, the one going westward would reach the opposite side a day after the one who went eastward. "But each traveller, setting out from Greenwich at the same time, and reckoning 200 days on the voyage, would give the same name to the day of his own arrival. If the one who went east arrived on his own Tuesday, the one who went west, and came in the day after, would equally arrive on his own Tuesday, or the other's Wednesday." Supposing the place at which the two travellers arrive to be inhabited by civilized people, what name would they give to the days on which the travellers respectively reached it?—K. G.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

142. *How to obtain Ease and Power in Debate.*—Having read, in the February number of your extremely interesting and highly instructive periodical, the communication from "Timon" re-

tive to the difficulty of replying to argument in the time allowed in a discussion class, and being a great admirer of controversy, I venture to offer a few remarks on the subject. The difficulty of which he speaks arises from various causes, which may in a great measure be removed by practice and attention. Those who are in the habit of attending debating clubs will readily admit that "Timon's" defect is by no means an isolated one. Men of the most profound knowledge and deep-thinking genius have laboured in vain to overcome the difficulty, simply from the want of a specified course of proceeding. I was once fortunate enough to hear from an intelligent young man an essay, which, for elegance of style and composition, I have seldom heard equalled. Yet he lost all the credit he might have gained by stating, when called on to reply, that he should require a fortnight to prepare a reply to the arguments brought forward against him in one hour! Now, to remedy this, I would offer a few suggestions to all who experience a difficulty so perplexing. When a person is preparing an essay, he should look at his subject without prejudice or partiality. He should first collect all the information he requires to enable him to introduce his subject in a manner consistent with his views. Having done this, he should consider, in the next place, that in all probability some of his audience will disagree with him on certain points. To enable him to ascertain which portion will meet with most opposition, he must, without any prejudice, take those which he thinks are open to the most objection from his opponents; and after he has written his essay he should then compose a reply to the objections which he has selected as likely to be brought forward against him. This reply, although written before the delivery of his essay, will almost invariably be useful to him, and to the purpose. I would recommend this course more particularly to the young discussionist; and, with some discretion in pursuing it, I doubt not he would find it very useful. The system which I would more generally recommend is one which I have, from practical experience, found to be of great assistance in replying to those who have opposed me. Having delivered my essay, I directly commence preparing for my reply, by taking a few short notes of the speeches of opponents. By the assistance of these notes I am enabled to think pretty clearly as to what I shall say in reply; and, as these notes are arranged in the order in which they were spoken, I find them extremely useful for reference. I trust that these observations will be of use to "Timon," and all who labour under similar difficulties.—ETNA.

If "Timon's" conscience indorses the truth of "Rolla's" remark; if, as "Rolla" supposes, his productions consist solely of "fiction, idealism, poetic flights," &c.; if, in short, he is merely a declamatory orator, let him follow "Rolla's" advice, and betake himself to the hard study of Locke, Bacon, Euclid, and Whately. If, however, on the other hand, he is able to open a debate in "excellent style;" if his prepared speeches are characterized by *sound argument*, let him take courage, and not fret himself because he has not the power of quickly marshalling his thoughts for the purpose of framing a dashing reply. *Non omnes omnia possumus*. His is the heavy artillery which tells with lasting effect, though it fail

to effect the apparently immediate success of a brilliant cavalry charge. Has he, in "Rolla's" words, "logical continuity"? If so, we bid him

"Not bate a jot
Of heart or hope; but still bear up and steer
Right onward."

Practice and time will enable him to quicken the pace of his thinking, though he may never attain to great facility. To think very rapidly, and yet soundly, is too high a gift to be common.

Above all, let me urge "Timon" to pursue the very opposite course to that recommended by "Rolla" in his remarks on *analysis* and *synthesis*. How so able a correspondent as "Rolla" can have fallen into so grave an error puzzles me exceedingly. I could almost suppose that the printer had transposed the words "analytical" and "synthetical," and had thus made "Rolla" say the very opposite of what he meant! Surely it must strike every one that to *build* is a higher art than to *unbuild*—that to *establish a truth* is a higher achievement than to *detect a falsehood*! Truth is necessarily consistent, and hence "Rolla's" mistake leads him into an inconsistency which is almost ludicrous. "Cultivate," says he, "the *analytical* faculty;" and he then proceeds to recommend Euclid and Whately. This is almost equal to the celebrated word of command, "Advance backwards;" for Euclid affords the purest specimen of *synthetical* reasoning extant. He never *unbuilds*; but, commencing with definitions, postulates, and axioms, shapes stone by stone as they are required for his noble edifice. The only instances where Euclid departs from the synthetical mode (viz., in his *ex absurdo* demonstrations) are cases where even his gigantic intellect was unequal to what "Rolla" terms "the natural, pleasing, and easy" system of reasoning. "Rolla" refers also to Whately's "Logic." Is he aware that the "Analytical Outline" there *precedes* the "Synthetical Compendium"? I commend to his notice the following passage from the introduction to that work:—"The *synthetical* form of teaching is, indeed, sufficiently interesting to one who has made *considerable progress* in any study; and, being more *concise, regular, and systematic* . . . ; but the analytical is the *more interesting, easy, and natural* kind of introduction. . . ." *Synthesis* is the highest power of the intellect; it looks onward and upward, while *analysis* looks backward and downward. The omniscience of Deity is *synthetic*, seeing "the end from the beginning;" while man in his feebleness is often compelled, and generally willing, to content himself with the analytic process of looking back from the end towards the beginning. The *child* naturally *analyzes*; he pulls up the flower he has planted to see whether it grows; but the *man* patiently waits for *synthetic* proof in the gradual development of bud and branch. "Rolla" refers to the criticisms of reviewers; but if he examine he will find that their "grand productions" have seldom been reviews in aught but name; the title of a book has furnished the text of a disquisition, and not the subject of criticism. When mere analytical criticism has been the object, our reviewers have often signally failed, and not unfrequently greatly erred. "Satan" and "The Omnipresence of the Deity" flourish in spite of the brilliant exposures even of Macaulay. James Montgomery is wor-

thily appreciated, though Jeffrey denounced him as "an ingenious youth intoxicated with praise and weak too." Byron's fame has outlived the criticisms of the Edinburgh, and we travel sixty miles an hour by the express, though the Quartermaster General we should choose to be shot out of a cannon in preference to trusting ourselves to half that speed. It is the synthetic message and not the analytical criticisms of our reviews that are become "tablets of immortality" to their authors. Our advice, then, to "Timon" is, in order to obtain power in debate—learn to synthesize, thoroughly study each subject you take in hand and on the sure foundation of admitted facts build the temple of truth; you may then analyze with safety, for the incongruous pile of falsehood will betray itself to your gaze, and he who has put together truth will be at no loss in taking to pieces the patchwork of error.

We have remarked at some length on power in debate, in order to neutralize the mischief which might arise from "Solon's" error—a few words on that which "Timon" more especially requires after, viz., ease in debate. To obtain this, "Timon" must first acquire facility in expressing his thoughts. The single phrase, "prepared speeches" furnishes a key to the whole matter, for until "Timon" can trust himself to find words without previous preparation, he will never attain ease in debate. This is the secret of "Timon's" difficulty; while he is "preparing" the words as well as the matter which he would use in reply to one sentence of his antagonist, the succeeding sentences are missed, and in the vain endeavour to regain the thread of the hostile argument, the mind becomes confused and grows "confused" more and more, till, in its struggles to extricate itself, the whole subject becomes "enveloped in mystery." Words are but the outward apparel of thought; "Timon" must therefore, seek to seize the thoughts of an opponent's speech, and not to grasp its wadded mass, and he will find the number of his foes greatly diminished,

and the "confusion" of debate greatly simplified. Let "Timon's" only preparation be that of studying the subject. When the debate is in progress, let him endeavor to think with each speaker, without regarding his words;—"Timon" will then feel when and where the speaker goes wrong; his own mind (as he speaks) will be sensibly thrown out of step by every false step of his opponent. By this means he will be enabled to keep his own thoughts clear and to rise and pass the speech in which he has just listened in review, pointing out each latent error with merciless logic and convincing effect. In conclusion—Acquire verbal preparation, and seek to acquire fluency of expression. This may be done in various ways—by accustoming yourself to rapid and easy conversation, by frequently thinking aloud by silently inquiring the subject of your thoughts, and stating them immediately. Be content with plain grammatical language and avoid oratory in connection with debate; it has other and more legitimate provinces for its display. Look at Russell, Peck, Palmerton, Melmoth, Gladstone &c and learn of them they are the Titans of parliamentary debate but their great speeches are little show. In hostile debate, Truth must meet Minerva with her shield and spear, when proceeding the multitude, let her be attired by the Muses. D. B.

151 The History of Sunday Schools.—We are sorry that we cannot give J. Y. all the information that he seeks, for the history of Sunday schools is as yet to be written, or at least to be compiled, and the materials are few and far between. In the Sunday school periodicals, especially in "The Teachers' Magazine," will most probably be found scattered fragments or suggestive hints. If our friend resides in London, or ever visits it, we should recommend him to resort to G. F. Newson Esq., obtain admission to the Sunday School Union Library, and there refer to the works most likely to furnish the information which he desires.—J. A. C.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. IV.—How does "the spirit of order" exert itself? To what does the specific immutability of objects lead? In what does our liability to error begin to develop itself? Does perception yield real or apparent truth? How is the word Judgment used? What is the characteristic of Judgment, and how may it be subdivided? What are analytical Judgments, and in what do they result? What are synthetic Judgments, and in what do they result? What is Judgment intuitive? What is Judgment inferential? Of what may intuitive and inferential Judgment be regarded as mere modifications? What is definition? Why necessary? Why important? To how many things do words bear reference? Is there any distinction between real and nominal definition? On what does definition depend? What is our business in definition, and how may we effectually accomplish it? What constitutes an adequate

definition? What is the use of diagrams? Of abbreviation? For what purpose is description currently employed? What are the commonly-accepted distinctions between definitions? Explain each. What are the laws of definition? What is the difference between the explanation of words and the explanation of things?

Professor—Kant's, No. IV., Vol. II.

Senior—Memory and the association of ideas. Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, James Mill, Bentham, and Brown all furnish the groundwork materials. Preserve consistency with your speculations, however.—K. B. Each question must be written immediately before the answer to it.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercise in Grammar, No. XIII.

Junior Division.

Professor Exercise No. IV., Vol. III, p. 28.

Senior Division.

1. Write out the following, substituting the re-

neric verbs that qualify mood, and doubly underline those that qualify tense :—

I will come to you. I should have come yesterday, only that business was very pressing from another quarter. I am coming to-morrow. The poor are often oppressed by the rich. Thou art wiser than I am, but John is more loved than thou art. Do this for me if you can. Did you leave the parcel? What message did you receive? James shall attend school next week. He has done very little towards improving himself lately.

He might have improved if he had applied himself, but he has not. You may call at the library with these books. Now Charles has improved, is improving, and will be improving.

The righteous soul of Noah was vexed by the wickedness of the people of his day. The world has always hated religious truth, because it has been opposed to its deeds. Good men are commonly despised by wicked men. Those houses are being built by the squire. The mansion has been finished long since.

MODEL EXERCISE No. I.—*Vide* Vol. III. p. 78.

NOUN.	ADJECTIVE.	PRO- NOUN.	VERB.	ADVERB.	PREPOSITION.	INTER- JECTION.	CON- JUNC- TION.
Practice Parsing Perfection			will produce		in		
Parsing Time	perfect	you	practise will become		in		if
Man Friends Counsel	young many	he their	had heeded	not		alas!	but
Business		your you	attend will repay	diligently	to		and
Son Proverb Care Mouth Neck	An Arabic	my your	says take breaks	not		O!	that
Results Research Speculation Hostility Deductions Reason Convictions Conscience Dreams Recluse Pity Contempt Seeds Earth Vitality Opinions Face Community Triumph Insult Contempt Opinion Derision Errors Comeliness Truth Rancour Propagation Seed Hurricane Husbandman	deep extravagant new startling public cherished like	me thy which they their	provoke announced may excite call cast will rot germinate are endowed are thrown are uttered lose are scattered irritates blinds	seldom when meekly as forth like quietly only	of forth into according to with in		or but if and

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—I.

Question 1. 3 lb. at 4s. = 12s.
8 lb. at 7s. = 56s.

$$\frac{11 \text{ lb.}}{5 \text{ lb.}} = \frac{68 \text{ s.}}{10 \text{ s.}}$$

∴ as 11 lb. : 5 lb. :: 68 : £1 10s. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.
J. F—k L.

Question 2. At the end of 51 days there will be 75 days' provisions left; and, as this was to serve 870 men, it was equivalent to 870 × 75, or 65,250 days' provision for one man, but 870 + 500 = 1,370 men.

$$\therefore \frac{65250}{1370} = 47\frac{8}{137} \text{ days.} \text{—Ans. X.}$$

Question 3. Let there be x sheep, then the price of each in shillings will be $\frac{7956}{x}$; but by the

$$\text{question } (x-17) \left(\frac{7956}{x} + 3 \right) = 7956,$$

$$\text{or } 3x^2 + 7905x - 135252 = 7956x;$$

transpose and divide by 3, then $x^2 - 17x = 45084$;

$$\text{or completing square, } x^2 - 17x + \frac{289}{4} = \frac{180625}{4};$$

extracting square root and transposing,

$$x = \frac{17 \pm 425}{2} = 221 \text{ or } 204.$$

J. K.

Question 4. The amount of £1 for one year at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. = $1 + \frac{3\frac{1}{2}}{100} = £1.035$; and since the

amount of a sum of money at compound interest is equal to the given rate raised to the power of the number of years, and that power multiplied by the principal, we have $(1.035)^{20} \times 200000 =$ the required amount; whence, by the theory of logarithms, $20 \times \log. 1.035 + \log. 200000 = \log. A$.

$$\log. 1.035 = .0149403$$

20

$$\frac{20 \times .0149403}{1}$$

$$\log. 200000 = 4.3010300$$

$$\frac{4.3010300}{1}$$

therefore the amount required is,

$$39795.688 = £39,795 \text{ 13s. 9}\frac{1}{2}\text{d.} \text{—Ans. J. S.}$$

$$\text{Question 5. } \frac{756 + 871 + 965}{2} = 1296.$$

$$1296 - 756 = 540$$

$$1296 - 871 = 425$$

$$1296 - 965 = 331$$

$$\sqrt{1296 \times 540 \times 425 \times 331} = 313767.4 \text{ feet.} \text{—Ans.}$$

Question 6. Area of the whole circle, or 360°, = $54^2 \times .7854$;

$$\text{area of } 1^\circ = \frac{54^2 \times .7854}{360};$$

$$\therefore \text{area of sector} = \frac{54^2 \times .7854 \times 47\frac{3}{4}}{360} = 303.03068.$$

—Ans.

Question 7. The diameter of base,

$$= \sqrt{25^2 - 20^2} \times 2 = 30;$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{the area, } 30^2 \times .7854; \\ &\text{solidity} = \text{area of base} \times \text{perpendicular height} \times \frac{1}{3} \\ &= 30^2 \times .7854 \times \frac{20}{3} = 4712\frac{1}{2} \text{ cubic feet. R. M.} \end{aligned}$$

Question 8. The weight to be raised,
= $4712.4 + 1665 = 784614.6$.

The centre of gravity of a cone is, at a point in the axis, distant from the base $\frac{1}{4}$ of the length of the axis; therefore, the mean height to which the material must be raised = $\frac{20}{4} + 10 = 15$ feet.

$$\therefore \text{units of work} = 784614.6 \times 15 = 11769219.$$

W. H. R.

$$\text{Question 9. Sine } A = \frac{2}{bc} \sqrt{s(s-a)(s-b)(s-c)}.$$

Substituting the value of the quantities under the radical, as found in question 5, we have—

$$\sin. A = \frac{2}{bc} 313767.417 = \frac{627534.834}{840515} = .7466075$$

$$\therefore \text{angle} = 48^\circ 17' 50'', \text{ and}$$

$$\sin. B = \frac{2}{ac} 313767.417 = \frac{627534.834}{729540} = .8601787$$

$$\therefore \text{Angle} = 59^\circ 20' 12''.$$

Now, as the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,

$$180^\circ - (48^\circ 17' 50'' + 59^\circ 20' 12'') = 72^\circ 21' 58''$$

$$= \text{third angle. W. C. D.}$$

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—III.

19. What is the value of $\frac{1}{16}$ of a ship, $\frac{1}{8}$ of which is worth £1,400?

20. How much, avoirdupois, does £300,000 worth of gold weigh, at £3 17s. 6d. per oz. troy?

21. A room is 27 feet 8 inches long, 36 feet 9 inches wide, and 12 feet 6 inches high; how many cubic feet of air does it contain?

22. I have two horses and one saddle. The first horse in the saddle is worth £110; the second in the saddle, £70; and the horses are, together, worth £120. Required, the respective values of each horse and the saddle.

23. A train left London for Peterborough at the same time that one left Peterborough for London. The first arrived in Peterborough six hours, and the second arrived in London in three hours, after meeting. How long was each upon the road?

24. I have a cistern whose length is 10 feet, depth 6 feet, and width 7 feet, which I desire to make as large again, retaining the same proportions. What must be the length, breadth, and depth, when the desired alteration is made?

25. Wishing to find the distance of an inaccessible object from A, I ran a base line, A, B, and found the angle at A $37^\circ 51'$, and the angle at B $67^\circ 44'$. What was the distance of the object, the base line being 240 links?

26. The specific gravity of copper is 9000. Required, the diameter of a sphere containing a pound weight of copper, that will exactly float in water, no account being taken of the weight of the air that it would contain.

27. What would be the thickness of the copper in the above case?

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XVII.—LITERARY ÆSTHETICS.

BEAUTY—GRANDEUR—SUBLIMITY.

"THE cunning handiwork so fine," of which Nature is the result—

"Earth and ocean,
Space, and the isles of life or light that gem
The sapphire floods of interstellar air,
This firmament pavilioned upon chaos,
With all its cressets of immortal fire,
• • • • this whole
Of suns, and worlds, and men, and beasts, and flowers,
With all the silent or tempestuous workings
By which they have been, are, or cease to be"—

are capable of producing within the human mind certain pleasurable emotions, which metaphysicians have now pretty generally agreed to denominate Beauty, Grandeur, and Sublimity. In the immediately preceding paper we announced our intention of attempting to explain the genesis of these emotions, so far as that question affected rhetorical studies, and more particularly that department of these studies which we have denominated Literary Æsthetics. We are now called upon to implement the obligation contracted by that announcement, and are thereby forcibly reminded of the truism, that engaging to attempt a thing

"Is easier far than afterwards essaying it,
Just as to sign a promissory note
Is not so difficult as paying it."

It is not easy to entrap the evasive spirit of Beauty in a network of words. The most common emotions of man are those of which the *modus operandi* and the ultimate reason are least known to philosophers. The singular frequency and rapidity with which they flit through the chambers of thought render it a difficult task to bring such abstract evanescences before the mind. "They come like shadows—so depart;" nor will they readily return, though you do call for them. They stream like a tempest of dazzling mist into the brain, and vanish so speedily that we scarcely have time to say, They come. One cannot easily detain them for analysis, and the hasty signature they trace upon the memory is not readily decipherable. Hence it is that on these topics there is so much uncertainty. Hence it is that "the theory of Beauty" is so difficult of settlement. Hence it is that, although we have all been enraptured with the view of some object or objects which seemed to us

"Almost translucent with the light divine,"

we have yet felt puzzled to determine the (*στοιχῆτα*) *elements* of which it is made up—the (*id quod*) somewhat in which the feeling has its origin. This difficulty ought not, how-

ever, to make us despair. It is rather a reason for perseverance. The most pregnant truths have been those which were most intricately enwrapped with every-day phenomena. Gravitation, electricity, steam, &c., have only to be mentioned to prove that in the ordinary appearances which surround us sublime truths are hidden, imperceptible to the casual eye, but readily cognoscible by the ardent inquirer. In this sense Truth may, in the words of the old riddle, be said to be patent though latent—*patent* to the earnest-seeking, purpose-guided eye; *latent* to the incurious, unawakened, or volatile. The ideas which the words above mentioned indicate were involved in ordinary phenomena, and yet for a long time they baffled discovery; but now they have yielded up their secrets. Ought we not also to hope that a like success may attend our speculations if we pursue them humbly and cautiously? Yea, verily! and it is in this hope that we now write. Beauty is always coy, but seldom long insensible to honest admiration. Her fervent worshippers, we would fain inquire her parentage, birth, and nature.

“The spirit of the thing interpreted,
Is that which doth interpret.”

It is impossible for even the most cursory observer of Nature to fail in perceiving traces of harmony, adaptation, order, and beauty. Mathematical precision is perceptible in the ebbing and flowing of the ocean-tides—the diurnal and annual revolutions of the earth, and the consequent recurrence of light and darkness, seed-time and harvest. Inorganic Nature, whether examined in the valley, the plain, and rugged mountain-side, or in the ocean's deepest beds, presents to the eye of the spectator indisputable testimony that it exists under fixed laws, and that, in the midst of all her changes, these are changeless. Organic Nature possesses a like constancy and perpetuity amidst all the revolutions, progressions, recurrences, and apparent aberrations which she displays. There is neither chance, confusion, nor erraticism in creation. Every element is governed by its own positive and relative laws. These laws are ever-operative. Thus it is that the harmony and stability of the universe, throughout all its evolutions and revolutions, is maintained. *Purpose* is the word which solves the enigmas of Nature, and appearances are only manifestive of that purpose. As every objectivity has a part to perform in the fulfilment of a purpose, it must have a constitution completely and specifically adapted to the production of the effect which it is intended to accomplish. The degree of adaptability which they possess for the bringing about of the nascence and consummation of that predetermined effect constitutes the *utility* of objects. Everything which is truly adapted to the production of the end for which it was intended—everything truly useful—everything perfect in its nature—may therefore, in one sense, be called beautiful, and utility and beauty may be considered as mutually implicative. It was in this deeper sense that the Greeks named the universe *κοσμος*—beauty; and the Romans, *mundus*—ornament. Perfection implies at once the highest beauty and the greatest utility. Abstractly, therefore, we do not quarrel with the defenders of the unity of the useful and the beautiful—those who maintain that these *two* are *one*. The beauty of Nature, however, is unique and real—a product of the cosmoplastic power of God. All that He does must be fair and beautiful and good. Upon His works no pure mind can look without being thrilled with elevated joy—

“Inspired, delighted, raised, refined;”

and filled with holy thought. In this sense *the beautiful* and *the good* are one. The highest moral exaltation results from the clearest perception of the all-provident kindness of the MOST HIGH. But all merely scientific truth, and much that is healthily moral, is derivable from Nature—from the impressions which she makes upon our sense-organs, and hence upon the intellection. Hence also, in one sense, *the beautiful* and *the true* are one. Again, our sweetest associations come to the soul

“Bright from the hill-tops of the beautiful.”

How many pure delights, pleasing fancies, glowing aspirations, beautiful hopes, ecstatic joys, and temporary triumphs, entwine themselves with our reminiscences of places and objects! How multitudinously are our most exquisite ideas interknit with Nature's charms! Hereon does “the associative theory of beauty” attach itself with some slight semblance of right. We find, then, that the ideas implied in the words emotive pleasure, the useful, the good, the true, and the beautiful, have all been, to some extent, regarded as coincident, while in some cases they have been looked upon as mutually convertible. “Each is a hint of the truth, but far enough from being that truth.” That such a heap of confused notions should have been entertained regarding this topic might appear wonderful, did we not know the laxity with which words are employed by the people on the one hand, and the eagerness with which metaphysicians engage themselves in word-wars on the other. In this state of confusion, however, the subject of “Beauty,” even at the present hour, exists, and so long as this is the case, we are afraid that the consideration of “Literary *Æsthetics*” must be surrounded with difficulties—the labours of the critic merely empirical, and Rhetoric a baseless science. We would be less audacious than we have hitherto been—not, we hope, without good results—did we not endeavour, out of this strange chaos of thought, to construct some system of opinion possessed of symmetry and truth. To do so we think possible, and, craving your indulgence, shall essay it, although we know

“How mean our efforts and our actions are!
The space between the idea of man's soul
And man's achievement who hath ever past?
An ocean spreads between us and that goal
Where anchor ne'er was cast!”

Nature is a reality. Whatever exists in Nature conformably to the laws which govern it, and in the highest degree of efficiency for the accomplishment of those purposes which it was designed to effectuate, is beautiful *in Nature*, when looked upon with reference to the presiding intention of its existence. In this sense it may truly be said that

“Nothing comes amiss;
A good digestion turneth all to health.”

This deciphering of the handwriting of God upon his works must, unquestionably, produce emotions of admiration, and the perception of its loveliness. The beauty of the objects which Nature presents to us may be said to be of two kinds, viz.—1, Absolute; 2, Relative. Absolute beauty is that which is independent of time, place, circumstance, or matter—(“*das seyn in das werden*”) the changeless in the changing—that beauty which constitutes *the ideal*. This beauty is appreciated by every mind, the pleasure derivable from it

is enduring, and the associated emotions resulting from it are the loftiest in our nature. Absolute beauty is that general charm which Deity has bestowed on Nature, in that He constructed it in conformity with the laws which He intended should regulate our senses, and invested it with a halo of glory which should faintly forth-shadow the greater glory of the Architect of a universe so resplendent as that in which we have our habitation. Its perdurability is unquestionable, for amidst all the fleeting of opinion, ideas of beauty have never departed from the minds of men.

“ Neither now nor yesterday began
These thoughts. They have been ever, nor yet can
A man be found who their first entrance knew.”

Relative beauty is dependent on circumstance, matter, time, place, or other modifying influences. It changes as these change, and depends for its vividness and intensity upon these changes. The contingencies of intention, fitness, circumstance, &c., enter into the composition of this species of beauty. Situation, plan, efficiency, proportion, &c., are constituent elements thereof, and add their grace and comeliness to the object or objects in which absolute beauty inheres.

It would not have been essentially necessary to mention these differences in the emotional feeling of the beautiful, but that it might furnish an opportunity of remarking that utility and relative beauty are coincident, while the sphere and operation of absolute beauty was beyond “the circumspection and confine” of our notions of utility. Let the spirit of utilitarianism conquer as it may, man will never require to complain that

“ The beautiful is vanished to return not.”

Oh! it will never, surely, be impossible to taste those pleasures which the bard has so eloquently well expressed in the following passage:—

“ To see the sun to bed, and to arise,
Like some hot amorist, with glowing eyes,
Bursting the lazy bands of sleep that bound him,
With all his fires and travelling glories round him.
Sometimes the moon on soft night-clouds to rest
Like Beauty nestling in a young man's breast,
And all the winking stars—her handmaids—keep
Admiring silence while these lovers sleep,
Sometimes outstretched, in very idleness,
Nought doing, saying little, thinking less,
To view the leaves—thin dancers upon air—
Go eddying round; and small birds how they fare,
When Mother Autumn fills their beaks with corn,
Filched from the careless Amalthea's horn:
To view the graceful deer come tripping by,
Then stop and gaze, then turn, and know not why;
To mark the structure of a plant or tree,
And all fair things of earth, how fair they be.”

Of a few of the elementary ideas which, in greater or less number, appear to us to be implied in the term Beauty, and are originated in us by the perception of those objects which are denominated beautiful, we shall now endeavour to speak.

That Beauty is a compound idea will readily appear from the fact of the existence of such a diversity of opinion regarding it. Did that emotion arise from any *one* quality in objects, experiment might easily have settled the question. But because men persist in attempting to find *one* quality, or a *few* qualities only, which are the producing causes of the sense of the beautiful; or because they adhere to the opinion that if there are a few they must appear in some certain definite order and regularly graduated proportion, their theories have been vague, uncertain, and inapplicable, in whole, to the facts of experience. We shall endeavour to avoid this error. In order that our ideas on this topic may be reduced to form, we subjoin the following tabular view of the qualities of which we intend treating, viz.:—

I. UNITY { of origin. of subject. of proportion. of sequence. of variation.	II. SYMMETRY { in the graduation of unequals. in the consortment of equals.	III. MODERATION. { Chasteness. Refinement. Completeness.
IV. PURITY. { Material. Mental, i. e., suggestive.	V. PEACE, or EASE, { in present state. in transition.	

I. It will scarcely be denied that in all those things to which we apply the term beautiful—whether landscapes in nature, pictures, sculptures, or writings—a strict adherence to unity forms an essential element in our idea. This is what we mean when we speak of congruity or incongruity; something which makes us feel that the *oneness* of object has prevailed or has been neglected. If the former case, it forms a reason of preference in our mind; in the latter, a cause of dislike and disapproval. A different unity is, of course, to be looked for in the varying objectivities of which we predicate Beauty. The unity of sculpture differs from the unity of painting, and that of architecture from that of oratory or poesy. Hence we have enumerated some of the several species of unity which are observable in Nature and Art. Not that we are called upon to examine all these with minuteness, but that we might not be supposed to be more stringent in our requirements than truth warranted.

Symmetry might be supposed to be included in proportional unity. The symmetry, however, which we desiderate is that which insensibly allies itself with the notion of fitness or adaptation, conformity to an ideal, a graduation in accordance with the laws of the senses and the requirements of thought—unity so carried out, that not only will no part seem out of place, but that no part should seem capable of occupying any other position than it does without injury to the mental emotion arising from its perception—the conformity in all points of the external reality with the inward ideal.

III. Moderation implies freedom from exaggeration or extravagance. Temperance of treatment is necessary to conserve the calmness of the emotion of the beautiful, which never *in itself* rises above enraptured enjoyment. Immediately on the perception of anything which is super-elevating, it merges into a new feeling. Moderation demands the absence of all visible straining or effort in the production of an effect; struggle is alien to its nature—ease, mastery, full capacity to give ready and appropriate expression to the ideal. All that is tawdry, *bizarre*, or *outré*—all glare, bedizenment, as well as all that is

low or mean—is hereby excluded from forming any portion of the elementary ideas which constitute the beautiful. Chasteness, refinement, and completeness, must overrule all.

IV. Purity becomes a portion of the notions implied in Beauty, because that emotion forms one of the loftier feelings of our nature. It stands on the boundary-line between material and mental enjoyment, a strange compound of both, and as such extremely liable to abuse. It may form the primordial excitement to many of our evil propensities, and may thus lead to our gradual depravement, or it may form the earliest emotion which awakens in the breast the purest and the holiest thoughts. Shakspeare has said,

“Beauty is but a vain and doubtful good;”

and it would certainly become so, but that the law of purity operates in our approval of the beautiful. Nothing that is either physically impure, or expressly calculated to suggest impure ideas to the soul, can long retain the admiration of the healthy mind.

V. Peace, or Ease, is not less necessary than those elements which we have formerly mentioned. Calmness and evenness of mind, unruffled—or, at all events, but slightly agitated—feelings are essential to real enjoyment. Rapid change, hurried transition, excessive excitement, and energy too much and too frequently exercised, disturb the complacency of the soul, and injure the delight experienced by it.

We by no means assert that these elements must all, in equal and unvarying proportions, enter into each and every item which we call beautiful; but we do affirm that the greater number of these elements which can at one period enter into the mind on the beholding of an object, the more it is entitled to be regarded as really beautiful. The quantities may vary; some of these may even be omitted, while accidental elements gain place, and yet the object may be regarded as capable of calling forth the emotion, and be catalogued amongst things beautiful; but we are convinced, upon mature consideration, that the works of Nature, as well as the highest works of Art, of whatever sort, are distinguishably remarkable for their power of educing these elemental ideas, and these elemental ideas appear, to us, some of the component constituents of the beautiful. Even as the seven colours of the rainbow are couchant in the raindrops, ready to manifest themselves upon occasion given, so are these emotional elements ready to arise within the mind when fitting objectivities are placed before them, and to become ravelled and twined together into Beauty.

It will be observed that we have not spoken of any of the qualities which enter into the composition of the emotion of the beautiful, except such as were, in our opinion, generally characteristic of that feeling. Undoubtedly there are laws of form, colour, &c., which enter largely into art studies; but such considerations as these belong not to us in our present essay, which, being confined to “Literary Æsthetics,” is precluded from entering into the general “theory of beauty,” further than is necessary to illustrate the philosophy which operates in the production of the higher purposes of literature. This we have now done, we think, with so much fulness as may enable our readers to perceive the general laws which demand attention in rhetorical compositions, and to understand the groundwork of our future papers on that important element in literature, “Figurative Expression.”

Having bestowed so much attention as was possible, in consideration of our space, in speculations regarding the elemental constituents of the beauty-emotion, we shall have but

little chance of doing more than offering suggestive hints upon the mental genesis of the idea. This, however, we esteem it absolutely requisite to do, in order that our idea of the position amongst the fine arts which literature ought to assume may be fairly set before the reader, as the consequences of our doctrine upon this matter must materially affect all our after-teaching. We believe, then, that before the highest perception of the beautiful can be elicited, there are four clearly-marked stages of mental activity to be passed, viz.—1. Sense-perception; 2. Intellectual idealization; 3. Imaginative activity; 4. Emotional excitement. The respective results producible by each of these acts of intelligential motivity we shall endeavour briefly to indicate.

Sense-perception must at once be admitted as the great *inlet* of all ideas derivable from externalities. It is the *sine qua non* of mental excitement—the soul's imperial palace-gate—the inspective power through which all cognitive ideas enter the soul. Sense-excitement is the protogenetic element in the evolution of knowledge and emotion. Without it experience must be blank, and without experience and the results of the operation of experience upon the mind, wherein does human intelligence manifest itself? Ever and ever does the intellect receive thence fresh nutriment and *stimuli*. All nature pours there-through a revelation of herself; by sense man acquires the foundation-elements of knowledge—those which excite him to become “the interpreter of Nature.” Sense-perception is, therefore, the earliest stage in which the beauty of the universe can manifest itself. This it does in that it presents to the eye and the other senses those effluences from herself which, in accordance with the structural laws of the organs of sensation, are calculated to bestow delight. Hence the intense admiration which Nature receives in our early years, when the senses are healthy, and the mind is unallured by false pleasures.

Intellectual idealization is another of the prerequisite operations which the mind performs prior to its being placed fully under that “heavenly quintessence” of thought—the beautiful. As the poet says,—

“It is the mind that sees; the outward eyes
Present the object, but the mind describes.”

From the presentations of sense, and the representations of memory, the intellect is ever engaged in fashioning and evolving thought. “The sensuous impression we actually receive on the bodily organ cannot be by any means a complete prototype of the perception which follows it; a very small portion of the properties perceived is actually *given* in the physical affection. The impression, for instance, by which we become cognizant of solid figures is made on a perfectly flat surface, so that here the mind has to *complete* what is only imperfectly indicated to it from without. The organic affection, in fact, acts only as a suggestion, which excites the mind to an independent intellectual operation of its own; but it can never bring with it any complete pictorial counterpart of the subsequent mental phenomenon. The perceptive mind must, indeed, take cognizance of the physical stimulus, and start from it; in place, however, of merely receiving and propagating it, it converts it at once into a new mental phenomenon; and this *mental* phenomenon, coming as it does from a soul originally constituted in most perfect harmony with nature, is far more true to the entire objective reality opposed to it than any material impressions could possibly be. All our perceptive experience, in fact, is *idealized* from fragmentary impressions made upon the bodily organs, and those impressions could never come at all out of the sphere of

existence into that of *thought*, except as thus transformed and assimilated by the thinking mind."* The imprint of externalities upon the sense-percepiencies gives the elements, and intellectual idealization out of these elements constructs a whole. "No sooner is any form or movement given in *the outward*, than the spontaneity—the soul deploying itself under law, impressed on the one hand by God, on the other by Nature—conceives in her own depths a form or movement of the same order as that which is given, but such an one as is beautiful of its kind. This type, the creation of the reason, is, however, overlaid by the real object as given in sense or in memory, and this, being more vivid than that of reason, throws the latter into the shade, and so absorbs or confounds itself with it that the two cannot be separated till after much practice in this kind of analysis."† Perceptivity, Memory, Abstraction, and Generalization, unite their efforts to produce this ideal—this type of outward objects freed from their specialities, and perfected by that freedom.

Imaginative activity, or vividness of conception animated by the several incitements which association presents, seizes upon the sense-given and subsequently idealized phenomenon, and by an exquisite refinement of skill colligates this to other ideas possessed of resemblant qualities, knits them together into oneness—an ideal unity—and thus the delight experienced through the beholding or remembering of these is, in part, transferred to this. The subtlety with which the imaginative faculty operates may prevent us from being able to trace the processes by which she spreads her glorious enchantment over objects, but of the fact no one can be ignorant.

"Hence the wide universe,
Through all the seasons of revolving worlds,
Bears witness * * * * *
To Beauty's blissful power, and with the voice
Of grateful admiration still resounds."

There may be, here and there, some earth-dull being whose soul has never been stirred within him by such thoughts—men to whom the green ocean, the blue sky, the star-gloried night, the garden, the grove, the forest, the landscape brightened by the rising sun, the solitary wild flower blooming in the sward, bring no delight—men to whom all things are objects of calculation—who estimate a landscape at its market value, and tread upon the blue-bell as an unsaleable commodity; but these are, surely, the exceptions among mankind. The embruting influence of the lower passions has not, surely, eviscerated the love of Beauty from the hearts of men, and made them insensible to

"The charm
That senseless Nature o'er the sense of man
Diffuses."

And if it has not, we may rest assured that imagination has been there, investing all things with a witchery of its own—imparting to objects a light which is invisible to all who are unblest with the power of perceiving the harmonizing elements which exist in all things. The intrinsic qualities of objects call forth the sense-energies, and subsequently excite the

* "Elements of Psychology," by J. D. Morrell, pp. 123-5.

† "Inquiry into Human Nature," by Dr. Macvicar, chap. xii. p. 165.

intellect; but the imagination enhances the brilliancy of the light in which we view them, by throwing around them an atmosphere of purity.

“Borné dans sa nature, infini dans ses vœux,
L'homme est un dieu tombé qui souvent des cieux.” *

Imagination is the heaven-light which he bears within him—the purifying agency by which the defects of the earthy are withdrawn, and the exquisite loveliness of the ideal only retained. “Physical nature is but a shrine; thereinto our souls must enter to behold a soul.” Our life its own life lends to all. Beauty of form, colour, unity, proportion, &c., appear in dissevered elements in the natural world. Beauty of conception flows from the soul; imagination is the union-bond of the bodily and the spiritual—the externally-given elements and the mind-given conception. Thus “at our starting-point there is no ideal, but only real beauty, natural beauty, beauty enwrapped in the concrete, hid in complexness. As soon as abstraction (&c.) has disengaged it, it shines forth in all simplicity,” and imagination adds thereto

“The light that never was on land or shore.”

Emotional excitement results from imaginative activity.

“And how and why we know not, nor can trace
Home to its cloud this lightning of the mind.”

All true poetry is deeply though instinctively philosophical, and beautifully as well as truly has the bard of the “Seasons” given utterance to this same idea in these words:—

“Ten thousand thousand fleet ideas, such
As never mingled with the vulgar dream,
Crowd fast into the mind's creative eye;
As fast the correspondent passions rise—
As varied and as high.”

The beautiful cannot be otherwise than suggestive; thought and action are the purposes of human existence; emotion is the primary prerequisite to action; hence we see that from a perception of the beautiful, emotion must arise and action must result.

“We live by *admiration*, hope, and love;
And even as these are well and wisely fixed
In dignity of being we ascend.”

It is from mistaking this *ultimate* result for the whole process of thought involved in the word Beauty that “the associative theory” has been so universally accepted; but our readers can now see that it, no less than the utilitarian hypothesis, is only a partial view of the subject—exhibits it only in one of its manifold phases. Emotion is the *final end* of the existence of the beautiful, as action is the *intention* which emotion is specifically capable of producing.

We have thus far spoken of the *ingoin*g—the becoming and the consummation of the Beauty-emotion—of the genesis and purpose of those notions which that word implies. This we have thought advisable, because an acquaintance with the method in which the

* “Finite in his nature, infinite in his desires,
Man is a fallen god who remembers the skies.”—*Lamartine*.

emotions of the soul are called forth is the only true rule by which they may be reproduced. To produce the beautiful in perfection we must utter from an emotion, in order that we may originate an emotion.

“It is our fear, our hope, our love,
Makes all the splendour when we move—
Gives earth its light and bloom.”

“Out of the fulness of the heart the mouth speaketh.”

The sculptor or the architect translates the emotion with which his soul is agitated in form—the painter in form, colour, &c.—the musician in sounds, *i. e.*, they appeal to the emotions through our sense-perceptions. The man of abstract science reads off the beautiful in nature into intellectual idealization. Narrative and dramatic writers, as well as the popularizers of science, excite the imaginative activity. The poet and the orator wield the whole sweep of the emotional nature. “With language poetry can paint and carve; it can raise a fabric like an architect; and, to a certain extent, it imitates the sweet concord of music. It is, so to speak, the point where all the arts meet: it is *art* supremely; it is the power of expressing all with an universal symbol. . . . Poetry in itself is nearly equal to all the other arts combined, and excels each separate one.” *

The beautiful may, then, as a summary definition, be applied as a predicate to everything that is capable of appealing to the sense-organs in accordance with their constitutional laws—of originating in the mind the ideal—of calling the imagination into activity, and of producing as its ultimate results emotions pleasing to the mind; and that is most beautiful which can produce all these effects on minds of the highest and most universal culture. It is not the useful, the agreeable, the good, the true, although those objects which possess it are able to suggest each of these in different circumstances. It is a contemporaneous exertion of the sense-perception, the intellectual, imaginative, and emotional faculties, originated by objectivities formed in consonance with the laws of sense, and resulting in emotions of an elevating, refining, purifying, and pleasing kind—the shadow still retained by the earth of the spiritual hues of heaven.

Grandeur is a feeling which flows into the mind through the same channels as the idea of Beauty, but differs from that idea inasmuch as the objects which originate the notion of Grandeur have the capacity of exciting in the emotional nature of man both pleasing and disagreeable ideas, when those ideas arise in equilibrium, or nearly so, *i. e.*, when as many emotions of an agreeable nature mingle with those of a displeasing sort as equalize each other. The sense of Beauty is not so much suppressed as absorbed—not less vividly excited, but more energetically neutralized. This contest, as it were, of emotions, as it produces greater vividness, causes us to suppose that a greater elevation of mind has been attained. This, however, is not the case. Grandeur is the intermediate stage between Beauty and Sublimity.

Sublimity is a union of beauty with disagreeable feelings. “Terror hath a beauty even as mildness.” Objects which are gigantic, vast, obscure, dark, dangerous, strong, swift, possessing indications of violent or malignant energies, &c., exercise a strange fascination over the mind. Of course it is only when these emotions are indirectly felt or suggested, not

* Cousin “Sur le Fondement des Idées Absolues du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien,” p. 100.

when they are actually experienced, that sublimity is predicable. It implies such a contention of emotions as gives for a result the predominance of the repressive or disagreeable feelings, the idea of awe. Delight, sensuous pleasure, love, reverence, and struggle, commingle in the mind—the intellectual and emotional are strongly roused in conflict, and the awful in general preponderates. The beautiful, however, never wholly vanishes even from the austere form of the emotion of sublimity, but, like the rainbow which overarches a cataract,

“ Bears serene
Its brilliant hues with all their beams unshorn.”

The intensity of emotion may subordinate, but cannot wholly obliterate, the magic light of Beauty and the deliciousness of feeling which accompanies it.

We have been compelled to be tediously dull and prosaic on one of the most poetical of topics, because we wished to subordinate our speculations to a useful end. That end will be better subserved by implanting in the minds of our readers fixed ideas, than in surfeiting them with the bauble jewellery of tinselled expression. The end in view was to lay a scientific, *i. e.*, a philosophic, foundation for the consideration of all topics bearing relation to Literary Taste. We have gone thus lengthily into the discussion of the topic because of the unsettled and chaotic ideas which seem to float through the popular mind upon æsthetical subjects. If we have been able to do what we desired, our readers shall now be capable of giving a reason for their æsthetic faith, and be furnished with the means of testing the real worth of those ornaments of style which prevail in literature, as well as to perceive the forms in which thoughts may be most advisably moulded. Grace, Beauty, Picturesqueness, Grandeur, and Sublimity, form the series of æsthetic qualities of which Poetry and Oratory—in truth, all real Literature—is an embodiment. We hope that we have now so systematized the theory of Taste as to enable us philosophically to pursue our inquiries into the laws which regulate figurative expression—the beautiful manifested in thought-utterance. Our pages have, we fear, been “*sicklied*” o’er with [more than] “the pale cast of thought,” for life does not flow so joyously through our veins as it did. With a far different meaning than was included in the same expression when we used it in these pages three years ago, we can now say, “The aspect of the world is becoming altered.”

Philosophy.

WOULD EDUCATION ERADICATE CRIME?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

In bringing this interesting debate to a close, it devolves upon me to sift the arguments brought forward by the writers on the negative of the question, and to see if any have been produced sufficiently potent to destroy those used by the supporters of the affirmative. The reader will be struck by the perfect similarity of the modes of treating the question by the latter, though their arguments may be clothed in a somewhat different garb, and enunciated with greater or less force. It may be well to refer to the opening affirmative article, and, by comparing the reasoning there adduced with that

advanced by our opponents, test the strength or weakness of the former.

First, then, it was desired to show that the cause of crime was threefold—a predominance of the animal nature, external excitement, and ignorance. B. W. P. says, "Without venturing to speculate upon the nature of crime, it may yet be desirable for our purpose to premise this much concerning it—that it is not a product of the intellect. Crime is an offence strictly against the moral law." But is it not absolutely necessary first to define the cause of crime, before we shall be able to declare whether education will eradicate it or not? Unless the cause is removed, the manifestations will never cease. However, so far as B. W. P. goes, he has not at all opposed our assertion; for we make crime dependent upon a deficiency of intellect and moral power. S. A. J. asserts "poverty to be the most prolific parent of crime." Doubtless it acts as one potent circumstance in the development of a large class of crime; but before it can be thus developed the criminal nature, or that state consequent upon partial growth, must exist; for virtue is not a monopoly of the rich. How is the rectification of this want—of this inequality—to be brought about? But it must not be lost sight of, that the poor are generally also the ignorant; and it is very questionable whether the crime that S. A. J. imagines is caused by poverty would exist to so large an extent were the poor better instructed. Statistics, as will be presently shown, fully confirm this opinion; and it may be maintained—and the result of our ragged schools bear out the assumption—that many a criminal would give the necessary impulse to his moral nature, did he know that the course he is pursuing is an evil one. Having been trained, however, to believe wrong right, he persists in the belief, and denounces society for tyrannically restraining him. And if we take the scriptural view, as given by F. J. L. in his elaborate and clever article on the negative side, viz., that sin is consequent upon the fall of man, we come to much the same result. Man was so formed that his religious, moral, intellectual, and physical natures were in perfect harmony; but having fallen—this harmony no longer existing—one nature has the predominance, and enslaves the rest. When the physical nature thus predominates, we

have the most fruitful source of crime. I see nothing in this opposed to the scriptural view: it is likewise in harmony with common sense.

The second point treated is the nature of education. It was asserted in the opening article, that education does not consist merely of the development of intellect, nor of the moral or physical powers alone, nor of the religious sentiments and emotions by themselves, but in the educating of the whole faculties and natures of a man; for, as "Sigma" very truly observes, "*Educare* (to lead out) may be as reasonably applied to pure secular instruction as to the development of the higher emotions of the soul." And it may be well here to remark that I have to thank "Sigma" for drawing my attention to a decided defect in the affirmative opening article, in which I have given a greater predominance to the purely religious education than further thought would altogether warrant; for, although I do believe it to be the highest kind of education, it alone would prove as ineffectual as that which has for its end the development of the intellect only. But although the religious education (let it not be confused with religious instruction—the two are very distinct) is insisted on, perhaps to an extreme, it will, by a careful perusal, be seen that the work of the educator is not confined to it, but, as the other powers and capacities of the human being are educated, they should be placed in a subservience to the highest natures. And not only is "education" a very comprehensive term, embracing the process of evolution of man in his entirety, but also with regard to the time over which this process is spread—it is one that commences with the first dawn of life and ends only as the eyes are closed in death. And does it end then? Shall we not say that then is its true beginning, when the being expands and regains the lost image of its divine Creator? Carlyle beautifully says, "The expressly appointed schoolmasters and schoolings we get are as nothing compared with the unappointed, incidental, and continual ones, whose school hours are all the days and nights of our existence, and whose lessons, noticed or unnoticed, stream in upon us with every breath we draw." The view of the development of the entire man being embraced by education is well treated by "Cosmopolite," and merely requires reite-

ration here to show that our opponents have not treated the subject in this light at all. Thus B. W. P. pointedly says, "Crime being, then, not the offspring of the intellect—nor, indeed, for its existence dependent upon any state of the intellect—how could the most careful, the most refined training of the intellectual powers abate, or, as the question is, eradicate the evil?" S. A. J. says, "They forget that education may, indeed, make the head more capable of designing, and the hand more skilful to execute; but that it cannot affect the passions, the inclinations, and the desires, alike common to the king and the beggar, the philosopher and the clown, and to which when unrestrained every power, both of mind and body, is but an obedient slave." And F. J. L. cites extracts from Alison, in which the writer evidently has reference to a similar kind of education. The point is granted; such an education is not adapted to eradicate crime; but we have no right to confine our remarks to any one phase of it. The gymnast educes the physical muscles as essentially as the teacher those of the moral or intellectual natures.

In the third place, we point out the relation between education and crime. B. W. P. appears to acknowledge the conclusion we arrive at, for he says, "Crime, then, has its root in the moral nature of man; if this, the soil, be well tilled and purified, then is the rank and noxious weed subdued." This is granting the very point for which we are contending. How is this soil to be tilled, save under some educational process? The development of the being in his true relation to God and the world will set evil at defiance by making him superior to the temptation. We know that "for nineteen centuries the purest system of morals we can conceive of has been in existence in the world," and still evil exists; but is it not because it has been *taught* to those entirely unprepared to receive it? We look at religion as a something to be given by means of lessons, and forget that, to be made a ruling principle in the heart, we must *grow into goodness*; and this growth can only take place by educating ourselves, by tilling the soil, affording favourable conditions for the growth of the divine gem. "The religious life consists of an eternal progress towards the Infinite Perfection." It is a *continual growth, and the consequence of*

the education of the religious nature, as much as the growth of the intellectual or physical power is the result of the processes to which they are submitted. Religion is, indeed, the highest act of education to which we can yield ourselves. I must confess I cannot sympathize with the fear expressed by S. A. J., that, by educating those at present illiterate and contented, we shall make them discontented, and implant "in them new desires they cannot satisfy," and "place in their hands new resources for attacking the social edifice." Does S. A. J. intend to infer that the capacities and faculties of some men were intended to be developed, and some not? and yet this is the legitimate conclusion from such an assertion. But it is impossible, supposing it to be desirable, to keep these men in ignorance; they will know something; and the question is, shall they be taught intelligently or not? They will be politicians, for instance, for many acts of the legislature affect them more than the higher classes: shall they be intelligent politicians or the reverse? If it be true that they are at present contented, desiring no amelioration of condition or intellectual improvement; if they will know nothing further than that they have to receive what their masters determine to give them, and pay whatever is demanded of them for the necessities of existence, asking no questions, and desiring not to know whether they are imposed upon or not, we must regret the fact, and declare most emphatically that it is the best evidence of a morbid and unhealthy tone of the whole of their being. But it is not so. Though in a great measure untrained, there is a large share of rude intelligence and inquisitive curiosity among the labouring masses; and I would put it to S. A. J., to whom would he prefer committing his worldly goods, to the instructed artisans of the present period, or to the perhaps more contented but illiterate rabble of any former time? But S. A. J. makes an admission that is favourable to our view of the subject, viz., "that if the head and the heart are alike educated, we shall come near to an earthly paradise." We thank F. J. L. for referring us to Plato's "Meno," and regret that we are unable to profit, as he intended we should do, by his reference to Thomson's "Castle of Indolence." It has but two cantos, and hence we were unable to find the forty-first;

and we cannot perceive any relation to the subject under discussion in the sixtieth and sixty-first stanzas of either the first or second canto. Plato does not appear antagonistic. He says, indeed, "Virtue can neither come by nature, nor be taught; but by a divine fate is present to those to whom it is present without intelligence." We have asserted pretty much the same thing—that, though we may educate or develop virtue, acting in accordance with our monitions of right, it is quite impossible to teach it. And this seems to be the gist of Plato's dialogue. And, while accepting F. J. L.'s definition of "education," and the deductions he draws from it, we cannot allow them all the weight he appears to desire. Man in his partially developed state requires this educative process; "he has the natural tendency to fall away from moral rectitude;" but what is the use of the religious discipline, if it does not as naturally tend to rectify this, and, by a harmonizing development, cause the tendency to follow right to predominate over that of doing evil? Gain this point, and education will no longer be necessary, nor will the declension from moral rectitude be natural. Again; he asks if laws could be so multiplied as "to provide for every contingency that should occur?" With the education we insist upon we shall learn when we are infringing upon the rights of our neighbour; and, having the divine law of right implanted and educed in our hearts, and the verbal laws enunciated, "Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you," and "Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself," nothing more is necessary. It is next demanded if we would give the same education to a gentleman, banker, statesman, professional man, and the labourer? We certainly should never think of *instructing* these in the same manner: but

F. J. L. is here confounding instruction with education. It must not be forgotten that there is a substratum on which these accidents are grafted which is common alike to all; and while we would instruct the gentleman, the banker, and the labourer in those branches for which he is likely to feel the want in after life, we would educate each to be men. Many exercises, it cannot be denied, that are given with the simple intention of imparting knowledge, have an educational tendency; but, unless the idea of development is kept constantly in view, the proportion of instruction to the receptive capacity is totally lost sight of; and while we may make living cyclopædias recipients of the opinions of all ancient and modern philosophers and thinkers, not one of such opinions will have been properly digested or made their own. And now, lastly, F. J. L. makes extracts from an essay by Alison. I have not seen the original essay, and am unable to test the statistics he has advanced in support of his theory. How can they be reconciled with those published by government, which, in 1848, I find were as follow?—

Classes of Criminals.	Males.	Females.
Those unable to read or write	7,530	2,161
Those able to read and write imperfectly .	13,950	3,161
Those able to read and write well	2,634	350
Those who had received instruction superior to the above	76	5

While the centesimal proportion, compared with the four years preceding, was:—

Classes of Criminals.	1844.	1845.	1846.	1847.	1848.
Those unable to read or write	29 77	30 61	30 66	31 39	31 93
Those able to read and write imperfectly .	59 28	58 34	59 51	58 39	56 38
Those able to read and write well	8 12	8 38	7 71	7 79	9 83
Those who had received instruction superior to the above	42	37	34	28	27
Those whose education had not been ascertained	2 41	2 30	1 71	1 65	1 59

These returns clearly speak for themselves, and require no comment.

And now I leave the subject in the hands of our readers, and beg to thank the affirmative writers for their able support, and those

in the negative for the kindly spirit in which the discussion has been prosecuted.

G. P. W.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE first part of our duty is the correction of two errors of the printer, which occur in our opening article, and which are just unfortunate enough to give inconsistency of expression, without being so palpably erroneous as to correct themselves. In one of them we are made to say that we would not "underrate" the eradication of crime by certain methods which only tended to a diminution; and in the other we are made to identify secular education with education exclusive of the "mental" faculties. The substitution of *undertake* for "underrate," and of *moral* for "mental," will restore consistency to these passages.

If there had lingered in our mind at the time we penned that article any misgivings as to the position we had chosen, such misgivings would be effectually dispelled at the point to which we are come. At any rate, having adopted the negation, we will not now disown it. Confirmed by the unanimous testimony of friend and foe, it commends itself to our support, not only as the truth of our adoption, but also as a truth altogether conceded to us. Do we reckon without our host? It were poor gains to our cause to do so, as well as contrary to our practice; and were we not certain of substantiating our calculation, we would not rest a triumph on so sorry an expedient.

Impartial reader, you who have followed the controversy from beginning to end, we put it to you whether our assertion as to the unanimous testimony to the inefficiency of education to eradicate crime be not a warrantable one. For you will observe, that although a specific has been found, and named by the name of education, and guaranteed (by two out of three advocates without doubt or drawback) to be the true restorative to moral innocence, that specific has not been *education* in the received sense of the term, that is to say, in the sense meant in the terms of the inquiry. We will quote from each of our friends opposed to us in confirmation of this statement. "Education," says G. P. W., "in its highest phase is essentially a religious act. It is the de-

velopment of the religious feelings and motions in the heart, a continual cultivation of reverence, veneration, and obedience to God, and love to our fellow-creatures"—(nothing less than the enforcement of the decalogue, it will be observed); while to make us quite sure that his standard is thus the loftiest of its kind, we are cautioned against the notion that religious instruction is "mere training in connexion with some of the numerous denominations of Christians, instruction in credal catechisms, or verbal repetitions of scripture texts." It is an education so holy in its purpose, and so untiring in its work, that the very "causes of sin," in relation to one class of criminals, are to be "done away with," and even "those grown aged in sin are not to be abandoned." "Dromo" follows in the same wake. He says, "The reason crime is so prevalent is, not because religion forms a part of our education, but because *religion is not properly taught*. For many years past we have had, not christian, but sectarian doctrines taught in our schools. When the day comes that a new order of things prevails—sectarianism supported by pure religion—then the children, upon becoming men, will consider crime as not only an outrage upon man, but as an outrage upon God, and first hate, then shun it." Again: "Make a man not only know, but *feel* the performance of a certain action to be a crime, and he will abstain from it." "Cosmopolite" is still more unmistakable: "The subject of education is man, in all the vastness and mystery of his nature, as the off-spring and image of the Supreme; the object of education is spiritual life; the period of education includes the whole duration of the present state of being. Education or culture being a design, running like a thread through life, and entering the regions of the unseen and eternal, is lost to mortal sight, and ends we know not where." Again: "The specific for moral evil is the influx of eternal love." Such, then, is education according to our friends. It is far ahead of our question, inasmuch as the actual rarefaction of the earthly

into the heavenly was not demanded, but we have no reason to quarrel on that account.

Nor is it our purpose to restrict the applicability of the term education. Our friends may apply it, if they choose, to that process whereby man is brought to an observance of divine law, and prepared for a higher state than the present. That there is such a process, all who believe in moral government will acknowledge; some think, with "Cosmopolite" and his friends, that it is a process chiefly communicable through direct human agency, by which the mind is taught, the heart touched, powers of goodness inherent in man's nature are educated, his love of virtue developed till it becomes perfect, and the subject of it assimilated to God himself. Others believe it to be a divine appliance whose agencies comprehend, besides human aid, all the connexions and circumstances of life; which disciplines for duty by experience; by life's sorrows educating ability of endurance; by its blessings, consecration, and love, comprehending, moreover, as its grand distinction, a more direct method for freeing the spirit from sin, and uniting it to God.

Now, whether our friends may confine themselves to the first of these processes, or, after due consideration, see the propriety of incorporating with it the second (and we think they will be anxious to incorporate at least a portion of it; for although they may not care much about their credit as theologians, they will not endanger their reputation as philosophers so much as to deny the educative character of *experience*), we say that, whatever be their regenerating system, still it is not *education* in the sense meant in the terms of our inquiry. Not education in the sense in which the word is current amongst us—not education in the sense which the originators of this debate designed it to be understood. To suppose that it is, is to suppose, either that they are inattentive to propriety of terms in framing an inquiry, which of all errors they would be the least likely to commit, or to involve them in the more serious suspicion of advertising a debate as on a popular question, which debate was designed to be on a question possessing no peculiarity of popular interest. If they had meant to inquire if *religion* would eradicate crime they would have said religion, though they would

know perfectly well, at the same time, that religion was a high species of education. Education, as practical amongst us, has not, in the whole range of her moral chemistry, a process whereby such a conversion may be effected in poor humanity—captivated by temptation, and too willing to transgress in spite of knowledge—as that henceforward these circumstances of its condition shall be subdued; and, according to G. P. W., "the religious feelings and motions developed in the heart;" or, according to "Dromo," "Crime hated, then shunned; man made to feel, so that abstinence from crime shall follow as a result." Education, in the sense meant, is not "a specific for moral evil," as averred by "Cosmopolite," nor does the "period of its operation include the whole of a man's being, extending into the regions of the unseen and eternal," but necessarily, from its very purpose, it is to fit for temporal duties, while from the difficulties which lie in the way of study in age, it is confined to the earlier part of life. We say, "purpose to fit for temporal duties," in confidence that the terms of the debate justify us here in thus confining the province of education, for it would show a ridiculous exaggeration, or rather, a ridiculous unappreciation in our calculations of means and ends, to inquire if a process producing *spiritual life* would eradicate an evil belonging to an inferior state of existence. Study Education in her records, in the reports of her commissioners; or, if these be found wanting, in the sanguine theories in which she still remains untried, so that you do not trench upon something else known as *religion*, and you will discover no purpose of "spiritual life." The process leading to it is beyond her pretensions.

It would seem, however, that in the case of one of our friends, at least, there is not that complete faith which generally precedes a guarantee, and which his devotion must have deemed desirable. Even the system which he has unwittingly assisted to send forth with borrowed credentials does not seem to commend itself to his confidence to the extent it is trusted by his less scrupulous brethren; though how G. P. W., after having avowed such a hypothetical doctrine, as that, in the case of one class—the ignorant, "Education would give them an immunity from crime if they be placed in circumstances which do not appeal to for-

cibly to their animal natures," could leap the gap between it and the conclusion that "education taken in hand in an earnest and universal spirit will eradicate crime," is a mystery, doubtless, clear to his own mind, but which he has certainly forgotten to make clear to others. "Dromo" and "Cosmopolite" venture a full warranty, outspoken and absolute; the former in particular, with a valour which is quite refreshing in these days of degeneracy, "dares any one to deny that an education, intellectual, moral, religious, and practical, will make a man detest crime as he would a serpent;" by the way, an infelicitous association of thought, seeing that there prevails a previous association of the serpent with crime, the serpent being the *allurer* and *conqueror* of human nature, which, if but a figure, is yet a true representation of the fascinating nature of crime. Now, with due respect for your sincerity, "Dromo," but with none for your defiance, we do deny your absolute doctrine, and, were it necessary, we should not hesitate to join issue with you and your friends upon it, granting you for a moment your explication of education, and to show that the hypothetical doubtful thesis admitted by your leader, G. P. W., is the more becoming; and that you have committed as great an error by over-estimating the merits of your system, as that which you fell into by borrowing them for the occasion. What data have you more than we possess to determine the matter? You may glorify the future, but you cannot draw inferences from it; these must come from the past, for which you have so little respect; and certainly the past will not befriend you. If you had made a discovery, if your system of education, "intellectual, moral, religious, and practical," differed essentially from that which our forefathers have handed down to us, your argument would lie in the discovery itself, out of the jurisdiction of opposers. But you do not maintain originality in this matter. We cannot understand, as we intimated at the outset of the debate, that you have purer ethics to teach, higher cardinal virtues to enforce, better rules of social duty to inculcate among mankind than those understood already. We really cannot admit that men have been so ignorant of these, or that they have been so *partially inculcated by sectarianism*, that

in such ignorance or partial instruction may be found the reason why these laws have not operated to a greater extent to the prevention of crime. This is a serious point of difference between us, and one, therefore, which ought to be fairly considered and fairly dealt with by both parties. Granting that rules have not been fully apprehended, and granting, further, that a fuller knowledge of them would have been followed by a proportionate effect upon crime, we ask, Is there a man amongst us who sins against his neighbour, who would not, were the injustice done to himself, reason upon his wrong with the utmost nicety of morality? If there be, we should say, he is an unpromising subject for education. Right and wrong have their life in a man's own consciousness—rules are but their abstraction. The secret power of the golden rule is in the very appeal which it makes to this inherent sense. Is it right, then, to make ignorance a chief point of our preamble, even though it should be true that sometimes the knowledge within perceives but a dim reflection of itself in rules without? Or, if it be insisted upon as essential to an understanding of principles, that there shall be an application of them by outer influences so that what knowledge the mind already possesses in its own consciousness shall be thereby educed and matured, then we point to examples, unhappily too notorious to be called in question. It is well known that what is termed polished society shares in the common affliction occasioned by delinquent members. We might take the inebriate man, the sensual, or the gambler, or the union of the three. He is a gentleman, a scholar, perhaps a *divine*—quite a possible case. Here there is no ignorance of law, divine or human. Motives which among other men might be but feeble, are here strengthened by a variety of circumstances. Self-respect, consistency, recognition of duties arising out of superior attainments and station, and the maintenance of so exalted a position, might be expected to have the utmost influence which motives possess. Yet have they all failed. Though backed by the penalties of disobedience in their most costly, confiscating form, which might be presumed the most effective in the case of tenacious human nature—though the transgressor has been educated in the ordi-

nary sense of the term, and then morally educated by even a higher process than it appears to us our friends speak of, inasmuch as it is a process in which, by the wise arrangements of Providence, crime itself, the very thing it is their object to eradicate, is a *means*, by being, as it were, the lightning of the moral atmosphere, self-destructive, and subservient to ultimate good—though religion has urged her claims in tender accents, bespeaking the affections by her own peculiar graces of love and mercy,—yet is obedience not secured, plainly confirming the testimony of all experience, that human passions may not be sanctified, though kept in check by education and other influences, and in some cases, by their assistance, approximated to the holy.

We think there can be little more said upon the subject; and we are quite sure that, from a desire not to be wanting in due attention to our friends, we have pursued it far beyond what the occasion demanded. We have shown, first, that there has been a departure from the usual signification of the term education, and which signification was intended by the terms of the debate; and we have next shown, that, even allowing such a departure, there are no grounds for supposing the object attainable. If, after all, our friends will adhere to a system, some theory which, passing under the designation of "intellectual, moral, religious, and practical," is yet independent of what we know belonging to intellect, morals, religion, and practice, and therefore inaccessible to our reasoning, see what their theory involves:—an undefinable means of attaining to innocence; its teachers models of innocence, having such a remarkable power of insight as to completely ken the several diverse mental constitutions, characters, and dispositions of every subject of their instructions; able, besides, to make a child *feel* what is right (for "Dromo" will have him to feel as well as know it), and so accurately to apply the system to each and every individual, that, although the passions will still exist, and temptations allure as before, a complete and universal freedom from crime shall be ensured. It must be a freedom *entire in individuals*, and universal *throughout the world*; for eradication means *nothing less than this*. A partial freedom is *not the object of the inquiry*.

Should our friends repudiate such a theory, and confine their professions to an improved adaptation of faculties and means already existing, an equally absurd set of conditions is involved. There must be this perfect acquaintance on the part of the teacher with the differing capabilities and characters of his pupils, and his system must give him entire control over their conduct and even over their feelings (according to "Dromo"), while under his care, and also supply an automaton power which shall act with unceasing regularity throughout life; else is crime not eradicated. With a being so singularly inapt to teach as man in general, having against him refractoriness just in its vigour, together with the newly-awakened passions, formed for gratification, but as yet unfortified against the abuse of it, the training of youth into the contemplated obedience must be impossible of attainment; and, at the risk of being deemed a heretic, we will venture to say, was never intended in this heterogeneous world of ours. What "Dromo" calls "a divinely-attested command," viz., "Train up a child," &c., we should rather consider a statement of ordinary result, by no means unexceptionable; and one of the best proofs we can give of this is the history of him who gave utterance to these words.

Considering that *eradication* has a partial meaning, we were the more surprised to see a "neutral article" on this question. Our friend "Sigma" has a wise mistrust of extremes, but in the present instance he has been unsuccessfully cautious. We imagine the opposition must have said, on reading his article, "He that is not with us is against us." To the query "Sigma" has addressed to ourselves, as to "whether education has done nothing to check crime?" we reply, Yes, a great deal; which he will find acknowledged in our former article. How "Sigma" could mistake us here, and how he discovers that we deem "education at variance with the Bible," we are unable to understand. We know that many who have great reverence for education, have little for the book which contains the sum of all morality: but that we supposed that education and the Bible were antagonistic is a misapprehension, not supported by any thing we have said. When a friend volunteers as dayman between belligerent parties—

he is generally supposed to discern the precise points of difference; however, as "Sigma" has given us such good assistance in the main question, it would be ungrateful on our part to make reflections. So, holding out to him and to all our friends the frater-

nal hand, we bid them God-speed, assuring them that although differing from them as to what comes within the bounds of accomplishment, we are their fellow-helpers in the work of education.

B. W. P.

Politics.

OUGHT THE GRANT TO MAYNOOTH TO BE WITHDRAWN?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

I FULLY agree with X. in the antiquity and universality of the religious tendencies of mankind, in the general influence of religion upon the public and private duties of men, and in the duty of rulers to encourage the religious development of the people; but I cannot divine the process by which X., from these premises, arrives at the conclusion that it is the duty of government to provide *any one, or any number of religions*, for the people. The question is not, does the constitution provide for an establishment; but does *truth, equity, and law*, permit the particular grant to Maynooth, or not. I have already shown in page 113, on the authority of Paley, that, even admitting the Protestant establishment to be allowed and allowable, consistency and truth require the withdrawal of the grant from Maynooth, because, "if the *provision* which the law assigns to the support of religion *be extended to various sects and denominations* of Christians, there exists no national religion or established church, according to the sense which these terms are usually made to convey;" and, on the other hand, were the Protestant church in Ireland to be severed from the state, and its resources withdrawn entirely, no justifiable reason would be given by this action to endow Maynooth, or any other phase of religious development. The question really at issue would be literally untouched; therefore the high-sounding, stereotype declamations of our utilitarian friends on the anomaly of the Irish church, and the title of the "two great churches" of the country—the injustice to Ireland, the "first of the ocean" and "land of the brave," are all far wide of the question at issue.

It is beating the bushes in the dark, while the citadel is far distant in safety and peace. I grant Ireland is misgoverned—sadly misgoverned—and, withal, priest-ridden to perfection. These are topics which it is our bounden duty, as men and brethren, to consider, and, as far as in us lies, to amend; but let us attend to these at a proper time, or egregious folly attaches to our conduct. The question now before us is, Ought the grant to Maynooth to be withdrawn? I say, to be consistent with truth, it ought to be withdrawn; because man is a voluntary agent, religion is a personal, individual matter, and religious exertions are necessarily of the same nature as the sources from which they spring, viz., voluntary; therefore their support and adoption cannot be compulsory.

The grant ought also to be withdrawn on the principles of equity. The grant is made from the Consolidated Fund, the general revenue of the country—from the taxes paid by every individual, whether he be Protestant, Catholic, or Dissenter. Each is compelled to contribute his share, according to the use he makes of the taxed articles in the supply of his daily wants and necessities; thus he cannot escape from the burden, however onerous it be to his conscience, as to escape would necessitate a breach of the civil law, by his refusal to pay taxes. Moreover, his refusal to pay taxes involves his refusal of the common necessities of life; hence, to escape the payment of his share of the expenses of Maynooth, he must escape from the world, or at least from the nation. Now, I affirm that this is "the greatest injustice of modern times," friend X., when "the teeming Protestant and Dissenting

population" of England, Ireland, and Scotland are required to pay for the propagation of that which is inimical to the best interests of the community—which professedly seeks to destroy their national prosperity, and deprive them of the glorious liberty to think, feel, and act as conscience dictates, and the statute-book of the great Eternal commands. It cannot be validly objected to this, that the Irish Protestant church exacts tithes, church rates, and such things, from the Irish Roman Catholic; these undoubtedly are unjust extortions, but the Papist and Dissenter stand on equal footing here. They may resist; their loss, in this case, is bounded by the forcible restraint upon a portion of their effects, and still they may enjoy the necessities of life, with many of its comforts, and preserve a clear conscience. Compare the two cases—the grant to Maynooth from the Consolidated Fund, and the support of the Irish Protestant church by tithes and church rates. Both are unjust; but, if there can be degrees in injustice, surely that which deprives man of sustenance to avoid the infringement of conscience is the *monster* injustice. Reflect also, friend X., that Ireland and England are precisely in the same relation to the *establishment*. Church rates and tithes are forced from Dissenters and Papists in the latter as well as in the former. There appears to me something so hollow, so unsound, in the rantings of those who would be considered the fast friends of Ireland and true patriots—who parade the *long-coined* and much-used phrases of justice to Ireland and religious equality for her children, while they add by their influence and their oratory to that incubus which oppresses the Irish, which has destroyed their manliness, taught her brave sons and her fair daughters treachery, deceit, low cunning, and every vice which can distort the fair proportions of her frank, open, ardent, and sincere soul. Out upon such false friends! Give me the heart that will raise and exalt its fellow—that will make common cause against the direst foe of man, an intolerant priesthood—that will not only assist the injured and oppressed, but will enter the arena and fight side by side with him for his rights, civil and religious. How better can this be done than by withdrawing the grant from Maynooth, and sending a numerous band of voluntaries to educate, not the priests, but the people—to

give them the truth, not polluted by the course through which it has passed, but the pure, unadulterated truth. Give them the truth, and with it power to make it their own; then shall Ireland, "first gem of the ocean," shine bright as the stars in the firmament of heaven, and become the pride of her sister, England, as she is now her shame.

The province of the legislature is to let religion alone. She is too delicate to be handled by our earthly *Solons* without pollution. She thrives best when untouched. Her gossamer wings are better fitted to fan the soul of penitent man into a state of heavenly peace, than to be roughly handled, clipped, and trimmed by the makers of variegated parchment at Westminster. Her mission is to go up and down in the world, giving consolation to the afflicted, binding up the brokenhearted, upraising the downtrodden and oppressed, giving to the penitent peace, to the despairing hope, and to the faithful a crown of glory which fadeth not away. But, should some of the votaries of the fair damsel forget their proper place, and, forsaking the province of their angelic guide, encroach upon their associates and seek to limit their freedom, trample upon their conscience, interrupt the free development of their religious aspirations, or counteract the discharge of the social duties of life, then, and not until then, is the legislature permitted to act. It is the duty of the state not only itself to let religion alone, but it is bound also to see that individuals or communities let the religion of other individuals or communities alone; that is, each one has the right to enjoy his opinion, and bear the expense of propagating it peacefully; and the state is bound to protect him in the enjoyment of this right, without let or hindrance from his fellow. Farther than this, the state rightly interferes only in those cases where the infraction of the civil law is taught as a part of religion, and the safety of the state thereby imperilled. Upon these latter grounds I consider it the duty of the legislature to withdraw the grant to Maynooth and discountenance the Roman Catholic religion. Here then, friends X. and H. P., with J. G. R., come, let us walk together; you desire that truth, justice, and law should decide this question, not clamour, nor pliancibility, nor power, nor the "No Popery" cry;

I wish the same; but let us be consistent. If the church of England and the church of Ireland are made by our constitution chargeable upon all the people of our country, let us unitedly admit the wrong, the error, of such a state of things, and endeavour to reform so great a political abuse and religious insult—an insult alike injurious to our reason and our common Christianity. Do not let us add another abuse—inflict another injury—in the shape of a sub-establishment. Let us endeavour to destroy this anomalous state of affairs in this our fatherland. Let us give to man his individuality, his personal responsibility to God and his own conscience, by endeavouring within our respective spheres to propagate the principles of civil and religious liberty, fraternity, and equality.

J. G. R. has very kindly given us a homily on moderation in the advocacy of our own opinions, and on forbearance and respect in our opposition to the opinions of others. Every christian man will sincerely thank him for his generous and affectionate advice. I cordially agree with him that but little can be done with violence and abuse towards convincing a person of opposite sentiments. How gratifying to the christian is the thought that his holy religion teaches an affectionate, painstaking boldness in the maintenance of christian truth, and repudiates bitter, acrimonious railing in the opposition of error. The blessed Redeemer with pity and compassion denounced the errors of men, warning them to flee the wrath to come because he loved them, and was willing to give himself a ransom for their guilt. He is our model; and I feel assured my readers will agree with me, that the more nearly we can imitate *Jesus* in our manner of life, the more effective shall we be in convincing others of error, in correcting ourselves, and attaining to a fuller realization of truth in its essential purity.

The first three gentlemen who have taken the negative in the present debate are, I feel confident from their articles, Dissenters. As such I would ask them, Why are you Dissenters? If you support the endowment of any religious body, do you not violate your principles—do you not forsake your nonconformity? Is not this one of the foundation-stones of your much-loved *dissent*, and one upon which the fair fabric

is so securely based—willinghood? You were not, my friends, compelled to be Dissenters; it is a matter of free choice with you; do, therefore, be consistent. A house divided against itself cannot stand; neither can dissent be in our heart a living principle, and the advocacy of state endowment, priestcraft, and intolerance be found on our lips, without damaging our character for consistency, and raising suspicions of our sincerity in the observer of *our religious life*. Dissenters, remember, too, the old fable of the husbandman and the viper: in his sympathy for its sufferings he carried it home to his hearth; no sooner had it gained strength from his fostering care than it stung the kind hand which had preserved it from death. I need not point out the analogy. You know the past history of the man of sin; you see something of his present workings, and can predict the future, as so much depends on your own sayings and doings now. That the truth will ultimately prevail I have no doubt; but much depends on its friends *when it shall prevail*.

I will now leave these *quasi* Protestants, these *pseudo* Dissenters, these apocryphal Nonconformists, whose high-flying professions of willinghood manifest their want of comprehension of the elementary principles of Nonconformity, and will, for a little while, engage the attention of the reader with the remarks of friend "Stanislaus." It is possible that my previous observations on this subject may appear *shallow* to a person of such astonishing erudition and *politesse* as "Stanislaus," from the manner in which he pronounces judgment, evidently is; but I must demur to the succeeding charge of *bigotry* and *misconstruction*. I understand bigotry to be the assumption that what one says is absolute truth, and every other individual is bound to believe it, and has no right to dispute the assumption. The reader will perceive that I have advocated those principles which make it the imperative duty of every Christian to think and act for himself, without let or hindrance from others, they having no right to interfere by any other means than persuasion, and the individual man being responsible to God alone for what he believes. How far the Roman Catholic Church grants civil and religious liberty to her children I have already noticed, and would now simply ask "Stanislaus" to

look at the history of his church, written by its own members, for irrefragable proofs of his error upon this point. With respect to the money value of the grant, it is, doubtless, paltry compared with the resources of the Protestant Church of England and Ireland; but I submit that the commission of a great evil does not legalize the perpetration of a less. As to "Stanislaus's" assertion that "there is no church more anxious that its support should depend on the voluntary contributions of its adherents than the Catholic Church," I must say that he is either entirely ignorant of the practices of his church, or he has wilfully perverted the facts of the case. What is more compulsory than the injunctions in the following extracts from the "Statuta Diocesana per Provinciam Dubliniensem, 1831"?—"We have gone so far in defining the sum of the dues, which may be EXACTED;" and "we appoint a rule to be equally observed by all." Again:—"Let them be bound to pay the dues." How are these understood by the Romish priests, and how are the laity made to understand them? In answer I refer to Butter's "Catechism," twenty-sixth edition, sanctioned by the National Board of Education for Ireland, where we read that the fifth command of the church is, "To contribute to the support of our pastors." "Question. Do the precepts of the church oblige under pain of mortal sin? Answer. Yes; he that will not hear the church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican."—P. 48. "Q. Where shall they go who die in mortal sin? A. To hell for all eternity." Here those of the laity who do not pay any dues the clergy may determine upon exacting from them are condemned to perdition for all eternity. What an awful and presumptuous assumption of power by a number of fallible men! How degrading is the bondage under which the lay members of this church are held! Where is the voluntaryism of your church, friend "Stanislaus"? The compulsory character of the Established Protestant Church can only claim by law the possession of a portion of our goods; but here your church claims the entire control, present and prospective, of the body and the soul. That the *Bible* is not used at Maynooth, either as a class-book, for reference, or for devotional purposes, I refer to the list of books handed by Dr. Crotty and his colleagues to the royal commissioners in 1826 (see page 28), and to the evidence of Mr. P. O'Brien, a student for six years in this college, as mentioned by J. C. M'C., Jun., in page 63. References to the holy scriptures may be found in many of the writings of the Romish Church; but our subject confines us to what is done at Maynooth in this respect, upon which the evidence adduced by J. C. M'C., Jun., and myself will be found quite conclusive, as the authority from whence they are derived cannot be impugned. The observations of "Stanislaus" on the question of oaths is so transparent that I shall only remark that he admits all I claim, viz., that prelates and spiritual superiors can and do prohibit the laity and inferior clergy from the due performance of their oaths; and, so far from the *Popish* clergy discountenancing the oath-breaker and the murderer, the secret instructions of the Jesuits and the denunciations from the altar, so familiar to us in these days, are something more than suppositions that they do encourage those crimes when the interests of the church are concerned. That our friend is guilty of misrepresentation, or grossly erroneous in his observations respecting heresy and the expulsion of heretical princes, is evident from the fact that the works from which my quotations are originally derived are returned by the authorities of Maynooth as the standards for reference, both by professors and students. Dr. Crotty gives evidence thus:—"The students refer to them only on points which they are supposed to treat more at large or more correctly," by these words proving that they are considered the authorities to decide any case of doubt which may arise in the course of the student's experience, both during his college course and after he has received priest's orders and appointment to a cure; for even then he is required by the Diocesan Statutes to read the books he has previously studied at college; and to secure the due performance of this duty he is examined at the periodical conferences of the clergy in these books, at which conferences he must be present under pains and penalties. That these doctrines were promulgated at a particular time, long ago, for a particular purpose, and have now become obsolete, is strangely incorrect. Dr. Crotty gave his testimony to these works being standards of authority on these points in 1826, and the Diocesan Statutes, confirming his estimate of them,

were promulgated in 1831, and continue in force, there is no doubt, to the present *hour*. Historic evidence affords proof of many a Galileo punished by the Papal Church for their discoveries and inventions; and "Stanislaus" must be but indifferently read in history not to have known better than to deny this. Permit me to inform my erring friend that "the same people located in America" are really more happy, more prosperous, and more intelligent than in their native Ireland, because they leave their "Popery," with its degrading superstitions, behind them in Ireland. So soon as their weary feet touch the land of their adoption they breathe a new life, because they are free to think and feel for themselves, and worship their God according to the dictates of their own conscience, without the intervention of a priest. On this subject I refer the reader to Archbishop Hughes's letter to his brethren in Ireland, in which certain calculations are made, to the effect that the whole of the Roman Catholics now in the United States do not number a twenty-fifth part of the Roman Catholic emigrants from Great Britain and Ireland and their descendants. This speaks volumes. Only one in twenty-five retain their belief in Popery when freed from the domination of the priesthood. Hence there are two plain inferences to be drawn. Give the people a Papal hierarchy, and they become poor, discontented, and miserable: give them freedom from such domination, and they become prosperous, happy, and contented.

On page 145 "Stanislaus" says:—"Well does the Catholic Church know that the decay of every other church is chiefly retarded by the arm of the state." So our friend does not know that the papacy is a state church!—does not know that the Pope, the head of that church, is a temporal prince also!—that he claims descent from the twelve Cæsars no less than from the twelve apostles! But "Stanislaus" must have known this. We will not say he affects to be ignorant of it.

On page 147 we have a slander upon the Albigenses, who are said to have "believed in two Creators, two Christs; taught that their souls were demons, prohibited marriage, with such-like vileness." Compare this with the following account of their doctrines, as found in a work written in 1190 by these persecuted people:—"They taught the origin of

sin in the fall of Adam; its transmission to all men, and the offered redemption from it through the death of Jesus Christ; the union and co-operation of the three persons in the blessed Trinity in man's salvation." But they also protested against masses for the dead, against purgatory, against the power of priests to absolve sin, and against the Romish system generally. *This* was the reason why they were termed "heretics" by the Council of Constance. We are surprised that our opponent should have mentioned the prohibition of marriage as one of the marks of these "heretics," when it is essentially the mark of the Roman priesthood.

Has it escaped the notice of "Stanislaus," that the individual he refers to in page 148 was, at the time when he was alleged to have been guilty of immorality, a priest of great honour and dignity in the Romish Church, and that, as such, the facilities for the practice of alleged immoralities were afforded? and is it not proved in evidence that no censure or punishment was ever inflicted upon him by that church until after he repudiated its doctrines? Then he, in common with all accused of heresy, is accused of immorality and vice. Surely the reference to this case will not further our friend's cause?

"Stanislaus" rather contemptuously refers to "the multitudinous creeds" of Protestantism, and exultingly of "the one creed" of Popery. Is it not a well-known fact that the disputes between the Jesuits and the Jansenists were in points similar to the disputes between the Calvinists and Armenians of the Protestant Church? Is not the history of the Roman Church the history of its differences and its divisions? Are there not the *Church* party and the Ultramontanes, to vie in their animosities with the Puseyites and Evangelicals of the Protestants? Do not the Dominicans, the Franciscans, the Carmelites, the Trappists, the Quietists, and the Visitandines, differ from each other and the rest of the Romish Church at least as much as the Lutherans, the Calvinists, the Presbyterians, the Wesleyans, the Baptists, and the Independents differ from each other? These latter do maintain the whole of the essentials of salvation; but it is very questionable if some sections of the Romish Church which I have mentioned do this.

But, further, in how many instances has the infallible head of the Romish Church been found condemning and anathematizing his predecessor as a heretic? How many general councils have condemned the decisions upon the doctrine and practice of previous councils? In fact, the proceedings of the Council of Trent, which now governs the faith of all Romanists, affords ample scope for the admission of all the incongruities of religious aberration to be found throughout Christendom, upon this one condition, that the supremacy of the Pope be admitted. Yet this is taught at the expense of our Queen's subjects. What folly! If a particular phase

of religious faith is to be endowed, let it be, at least, the most pure, the most perfectly in accordance with the Christian's statute-book.

I now take leave of "Stanislaus" for the present, with the impression that as friends we have argued our heartfelt convictions, and the hope that further intercourse through these pages will conduce to our mutual improvement both in mind and in heart. Truth cannot be injured by our search after it; but we must be benefited by the occupation in proportion to the nearness of our approach to the *Source of all Truth*.

L'OUVRIER.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"He (Mr. Scholefield) had been asked, if he wished to get rid of all endowments, why he did not get rid of the Maynooth grant? Because he had a strong opinion that the selection of Maynooth was the worst that could be made—(hear, hear); it was evidence of an unjust and ungenerous policy, and therefore he was not disposed to adopt it. If they were to have piecemeal legislation on this subject, they should commence with the most powerful first, and not with the endowment of Maynooth, which was a college for the education of the clergy of a religion professed by one-third of her Majesty's subjects, and those the most destitute."—*House of Commons, Tuesday, Feb. 22, 1853.*

"If there was an investigation, it was impossible that from the investigation the Church of Ireland could hope to escape. *History contained no record of greater wrong to a people than the maintenance of the Established Church in Ireland.*"—*Sir William Clay, ibid.*

"There is a great religious principle involved in this measure—the principle of abstaining from persecution. My lords, you are strong: abstain, then, from persecuting the weak. It is your duty to give effect to this principle, and to abstain from even the appearance of persecution."—*Late Duke of Wellington.*

"The Established Church of England, planted by force in Ireland, has done little for it, except to unjustly tax, and cruelly treat, those who dissent from its ritual, and to foment and aggravate religious feuds."—*R. B. Stanton.*

"The revenues of the Irish Church, according to the returns, amount to £711,534—a sum which, by those who know anything of clerical returns, will not be thought to be an exaggeration. In addition, it has had, since 1800, £920,000 for the erection of churches and parsonages, and for glebe lands. Yet, in 1835, there were 425 parishes, containing less than 100 members of the Church of England, and 1,841 in which it had not a single adherent. To the question, whether any and what duties were discharged by the cathedral dignitaries, the reply, "*There are not any duties annexed,*" was returned in the case of sixteen deaneries, nine precentorships, five chancellor-

ships, seven treasurerships, two provostships, twelve archdeaconries, twenty-three prebends, and one canonry!"

"Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you."

THERE is a mystery even in the art of debate, as may be gathered from the affirmative articles of "L'Ouvrier" and J. C. McC., Jun., where the one justly argues the withdrawal of this grant on the ground of principle, but still has recourse to argument which cannot affect the question, as it applies with like force to (and may be urged by the partisans of) either creed; the other, not noticing the reason and justice of the principle, leaves it to be assumed that he does not entertain it, but makes use of the only plausible, but the certainly evasive, reason which is available, in order to show what he and his party conceive to be the true grounds of the position they have taken. Perhaps it is that there is division in their camp, or that the prejudices of the latter would not allow him to take so comprehensive and equitable a view of the topic as his predecessor. It is, however, somewhat marvellous that a writer who urges the repeal of the grant on the ground of principle, occupying the affirmative side, should condescend to the use of arguments which can never place the question in that self-convincing light which that of principle does, and seek by other means to prove a position unworthy of the high and just principle which regards all grants as subject to the one common law—that of all religions as being properly independent of, and unconnected with, the state.

Judging from the course pursued by both writers, it appears evident that certain important facts have been forgotten by them which are inseparably connected with the termination of this debate, and which, had they been noticed, would have tended very considerably to have given a severe and caustic *exposé* of the weak and fallacious character of the arguments which they brought forth. But possibly our friends had no knowledge of these facts, and wished none; for we know that

"Where ignorance is bliss
'Tis folly to be wise."

Certain it is, however, that they have not referred to circumstances which are part and parcel of the question; hence it has fallen to my lot to present my readers with the materials necessary to assist them in their examination of this question, which, whilst not altogether a part of the subject, must nevertheless be considered, for justice demands that, in this case, "the whole and its parts" shall be subject to, and determinable by, the same laws—of reciprocity, right, and equity.

I was certainly staggered by the following passage in the article of "L'Ouvrier," inasmuch as when I perceived that he made the withdrawal of the grant one of principle, I gave him credit for more liberality and fair dealing than is displayed in the extract. He says:—"The number of Roman Catholics in Great Britain and Ireland is, according to the best authorities, about 10,000,000, while the numbers opposed to Roman Catholicism amounts to more than 16,000,000; yet the whole of these 16,000,000 are required to contribute to the support of an establishment, to the amount of £26,360 per annum, for the express propagation of that which, in their estimation, is error of a vital character, and injurious to the spiritual and temporal well-being of mankind." Now, I put it to the good sense of my readers whether they would have thought any worse of him—whether justice or truth would have suffered—or, if "L'Ouvrier" wished to place this obnoxious injury to the Protestants in the *most charitable* and the *least painful* light—had he rather given the *total* number of the *Romanists* and *Protestants* in *Ireland only*? Let it be remembered that the money is *not* given for the *general dissemination* of

Popish principles, but is given for a *specific purpose* to a *certain college*, in a *country* where it is *most required*. No doubt, had he done this, he would have been ashamed of the previous avowal; for in Ireland the *majority*, who are *Roman Catholics*, are *taxed* to support the *minority*, who are *Protestants*, for the express *propagation* of that which, in *their estimation*, is *error of a vital character*, and *injurious* to the *temporal and spiritual well-being of mankind*.

In 1835, in reply to an inquiry, the following figures were presented to the House of Commons:—State Protestants, 852,064; Roman Catholics, 6,427,712; and the total revenue of the Irish Church for that year amounted to £716,785, being the cost of administering spirituality to 852,064 Protestants; whilst the revenues of all the dissenting denominations did not amount to more than £500,000. And yet, forsooth, although the major portion of the Irish Church revenues is wrung from the Roman Catholics, there are those who begrudge them a portion of the money which they themselves have subscribed! How is it that the revenue of the Established Church in the United Kingdom, subscribed by Roman Catholics, has been totally forgotten, or passed over stealthily, by the affirmative writers? Was it that its enormities are too great and glaring—that the injustice of a state church, supported by Dissenters in general, was of so vast a magnitude—or that the affirmative writers were so ashamed of the sentiments they maintained, when denying £30,000 per annum as a return for the money contributed by the Romanists to a church which they completely ignored? Do they think the two are not parallel cases? Where is the difference? Are the Romanists to have "liberty of conscience"? May they exercise it as conscience would dictate? If not, then the phrase is a farce. Because the 16,000,000 Protestants contend that the religion of Rome is vile, is the same right of opinion to be maintained and practically exemplified by the Catholics? Do they, on the other hand, contend that because the number of the two are unequal, that the minority must bow, and be subject to the will and caprice of the majority, in matters *appertaining* to the free use of conscience? If these be their sentiments, how can they

accordance with its dictates? And if it declares to support a religion which they disavow, is it to be treated as though it had contracted a debt, and were consequently bound to discharge it? This reasoning the result of what must of necessity occur where there is a state-paid religion, *whatever religion that be*; and with what show of justice or reason "L'Ouvrier" can call at 16,000,000 Protestants being compelled to support "error of a vital character," and be silent when 10,000,000 Catholics are called upon to pay tithes to a church which they also believe to hold doctrines and errors "injurious to the temporal and spiritual well-being of mankind," is an anomaly which I can neither explain nor understand.

The general tenor of the articles from the pen of "L'Ouvrier" (although, by-the-by only an enlargement of the idea of the immutability of the Romish doctrines) would irresistibly convey to the reader's mind the notion that there were but *one* set of consciences and opinions in the world—that these were possessed *only* by Protestants, and that *they* were to *think* and to *judge* for *everybody else*, or at least for the Roman Catholics. The whole of his articles, with one exception (that where he refers to principle as well as the article of J. C. McC., Jun., is one complete tirade on the pernicious character of Maynooth teaching. Such is his opinion, and such is mine; but what of that

peared to him, as to his hon. friend (Mr. Spooner), that Maynooth was an endowment, the result of which was, the *propagation of error*; but *then he recollected that what was truth to him was error to others*. His hon. friend, on the other hand, *knew only one kind of consciences, and those Protestant consciences*. He should know, however, that there were *other grants* under acts of parliament which must *violate the consciences of Roman Catholics just as much as the Maynooth grant violated the conscience of his hon. friend*. And it was but common justice that their consciences should be as tenderly treated by the House of Commons as that of his hon. friend. . . . If they endowed *one particular sect at the expense of others, it was, pro tanto, a religious persecution of those sects*." The sum and substance of this question was graphically expressed in one short but impressive sentence delivered last year on this topic by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, now Chancellor of the Exchequer. He said, "If the endowment be *withdrawn*, then the *parliament* that *withdraws it must be prepared to enter upon the whole subject of the reconstruction of our ecclesiastical endowments*." Such must inevitably be the case. Perhaps the total repeal—and not the "reconstruction of our ecclesiastical endowments"—would speedily follow. Then those anti-Maynoothites who are in favour of an Established Church may thank themselves if *all grants* be repealed; for, whilst clamouring for the abolition of *one particular grant*, which they cannot tolerate, they are at the same time unwittingly hastening the destruction of a politico-religious establishment which they wished to see undisturbed and still connected with the state.

There are those who contend that the established religion should be supported by the state, although they cannot see the injustice of Catholics and others being compelled to contribute to its maintenance; and, strangely enough, refuse them a portion of the money they have contributed. But for what reason should there be *any* established church? Is it that its professors fear that they could not obtain sufficient aid from voluntary sources to maintain their ministers, churches, &c. &c., and to administer to the wants and necessities of the poor? Do they

so distrust the faith of those who call themselves its members, or do they consider that they would become apathetic for their creed? Do they suppose that the faith of the Church of England is so untenable, sophisticated, and unreal, that it requires the assistance of the state to support it? Surely there can be no other reason nor plea than this. Is it that they fear their enemies (the Romanists) from without? or that there are malignant, inflammable, and treasonable conspirators who seek to destroy it from within? Will state aid obviate this difficulty? On the other hand, so far from this being the case, there are clergymen of the Established Church at the present time fattening on her liberality, who are preaching doctrines the very opposite to those ordered by her ritual—doctrines of which "L'Ouvrier" has so great a horror—doctrines, in fine, "of a vital character, and opposed to the temporal and spiritual well-being of mankind." Are there greater enemies to the Established Church than such "wolves in sheep's clothing"? Has Rome herself better friends?

Dependent, then, upon her professors for support, the Church of England will be in a far better position, and the right of the selection of her own ministers will enable her to expel those who teach not her true doctrines. A well-known writer (the Rev. J. A. James) says:—"It is evident that no external violence, short of the setting up of a Popish and intolerant government, *can* destroy the church; it may die a natural death by the total abandonment of episcopacy on the part of the people; or it may be destroyed by an entire relinquishment of it by its clergy, events by no means likely to happen; but it can never be slain, except by a suicidal act of its own. It may bid defiance to King, Lords, and Commons, as long as it lives in the affections of its ministers and members; and to *affirm that its separation from the state would terminate its existence*, is, in my opinion, to *pronounce its condemnation as a christian institute by representing it as founded on human laws, instead of the word of God*."

It is worthy of remark, as being somewhat singular, that whilst "L'Ouvrier" is very careful in insisting that every one is accountable to God for his religious belief, he appears to forget the fact—in the face of this avowal

lead to a claim on the part of other dissenting sects to receive state funds. Why should the demand be resisted? (1) Because they teach immoral and pernicious doctrine; that **the reason.**" Then would it be difficult to show that the teachings of Oxford are **more** akin to those of Maynooth. See how many ministers she has sent forth who have seceded to the Church of Rome! It has been well called the "hotbed of Popery." On the contrary, I may ask, How many dissenting ministers have seceded from Protestantism to Popery? More persons have seceded from Popery to Protestantism than recovered, as regards Dissenters, is the reply.

The idea, then, of the immorality of Romish teaching, although true in itself, is unconnected with the question of state endowment. It is the only plea to which Mr. Spooner and his party can have recourse when asked "Why not repeal *all* endowments?"

The sentiments of the Anti-State-Church Association are so reasonable that I will give them a place here:—"But have these parties never reflected that Roman Catholics also pay taxes; and that it is equally a hardship on them to be obliged to contribute to the support of other sects, who denounce their religion as heretical and superstitious? If the Episcopalian in England, and the Presbyterian in Scotland, has his church supported by the state, in the name of fair play, how can he deny to the Papist in Ire-

sins," are at the same time more certain to win converts to their cause, and to make friends of those whom they formerly regarded as enemies, because they were the professors of a faith differing, unfortunately, from their own.

J. G. R.

P.S.—Since the above was written two additional articles have appeared—the one a

confirmation of my own expressed sentiments and arguments, in part; the other only a *fac-simile* of the views generally held by anti-Maynoothites. A careful perusal of it convinces me that nothing further is needed from my pen in refutation thereof, as the above is, I trust, a sufficient reply to the articles of A. S., as well as those who have preceded him in advocating the same views.

JUDGING FROM THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF FRANCE, IS AN ATTEMPTED INVASION OF ENGLAND PROBABLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

On approaching this subject in the spirit of candid inquiry, we feel compelled to congratulate our readers on the noble character of the *British Controversialist*, which, taking its stand on the liberty of the press, throws open its impartial pages as an arena on which religious, social, and political error is to fall, and truth is to rise in its divine majesty!

France ranks among the nations of the earth as one of the first and noblest. Its Gallic origin, its sublime genius, its Elysian position, and beautiful language, are the main elements of its national greatness. Notwithstanding all this, its history is dark and gloomy, being associated to an awful extent with superstition, atheism, anarchy, and revolution. The Gauls, like the ancient Britons, struggled against the power of Cæsar, but only became the nobler trophies of his conquest. They were early acquainted with the Roman constitution, and soon became familiar with, and partial to, Roman laws, learning, and customs. Seeing, then, that the Gauls were subdued by the same power, and their national character biassed by the same influence, as the Britons, the inquiry naturally occurs, How is it that their subsequent history is so different? An answer must be sought in the character of the Gallic people.

The character of all nations is original, and we can answer no question in the history of any nation without first learning the character of its people. We may regard the French as the offspring of the Gauls, and, consequently, as partaking of their predecessors' national character.

"The Franks, who were of Teutonic origin,

and who, by their conquests, gave their name to the country, formed, perhaps, no larger portion of the inhabitants than the Norman conquerors in England, and did not sensibly affect the great mass of the people."*

Cæsar, in his Commentaries on the Gallic war, represents the Gauls as being "among the bravest and most warlike nations of the earth." Less ferocious than the Britons, but unwearied in military device and stratagem, seeking every opportunity to deceive the mighty conqueror to whom they had sworn allegiance;—impatient and restive at the least encroachment of the ruling power over the democratic element;—enthusiastic and fanatical under the idea of national renown; raising monarchies to indicate their glory, and shortly hurling them to the dust to show their power!

This feature of the character of the Gauls it is necessary ever to bear in mind while studying the history of France.

But we have to do with its modern history. The revolutions of 1789, 1815, and 1848, were the fearful manifestations of the democratic element overwhelming the monarchic power which it had created. The "fierce Corsican" was, in the beginning of his career, the representative of the French democracy, just as Cæsar, in an age past, had been that of the Roman republic. But both Cæsar and Napoleon fell. Why? Through the violation of the power they had gained. Cæsar passed the Rubicon and defied the senate; and Napoleon—

ect. The Peace Society is not to be deprived of the opportunity of attacking its principles and Cobden, its great organ, is a prophet, one of the late orators at Manchester, annihilated his fame by a sweeping bet of £15,000 to 1s. per week for a charitable purpose: ~~fulworn~~ that the anticipated invasion will never happen! Were we convinced the betting is just and honourable, we should feel no hesitation in doing the same. But why? Is not the present Emperor (!) the very man to desire such an event? Does not the past history of France present on terrible scene at which his despotic spirit is troubled within him? True it is that England has everything to fear from the Emperor, but nothing from any other quarter. The man who would dare to violate his republican oath, though it were to save his life, we dare not trust with firearms at our doors. He is a traitor. If he gain power he will abuse it. The man who dares to trample on the genius of a nation, exile its great characters, change its government in one night from a republic into a complete despotism, limit the rights of the people and destroy the independence of the ballot and press, is but a modern Nero. He who on his tour through the country over which he was to reign to promote its highest interests, hesitated not to speak thus at one of its largest towns, "If I were to die to-morrow, the only military feat which history

tive of repose and satisfaction, but intensely prophetic of the moment in which it shall be broken, and despotism and priestcraft vanish as a midnight dream. This being the condition of the nation, any military expedition would but hasten the event of his certain downfall, especially if in that expedition military glory were his chief motive, and was not the object of national desire, which would be the case in invading England.

Thirdly. His position as it regards the army and priests.

Those who have studied the late change of government in France must have observed how much the Emperor owes his present position to the army on the one hand, and to the priests on the other. The relation which exists between the Emperor and these two classes, and that which existed between Napoleon Bonaparte, his army, and the priests of his day, form a most striking contrast. The late emperor was the master and commander of his army; the present Emperor is the slave, the tool, and flatterer of his. The army of the one obeyed implicitly, while the army of the other commands, and only obeys when it is to obtain its own ends. The former followed the impulse of one mind in all his actions, while the latter yields to the caprice of a vast army. Napoleon Bonaparte's army was united to do his will—attached and affectionate to their general—ready to pass the Alps or traverse the snow-clad steppes of Russia at his command, and back again to the terrible scene of Waterloo. Well hath Byron put words into the mouth of the Polish officer who “clung to his master's knees” on his departure for exile, expressing the bond of unity and affection between the general and his army—

“My chief, my king, my friend, adieu!”

But this is not the character of the present Emperor's army. Like the nation, it is a divided body. Notwithstanding the base system of intimidation to which the army was subject during the period in which its votes were given, many thousand negative votes were cast in a brave and noble spirit. In them we have great faith, and, rejoicing, behold the manifestation of that nobility and heroism which shall one day redeem France.

The priests. Here the contrast is greater still. The destruction of the priestly power

and spell was one of the objects of the former Napoleon's ambition. He swept away the infernal fragments of the inquisition, and bade the priest cease to deceive and begin to teach. He shook the throne of papacy, as well as monarchy, to its centre. How different the conduct of “Napoleon the Little”! His next step, after alluring the army to his standard, was to gather round him the sycophantic priests of a corrupt religion. He did not try long, for they soon rolled their legions round him. But he has to *serve* both, with the loss of independence, the army and priests. Power thus gained would forsake him on the frowning Alps, on the Russian steppes, and on Albion's plains, too, where many a Cromwell dwells. Power thus gained must be retained with difficulty, and only by the constant exercise of the most consummate subtlety. This would be impossible were the Emperor engaged in military expeditions. Power thus gained must ultimately prove his ruin. All history attests it.

Lastly. There is the common cause of liberty, not to speak of national and commercial interests. Although the Emperor would not regard the cause of liberty, his people would. The battle of Waterloo was not fought to secure the liberty of England *only*, but of all the nations of Europe; and France herself was no loser by the event, though it overthrew her proud emperor. The most eloquent orator of modern times thus addressed a British audience on the threatened invasion by Napoleon I.:—“It remains with you, then, to decide whether that freedom, at whose voice the kingdoms of Europe awoke from the sleep of ages, to run a career of virtuous emulation in everything great and good—the freedom which dispelled the mists of superstition, and invited the nations to behold their God—whose magic touch kindled the rays of genius, the enthusiasm of poetry, and the flame of eloquence—the freedom which poured into our laps opulence and arts, and embellished life with innumerable institutions and improvements, till it became a theatre of wonders—it is for you to decide whether this freedom shall yet survive, or be covered with a funeral pall and wrapt in eternal gloom.” In the attempt to invade England the common cause of liberty would be involved, for within her bosom is the palladium of the rights and liberty of universal humanity. Against this

into p. 91 shares, and their spears to
their looks," and that they will nev
"I am war again." But this passage
scripture, which the members of the so call
Peace Society triumphantly emblazon on th
front of all their publications, is itself
refutation of their absurd theories; for,
they would carefully study its context, the
would perceive that it was an intimation
what would occur during the millenniu
itself, and not before that epoch. It i
therefore, equivalent to an assertion tha
until that period there will be a necessit
for material weapons, and for learning th
art of war. Since, therefore, the millenniu
has not commenced, war is *always* possible—
never improbable. If we look at the presen
time to the continent of Europe, and see
for the nation most distinguished for it
military propensities, where does our ey
finally settle, as having found the object o
its search? Undoubtedly on France—Franc
under any form of government, but especiall
under that peculiar form the only tradition o
which is war and conquest. When, there
fore, a war does break out, we may naturall
expect France, and especially France as an
empire, to take at least a prominent par
therein. And if it be true in the politica
as in the physical world, that before a storm
comes a calm, we may expect, from the long
duration of peace, that when the war doe
break out it will be very severe. The ques

so much desired. At the sound of the cannon the troops embarked with great precision and celerity. *Shouts of joy rent the air*, which were changed into murmurs of dissatisfaction when they learned that the whole had been a false alarm.* And if it be alleged by any that times are changed—that the disposition of the French is altered—we would remind such that in *one* feature of their character they are not a whit altered, viz., in *fickleness*. And hence we ought not to depend upon their hollow professions of a pacific character. The fickle have no principle, and do not know themselves what will be their next deed. Consider the man who now wears the imperial purple in France. In the *Edinburgh Witness* we find the following statement:—"When Napoleon created the second child of Hortense, then a boy of four years, Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves, he took him on his knee, and, looking him in the face, addressed him in the following remarkable speech:—'Come, my son, I will be your father; you shall lose nothing. This conduct of your father grieves me to the heart; but it is to be explained, perhaps, by his infirmities. *When you become great you must add his debt to your own; and never forget, that in whatever situation you are placed by my politics, and the interests of my empire, your first duty is towards me, your second towards France; all your other duties, even those towards the people I shall confide to you, will rank after these.*' And now the child created Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves by Napoleon I. is Napoleon III., and placed in circumstances fully to discharge the debt laid upon him by his uncle, as due both by himself and his father." Thus we see that Hannibal, in ancient Punic story, was not more truly set apart for hostility to the people of Rome, than Louis Napoleon is for hostility to the people of England; and, from what we know of his character, we may expect that he will take the earliest opportunity of fulfilling his "destiny."

On the 1st of December, 1851, the city of Paris sank to rest in all the calmness of conscious security. On the 2nd they awoke to find the National Assembly dissolved, the laws suppressed, and the streets swept with grape-shot. Since then "he has proscribed

eighty-four representatives of the people; confiscated the property of Louis Philippe, to whom he owed his life; decreed despotism; garotted the republic; gagged liberty; pawned the railways; picked the pockets of the people; regulated the budget by *ukase*; transported 10,000 democrats; banished 40,000 republicans; filled all souls with sorrow; covered all foreheads with a blush." Such a monster of ingratitude and villainy scarcely ever existed on the face of the earth! And this is the person, forsooth, to whom our London merchants pay court, and on whom the Peace Congress would have us rely, as if his word was infallible and his faith unimpeachable! Look, too, at the Emperor's marriage. Were not even the French nation taken by surprise at this? Verily, no man knows to-day what Louis will do to-morrow. And think you he has no reckoning to settle with England for defeating his uncle at Waterloo, and condemning him to die far from the land of his birth and the arena of his crimes? He has; and rest assured he will take the earliest opportunity of paying it, for "Brutus is such an honourable man!"

In the second place, we think that a French invasion is probable from the present aspect of POPERY on the Continent. The whole of the Roman Catholic powers of Europe are anxious to put down the Protestantism of Britain. Separated from them by the rolling waves, Britain nobly rears her head as the refuge of God's truth from the assaults of the enemy, and the asylum of all that is free, noble, and pure. Her Protestantism marks her for the hatred of Popish powers; her liberty exposes her to the wrath of despotism. And where is there at this moment a country so Popish as France, or a tyranny so despotic as Napoleon's? Other nations may hate England for one of these causes, but France hates her for both. We have reason to believe that Popery is about to make a final struggle, a last attempt, to crush the truth and liberty of Britain. We know that one pope laid England under interdict, another excommunicated Henry VIII., another excommunicated Queen Elizabeth, and encouraged Philip of Spain to attempt to subdue our country by the terrible armada; and, for ourselves, we little know how soon the prediction of a modern poet may be fulfilled:—

* "Life of Napoleon"—Monthly Volume II. Religious Tract Society.

"Woe to the watery regions of the west!
Woe to the lands once 'Islands of the Blest'!"

Lo! when the minds of men are locked in sleep,
The treacherous foe speeds o'er the mighty deep

A dread armada, ready charged to pour
An overwhelming torrent on thy shore.
High o'er their heads the GOLDEN EAGLE flies,
And joyful mingles with its native skies.
Proud in the midst THE BEAST uprears its head,

Like an avenging Fury from the dead,
Drunk with the martyrs' blood, unsated still,
Resolved once more at least to drink his fill.
And now to dungeon dark and flaming stake
The slumbering nation doth at length awake.
Too late, alas! The gate is opened wide,
And through her streets her foes triumphant ride.

The land is deluged with the crimson flood,
And all the rivers swell to seas of blood."

Yes; let it never be forgotten, that if there be a war in Europe it will probably be a war of *religion*; and if an attempt be made to invade England, it will be to destroy the established religion of the country, and to rear the Tower of Babel on its ruins. The

state of parties in England greatly encourages the Continent. Ultra-Protestant Dissenters on the one hand,* and the High Church party on the other, *fraternizing* with Popery, while infidelity is spreading; and so the real church of Christ is reduced to a very small minority. But surely there remains in England the elements of the flame of our ancient glory—that flame which is

"No flickering flash that a breath may extinguish,
That one scarce in the darkness around can distinguish;
But a quenchless fire that is lit at their birth.
To consume every tyrant and despot on earth."

If so, may we soon see that glorious flame rising in splendour to the sky, and by its dazzling effulgence illuming the world!

J. C. M'C., Jun.

* One of the most eminent ministers of the *Independents* actually received a letter of thanks from Cardinal Wiseman for preaching a sermon in favour of the Papal aggression!

Social Economy.

IS THE USE OF OATHS FOR CIVIL PURPOSES RIGHT AND EXPEDIENT?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE custom of confirming important statements by oath—that is, by appeal to the recognised deities or Deity in the presence of others—appears to have been common among all civilized nations, and enters largely into every ramification of our civil and ecclesiastical polity. Most countries have their peculiar forms in the administration of oaths. The Athenians, Romans, and Jews, were accustomed to perform it by stretching out their hand towards the heavens, or by placing them under the thigh of the person to whom the oath was made. Thus does Virgil represent the treacherous Sinon in the former of these attitudes, when by his subtlety he would beguile the Trojans:—

"Ye lamps of heaven!

Thou venerable sky!
Inviolable powers, ador'd with dread!
Ye fatal fillets, that once bound this head!
Ye sacred altars, from whose flames I fled!
Be all of you adjur'd!"

"By Jove!" "By Hercules!" and all such terms, were deeply religious phrases, indi-

cating the truth of the statement to which they were attached, also the earnestness of the speaker, when used by the Romans and Greeks.

It would have been considered by them impious in the extreme to use such terms on trifling subjects, or with the frivolity of many of our university students. The Jews expressed their oaths by an appeal to the God of their fathers; and we in civil matters use a no less significant term, "So help me, God!" That this practice was in harmony with the religion of the Jews, Greeks, and Romans, we doubt not. Our endeavour will be to show that the use of oaths, for civil purposes, is not in harmony with scripture, and consequently with the spirit of Christianity.

We shall first inquire, What purpose is this custom intended to answer in civil matters? Secondly, Does it answer the purpose intended? Thirdly, Is it in harmony with scripture and the spirit of Christianity? In conclusion, What is the general tendency of

such a custom, as it regards the social welfare of the community?

The object in view in the administration of oaths is evidently to elicit truth in matters of great importance. By an oath a person is supposed to confirm a given statement by an appeal to the Omniscient. Now, if we consider the thing, it will appear evident that an oath can be of no real value, or positive use, unless it be taken from principle; that is, from the love of truth. He who is lacking in this cannot on any occasion, however important, be said to speak anything from this only true motive. The very thing that will lead a man to assert, knowingly, a positive lie in the presence of his fellows, will lead him to confirm it by an oath. An oath in such a case is merely the repetition of the lie. The reason why he does not hesitate thus to take an oath is because he does not fear to utter a lie; or the reason why he takes a false oath arises from the prior event of asserting an untruth, and this arises from the absence of the love of truth. Nothing but the actual and abiding love of the truth will lead a man habitually to speak the truth. But some will say, "A man will fear to take an oath, though he be guilty of falsehood." This we know is a general opinion concerning oaths; but it is, we think, radically unsound; and is evident if we inquire as to the origin of this fear which is to deter him from the repetition of falsehood. We presume that the fear of God is here alluded to; if so, in what does the fear of God originate? Does it not arise from the very principle which we say must exist within a man in order that he may speak the truth habitually? We can see no meaning in an oath, unless it be taken from the real love of truth, apart from any sinister motive whatever. Neither can we conceive of the fear of God as existing in the mind apart from the love of truth; for it is this principle which leads a man to fear, love, and serve God in sincerity, and this alone. The conclusion to which we naturally come is this, that he in whose mind the love of truth is predominant will habitually speak the truth, and that his word is actual truth, as far as he is knowingly and conscientiously implicated, and that an oath, or ten thousand oaths, cannot take from or add to the real value of his testimony. So, on the other hand, he in whose mind this principle does

not exist, will, from some sinister motive, frequently assert falsehood, and as long as that motive exists will he affirm the same, and even corroborate it by oath. Of what use, then, is an oath, seeing that it neither adds anything to the real value of the statement made by the principled, or subtracts anything from the statement of the unprincipled man? Is it not a worthless form—a meaningless action—when resorted to?

II. Does it answer the purpose intended? We have anticipated this inquiry, and shown that it does not. In order to make it more evident, let us refer to an example. We have a remarkable instance illustrating the point in question in the case of Peter, who, we are informed by the four evangelists, denied his Lord three successive times. Why, we would ask, did he thus deny Christ? What was his motive in persisting in this positive lie? It could not have been the love of truth, "for men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles." It was a sinister motive which led him thus to act. He feared to be recognised as one of the friends of the despised Nazarene. The fear of man brought a snare, and wary Peter was taken therein. Matthew tells us that on his second denial he confirmed it by an oath. Here we plainly see that the denial in the first place, and the false oath in the second, arose from the same motive—the fear of man. We will suppose the case of a jury. Twelve men are chosen, and required to take the oath, according to custom, that each will, according to his judgment, conscientiously give his candid verdict. Does this oath necessarily imply that each does so? By no means. The probability is, that if there was one in whose mind the love of truth was not a fixed principle, he would be swayed in his opinion by any influence rather than the right, or that his opinions would be given from a sinister motive. The oath no more secures the real conviction of each member of the jury than it gives them power to "judge righteous judgment." Of what use, then, in this case, is the oath? Is it not a mere ceremony? If the administration of oaths be necessary in the case of one class of men in civil purposes, why is it not in all cases? Why am I required to corroborate my statement by an oath, while at the same time my friend's is taken on the same ground without an oath? It would, we presume,

to be true, and to be true in respect to society we would say. We are not an Episcopalian State, or that of any other denomination, and we are true and valid without an oath as the Quakers? The only imaginable case in which an oath can be said to answer the purpose intended is with ignorant and superstitious persons, who, not speaking the truth from the love of it, may be, in some cases, compelled to speak it from fear. Such cases are of rare occurrence, and never happen when there is fear arising from the assurance of present punishment. This is, we think, an unjustifiable course of action, to elicit truth by imposing a meaningless rite upon the ignorant and superstitious—a practice, by no means in harmony with the nature and dignity of truth itself.

III. Is it in harmony with scripture and the spirit of Christianity? We have shown that the use of oaths does not answer the purpose intended, and that the state, in some instances, admits that it is not absolutely necessary. This is, we think, a sufficient reason why oaths are not, in civil purposes, right and expedient. A more decisive argument still is, that it is not in harmony with scripture; consequently, with the spirit of Christianity. The language of the Great Teacher, and of one of his disciples, is remarkably clear and decisive on this point. This, we think, is the highest possible evi-

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE are glad to see an opportunity afforded of impartially discussing this important question in the *British Controversialist*. We take the affirmative view of the subject, and will, as briefly as possible, state our reasons for doing so.

First. We will endeavour to show that the use of oaths for civil purposes is right. We are aware that it will be used as an argument against us that our Saviour has said, "Swear not at all," and that this commandment is obeyed to the very letter by the Quakers, and two or three other sects; but it is a rule too well known and generally acknowledged to need supporting here, that, if we wish properly to read and really understand the doctrines of the Bible, we must do so by explaining one passage by another. God, in the third commandment, impliedly allows the name to be used on all *proper occasions*, for he only forbids it being used *in vain*. And may not the commandment of our Saviour be construed in the same manner? Is it not only reasonable to suppose that the commandment was given to prevent the improper use of oaths on every trivial occasion, which was then a far too prevalent practice; for, in the twenty-third chapter of St. Matthew, he rebukes the foolish and absurd oaths of the Pharisees? In Genesis we find Jehovah himself ratifying the fulfilment of his promise to Abraham by an oath; for we read that he said, "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord;" and there can be no doubt that, in the moral code of laws which God himself delivered to the children of Israel in the wilderness, the use of oaths was not forbidden, but allowed on all proper occasions; and in several instances the punishment of death was ordered to be inflicted upon a false witness. This view of the subject is that which is taken by most bible commentators. Barnes says, "Our Saviour here (Matt. v. 33, 34) evidently had no reference to *judicial* oaths, or oaths taken in a court of justice. It was merely the foolish and wicked habit of swearing in private conversation—of swearing on every occasion and by everything—that he condemned. This he does condemn in a most unqualified manner. He himself, however, did not refuse to take an oath in a court of law, Matt. xxvi. 63, 64. Paul often called

God to witness his sincerity, which is all that is meant by an oath. See Rom. i. 9; ix. 1, &c." May we not conclude the first part of our argument, then, in the words of the last article of the Church of England:—"The christian religion doth not prohibit, but that a man may swear when the magistrate requireth, in a cause of faith and charity, so it be done according to the prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth."

Secondly. We think there can be little doubt that the use of oaths for civil purposes is expedient. All nations, both ancient and modern, have, from time immemorial, used them in their courts of justice; and a perjurer has been, and is everywhere, severely and justly punished. In all cases, by the laws of France, upon a just principle of retaliation, perjury, at least upon capital accusations, whereby another's life is, or might be, destroyed, is rendered capital, and the offender suffers death; and there can, indeed, be no moral doubt that, if a wilful perjurer actually causes the death of an innocent person, he is guilty of murder. But, although our ancient laws formerly punished this awful crime with death, or the loss of the tongue as the offending member, corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile, and perpetual infamy, are now inflicted as more suitable to the enlightened spirit of the age. Is there not something solemn in an oath as administered in our courts of justice, where the witness swears to speak the truth, *so help him, God!* Is there not something calculated to prevent even the most abandoned wretch from committed the perjury he may have been suborned to, in the thought that, besides the civil punishment he may foresee looming in the distance here, there will be an eternal punishment inflicted upon him hereafter by that God whom he has just invoked as a witness to his speaking the truth? That oaths are regarded by such men as sacredly binding upon them is a daily attested fact. Shakspeare illustrates this when he makes one of his characters exclaim—

"This, in the name of heaven, I promise here;
The which, if he be pleased, I shall perform.
I do beseech your majesty may save
The long-grown wounds of my intemperance:
If not, the end of life cancels all bonds,
And I will die a hundred thousand deaths
Ere break the smallest parcel of this vow."

We live in an age of progression, and we must all move onwards; but, though the laws of our country are being constantly changed and improved, I trust the day is far distant

when the proper use of oaths for civil purposes will be discontinued, and the laws now in force concerning them abrogated by the legislature.

C. E.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XIV.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. V., Vol. III. p. 239.

Senior Division.

Prepare a form like the one given, and arrange the following verbs, and their inflexions, under their proper heads:—

Fall, fast, hold, halt, show, mow, snow, blow, crow, throw, cleave, heave, weave, freeze, steal,

speak, dip, swear, bear, forbear, tear, shear, steer, shake, get, eat, seethe, tread, bld, awake, grave, arise, abide, glide, alide, write, thrive, strive, climb, slit, bite, swim, begin, spin, win, sing, sting, ring, wring, fling, cling, drink, stink, melt, help, bind, grind, choose, feel, sweep, creep, lose, loose, flee, sleep, confess, hush, pluck, bend, send, rend, spend, lend, wend, gird, gild, build, shed, cut, cost, spread, hit, hurt, put, set, burst, knit, cast, leave, have, make, buy, owe, work, think, bring, beseech, reach, teach, seek.

VERBS.

REGULAR.			IRREGULAR.		
Present.	Past.	Perfect Participle.	Present.	Past.	Perfect Participle.

MODEL EXERCISE No. II.—Vide Vol. III. p. 116.

I.—NOUNS.

PROPER.	COMMON.			
London Liverpool John Southampton Louis America Victoria Albert Henry	book	Collective. multitude congregation parliament committee nation man (universal) concourse herd flock	Verbal. being feeling hearing seeing	Abstract. affliction whiteness highness slavery manhood friendship laughter knowledge affection belief hope intentions revolution bloom trammel affinity erasure attendance acrimony fallacy ardour
	house			
	pen			
	son			
	paper			
	a man			
	heart			
	king			
	seed			
	bloom			
	shadow			
	maid			
	queen			
	prince			
	gardener			
	rector			
	executrix			
	region			
	animalcule			

II.—1. A noun is a name; as, John, London, house, box, thought, wisdom, intelligence.

2. An adjective is a word thrown to a noun, to describe the person or thing, &c., which it represents; as, London is a great city; John is an industrious man; that box is a large box; that thought was a good thought, &c. Here great, industrious, large, and good, are thrown to the nouns city, man, box, and thought, to describe

the person, place, and things which these nouns represent; great, industrious, large, and good, are therefore adjectives.

3. A pronoun, or for noun, is the representative of a noun, or name; as, John is here to-day: he (i. e., John) will be on the sea to-morrow. London was once a small fishing station; it (i. e., London) is now the largest city in the world. The house was large; but it (the house) was not

convenient. The thought was good; but it (the thought) was not matured

4. A *verb* may be known by its affirming something when attached to a noun or its representative; as, John *reads*. London *is increasing*. The house *is being built*. The box *is repaired*.

5. *Adverbs* qualify verbs, adjectives, or other adverbs; as, John *improves quickly*. London *is very large*. The sun *shone very brightly*.

6. *Prepositions* indicate the relations of things, &c., to each other; as, John *is in* London. John *is near* London. The house *is on* the hill.

7. *Interjections* are words *thrown between* the parts of a sentence; as, "*Alas!*" and did my Saviour die?"

8. *Conjunctions* are *joining words*; as, George and Henry went out together. Here the conjunction *and* joins George and Henry together as the subjects of the verb went.

III.—Abstract nouns are the names of qualities or states of being, &c., when considered as separate existences; thus we have the verb *to afflict*. A dispensation which afflicts is called an *afflicting* dispensation. *Afflicting* in this case takes the nature of an adjective; but the particular quality which afflicts is called an *affliction*. Affliction is the name of a quality abstracted from the object in which it resides; hence affliction is an abstract noun.

Verbal nouns are simply the present participles of verbs. Those given in the above form are examples.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. V., Vol. I.—Why should we consider definitions as products of judgment rather than of perceptivity? What is the distinction between definitions and propositions? What are embodied in propositions? What lies in propositions? Is fact-philosophy infallible? What are the parts of a proposition? Define and illustrate them. What are the chief relations which objects bear to each other? Define and illustrate their use. How are propositions subdivided? Define and illustrate their subdivisions. Ought these to be looked upon as technical puerilities?

Prorector.—Exercise, No. V., Vol. II.

Senior.—Attention and its Influence on Memory and Association.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—II.

Question 10. In this case the pound avoirdupois must be in the same proportion to 112 as 5,760 grains is to 7,000. Thus—

$$7000 : 5760 :: 112 : \frac{5760 \times 112}{7000} = 92 \frac{28}{112} \text{—Ans.}$$

AP. OWEN.

Question 11. One ounce troy of standard gold is worth £3 17s. 10½d., Mint price.

$$\begin{array}{r} \text{£} \quad \text{s.} \quad \text{d.} \\ \therefore 11 \text{ oz.} = 42 \quad 16 \quad 7\frac{1}{2} \end{array}$$

Deduct 1 oz. copper 1

$$\therefore 10 \text{ oz. fine} = 42 \quad 16 \quad 6\frac{1}{2}$$

$$\therefore 1 \text{ oz. fine} = 4 \quad 5 \quad 7\frac{85}{100}$$

$$\text{and 1 lb. troy} = 51 \quad 7 \quad 10 \cdot 20 = £51 \cdot 3925.$$

But by question, 23 lb. avoirdupois contains 22 lb. avoirdupois of fine gold; and, as

$$1 \text{ lb. av. lb. troy.}$$

$$5760 : 7000 :: 22 : 26 \cdot 736\frac{1}{2}$$

$$\therefore 51 \cdot 3925 \times 26 \cdot 736\frac{1}{2} = £1374 \cdot 0255903$$

$$= £1374 \text{ Os. } 6 \cdot 141672 \text{d.}$$

Add to this 1s. 4d. for 1 lb. of copper, and the 23 lb. are worth £1,374 1s. 10·141672d.—Ans. W.

Question 12. The interest of £100 for 60 days is 16½ shillings. Therefore, as

$$£100 \text{ } 16\frac{1}{2} \text{ s.} : 16\frac{1}{2} \text{ s.} :: £15,000 : £122 \text{ } 5 \text{ s. } 7\frac{1}{2} \text{ d.}$$

R. M.

Question 13. As $96\frac{1}{2} : 100 :: 3\frac{1}{2} : £3 \text{ } 12 \text{ s. } 7\frac{1}{2} \text{ d.}$

J. S. D.

$$\text{Question 14. } 4x + \frac{y}{4} = 148 \quad (1)$$

$$4y + \frac{x}{4} = 73 \quad (2)$$

multiplying (2) by 16 we have

$$64y + 4x = 1168 \quad (3)$$

\therefore subtracting (1) from (3) we have

$$64y - \frac{y}{4} = 1020; \text{ or } 255y = 4080$$

$$\therefore y = \frac{4080}{255} = 16$$

and by (1) $4x = 144$; or $x = 36$. J. B. M'C.

Question 15. Let A B denote the tower, and C the angle of elevation; then,

$$\frac{A B}{B C} = \frac{\sin. C}{\sin. A} = \frac{\sin. C}{\cos. C} = \tan. C$$

$$\therefore A B = B C \tan. C;$$

$$\text{whence } \tan. 47^\circ 0' 30'' = \log. 10 \cdot 030471$$

$$72 \text{ feet } B C = \log. 1 \cdot 857332$$

$$\therefore 77 \cdot 2341 \text{ feet } A B = \log. 1 \cdot 887803$$

Question 16. The diameter of the sphere being \bar{d} , and the height of the segment \bar{h} ,

$$\text{vol. of segment} = \frac{\pi}{6} (3\bar{d} - 2\bar{h}) \bar{h}^2.$$

The given values are, $\bar{d} = 36$ and $\bar{h} = 16$; hence, vol. of segment

$$= \frac{3 \cdot 1416}{6} \times (108 - 32) \times 256 = 10187 \cdot 1616 \text{ cubic in.}$$

J. K. L.

Question 17. Radius of segment =

$$\sqrt{\frac{d^2}{4} - \left(\frac{d}{2} - h\right)^2} = \sqrt{d h - h^2} = \sqrt{36 \times 16 - 256} = 17 \cdot 8885 \text{—Ans.}$$

J. K. L.

Question 18. Let $\frac{x}{r}$, x , $r x$ be the numbers;

$$\text{then } \frac{x}{r} + x + r x = 84 \quad (A)$$

$$\text{and } \frac{x^2}{r^2} + x^2 + r^2 x^2 = 4368 \quad (B)$$

$$\text{dividing B by A } \frac{x}{r} - x + r x = 52 \quad (C)$$

$$\text{but by (A) } \frac{x}{r} + x + r x = 84$$

$$\therefore \text{ subtract C from A, and } 2x = 32$$

$$\therefore x = \frac{32}{2} = 16$$

substituting in A the value of x ,

$$\frac{16}{r} + 16 + 16r = 84$$

$$16r^2 - 68 = 16$$

completing the square,

$$r^2 - \frac{17}{4}r + \frac{17^2}{8^2} = \frac{289 - 64}{64} = \frac{225}{64}$$

$$\text{extracting root, } r - \frac{17}{8} = \frac{15}{8}$$

$$\therefore r = \frac{15+17}{8} = \frac{32}{8} = 4$$

hence, substituting $\frac{16}{4}$. 16 . 4 x 16,

4 . 16 . and 64 are the required numbers.—X. F.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—IV.

28. It has been announced that the Mint at present strikes off half a million pounds sterling in gold per week. How long will a man be engaged counting this sum, if half of it be in half-sovereigns, and he count 100 per minute for eight hours a day?

29. Required, the simple interest of the above for 15 years and 61 days, at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum.

30. The weight of a cubic foot of water is 62.5 lb. What is the weight of a cubic inch?

31. Required the compound interest of £1 for 1,000 years, at £5 per cent per annum.

32. What is the sum of the series $\frac{1}{1^2} + \frac{1}{2^2} + \frac{1}{3^2} + \dots$ &c., *ad infinitum*?

33. If a body be put into motion by a force which moves at the rate of 200 feet the first second, 190 the second, and so on for ever, in the ratio of $\frac{1}{10}$, how many feet will it pass over?

34. What weight of water will a globe of beech, whose diameter is 27 inches, and specific gravity .852, displace?

35. How much will the water measure by imperial gallon?

36. What will an iron shot, the specific gravity of which is 7.248, and diameter 6 inches, weigh in water?

37. Given $\begin{cases} x^2 - xy = 84 \\ y^2 + xy = 176 \end{cases}$ to find x and y .

Notices of Books.

The Sexuality of Nature. By Leopold H. Grindon, Author of "Figurative Language," &c. London: Fred. Pitman.

This is an ably-written essay, attempting to show that "sex and the marriage union are universal principles: fundamental alike in physics, physiology, and psychology." The writer sets out by asserting that "Nature is a system of nuptials. Everything in creation partakes either of masculine or feminine qualities;—animals and plants, earth, air, water, colour, heat, light, music, thought, speech, the sense of the beautiful, the adaptation of the soul for heaven,—all exist as the offspring or products of a kind of marriage." In endeavouring to substantiate this position Mr. Grindon, while disclosing the school of theologians to which he belongs, exhibits considerable talent, and succeeds, we must say, in elaborating a very ingenious, if not a truthful, theory. His remarks on the different characteristics of man and woman will be perused with interest by many of our readers:—

"Perhaps no question has ever been more actively discussed than the comparative value of man and woman; and throughout the dispute superiority has been arrogated to man. In many great departments of life and its employments, unquestionably he is superior; but, fairly examined, the difference between the sexes is one which neither subordinates woman nor aggrandizes man. Affection, or woman's prerogative, is a thing as excellent as intellect; and fulfils a part in the economy of human life, if not so commanding, lovelier, and far less easy to be dispensed with. In all ages, however, it has been the malpractice to measure nobility of spiritual nature by vigour of understanding alone, setting aside the priceless qualities of the heart as lower and less worthy—good in themselves, but possessing none of the royalty of mind. Nothing could be more selfish or unfair; for it is to confine the comparison to what is less conspicuous in woman with what is chiefly so in man, and to neglect to continue it into those very points wherein man would lose and woman transcendently excel. Man and woman ought not to be compared according to their relative wealth in one spiritual quality in particular. By such a course each is in turn

found wanting. That this should have been lost sight of by intending 'vindicators' of woman is not a little surprising, and very unfortunate for them, as they have failed of necessity to prove the equality *really existing*, by confining their attention to what only indicates *inequality*. It is quite as absurd to think slightly of woman because of her deficiency in man's peculiarities, as it would be to reverse the custom, and disparage man for his lack of the characteristics of the female. And for the same reason it is vain to expect similar intellectual works from man and woman, unless as rare exceptions. Not that woman's intellectual powers are dull or contracted. Quite the contrary. Woman has proved herself competent to unfold mental products of the highest beauty, but she cannot infuse into her writings that mighty vigour which would place them on a level with man's. It is with the mind of the two sexes as with their qualities of body. Man is bony, angular, rough, muscular, replenished with strength; woman is soft, whiter, exquisitely rounded, beauty itself:—

'Induitur, formosa est; exuitur, ipsa forma est.'

Not even if similarly trained, can woman's mind become like man's. No education can effect such a conversion, any more than it can womanize the masculine intellect. The sexes of their outward frames are not more distinct for all life, than are the sexes of their inner lives. Indeed, the latter are far more real; for, even if it were possible to abolish external sex, the psychological constitutions would yet remain intact, seeing that it is on these that personality depends, and that they are born to an unchangeable immortality. See how in every spontaneous act of life woman betokens her identification with whatever primarily concerns the heart, man with whatever primarily concerns the head. While man is more theological, woman is more pious. *He* remembers principles; *she* remembers incidents; those in particular which are connected with the feelings. He delights to read books; *she* prefers to hear them read. For the eye is the organ pre-eminently of the understanding, the ear that of the affections. The one is more masculine, the other more feminine."

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XVIII.—FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION.

FIGURATIVE Expression is a theme which has given vast scope for nonsense-writing. Some rhetoricians appear to think that it can be readily acquired by art; and, influenced by this idea, have written out laboriously minute *recipes* for the manufacture of "figures of speech." By so doing they seem to expect that their pupils will readily acquire the power of trimming and bespangling their compositions—like the regal vestments of a stage-king—with itemal ornaments. Such adornment, however, is "no more like the true thing than a bad half-crown rings like a good one;" it is the mere frippery of eloquence; one of the evil results of the general acceptance of that shallow saying of Lord Chesterfield's, "The manner of speaking is as important as the matter." To write or speak in a truly rhetorical manner, it is not at all necessary to acquire the absurdly extravagant style of Sir Hudibras, who

"Could not open
His mouth, but out there flew a trope."

The clap-trap oratory of mere demagoguism may require to be thus excitingly seasoned; but not that higher eloquence which becomes the thinker, and confers upon him the delicious power of awakening in the minds of others high thoughts and noble aims. Figurative expression, to be pleasing, must be natural, and no mere educt of the *formulae* of art. Although, however, we speak thus severely of mere art-culture, let us not be understood as the opponents of art-studies, when kept within proper limits—when not regarded as the all-in-all of eloquence. Were we indeed so, why our present prelections? Were accuracy, grace, fluency, ease, and brilliancy of diction,

"No more difficile
Than for a blackbird 'tis to whistle,"

what need were there for our lengthy exposition of the principles of thought-utterance? It is because we believe that all men may be improved by a diligent study of the laws of thought that we write. *This* is the true province of art. Not origination, but improvement—not the imparting of power, but the culture and training of power possessed—are the ends and aims of true art. Hence it is that we shall abjure the example of the recipe manufacturers, and expound rather the principles of thought from which figurative language proceeds, than the method of artificially cultivating the art of rhetorical ornamentation.

Thought may exist in the mind either (1) purely, (2) in conjunction with either imagination or emotion, or (3) in conjunction with both. In the pure state (1) it is strictly logical and cognitive; in the singly combined state (2) it is either æsthetic or impassioned; in the duplex combination (3) it is intellective, æsthetic, and emotive. Pure thought only requires truth, clearness, pertinence, correctness, and is altogether alien to figurative expression. The just, the adequate, and precise exposition of the *matter* with which our cognitive faculty (*Erkenntnis-vermogen*) is concerning itself, is all that can be fairly

demanded of us; as it is, indeed, all that can be given. Imaginative or impassioned thought, being of duplex origin, must bear intimations of the sources whence it springs: to truthful and correct expression must be added beauty or energy—taste or passion. In such cases language must neither be dark nor barren, but to the lucidity of intellect must add the brightness with which imagination halves all things, or the life and action which the passions lend. When thought flows from tripartite sources—when intellect, taste, and emotive ardour are conjoined—an elegantly-idealized and gracefully-ardent manner will result. Thus it will be seen that there is no *one* style which can be always *the best*—there is no recipe by which those who have not thought peculiarly can express themselves peculiarly. The thoughts which arise in a man's head or heart will find expression fitted to themselves much more easily than enter into a forced marriage with an ill-chosen life-companion. Style evolves itself spontaneously; art can only aid its growth, and ought not to attempt to modify or alter its constituent characteristics, but merely co-operate in its healthy and legitimate development. As the foliage and blossom of a plant must bear a certain relation to the stem and radicle from which they spring, and the circumstances which surround them, so must style—the flower and fruit of mind—depend for its essential characteristics upon the native power and subsequent culture of that from which it germinates, and those things by which it is influenced. If we think well we must potentially possess the capacity of speaking and writing well, for *that* is the mere externalization of thought,—the making of that objective which aforesaid was subjective. As is the *form* of our thought, so shall be the form of our style, varying continually, according to the changing of the mind's view of the *matter* of its thought.

These few introductory remarks we regard as needful to remind the reader of the method of exposition which we have adopted in all our prelections on this subject, viz., that of seeking in the mind itself, and not in the arbitrary rules of illustrious men, the *rationale* of rhetorical laws.

To those who have followed us thus far it will appear evident, first, that there are two species of beauty capable of being blended together in composition, viz., (1) of thought, (2) of manner; and that the latter depends upon the former; and likewise, secondly, that there are two processes of mental action capable of being exerted in both, viz., (1) choice, (2) arrangement.

BEAUTY OF THOUGHT refers to the topic upon which the mind engages itself. When *this* is reflected upon in such a manner as to produce a union of truth and taste, the thought is said to be beautiful. As a general rule it may be asserted, that in the choice of thoughts we should avoid all low, mean, unnatural, useless, and erroneous ideas, and should aim at the acquirement of those which are noble, worthy, correct, agreeable, beneficial, and ingenious. In the arrangement of these thoughts we should adopt that mode which may be most efficacious in securing the end we have in view. This department of rhetoric, however, may be more beneficially treated of in a future paper on *Method*; in the meantime it may suffice to say that, when one has made himself fully master of the lexicon of a language, each idea calls up the precise word or words by which it may be most easily introduced, representatively, into the mind of another; and when one has thoroughly acquainted himself with the matter of his thought, and has familiarized himself with the principles of mind on which it exerts an influence, he must know that these necessitate

certain modes of expression; and, inversely, that these modes of expression, as they originate in certain states of thought, or proceed from certain principles of mind, must educe the same states, or act upon the same principles, in the minds of others; and hence that beauty in the arrangement of thought is secured when the matter is so syntagmated or methodized as to attain ready and acceptable inspection and credence from others.

BEAUTY OF MANNER concerns itself with the mode adopted for exposition. The means of exposition are twofold: (1) arrangement (for which see remarks in preceding paragraph and our future paper on Method), (2) language. Beauty of language is also duplex, and may consist (*a*) in the harmony and relation of our words to the matter of our thoughts, or (*b*) in the harmony and relation of words to one another. Of these, however, we do not intend to discourse separately, but shall go on speaking of them unitedly as productive of demands upon the attention regarding these three points, viz., 1st, syntactic structure; 2nd, variety of style; 3rd, figurative expression. The first and second topics have already been sufficiently protected upon; and, though they may be referred to occasionally, we purpose confining our attention, at present, to the principles and laws of figurative expression.

This subject has been treated of in such a number of ways, each possessing advantages peculiar to itself, that it is very difficult indeed to decide upon the method which combines the greatest number of advantages. Of these we may mention the following, viz.:— (*a*) I. Figures of arrangement—II. of conversion, or tropes. (*b*) I. Figures of analogy—II. of substitution—III. of construction; IV. epithetic figures; V. figures resulting from the impassioned and indirect expression of thought. (*c*) I. Figures which add beauty to language—II. to thought. (*d*) I. Figures addressed to the intellect; II. figures which affect the passions. (*e*) I. Figures of imagination—II. of intellect; III. coalescent figures, or those which excite at once imagination and intellect. (*f*) I. Figures of sound—II. of sense. (*g*) Figures of similarity—II. of opposition—III. of substitution. (*h*) I. Figures of intellect—II. of imagination—III. of emotion—IV. of all combined. This latter arrangement we shall in a great measure adopt, as being at once comprehensive and philosophical, although we shall not pledge ourselves to a strict adherence to any system in all points. Indeed, it is difficult to perceive the possibility of any very minute and peremptory classification, as, from the very constitution of the human mind, it will appear obvious that there must be a gradual shading off from one to the other. The elements of thought are so various, and they may be combined in proportions so diverse, that any rigid and inflexible system of classification must fail from want of practicability. While approving therefore, in general, of the division last mentioned, we shall take leave to deviate from the arrangement it proposes, if at any time it should present the appearance of leading us into error.

This additional amount of prefatory matter we have laid before the reader in order that he may be led to perceive the difficulties which lie in the way of our progress, and may be inclined to grant us an indulgent hearing, even when he may suppose that we are wandering from the pathway to the palace hall of Truth.

Figurative expression ought not to be regarded as an artifice of style, but as an essential requisite to the adequate exponentiation of the thoughts which originate in the mind of a being of such a complex character as man, in whom clear thought, refined taste, exquisite imaginative powers, and ever-active passions,

“ Mingle in one being, like
The married colours in the bow of heaven.”

The bare *statesqueness* of merely intellectual thought is undoubtedly beautiful; but the *picturesqueness* of thoughts which exhibit imagination and passion is still more exquisitely so. But it is seldom, indeed, that thought passes through and leaves the mind without exciting some emotion, or calling into action some principle of taste. Those thoughts will always afford the greatest gratification to men which impart the greatest possible amount of activity; for upon activity all delight depends. Those thoughts, therefore, which excite or employ the whole of the mental powers are most fitted to secure general attention, and to produce the largest measure of beneficial result. Thought-expression, to be generally interesting, must base itself on this fact—must pass actively through the intellect, the taste-faculties, and the emotional nature of man, or our speech or writing will never issue in an “Autumn dropping fruits of power.” The logical form of speech is only the mode which the intellect adopts as the clearest and most readily comprehensible expression of that which agitates it; because this is the case, however, we are not to infer that there is no other method of expressing ideas which is natural and proper. So far is that from being the case, that on many occasions those forms of language which are called “figures of speech” arise more naturally and spontaneously than any other; nay, the very poverty of human language renders such a use of words a necessary element in the communication of thought. “The figurative use of words is very extensive; a use to which necessity at first gave birth, because of the poverty of words and barrenness of language; but which, on account of the delight and pleasure derivable from it, became very frequently practised. . . . Figurative speech, introduced in consequence of scantiness of phraseology, has continued to be cultivated because of the delight it gives.”* The more copious the ideas entertained by the soul of man become, the more difficult it is “with words like colours” to “limn them on the canvas” of the sense. By the use of figurative speech, however, and by bringing to our aid the numerous analogies in things of which the mind is conscious, the richness of our mode of thought-utterance is vastly increased. It cannot but be evident that, as the greater number of our ideas are received by, or originated in, us by the external senses, so the most frequent figures must be those which apply the details of the external world as analogical of those which pass in the inner invisible world of mind. It must also be regarded as a fact given in consciousness, that “the association of ideas” holds in the imaginative and emotional as well as in the intellectual nature of man, and hence that the relations of ideas, whether as co-existent or successional, must rule in figurative language not less than in logical thought.†

It may be as well, perhaps, however, before proceeding farther, to aid the student in perceiving more clearly the advisability of the division which we have adopted to classify the various “figures of speech,” and arrange them before him in a tabular scheme, in which he may have a list of the denominations which they have received, and a notion of the relations which they bear to each other, at one view, thus, viz. :—

* “Modus transferendi verba latè patet; quam necessitas primum genuit, coacta inopia et angustias; post autem delectatio jucunditasque celebravit. . . . Verbi translatio instituta est inopie causa, frequentata delectationis.”—Cicero’s “De Oratore,” lib. iii.

† For an exposition of the laws of association, ride “Art of Reasoning,” No. XX., p. 444.

FIGURES OF SPEECH.

CLASS I.—OF INTELLECT.	<i>Species I.—Decrementive</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ellipsis. 2. Asyndeton. 3. Anacoluthon. 4. Aposiopesis. 5. Hyperbaton. 6. Synæchthosmus. 	<i>Species III.— Amplificative...</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Anaphora. 2. Anadiplosis. 3. Analepsis. 4. Apposition. 5. Epanalepsis. 6. Epanaphora. 7. Epiphora. 8. Climax. 9. Anticlimax. 10. Exergasia. 11. Euphemismus. 12. Pleonasm. 13. Polysyntheton. 14. Synonymy.
	<i>Species II.—Antithetic...</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enantiosis. 2. Antanacclasis. 3. Antimetabole. 4. Paradiastole. 5. Synœceiosis. 6. Paronomasia. 		
CLASS II.—OF IMAGINATION.	<i>Species I.—Resemblant...</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Simile. 2. Allegory. 3. Metaphor. 4. Catachresis. 5. Hyperbole. 6. Personification. 7. Vision. 8. Apostrophe. 	CLASS III.— OF EMOTION.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Erotosis. 2. Esphonesis. 3. Dissideration. 4. Irony. 5. Sarcasm. 6. Mimesis. 7. Litotes. 8. Auxesis. 9. Tapinosis. 10. Prolepsis. 11. Synchorexis. 12. Anacœnosis. 13. Aporia. 14. Epanorthosis.
	<i>Species II.—Substitutive</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Metonymy. 2. Synecdoche. 3. Antonomasia. 4. Metalepsis. 5. Periphrasis. 		CLASS IV.— EPITHETIC.
				<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Onomatopœia. 2. Antiphrasis. 3. Polyptolon. 4. Ploce. 5. Oxymoron. 6. Enallage.

I. FIGURES OF INTELLECT.—It cannot have escaped the observation of the most careless, that there is a fitness in certain verbal arrangements to arrest thought and quicken attention—that there are certain combinations and juxta-positions—certain modes of exciting the susceptibilities of the mind and presenting ideas effectively to it—which violate the strictly logical method of exposition, and are yet more successful in realizing the object of the speaker or writer than it. That these deviations from ratiocinative consecutiveness are erroneous few will be bold enough to affirm, since they exhibit our thoughts more clearly and forcibly than they could be by any other mode of utterance. If, then, they are natural, there must be some mental principle or principles on which their superior efficacy depends. The central principle we believe to be the economization of intellectual energy.* This principle may be said to imply the following law, viz., that

* See this well illustrated in a paper of singular merit in "The Westminster Review," October, 1852, "On the Philosophy of Style," to which we have much pleasure in owning our indebtedness.

occasional change of structure is advisable, and that for the following reasons, viz.:—1. Occasional change, as it intermits the excessive activity of any one faculty of mind, and imparts rest to it, capacitates in it greater vividness of perception; i. e., change, as it conserves the moderate exertion of the mental powers, conserves also their healthy action. 2. Occasional change, as it calls a greater number of faculties into operation upon the same topic, produces pleasure. 3. Occasional change lessens monotony, and heightens our gratification by the sense of contrast. 4. Occasional change enables us to impart our thoughts more pertinently to a greater number of minds, as well as to appeal to those several minds in various ways, and thus secure a greater number of possible avenues for the entrance of our thoughts. These occasional changes, however, must result from fixed laws in the human mind, and impress other minds in accordance with the laws which govern them. Keeping these principles in view, we may proceed to the enumeration and description of some of the chief Figures of the Intellect. Our readers, however, may perhaps permit us to interject one remark, namely, that though we include the following figures in the above-mentioned class, we do not mean that they are wholly the result of intellectual causes, but that these causes predominate, and hence confer on them the class characteristic which is implied in the name we have given them.

In our next paper we hope to supply those who are anxiously asking how shall

“ I discipline my young novitiate thought ? ”

with such an explanation of the mental origin and general characteristics of the above-mentioned figures of speech as shall enable some of them, by diligent culture, to have it said in after-day of them, as was said of one of old,—

“ On the tip of his subduing tongue
All kinds of arguments and questions deep,
All replication prompt and reason strong,
For his advantage still did wake and sleep,
To make the weeper laugh—the laugher weep;
He had the dialect and different skill,
Catching all passions in his craft of will,
That he did in the general bosom reign
Of young and old.”

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON WORTHY OF ADMIRATION ?

NEUTRAL ARTICLE.

“ Rashly, nor oftentimes truly, doth man pass judgment on his brother ;

For he seeth not the springs of the heart, nor heareth the reasons of the mind.”

M. F. Tupper.

“ The Duke of Wellington is one of that bright band of whom it may be justly said,—

“ Such souls are rare ; and mighty patterns given To earth ; and meant for ornaments to heaven.”

J. G. R.

“ The language which Byron addressed to him still retains all its point :—

“ ‘ Never had mortal man such opportunity, Except Napoleon, or abused it more.’ ”

Aristides.

When the first public announcement of the Wellington tournament was made, great was the interest which it excited, and many

were the eyes "bent with eager gaze" upon the field of combat. That tournament is now over; but its "footprints" are left "on the sands of time," and its trophies are hung up in the halls of the *Controversialist*. For the purpose, then, of examining these trophies more minutely, and of enabling the readers of this magazine to view Wellington, if possible, in a proper light, we pen this article. We shall speak freely of our hero, utterly regardless of the *fact* that he is dead, which *fact* has been laid much stress upon, but which, we would

premise, should not weigh one iota either for or against him.

The two most striking and characteristic of these trophies—these pen-won laurels—are those which are placed at the head of this paper; and, simply pointing out how truthfully they illustrate the lines of Tupper, and how significant the contrast between them, we will proceed to a brief review of the others, putting them, for the purpose of more readily comprehending their scope and signification, in a tabular form, *pro* and *con*.

Pro.

WELLINGTON CHARACTERISTICS.

Con.

"We see him, not resorting to the height of extravagance in revengeful actions, or exulting over his foes with cruel rapacity or horrid butchery; but, on the contrary, manifesting steady and unflinching adherence to the stern mandates of justice, and tempering all his movements with merciful consideration."—*T. W.*, p. 20.

"A love of country, coupled with a sympathy for the faults and failings of his fellow-creatures, caused him at once to be just, but yet merciful."—*C. W.*, *Jan.*, p. 57.

"The amount of forethought evidenced by him in all his services, together with that prompt decision, that unwearied perseverance and strict regard to the requirements of *duty* by which he was ever characterized, render him deserving our respect."—*T. W.*, p. 21.

"We base our admiration of Wellington upon two positions, . . . the first being in respect of those qualities of mind and habits of industry which led him on to greatness; the second being that true nobleness of nature which guarded him from falling a victim to those *ambitious propensities* which have so often overtaken other great men."—*C. W.*, *Jan.*, pp. 57-8.

"The poor old Duke endeavoured to carry out practically and zealously the injunction of Nelson, 'To do his duty.'"—*J. G. R.*, p. 104.

"The immense sacrifice of men at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos was by no means compensated for by the capture of those places."—*Aristides*, p. 59.

"To pity he was a stranger."—*Aristides*, p. 60.

"'Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty, and murder—shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and two nights in the streets of Badajoz.' And who permitted this, do you ask? We answer, the general commanding."—*L'Ouvrier*, p. 109.

"Neither his skilful combinations, his artful manœuvres, his inflexibility of purpose, nor his personal valour, can command our admiration, unless these be yoked to a good cause, and that cause itself be the only, or at least the chief, motive, for engaging in it."—*Aristides*, p. 23.

"We grant, at once, that in the minor traits of frankness, courage, decision, promptitude, unceasing activity, persistency of purpose, his life forms a pleasing contrast to that presented by the lives of many more highly-gifted men; yet these, as they involve not great principles, cannot elicit our admiration of a public man, so marred by other deficiencies."—*Aristides*, p. 60.

"Wellington's duty consisted in implicit obedience to his orders; and in the execution of these orders it was no consideration of his whether they were morally right or wrong, nor what might be the cost of property or life thereby: his duty was to obey."—*L'Ouvrier*, p. 108.

"An attentive observer cannot fail to distinguish throughout his senatorial proceedings, as well as in his military transactions, such qualities, and such manifestations of virtue and justice, as constitute the general tenor of his character worthy our admiration."—*T. W.*, p. 21.

"The Duke always entertained serious apprehensions that any alteration in the laws would materially affect, and probably injure, the interests and prosperity of the kingdom at large; but when he saw that disastrous results were likely to follow unless certain remedial measures and alterations were proposed and carried into effect, he sacrificed his convictions, . . . and cheerfully assisted in carrying out any measure calculated to promote the general welfare."—*J. G. R.*, pp. 105-6.

"His charity and benevolence, always unobtrusive, was most gratifying. One or two instances, selected from the many, will suffice," &c.—*J. G. R.*, p. 104.

"His biographer says, 'He loved to do good by stealth, and did not care to find it fame.'"—*J. G. R.*, p. 104.

"For my own part, I am glad that he was satisfied with the whispers of an approving conscience, endorsed with and by the approbation of his Queen, his country, and the major part of the states of Europe."—*J. G. R.*, p. 104.

"He always evinced a laudable anxiety that the soldiery should have the assistance of chaplains of orthodox principles and exemplary conduct."—*J. G. R.*, p. 105.

"When speaking or thinking of the departed Duke, let us ever remember that, 'unvanquished in the field,' his sword was never drawn for territorial conquest, but for the independence of Europe and the salvation of his country."—*C. W., Jun.*, p. 58.

"He always acted as a disinterested party, and there is but one impression which is irresistibly conveyed to the mind of the

"We find him in the attitude of resistance towards the three momentous questions which then agitated the kingdom—the repeal of the corn laws, religious disabilities, and parliamentary reform; and, if he could have had his way, no modification would have been granted."—*Aristides*, p. 24.

"It is to the out-of-door agitation we are indebted for the concessions made during his administration, rather than to the ministry; so far as his own opinions were concerned, he was stoutly opposed to them; but the excitement throughout the country was so intense, so irresistible, that no alternative was left to ministers, if they did not concede, but to relinquish office."—*Aristides*, p. 24.

"We find him, while in power, placing his mother on the pension list. . . . His own official salaries, and his various bounties, were surely sufficiently munificent to have enabled him to have secured her who bare him from being degraded into a state pauper."—*Aristides*, p. 58.

"Rarely was he animated by generous impulses to assist the weak or overawe the strong."—*Aristides*, p. 60.

"The test by which it is endeavoured to convince us of the rectitude of the Duke . . . is fatally defective, inasmuch as a man's conscience is not some incorruptible faculty, but one subject to modification from his principles and pursuits; . . . and it is notorious that the Duke never was a favourite with the people at large, either of his own country or of the countries of the continent."—*Aristides*, p. 143.

"His famous declaration that men who believe in the New Testament have no business in the army, will serve to counteract any danger of mistaken views being entertained regarding the religious sentiments of his grace."—*Aristides*, pp. 143-4.

"Was he more than an instrument, and would he have refused to conduct the army in an unjust war? In this both negative and positive evidence is against him."—*Aristides*, p. 143.

"He was the aristocracy's hero, both in the field and in the parliament house; and at their instance, and by their influence, the

reader of his life, viz., his earnest devotedness to his country."—*J. G. R.*, p. 106.

The above tabulated statements contain, if we mistake not, the pith of the several papers which have appeared on this question; and when it is noted how widely antagonistic these statements are, it will at once be perceived that the task is not easy of forming a true estimate of Wellington's character, and that not only must our range of information be varied and extensive—not only must we drink largely at all the intellectual rivulets which flow into the one great channel, but that the greatest amount of careful and patient thought, the deepest and broadest investigation, and the widest possible induction and deduction, must be brought to bear upon the subject.

The writer of the first affirmative article finds cause to admire Wellington's character both as a soldier and a statesman; his justice, mercy, and strict regard to the requirements of duty, as a soldier; and his virtue, justice, sagacity, foresight, and common sense, as a man. Now, there are two points to be remembered in judging the character of a soldier: the one is, to exclude all consideration of the merits of the cause for which he fights; the other, to keep these prominently in view. The latter is the method which has been adopted by almost all panegyrists of Wellington; and hence, thinking that he fought for the "liberties of Europe and the salvation of his country," they have seen cause to shower upon him praises innumerable. The former, however, seems to be the method adopted by T. W. and the other affirmative writers; and consequently for the present we will take the same ground, touching upon the latter, however, in another part of our paper.

Against the assertions of T. W. we have those, as tabulated, of "Aristides" and "L'Ouvrier." Now, having taken the trouble to read and study the history of Wellington's military career, from his first exploit in India to his final *chef-d'œuvre* at Waterloo, and his consequent entry into Paris, we are compelled, by the evidence before us, to allow him those qualities for which, as a soldier, T. W. has praised him.

titles and estates, the places and pensions, were granted as the reward of those services which contributed to secure them in their immunities and privileges."—*Aristides*, p. 145.

View him for a moment after the storming of Seringapatam. For two days his exertions to save the lives and properties of the inhabitants never flagged; and during the time he was governor there his invariable justice and humanity won for him the gratitude of the inhabitants. So much did they esteem him, that on his return from Assaye they presented him with an address, in which "they implored the God of all castes and of all nations to hear their constant prayer that, whenever greater affairs might call him away from them, to bestow on him health, glory, and happiness."* "To this hour," says one who wrote some twenty years ago, "the memory of all these services, and more particularly of those which he rendered to the terrified and desolate natives in the moment of our triumph and their distress, is cherished by the aged inhabitants of Seringapatam with gratitude."†

View him again in the Peninsula. Trace him from Portugal to Paris. We find everywhere the same characteristics which distinguished him in India. We know, and we mourn over it, that many of his victories were purchased at a tremendous sacrifice of life, particularly those of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; but, against the assertion of "L'Ouvrier," that our killed and wounded were ever far greater than those of the French, we, in all fairness, must place the fact, "*that the losses of the French were never actually known, as, throughout the war, they published no returns.*" "Many of Lord Wellington's proceedings," says Napier, "might be called rash, and others timid and slow, if taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of a great plan for delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or daring, as the circumstances warranted."‡

With respect to the conduct of the soldiers at Badajoz, it is due not only to Wellington,

* "Dispatches," vol. iii. p. 430. André Vieusseux, "Military Life of Wellington."

† Captain Moyle Sherer, "Military Memoirs of the Duke of Wellington."

‡ W. Napier, "History of the War in the Peninsula."

We cannot pass on without noticing the striking contrast exhibited between Wellington and his soldiers and the French generals and their troops—the one living by plunder, rapine, and bloodshed, massacring the inhabitants with whom they came in contact, ravishing their wives and daughters, turning the fertile valley into the “waste, howling wilderness,” and the song of joy into the wail of lamentation; the other, though at times without food, and exposed to the most fearful temptations, still, in general, refraining from plunder and devastation, still protecting the lives and properties of the inhabitants, and rarely, if ever, openly dishonouring their wives or daughters, or wantonly invading the peaceful security of their homes. “Where I command,” Wellington says energetically, when writing to a Spanish general, “I declare that no one shall be allowed to plunder. If plunder must be had, then another must have the command.”† “His campaigns,” says Southey, “have been sullied by no cruelties—no crimes: and the chariot-wheels of his triumphs have been followed by no curses.”‡

We approach, now, to that highly-eulogized

hearts." We believe that there are hundreds of others, whose names are written in blood, and yet who have acted under the same impulse of duty; and we do think that, "if a mere stern, inflexible obedience to a sense of duty of any sort, without at all inquiring duty to whom or what, is to be esteemed a sufficient title to admiration, then were these men admirable."*

It was Wellington's sense of duty which led him, when remonstrated with by some officers, to make that famous declaration on religion which has been referred to by "Aristides," and which declaration, we opine, should occupy a more prominent place in the minds of his pulpit admirers. It was the same sense of duty which led him, at Badajoz, to impale his men by hundreds on the rows of glittering sword-blades which the French had fastened into planks and thrown across the breaches. It was the same feeling of duty which animated him, in 1832, "when he was quite prepared to lead forth the army to crush his countrymen who were crying for reform, and had actually issued his orders for the Scotch Greys to 'rough-sharpen their swords on the grindstone,' and to be in readiness to fall on the people."† It was the same inexorable sense of duty which carried him through that war which cost some fourteen or fifteen hundred millions of money, and spilt the blood of the best and bravest of England's sons in defence, as it is said, of liberty.

Leaving, then, this point, we will examine another and more important one, viz., the correctness of the assertion that Wellington lived and fought "for the liberties of Europe and the salvation of his country." With almost all the admirers of Wellington this is the keystone of their praise—the major premise from which they draw their favourable conclusions. Our aristocrats have raised the cry, our historians have taken it up, our pulpit-orators have spread it far and wide, and the people have echoed and prolonged it, till everywhere has been heard, "Wellington and the liberties of Europe!" "Wellington, who bore aloft the sword of conquest that he might plant in its stead the emblems of peace!" This fulsome adulation cannot be too strongly condemned, especially when, as

it appears to us, it has no foundation in facts.

We deem it a duty, not only to the cause of peace and humanity, but also to our brethren across the channel, to assert that Wellington fought not for the "liberties of Europe;" nay, more, that England was the aggressor in the last war, and that it was entered upon for the sole purpose of putting down the spirit of reform, and that thirst for liberty which was then menacing not only the throne of kingly and priestly despotism in France, but even in England and many other nations.

When we have studied the French revolution of 1789—when we have perused the debates in the English senate at the time—when we have reviewed the conduct of the French nation to England during the revolution, the conduct of Napoleon afterwards, and the policy of England and her ministers—when we have mastered the contents of the earnest speeches of Fox, Sheridan, Tierny, Erskine, Grey, and Holland, on the one side, and the rabid declamations of Burke, Grenville, Pitt, and other supporters of the war, on the other, then shall we know whether the "cause was sanctified by right;" then shall we be in a position to speak rightly of the war, and to praise or condemn, to curse or bless, the general who so ably directed it.

It is mournful to see with what complacency it is assumed that Wellington headed a necessary and unavoidable war; and we regret that the limits of the *Controversialist* prevent us from entering into a detailed investigation on this point. We feel compelled to say that a calm and dispassionate review of the whole of the evidence relating to the war in which Wellington gained his honours, titles, and pensions—in which "two millions of human lives were destroyed in every conceivable form of agony"—will prove beyond dispute the mournful fact, that *England was the aggressor*. It is an historical fact that, when the French revolution took place—when the people of France were justly struggling for their rights and liberties against the tyranny of the crown and the nobles—when the shout for reform had made to tremble the tyrants of the earth, certain of the foreign powers, with the Duke of Brunswick at their head, fearing that the death of tyranny and despotism was at hand, at once armed themselves and prepared to

* "Herald of Peace."

† *Ibid.*—Andrew Somerville, who was in the Scotch Greys at the time—pp. 244—249.

invade France, in order to restore the fallen prerogatives of the king, to drown the cry for liberty and reform, and to prop up the then tottering throne of tyranny and despotism. And what followed? Hear it in the words of Alison:—"No doubt (says he) can now exist that the interference of the allies augmented the horrors and added to the duration of the revolution. *All its bloodiest excesses were committed during or after an alarming but unsuccessful invasion by the allied forces.*"* The allies were repulsed with disgrace; and England then took up the cry, put herself at the head of the coalition,† and forced France into that war which for twenty years darkened the affairs of Europe, and which France did *everything* in her power to avert. And what has this war left us? Read the answer, written as it is with a pen of blood, in the world itself. Read it in the words of Brougham, who says, "Fifteen millions have been squandered on cruelty and crime—in naturalizing barbarism over the world—shrouding the nations in darkness—making bloodshed tinge the earth of every country under the sun; and all with the wretched, and, thank God! I may now say, the utterly frustrated, as it always was the utterly vain, attempt to crush the liberties of the people."‡

We do earnestly hope, then, that the fulsome adulation of Wellington as the defender of our "rights and liberties" will, ere long, cease to be heard. We hope that his admirers will, for the future, base their admiration on another foundation; for, not only does the evidence relating to the war prove this a slippery and unsafe one, but Wellington's military oath, and his *theory of duty*, wholly incapacitate him for receiving any admiration on this score.§

We come, now, to Wellington's life and

character as a man and as a statesman. We confess that we approach this part of our subject with some reluctance. A man in private life may work for good or evil, and the world know it not; and as a statesman, as a public character, there are actions, and reasons for actions, which none can fathom but himself. T. W. and his satellites have looked upon this phase of his character from pretty nearly the same point of view; and, consequently, we shall take them together, as also "Aristides" and "L'Ouvrier," who have followed on the opposite side. It is amusing to see how this portion of Wellington's life is made subservient to individual views. One sees in it nothing but a personification of virtue and justice, charity and benevolence, sacrifice of self, and entire devotion to the public weal; another, austerity and oppression, selfishness and ingratitude, bigoted opposition and forced concession, legislation for the aristocracy and not for the people.

This part of the subject seems to us to resolve itself into this, Did Wellington act conscientiously? Did he act with a single eye to the furtherance of the interests of society, or was he only animated by class interest, aristocratic prejudice, or implicit obedience to the behest of an earthly power? These questions, and others of a like nature, are hard to solve; but still we must grapple with them. We can scarce go the whole length with Cobden, when he says, "Sometimes it was the Queen; sometimes the public service, or the apprehension of a civil war, or a famine, which changed his course, and induced him to take up a new position; but *reason, or conscience, or will*, seemed to have no more to do in the matter than in the manœuvres of an army;"* for we think that, at times, *reason, will, and conscience*, had something to do in the matter; though, at the same time, we cannot but deeply deplore that these noble attributes of the human soul were often lamentably obscured by that sense of duty which he brought with him from the camp to the senate.

Wellington's guiding principles as a statesman are fully embodied in the words, "duty" and "necessity." When fully convinced of the necessity of a measure, he at once applied his almost superhuman energies to the car-

* Vol. v. p. 129.

† "England was still the soul of the coalition, and the implacable son of Chatham made prodigious efforts for the destruction of France."—*M. Thiers*.

‡ Brougham's speech at Liverpool, 1835.

§ "The soldier, be he commander or common man, who hires himself to do the bidding of whatever government may have power in his country, going out and doing whatever he is commanded to do, without reserving to himself the right of considering whether he fights on the side of liberty or tyranny, of right or of wrong, makes himself a mere automaton, which can deserve no honour."—"Wellington," by Dr. Brown.

* Cobden's pamphlet, "1793 and 1832."

rying of it; and we admire his frank and manly explanations of conduct, his utter disregard of party, the contempt with which he met the bitter sneer and biting sarcasm, even when hurled, as it often was, from his own party, and the true John Bull courage and firmness which carried him through difficulties which would have overthrown even greater minds. When fully convinced of the necessity of Catholic emancipation, he at once adopted it, even when the country was far from being unanimous in its support, and when the church, the mouthpiece of the state, was loud in its condemnation; and, amid the most tremendous opposition, he passed it, a full and complete measure. When attacked on the score of having at one time voted against such a measure, he replied in the following simple and disingenuous words:—"My lords, I admit that many of my colleagues, as well as myself, did on former occasions vote against a measure of a similar description with this; and, my lords, I must say that my colleagues and myself felt, when we adopted this measure, that we should be sacrificing ourselves and our popularity to that which we felt to be our duty to our sovereign and our country. We know very well that if we had chosen to put ourselves at the head of the Protestant cry of 'No Popery!' we should be much more popular even than those who have excited against us that very cry. But we felt that in so doing we should have left on the interests of the country a burden which must end in bearing them down, and, further, that we should have deserved the hate and execration of our countrymen."*

On all questions that came before the house we find him frankly declaring his opinion, heedless of praise or blame. Even on the celebrated reform bill there is the same frank and honest avowal of his sentiments. After giving his opinion upon it, as quoted in a previous number of the *Controversialist*, he says, "*I feel bound in candour and honour to state that the proposition of parliamentary reform will meet with my strenuous and decided opposition.*" This bold avowal was made in the face of the certain destruction of his ministry; and though we may mourn over his want of penetration and sagacity in not seeing the

necessity of such a measure, we cannot condemn his opposition, when it came from a conscientious belief that the "representation could not be improved." And even the reform bill owes *something* to him; for after a long opposition, and seeing the distracted state of parties, the inflamed condition of the people, and the critical position of the nation, he at once withdrew, along with a hundred peers of his party, from the sittings of the house, and then the bill was passed, 106 voting for it, and 22 against it.*

Wellington was not an enlightened statesman. He was not a liberal man, in the popular sense of that term. He had not that far-seeing glance which can discern at once the wants and requirements of society; and yet he was far more liberal than many of his political creed; and when judged by the men of his own time, instead of the men of our own day, he will lose little by the comparison. "I am not (says he) one of those who consider that the best means of preserving the constitution of the country is by adhering to measures, which had been called for by particular circumstances, because they have been in existence two hundred years, since the lapse of time might render it proper to modify, if not to remove them altogether."†

In conclusion, we would say that Wellington, as a *soldier*—as a *mere machine*, that performed its work well, may be justly admired; but when contrasted with such men as Washington, Kossuth, and others, who have fought in defence of their rights and liberties, responsible to none but their God, he dwindles into insignificance. As a statesman he possessed many qualities which we freely admire, and which we would wish to see more common among the statesmen of our own day. We admire his courage and firmness—his frankness and candour—his simplicity and unswerving integrity—his utter contempt of all affectation and cant—his immobility amidst all the kingly favours and praises which were bestowed upon him—his undeviating rectitude—his freeness from petty passions and party strifes, and his rigid adherence to whatever he deemed a duty.

We mourn, however, that with the oppor-

* *Catholic Relief Bill, April 4, 1829.*

* Hansard's "Debates," and "Life of Wellington," by Sir A. E. Alexander, F.R.S.

† Debate on Corporation and Test Acts Repeal Bill, April 21, 1828.

tunities he enjoyed—with the talents which he undoubtedly possessed—with the long life that was permitted him—he did not do more for human freedom and progression; that he did not come more out into the world, and, throwing off his aristocratic prejudices, mix freely with his fellows, sympathize more with their wants and feelings, and try to alleviate and lessen their miseries and distresses. We regret that his cradle was the camp and tented field. We mourn that he was worshipped as a military hero. We mourn that historians sing his praises through the trumpet of glory. We mourn that our poets bend the knee, and in the melody of rhyme portray his victories and triumphs. We mourn that the world delights to honour such—to erect them statues—to give them titles, places, and pensions, passing by the men of mind and intellectual greatness, who so unweariedly work for their elevation and enlightenment. We mourn, in fine, that Wellington lived and died as a warrior. We mourn that his last act was that of a warrior; and we mourn that he has not carried with him into the tomb that military spirit, which is even now fearfully rampant in England, and which is ever opposed to the true interests of man, and the teaching of Christianity.

We have now done. We have felt the onerous nature of our task, and we tremble lest we should have erred; for,

“Tis hard to censure and be just;
To whet the sword too keen or let it rust;”

and,

“Perchance, if we knew the whole, and largely,
with comprehensive mind,
Couldst read the history of character, the chequered story of a life,
And into the great account, which summeth a mortal's destiny,
Wert to add the forces from without, dragging him this way and that;
The secret qualities within, grafted on the soul from the womb,
And the might of other men's example, among whom his lot is cast,
And the influence of want or health, of kindness or of harsh ill usage,
Of ignorance he cannot help, and knowledge found for him by others,
And first impressions hard to be effaced, and leadings to right or to wrong,
And inheritance of likeness from a father, and natural human frailty,
And the habit of health or disease, and prejudices poured into his mind,
And the myriad little matters which none but Omniscience can know,
And the accidents that steer the thoughts where none but Ubiquity can trace them;—
If we could compass these, and the consequences flowing from them,
And the scope to which they tend, and the necessary fitness of all things,”

then could we truly and unerringly estimate character; then should we read the “secrets of the heart and the reasons of the mind;” but now we truly feel that

“There is so much of good among the worst, so much of evil in the best,
Such seeming partialities in Providence, so many things to lessen and expand;
Yea, and with all man's boast, so little freedom of his will,
That—to look a little lower than the surface, garb, or dialect, or fashion—
We may feebly pronounce for a saint, or faintly condemn for a sinner.”

J. N. C.

Politics.

JUDGING FROM THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF FRANCE, IS AN ATTEMPTED INVASION OF ENGLAND PROBABLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“He was disposed,” Lord Aberdeen said, “to dissent from the maxims which had of late years received very general assent, that the best security for the continuance of peace was to be prepared for war. That was a maxim which might have been applied to the nations of antiquity, and to society in a comparatively barbarous and uncivilized state, when warlike preparations cost but little; but it was not a maxim which ought to be applied to modern nations, when the facilities

of the preparations for war were very different. Men, when they adopted such a maxim, and made large preparations in time of peace that would be sufficient in time of war, were apt to be influenced by the desire to put their efficiency to the test, that all their great preparations, and the result of their toil and expense, might not be thrown away. He thought, therefore, that it was no security to any country against the chances of war, to incur great expense and make great preparations for

warlike purposes. A most distinguished statesman of France had lately emphatically declared in the French Chamber his desire for peace; but he added that, to maintain it, he must have an army of 600,000 men. And what, he (the Earl of Aberdeen) would ask, could be expected from the raising of such a force but war, or national bankruptcy? He, therefore, dreaded the intention of those who desired such extensive armaments, notwithstanding the pacific professions they made; and he could not be at ease as regarded the stability of peace until he saw a great reduction in the great establishments of Europe. Such should be the great object of all governments, and more especially of the government of this country."

"Intelligent men in that country cannot believe that we think them capable of such folly—nay, madness—as to rush headlong, without provocation and without notice, into a war with the most powerful nation in the world, before whose very ports the raw materials of their manufactures pass, the supply of which, and the consequent employment and subsistence of millions of their population, would be immediately cut off, to say nothing of the terrible retribution which would be visited upon their shores, whilst all the world would be calling for the extermination of a community which had abdicated its civilized rank, and become a mere band of lawless bucaniers. No; they cannot think so badly of themselves as to believe that others, whose opinion they respect, would ever give them credit for such wickedness or insanity.

"But I shall be told that the people of France are entirely at the mercy of one man, and that public opinion is now powerless in that country. There is nothing about which we make such mistakes as in passing judgment upon our next neighbour. *Public opinion is as omnipotent there as in the United States, upon matters with which it interests itself*; but it takes a different direction from our own, and therefore we do not appreciate it. But it is quite necessary that the people—I mean the mass of our people—should be better informed as to the character and circumstances of the population of France. Teach Englishmen to despise another nation, and you have gone far towards making them quarrel; and there is nothing so sure to evoke our contempt as to be told that a people have not spirit to maintain their rights against the arbitrary will of a usurper."—*R. Cobden, M.P.*

HOMECOMING appears to be a prominent feature of the age. An implicit belief in, and reliance upon, all that the terrors of the imagination can convey through the medium of false and delusive misrepresentations, seems to have been the peculiar characteristic of certain wrong-headed journalists, who, relying on the elevated position which they hold in society, have falsely assumed that their powers of discrimination and judgment are as correct and infallible as their influence is extensive. We might have expected, however, that a nation priding itself on its power, extent, intelligence, civil-

ization, and refinement, as well as for its superiority in respect to warlike tactics, &c., would have been possessed of better materials for ascertaining true and correct data than such organs as the *Times* furnishes us. However, the experience of the last few years gives us ample proof that even that organ is not infallible, as it also proves that the English people (if they are *really* represented by the *press*) are not so distinguished either for their research or moral courage as their antecedents would lead us to suppose. The cry that the "country is in danger" has been systematically got up during the last few years, and has as often been falsified, to the infinite disgrace and deserved shame of its promoters; and, what is more remarkable, this hubbub has always arisen either when the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to report a good surplus, or when there was a demand, on the other hand, on the part of the nation, for an examination into (with the view of reducing) the enormous expenditure annually disbursed by the army and navy. This very fact is itself an emphatic *exposé* of the *real* intentions of the abettors of war. The innumerable host of captains, admirals, colonels, and generals, who are now in the receipt of large salaries and emoluments for doing nothing, are the real parties who promote the cry, and represent our position as "defenceless." They say the ships of war are all disabled, the coast walls dismantled and out of repair, the chief ports and harbours inviting the enemy by their insecure condition, very few thousand men available to concentrate upon any given place if attacked, and the whole kingdom not worth a row of pins, should the French invade us. But is this really the case? for here the naval and army authorities are at loggerheads. They know very well (and the preceding representations on their part are only a subterfuge to avert it) that monstrous and gross extravagance prevails in the whole system from beginning to end, and that an impartial investigation will inevitably, and must of necessity, terminate in a complete reconstruction of our warlike establishments. Whilst there are so many sinecures—so many "high," and "mighty," and "nothing-to-do" men—men receiving the pay of the country, although able to support themselves, being provided for by illustrious and noble connexions, it is not unreasonable to

suppose that, whenever there arises any probability of our warlike expenses being curtailed, they will, to save their own fate, represent the kingdom as "defenceless," and at the mercy of the "invaders." And so long as the English remain apathetic on this question—so long as they are careless about obtaining a correct knowledge of our real position, and what position we should really be in—so long will these literal "blood-suckers" of the nation continue to crave for and to extort more nourishment from them—so long will the people be punished for their inattention. I am no advocate for being insecure; but I do contend that we ought to know when we are safe (and that we shall never ascertain so long as we are dependent upon the information which the army and navy afford us), and then not to allow any further addition in any way or shape, come from whatever quarter the cry of "insecurity" may.

The represented insecurity of the kingdom, originating in the "clubs," has been, it is to be regretted, repeated by a portion of the press. Placing too much confidence in the fallacious statements emanating from the Horse Guards and other quarters, these journalists have degraded their position, have become contemptible in the eyes of the public, and been justly admonished and censured by their more discriminating and judicious brethren of the pen. The *Times* has placed its influence at the service of the too ready abettors of warlike establishments. Whether its proprietors are in any manner connected with the "men of the sword" is a matter which, if it cannot be proved, may very reasonably be inferred. Leader after leader was sent forth every morning, which, whilst echoing the atrocious, because incorrect, statements of the military and navy, poured forth a torrent of invective, calumny, vilification, and falsehood, upon the present ruler of France, and which, had it been transposed, or written by the French press on our beloved Queen, would have been instantly construed into, and insisted upon as nothing less than, a libel on the sovereign of this country; as tending to excite revolutionary principles; and, in fact, as nothing less than an open declaration of war between Great Britain and France. And none would have been more ready and eager to represent the case as I have given it than the *Times*. Happily,

however (although the conduct of the French Emperor was such as to deserve severe comment and condemnation), the *Times* was severely handled by politicians of all creeds, not excepting those who, like that paper, had pertinaciously persevered in libelling Louis Napoleon. After the explosion of all these pseudo-representations had passed away, proving the gullibility of some of our journalists, parliament met. Lord Derby, the then premier, said:—"My lords, I will say that I firmly believe that the French President, personally, is fully disposed to entertain friendly relations, and to maintain a pacific policy towards other nations. But, my lords, I think that if anything could divert him from that course—if he were a man likely to be worked upon by his own personal feelings—if anything were likely to divert him from that course of policy which I believe his inclination and his sense of the interests of France are likely to make him take—it would be the injudicious, and I may add unjustifiable, language which has been made use of by a large portion of the public press of this country upon the character of the French government and people. If, as in these days, the press aspires to exercise the influence of statesmen, the press should remember that they are not free from the corresponding responsibility of statesmen; and that it is incumbent on them, as a sacred duty, to maintain that tone of moderation and respect, even in expressing frankly their opinions on foreign affairs, which would be required of every man who pretends to guide public opinion, and which is naturally expected from every man who does not seek to inflict the most serious evils upon his own country and others; and I say that it is more than imprudent, that it is more than injudicious, that it is more than folly—that it is perfect madness—at one and the same time to profess a belief in the hostile intentions of a foreign country, and to parade before them the supposed inability of this country to defend itself; to magnify the resources of your supposed assailant, and to point out how easy would be the invasion, if not the subjugation, of this country (though, thank God, the most violent have not yet spoken of subjugation); but to speak of that invasion, accompanying it with details of the fearful amount of horror and bloodshed which, under any circumstances, must attend

it, and then, in the same breath, to assail with every term of obloquy, of vituperation, and abuse, the public and private character of the man who wields that force which you say is irresistible. I am sure, my lords, that whatever unfavourable impression may have been made on the public mind of France by the unjustifiable censures of the public press, that impression may be removed to a great extent by the frank expression of opinion such as you have now received in this and the other house of parliament; and certain I am that, in making use of these expressions, I speak the opinion of every well-judging and well-meaning friend of his country."

Earl Grey also said:—"He entirely agreed with him (Lord Derby) as to its being the duty of this country, as a country, and as a nation—the duty of each individual, in his individual capacity, to abstain from all interference in the internal politics of that great and powerful nation which is so very near to us. He had, like the noble earl, observed with the deepest concern—and he might say, also, with the indignation which the noble earl had expressed—the tone taken by a large portion of the newspaper press of this country. He thought that denunciations of the person at the head of the government of France, coupled with those which the noble earl had justly said *were not only exaggerated, but untrue, representations of the defenceless condition of this country, not only savoured of imprudence, but of something worse than imprudence*; and he rejoiced that the noble earl, in the position he occupied, had come forward to state, in the emphatic manner he had done, his utter repudiation of language such as that which he had described."

Lord John Russell said:—"But I have certainly to state further, because I confess I have seen with very great regret the language which has been used by a portion of the press of this country with respect to the President of France. *I remember something as a boy, and I have read more, of that which occurred during the Peace of Amiens, to render that peace of short duration, and to involve these two great countries in the most bloody hostilities that ever mangled the face of Europe. I believe that temperate discussion and negotiation between the two countries might have prevented the calamity*

of war, but that the language of the press at that time was such that it embittered all negotiation, and prevented the continuance of that peace. Sir, I should deeply regret if the press of this country, at the present time, were to take a similar course. . . . I am convinced of this, that there never was a time in which it was more essential that these two countries should preserve the relations of peace and amity. I am convinced that there never was a time when the peace of Europe would contribute more to the course of civilization and happiness. *I am convinced, likewise, from every source of information I have had, that the ruler of France, the present President of France, is desirous of keeping on those terms of amity; and it shall not be any fault of ours—it shall not be any fault of the government of this country—if these terms of peace and amity are not continued. . . . But really to see some of the letters which have been published, and to hear some of the language that has been used, it would seem that these two great nations, so wealthy, so civilized, so enlightened, were going to butcher one another, merely to see what would be the effect of percussion shells and needle guns!*"

The Earl of Aberdeen said, February 15, 1853:—"I am happy to assure the noble marquis that the best possible understanding continues unbroken between the governments of England and France; nor is there anything that can appear as in the least likely to endanger or diminish the cordiality of that understanding."

And finally comes Mr. Disraeli, with the following emphatic declaration:—"I know there are persons in both countries—persons who have been born, and lived, probably, during the last great struggle—who are of opinion that there is a natural hostility between the French and the English nations. They are persons who may, probably, be placed in the same category of individuals with those who think, or used to think, that five per cent. was the natural rate of interest. . . . I know that it is in vain to appeal to persons influenced by such a conviction on any of those economical considerations which are often mentioned at the present day. I know it is in vain to impress upon them that, in an age favourable to industry, ancient and highly civilized communities are diverted from the thought

of war. I know it is in vain to appeal to the higher impulses of that philanthropy which many of us believe in, in such communities, in societies under such conditions of great antiquity and advanced civilization, for mitigating the heart of nations. But, sir, I think I have a right to appeal to stern facts, which cannot be disputed—to the past conduct of men, which, according to the theories of these individuals, is the best test of what their future behaviour will be; and I must say that I do not think the history of the past justifies that too prevalent opinion, that between England and France there is a natural rivalry and hostility. . . . And, if we take that which is the real point of our modern history as the one which should guide us upon this subject, we shall observe that the most sagacious sovereigns, and the most eminent statesmen of England, almost without an exception, have held that the French alliance, or a cordial understanding with the French nation, should be the cornerstone of our diplomatic system, and the keynote of our foreign policy. . . . And, therefore, it is not true that there have been at all times, or at most times, this want of sympathy between the French and the English people; but, on the contrary, the reverse is the truth, and the alliance and good understanding that have prevailed between us have been the source, in my opinion, of great advantage to both countries, and of advance to the civilization of modern Europe. . . . It is extremely difficult for us to form an opinion upon French politics; and so long as the French people are exact in their commercial transactions, and friendly in their political relations, it is just as well that we should not interfere with the management of their domestic concerns. . . . During the period we occupied office nothing occurred to interrupt that cordial understanding with France which had been bequeathed to us by our predecessors; and there were several occasions upon which that cordial understanding came to our aid to maintain peace, to advance civilization, and to promote the general welfare of mankind. . . .

REMEMBER, SIR, THAT ALL THIS TIME, WHILE FRANCE WAS WORKING WITH YOU FOR THE COMMON WEAL OF HUMANITY, HER RULER WAS HELD UP AS A CORSAIR AND A BANDIT, WHO WAS ABOUT PRACTICALLY INVADING THIS COUNTRY WITHOUT

THE SLIGHTEST WARNING, OR PREVIOUS CAUSE OF QUARREL."

The preceding extracts (for the length of which I must apologize) go to establish three distinct facts, all of which relate, in a greater or less degree, to the subject before us. First, that the most unjust accusations and virulent charges have been brought by the press against the Emperor of France; secondly, that the preceding and present governments were of opinion that the best possible amity and concord have existed and do exist between this country and France; and, thirdly, that there was nothing which was in the least calculated to disturb that friendly feeling which was reciprocated between the two governments. But whilst this is the case (and may it ever remain so!), it cannot but be evident to all who read the newspapers, that attempts are being made to arouse that rivalry, national prejudice, and hostility which, unfortunately, once characterized the two kingdoms. As in the last French war, which was provoked and entirely originated in the obstinacy and headlong stupidity of the then government of this kingdom, as Mr. Cobden has shown in his pamphlet entitled "1793 and 1853," recourse is now being had to the most shuffling pretexts, as well as to the most groundless assertions, that could possibly be had. I give one or two extracts on the last war between the two countries. Speaking of the efforts that were made to create a panic in the public mind, Lord Lauderdale, at a later period, observed:—"But is there a man in England ignorant that the most wicked arts have been practised to irritate and mislead the multitude? Have not handbills, wretched songs, infamous pamphlets, false and defamatory paragraphs in newspapers, been circulated with the greatest assiduity, all tending to rouse the indignation of this country against France, with whom it has been long determined, I fear, to go to war? To such low artifices are these mercenaries reduced, that they have both the folly and audacity to proclaim that the New River water has been poisoned with arsenic by French emissaries." And Mr. Cobden says:—"Let me repeat it—if for the dozenth time—such an opinion would never be put forth, unless by writers and speakers who presume most insultingly upon the ignorance of the public. It really should be a question with the peace

party, whether they could do a better service to their cause than by giving popular lectures upon the actual state of the population of France. And let them not forget, when dealing with this invasion cry, how the people were told, in 1792, that the French were coming to burn the Tower, and put arsenic in the New River to poison the metropolis, at the very moment when, *as we know now*, the French ambassador was humbly entreating our government not to go to war. May not the historian of sixty years hence have a similar account to give of the stories now put forth respecting the intentions of the French people? And, in a speech in favour of peace, Mr. Wilberforce said:—"With regard to the probable consequences of pursuing the war, he considered them to be in their nature uncertain. *Heretofore it might justly be said to be carried on in order to prevent the progress of French principles*; but now there was much more danger of their being strengthened by a general discontent, arising from a continuance of the war, than from any importation of the principles themselves from France."

Coming down to our own day, we find the same deceptive arts practised. Mr. Bright, M.P. for Manchester, in a speech delivered in that city, said:—"You may have seen another paragraph the other day, stating that the French government offered an order for six steam-frigates to the very eminent shipbuilders of Glasgow, the Napiers, and that our government, that the firm might not lose by refusing the order, had at once given it an order for six ships of an equal cost for the service of the English government. Do you believe it? I took the trouble to make special inquiry in the quarter where it must be known whether the information was true, and I found that there is not one syllable of truth in that paragraph."

Enough for the present. In a future article I will lay still further before my readers the hollow and sophistical nature of the "cry." I shall then direct my attention more particularly to the subject under debate. What has been advanced is, strictly speaking, quite in order with the question at issue. There is nothing worth noticing in the article of J. C. M'C., Jun., except it be his *horror of Popery*. What that has to do with *this* question I know not. We had quite sufficient under that head in a former article from

the same pen, and no one will wish to be subjected to another edition of the same. Meanwhile there remains plenty to be done, amply sufficient, without being frightened by reports of war, and "rumours of war," from the Horse Guards. Let our national instructors, teachers, heads of colleges, tutors, and, above all, our *mothers*, devote their attention to the proper feeling which they ought to entertain towards France. The rising generation is but badly taught respecting their neighbours. No sooner can they talk but they are told that the French are their enemies—that they have a "grudge" against us—that they must "wipe out" the "Nile," "Trafalgar," and "Waterloo." On their slates they are taught to represent the English and French in an engagement. When older they develop their pugnastie propensities more physically by joining in combat with boys of their own age and size. Such is the training they have received. It is thus early, before reflection, common sense, and judgment have become developed, that warlike animosities are instilled into their minds. Rather let our instructors commence afresh, by teaching the young that "God hath made of *one blood* all kindreds of the earth." Let them be taught that they have feelings akin to our own—that they and we also are children of the same God—that the same heavenly Father watches over, cherishes, and cares for all—that he knows no distinctions—that we are alike subject to the same feelings, passions, and pleasures—are in search of the same object, happiness—resolved in cultivating commerce, the arts, sciences, good feeling, brotherly love, kindred affection, and attachment for each other—that we deplore war, as injurious to nations as well as to individuals—that it eats up prosperity, promotes rivalry, animosity, and hatred, retards civilization, and brings beggary and disgrace. With such sentiments as these jealousy will cease, rivalry will be no more, contests which once disfigured our national history (and of which we were principally the abettors) will be forgotten, and nothing will be more productive of harmony and good feeling, and more opposed to and preventive of further discord, than the realization of the fact that the interests of both nations have,

"Like kindred drops, been mingled into one."

J. G. R.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN entering upon any controversy it is very desirable for each disputant not only to avoid all extraneous considerations, but also to state as clearly as possible the exact nature of the propositions which he intends to maintain. So great is the imperfection of human language, that it is scarcely possible to put a topic of debate into the form of a simple question without using a generality of expression seriously endangering the interests of truth.* In the question before us some difficulty arises from the excessive vagueness and latitude of meaning which attaches to the word "probable." For my own part, mathematical recollections lead me always to think of "probability" as a variable fraction, lying between 0 and 1; and I cannot but regret that the phrase as to the expediency of the "governmental precautions" has been struck out of the question, since I think it might have afforded a sort of *measure of probability*, instead of leaving it, as at present, to the varying tastes of individual disputants.

Upon a careful consideration of the subject-matter of the present debate, I can scarcely think that it is intended to open these pages to a series of articles on the purely speculative question, "*Will a war with France probably occur?*" Such a question would, in my humble opinion, be wholly useless, since we know that it is neither within the province nor power of reason to draw back the veil of futurity; and, consequently, the formal discussion of this point would only sink those who engage therein from the noble position of truth-seeking controversialists into what my opponent, "Rolla," has aptly termed "grandiloquent prophets." Admitting, however, that a war *may* take place, it becomes a question of the deepest interest to

* Perhaps I may be allowed, in illustration of my remarks, to refer to a late debate in these pages (that on the Sabbath question, see p. 133), where a writer claims "a unanimous verdict" on the very illogical ground that his opponents have not maintained an *unqualified* affirmative! Now, since truth, like safety, is generally to be found lying between the two extremes of unqualified affirmation and negation, I hope that each writer in the present debate will be content to support his own views, or to oppose his antagonists', without requiring them to vote black or white, as demanded by the writer to whom we have just alluded.

every lover of his country to inquire into the *mode in which it would probably manifest itself*—what points are most likely to be first attacked? No wise man spends his time in endeavouring to settle the probability of any given misfortune befalling him, yet no thoughtful person omits to consider in what manner and from what source such a misfortune may arise. We do not speculate on the probability of a burglar's visit to our homes. We know that he *may* come, and we simply consider *how* he would probably attempt to get in, and take the necessary precautions to prevent his entrance. In accordance, therefore, with these considerations, I shall endeavour, first, to prove that an attempted invasion of this country by France is highly probable, *in case of a war* between the two countries; and, secondly, to show that there are *serious grounds for the apprehension* that a war *may* suddenly break out.

I. When war is resolved upon, the first question which occupies the governments of the concluding nations naturally and necessarily is, "Where shall we commence hostilities?" To this question the natural answer is, "In the heart of the enemy's country, where every blow will tell, and where the expense and burden of our armies will, in a great measure, be transferred to our opponents." This plan is essentially the Gallic mode of procedure. To make the war support itself, to subsist and pay his troops by plunder, were the avowed maxims and actual practice of Napoleon. It must at first strike every one with surprise that France, after the protracted struggles of the last and present centuries, should exhibit a national debt so vastly inferior in amount to that of England; but when we turn to the records of history the cause of this discrepancy is at once explained. We paid our own troops, subsidized our allies, and fought on friendly or neutral ground, where everything was to be bought and paid for; while Napoleon marched on from victory to victory, conquered nations, and subdued half Europe, at a virtual cost of *life only*. Blinded by military glory, France was willing to send forth army after army to be destroyed beneath the imperial standards. Life was almost the

only treasure she spent—the only treasure (we believe) which she would have consented to spend in so profuse a manner! Twice was England threatened with invasion, to be conducted by Napoleon himself; and, had he not been inextricably entangled in continental quarrels, that threat would not have been in vain. Are we to suppose, then, that France will forget her ancient policy—that her army will despise the maxims and example of their idolized chief—that the new-fledged Emperor will, in this one item, refuse to copy his chosen model?

I now turn to the evidence of history. The first appearance of our beloved country on the stage of recognised history is connected with *invasion* by the Roman armies, and *from the coasts of France*. Again and again was invasion successful, until Britain became a conquered province of the Roman empire. A few centuries after the dominion of England passed into the hands of *Saxon invaders*, and they in their turn were *invaded*, harassed, and conquered by the *Danes*. Scarcely had these various nations begun to coalesce, than the Normans invaded the country and established their power; and at the present day our beloved Sovereign signifies her assent to acts of parliament in the Norman French of her invading ancestor, William I. From the date of the Conquest the reciprocal history of England and France, for some centuries, is little else than an interminable record of invasion and counter-invasion. May we specify a few instances. In 1209 we find that no less than 1,700 vessels were assembled at Boulogne, and the invasion was only bought off by one of the most disgraceful of all possible means—by bribing the Pope to forbid it. In 1216 Prince Louis, son of Philip II. of France, landed at Sandwich, took Rochester, and ravaged the country almost at will, failing only in his sieges of Dover and Windsor Castles; so that England seemed doomed to become a mere appanage of the French crown, until a defeat, suffered under the walls of Lincoln, compelled the invaders to evacuate the country in the summer of 1217. In 1293 Dover was burnt, and Kent laid waste, by French troops. In 1369 Southampton was plundered; and a few years previously Brighton, Hastings, Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Isle of Wight, were pillaged. In 1457 Sandwich was sacked. Richard II. lost his crown and life by a suc-

cessful invasion on the part of the banished Duke of Hereford, afterwards Henry IV. Scarcely had Edward IV. established himself on the throne than Margaret of Anjou, assisted with troops and money by Louis XI. of France, landed once more to renew the wars of the Roses. Even Spain ventured to attempt an invasion, in despite of the courage of Elizabeth; and of its result we can only say, with her, "*Afflavit Deus et dissipantur inimici.*" Not two hundred years since the Dutch insulted us in the Channel, and burned our ships of war at Chatham. William III. owed his crown to successful invasion; and the ex-King James was landed in Ireland by one French fleet, while another brought him 3,000 men, engaged an English fleet, captured seven Dutch vessels, and returned to Brest in twelve days. Need we refer to the attempted invasions of 1708, 1715, 1744, &c., in behalf of the Pretender, or to the elaborate plans formed by the celebrated Choiseul during the "seven years' war"? In 1796 a fleet was prepared at Brest, *and actually sailed* for Ireland, during the progress of negotiations, and *five days before our ambassador was dismissed from Paris*. In July, 1797, we were again treating for peace; but in October "The army of England" was formed on the French coast, and waiting for General Bonaparte, to whom the command was assigned. In 1798 the French troops *landed* in Ireland, and held Castlebar for some time. Lastly, we were threatened by the gigantic plan commenced at Boulogne. Two thousand three hundred and sixty-five vessels were crowded into the harbours of Boulogne, to transport to these shores a force outnumbering the whole British army at home and abroad; they arrived at that port in detachments, eluding the utmost vigilance of the English fleet on their passage, and defying the most desperate attempts to destroy them when assembled. What *can be done* in the way of invasion is shown by the invasion of Holland in 1799, the bombardments of Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807, the expedition to the Scheldt in 1809, the capture of Washington in 1814, &c.

Such are the premises which history affords us of judging of the probability of invasion. Let the reader decide. Perhaps, however, some may object that the above remarks would apply almost as well in supporting the probability of the invasion of

France by England. I reply, first, that the body of the English people would not consent to an aggressive war with France, and without their consent neither the court nor parliament could engage in war; in France the people have not the power to choose for themselves. Second, the English are not so sensitive of national honour as the French, and have no rankling recollections of humiliated pride. Third, England is more liable to injury from invasion than France. Paris is not situate on a highway of nations, like London; nor, like the latter, within two days' march of the coast: Cherbourg is declared impregnable—a proposition which cannot be predicated of any English port. The sack of Dunkirk would not compensate for the pillage of Southampton, nor the capture of Dieppe for the bombardment of Liverpool.

II. I hope I have succeeded in satisfying the reader that an attempt to invade this country would most probably occur in the event of a war with France; I shall now proceed to point out some serious grounds for apprehending that war may speedily and suddenly come to pass. I believe the present feeling of the bulk of the French nation is in favour of peace; but when we consider the utter fickleness and headlong enthusiasm of their national character, the hopes which this belief would inspire quickly vanish. They seem to regard politics as a kind of national theatricals. The more frequently the scenes are shifted, the more novel and outrageous the feats performed, the warmer their applause. They will exult round the scaffold of a king, or pray round the bones of a despotic emperor, with equal fervour. They once adopted atheism, they now prop papacy on its throne. I turn, then, to consider the imperial actor, who now "fills his brief hour" upon the stage where their united suffrages have placed him. On him depends the question of peace or war; while *his* hour lasts *they* will follow his lead, and applaud his acts.

Is the *character* of the present Emperor such, then, as can inspire confidence? May we judge him by the company he keeps? There is General St. Armand, who was twice expelled from the army, who acted under an assumed name at a petty theatre in Paris, who has repeatedly been imprisoned for debt, and who is said to have received

£20,000 down on the spot on the memorable 2nd of December, 1851; this disreputable gambler is now marshal of France, senator of the empire, and *minister of war*! As a worthy "brother" in iniquity and immorality, the spendthrift traitor, Magnan, has been likewise dubbed marshal and senator, and elevated to the post of commander-in-chief of Paris. Goodly specimens these! M. de la Guérournière, the paid scribe of the Emperor, informs us that the "President" broke his oath to the constitution because "his conscience liberated him, and his mission irresistibly hurried him on;" that "to obey his destiny, to follow his star, are the dictates of his duty." And again, that "his star led him to Boulogne." May not his "star" lead him to invade England? Conscience cannot withhold him, for it sanctions midnight perjury. Common sense, self-interest, reason, cannot dissuade the maniac who attempted to overthrow the monarchy of France by the ridiculous attempts at Strasbourg and Boulogne. Hitherto we have seen that he almost always acts in direct opposition to his words. He swore to the constitution, and overthrew it at midnight: he sought a royal alliance, and married a plebeian! He derives his title by descent, and terms himself a "*parvenu*." And he (the man who in one night incarcerated a refractory parliament and deluged the streets of Paris with blood) had the audacity to tell the ignoble deputation of London citizens that he admired English liberty! Can any one trust this perjured hypocrite, when he professes to desire a lasting peace with England? Can we even *hope* that in this case, he will forget his star, deny his mission, cast aside his model, and fashion his acts in accordance with his words? "True it is that England has everything to fear from the Emperor," is the ingenuous admission of our opponent "Rolla"!

Both friends and foes represent Louis Napoleon as a blind believer in fate. If this representation be correct, we may dispense with the consideration of his *position*; but since "Rolla" has based *all* his reasoning on the assumption that Louis Napoleon will act (like the majority of human beings) with a due regard to the circumstances in which he is placed, I feel bound to examine this topic. Now, are we to suppose that France will passively bear the yoke laid upon her by his

Imperial Majesty Napoleon III?—that the most restless and revolutionary nation on earth will quietly submit to the most uncontrolled despotism? He has deluded, deceived, and oppressed the people; cajoled the clergy; bribed the army; tabooed the press of France; tied the tongue of her orators; curtailed even the amusements of the people. He governs the nation by decree, the communes by police, and Paris by soldiery. He gambles with the national credit, and regulates the money market by edicts. His throne stands alone; raised by treachery, surrounded by hatred, and planted on a volcano. Thus far, he has pleased the bulk of the people by infantile shows, by reviews in the Champ de Mars, waterworks at Versailles, fêtes at the Tuileries, balls and banquets in the provinces. There yet remains the coronation and the pomp of empire; but when that is passed, he must tax his ingenuity for new means of diverting popular attention. *Dare* he remain at peace, and give France time to consider her position? According to Mr. Cobden, we went to war with France, in 1793, to stave off political reform; and if that be the case, the move postponed reform for nearly forty years! Will Louis Napoleon hesitate to repeat the successful manœuvre which Mr. Cobden has so elaborately and kindly explained for his benefit? He has played a desperate game. He staked his all on the success of the *coup d'état*, and won; he has one more stake left, and that is *war*. Why should he hesitate? The example of his great predecessor points the way; if success fail him, the result cannot be worse than the fate of his chosen exemplar.

Let me now turn to examine the opposing arguments of "Rolla" on this head. The first argument is, that the Emperor "has not the sympathy of the great men of France." Now, may we ask whether "the great men of France" are so very pugnacious, that their *absence* will tend to keep the *peace*? Would Lamartine be likely to recommend war,—or Cavaignac to propose a treacherous attempt on our shores? It is amusing to read this part of "Rolla's" article. In one place we find that the Emperor dared to "*trample* on the genius of the nation"—in another place, that this ill used genius "*stands aloof*" and "*works unseen* in the heart of the fallen nation." We are asked, "Where are the leading and noble characters" of France? and

are told that they are "in exile;" that they "have retired" to "work unseen," and to find homes and kingdoms "in the heart of the nation;" and, lastly, that they are not "to be found" surrounding the Emperor! Is this incoherent talk intended as *reasoning*?

The arguments to be drawn from considering the emperor's position with regard to the people, I have already endeavoured to prove to be in favour of my own side of the question. When the bulk of the nation are resolved on his downfall, they will doubtless find means to accomplish it; but let no one flatter himself that they will do this for *our* sake. It appears to me perfectly outrageous to suppose that those who acquiesced in the *coup d'état*, which deprived them of *their own* liberties, would rise in rebellion against an invasion of *our* rights.

"Rolla's" remarks on the relations of the present Emperor to the army and the priests are strange indeed. Napoleon Bonaparte has nothing to do with the question, any more than Lord Byron's poetry and the Polish officer who are dragged into the discussion to prove what I presume no one ever ventured to deny—the attachment of the French army to the person of their great chief. Then we find that the present Emperor is "the slave, the tool, and flatterer of his army"—that the army "only obeys when it is to obtain its own ends;" and yet we read of "the base system of *intimidation* to which the army was subject"! Can any one construct an argument out of these flat contradictions? As to the priests, we are summarily informed that any power gained from them "would forsake" and "must ruin"—a line of argument convenient to the writer, but scarcely convincing to the reader.

"Lastly," says "Rolla," "though the Emperor would not regard the cause of liberty, his people would"! What can one make of this paradoxical idea, that the people who *submit* to the tyranny of "a *dependent* and *powerless despot*" would not permit of any infringement of *English* liberty? In what way does oratory "addressed to a British audience on the threatened invasion by Napoleon I." disprove the probability of an invasion by Napoleon III.? What does the concluding poetry prove? I venture to suggest an improved reading, which I conceive will approach much nearer the truth—

France hath oft in vain been taught
The moral lesson, &c.

"Other arguments there are"—pray, then, good friend, let us hear them; those which have been adduced are by no means "sufficient for *your* purpose!"

A few words on the remarkable doctrine as to the proper system of studying history, propounded at the commencement of my opponent's article. We are informed—"The character of all nations is original, and we can answer no question in the history of any nation without first learning the character of its people." Now really this seems quite a new idea; I always imagined that the character of a nation was to be learnt from its history, and not *vice versa*. But let that pass; whence are we to learn the character of the French? We find three authorities—James Cornwell, Ph. D., Julius Cæsar, and "Rolla." As the worthy Dr. merely informs us that the French are *not* Franks, we will abide by the verdict of the other two. The French, then, are among "the most warlike nations of the earth" (Cæsar); "they are unwearied in *military device and stratagem*" and "*fanatical* under the idea of national renown" ("Rolla")! Such is the character which we are ever "to bear in mind," when discussing the probability of an invasion by the French of the very country

which unfortunately has been most successful in humiliating the idol of their fanaticism! By what means "Rolla" is enabled to draw the consoling assurance of peace from this ominous picture, I know not: it is almost sufficient to overcome my own natural antipathy to gunpowder, and to induce me to join "the Royal Victoria Rifles." "Rolla" speaks of the "revolution" of 1815 as a "fearful manifestation of the democratic element: overwhelming the monarchic power which it had created." Will he be kind enough, in his reply, to inform us how and where this *revolutionary* "manifestation" occurred? Again, we are told that Cæsar and Napoleon "fell through the violation of the power they had gained;" Byron being introduced as an historical (!) authority. Now Cæsar was assassinated *before* he became emperor; and Napoleon was conquered *eleven years after* assuming that dignity, having in the mean time overrun and dictated terms to all the nations of continental Europe;—where, then, is the parallel? In what way Napoleon's "violation of the power he had gained" contributed to the success of Wellington on the plains of Waterloo, I am at a loss to conceive. I really fear that "Rolla's" new plan of studying history is not productive of sound conclusions.

B. S.

Social Economy.

IS THE USE OF OATHS FOR CIVIL PURPOSES RIGHT AND EXPEDIENT?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

AT the outset of our discussion of this question we must define, first, what an oath is, wherein it differs from a declaration only, and what better guarantee it professes to give for the truth of evidence. We shall then inquire, secondly, if the use of oaths is consistent with the obligation man is under always to speak the truth, or with the character of God's moral government of mankind;—if, thirdly, they really prove an efficient means for realizing their object;—and, fourthly, what influence the customary imposition of them has upon society?

First. An oath is a promise, made either

vivâ voce or in writing, to speak the truth on the occasion upon which it is made, or to do certain things at a future time, in confirmation of which the person swearing appeals to the Supreme Being, "invoking his vengeance or renouncing his favour" if the truth be not spoken, or the things promised be not faithfully performed. He is held to believe that the Deity will in that case inflict a punishment, either in this life or in the next, or in both, which he would not have inflicted had the engagement been made without such appeal to him. An affirmation is simply the same promise made without

this appeal to God, and is held to be made under the fear of the loss of character, and of the legal punishment which would result from discovery of the breach of the promise only. In fact, in this one particular—the faith in, and the fear of, a specific punishment for specific falsehood, or, as in this case it is called, perjury—the peculiarity of an oath consists, and its greater efficacy for the discovery of truth is comprised.

Secondly. Now, the obligation to speak truth is universal, without limitation as to person, time, or circumstance. The oath is so clearly a ceremony adverse to this obligation—inasmuch as it proceeds upon the idea that under certain circumstances a greater obligation is placed upon witnesses by its use than would attach to them in ordinary times—as not to need demonstration. Indeed, the custom of judicial swearing could never have attained its present hold on our civil policy had it not, by habitual use in ages of ignorance and superstition, been interwoven with every part of the system, in both its political and judicial branches.

As the Deity takes equal cognizance of all human speech and conduct, his estimate of truth or untruth cannot be varied by any of the ceremonies or circumstances that may attend the declaration of it; nor, therefore, can special punishment follow particular deviations from it, at the will of the person making oath. Hence the inconsistency of the oath with the character of his moral government of man.

Thirdly. But it is possible that, whilst no one will attempt to justify the use of oaths on abstract grounds, it may be held that many, when swearing to an oath, believe in the direct punishment of perjury, and that it is expedient to retain them to deter that class of witnesses from the crime. This opinion is untenable; for the oath does not prevent the deposition to untruth by witnesses of bad character; nor, on the other hand, does the substitution of a declaration lessen judicial belief in the evidence of those of an opposite character. The frequency of the enforcement of the laws against perjury is an indisputable proof of its failure to ensure the veracity of those whose predisposition or interests are opposed to the discovery of truth. Its trifling value is manifest in many cases not resulting in prosecutions. Recently it has been made more apparent in conse-

quence of the courts of law being empowered to take the evidence of persons, whether plaintiffs or defendants, in their own causes, in civil actions. In these cases the personal interest is strongest, and offers the greatest temptation to deviate from truth; and frequently the depositions of the two parties, made with the same professed faith in and fear of God's anger if truth be not spoken, are directly opposed to each other, not in spirit only, but in regard to facts. In such cases neither judge nor jury seek, in this faith or fear of the witness, for the test of his accuracy; but endeavour to find, in a knowledge of the uprightness and integrity of his ordinary life, or otherwise, a clue to the truth or falsehood of his sworn testimony. On the other hand, Quakers and Moravians, and persons who have been either, but, having ceased to be such, retain a conscientious objection to taking an oath, are exempt from the necessity of doing so, and their affirmation is received instead. These sects form part of that class to whom the apprehension of divine punishment in a future state acts as the strongest motive for abstaining from wrong doing. Having so keen a sense of their accountability to God for their conduct in this life, they are those to whom, if the oath were indeed of value, it should be first administered. Every sanction of it would apply to them, and it would guarantee from them, if from any, the utterance of the simple truth. And why are they exempt? Their objection, it is well known, is founded upon supposed scriptural prohibition; but far other reasons induced the legislature to relieve them from the necessity of compliance with the usual form, the greatest of which was, that their conduct had shown that justice would not suffer by their exemption. These privileged classes had given grounds for the belief that they acted under a sense of the imperative duty *always* to adhere to the truth; and with them no greater strength could be given to an assertion by an appeal to the Deity. Another exemption of a more extraordinary description also supports my position. Peers of the realm and corporations are permitted, in proceedings in the Court of Chancery, to give answers—the first upon their honour, the last under their corporate seal. The fear of the loss of honour is substituted for the fear of divine vengeance in the case of a peer; and in the other men,

who in their individual character are required to attest their evidence by an oath, are exempted when united with others, equally liable individually, in the discharge of public duties.

These exemptions show that where, from character or position, witnesses are believed to have another motive for speaking the truth, the oath may be dispensed with; and that it is only insisted upon either where no sufficient objection is felt to induce refusal, or where a superstition as to its effect is entertained.

Fourthly. The evil effect of the habitual use of oaths in courts of justice is, I think, serious, and difficult to remove. The form of the oath requires belief in certain theological opinions to give competency to witnesses, and therefore disqualifies persons who are not unworthy of credence, and at times obstructs the course of justice. Every person who offers himself to give evidence may be interrogated as to his belief in the existence of a God, in a future state of rewards and punishments, and of the punishment of perjury in that state. Those who cannot reply in the affirmative are incompetent to bear testimony. Children, also, who are supposed incapable of comprehending the meaning of them, are excluded. In both of these cases there is a possibility of injustice being inflicted, or of a failure to convict the guilty. This arises from the inadaptability of the oath to judicial purposes. In a state where the civil system is framed professedly to give to every citizen a power to assert rights and a remedy against wrongs, the basis of evidence should be as wide as the stability of society will allow. The principle that is nearest the foundation of society is, that it is incumbent on man to speak truth and do justice in all his communications and dealings with his fellows, and the profession of a belief that he is bound to adhere to it is all that should be required as preliminary to examination. The only essential qualification of a witness is worthiness of belief; and

men who disbelieve the opinions I have mentioned as required to render evidence capable of reception, or vary from the received standard in the mode in which they hold them, and children thought too young to understand them, generally possess it. The evil of this disqualification is not an imaginary one. The rejection of the testimony of children, when doing so defeats the ends of justice, is not unfrequent; and a case has occurred in which a witness expressed doubt only upon the necessary points of faith, and was rejected in consequence, though no aspersion could be cast upon the integrity of his character.

Farther. The practice of judicial swearing weakens the public sense of the duty of veracity when unsworn, and so has a tendency to deprave the morals of the community. It is an inevitable result of giving to an action in one place a greater force than in another, to reduce its effect in ordinary cases. The imprecation of divine anger, from being sanctioned by judicial usage, becomes, on the other hand, a part of common speech to a certain class of society. It is used by them sometimes for deception; oftener, perhaps, in mere prodigality of pretestation; and familiarity with it, unaccompanied with the experience of evil resulting from the breach of assertions made under the sanction of it, deadens the feeling which alone can give it effective strength, and thus weakens its hold upon a witness when he is formally sworn.

I have thus endeavoured to indicate the most prominent considerations that seem to me to afford satisfactory grounds for denying that the use of oaths for civil purposes is either right or expedient. Perhaps an opportunity may offer for more fully enforcing my views during the progress of the discussion; and, if that should be the case, I shall gladly avail myself of it; for I think the subject is not one of theory only, but involves practical questions, deserving of the serious attention both of moral and political reformers.

E. D.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE taking of an oath—which, rightly regarded, is a purely religious act, and perhaps the most solemn a man can be called to perform—having degenerated into mere court business, and lost much of its solemnity and

effect from the idle formality with which it is generally administered, we are not surprised that it should have become a question among thinking and serious men, whether this much-abused custom is not prejudicial,

rather than otherwise, to the interests of society, and, consequently, whether it be really a divine institution.

In endeavouring to set this subject in its proper light, we will, first, consider the true nature of an oath; then its consistency with the spirit and precepts of Christianity; and, afterwards, its bearing upon the interests of society.

The familiar definition of an oath—namely, the calling upon God to witness the truth of a statement—is, to most, as clear and comprehensive as is ordinarily needed; but on an occasion such as this we had better attempt an analysis. This solemn act, then, implies that the person who performs has religious convictions—that he believes in the existence of a God—in his moral government of the world, and that he is responsible to that God for the truth of his testimony. Those who require him to swear are supposed to give him credit for these convictions, and to believe that he is actuated by them. Yet knowing, by experience and observation, the frailty of human nature, they are prone to distrust his veracity, and believe it safest to hear him speak, in matters involving their own interests, under an acknowledged sense of his moral obligation to God. Accordingly, this acknowledgment takes a solemn form of expression, calculated to satisfy his distrustful antagonist; showing that he is fully conscious of the solemn position in which his testimony places him in relation to his supreme Judge—that so conscious is he of rectitude, that he voluntarily places before his own eyes, in the strongest possible light, the strongest motives to speak the truth, hanging his eternal interests upon his own word, and not fearing to look up in the face of Omniscience with the truth upon his lips.

All this is implied in the taking of an oath; and this act is thus shown to be one which a conscientious man only can rightly perform. It is a test of the highest integrity of character. Hence it cannot be derogatory to, but in perfect consistency with, the christian character; and, if so, it must be consistent with that which is the root of christian character, namely, Christianity.

But it has been urged that this practice is opposed to scripture and the spirit of Christianity. Our opponent E. W. S., however, admits that "this practice was in harmony with the religion of the Jews;" for no

doubt he has found, in the Old Testament, abundant proof that it was sanctioned by the example, and regulated by the precepts, of the most distinguished servants of God; and, also, that it had a most important influence upon many events in the history of those times. But E. W. S. says, in his next sentence, "Our endeavour will be to show that the use of oaths for civil purposes is not in harmony with scripture, and, consequently, with the spirit of Christianity." Here, of course, he confines himself to New Testament scripture. Accordingly, we find he comes immediately to the well-known passage on oaths in Christ's sermon on the mount. "This," he says, "is the highest possible evidence, and as such demands our earnest and candid consideration." We will, therefore, endeavour to give it an earnest and candid consideration, and view it in all its bearings.

Christ in this unparalleled sermon, after assuring his hearers that he was not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil it, calls particular attention to certain points of the law which had been grossly abused, and shows that in these abuses the law had been either misapplied, or altogether evaded; he therefore first quotes the law, and then points out the kind of abuse to which it has been subjected, showing that this abuse had weakened its influence and made it of no effect.

He takes, first, the law which forbids murder, and shows that, while they flattered themselves that they were guiltless of an open violation of this law, they had been accustomed to cherish all these vindictive feelings towards each other to which this crime owed its existence, and to which the law, in its spirit, was equally opposed.

Taking, next, the law which forbids adultery, he shows that although they flattered themselves upon their purity, yet they had granted themselves the liberty to indulge in all kinds of lasciviousness, only stopping short of the grosser sin, to which they supposed, or wished to believe, the denunciations of the law were confined.

Then, coming to the law which forbids perjury, he shows that their loose and profane manner of trifling with oaths—swearing by heaven, by the earth, by Jerusalem, and by their heads, in cases wherein they need not swear at all—in their ordinary communications with each other, when "yea" or "nay"

was quite sufficient—was fraught with evil, inasmuch as it led them to treat lightly the things pertaining to God. He further designed to show them that—as they had chosen these forms of swearing to avoid the direct profanation of God's sacred name, and, probably, to escape the obligations of an oath—these objects (heaven, earth, Jerusalem, and the head) were more nearly related to God than they seemed to be, and hence became more binding than they thought. They were not to swear by heaven, for it was God's throne; nor by the earth, for it was his footstool; neither by Jerusalem, for it was the city of the great King; nor by their heads, for they could not make one hair black nor white; because, as he told them on another occasion (Matt. xxiii. 21, 22), what, it appears, they were not fully aware of, "Whoso shall swear by the temple, sweareth by it, and by him that dwelleth therein. And he that shall swear by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon." Therefore, using these as objects of appeal in familiar conversation, they were as solemnly sworn, and as liable to the guilt of perjury, as if they had used the name of God himself.

Hence we believe it was not Christ's intention, in this passage, to set aside the use of oaths in courts of law; but to deprecate the dangerous practice, into which the Jews had fallen, of swearing in their ordinary intercourse, when it was wholly unnecessary.

Had he intended to forbid the taking of an oath in a court of justice, would he not have been more pointed and explicit? It is not to be supposed that the oaths he here forbids were those used in courts of law. "I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God," was the judicial form of oath which the high priest put to this divine Teacher, when arraigned before him in a court of law, and to which he did not refuse to respond.

Having thus endeavoured to prove that the taking of an oath is not forbidden in scripture, and that it is not inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity, we will now attempt, further, to show its purposes, and its bearings upon the interests of society.

When we reflect upon the degeneracy of society in all ages, the deceit and falsehood which have tarnished the dealings of men,

and the fatal effects of base propensities upon all human interests, we do not wonder that men should have been accustomed to regard each other with suspicion, and that they should have been unwilling to trust their interests into each other's hands, without, at the same time, obtaining for their safe keeping every available security. Accordingly, when the life, reputation, liberty, or substance of one man has been endangered by the testimony of another, it has been natural enough, and by no means unfair on the part of the accused, to demand from his accuser not only a true testimony, but, beyond this, some satisfactory pledge of his veracity. Now, in such a case, what pledge can we suppose him to give? He cannot open his bosom and reveal his thoughts to the eyes of his opponent; he can only appeal to One who can read them, whose eye can search the dark recesses of his soul, and with whom he has a far greater interest at stake, an interest as much affected by the truth of his testimony as that of the accused. This pledge is calculated to answer the twofold purpose intended—a powerful motive to speak the truth, and a satisfactory pledge that he will yield to its influence, because, in case of his giving a false testimony, he has involved himself in a more terrible responsibility than if he had spoken an ordinary lie. An ordinary lie would be a damning sin; but the act of calling God to witness the lie would heighten its heinousness, and consequently deepen his damnation.

Such is the purpose which an oath is intended to serve; and, by serving to secure the ends of justice, it therefore becomes an indispensable element in its administration, and a valuable preservative of the interests of society. It is not, then, an evil, but a good. But, alas! all the good in this disordered world is at the mercy of wicked men. All that is sacred in religion have they abused to further the basest ends. Hence we find there are those who do not scruple to confirm falsehood with an oath. Yet, are we to annihilate that which is good and beneficial to society to prevent its abuse? Is it for us to abolish the practice of religion because hypocrites use it as a cloak for sin? No more are we to abolish oaths because bad men perjure themselves. Perjury, however, we have reason to believe, is not so extensively practised as to weaken materially the

value of an oath. Few, very few, of those who understand the nature of an oath are hardy enough to perjure themselves under that full and immediate sense of their responsibility which it is calculated to awaken; and there are, we believe, still fewer exceptions to the rule, that they who do not fully understand the nature of an oath are as much awed by its mysterious solemnity, and feel themselves as strongly bound to speak the truth as those who do: a sense of its solemnity coming directly upon their feelings, rather than upon the intellect, it is the more likely to influence their conduct.

In conclusion, this institution is a standing memorial of our depravity, and a witness against us. It arose from our imperfections, and with them it must cease. We have reason, however, to hope that, should intelligence and religion maintain the ratio of their present progress in the world, society may yet attain to the high integrity of that respected class of Christians to whom our opposing friend has referred, and whose consistency has won for them an honourable exemption from this legal badge of infirmity.

Birmingham.

J. F.

The Societies' Section.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Manchester.—*Elm-street Mutual Improvement Society.*—On Friday evening, March 4, 1853, the third annual meeting of this society was held in the "Elm-street Sabbath School for Children of all Denominations," on which occasion about sixty of the members and friends partook of tea. After tea Mr. John Kelly, the senior conductor of the school, was unanimously voted to the chair. Mr. John Dunkerley, secretary to the society, read the report, from which it appeared that during the past year thirty-three meetings had been held, thirteen essays had been read, and twenty important questions on various subjects had been discussed. The report also stated that the society had determined in future to divide different branches of study into a number of sequential sections, on which an essay will be read, followed by discussion.—Mr. W. H. Tattersall, in moving the adoption of the report, dwelt at considerable length on the objects of the society.—The adoption of the report was seconded by Mr. J. T. Stone, who read a very talented paper on "Intellectual Progress," and in clear and forcible language showed that mutual improvement societies are highly promotive of this progress.—The resolution, being put to the meeting, was carried unanimously.—The Chairman, in an interesting speech, commented on various parts of the report in a manner very encouraging to the society.—Mr. Thompson made a few remarks on "Sociality;" and Mr. Firth followed in an address on "Friendship."—Mr. Consterdine, one of the conductors of the school, was the next speaker, and expressed himself as highly pleased with the report and the meeting.—Mr. Hewitt followed, and recommended the study of logic as of great importance, and offered many useful and practical remarks.—The meeting then adjourned to partake of the dessert; after which Mr. Turver, a conductor of the school, and Mr. Hallam, addressed the meeting.—Mr. Nickson, the chairman of the society, then followed on "Great Men." He said that the death of the Duke of Wellington had given occasion for the vocabulary of praise to be almost exhausted

by persons who had written on the life and actions of the late illustrious Duke; it was therefore important, and might prove interesting, to determine what constitutes greatness. The time, however, only allowed the speaker to dwell upon what greatness is not.—Mr. Mellor read an excellent paper on "The Secret of Success—Joseph as an Example."—Mr. Yarnwell spoke on "Character," Mr. Taylor read a short paper on "Duty," and Mr. Walch made an interesting speech on "The Influence of the Age on the Characters of Young Men."—After a few words from Mr. John Hewitt, a vote of thanks was presented to the chairman.—Mr. Kelly, in reply, thanked the meeting, and in his usual earnest and affectionate manner called upon the members not to lose sight of the claims of religion, and the advantages of piety in the pursuit of knowledge.—C. N.

Altrincham Zetetic Society was established October, 1852, and now numbers about thirty members. In consequence of a misunderstanding on the part of some of the inhabitants of the town with respect to the objects of the society, the members have printed their constitution and rules, and boldly say, "Any person still thinking that our constitution is based upon error, the society will esteem it a favour if that person will come forward and endeavour to prove it to be so based: the society pledges to change that constitution if such be proved." This is the best course which could be adopted for stilling the tongue of slander.

Wolverhampton Mutual Improvement Society was established in the early part of last year, and from a very humble commencement has progressed to its present state of prosperity. Popular questions are debated weekly, prize volumes (to which are appended certificates of merit) are given monthly for the best essays; and a more valuable prize is presented quarterly for the best poem on some given subject.

The following questions have already been discussed:—"Which was the Greatest Patriot,

Bruce or Wallace?" "Is Woman Mentally Inferior to Man?" "Which was the most Ambitious Man, Cardinal Wolsey or Napoleon Bonaparte?" "Is a Republican Government more conducive to the Happiness and Prosperity of a Nation than a Monarchical One?" "Can the Actor be a Moral Man, according to the Present State of the British Stage?" "Are barbarous Nations as Happy as Civilized Ones?" "Ought the Jews to be Admitted to the British Parliament?" "Will Literature, Science, and the Fine Arts, be as Progressive under a Monarchy as a Democracy?"

Prizes have been given to Mr. J. H. Farmer, for an Essay on the "Force of Habit;" to Mr. E. Stevens, for one on "Nature and Art;" to Mr. G. Hughes, on the "Difficulties that Beset the Paths of Genius;" Mr. G. Higham, on "Fiction;" Mr. W. A. Green, on "The Rise and Progress of the United States."

The only successful poet is Mr. G. Cooper, who produced a piece, possessing great originality, on that hackneyed theme, the "Creation."

On the 27th of January last this society held its first anniversary, over which Mr. T. J. Doran presided; Mr. W. A. Green occupying the vice-chair. An hour or so after supper the company partook "of that cup which cheers yet not inebriates." During the evening a number of standard toasts were drunk, and music and recitations were introduced.—G. H.

Colchester Mechanics' Institute.—On Friday evening, March 4, 1853, a lecture was delivered, by Mr. G. R. Coleman, to a large number of the members and friends of the discussion class (amongst whom was an unusually large attendance of ladies) upon "The Application of Coal Gas for Illuminating, Culinary, Heating, Chemical, and Manufacturing Purposes." Mr. Payne occupied the chair. The lecture embodied a large amount of practical information on a subject which comes home to the houses of many. In addition to lucid diagrams displayed by the lecturer, his topic was illustrated by a complete working model of a gas manufactory. After giving a complete history of the manufacture of coal gas, Mr. Coleman experimentally illustrated the different kinds of light which have been submitted to public regard since the introduction of that gas, viz., the Beale, the Bude or Gurney Light, the Drummoud and Electric Lights, &c. Perhaps the most interesting part of the lecturer's discourse, and which met with the applause of all present, was the introduction of a very excellent gas cooking apparatus, in which was performed the whole process of cooking mutton and other chops, which were partaken of by the audience with a zest not often witnessed. We must not forget to mention that various parts of the lecture were illustrated by several well-performed chemical experiments; after which, ironing by gas and roasting coffee were explained, with several other important matters connected with the application of coal gas; and, in concluding his lecture, Mr. Coleman observed that, in undertaking the delivery of these lectures, he was animated chiefly by a wish to increase their interest in the subject, and to excite in them a desire to study that important science; and if he should succeed in that, his aim would be accomplished, and he should be satisfied. (On the motion of Mr. Charles Bewers, a cordial vote of thanks was presented to Mr. Cole-

man for his interesting and instructive lecture, which was carried by acclamation.—F. H. T.

Law Students' Societies.—A correspondent has sent us a copy of the rules of the *Rotherham* (Yorkshire) *Law Students' Society*, and asks to have them reviewed and commented upon. Rules are dry materials for the reviewing process, and law a dangerous subject to comment upon; but so far as a notice of these rules may be of service to other similar societies, they readily command our attention and space. This we presume to be all our correspondent would desire.

The rules are sixteen in number, and are explicitly drawn. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, state the name of the society, and that the members shall be of two classes,—solicitors and attorneys for honorary members, articled clerks and other law students (before examination) for ordinary members;—members may be expelled on the vote of two thirds of those present at any meeting;—honorary member's payment to be one guinea, in shape of an entrance fee; other members, 2s. 6d. entrance fee, and 1s. monthly.

Nos. 5 and 6 provide for weekly meetings, "for the purpose of discussing legal and jurisprudential questions;" also for annual meeting, and election of officers thereat;—temporary vacancies to be filled up at weekly meetings.

Nos. 7, 8, and 9, provide that ordinary members shall be fined 6d. for absence, and the president 1s.;—fourteen days' notice to be given of any motion;—president in rotation to supply question for the next discussion, or forfeit 6d.

Nos. 10, 11, and 12,—no member to speak for more than half an hour (!), and only once in each debate, except opener, who may reply;—the president to decide the question at end of debate; also all matters of order, &c., and enter report of debate in a book, with the authorities cited. (Phonography is a desideratum.)

Nos. 13, 14, and 15,—after three months' arrears members expelled, unless explanation follows;—necessary expenses to be allowed to secretary; and three months' notice, or three months' subscription, given, or paid, on a member withdrawing.

No. 16,—that the society take in the "*Law Students' Magazine*" and "*Quarterly Law Magazine*," and such other works as may be determined.

We presume the *Controversialist* is taken by the members individually, as a matter of course, and therefore did not require to be named. We can only say, further, that these rules seem so well adapted to the purposes of the society, as such societies are adapted to the wants of law students.

Tewkesbury Mechanics' Institution.—This institution was commenced in 1848, with fourteen members. It was intended that it should be supported by the subscriptions of the members only; but the committee soon found that the sphere of its influence was too contracted for such a principle to be carried out, and that the *ad ipso* *caritatis* expectations of its first supporters could not be realized without extraneous assistance. The committee, therefore, in 1860, determined to "put their hands to the plough;" and after much labour, and by the help of liberal donations, were enabled to procure suitable accommodation for the members, and to form a library and museum, taking as their precedent the "Great Exhibition

of 1851." The committee determined to attempt a local "Exhibition," by obtaining the loan of attractive objects of antiquity and art from the gentry of the town and neighbourhood. In this they were successful, and the Exhibition opened in the town hall. In connexion with it, lectures, concerts, dissolving views, &c., were announced for two evenings, and were very largely attended.

Since this exhibition, the success of which astonished the promoters themselves, donations of money, books, and additions to the museum have poured in, Lord Sudeley heading the lists with the munificent donation of £50. The institution now boasts of an interesting library—upwards of 300 volumes, a well-furnished reading-room, supplied with two daily and five weekly papers and various periodicals, and a lecture-room for discussions on Friday evenings.

Among the questions that have been discussed this season are the following:—"The Character of Cromwell;" "Will Parliament be justified in sanctioning the Opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays?" "Which Season of the Year is most productive of Sociality, Summer or Winter?" "Which most deserves the Admiration of his Country, Burns or Telford?" "Transportation or Nontransportation?" "Was Joan of Arc an Impostor?" "Is Bribery to any extent Justifiable?" "Ought Capital Punishments to be Abolished?" "Cæsar or Napoleon, which the Greater Man?"

At the last quarterly meeting, the treasurer's account showed a balance of £33 in favour of the institution.

Such is the short sketch of the history of this institution, and I hope at a future date to be enabled to report still greater progress.—A M. M. B. R.

Manchester.—*All Saints Mutual Improvement Society.*—The first annual coffee party of this society was held on Thursday evening, the 28th of April. About seventy persons were present. After a very appropriate address from the president, Mr. Robt. Thornhill, the secretary, Mr. Thos. H. Hope, read the report, by which it appeared that the society consisted of twenty-three members and three honorary members; the meetings being held weekly; and that during the year thirteen essays had been read and discussed. A paper on "Mutual Improvement Societies and their Advantages," was then read by Mr. Unwin; after which the company was addressed by the Rev. Dr. Burton, the treasurer; Mr. Denton, Mr. Heathcote, and Mr. Anderson, delegates from the Cavendish-street and Grosvenor-square Mutual Improvement Societies, and by several of the members.

Edinburgh Temperance Mutual Improvement Association.—The fourth anniversary soirée of this association was held on the evening of Thursday, the 14th of April, in Mr. Buchanan's Coffee-house, High-street, when a large number of the members and their friends sat down to tea.

After tea, the chairman, Mr. Wilkes, delivered an eloquent address, in which he spoke of the importance of having fixed principles, and the necessity of cultivating and improving the intellectual and moral faculties. The report of the past year was read by the secretary, and gave a most cheering account of the past progress and present prospects of the association. Addresses were delivered during the evening on the following subjects, viz.:—"Means of Mental Improvement;" "Social Advancement of the Working Classes;" "Perseverance necessary to Improvement." A number of recitations, songs, glees, &c., were interspersed with the speeches, and contributed greatly to the enjoyment of the meeting.—JAMES.

Union of Mutual Improvement Societies, Edinburgh.—A soirée, consisting of the members of the Edinburgh Temperance Mutual Improvement Association, the Edinburgh Young Men's Association, the Nelson Association, and the Controversialist Society, was held in Edinburgh, on the evening of the 27th of April last. The chair was occupied by Mr. T. Usher. The chairman addressed the meeting on the propriety and advantages of a union between the four societies, with any others that might join it. Addresses were afterwards delivered by Mr. M'Jarrow, on "Knowledge;" Mr. Fyle, on "Self-Culture;" Mr. Gilbertson, on "Education;" Mr. Wilson, on "The Age we Live in;" Mr. Hardie, on "The Advantages of Mutual Improvement Societies;" Mr. Thomas, on "Eloquence;" and Mr. M'Lean, on "Friendship." Several recitations and songs were given in the course of the evening. The number present was considerable, and the whole proceedings passed off to the satisfaction of the parties present. As it is very seldom that so many mutual improvement societies unite in this friendly way, this desire for union should be hailed as a cheering sign of progress. The societies contemplate a union of a permanent character for the purpose of promoting their common interests, and a course of three or four lectures is to be delivered under the auspices of the union in the month of May.

It is trusted that the formation of a union in Edinburgh may be considered as a good example to the members of mutual improvement societies in other towns. We have noble objects in view, and to promote these it is important that we should give and obtain all the help possible. Such societies have too long been isolated from others of a similar character: an unfriendly rivalry has thus been kept in existence; and, above all, the strength and importance of mutual improvement societies have not been sufficiently felt. By means of a union, however, such societies would be able, while maintaining their individual existence and independence, to have lectures delivered, and to carry on other operations which they could not do separately with much chance of success. Let us hope that many such unions may be formed and prosper.

"Opinion is when the assent of the understanding is so far gained by evidence of probability, that it rather inclines to one opinion than to another, yet not altogether without a mixture of uncertainty."—*Zimmerman.*

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

159. Perhaps some of your scientific correspondents would please to furnish, for insertion in your useful journal, a cheap mode of making a camera obscura fit for taking sun pictures or Talbotypes.—J. D. B.

160. I should feel much obliged to any of your numerous readers who would inform me, through the pages of your excellent magazine, how I could prepare photogenetic paper, suitable for taking landscapes by the camera obscura; also, if such paper may be bought, and what is the price of it.—J. H.

161. Will any of your correspondents inform me what book or books I ought to read to obtain a knowledge of the law, &c., relating to merchants and ship-brokers? I can have access to Russell on "Factors and Brokers," 1844; Smith's "Compendium of Mercantile Law," 1834; and Wilkinson's "Law of Shipping," 1843; but I am afraid that since the above dates there may have been material alterations in the law and practice, or that there may have been some better books published.—B. X.

162. Can any of your readers inform me who Chief Justice Marshall and Alexander Hamilton (noticed in Todd's "Student's Guide," chap. iii., section entitled "Expect to become familiar with Hard Study") were; and also give me a good reference for applying for their speeches at any library?—Eff.

163. Will some of your readers have the goodness to inform me, in the next number of the *British Controversialist*, who is the author of the following lines?—

"Be thou like the first apostles;
Be thou like heroic Paul;
If thou hast a truth to utter,
Speak it boldly—speak it all.
Fear no enemies—accusers:
Fear not prison, scourge, or rod;
All the truths thou hast to utter
Speak—and leave the rest to God."

G. P.

164. I have a great wish to acquire a smooth and beautiful utterance; but at present I have a very harsh and ungraceful manner of expressing my thoughts. I am told that my ideas are correctly conceived, but that my words are uncouth and discordant. Thus, I said to a friend, "Rainy weather makes the roads very rough." He answered, more pleasingly, "Yes; the rain, though useful, is often unpleasant." I have found that persons are esteemed and loved, and have influence and power of impression in company, more on account of sweetness of voice than strength of intellect. All listen with pleasure to a delightful diction, and feel a deep interest in those who possess so powerful a means of fascination. It has long been my study to excel in this accomplishment; but I have hitherto failed; more, perhaps, from defective methods of instruction, than from insurmountable obstacles in my mental constitution. I shall feel deeply obliged if any of your intelligent correspondents will suggest some practical plan (as the reading of

particular works, &c.) by which they think I may attain a more harmonious expression.—R. F. F.

165. There are two individuals, real literary men, with very different opinions relative to the sun. One of the two gentlemen affirms that the sun is an opaque body, having living beings upon it; that the luminous body which we see, and which affords us light, is the sun's atmosphere; and that the sensation of heat which is felt is produced by the action of the above atmosphere upon the latent caloric of the bodies of animals. The other gentleman alluded to believes that after matter was created in its chaotic state, God so acted upon it as to divide the heterogeneous mass to its simples, so that the fiery and lucid particles ascended (being lighter than the rest), and which moved about the expanse for two days, after which God condensed it, and, casting it into a proper orb, placed it at a convenient distance from the earth and other planets, inasmuch that it became a sun. The former of the two gentlemen believes the sun to be an opaque body, while the latter believes it to be a body not on fire, but a body of fire. Perhaps some of your correspondents will be kind enough to state which of the two hypotheses they consider to be most philosophic.—R. S.

166. Since the appearance of the criticisms upon the Greek Testaments of Alford and Bloomfield, in Vol. III. of the *Controversialist*, Alford has published another volume of his work, in which, I am told, he departs very much from the plan pursued in the first volume. Also, it seems, that Alford's is to be in three volumes instead of two. Can any of your readers inform me of the nature of the changes in Vol. II., and whether they be considered improvements? Is the same doctrine taught in the two, or do they differ in anything of consequence? Also what is known of the author generally, and his religious opinions? W. C.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

142. *How to obtain Ease and Power in Debate.*—"Rolla" congratulates the readers of the *British Controversialist* that B. S. has entered the arena of debate, and not left him ("Rolla") to solitary fame on so great a subject. If "Rolla"—if even B. S.—has failed to furnish "Timon" with a philosophic answer to his inquiry, we trust the true answer will be elicited, even though it be from the ruins of either or both theories. B. S., after taking up the one idea to which "Rolla's" remarks tended, comes to the same happy conclusion—that "Timon" may "abjure despair." The former part of his reply is an echo to the practical part of "Rolla's." Still we would remind him that in all debates the effect of the "cavalry charge" is infinitely superior to that of "the heavy artillery," to use his own figure, which is not one of the most expressive. It was the pebble slung by the shepherd-hero that laid low the mighty Philistine, not the might of the armies of the Lord of Hosts! Powerful as our modern Hume, with his vast political resources, is, he could never achieve the victories which Sir R. Peel or B. Disraeli won by their "brilliant cavalry

charge." But to the point. After perusing and re-perusing the negative part of B. S.'s reply, we have been gradually led to regard it as a piece of dogmatism, in which neither the true nature of the inquiry itself is brought to light, or the premises and relative features of our answer justly dealt with—in which the very premises of that reply are lost sight of, and the conclusions deduced therefrom made to appear as confused as our friend's logic itself. We will be explicit. B. S. says, with much assurance, "Above all, let me urge 'Timon' to pursue the very opposite course to that recommended by 'Rolla' in his remarks on *analysis* and *synthesis*. How so able a correspondent as 'Rolla' can have fallen into so *grave* an error puzzles me (!) exceedingly," &c. *Non omnes omnia possumus*. This is one of that number. Why? "There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Now, in order either to confirm or explode a *given theory*, according to inductive philosophy, it is required that we examine the premises on which it stands, and *first* prove that they are erroneous. This B. S. has not even attempted; but has actually given a conclusion as though he had. Induction has to do with *facts*, not mere dogmatic and arbitrary conclusions. Inductive philosophy teaches to explode a *theory* by testing the premises on which it rests. But B. S. takes suppositions for *facts*, and attempts to prove our theory *false* by a *vice versa* process. This will account for the "grave error" into which he has fallen, leading him to the supposition "that the printer had transposed the words 'analytical' and 'synthetical,' and had thus made 'Rolla' say the very opposite of what he meant." This is about as good a compliment to our philosophic conjecturer as it is to the compositor. To the honour of the *latter*, and to the confusion of the former, we affirm that the compositor's accuracy is unjustly questioned. The words appear just as they were in our manuscript. Let us see how B. S. comes to this strange supposition. It is regardless of the very premises on which our theory was based, and from which our conclusions, and ultimately our advice, was given. Our readers will remember that we first traced the lack of ease and power in debate to a radical cause—"a defective mental tuition;" secondly, we showed in what that defect consisted, viz., the cultivation of the synthetical faculty to the neglect of the analytical faculty; therefore we said, "cultivate now the analytical faculty." These were the premises on which we founded our theory, and on these it still stands intact. Is it not the height of dogmatism to deny a conclusion without first exploring the principles on which it stands? This B. S. has done, with the greatest assurance that he is right and "Rolla" wrong—dangerously wrong. B. S. seems to have considered our advice to "Timon" as based on no facts at all; ergo, open to point-blank contradiction, unpremeditated it may be, but without doubt "baseless as the fabric of a vision." This, however, was a great error, as we have just shown by repeating the premises on which our theory stands. This will show to any of our readers that our theory remains intact beneath the broad axis of truth, our conclusions just, and our advice worthy of attention and respect on the part of "Timon," or any other inquirer on the subject. Let, then, our theory and its premises, our conclusions and advice, be

kept in mind while perusing B. S.'s reply and pretended refutation, and we doubt not but that the unsound nature of his argument, and its absurd application to the point at issue, will appear evident. The drift of his advice to "Timon" runs thus, for he accidentally admits the premises of our theory in the first part of his reply:—"If you have been hitherto solely cultivating the synthetic faculty in preparing speeches, essays, articles, works of fiction, idealism, &c., and find yourself still in the same dilemma, i. e., without 'ease and power in debate,' let me, above all, urge you to pursue the very opposite course to that recommended by 'Rolla.'" He tells you to "revert the order of your intellectual action," that by so doing you may bring into action *power* untried, and leave no *faculty* dormant. I say learn to synthesize still; the analytical exercise you may leave, that is sure to be right; go on compiling and producing. It is a higher art to build than to unbuild; to establish a truth is a higher achievement than to detect a falsehood." This is the advice which B. S. offers to "Timon," the following out of which is to give him ease and power in debate. Had he said *disappointment* and *despair* instead, he had, we think, been much nearer the truth. "Timon" is to go on cultivating his mind in a given habitude (*synthesis*), that he may acquire power in that which requires a *vice versa* habitude (*analysis*). He is to learn to unbuild by building still—to reproduce by producing still; in fact, to detect falsehoods by simply establishing truths! This is the apex of B. S.'s "great argument." The absurdity of such advice needs no comment to expose it. It is an axiom in physical science, that ease and power in the use of a natural function cannot be attained without systematic exercise. So is it in mental science. This, however, the principles on which B. S.'s reply is given do not admit, as "Timon" is told to expect the same result from one course of mental action as he would, according to the teachings of inductive philosophy, from an opposite course. According to this strange theory, Socrates and Bacon ought to have become novelists, or anything rather than profound philosophers, for the key to their mental power is the fact that they adopted courses of mental discipline in which the *analytical* and *synthetical* faculties were duly exercised, and never neglected. It would be as absurd to say that the profound works of Socrates and Bacon, Newton and Locke, were the results of the exercise of the synthetical faculty *merely*, as it would be to affirm that the earth is kept in its relative position in the system apart from the influence of the centripetal force. The defect in mental tuition, which accounts for "Timon's" dilemma, is not to be traced in their works. It did not exist. Their mental discipline was perfect, because it involved the just exercise of *all* their mental powers. Bacon displayed the power of the *synthetic* faculty by exploding the Cartesian system of philosophy on the one hand, while he manifested the sublime power of the *synthetical* faculty on the other hand by framing a system of philosophy which should hand his name down to remote posterity as one of the profoundest intellects, and in establishing a system bearing his name and reflecting his genius, "not for an age, but for all time." We have spoken thus candidly on B. S.'s reply to "Timon," and his animadversions on our advice, because he betrays no small

degree of dogmatism, in order, as he says, "to neutralize the mischief that might arise from 'Rolla's' error." Here we may safely leave "Tunon" and our readers to judge for themselves concerning "'Rolla's' error," and the consequent "mischief." A few words on B. S.'s remarks concerning analysis and Euclid, authors and criticism, and we have done. By what process—surely not induction; by what train of thought—surely not close mathematical observation;—B. S. is led to affirm that "Euclid affords the purest specimen of *synthetical* reasoning extant," we leave him to explain. The great benefit which accrues to the mind from mathematical studies arises from the fact that while the process is, *prima facie*, *synthetic*, it is not less *analytic*. This is particularly true of algebra and differential calculus; while, in fact, no one branch of mathematics is an exception to the rule. We would ask any student well versed in Euclid whether he ever apprehended the beauty and harmony of any problem, without not only seeing through it from the beginning to the end, but back again from the end to the beginning? We think not. The blending of these two faculties arises from the constitution of the mind and the nature of all mathematical studies. This B. S. denies; but, *quo warranto*? Does B. S. mean by his statement, "the omniscience of Deity is synthetic," that it is less analytic? Perfection is the leading characteristic of all the attributes of Deity, considered in every true light. The omniscience of Deity is as purely analytic as synthetic. As it regards authors and criticisms, B. S.'s views are the reverse of ours. "Rolla" assures him that he has long examined many of the criticisms which have proceeded from the pens of England's and Scotland's profoundest minds and to his delight has met with many beautiful portions of *analytical criticism* on works of poetry, science, art, literature, theology, politics, history, &c., all of which well repay their repeated perusal. We think B. S.'s remarks on criticism in general highly erroneous, too much so to do much harm in the present day, when the keenest intellects, profoundest minds, poets and philosophers, think it no dishonour to write reviews on *works* which embody error or illustrate truth. Unworthy productions in this branch of our literature there are; these we do not defend; but they are the exceptions to the rule B. S. attempts to lay down. *Rules*, we would remind him, stand on facts as well as *theories*, if they are true. Is B. S. aware of whose sentiments his are the echo? They are as common as street ballads among that despicable class of persons who write for no other purpose than to make books—those everlasting synthesizers, who constantly glut the market with their trash. While such a state of things exists, we can but regard criticism as the mighty bulwark of true, pure, and sublime literature; and our Jeffreys, our Fosters, our Macaulays, and many of the present contributors to our popular reviews, as far greater and nobler benefactors than any or all the Dickenses, Jameses, &c., the world has known; and all such insinuations as B. S. makes, the manifestations of a literary pride which has paid dearly for its folly.

--ROLLA.

148. *Works on Astrology*.—Your correspondent J. J. will probably, find some of the following works on astrology to meet his wants:—

Works by W. J. Simmonite, A.M., published by

Simpkin and Co., London:—1. Almanac, containing an Astronomical Aspectarian, Astrology Defended, &c., price 6d.; 2. Astronomical Ephemeris and Aspectarian, 1s.; 3. The Scientific and Literary Messenger, 3s. 6d.; 4. The Catastrophe Mundi, 1s.; 5. The Arcana of Astronomy, consisting of the Doctrine of Nativities, &c., 15s.; 6. Tables to be used in calculating Nativities, 5s.; 7. Astronomical Ephemeris, from 1800 to 1820, and from 1820 to 1840, in 2 vols., 10s. each; 8. The Miscellany of Astrology, containing Remarkable Nativities, &c., 7s. 6d.; 9. Prognostic Astronomy, or Horary Astrology Simplified, 5s.

Published by Bohn:—Zachriel's Lilly's Horary Astrology, Grammar of Astrology, and Tables for Calculating Nativities, all in 1 vol., price 5s.

If J. J. would be kind enough to forward his address, "Libra" will give him any information that may be required as far as he is able. "Libra" would be glad to correspond with J. J. on astral studies.

149. *Works in Law for Law Students*.—Perhaps I shall not be considered officious in tendering my advice to "A Law Student," though he expressly addresses himself to C. W., Jun. I think for the purposes of "A Law Student," the list to which he refers is chiefly deficient in History, a branch of knowledge of vital and paramount importance to the lawyer. I suggest the following list as supplementary to that furnished by L.:—1. Sir Harris Nicolas' Chronology of History; 2. Knightley's Outlines of History (these two works, published in the Cabinet Cyclopædia, are invaluable, and should be used as books of constant reference); 3. Hallam's Constitutional History; 4. Hallam's Middle Ages; 5. Hallam's Literature of Europe, 4 vols.; 6. Guizot's History of Representative Government, and History of Civilization; 7. Hume's History of England; 8. McIntosh's History of England (Cabinet Cyclopædia); 9. Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; 10. Alison's History of Europe; 11. Professor Smyth's Lectures on Modern History; 12. Arnold's Lectures on History; 13. Hale's History of the Common Law; 14. Sullivan's Lectures; 15. May's History of Parliament; 16. Lord Clarendon's History; 17. Lord Clarendon's Life; 18. State Trials; 19. Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*; 20. Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Defined; 21. Bentham's Legislative Works generally, especially Darnont's Edition of the Principles of Legislation; 22. Brougham's Political Philosophy; 23. The preliminary dissertations in the Encyclopædia Britannica (the new edition now publishing); 24. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, McCulloch's Edition; 25. McCulloch's Commercial Dictionary; 26. Sir William Hamilton's Edition of Reid's Essays; 27. Herschel's Preliminary Discourse on Natural Philosophy; 28. Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind; 29. Dr. Young's Lectures on Natural Philosophy; 30. Locke's Essay on the Understanding; 31. Milton's Prose Works; 32. Edmund Burke's Works.

The above I consider to be works with which "A Law Student" should be more or less acquainted. "General literature" is a province in which he should seldom wander: occasionally, as a rebel from severer studies, he may spend an hour in its pleasant domains; and, recreation being his object, it will perhaps be wisest that he should select for himself, for which reason I have purposely

avoided including such works in my list. "A Law Student" complains that the former list of works is too *theological*; I would remind him that theology is a school for the *heart* as well as the *heart*. Coleridge has said, "*Intense study of the Bible will keep any man from being vulgar in point of style*;" and on another occasion he declared that he would recommend an *advocate* to employ part of his leisure time in the study of "the metaphysics of theology." Archbishop Whately, when urging the student of logic to practise himself by analyzing argumentative works, recommends Butler's Analogy, Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants, Paley's Horæ Paulinæ, and other (chiefly *theological*) works, as affording the *best specimens of true reasoning*. Chief Justice Mansfield speaks of Chillingworth as "a model of argumentation;" Locke proposed the "study of Chillingworth for the attainment of *perspicuity and right reasoning*;" and Mr. Warren, in his work on law studies, after directing the student to adopt Locke's suggestion, and sketching out a plan for that purpose, speaks thus.—"The *task* will be severe at first, but the profit, if you persevere for *months*, (!) will be immense." I would advise "A Law Student" to *add* to the theological list of L., this work of Chillingworth. I purposely omit any "list of books in *law*." If "A Law Student" has already commenced his law studies, he must know that it is impossible for any one to advise him on this point within the limits of the "Inquirer," unless his past studies and his future intentions were known. The list of law books is interminable, and every *professional* student must be guided in his selection by the circumstances of his own case. I might advise him to spend some hundreds of pounds in books *necessary* in other branches of the profession, but *useless* to him. Let him follow the advice of L., and carefully study Mr. Warren's "Introduction to Law Studies." In conclusion, may I offer a friendly warning? Let "A Law Student" beware of attempting too much. Not many are physically able to "devote at least eight hours a day to *close and continuous study*." Too many imagine that mere reading is study: nothing can be more erroneous. The works in the foregoing list may be *read* in a comparatively short time.—to *study* them will require *years of regular and systematic labour*. "Nothing weakens every faculty of the mind as much as extensive reading without reflection." (Dugald Stewart.) Read and ponder over the chapters on "Study" and "Reading" in Todd's Student's Guide, Bacon's Essay, "Of Studies," and Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, part ii. chap. 6. sect. 5.—B. S.

C. W., Jun., begs to inform "A Law Student" that prolonged absence from home has prevented his complying with the complimentary request contained in the March number of this magazine. Immediately on his return the matter shall have attention. In the meantime "A Law Student" may find it beneficial to reperuse some of the books with which he is already acquainted, and commence keeping a registry of what he reads, if he has not already done so.

152. *Manuscript Magazines*—It is customary in some schools for the more advanced pupils to keep up a manuscript magazine among themselves, for the sake of practice in composition. The order of proceeding is as follows:—one of

the association is appointed "editor;" his duties being to collect a small sum from each of the members towards defraying the expenses (for paper, &c.), and to prepare the sheets for the magazine, monthly or weekly as the case may be, by stitching together a quire or two of foolscap. Sometimes the ordinary exercise-books in use in the school are employed for the purpose, two or more being sewn together. The editor then, being himself generally the cleverest at composition, writes an article first, either a short essay, or review of some book or play he has lately read, or a copy of Latin or English verse, or translation from some classical author, or a short story with moral, &c., and then gives the magazine to the next in order, who also writes something, and then gives it to the next, and so on till the magazine is completed. Arrangements are previously made by the editor, who keeps a list of those who have promised to contribute, that no two members should write on the same subject, unless, as occasionally happens, the object be a comparison of the views of the different pupils upon one subject, as upon a book they have all lately read. When finished the magazine is circulated once more among all the members of the association, and thus each has an opportunity of measuring his own powers by those of his fellows. It is certainly an admirable plan for training in composition, as well as for removing that self-conceit which young writers so generally entertain; and I am surprised that it is not more generally encouraged by schoolmasters, in lieu of the dry, formal essays upon a given subject required of the boys, the only sensible parts of which are usually copied from some old magazine or review. I have not heard of manuscript magazines being kept anywhere but in schools, but I have no doubt that very considerable benefit would result where a great number of acquaintances, residing within a small circuit, so that there should be no trouble or loss of time in passing the magazine from one to another, should club together for such an object. Periodical meetings might be held for arranging and classifying the contributions, and discussing and criticizing the contributions. Thus if, in a large factory, all the working people that could write, would write for such an object, what immense benefit to their intellectual and social condition would probably result. The editor, in such a case, it is needless to observe, should be a person of mature judgment, and great tact and discrimination; and theology and politics, I think, should be rigorously excluded from such magazine.—F. J. L.

Manuscript magazines are chiefly got up by, and circulated amongst, the members of mutual improvement societies. A member, generally the secretary, acts as editor. He supplies the other members with paper of a uniform size and colour, or they purchase it. Such of the members as choose write short original articles. These are handed to the editor, who arranges and gets them stitched up, or bound. The magazine is then circulated amongst the members by ballot or rotation. The editor is usually expected to write an article for the magazine, and to provide a supplementary part, containing an account of the most notable occurrences in the society and in neighbouring associations, since their association. In this part any letters are inserted having reference to matters of passing interest or impor-

tance, and the supplement is in the handwriting of the editor. It is also a duty of the editor to reject articles unfit for insertion. In most manuscript magazines a space is left at the end of each article, or at the end of each number, in which the readers are at liberty to make written observations on the articles. In other magazines this is not done, but the articles are submitted to verbal criticism, or no formal criticism is made at all. We wish, however, to do more than merely answer the question put by I. O. U. We cordially recommend the introduction of these magazines into all societies which do not possess them. The articles are usually shorter, and of a lighter kind than those submitted for criticism at the ordinary meetings of mutual improvement societies; and consist of tales, poems, brief essays, notices of books, &c. Manuscript magazines encourage careful composition and penmanship, the articles being read by the different members. The *British Controversialist* cannot be said to interfere with the circulation of manuscript magazines. Its province is much more extended. We regard it as a bond for uniting the members of mutual improvement societies in all parts of the kingdom as one glorious brotherhood. As no society should be without this valuable periodical, so no society should be without its own manuscript magazine. And in the event of two or more societies in the same town forming a union, their magazines might be interchanged.

T. U., *Edinburgh.*

Having been connected with the establishment of two manuscript magazines—having gained no small benefit from a continued connexion with both—having long rejoiced over the permanent good which they have conferred on individuals, and through them on society—having traced the progress of the minds of the contributors to those magazines to their present position in the literary world, viz., that of contributors to public magazines, *all* the members of one society having written articles which have appeared in the *Controversialist*, except *one*, whose productions have appeared in other popular periodicals; while *most* of the members of the other society are *now* connected with a new magazine of merit and novelty—we venture to present I. O. U. with “some *general* information.” We shall not be blamed if it is *particular* and *practical* as well on the subject.

We cannot do better than give a brief glance at each of these societies of contributors to their respective manuscript magazines, as both furnish an illustration of the intellectual good which must inevitably result from the contact, influence, and co-operation of minds of different tastes and capacities, all having the *good* of each in view.

The one was in the town, and consisted of about a dozen members, of different position and avocation in the world. The other was in the country, and consisted of but four members. The former was represented by a manuscript magazine, called “Our Monthly Portfolio of Sketches, Literary and Artistic;” the latter, the “Literary Republic.”

They were independent of each other, and unconnected, except that the *writer* was a contributor to both magazines. They were vastly different, as town and country societies invariably are, but were both based on good principles and laws; and neither was devoid of merit, nor free

from many imperfections. We shall speak chiefly of the “Monthly Portfolio,” as it is most likely to furnish I. O. U. with the information he seeks.

It was, necessarily, the largest and best-conducted of the two. The first and second numbers lie before us, and most have passed through our hands. None are unworthy of the title. Each contains articles on different subjects; poetry, translations, and illustrations in pencil, water-colours, and oil. We give the index of the first number, which is, perhaps, inferior to the rest; and leave the reader to judge of its contents, compass, and *possible worth*, as they have often done of works by glancing down a bookseller’s catalogue.

We would much rather give a few quotations, to show that it is not devoid of merit, than assert the same, but our space does not permit. The index to the first number is as follows (each article is signed with an assumed name):—Preface, by the Editor; Essayic Writings and Maximal Advice to Critics, Eothen; Sentences about US, Iota; Visions of the Night, a Poem by Civitas; Art and Religion, Paolo; Biography of Oberlin, Giovanni; Gavazzi, a Poem by Aretar; Science, Theophilus; Evening, a Sketch in Water-Colours by Paolo; Gregory VII. and his Times, Chronos; Le Souverain Peuple, Ultimus; Composition, a Sketch in Pencil by Omega; also about ten pages of criticisms. These are neatly transcribed, and stitched up in a stiff wrapper, bearing the above-mentioned title. It consists of about a hundred quarto pages. All articles were forwarded to the editor, who was appointed by the majority, and held office *pro tempore*. Every number was issued at the beginning of the month, and circulated among the members of the society. Each member was at liberty to pass praise or censure on any of the productions, as several blank pages were left at the end of each article, &c., which were generally filled, showing what interest was taken in each composition. This society did not cease to exist because it had within itself the elements of decay, but because its power was called into another and a much wider sphere, viz., the pages of the “Midland Metropolitan Magazine.”* Whatever may be the future intellectual history of its members, we doubt not but that the days when they wrote for its humble pages will ever be remembered with joyous recurrence. The “Literary Republic,” notwithstanding all its circumstantial defects, was, in one point, superior to the “Monthly Portfolio.” Its members did not confine their remarks and criticisms to pen and paper, but after the manuscript-book had been round to each member, who inserted his own article, a meeting was held, at which each production was read by the writer, and not unfrequently became the subject of continued criticism, analysis, and controversy. This arrangement led each member to study and write upon subjects far more common and practical than ever appeared in the “Monthly Portfolio.” This gave the mental power of the “Literary Republic” that bias which has led its members to the arena of debate, thrown open to all by the *Controversialist*. Doubtless, most readers, perusing the collected writings of the “Republic,” would recognise the peculiarity of

* Published monthly. Arthur Hall, Virtue, and Co.

intellectual idiosyncrasy displayed so palpably in the calm sophistication of T. B.'s *affirmative* article on the "Confessional," and in the deep negative philosophy of "Cosmopolite's" *negative* article on the "Sabbath."

We would advise I. O. U. to bear in mind this feature of the "Literary Republic," if he thinks of establishing a similar society, and, if possible, to give it prominence, as it invariably tends to lead the mind to topics of every-day consideration and practical bearing on society at large, which, of all things, is the most desirable in the present day, when the press is constantly sending forth the *volumes* of many a Dumas—when fiction and idealism seem to be the ambition of the majority of writers, especially *beginners*.

They who, by continued thought, close investigation, deep penetration, and sound philosophy, throw back the folds of error from religious, social, or political *questions*, which the voice of ages, it may be, has answered in dogmatic error, take their position among the world's greatest benefactors. To them mankind will ultimately listen, and award the laurels of immortality! The establishment of societies which shall blend the peculiarities of organization, as seen in this brief glance at these two societies, would necessarily prove much more *efficient* than either of them have *done*, in training minds for such intellectual action, the glorious result of which is to *bless* mankind by delivering them from the ignoble fetters of *specious* error, and establishing them in the divine liberty of everlasting truth. Having been connected with a literary and scientific institution, also a mechanics' institution, we can testify to the permanent good which such a *manuscript magazine* would be likely to effect, if well conducted by the members.—THEOPHILUS.

For the information of I. O. U., I append a few particulars of how a manuscript magazine is managed at an institution of which I am a member.

It is upwards of three years since it was commenced; and the plan we adopted has worked exceedingly well. We appoint an editing committee, composed of three members (elected annually), to receive the contributions of the members, and whose duty it is to reject any article which they may deem unworthy of insertion, and to see that the magazine is issued to the members punctually on the first Monday in every month. Our magazine is closely written on note-paper, and averages about fifty pages, and is often embellished with very superior drawings. The members look anxiously for its appearance the day of publication, and it forms one of the principal features of our institution.

I think the plan of having manuscript magazines in connexion with societies for mutual improvement is deserving of encouragement; and that, when well conducted, with perseverance they will prove conducive of much good to every reader and writer.—G. D. W.

155. *The Order of Studying the Sciences.*—The question relative to the order in which the different sciences should be studied has been thought not unworthy of attention by some of the profoundest philosophers the world has possessed. But as I presume Z. A. has in view no question in mental philosophy, but wishes simply to ascertain in what order the four branches of learning he mentions, grammar, geog-

raphy, history, and mathematics (for algebra is a part of mathematics), are, in their elementary portions, most easily and naturally to be acquired, I will attempt briefly to explain that order which, to my mind, seems most natural, being adapted to the progressive growth of the human faculties, language, and reason, viz.—grammar, history, geography, mathematics.

1. The art of speaking and writing one's native language correctly, so as to be able to communicate with others without violating any of those rules which regulate such intercourse in our own sphere of society, seems pointed out by nature as the primary object of instruction, and among all civilized nations it has ever been esteemed such, as evidenced by the routine of school education invariably adopted. It is, evidently, a necessary preliminary to the study of history or geography, which can never become intelligible till the meaning of words and sentences is understood. Arithmetic (omitted by Z. A.) seems naturally to follow next in order; that is to say, so much of the science of numbers as is needful to secure us from mistake and imposition in the transaction of business with other men.

2. Next in order, history presents itself as the most proper subject of study. I mean, of course, those elementary outlines of it, and particularly the history of one's own country, which has always been considered a necessary portion both of the higher and lower education. It properly follows grammar, inasmuch as when once the power of reading and understanding printed books has been gained, the interest should be excited and sustained by the narrative of great and striking events, while the memory is strengthened by the learning of names and dates. In reading history, even in this early stage, the maps of countries referred to should be constantly consulted.

3. But the study of geography as a separate science, especially of the drier details, in which a knowledge of geometry is requisite, should be deferred until the intellect has been fortified by the previous study of history. In its higher departments it is a science of great difficulty, requiring a very considerable degree of skill in the mathematics.

4. The elementary mathematics are of little use, except as a mental discipline. For practical purposes in actual life they are very seldom wanted; only in their higher and more difficult applications do they become useful to scientific and professional men, to the actuary, surveyor, architect, engineer, and astronomer. Euclid may probably be studied with advantage together with geography; algebra, which is arithmetic generalized, a year or two later. Up to quadratic equations is amply sufficient for disciplinary purposes; and then the elementary parts of trigonometry, so far as to include the solution of triangles.

If Z. A. desire it, any extensive bookseller would probably furnish him with a list of the elementary works in each of these four branches of study, which are most in demand. And I would remark, that no one who is not yet past fifty need despair of making very great progress in any or all of these, if he really wishes. An eminent living philosopher holds that the powers of the mind are strongest at about forty-eight years of age. Only let the student's motto be, "Whatever thy hand findeth to do, do it with

thy might," and he will inevitably make great progress. Let Z. A. and others in his situation procure and read attentively Todd's "Student's Guide" (a good edition, edited by the Rev. T. Dale, is published by Routledge and Co.), and also Foster's "Essay on Decision of Character." —F. J. L.

158. *Solution of a Geographical Problem.*—As the two travellers K. G. relers to complete the journey in 200 days (or any other number of days) each, they must travel at the rate of $180 \text{ deg.} \div 200 = \frac{9}{10} \text{ deg.}$ per day, and the eastward traveller's noon on each day begins $\frac{9}{10} \text{ deg.} \times 4 = 3\frac{3}{4} \text{ min.}$ sooner than on the preceding day. The westward traveller's just the reverse; viz., $3\frac{3}{4} \text{ min.}$ later; hence, $3\frac{3}{4} \text{ min.} \times 2 = 7\frac{1}{2}$ difference of time between the following noonday of the travellers. And $7\frac{1}{2} \text{ min.} \times 200 = 24 \text{ hours}$ total difference between the noonday of the travellers, or time gained by eastward traveller. Therefore he must

arrive 24 hours (one day) sooner, and the eastward traveller arriving on his Tuesday, would call the next day Wednesday, but which the westward traveller calls Tuesday, and would be called Tuesday by the inhabitants of the place. As proof of this I shall suppose the eastward traveller continues his journey until he completes his revolution, and arrives at Greenwich, gaining each day $\frac{9}{10} \text{ deg.}$, or $3\frac{3}{4} \text{ min.}$; that is, having his noonday so much earlier than on the preceding day. Hence, arriving in 400 days, he would have gained $400 \times 3\frac{3}{4} \text{ min.} = 24 \text{ hours}$ in advance of the noonday at Greenwich. And if it were Tuesday he arrived on according to his calendar, he would find, to his surprise, they called it Wednesday. And, were it allowed him to travel with the velocity of that daylight in a westerly direction, until he would arrive at the place where he formerly met his fellow-traveller, he would find that they also called it Wednesday.—STANISLAUS.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. VI., Vol. I.—Why does the study of the human mind not deeply interest the present age? Mention one great distinction between physics and metaphysics? How can self-knowledge be gained? What is evidence? Why is the law of evidence an all-important inquiry? What do we find in each varying objectivity? With what is man born? What is consciousness? What is the ultimate criterion of truth to each individual? Do any laws govern the human mind? What are the twin powers of consciousness? How are the fundamental principles on which reasoning proceeds educed?

Proctor.—Exercise, No. VI., Vol. II.

Senior.—Consciousness—its Nature and Laws; its Relation to Memory and Association. (Hamilton, Cousin, Locke, and Macvicar are the best references, in the order of their arrangement, we can give regarding "The Philosophy of Consciousness.")

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XV.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. VI., Vol. III. p. 278.

Senior Division.

Place the verbs in the following exercise, and their inflexions, in a form like the one given:—

"True liberty consists in the privilege of enjoying our own rights." "The smallest trifle often renders a man miserable, while innumerable

mercies and blessings produce no thankfulness." "Tradition is but a meteor, which, if once it fall, cannot be rekindled." "He who in the prime of life finds time to hang heavily on his hands, may with much reason suspect that he has not consulted the duties which the consideration of his age imposed upon him." "He who, without friends to encourage, acquaintance to pity, even without hope to alleviate misfortunes, can behave with tranquillity, is truly great, and, whether peasant or courtier, deserves admiration, and should be held up for our imitation and respect." "He is a true man and honourable who keeps steadily in the path of honour, and braves the laugh of the world." "The veil which covers futurity has been woven by the hand of merrv." "Truth appears the brighter, and acquires a new lustre, by a free and candid inquiry." "The human mind will improve itself if kept in action, but grows dull and torpid when left to slumber." "Stupidity itself may be cultivated." "Was any calamity has been suffered, the first thing to be remembered is, how much has been escaped." "Guilt, though it may attain temporal splendour, can never confer real happiness." "The most important truths cannot be too early learnt." "The wild olive tree of our natural powers was not given to be burnt or blighted, but to be grafted on." "The happiness we cannot call our own we yet seem to possess, while we sympathize with those who can." "There is no security in a good disposition, if the support of good principles be wanting; it may be soured by misfortune, corrupted by wealth, or blighted by neediness."

VERBS.

ACTIVE, OR TRANSITIVE.			PASSIVE.			NEUTER, OR INTRANSITIVE.		
Present.	Past.	Perfect Participle.	Present.	Past.	Perfect Participle.	Present.	Past.	Perfect Participle.

MODEL EXERCISE No. III.—*Vide* Vol. III. p. 158.

I.—NOUNS.

1. FORMATION OF THE PLURAL.

By the addition of "s."	S, sh, ch (sound- ing tsh), x, and o, adding "es."	Y, changed into "ies."	F, or fe, changed into "ves."	Irregular.
caitiffs cliffs pontiffs puffs scoffs leases	asses echoes wishes boxes cargoes buffaloes dishes grottoes mottoes potatoes volcanoes	allies armies aviaries beauties	calves halves knives lives loaves sheaves shelves	men children feet women geese teeth lice banditti oxen foci genera hypotheses dicta seraphim
	Exceptions in o.	Y, preceded by a vowel, remaining regular.	F, or fe, remain- ing regular.	Double plurals.
	armadillos folios nuncios punetillios porticos seraglios	abbeyes attorneys chimneys	dwarfs fifes griefs hoofs strifes	brothers brethren dice dies sows swine genii geniuses indexes indices pennies pence dogmas dogmata pease peas

2. Brothers is the plural of the family relation-
ship.
Brethren is the plural of a relationship produced
by association.
Dice—the cubes used in gaming.
Dies—stamps used for impressing buttons, coins,
&c.
Sows—the usual plural of sow.
Swine—the original plural of sow, now used as
the plural of the species.
Genii—titulary deities.
Geniuses—men of genius.
Indexes—tables of contents ; hands of a clock.
Indices—originally the plural of "indice," now
obsolete ; the exponents of algebraic formulæ,
as the small figures in a^3 , x^4 , &c.
Pence—a sum of copper coins, considered in the
mass.
Pennies—a number of penny coins.
Dogmas, dogmata—synonymous.
Pease—peas in the mass, as pease-pudding.
Peas—a number of peas.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—III.

Question 19. $\frac{1}{8} : \frac{1400}{1} :: \frac{1}{10} : £1,120.$

R. M.

Question 20. £3 17s. 6d. = £3.875, the price per
troy ounce,
 $\therefore \frac{200\ 000}{3\ 8.5} = \text{oz. troy, or } \frac{200\ 000}{3.875} \times \frac{480}{1} = \text{grains ;}$
or $\frac{200\ 000}{3.875} \times \frac{480}{7000} = \text{lb. avoirdupois}$

$\text{ton cwt. qrs. lb. oz. dr.}$
= 3539.1705 lb., or 1 11 2 11 2 11, &c.
J. F. L.

Question 21.
 $27\ \text{ft. 8 in.} \times 36\ \text{ft. 9 in.} \times 12\ \text{ft. 6 in.} = \text{cub. content,}$
or $27\frac{1}{2} \times 36\frac{3}{4} \times 12\frac{1}{2} = \frac{81}{3} \times \frac{147}{4} \times \frac{25}{2} = \frac{305025}{24}$
= 12709 $\frac{1}{8}$ cubic feet.

Question 22. Let x = price of the first horse,
 y = price of the second horse,
 z = price of the saddle ;

then, by question, $x+z=110$ (1)

$y+z=70$ (2)

and $x+y=120$ (3)

Transposing (1) and (2), and adding them together, we get $x+y=180-2z$

(3) $180-2z=120$

$$\therefore z = \frac{180-120}{2} = \frac{60}{2} = £30,$$

substituting this in (1) $x=£80$,

and substituting the value of x in (3) $y=£40$.

SAPPER.

Question 23. Let x =the number of hours each was on the road before they met;

then $x+6$ =time of first train,

$x+3$ =time of second train;

hrs. hrs. journey.

then $y+6 : x :: 1 : \frac{x}{x+6}$ { distance travelled
by first to meet-
ing point;

and $x+3 : x :: 1 : \frac{x}{x+3}$ { distance travelled
by second to
meeting point;

$$\therefore \frac{x}{x+3} + \frac{x}{x+6} = 1,$$

clearing the fractions and transposing $x^2=18$;

$$\therefore x = \sqrt{18} = 4.24264, \&c.$$

$\therefore x+6=10.24264, \&c.$, time of first,

and $x+3=7.24264, \&c.$, time of second.

SAPPER.

Question 24. Now, as solids are to each other as the cubes of their homologous sides, and the cisterns are in the ratio of 1 : 2, we have—as 1 : 2 :: 10³ : 2000; and $\sqrt[3]{2000}=12.599211$ feet=length of cistern required. And 1 : 2 :: 7³ : 686; and $\sqrt[3]{686}=8.819447$ =width of cistern. Also, as 1 : 2 :: 6³ : 432 and $\sqrt[3]{432}=7.559526$ feet=depth of cistern, when the alteration is made.

Question 25. As the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or 180°, 180°—(37° 51' + 67° 25')=74° 25', the other angle.

Now, as the sides of a triangle are to each other as the sines of their opposite angles, we have. sin. 74° 25' : sin. 67° 44' :: 240 : 220.579, &c., links. PHILOMATH.

Question 26. Solidity of sphere, or the quantity of water displaced by its immersion,

$$= \frac{16 \times 17.8}{1000} = 27.648 \text{ cubic inches;}$$

consequently, $\sqrt[3]{\frac{27.648}{.5236}} = 3.7516$ inches, the required diameter.

Question 27. Solidity of copper in sphere,

$$= \frac{16 \times 17.8}{9000} = 3.072 \text{ cubic inches;}$$

hence, content of cavity=27.648—3.072=24.576 cubic inches. \therefore Diameter of cavity,

$$= \sqrt[3]{\frac{24.576}{.5236}} = 3.6072;$$

and the thickness of the shell,

$$\frac{3.7516 - 3.6072}{2} = .0722 \text{ inches.—W. D.}$$

Question 11. Having inadvertently introduced an incorrect solution to this question, we take the present opportunity to offer a correct one.

Since the price of standard gold at the Mint is £3 17s. 10¹d. per ounce troy, it follows that the price of 24 lb. avoirdupois may be found thus:—As 480 : 7000 \times 24 :: £3 17s. 6d : £1362 16s. 3d. But standard gold contains 2 parts of copper to 22 of gold; whereas the gold in the question contains only 1 part of copper to 22 of gold; whence it follows that in the price found we have the price of 1 lb. of copper too much. Reckoning this at 2s., the true answer will be, £1362 16s. 3d.—2s.=£1362 14s. 3d.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—V.

38. How many pairs of ladies' boots, at 4s. 6d. per pair, can I obtain for 48 dozen hose, at 8s. per dozen?

39. A castle wall is 37 feet high, and the ditch in front 20 feet wide. Required the length of a ladder that shall reach the top of the wall over the ditch.

40. My bookseller allows me 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent discount. How much shall I receive out of a bill of £37 15s. 9d.?

41. A square farm contains 124.25623 acres. What is the length of the side?

42. A circular tank, whose present diameter is 12 feet, is intended to be increased to three times its present dimensions, without increasing its depth. What will its diameter then be?

43. An equilateral triangular court, whose side is 53 feet, is being paved at an expense of 2s. 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. per foot. What will be the cost?

44. Find two numbers, such that their difference multiplied by the greater equals three times their sum multiplied by the less, and one more.

45. Given, a side 976 links, and two angles adjacent (36° 30' and 78° 45'), to find the area of a triangle.

46. It is required to strike a circle enclosing a rood of land. Required the length of the cord.

Notices of Books.

Christianity and Secularism. Report of a Public Discussion between the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A., and George Jacob Holyoake, Esq. London: Ward and Co.

This is a verbatim report of an important discussion recently held in London, during six successive Thursday evenings, on the question, "Would any Advantages accrue to Mankind generally, and the Working Classes in particular, by the Removal of Christianity and the Substitution of Secularism

in its Place?" The report, having been read by both disputants, is now published with their joint consent, and very properly sent forth to the world "without note or comment." Thoughtful men who wish to investigate this subject may now quietly sit down, take up the volume before us, carefully separate the argument of each speaker from that which is merely personal, impartially weigh them, and then think out the subject for themselves, until they arrive at an intelligent and truthful conclusion.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XIX.—FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION—*continued.*

THE *whole* logical contents of a thought are not often verbally expressed. To make the signs of thought completely exponential of *all* that passes through the mind is wholly impossible. No imaginable rapidity of utterance could effectuate *that*. The instrument of vocalization—capable as it is of producing an almost infinite variety of sounds, and of enunciating them with swiftness and inimitable beauty—is far, very far, from possessing the power of expressing, with perfect adequacy, the vast variety of ideas which flash their radiance through the mind, or of indicating the more than lightning speed with which they pass before the mental vision. Hence originate grammatical and logical elisions. *These* are means employed to increase the speed of thought-utterance. Nor are these unnecessary; or, "regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and the better arranged its parts, the greater will be the effect produced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine is deducted from the result. A reader or listener has, at each moment, but a limited amount of mental power available. To recognize and interpret the symbols presented to him requires part of this power; to arrange and combine the images suggested requires a farther part; and only that part which remains can be used for the realization of the thought conveyed. . . . Hence, carrying out the metaphor that language is the vehicle of thought, there seems reason to think that, in all cases, the friction and inertia of the vehicle deduct from its efficiency; and that in composition the chief, if not the sole, thing to be done, is to reduce this friction and inertia to the smallest possible amount."* Even with the aid of various kinds of elisions, however, it seems impossible ever to secure an adequate and complete logical harmony—a perfect equation—between the thoughts to be expressed and the language used for their expression.

The Intellection, however, is not the only collection of powers from whose operations elisions result; the emotional faculties also exert their influence in lessening the precise and adequate expression of thought in words. The appetites are intermittent, the feelings unstable and volatile, the affections often inconstant, and the passions hasty and impatient. Speech ought to symbolize all these changes in all their various degrees of modification. As the pulse of the Emotions does not always beat equally, the language which they suggest ought to be similarly unequal. These active and hurrying impulses launch forth their words with precipitation; the words employed ought therefore to be short—the syllables brief and surcharged with meaning. Only the principal ideas are expressed; the mind has then neither patience nor leisure to attend to *minutiae*.

The above remarks seem to us to embody the reasons why decrementive figures of speech

* "Westminster Review," October, 1852—article, "Philosophy of Style."

exist; in treating, therefore, of these figures, it will be necessary that we retain the general principles above enunciated in remembrance, in order that we may perceive their relation to the necessities of mind from which they originate.

FIGURES OF INTELLECT. *Species I.—Decrementive.*

1. Ellipsis is a figure in which we omit some words of a sentence which are requisite to complete the sense and the construction. It is either Grammatical, whose end is mere brevity, or Rhetorical, in which it is indicative of rapidity of emotion; thought is uttered as it were incoherently; no pains are taken to show the train of associations which connect the ideas. The following example from Byron will illustrate this:—

“It is not that I may not have incurred,
For my ancestral faults, or mine, the wound
I bled withal; and, had it been conferred
With a just weapon, it had flowed unbound;
But now my blood shall not sink in the ground;
To thee I do devote it—*thou* shalt take
The vengeance which shall yet be sought and found,
Which if I have not taken for the sake——
But let that pass—I sleep, but thou shalt yet awake.”

2. Asyndeton.—In this figure words are precipitately heaped and huddled together, without the conjunctions which ought to be employed to connect them. Either the intellect is in fear lest it should, perchance, omit any topic which ought to be considered, or the emotions, hurrying it on, allow not of the calm rehearsal of the several items of thought: thus, viz.:—

“Think you saw what past at our last parting;
Think you beheld him like a raging lion,
Pacing the earth, and tearing up his steps,
Fate in his eyes, and roaring with the pain
Of burning fury; think you saw his one hand
Fixed on my throat, while the extended other
Grasped a keen, threatening dagger, • •
• • • • • • •
and at my bosom
Presented horrid death; cry'd out, “My friends!
Where are my friends?” *swore, wept, raged, threatened, loved*
—*For he yet loved.*” *Otway's “Venice Preserved.”*

3. Anacoluthon, or Metabasis, is the transition from one kind of syntactic structure to another, thus at once indicating a change of feeling, and giving emphasis to the expression. The following extract from Butler's “Hudibras” alludes to this figure:—

“When he happened to break off
In the middle of his speech, or cough,
He had hard words ready to show why,
And tell what rules he did it by.”

An example will more clearly explain what this figure does:—

“A star is trembling on the horizon's verge;
That star shall broaden on the night,
Until it hang divine and beautiful

**In the proud zenith—
Might I so broaden on the skies of Fame!"**

"A Life Drama," by A. Smith.

4. Apopsiopsis employs concealment, or silence, to heighten the idea by leaving it vaguely enunciated, so that imagination may be called in to fill up the outline of the thought. This figure is very much in use among those who are

“ Skilled by a touch to deepen scandal’s unction
With all the kind mendacity of hints,
While, mingling truth with falsehood—sneers with smiles—
A thread of candour with a web of wiles—
A plain, blunt show of briefly-spoken seeming,
To hide their bloodless heart’s soul-hardened scheming.”

Thus *Marwood*, in Shirley's Tragi-comedy, "The Wedding," introduces the odious falsehood by which he blasts the hopes of Beauford and Gratiana by the following instance of Aposiopesis, viz.:—

" *Marwood.* Death is
A mockery to that divorce I bring.
Come, you must not love her.
Beauford. Did I hope thou couldst
Give me a reason, I would ask one.
Marwood. Do not!
*It will too soon arrive and make you curse
Your knowledge. Couldst thou change thy temper
For an angel's, at the hearing of this reason,
'T would make thee passionate and turn man again."*

5. Hyperbaton signifies a transposition of words from their usual grammatical or logical order, that they may have greater effect by being placed in these unexpected relations; thus, viz. :—

“ What tho’ first
In years unseasoned, I attuned the lay
To idle passion and unreal woe ?
Yet serious Truth her empire o’er my song
Hath now asserted ; *Falschood’s evil brood,*
Vice and deceitful Pleasure, she at once
Excluded, and my fancy’s careless toil
Drew to the better cause.” *Akenside’s “Pleasures of Imagination.”*

6. Synœthrœsmus is the hurrying together of a multiplicity of words without apparent order, as if the mind had no time or inclination to take a regular survey of the whole calmly; thus, viz.:—

“ God! there are
Who quit thy sun, thy skies, and the green earth,
The stir, the animation of this world,
Friendship, and love's sweet extacy—which last
In heaven itself were still a second heaven—
To shut them in dark walls, and talk to thee—
To thee—God of The Beautiful—in groans!
Oh, 'tis the devil's sin, sullen rebellion,
Or pitiable madness; either way
A fate intolerable.”

W. Smith's "Sir Wm. Chrichton."

There is in the following passage from Milton's "Paradise Lost," book iii., a combination of synœthrœsmus, with a figure afterwards to be mentioned, Polysyndeton:—

" Thus with the year
Seasons return ; but not to me returns
Day, or the sweet approach of even or morn,
Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer's rose,
Or flocks, or herds, or human face divine :
But cloud instead and ever-during dark
Surround me ! "

FIGURES OF INTELLECT. *Species II.—Antithetic.*

The antithetic figures depend upon the perception of contrasts, and are originated by the law of the association of ideas. The pleasure we derive from them results from the extra-employment which the faculties of the mind receives; this agreeability being heightened by the one idea contributing excitement to two opposite faculties.

1. Enantiosis is the expression of an opposition of meaning in such a manner that the words also stand opposed to each other, either in signification or in order; thus, viz.:—

" A fool to pleasure, yet a slave to fame:
Now deep in "Taylor" and "The Book of Martyrs,"
Now drinking citron with his grace and Chartres;
Now conscience chills her, and now passion burns,
And atheism and religion take their turns;
A very heathen in the carnal part,
Yet still a sad, good Christian in her heart."

Pope's "Moral Essays," II.

2. Antanacsis is the use of one word having different meanings in such a way that the one meaning is antithetic to the other, *e. g.*, "Care only for those things which deserve care;" "Learn some *craft* when young, that you may do without *craft* when old."

3. Antimetabole assigns two antithetic words, or phrases, as correlative parts of one definition, *e. g.*, "Painting is mute poetry; poetry is eloquent painting."

4. Paradiastole is the antithesis of part of a word only, *e. g.*, "Though now overwhelmed, we are not *over*crawed;" "That which we easily *get*, we as easily forget."

5. Synœceiosis is the antithesis of two sentiments, by which both, although apparently contradictory, are reconciled, *e. g.*, "Forewarned, forearmed. Extremes meet."

" Men might be better if we better deemed
Of them. The worst way to *improve* the world
Is to condemn it. Men may overget
Delusion.—not *despair*."

"Festus."

6. Paronomasia, or Pun, is the antithesis of words similar in sound, but different in sense, *e. g.*:—

" *Chief Justice*. Well! the truth is, Sir John, you live in *great* infamy.
Falstaff. He that buckles him in my belt cannot live in *less*.
Chief Justice. Your means are very slender, and your *waste* great.
Falstaff. I would it were otherwise; I would my means were greater,
And my waist slenderer.

II. FIGURES OF IMAGINATION.

The imaginative faculty, and its modes of operation, have already occupied our attention, and we are on that account relieved from the necessity of doing more, just now, than merely tracing, in outline, the process by which these figures of speech arise in the mind and operate thereupon. In the earlier stages of mental development all things appear as if seen by

“A winking lamp, that weakly strikes
The ambient air, scarce kindling into light.”

Gradually, however, the power of the light increases, and the eye becomes more keenly and critically observant. Relations begin to be discerned—similarities impress upon the mind ideas of sameness—analogies become perceptible—abstraction and generalization operate, and idealisms of exquisite grace, beauty, and perfection, are formed within the mind. The associative faculties recall other members of the same class of ideas, and the blended loveliness of all gives gratification to the mentality.

Species I.—Resemblant.

In the affluence of its treasures imagination delights to pour out a profusion of analogies, and seeks, by rich suggestiveness and the charms of diversity, to heighten the intellectual pleasure which we derive from thought to the highest degree. Thus it is that, in the sweet combination of ideas which imagination makes,

“Each gracelier seems than each, and each than each seems gracelier,”

and all of them become “beautiful exceedingly.”

1. Simile is the comparison of two objects between which there is a real or fancied resemblance. It may have, as its purpose, the instructing of the understanding, the pleasing of the imagination, or the affecting of the emotions, and is thus explanatory, ornamental, or pathetic; although it must still be remembered that the pleasure which it yields is primarily derived from Imagination. Bailey somewhere says,

“There’s reason now and then in similes,”

and we fancy he is correct. How beautifully, for instance, does Shelley, in his “Adonais,” explain the influence of the deeds and conduct of men on their after-world condition in these lines:—

“Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of eternity.”

Locke, in this sentence, most exquisitely describes the failure of the human faculties when age steals on them: “The minds of the aged are like the tombs to which they are approaching; where, though the brass and the marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery has mouldered away.”

The following similes commend themselves to our taste:—

“Cold, oh! cold indeed
Were her fair limbs, and like a common weed
The sea-swell took her hair.” *Keats.*

“Soon was he quieted to slumbrous rest,
* * * and as a willow keeps
A patient watch over the stream that creeps

Windingly by it, so the quiet maid
 Held her in peace ; so that a whispering blade
 Of grass, a wailful gnat, a bee bustling
 Down in the blue bells, or a wren light rustling
 Among sere leaves and twigs, might all be heard." *Keats.*

"The world was cold,
 And he went down like a lone ship at sea." *A. Smith.*

"Thy sweet words drop upon the ear as soft
 As rose-leaves on a well." *Bailey's "Festus."*

"My bosom, like the grave, holds all quenched passions." *Id.*

"Between two worlds life hovers like a star
 'Twixt night and morn, upon the horizon's verge.
 How little do we know that which we are !
 How less what we *may be* !" *Byron.*

We have been thus profuse in illustrating the simile, because it is not only one of the most frequent, but one of the most important, of rhetorical figures.

We shall now mention a few cautions regarding the use of similes which, we think deserve mention. 1st. Similes should illustrate the subject, and for this purpose the points of comparison should be obvious. 2nd. Similes, unless when ridicule, contempt, or any of the other debasing passions are to be excited, ought to be drawn from objects which are beautiful, dignified, or important. 3rd. Similes should be instituted between objects of different kinds. 4th. Similes ought to be very sparingly used in impassioned language.

2. Allegory is a figure in which we rehearse a story or description under which a meaning is veiled different from that which appears on the surface. We cannot do better than mention some of the choicest allegories in the English language, viz., Spenser's "Fairy Queen," Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," Swift's "Tale of a Tub," D. Jerrold's "Chronicles of Clavernook," &c. The scriptures abound in allegories; and amongst our English Essayists many splendid examples of this figure may be found. Space will not permit us to make quotations. In allegory, the literal and figurative signification ought not to be inconsistently mingled.

3. Metaphor is a simile not formally stated—a figure in which we apply language which is, strictly speaking, true only of the object to which we compare another to the object compared to it, *e. g.* :—

"That time of year thou mayest in me behold
 When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
 Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
 Bare ruin'd choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.
 In me thou seest the twilight of such day
 As after sunset fadeth in the west,
 Which by and by black night doth take away,
 Death's second self, that seals up all in rest."

Shakspeare. Sonnet LXXIII.

"Prayer must be animated. The arrow that would pierce the clouds must part from the bent bow and the strained arm."—"World Without Souls."

The following cautions apply to metaphors:—1st. The resemblance should be evident; neither too far fetched nor too difficult of appreciation. 2nd. Congruity ought to be

observed. 3rd. Heterogeneous metaphors ought not to be multiplied in speaking of the same object. 4th. The expressions employed ought to be literally applicable to the compared object.

4. Catachresis is an abuse, or a carrying to excess, of the metaphor, to express even greater emotional ardour than ordinary metaphor, *e. g.*:—

“ This moment I could scatter
Kingdoms like halfpence. I am *drunk* with joy.
This is a royal hour—the top of life.”

A. Smith.

5. Hyperbola.—Emotion exaggerates, and, in hyperbole, it magnifies the greatness of the external objects, in order that it may adequately represent the feelings of the mind. It heightens the object to make it *resemble* what would raise the emotion, *e. g.*:—

“ Hunting the buck,
I found him sitting by the fountain's side,
Of which he borrowed some to quench his thirst,
And paid the nymph as much again in tears.”

Beaumont and Fletcher's "Philaster."

“ The mind of England's Elizabeth was like one of those ancient Druidical monuments, called rocking-stones. The finger of Cupid, boy as he is painted, could put her feelings in motion; but *the power of Hercules could not have destroyed their equilibrium.*”—*Kenilworth.*

Cautions:—1st. Hyperboles ought chiefly to be used under the influence of emotion. 2nd. They should be succinctly expressed. 3rd. The mind of the reader or hearer ought to be prepared, emotionally, before using them.

6. Personifications not only gives vivacity to style, but supplies an outlet to overcharged emotion. Sometimes, however, they are merely the frost-work pictures of Fancy. In personification we bestow life and intelligence on inanimate objects. In Giles Fletcher's “ Christ's Victory in Heaven ” there are some fine specimens of this figure; see, especially, his “ Justice,” *e. g.*:—

“ She was a virgin of austere regard;
Not as the world esteems her, blind and deaf;
But as the eagle, that hath oft compared
Her eye with Heaven's, so, and more brightly, shines
Her lamping sight; for she the same could wind
Into the solid heart; and with her ears
The silence of the thought, loud-speaking, hears;
And in one hand a pair of even scales she wears.”

Farther examples may be plenteously found in Milton, Thomson, Spenser, Byron, Coleridge, Shelley, &c.

Caution:—Fantastic and trifling circumstantialities ought not to be unnecessarily introduced into personifications.

7. Vision places the object, or action, on which thought is to be employed, before our eyes, and represents it as taking place within sight, *e. g.*:—“ The foe came on like a storm. The mingled sound of death arose. Man took man; shield met shield; steel mixed its beams with steel. Darts hiss through the air; spears ring on mails; swords on broken bucklers bound.”—*Macpherson's "Ossian."* See Southey, Scott, Campbell, Shelley, James Montgomery, &c., for numerous examples.

8. Apostrophe addresses the absent, or dead, as if present or alive, the inanimate as if living, or turns from the logical order of thought to address the person, or thing, spoken of, *e. g.*:—

"O gentle sleep,
Nature's soft nurse, how have I frightened thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down,
And steep my senses in forgetfulness."

Shakspeare.

"Oh, you leaden messengers,
That ride upon the violent speed of fire,
Fly with false aim; pierce the still moving air,
That sings with piercing; do not touch my lord!"

Ibid.

Cautions:—1st. Do not overload apostrophe with ornament, nor carry it too far; temper into harmony with the emotion which excites the imagination. 2nd. Never employ it unless under the influence of strong emotion.

We shall conclude the consideration of Figurative Expression in next issue.

Religion.

IS THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS A PRACTICE IN HARMONY WITH THE SCRIPTURES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"'Twixt *truth* and *error* there's this difference known,
Error is fruitful, *truth* is only ONE."—Herrick.

"More proselytes and converts use t'accrue
To *false* persuasions than the right and *true*;
For *error* and mistakes are infinite,
While *truth* has but ONE way to be i' the right."
Butler.

WE rejoice that the terms of the present question limit the debate to scripture evidences and clear inferences to be drawn from them, as this will tend to divest it of the many irritating and unpleasant phases which the Baptist controversy has assumed throughout the whole history of the church. We most cordially endorse the sentiment that

" * * * in the congress of opinions, the bustling highway of intelligence,
Each man should ask of his neighbour, and yield to him again concession;"

and by no means would we give first place to any in the advocacy of individual right in the matter of opinion; but where a *positive precept* prescribes the path of duty to the Christian, we feel bound ourselves to obey, and to endeavour to persuade others to do likewise. In the words of the late Dr. Carson, "I press my views on my brethren: if I succeed, I do them service; if I fail, I discharge my duty, but have no cause of

complaint against them. They are not accountable to me, and it is the essence of Popery to assume any authority but that of argument. In the field of battle I strike in earnest; but even then it is the arguments, or the talents, or the harmony of my opponent, at which I aim. I never judge the heart! I am united in heart with all who are united to Christ."

I would premise that great care should be used in the definition of terms—the right understanding of forms and customs; as,

"Terms ill defined, and forms misunderstood, and customs, where their reasons are unknown.

Have stirred up many zealous souls to fight against imaginary giants."

These it must be our care to avoid; and if to this be added a prayerful inquiry and teachable spirit, doubtless we shall arrive at the truth more satisfactorily than by an exciting and party-spirited course. We prefer applying the investigative process to this question rather than the dogmatic, as it tends to lead the mind with more becoming willingness to a right acceptance of the preceptive evidence of the holy scriptures. The subject of our present inquiry is historical—is a fact or actual event not known to us by

personal observation—in support of the affirmation that such an event has taken place according to the terms of the question, and within the limits prescribed we search for evidence, which must arise from either *divine precept, human testimony, or other facts*, whence an inference may be drawn of sufficient validity to decide between prejudice and inclination, and impose implicit obedience.

The origin of baptism is far anterior to the time of our Saviour, and his precursor, John. It was a custom prevalent among the Jews, from the time of the Babylonish captivity, of receiving all proselytes into the synagogue as proselytes by baptism, therein figuring to the candidate his past impurity and ceremonial sinfulness, his present separation and death to the system of idolatry, his preparation for, and adoption of, the living truth and purer worship of the one only living and true God. This view of baptism is supported by many highly revered men, among whom we find Selden, Lightfoot, Dr. Doddridge, and Dr. Gill. It is observed by these good men, and also many learned Jews, that the foundation for this practice is to be found in such passages as Lev. xiv. 9, and Numb. xix. 19, where it will be perceived that to *wash* and *bathe* the whole body in water by the unclean person himself was necessary to ceremonial purity; the essential ideas evolved in the ceremony being—a personal knowledge of impurity, the necessity of extraneous means of purification, the separation from pollution, and the attainment of a purer condition, as necessary for fraternal intercourse with the children of God. Thus the same ideas are manifested in the two cases—the baptism or bathing of the proselyte from the heathen world, and the purification of the polluted Jew. In the latter case, circumcision had invariably preceded, by many years, the act of baptism or bathing for ceremonial purification; and in the former it not unfrequently preceded or accompanied the rite; indeed, immediately before the coming of John the Baptist, it became a general rule to circumcise and baptize all proselytes to the Jewish faith.

We learn in Matt. iii. 1, 2, 6—11; Mark i. 4—8; Luke iii. 3—7, that John the Baptist, on his entrance to his ministry, came preaching, in the wilderness of Judea, the

baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, and the necessity of a purer life. When the hypocritical Pharisees, the presumptive Sadducees, together with other notoriously wicked persons, presented themselves as candidates for baptism, he distinctly and emphatically declared the necessity for a voluntary repentance for the sins of the past. He required proofs of the sincerity of that repentance, and of their purpose to live a reformed life for the future, a fleeing from the wrath to come, and a laying hold of the truth—duties which are evidently implied in the words, O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth therefore fruits *meet* for (*worthy of, or in proof of,*) repentance.

From the tenor of the gospel we infer that many of the immediate followers of our Saviour were not baptized, although at an early period of his ministry he made this ordinance the initiation into his kingdom, John iii. 5, 22; iv. 1, 2. After his resurrection he commissioned his disciples in these words:—"All power is given unto *me* in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen," Matt. xxviii. 18—20; or, as Mark expresses it:—"Preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned," Mark xvi. 15, 16. How the apostles understood and obeyed this precept we find by perusing the masterly oration of Peter on the day of Pentecost. He entreated his hearers to listen, while he declared to them "the truth as it is in Jesus." On hearing his recital, they were "pricked in their heart," and said, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" The simple reply of the man of God was—"Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call. . . . Then they that gladly received his word were baptized," Acts ii. 37—41. When Philip planted the church in Samaria, a similar course was observed, for "Philip went down to the city of Samaria

and preached Christ unto them. And the people with one accord gave heed unto those things which Philip spake, and there was great joy in that city;" and, notwithstanding they had in former time given respect and paid reverence to Simon the sorcerer as the great power of God, "when they believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women," Acts viii. 5—12. After these events Philip, being directed by an angel to journey toward the south, on the road from Jerusalem to Gaza, fell in with an Ethiopian eunuch of great authority under queen Candace; he found him reading the prophecy of Isaiah, and inquired if he understood the words of the prophet. The Ethiopian acknowledged his difficulty. When Philip "began at the same scripture, and preached unto him Jesus," his slumbering convictions were awakened, and he said, "What doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. He answered, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." Then "they both went down into the water, and Philip baptized him," Acts viii. 26—39. When Paul and Silas were cast into the prison of Philippi, the prison-keeper, being convinced of the miraculous interposition of God for the preservation of his servants during the earthquake which had occurred that night, he was assured of the divine mission of his two prisoners, and, rushing into their cell, he threw himself at their feet, anxiously inquiring for instruction in the way of salvation. The apostles cheerfully responded, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved. And they spake unto him the word of the Lord, and to all that were in his house," when "he was baptized, and all his, straightway, believing in God, with all his house," Acts xvi. 23—34. Also, when Paul was at Corinth, labouring in his Master's cause, "Crispus, the chief ruler of the synagogue, believed on the Lord with all his house; and many of the Corinthians hearing believed, and were baptized," Acts xviii. 8. The most superficial observer will not fail to remark that, in all the cases cited, believing converts were the persons baptized; and the most skilful logician must admit, reluctantly it may be, that our blessed Redeemer "made and baptized more disciples than John," John

iv. 1; that Peter baptized such as "gladly received the word," Acts ii. 41; that Philip baptized at Samaria such as believed the truths he taught respecting the kingdom of God and his Christ, Acts viii. 12; that Peter baptized at Cesarea such as had received the Holy Ghost, Acts x. 47; and that Paul, at Philippi and Corinth, baptized those who had heard, believed, and rejoiced in God, Acts xvi. 32—34; xviii. 8. Hitherto we have only met with inquirers, hearers, believers, and rejoicing ones, both men and women, but no infants, as the subjects of baptism, neither under the ancient Jewish dispensation, during the advent of John the Baptist, the ministry of the Messiah, nor in the times of the apostles. Lest it may be thought we have evaded one portion of the scriptural evidence on this subject, upon which great stress is laid by our paedobaptist brethren, we will continue our observations in that direction. The passages of scripture considered by the advocates of infant baptism to bear upon the subject, and to which they attach considerable importance, are the following:—"Lydia was baptized, and *her household*," Acts xvi. 15; the Philippian jailer "was baptized, and *all his*, straightway," Acts xvi. 33; Paul "baptized also *the household* of Stephanus," 1 Cor. i. 16. When Peter spoke of God's acceptance of his devout servants from every nation, and preached "peace by Jesus Christ" to Cornelius, "*to his kinsmen and near friends*," "the Holy Ghost fell on them," and they who came with Peter "were astonished;" but Peter inquired, "Can any forbid water, that these should not be baptized? And he commanded them to be baptized in the name of the Lord," Acts x. 47, 48. And on the day of Pentecost, Peter also says, "Be baptized *every one* of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to *your children*," Acts ii. 38, 39. On one occasion our Saviour was teaching, when young children were brought to him by his hearers, that he might put his hands upon them and bless them. This displeased his disciples; but he, observing their displeasure, said, "*Suffer little children* to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of God," Matt. xix. 13, 14; Mark x. 13, 14. In Matt. viii. 5, we read, "Whoso shall receive one

such *little child* in my name, receiveth me." Baptism being considered the initiative into the christian church, as circumcision was the initiative into the Jewish church, infant baptizers refer with considerable confidence to Col. ii. 11, 12, where we find the apostle writing thus to Colosse, "In whom also (i. e., in Christ) *ye are circumcised* with the circumcision made *without hands*, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ: buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him." These are the evidences we find in the sacred scriptures; and upon these, as advocates of believer-baptism, we are content to venture our reputation as consistent Christians and reasonable men, while, with the most unlimited christian charity, we feel bound by the conscience which our God has given us to speak, as we believe, truthfully on this subject, upon all occasions where opportunity offers, so that others may be induced to adopt the same views of sacred truth from similar convictions of duty.

We have said that this subject is historical, and, as such, its affirmation or negation must be proved by sufficient evidence; we shall, therefore, proceed to the analysis of that adduced. And first we shall perceive that baptism is not, in its origin, of direct divine ordinance, for it existed in the times of the prophets, and on the advent of John the Baptist, as a peculiar adhibition of the Jewish ceremonial of purification; and, though it received more of authoritativeness from the practice of our Saviour during his ministry, it remained for the closing scene of his terrenal labours to receive the solemn sanction of a divine precept, when, after his resurrection, and immediately before his ascension, he commissioned his disciples to preach the gospel to every creature, and baptize every believer; thus making it the duty of every repentant sinner, believing in the Lord Jesus Christ for the remission of his sins, to submit to the ordinance of baptism. See Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; Mark xvi. 15, 16. While the terms of the commission are thus *unlimited* as to the duty of Christians to teach all men, they are with great strictness limited to the baptizing of believers only, none but believers being proper subjects for christian baptism according to the terms of the *commission*.

Human testimony on the present question

is doubtless of great importance, when the witnesses are worthy of credibility, and their evidence is properly authenticated; but when these witnesses were divinely inspired men, "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," we receive their depositions as divine, and equally binding upon Christians with the precept contained in the Messianic commission. In this class of evidence we find the events of the day of Pentecost; the touching harangue of Peter to the assembled Jews, which "pricked them in their heart," mightily moved them in their inmost soul with convictions of sin and the necessity of forgiveness, which caused them in their distress to cry, "What shall we do?"—the Samaritans' believing with great joy; the eunuch believing with all his heart; the Philippian jailer being baptized, believing in God; Crispus, and the Corinthians' hearing, believing, and being baptized. Are not these events sufficiently clear and forcible as illustrations of the apostles' practising believer-baptism? Are the acts of *hearing, understanding, giving heed* to the word preached, *repenting, believing, rejoicing in God*, the attributes of infancy? Surely not. They are the acts of mature age, and imply the possession of a sufficiency of "thought-power" and reflection to constitute the subject thereof a morally responsible being; yet, as if to make assurance doubly sure, and give no room for the captious and invidious deviations of erratic spirits, the sacred historian has emphatically mentioned the persons engaged in these events as persons of mature age, and subjects of moral and social responsibilities, from the nature of the duties performed by them and the offices they filled; for we are told they were "devout Jews from every nation under heaven," Acts ii. 5. One was "an eunuch of great authority under Queen Candace," Acts viii. 27; another was "a centurion of the Italian band," Acts x. 1; another was "a certain woman named Lydia," Acts xvi. 14; then there was "Crispus, the chief ruler of the synagogue," Acts xviii. 8; and "the keeper of the prison at Philippi," Acts xvi. 27; with other "men and women," Acts viii. 12; but nowhere is there any mention of infants; no proof, direct or indirect, of the baptism of infants, is afforded by the scriptures. We may be asked how we account for the baptism of households? Are there no infants

there? Our reply is simple, and without equivocation or evasion; *it is not in evidence that the households mentioned contained or included any children at all, much less infants*; on the contrary, the household of the Philippian jailer, as well as himself, were exhorted to believe as a necessary condition of salvation. The word of the Lord was spoken *to all* that were *in* his house; and he rejoiced, believing in God, with *all* his house. Here we learn that the inmates of his house were exhorted to believe. They heard the word, they rejoiced, and they believed, Acts xvi. 31—34. The house of Crispus believed equally with Crispus himself, Acts xviii. 8. The apostle "entered into the house of Lydia; and when they had seen *the brethren*, they comforted them, and departed," Acts xvi. 40. And although Paul baptized the household of Stephanus, the members of which this household was composed "were the first fruits of Achaia, and they addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints," 1 Cor. i. 15; xvi. 15. Hence the members of the households mentioned were all in an equal condition of moral responsibility with the heads of the households. As individuals personally responsible, they had to hear, understand, repent, believe, and be baptized for themselves.

The circumstances of the day of Pentecost, and Peter's application of the promises to the Jews and their children, are, in this respect, irrelevant to our subject, because the promise is of "salvation and remission of sins" to you and your children, "as many as the Lord our God shall call," Acts ii. 38, 39; as many as shall be conformed to the image of his Son, Rom. viii. 29; and refers not to the ordinance of baptism, but to the change of heart, a condition of which the infant is not susceptible, because unconscious of its nature, obligations, and consequences.

The advocates of believer-baptism would by no means allow that children should not be brought to Jesus to receive his blessing in early life. Their practice is a plain commentary upon their principles in this respect; for they anxiously place their own children under the influence of the gospel in early life, and they continually bear them in the arms of faith before the mercy-seat of God. They bring their little ones up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, with *the hope that in the spring-time of life, when*

the sweet blossom of intellectual and moral innocence first feels the taint of human depravity, when supposed freedom from guilt acknowledges with tears of penitence its need of a Saviour, it may lay hold on the hope set before it in the gospel, and find peace and joy in believing. Their expansive hearts also yearn over the little ones whose *parents* and *sponsors* have forgotten their promises and obligations, and they gather them into the sabbath school, to lead them to feel their need of a Saviour, in whom they should believe and be baptized.

That baptism and circumcision are not interchangeable or substitutionary from the *Jewish* to the *Christian* dispensation, is evident from the fact that circumcision co-existed with the practice of baptism; that in many instances during the ministry of John the Baptist, our blessed Saviour, and the apostles, the converts to Christianity, were circumcised in infancy and baptized in their maturer years. Hence, to baptize infants, because infants were circumcised, is not christian baptism, but an aberration from the truth, which originated in later times, when it became a doctrine of the church that baptism was necessary to salvation—that it was an *opus operandi*, regenerating the subject thereof, and that children or others who died without baptism were irretrievably lost, a doctrine as pernicious as it is false; yet nevertheless it is considered by many learned men to have been the parent of infant baptism.

We have endeavoured, as far as possible, to make the holy scriptures speak their own truth upon this subject, confiding in the power of the "word of truth" to teach *the truth* much better than any argument or language we could produce. Our confidence is most unlimited in the decisive character of this evidence in favour of our own views, and we heartily believe it to be full and complete in its power to settle the baptismal controversy, in whatever phase it may be presented to our consideration, without the assistance or corroboration of uninspired testimony; yet, consistently with these views, we with great pleasure refer to the opinions and practices of the church immediately succeeding the apostolic age. Hagenbach, in his "History of Doctrine," vol. i. p. 207, says:—"Infant baptism had not come into general use prior to the time of Tertullian;

that father opposed paedobaptism on the ground that those who have not committed any actual transgression need no cleansing from sin." The same writer observes, p. 210, note 4, "The passages from scripture, which are thought to intimate that infant baptism had come into use in the primitive church, are doubtful, and prove nothing, viz., Mark x. 14; Matt. xviii. 4—6; Acts ii. 38, 39, 41; x. 48; 1 Cor. i. 16; Col. ii. 11, 12. Nor does the earliest passage occurring in the writings of the fathers (Irenæus, 'Adv. Hær.,' II., xxii.-iv. p. 147) afford any decisive proof. It only expresses the beautiful idea that Jesus was Redeemer *in* every stage of life, and *for* every stage of life; but it does not say that he redeemed children by the *water of baptism*, unless the term *renasci* be interpreted by the most arbitrary *petitio principii* to refer to baptism." Tertullian alleges the following reasons against infant baptism:—The importance of baptism, the consequent responsibility of sponsors, the innocence of children, the necessity of being instructed in religion previously, and the great responsibility which the subject of baptism takes upon himself. See Hagenbach, vol. i. p. 111. The words of Tertullian are, "Let them (*i. e.*, children—infants) come when they grow up; let them come when they learn; when they are taught whither they are coming; let them become Christians when they are able to know Christ. Why does the innocent age hasten to the remission of sin? Men will act more cautiously in worldly matters, so that to one to whom no earthly substance is committed, that which is divine is committed. Let them know how to ask for salvation, that thou mayest seem to give to him that asketh. . . . They who know the weight of baptism will rather dread its attainment than its postponement; a perfect faith is secure of salvation." See Neander, "Antigonostikus," p. 337. Speaking upon this quotation, Neander says, p. 337-8, "No doubt what Tertullian means to say is this:—The catechumen has no cause for hastening to baptism, so that he should fear if death should overtake him before he has received baptism, lest he should not be a partaker of salvation; for where the right faith exists, and a person who has the desire to be baptized is prevented in a manner that involves no blame on his part, he is certain of his salvation in virtue of his faith." . . .

"Tertullian expresses himself as the unconditional antagonist of infant baptism too sharply, and presupposes too distinctly the necessary connection between faith and baptism, to allow of our imposing such a limitation on his language," as to suppose that he admitted under any circumstances the necessity of infant baptism. It is worthy of remark, that Irenæus and Tertullian lived in the latter half of the second century, and there is some reason for believing that Tertullian was living at the close of the second century; hence, from the nearness of their position to the apostolic age, great importance is to be attached to their sentiments. Later in the course of time, Gregory of Nazianzen, in the fourth century, although practising infant baptism, writes concerning christian baptism, giving it a number of different names, carefully distinguishing it from the baptisms of Moses and John. The following is the principal thought expressed by him upon this subject, on which this abundance of names is founded:—"All the blessings of Christianity appear concentrated in baptism, and are dispensed, as it were, altogether in one moment; but all these names can only in so far be applied to baptism as *the person to be baptized possesses the right disposition*, without which none can enter into the kingdom of heaven."—Ullmann, p. 461, quoted in Hagenbach, vol. i. p. 388.

Neander, speaking of the usages of the Gentile Christians in the latter part of the apostolic age, observes that, "Since baptism marked the entrance into communion with Christ, it resulted from the nature of the rite that a confession of faith in Jesus as the Redeemer would be made by the person to be baptized. . . . As baptism was closely united with a conscious entrance on christian communion, faith and baptism were always connected with one another; and thus it is in the highest degree probable that baptism was performed only in instances where both could meet together, and that the practice of infant baptism was unknown at this period. We cannot infer the existence of infant baptism from the instance of the baptism of whole families; for the passage (1 Cor. xvi. 15) shows the fallacy of such a conclusion, as from that it appears that the whole family of Stephanus, who were baptized by Paul, consisted of adults. That not till so late a period as (at least certainly not

earlier than) Irenæus, a trace of infant baptism appears; and that it first became recognised as an apostolic tradition in the course of the third century, is *evidence* rather *against* than *for* the admission of its *apostolic origin*."—"Planting of Christianity," vol. i. p. 163.

Dr. S. Hinds, Bishop of Norwich, in his "Rise and Early Progress of Christianity," speaking on the establishment of Christianity in the apostolic age, observes, in apposition with our views, "Baptism, first, is the symbol of a covenant between two parties—between the Christian and his Lord. On the part of the Saviour, it was instituted as a means by which grace was given; and, as a proof of this, in the primitive church it was always, perhaps, accompanied by some extraordinary gifts of the Spirit. *On the part of the redeemed, it was a pledge that he believed.* Thus, when the eunuch requested to be baptized by Philip, his answer is, '*If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest.*' To the gaoler at Philippi St. Paul made the same reply, when asked what was the requisite qualification to fit him for admission into the covenant of salvation, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved (i. e., made a Christian).' Baptism then was, on the part of the Christian, the pledge *that he believed.*"—"Encyclopædia Metropolitana," Dis. III. vol. v. pp. 65, 66.

We conclude, for the present, with a quotation from the pen of the Rev. J. Jacobi, of the University of Berlin, who says, "*Infant baptism was established neither by Christ nor the apostles.* In all places where we

find the necessity of baptism notified, either in a dogmatic or historical point of view, it is evident that it was only meant for those who were capable of comprehending the word preached, and of being converted to Christ by an act of their own will. A pretty sure test of its non-existence in the apostolic age may be inferred from 1 Cor. vii. 14, since Paul would certainly have referred to the baptism of children for their holiness." He further observes, that the strongest argument in favour of infant baptism "is the regulation of baptizing all the members of a house and family. In none of these instances has it been proved that there were little children among them; but, even supposing that there were, there was no necessity for excluding them from baptism in plain words, since such exclusion was understood as a matter of course."—"Kitto's Biblical Cyclopædia," vol. i. p. 287.

Permit me now, kind reader, to ask—if

"*Truth has but one way to be i' the right,*"

and you will not question this—Is the baptism of infants a practice in harmony with scripture, or with the faith and practice of the apostolic age? Your reply will be, without doubt, in the negative, for you are a lover of truth; and although inclination may be thwarted, and the prejudices of education destroyed, your devotion to the sacred goddess will relieve you from the bonds wherein erstwhile you were held, and, rejoicing in liberty, you will declare yourself the advocate of *believer-baptism*, with your friend,

L'OUVRIER.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

We find in the christian church that there exist exceedingly diverse opinions respecting many of the external rites and ceremonies of religion, and we are therefore apt to imagine that the Bible, which each party claims as its authority, must enunciate different and opposite views; but on examination we shall find that these diverse opinions do not arise from any discrepancies in scripture, but mainly from two other causes, viz., the silence of scripture on those disputed points, and the different interpretation which persons put on the same portion of the revealed word. These two causes may fairly be assigned as the reason of the diversity of opinion on the

question at issue; for, were the scriptures to give an explicit statement on the subject of baptism, there would never be any dispute with regard to it; or, if all persons were to form the same opinion respecting those portions of scripture relating to it, then also we should have an unity of belief. But on minor points scripture is not thus explicit and Christians disagree. That their disagreement on this point has given rise to much contention and strife, we deeply regret; and in discussing this subject we would sincerely desire to avoid all animosity ourselves, and we would say to our opponents, Should our arguments fail to convince you, we hope

you will feel the propriety of receiving the opinions of others with the same candour and respect as you desire for your own.

We would at the onset remind our readers that we have nothing to do with the mode of baptism, or with any other difference of opinion which may exist respecting it, but merely as to its application to infants; we shall, therefore, discard all extraneous disputes, and confine ourselves as closely as possible to the point at issue, hoping to be

“Free from the wayward bias bigots feel—

From fancy's influence, and intemperate zeal.”

To the question, then, before us we can sincerely give an affirmative reply, so far as to its application to the infants of believers; because,

I. That they are members of the church. To substantiate this, two considerations will suffice; first, the true church of God is the same under all dispensations, and children were admitted members thereof under the Jewish by the right of circumcision; secondly, the conduct of our Lord Jesus Christ towards children harmonizes with this.

First. It is evident that, if we understand by the church of God all those who have been brought into spiritual relation with him through Jesus Christ, it must be one and the same church under all dispensations. Although Christ was not made manifest in the flesh previous to the present dispensation, it was through faith in him that the Jews and patriarchs obtained pardon, and became the servants and sons of God. He was *their* Redeemer; and it was upon the provision of his making atonement for their sins that they became inheritors of the kingdom of heaven. Through grace they were saved, and grace never reigned otherwise than through Christ Jesus. True religion has always had the same God to worship, the same Messiah as the object of faith, and the same Spirit as the source of joy and peace in believing man. Hence it must have been the same church under all dispensations, however much it has varied in its external rites and ceremonies. But it is true that the christian dispensation is superior to preceding ones, insomuch as that which was promised is come, that which was emblematical is real, and that which was typical has had its consummation in the great Antitype. When this dispensation was established, many of the practices connected

with Judaism assumed a different form, while others ceased altogether, because the reasons on which they were founded had ceased. Among those which assumed a different form may be mentioned public worship, and the change of the sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week, for neither of which changes have we an express command; also the change of the mode of initiation into the church.

If, then, the church is the same under all dispensations, it must necessarily follow that, as children were members of the church under the Jewish economy, they have equal right to be so now, unless the reasons for their membership have ceased, or that they have been excluded by express command. We cannot believe that any true Christian will assert either. But, before making such an assertion, we should inquire what were the purposes of infant church membership formerly? Among others, the following may be mentioned:—1. To consecrate them from infancy to the work of God. 2. To instruct them in the laws of their religion. 3. To instil into their minds the principles of true religion. 4. To secure for them the interests and care of the church. These and other equally important purposes were formerly had in view, and we would ask any impartial reader, Have they ceased? Should children be deprived of these privileges? We think not. Their spiritual interests are as important now as ever; and as God placed them in such a favourable position for the cultivation and nourishment of pious principles, admitted them to enjoy the high privileges of his church, it is evidently a deduction from their just rights to retain from them the privileges granted them by God. Nothing less than an express command from the Lawgiver of Israel can justify us in so doing; and we have failed to find any such command in the pages of holy writ. Not only so; but,

Secondly, The conduct of our Lord Jesus Christ towards children during his sojourn upon earth confirms us in our belief that they were to *continue* members of the church. When the disciples rebuked the affectionate parents that brought their children to him, he was displeased, and he censured them for so doing, and uttered that memorable sentence, “Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom

of heaven." Were they to be disconnected from his church, it is natural to suppose that he would have intimated it then, instead of implying quite the opposite by his conduct and remarks. It is thus evidently implied that children are proper members of the church, and that they should enjoy its privileges; if not, would it not be very inconsistent in Jesus Christ to set up a child—an improper member—as a model for others? If the qualification possessed by the child was necessary to be exemplified in the man, in order to render the latter fit for church membership, then it must have the same effect upon the former, else the model to be resembled is unfit, while the ressembler is fit, which is rather illogical.

If, then, they are proper members of the church, why should they not be introduced by the outward mark of consecration? If it is proper to consider them as the lambs of his fold, why should they not be marked by this solemn rite? If Jesus considered them as fit for his kingdom, why should we entertain a different opinion, and refuse them admission through baptism? And if the conduct of the disciples was repugnant to the sacred and affectionate feelings of the Saviour then, is not similar conduct equally so now?

II. The commandment of Jesus Christ respecting baptism fairly comprehends the children of believers among those to whom the rite should be administered. This is not a forced interpretation, but is the most natural one that can be put upon it according to just rules of interpretation; for, if we only place ourselves in the same position as our Lord and his disciples occupied at the institution of the rite, we shall immediately perceive that the language conveys such a meaning. And it must be allowed that this is the best method of ascertaining the import of any assertion or commandment.

It is well known that Christ and the apostles—the commissioned messengers of God to establish the christian dispensation—were Jews, and therefore accustomed to the laws and usages of the Jewish people; so that whatever commission they might receive, they would unhesitatingly understand it in the sense most natural and obvious to them, unless they were told to the contrary. When the Great Teacher was about taking his departure from among them, we find him com-

manding them to "Go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." The word "teach" in this place properly signifies to proselytise or convert, so that the verse in its proper signification would be thus:—"Go and make proselytes of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Now, the Jews having been accustomed to make proselytes, the command contained nothing new to the disciples, farther than, instead of proselytising the Gentile to the Jewish religion, they had now to proselytize Jews as well as Gentiles to Christianity, without any distinction in their liberties or blessings. When the Jews succeeded in making a proselyte, it was well known that he and his seed had invariably to undergo the rite of circumcision, and, according to the most satisfactory evidence, they had also to be baptized. If, therefore, we place ourselves under similar circumstances, thoroughly familiar with such usages, and perfectly acquainted with such customs, should we not naturally infer from the wording of the commission that it implied the same mode of action towards the proselytes as formerly, without excluding their seed from having the right of baptism administered to them? As proselytes *and their children* were formerly set apart by being circumcised and baptized, is there anything in the commission the disciples received that would lead them to suspect that children were not to be set apart as formerly by the same rite as their parents? The want of an express command for the baptism of children is by no means a valid objection, as there are many other things in the church which rest upon the same foundation. There is no commandment for the change of the sabbath from the seventh day of the week to the first; but our friends would not say therefore we should not observe the first. Neither is there any command for female communion; but we feel confident that they would not therefore wish to abolish it. Why, then, do they insist upon having a direct command for the baptism of infants, while it rests upon the same basis as the foregoing; and, indeed, has much stronger evidence in its favour than they have?

Again. For the sake of argument, let us for a moment lose sight of the fact that pro-

proselytes had been formerly baptized, as some of our friends on the other side think the evidence not decisive, and let us suppose that the disciples, after receiving the commission, entertained a doubt as to the application of baptism to infants in consequence of our Saviour omitting to mention them, would not the following reasoning be natural? "Our divine Master has commanded us to go and make proselytes of all nations, baptizing them, &c.; but in so doing he has not been so explicit as we could wish, not mentioning a word concerning the children of those who become proselytes; we therefore feel ourselves in a dilemma as to what course to pursue, whether should they be baptized or not? we have been accustomed, though, to proselytism, and when we proselyted any to Judaism, we had invariably not only to circumcise the adults, but also their children; and, as he has not mentioned any restriction different from our former custom, we therefore shall adopt the old method, and allow infants to enjoy the same privilege as formerly, for why should we restrict when he has not commanded us to do so?" We would by no means assert that they did thus reason within themselves; but we merely show that this was the most natural way for them to decide the question, had they entertained a doubt. But, indeed, so far as we can see, they had no reason to halt for a moment between two opinions; because, accustomed as they were to infants being admitted to the privileges in the church, together with the solicitude and affection evinced by Jesus towards them, they would not hesitate for a moment as to allowing their continual participation in religious blessings.

Again. Supposing that Christ had commanded them to go and make proselytes of all nations, and, instead of instituting baptism, had continued the practice of cir-

cumcision, with the addition that it should be performed in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is it not evident that they would have circumcised the children of the proselytes as formerly? Or suppose that he had enjoined circumcision in addition to baptism, is it not equally evident that they would not be more restricted in the application of baptism than of circumcision? Why, then, should we surmise that they would restrict baptism, when it alone is commanded? To suppose any such thing is certainly contrary to reason, and is not supported by holy writ. Their familiarity with the religious customs of their country, then, and the circumstances wherein they were situated, precludes our insinuating that they would infer baptism to be thus limited, unless Christ expressly said that it was, and this it is well known he did not. Therefore we have cogent and decisive evidence in proof of our position, that the commandment of Jesus Christ respecting baptism fairly implied its application to the children of believers, and that the disciples necessarily understood it in such a sense. Let us thus endeavour strenuously to throw aside all preconceived notions, and impartially strive to ascertain the signification the apostles would be most likely to attach to the words of their Lord, for this is the only way satisfactorily to decide the point at issue. An express command we have not, either *pro* or *con*; and, therefore, we must rest satisfied with that evidence which has the greater degree of probability, and we sincerely believe that it preponderates in our favour. But we must leave the reader to think and judge for himself, and we opine he will do so impartially, giving due consideration to the fact of infant membership, and to the interpretation of the command of Jesus which we have been advocating, and which we consider as just and true. GLOWR.

Politics.

JUDGING FROM THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF FRANCE, IS AN ATTEMPTED INVASION OF ENGLAND PROBABLE ?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"I believe I am the interpreter of my more honourable fellow-citizens, in declaring that they would regard an armed quarrel between France and England as an enormous evil, which would

becloud the hope of oppressed peoples ; England, which is to-day the last bulwark of political liberty in Europe, the only asylum where the defenders of right can lift their hands against persecution."—*Carnot, Ancient Representative of the People, formerly Minister of Public Instruction.*

"I regret the more earnestly my inability to be present, because I think I should have expressed the unanimous opinion of industrial France in saying that, never has it better comprehended than now, that the durable maintenance of peace will be the inevitable re-establishment of liberty, by the progress of civilization and the exchange of ideas. Also, that it does not at all understand the preparations and armaments of the English government—armaments and preparations that are without an aim, unless they have some other than the absurd supposition of opposing a disembarkation without object."—*Emile de Girardin.*

"I have been some weeks in France, and I believe, from all I have seen and heard, on the most unquestionable authority, that the feelings of the French people are decidedly in favour of peace. Indeed, I believe the general feeling of the French army to be decidedly peaceful. Nothing but some sudden impulse—the sense of some supposed injury—would give to public opinion a different direction."—*W. Ewart, M.P.*

"But are the English people in a position to begin again to exasperate the French people, by accusing them of an intention to invade us, and of entertaining those base intentions against our shores, when the only example in the memory of living man is one in which we played that part against them? It is ignorance in the minds of the great masses of the people as to what the real condition and circumstances of the French people are."

"I believe the French army was never much smaller than now. I believe it has been lately reduced, and there is a strong report that it is to be further reduced; and this we do know, that nothing could be more popular in France than lessening the system of conscription, which, amongst the whole agricultural population of that country, is viewed as a great grievance. Therefore, if it is true that the ruler of France seeks popularity amongst the agricultural population of that country, it seems more probable that we shall have the reductions already commenced in the French army continued, than that there should be any considerable increase. There never was a time when the French army had, in reference to its magnitude, greater demands on its services, in Algeria and elsewhere, than at the present moment; and I am at a loss for any one single fact which gives me an assurance that anything is taking place in France of a threatening or a menacing character, or which should induce this country to depart from the true constitutional policy of a small peace establishment in times of peace, and, above all, of a small military establishment within the United Kingdom."—*Right Hon. T. M. Gibson, M.P.*

An old adage suggests itself to my mind, that "the devil is not so black as he's painted." I think this truism is equally applicable to human nature, and that it is

too commonly the disposition of men to represent the sins of their fellows in an exaggerated form. In opposition to this, it appears that my estimate of humanity was too limited—that I was too charitable and humane, or that my experience was not so general as that of B. S.; for any unprejudiced person would suppose, after the perusal of his missive, that Louis Napoleon, the present Emperor of the French, was a worthy representative of his satanic majesty. In his article all that could possibly be found to convey an idea of infamy, vice, and villainy, has been sought, and every circumstance connected with the legislation or administration of affairs by the French Emperor has been expressed in terms of the most unmitigated hatred. The *pretended* "natural antipathy" of B. S. to "gunpowder" is nothing but a cloak to the ill feelings which rankle in his heart; feelings of the most reprehensible description, which could never have found utterance except through the mouthpiece of some sworn enemy to France. Every reader of his paper must have felt convinced that its writer was an abettor of war; for the sentiments, as well as language, would naturally induce those against whom they were directed to punish such gross and undue licence with public characters. Not only does he represent the Emperor under a mean simile, as being "new fledged," but he is also stigmatised as a "maniac," "perjured hypocrite," &c.; and to show his sympathy for the principles of peace (although in another place he represents his "natural antipathy" for "gunpowder"), he designates the deputation which waited upon Louis Napoleon "ignoble." Like his predecessor in the May number, he evinces little desire for peace. That gentleman scoffingly says, "To hear some people talk one would suppose the millennium had arrived—that men had already begun to beat 'their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks,' and that they would never 'learn war any more.' But this passage of scripture, which the members of the so-called (?) Peace Society triumphantly emblazon on the front of all their publications, is itself a refutation of their absurd (?) theories; for, if they would carefully study its context, they would perceive that it was an intimation of what would occur during the millennium itself,

and not before that epoch." Pray, what does our friend mean by his "so-called" expression? Does he mean to insult peace men by saying they either do not believe their "absurd theories," or that, believing, they do not practise them? Either would be a most ungenerous enunciation. Unless this gentleman be gifted with a small amount of comprehension, he will find that in the New Testament there is no limit assigned to the practise of peace principles; that is, we see them exemplified by our Saviour, and enjoined on all his followers. As J. C. M'C. tells his "peace" friends, they should have studied the context of the quotation "so triumphantly emblazoned on their publications," perhaps he will be good enough to tell them what the context is of the following injunctions—whether they are an "intimation of what would occur during the millennium itself," or whether or not they are to be carried out before that epoch:—"Follow peace with *all* men." "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves." "Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses, nor scrip for your journey, *nor yet staves*." "Put up thy sword again into its sheath, for all they that use the sword shall perish by the sword." "Then shalt not kill," &c. It is somewhat surprising that such texts as these, abounding as they do in the New Testament, should have escaped the observation of J. C. M'C.

The remarks of my opponents, more particularly B. S., deserve the strongest condemnation; and, directed as they are against the character of one who rules a large empire, they are calculated to rouse in the French people a very hostile and bitter spirit towards the people of this country. Although the faults of Louis Napoleon are not to be palliated, it neither becomes B. S. nor others to write such inflammatory critiques on notable individuals. If the abettors of war were desirous of provoking a rupture between this country and France, they could not have done better than by sedulously following out the course pursued by a large portion of the press of this country for the last twelve months. We can scarcely fancy that they have their country's welfare at heart; certainly not, when the means employed are calculated to render our position unsafe, and to compel us to increase our defences, rather than to foster that friendly and social spirit

which ought to exist between England and France. Whilst holding Louis Napoleon up to the execration of posterity as a fiend and a rebel; whilst thus, as it were, pretending to show that we were on the eve of being invaded by him, when he could not actually govern his own people, they have literally invited his attack on our shores, by giving out false representations of our defencelessness, and naming those places on which a descent and landing might be easily effected. Such logic as this, so far from convincing me that they wish to preserve the freedom of this country, assures me that ill will to others, and a meddling disposition to interfere with the legislation of foreign countries, is the chief aim of these "mischief makers;" and, if Louis Napoleon should ever make an attack on our shores (and he stated recently to an English visitor, "that if there shall be war between the two nations, *it will never be owing to me, but to your own press*"), it is sincerely to be hoped that the first places and persons on which he will vent his spleen will be on the editorial precincts of Printing House Square, and B. S. of the *British Controversialist*.

What would induce Louis Napoleon to provoke a war with this country? Would it replenish the exhausted exchequer of France? Would it promote commerce? Could a war be carried on without the combined assistance of the at present discontented (and maligned) French people? Would it be easier for Louis (as B. S. absurdly represents) to invade this country, than for us to defend ourselves on our own soil? Are we unprovided with line-of-battle ships? Are our coasts undefended? Is the shore at all times safe to an invading enemy? Will it secure Napoleon any better on his throne (although, by the bye, elected by an overwhelming majority to be the reigning Sovereign of France), whilst so many malcontent aspirers to imperial or kingly honours are scattered about? All simple questions, these; yet they have been apparently passed over by my opponents. Some common sense and practical remarks from a speech by M. de Cormenin are worthy of transcription, despite their length:—"Every government in Europe (he says) that is administered by wise and prudent statesmen sighs after peace; for their interests, their necessities, their wishes, are bound upon peace. They

and yet which affects to know, or which really knows so little of us, although we are separated only by a little bit of a creek, that it attributes to us the most bellicose intentions in the world. Really, if I had not now for many years known that no folks are so foolish as your very clever folks, I should be at a loss to ascribe an origin to these crooked notions you good English entertain of us. They amount simply to this: that Napoleon III. must necessarily blow away a good deal of gunpowder because his uncle, Napoleon I., amused himself pretty considerably in this way. Here is a pretty kind of reason for sensible folks to run their foolish heads against; as though because one man has done such and such a thing at one particular time, it should be absolutely necessary for another man to do the same thing at some other time. I wager a hundred to one that if Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon, any or either of them, suddenly reappeared on earth, they would ride some other hobby than the one that is associated with their names, and that the world would be extremely surprised to see the amiable countenance they would put on. I certainly have not had the honour of a personal acquaintance with Alexander or Cæsar; nor with Charlemagne; but I did know

value as business is checked? Is it the dealers and traders in oxen, calves, sheep, poultry, who produce these things only when there is money to pay for them: but pray, in time of war, where is there any money? Is it the manufacturers and spinners of silk, and cotton, and wool, who would have to padlock their manufactories and their shops for want of a demand for their wares? Is it the artisan class—the workers in, and exporters of, bronzes, looking-glasses, piece-goods, jewellery, false and real, crystal ware, carpeting? Is it these who are going to risk their fragile elegancies across continents and oceans—those elegant nothings which are purchased almost at the price of their weight in gold, in the markets of peace, and only there? Is it the holders of shares of all kinds in railways, steam-boat companies, banks, docks, mines, canals, and the thousand-and-one financial enterprises that give activity to the money-market? Is this the class to clamour for war, in the teeth of a dead certainty that their property and interests will be depreciated till it attains a merely nominal value? And the fundholders in the three, five, four, or four-and-a-half per cents.; is it they? What have they to gain? Nothing but a loss of at least forty per cent. Is it the christian priests, who abhor bloodshed in the fratricidal struggles of kings against kings, and peoples against peoples? Is it our minister of finance, who at the very smallest whisper of war would see, with eyes filled with tears, suddenly dry up before him the double sources of direct and indirect taxation; our exchequer bills no longer negotiable, and our capitalists jealously locking up their strong box with its patent Chubb (for we secure our treasures with your locks), and emigrating to foreign lands, with our money in their fobs, or consenting to lend it only at usurious interest. Is it our excellent frontier inhabitants, who, eating and drinking in peace one evening with their neighbours of the east and the north, are going to set-to the next morning and tear one another to pieces like wild beasts, as they would be, and as you charitably pretend that they are? Is it our workmen who want to go to war with the workmen of Belgium, Italy, Spain, Russia, Germany, England? Is it our artists, our musicians, our comedians, our singers, our philosophers, our professors and their pupils, our mathema-

ticians, our writers, our physicians, our lawyers, our poets, our surgeons, chemists, and alchemists? Pooh! Well, if out of this mass, comprising all classes, not one of them desires to make war upon you, nor even to pay for it, who, then, do you expect is going to do it? Perhaps you are going to pay somebody to undertake the task; you are going to beg of them very politely to do you the honour to make a descent upon your coasts, in, say, four flat-bottomed boats, duly armed, manned, and ammunitioned. In so great a hurry are you, I see, to be once, and for the first time in your life, well drubbed, so that you may at length say, "We have been well drubbed, and we are satisfied." Such, then, are a few of the reasons, such are some of the circumstances connected with the commercial, &c., interests of France which would "induce" Louis Napoleon to invade this country!!! Such are the "glorious" prospects held out to Napoleon! Such are the various classes of tradesmen on whom Napoleon can surely count for co-operation in his premeditated attack on England!

As B. S., more particularly, appears to have weighed with such great accuracy the odds in favour of a contemplated invasion of this country, and as he appears to be so sure that Louis must and will fulfil his "destiny," I would ask him why he has not accepted the Cobden challenge? Although only intended for a local editor, whose fears and information appear to be as firmly grounded as B. S.'s (in his own mind), I feel convinced that, if the latter will forward a copy of his article to the honourable member for the West Riding, that that gentleman (in order to give effect to his own opinions, as also to test the sincerity and to allay the fears of B. S.) will gladly renew the offer; and I feel as confident that B. S. will, like his prototype of the *Manchester Guardian*, decline it. It is also probable that Mr. Cobden would enter into an agreement with B. S. as he did with Captain Brotherton, viz., to give him £10,000 when Louis Napoleon *attempts* to invade this country, on condition of his opponent subscribing 1s. per week to the Manchester Royal Infirmary. This would be an excellent opportunity for B. S. to manifest his sympathy with humanity, *as well as to give expression to his own convictions.*

What is the position of France with regard

to military and naval armaments? Is the senate increasing or disbanding the army? Is there increase in the navy? I suppose it will be objected that, if there is a reduction, it will only be as a cloak to the real intentions and designs of the Emperor towards this country. Let me trouble my readers once more with a few short extracts. When the story of M. Fould's warlike threats and preparations had been repeated again and again, Mr. Ewart, M.P., wrote to that gentleman to inquire if it were true, and received instantly a most courteous reply, in which he says, "*I confine myself to declaring to you that I have not armed a single gun-boat, stirred a single cannon, or equipped a single soldier. I remain the calm spectator of the enormous expenses which you are making to conjure away an imaginary danger.*" What an undignified rebuke to the government of this country! Again: Mr. J. D. Powles, who is described as the leading Tory merchant in the city of London, thus writes to one of the morning papers:—"Having been in Paris for some days within the last few weeks, I found war denounced as the greatest calamity that could befall France. *I heard the greatest surprise expressed that persons could be found in England to believe for a moment that France could entertain the insane project of making war on this country. The idea was treated as one so wild and absurd as not fit to form the subject of a serious conversation.*" This admission comes from one of a class who, of all others, are most prone to give credit to what they hear.

The "extraordinary activity" in the French navy proves to be purely fallacious: and the *Times*, after diligently propagating these tales, is obliged to say, "We have ascertained from competent evidence that no signs of extraordinary activity prevail in the dockyards. We must also add that we have received from the French Department of Marine a positive statement, that the French navy estimates for the current year will be about forty million francs less than they were in the last year of Louis Philippe's reign." The naval estimates of France in 1847 were 158 millions of francs, and in 1852 117 millions! This comes from the organ who, like B. S., has been led pug-nosed by all on dits of the day. But this is not the first time that there has been such tamperings

with the public credit. I have before me a return, showing that, from 1836 to 1849, there have been additions (over and above the amounts annually voted and expended) for 33,500 sailors and soldiers; and, irrespective of the costs of these, there were, in the years 1845, 1846, and 1849, £3,900,000 voted in the general estimates for warlike armaments. All these additions were made at times when there were disagreements in this or some other countries about our own territories, &c.; but the "panic" soon blew over, the men especially raised for the suppression thereof still remaining. Last year there was another addition to the estimates of £800,000 for 80,000 militia-men, and this year 20,000 more.

One more statement respecting the French army, made by General Sir De Lacy Evans, in the House of Commons, May 4, 1852, will suffice:—"It was stated that there were 400,000 French troops on the opposite shore; but the fact was not so. The actual amount, according to the French army estimates for this year, was 369,000, and from that must be deducted 70,000 for Algiers; so that there went 100,000 men from the number supposed to be the army of France. Then there were 16,000 officers, and 22,000 non-commissioned officers, making 38,000 together, and they were to be deducted, if the number of our own officers—though he could not understand why—were to be deducted from the number of our own force; then there were 28,000 drummers and trumpeters, who ought also on the same principle to be deducted. But there was in the French estimates one class which we had not in ours; they considered as part of their army the infantry and cavalry police, or the gendarmes; they numbered 21,000; but that force was not available for the purpose of invasion; it was absolutely necessary for the local government of France, and carried it on, in fact, more than our police. If, however, that formed part of the French army, then we ought not to lose sight of the 12,000 Irish police, who were quite as good, and in his opinion better. He knew no troops in the world he would count on better than the Irish police; they were not exercised in battalions, but the general way in which they were employed in responsible service made them fit for any duty, and rendered them most valuable troops in case of emergency. Then, look to the number of

men invalided. The average of the British army was $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., or 3,000 for the whole force; but the number for the whole army of France would be 13,500. That number, therefore, must be deducted, and, counting all deductions together, he might put them at another 100,000 men in round numbers to be deducted from the 300,000. There then remained only 200,000; but did the house suppose the whole of that force would be available immediately for some ambitious project? No such thing. There was in the time of Louis Philippe never a less garrison in Paris and its neighbourhood than from 50,000 to 60,000, and he believed he was underrating it now if he said the present number was 70,000. Lyons and the country around it also required 30,000, and he believed it was impossible for the French government to leave either of those two great cities without garrisons of those amounts, however ambitious they might be. Thus there went another 100,000. What remained? Only 100,000. He would suppose there was nothing else to be looked to in France—no great military power on the frontier. He would suppose that 100,000 men of the French army were quite available to be sent over here some fine summer morning. If they did, he would venture to say that, with the deductions that would have to be made before they came into general action with the British army, they would still be inferior to us in number, besides the immense advantage we should have in fighting in our own country, and choosing our own spots for the purpose, with a brave and patriotic population to support our army, and thwart in every way that of an enemy. But there was no such thing as 100,000 men of the French army available at present. The French had 80 garrisons to provide for, some of which they could not leave without considerable protection, such as Strasburg, Belfort, Metz, and Lille. He (Sir De Lacy Evans) did not believe the French government could really collect 30,000 men for the purpose supposed."

Since General Evans stated this, the French army has been reduced by 20,000 men.

I must apologize for the excessive length of this article; and must more especially crave the indulgence of French readers for having treated this subject in so serious a manner, when all that can be gathered on this question attests the improbability of an invasion of this country by the French Emperor. He is a shrewd man, and knows the cost of such an enterprise. It would exhaust—nay, entail a serious debt upon—France; it would impede—perhaps irretrievably ruin—the commercial interests of the two countries; it would involve, above all, the cordial co-operation of all classes of the French people; and, if such a project as an invasion of England were to be undertaken, our sea-girt position, the tremendous power of our navy, the addition of the army, and, if need be, the inhabitants of England, would be obstacles (which cannot have escaped the serious attention of the Emperor, if invasion be contemplated), which would be almost insurmountable impediments to success. I pity the credulity of B. S. and his colleagues. Above all I pity their want of judgment and discernment, as I also lament the very serious language which they have attributed to the Emperor of the French. Whence their information I know not; nor yet am I aware of any inducements to lead to a rupture with France. If the overthrow of France were sought, nothing on earth would be more effectual and certain of success than the *practical exemplification* of the "*probability*" of invasion. But to be serious. When are we to be invaded? It has been predicted during the last few years, and it has not come yet. "Why tarrieth the wheels of his chariot; why is his chariot so long in coming?" What curious prophets B. S. and Co. are! They have lost all claim to our respect and belief. They have now imposed on us so long that we can see through their "*sham*." We cannot consent to believe them again.

J. G. R.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In the investigation of this subject it will be well to glance, by way of commencement, at the reasons which have been urged against the probability of an attempted invasion of England by France.

It has been said that the interests of the French people are against an invasion; that it would immediately most seriously damage, if not destroy, their trade and commerce; that it would incalculably increase their debt,

and cause the destruction of thousands of their friends.

In reply we may ask, Do the French see and feel all this? Even if we were convinced that they did, do we not know that men, both individually and collectively, act every day in opposition to their perceived interests? How few crimes, how few wars, would there have been, if a man's or a nation's course had been decided by real interest! Commerce, debt, friends, life—these, alas! often weigh but little against plunder, rapine, revenge, conquest, glory. Again: However wise the French people may be, when the imperial mind revolves the question, Shall I invade England? it is to be feared that the people's voice will be either but faintly heard, or haughtily and daringly despised.

This leads us to notice the argument that the *Emperor's* interests are against an invasion; that his throne rests on order and peace, and the consequent prosperity of the masses of the population; that he needs his soldiers to keep down discontent and insurrection at home; that invasion could but end in *his* overthrow, as, if unsuccessful, the nation would rise against him, and, if successful, the general in command would gather the laurels, and surely undermine his master's power.

In answer, the previous question recurs, Is all this felt and seen? If it be, may not the idea of destiny, the vision of glory, tempt the Prince to run the risk, and leave to fate the task of counterworking the apparent certain issues? May not circumstances arise that will seem to him to make the invasion of England the last die he can throw for popularity and power? Nor is it always the case that the sovereign who himself does not lead his armies is excluded from all the renown of victory and triumph, and from gaining thereby new strength to his throne. The daring that could think of such an enterprise, the wisdom that could plan it, and select the fitting instruments for its accomplishment, are not without merit of their kind; and, under some circumstances, they would exalt the man who displayed them into a demigod, and obtain for him a niche in the Pantheon.

But it is said the attempt would be madness. Invasion!—England conquered! Impossible! The enterprise is hopeless, and Louis Napoleon knows it! Does he? Is it quite evident that he disbelieves all that has

been said and written about our defencelessness? If he considers the whole as entitled to no credit whatever, he must be a dogged sceptic indeed, the more so as his wish must be in favour of the truth of the representations that have been made. We easily believe that which we wish to be true. Besides, to whom is the enterprise hopeless? To Louis Napoleon? But may he not expect the support of the other absolute powers of Europe? The idea of a coalition against England may before this have crossed his mind.

We proceed now to what may be further said in affirmation of the question.

First. The Peninsular campaign, closing after a brief interruption with Waterloo, is not *forgotten* by the nephew of the hero, whose soldiers were defeated and whose sceptre was broken on its bloody fields; nor is it forgotten by those who have raised the nephew to his present elevation. We may be pardoned if we doubt whether it is *forgotten*. Some words fell, not very long since, that sounded like "vengeance;" though, perhaps, the speaker bit his lip the moment after. It was too early a betrayal of his dark thoughts. His wont is to plan and plan, and not to speak till he is prepared to act.

Secondly. The Emperor of the French cannot be trusted; no faith can be put in his word; he always masks his designs. "The republic," "the constitution," "the inviolability of the assembly;" these were always on his lips, never in his heart. His oft-repeated oath to preserve them kept not back his hand when it served his purpose to destroy them. "The republic" meant the empire; "the constitution," an armed revolution, to be followed by a despotism; "the inviolability of the assembly," the midnight arrest, the dungeon, the galleys, and Guiana for its wisest, noblest, and most patriotic members. Surely, when such a man talks of peace, we are not uncharitable if we surmise that war is in his heart!

Thirdly. Louis Napoleon shrinks from nothing that promises to further his ends. We have just spoken of perjury. Now, his career shows that when he has anything to gain he laughs at law, riots in robbery, and wantons in the wretchedness of others. The substitution of the imperial edict for his country's laws; the confiscation of the private property of the Orleans family; the imprisonment, spoliation, and banishment of

opponents; his massacre of the Boulevards, and his anxiety for the restoration of the guillotine;—these are proofs of our assertion. We must believe, then, that it will not be the thought of guilt or crime that will restrain him from attempting the removal of whatever stands in his way. Does Britain occupy this position; and why should she, rather than the other European powers, be the object of his hostility? The answer is obvious. She gained Waterloo; she, chiefly, holds back his hand from Belgium and Switzerland. England is free, and throws her shield over men who sigh, and who, at a fitting opportunity, are prepared to fight, for French and European freedom. The English press is free, and will call vice, though reigning in a palace and smiled on by high-born dames, vice; perjury, though privileged by priestly absolution, perjury; robbery, though legalized by royal edict, robbery; and crime, though crowned, crime. It will denounce unrighteousness, oppression, and despotism, though its words of fire should kindle another conflagration, in which crowns and thrones should be consumed. The English conscience, too, is free, is not enslaved by priestly pretensions and superstitions; but is the eternal foe of religious usurpation. Yes; it cannot be concealed that England, in her constitution, her freedom, and her religion, is the antagonist of the other great powers of Europe. While she remains so, there can be no cordial union between her and them, and their power cannot be consolidated, or their preservation secured. To the priests and princes of the Continent the revolutionization or destruction of England is a cherished wish. But England will not change, unless it be to still greater freedom. Her march is towards an increase of democratic power, and therefore of liberty. She must be destroyed then. There is imminent danger of a league being formed against her, in which France will be foremost; a league that will

be blessed by popes, and in which priests, Jesuits, and inquisitors shall be advisers, and which will be prepared to take a course branded by treachery the basest, and crime the most atrocious. France, if isolated and unsupported, will not invade England. There are deep sympathies between France and other continental powers. They respect but little the *parvenu*; but they will use him, in the hope to cast him aside by and by, and place upon his vacant seat a prince with "right divine."

But are the peoples not forgotten in all this? Will they sanction such a league, so unholy a coalition? They may, but from a motive totally different from that prompting their rulers. They may sanction it because they desire, not the overthrow of England, but the destruction of their own despotisms. Let but the hosts of England and the Continent come into collision, and Europe would be in the blaze of revolution. We have faith in the issue, because we have faith in a righteous Governor of the world, under whose reign tyranny cannot ultimately prosper. This, however, is a faith that blesses not the breast of European autocrats; and the probability is that they will madly attempt to crush England. I say the *probability* is that they will make the attempt; by no means the *certainty*; for "who can tell what will be on the morrow?" If the present continental system lasts, there might be little doubt on the subject; but to-morrow may witness other occupiers of the thrones at present filled by Louis, Nicholas, Joseph, and Frederick. We believe that in some way or other, and that ere long, England and the other great nations must be assimilated in character, in principles, and in government, or there will be a convulsion, in which power will be banded against right, despotism against freedom, and religion against priestcraft.

W. G. S. H.

The exciting causes to which our organs are subjected during the day, tend progressively to increase their action. The throbbings of the heart, for instance, are more frequent at night than in the morning; and this action, gradually accelerated, would soon be carried to such a degree of activity as to be inconsistent with life, if its velocity were not moderated at intervals by the recurrence of sleep.—*Richerland*.

Life in every shape should be precious to us, for the same reason that the Turks carefully collect every scrap of paper that comes in their way, because the name of God may be written upon it.—*Jean Paul*.

Serial Economy.

IS THE USE OF OATHS FOR CIVIL PURPOSES RIGHT AND EXPEDIENT?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN neither of the articles on the affirmative have the writers stated a *principle* by which the use of oaths is justified as *right*; but they have based their argument upon certain passages of scripture, and mainly upon those in which the Author of Christianity established a rule of conduct for his followers diametrically opposed, I conceive, to that they have deduced from them. These passages are subject to the objections which always attach to reports of spoken words; and it would have been far better if our opponents had shown what principle caused their utterance consistent with their conclusion. Such a course would have given a coherence to their argument it does not now possess. As I made no reference to this part of the subject in my former article, I may, perhaps, be permitted to enter upon it now.

In the first place, then, we must exclude from consideration all the references which have been made to the admission of oaths into the Mosaic system as altogether inapplicable to the question now. Whatever authority there was for their use under it must have been as parts of the system, every other part of which had equal force, and they are, consequently, only admissible with the whole body of Jewish law.

We shall, then, have to interpret those words of the Great Teacher which have been twice quoted already. J. F. holds that they do not "forbid the taking of an oath in a court of justice." C. E. quotes and adopts a note from Barnes, stating that "our Saviour here evidently had no reference to judicial oaths." To decide this point satisfactorily we must have the whole case, as presented in the quotations before us, in a connected manner. In Matt. v. 33—37, Christ gives a general rule, "*Swear not at all*," and enumerates and reprobates certain forms of swearing, which were then, probably, in common use among the Jews. One of these proscribed forms, I maintain, includes the judicial oath; it follows immediately after

the general reprobation of them, and is in these terms, "*Neither by heaven, for it is God's throne*." The meaning we must attach to these words is explained by the speaker himself in Matt. xxiii. 22, where He says, "*He that shall swear by Heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon*," namely, the living God. The form of the judicial oath, which, according to Matthew's narrative, was administered to Christ when before Caiaphas, was—the high priest speaking—"I adjure thee by the living God;" and this, responded to by the witness, completed the oath. From this it is apparent that the prohibition made by Christ, is his own explanation of its meaning, did include the judicial oath; and consequently, as far as these passages extend, it is indisputable that every appeal to God of the nature of an oath, in judicial and all other cases, is condemned.

But J. F. and C. E. both attempt to confirm their deductions from these scriptural quotations by the course adopted by Christ when before the high priest, and immediately preceding his condemnation to an ignoble death. It is of great importance to show that the conclusion I have drawn from his precepts are not invalidated by his conduct.

We have in the New Testament four biographies of Christ, and in each an account of the proceedings before the high priest on this occasion. In consequence of the variations in them it is necessary to take each narrative of the event, and, comparing it with the others, obtain, if possible, a clear understanding of it. If I thought space would permit, I would quote them in full; but it is, perhaps, sufficient to refer to Matt. xxvi. 63, 64; Mark xiv. 61, 62; Luke xxii. 67—70; John xviii. 20, 21. Each differs materially from the others; but Matthew only represents the high priest to use the adjuration; the remaining three, though disagreeing in nearly every other particular with him and each other, agree that an ordinary interrogation only was used. Add

to this fact, that Judea being under Roman government, the high priest did not then possess judicial power, and so could not put the oath judicially—that Matthew was not present on the occasion, whilst John (see xviii. 16) probably was, and it is demonstrated, as far as the fact is susceptible of it, that the words reported by Matthew were not those used; and, consequently, no inconsistency exists between the precept and the practice of Christ upon the subject.

But we have, in these scriptural quotations, the declaration of a rule or law merely; whilst we should always appeal, in preference, to the principle from which the law derives its justification and force. The one involved in the question as between man and man is, that it is an imperative duty of man to act justly—the observance of truth is essential to the performance of that duty; it is universal in its application, as all moral duties are; it therefore cannot be possible for man, the subject of it, to deepen it by a ceremony, or weaken by non-observance or avoidance of one. And, as between God and man, it may be stated thus—that, as his knowledge and justice are both infinite, the first cannot be increased, nor the last modified or varied, by any form of appeal to him man may use. An oath including such an appeal fails in one of its essential parts, is inconsistent with the character of God and with itself, is wholly and irremediably wrong.

It is necessary I should notice the omission of an essential feature of the oath from J. F.'s definition. It is true, as stated by him, that it implies the possession of religious convictions, and of responsibility to God, by the witness or other person performing the ceremony, and that it is intended to satisfy the distrust of his antagonist, and of the court judicially deciding a question between them; but it also calls upon God to witness that the statement is true, and invokes his anger if it be false, presupposing the belief that in the latter case he will inflict a punishment different in nature or degree, or in both, from that with which he would visit a deviation from truth to a similar extent if made without such appeal to him. Hence it rests with those who advocate the use of oaths to show that they remove acts performed under them out of the category of ordinary things, and change the relationship between God and

man, *at the will of the man*. But it is impossible to conceive that the administration of pure justice can be so modified by forms adopted by those subject to it.

J. F.'s argument, not being based on a firm principle or a clear and comprehensive definition, becomes necessarily incoherent and inconclusive. He states that the "taking of an oath is a purely religious act"—that the act is "one which a conscientious man only can rightly perform," and that it is "a test of the highest integrity of character." But this, his idea of an oath, and of its requirements from, and its influence upon, those who take it, can be shown, from his own words not to possess one point of correspondence with the men it has to operate upon, and the purposes it has to serve when applied to its ordinary use in society. The "degeneracy of society (he says), the deceit and falsehood which have tarnished the dealings of man," have caused them to require a "pledge of veracity" from each other. He considers, moreover, the oath to be "a standing memorial of our depravity"—that "it arose with our imperfections, and with them it must cease." Hence it follows, then, that we require as a pledge of the veracity of men partaking of the degeneracy of society, and whose dealings have been tarnished by deceit and falsehood, an act of a purely religious nature, that implies their possession of religious convictions, which a conscientious man only can rightly perform, and the right performance of which affords a test of the highest integrity of character, which is, besides, an evidence of their depravity, and is to cease when man shall have become perfect, i. e., on his showing, competent to the due performance of the act! We have here a strange forgetfulness of the simple rule, that an influence should be adapted to the nature of that which it is designed to move, and that the same act cannot be an evidence of virtue and depravity.

Having thus shown the utter fallacy of the argument in support of the affirmative attempted to be drawn from scripture, and its incoherence and inconsistency with all sound principle and with itself, I need not repeat the reasons which daily experience press upon us in proof of the evil influence the use of oaths has upon our judicial proceedings, and in ordinary life. E. D.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE have observed, of late, that in the discussion of religious topics, and topics allied to religion, it is customary with some writers in the *British Controversialist* to regard the Bible as the depository of two kinds of religion; whereas we have been taught by the sacred writers themselves to regard it as the depository of but one true religion. The religion of the *Old Testament* is the same with that of the *New*: in the former it was in childhood, in the latter it assumes the form of manhood: in *that* it has one phase, in *this* another. We should learn to discriminate between what is essential and what is accidental—between a man and his clothes. Whatever was right in itself under the *Old Testament* dispensation is the same under the *New*. A thing attended with the same circumstances cannot be right at one period and wrong at another.

Now, with respect to the use of oaths, E. W. S. acknowledges that "it was in harmony with the *religion* of the Jews," &c.; and also that by virtue of that religion "oaths were recognised as necessary under the Jewish theocracy." But why does he limit the legality and necessity of oaths to the Jewish nation, or to the period of the Jewish theocracy, when it is evident that their use and necessity were anterior to the origin of the Jewish nation, and commensurate with society itself, both as respects time and place? The use of oaths in matters of great moment is a portion of natural religion, proceeding from the light of nature, approved of by God, and in keeping with the spirit of revealed religion.

That our views of the subject may assume a tangible form, we shall attempt to vindicate the use of oaths for civil purposes on the following grounds:—

I. From the nature and design of an oath. An oath is a solemn appeal to God to witness the truth of what is spoken; and the person sworn is supposed to renounce all claim to God's mercy, and to invoke divine vengeance, if he does not speak the truth as far as he knows it. Hence, to take an oath is a religious act,* by which the person exacting an oath, and the person by whom it is taken,

both acknowledge the omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and justice of the Deity. "Thou shalt swear, The Lord liveth, in truth, in judgment, and in righteousness," Jer. iv. 2. Thus, in a lawful oath there must be *truth, judgment, and righteousness*. Again: "He that sweareth in the earth, shall swear by the God of truth," Isa. lxxv. 16. The formulas and ceremonies which attend the administration of oaths are various and mutable; consequently they are non-essentials, and do not affect the question at issue.

The design in view in the administration of oaths is twofold. 1. To elicit the truth in matters of paramount importance. 2. To confirm and commend the truth. Than this nothing can be more honourable to a government and beneficial to a nation. St. Paul says, "An oath for confirmation, is to them (men) an end of strife," Heb. vi. 16; that is, disputes, contentions, and contradictions, are usually put an end to by the interposition of an oath, which is the highest and most decisive evidence that can be adduced in proof of the agreement between a man's thoughts and words.

II. The use of oaths is compatible with right reason, reason in its present most perfect state. The very fact of administering oaths involves a cogent proof of their legality, for it presupposes that men are unprincipled and suspicious beings. Were they not so, the necessity for continuing the use of oaths would cease to exist, and the custom of administering them might then be dispensed with; but so long as men universally do not reverence the truth, and speak the truth *for truth's sake*, the use of oaths can no more be safely dispensed with than bolts, bars, locks, &c. Since it is a well-ascertained fact that many men, perhaps the majority, do not at times speak the truth, and that from principle; it is right, in weighty matters, for properly qualified persons to imbue them with other motives, motives of a potent and telling kind. Indeed, in all criminal and judicial causes, where life, property, and character are at stake, it is in every sense right and expedient to lay the parties at variance, and their respective witnesses, under the most powerful obligations to speak the truth, the *whole* truth, and *nothing* but the truth.

* Tully calls it a "religious affirmation."

And, pray, how can this be more effectually accomplished than by the civil authorities demanding that all depositions pertaining to such causes shall be made by men upon their oaths? We most cordially acquiesce in the proposition of E. D., that "the obligation to speak the truth is universal," &c. But does this obligation elicit truth from all persons, at all times, and under all circumstances? By no means. Then why not impose an additional obligation, one which comprises a "greater efficacy for the discovery of truth?" A man's obligation to tender true evidence, and enunciate the truth, is enhanced in proportion to the magnitude of the cause and the dignity of the persons concerned; and when the eternal God becomes specially concerned (as he does when, by the taking of an oath, he is being appealed to by all parties to be a swift witness against the liar) the man giving evidence is bound by all that is human and divine to speak the truth. Beyond this* human laws cannot be enacted to elicit and confirm the truth of oral statements. If a man be unprincipled, and if he lacks the love of truth when he enters the witness-box, what can be expected from him but, at most, very suspicious evidence? There is just *one* chance—not a probability, but a bare possibility—that he may speak the truth. Now, by imposing upon him a solemn oath, by which he is reminded of the fact that God is there, and that he has imprecated God's vengeance if he does not declare the truth, you place the man under a twofold obligation to do so, and there are then *two* chances that he will speak the truth. To lie is bad; but to be guilty of perjury is worse, for the latter involves the former; and the man who is guilty of perjury is liable at any moment to be punished, not only for lying and perjury, but also for the bad effects which his conduct may have occasioned. Hence we infer that by how much more punishment is due to the crime of perjury than to that of lying, by so much more is a man obligated to speak the truth when upon his oath than otherwise. True, an oath adds nothing to the real value of a man's testimony which is true, so far as the testimony and the man himself are concerned; but the attester is a man—a suspicious being, and a social creature, and his

testimony has relation to beings like himself; hence it becomes of more value, when given upon oath, than what it otherwise could be, to his fellow man. For the reasons stated above and implied we cannot accede to the tenor of E. W. S. and E. D.'s arguments on this subject.

In reply to E. W. S.'s second inquiry we say that, providing the administration of oaths does not secure the intended object in all cases, this is no proof that the use of oaths is wrong and inexpedient. The question is, does the use of oaths elicit truth in any case, where, without an oath, it could not be elicited? If so, the use of oaths is right. E. W. S. tacitly acknowledges that oaths are of real value when taken from principle; so that we gain another point, viz., an oath detracts nothing from the truth of a statement. Now, if a man will make a false statement when upon his oath, there is no probability whatever that he would make a true one when not upon his oath; whereas, on the other hand, there is a great probability that a man will speak the truth when upon his oath, although he does not hesitate to lie when not upon his oath. Hence the expediency of the use of oaths.

With respect to the Quakers, we remark that though they are, by an act of parliament, exonerated from subscribing to the British formula of administering to an oath, yet they are by no means freed from the spirit and obligation of an oath. Their affirmation—"I, A. B., do solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm"—is equivalent to an oath; and so it is deemed by the Quakers and the state; and the violation of the said affirmation is, we believe, followed by the same consequences as perjury. The power of dispensing with one form of swearing and adopting another is in the hands of government; consequently, the exercise of this power does not interfere with the legality and utility of oaths. And, providing our government were to dispense with the use of oaths altogether, it would by no means follow that the use thereof was wrong.

III. The use of oaths is in harmony with the example of God, and "with the character of his moral government of man." Whatever God does is right in itself, and by virtue of its relation to God. In many instances we find Deity himself ratifying his promises and

* Tully says, "Our ancestors had no stricter bond whereby to oblige the faith of men to one another than that of an oath."

threatenings by interposing his oath; not because he is unprincipled, and addicted to utter falsehoods, but because of the hardness of men's hearts. If Jehovah, to commend the truth of his statements to the consciences of men, spoke upon his oath, why should not those who profess to be his followers and imitators in all possible matters do the same for the same ends?

IV. We argue the lawfulness and expediency of the practice of solemn swearing on the ground that it is in harmony with the whole tenor of scripture and to the spirit of Christianity. Although we differ in opinion from E. W. S. on this point, we cannot forbear admiring his deference for scripture authority in the matter. 1. It has already been acceded that the law of Moses not only allowed, but required, the use of oaths. Under this law the use of oaths was not a mere ceremony, a meaningless rite, but a great moral and religious duty; for God says expressly, "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name," Deut. vi. 13; x. 20. Now, what authority, we ask, has any man to dispense with one part of this injunction and not with the other? To say that Christ abrogated the Mosaic law does not affect the subject one iota, for the use of oaths was current among God's people prior to the institution of the Mosaic dispensation. See Gen. xxi. 23, 24; xxiv. 39, &c.

2. The prophets, in their prophecies and promises respecting the times of the gospel, mention the use of oaths especially. "Unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear," Isa. xlv. 23. Compare Rom. xiv. 11. Jeremiah, too, when describing the conversion of the heathens under the gospel, mentions the act of swearing by the name of the Lord as belonging to those persons, Jer. xii. 16.

3. Christ himself sanctioned the use of oaths by his own example, (a) when he said, "Verily I say unto you, There shall be no sign given to this generation," Mark viii. 12. In the original there is an ellipsis of some such words as these, "may I not live," or "let God punish me if a sign be given," &c. Yet, the words in their present form have an Hebrew formula of an oath,* Deut. i. 35;

* On this passage Dr. Bloomfield says, "This is a form of solemn asseveration (common in the Old Testament), in which there is implied an imprecation; which, however, is omitted, per apo-

1 Sam. iii. 14; Psa. xcv. 11; cxxxii. 2, 3, &c.

(b) Again: Christ did not refuse to take an oath, when sworn by the high priest in these words, "I adjure thee by the living God," &c., Matt. xxvi. 63. Now, when a person was thus adjured, he was obliged to answer upon his oath, Lev. v. 1. Being thus sworn, Christ answered, "Thou hast said" (i. e., Thou hast said right, I am the Christ, the Son of God). So Mark has it, xvi. 62. Had it not, therefore, been right to be sworn and give evidence upon oath, Christ would have entered his protest against the practice. But he did not; on the contrary, he complied with it; consequently, the practice is right and expedient.

4. In the book of Revelation, which was written posterior to the time of the abrogation of the law of Moses, we have an instance of an angel attesting the truth of a great statement by an appeal to the most high God, Rev. x. 5, 6.

5. The great apostle in several places confirms his speeches and the truth of his professions by calling in God as a witness, Rom. i. 9; ix. 1; Phil. i. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 31; 2 Cor. i. 23; Gal. i. 10. In 2 Cor. i. 23 we have this significant form of an oath, "I call God for a record upon my soul," &c. Now, Paul was a Christian in every sense of the word; then how can we suppose that he would comply with a practice that was not in harmony "with the spirit of Christianity?" Why did not E. W. S. speak to these passages in Paul's writings? From all these examples we think it is clear that the use of oaths for civil purposes is in harmony with scripture, consequently right, and in harmony with the spirit of Christianity.

It now only remains for us to examine those words of our Saviour which E. W. S. regards as containing a decisive argument that the use of oaths for civil purposes is wrong. E. W. S. must not be surprised if we tell him that the words have no respect at all to oaths for civil purposes, for this is the case;* and the inference which E. W. S. draws from these words, beginning "Thus does he teach us," &c., is very faulty indeed.

siopesin et gravitatis ergo.—Vide Greek Text, in loco.

* The Jews, in their judicial oaths, invoked God only; whereas the oaths here prohibited were conceived by heaven, earth, &c.—See Exod. xxii. 11.

There is more than one kind of swearing: there are many; such as true swearing, false swearing, forswearing, vulgar swearing, &c. Now we have shown that one kind of swearing is used and commended in scripture, and but one; this is true swearing, for no other kind can be supposed to be right. But the same thing, attended with the same circumstances, cannot be commended in one place and condemned in another. It is a rule equal to an axiom in the interpretation of scripture, that when a thing is forbidden in one place and allowed in another, not the essence of the thing, but the accidentals, modes, or non-essentials, are spoken to, at least in one place. Besides, there are scores of instances in the Bible where the sacred writers seem to express themselves absolutely and positively when they mean to be understood comparatively and conditionally. See Luke vi. 30, where Christ says, "Give to every man that asketh of thee," &c.; 1 Cor. vi. 7; viii. 4; Matt. ix. 24; vii. 23. Thus, then, we must necessarily come to the conclusion that Christ prohibits some kind of swearing, probably all kinds, save that which is right and commended. This kind he cannot be supposed to forbid; for such a supposition sets Christ against Christ, and Paul against James. When Christ says, "Swear not at all," &c., he prohibits all sorts of vain and vulgar swearing, perjury, and the violation of oaths. The Scribes and Pharisees had erred, not only respecting the laws of uncleanness, divorce, and retaliation, but respecting the use of oaths. These men, like many others, had addicted themselves to falsehood and superstition to that degree that they were obliged to devise means in justification of their conduct or forfeit the confidence of the people; and, that they might follow their wicked practices without seeming to incur God's wrath, they argued to the following effect:—1. No oath is binding, except the name of God be interposed or expressed. 2. A man may swear in common conversation with impunity, so long as he swears by a creature only; or, the obligation of an oath increases in the same ratio as the dignity of the person or thing by which a man swears. 3. A man may swear in

ordinary conversation, even by the name of God, if what he swears be the truth.* In proof of these remarks we adduce the following evidence:—"They that swear by heaven and by earth are free."† "If a man swear by heaven, or by earth, yet this is not an oath."‡ R. Judah§ says, "He that says Jerusalem, or by Jerusalem, says nothing." "Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing," &c., Matt. xxiii. 16—22. Now, it was against what the Jews called these *lighter* oaths that Christ directed his discourse. Their manner of mincing those sacred obligations was repugnant to the true nature and design of oaths; and from what we gather on this subject, it seems that Christ gave his followers to understand these two things:—1. That they ought not to swear by any creature; for every oath, whether conceived by a creature or otherwise, had respect to God, and was therefore binding. To swear by the temple was the same as swearing by the God who dwelled therein; and so of all the rest, Matt. xxiii. 16, &c. 2. That they ought not to interpose the name of God at all in attestation of common and trivial statements, however true.¶ That such is the true design of our Saviour's prohibition in Matt. v. 33, &c., is evident from this weighty consideration, that everything else prohibited in the same chapter was in itself unlawful, and had always been deemed so by God's law. It was the glosses and dogmas of false teachers that Christ sought to root up and destroy; with respect to the things that were of God, he said, "Think not that I am come to destroy the law and the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil." J. F.

* This opinion they founded on Lev. xix. 12, "Ye shall not swear by my name falsely," inferring from this text that they might swear by it, even in trivial matters, so long as their affirmations were true.

† "Misn. Sheb., chap. iv. sec. 13.

‡ Lightfoot, on Matt. v. 34.

§ "Sheb.," chap. xii.

¶ Quintilian held the same opinion:—"To swear at all (says he), except where it is necessary, does not well coincide with a wise man." And Epictetus the same:—"Shun oaths wholly, if it be possible; if not, as much as you can."

Riches are the baggage of virtue: they cannot be spared, nor left behind; but they hinder the march.

The Societies' Section:

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Paisley Artizan's Institution.—The second session of the essay and discussion class in connexion with the above flourishing institution having been lately brought to a close, the members, along with a few friends, held their annual meeting in the Vulcan Hotel, County Place, on the evening of the 24th of May last. Mr. John Guy, president of the class, occupied the chair, and the duties of croupier were discharged by Mr. Gordon Smith. After partaking of an excellent repast, and the cloth having been withdrawn, the usual loyal and patriotic toasts were given, and warmly responded to.

The chairman then proceeded to deliver the closing address for the session, in which he strongly recommended mutual improvement societies as an invaluable boon to all who have entered on the arduous task of mental improvement and self-education. He spoke in eloquent terms of the very great advantages which young men might derive from attending such classes, characterizing them as a sort of mental gymnasium, in the arena of which the powers and faculties of mind may be trained, by proper exercise, into a healthful and vigorous operation. He concluded a deeply interesting address, which displayed throughout a great amount of mental acumen and deep thought, by passing a high eulogium on "that excellent periodical, *The British Controversialist*." In referring to it he said, "I cannot allow this opportunity to pass away without bringing under your notice a most excellent periodical, specially designed for you, and conducted with great talent and ability. I refer to *The British Controversialist*. I would strongly advise every one now present (who may not be so already) to become at once a subscriber to that truly valuable production. As the cost is but trifling, I would have you purchase it from the commencement. The work needs no eulogium; it only requires to be seen to be appreciated. It is a library in itself; and its object, like our own, is mental and moral improvement. If you make such a work your study during the vacation months, I shall expect great things in the coming session."

The secretary then read an interesting report of the past year's proceedings, from which it appeared that during the session nine essays had been delivered by the members on the following subjects, namely:—1, "Perjury, morally and legally considered;" 2, "Patriotism;" 3, "Love;" 4, "Conscience;" 5, "Peace and War;" 6, "The Chemistry of Flowers;" 7, "Frivolous Amusements;" 8, "Time;" and 9, "Sociality."

The following important questions had also been discussed, viz.:—1, "Ought slavery to be instantly or gradually abolished?" 2, "Ought a member of parliament to vote according to his own opinion or to that of the majority of his constituency?" 3, "Whether is there more pleasure derived from the eye or the ear?" 4, "Whether is there more pleasure derived from the giving or receiving a benefit?" 5, "Was Wellington or Napoleon the greater man?" 6, "Ought dancing

to form a branch of education?" 7, "Is a nation better for having enemies?" 8, "Ought the franchise to be extended to £5 in the present session of parliament?" 9, "Whether has hope or fear the greater influence on the mind?" 10, "What ought to exalt a man most, the good qualities of the head or those of the heart?"

As stated in the report, the essays were all of a superior character, and showed that the various writers had given the subjects their careful consideration. The discussions were entered into with spirit, and were candidly and fairly conducted. During the evening various toasts were given by several of the members, each prefaced by a few appropriate remarks. These, interspersed with songs and recitations, kept up the hilarity of the evening till a late hour, when the company separated, well pleased with the manner in which the evening had been spent, and expressing their earnest wish for the future prosperity of the class.

It may also be stated, that arrangements have been made to enable the members to enjoy one or two pleasure excursions during the summer months, to keep up their interest in the class till the approach of winter, when it is confidently expected we shall be enabled to resume our meetings with a very considerable addition to our numbers.

Kirkintilloch Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The third social meeting of this society was held on the evening of Wednesday, the 11th of May, in the usual place of meeting, New Post Office.

At a quarter to seven o'clock the members and their friends sat down to tea. Afterwards the chairman, Mr. Robert Allan, jun., manufacturer, Kirkintilloch, amidst great applause, delivered a very excellent speech, in which he dwelt much upon the necessity of having fixed principles, and showed by means of examples, known to most present, the serious and dangerous consequences that were likely to result to young men from their going abroad into the world and into business with their minds wholly unsettled. He then called upon the secretary, Mr. J. Russell, to read a statement of the society's business. From this it appeared that the society had been in existence since the 5th of June last year; that during that time twenty-four original essays on various subjects had been read by members; that a great number of subjects had been debated, some of which, from the great interest they excited, had occupied the society during three nights; that members were gradually increasing in numbers; and that a library had been established, which had already risen to seventy volumes, besides the circulation amongst members of several periodicals and reviews, such as the "*British Controversialist*," "*Edinburgh Review*," "*Temperance Review*," &c. The report having been adopted, a vote of thanks was given to the retiring secretary. The treasurer, Mr. J. Allan, then read his report, which showed that the funds of the society were in a satisfactory condition; to whom also a vote of thanks was given.

The chairman then called upon each member present to speak, when several very able addresses were given on such subjects as the following, "The necessity of not living for nothing," by Mr. R. Scott; "A comparison between the cultivator of the ground and the cultivator of the mind," by Mr. D. Menzies; "The necessity of studying science in its moral as well as intellectual aspect," by Mr. D. Chapman. During the intervals

between the speeches the company was enlivened by songs and recitations, and refreshed by several courses of fruits and sweetmeats. Finally, a vote of thanks was given to the chairman for the able manner in which he had conducted the business of the meeting; and, after passing a very happy evening, the proceedings were closed at twelve o'clock by the members singing "Auld Lang Syne."

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

167. I wish to be informed whether a gentleman who desires to enter the ministry of the Church of England, can prepare for the same in King's College, (London)—the course of study pursued—the time requisite to be spent therein—the qualifications necessary for admission therein—and the expenses incurred for tuition, lodgings, &c.?—BYNUM.

168. Would any of your law friends be so kind as to answer the following queries? 1st. What is the corresponding term in English law to the Scotch "*Advocate*?" and 2nd. What are the necessary studies and general qualifications for admission to the Scotch bar?—with anything connected with these questions that is useful and interesting.—I am, &c. J. L.

169. BOMILCAR.—Required the literal signification of this name, which was borne by two celebrated Carthaginians and one Numidian? It is evidently a similar compound of the god Melcarth as the name Hamilcar, which is thus defined in *Dr. Smith's Classical Dictionary*, p. 253, 2nd ed.,—"The two last syllables of this name (*Hamilcar*) are the same as *Melcarth*, the tutelary deity of the Tyrians, called by the Greeks Hercules, and the name probably signifies 'the gift of Melcarth.'"—W. G. H.

170. Some months ago my attention was directed to a paragraph which appeared in some of the provincial newspapers, to the effect that a French engineer (if I mistake not) had declared that by means of a very simple experiment, he had succeeded in rendering visible the minute molecules of which the atmosphere is composed. The experiment is this:—Take a circular piece of card, about an inch in diameter, painted black, and perforated in the centre by a fine sewing-needle; and then, closing one eye, and holding the card at a convenient distance from the other, so as to enable the experimenter to look through the small hole into the atmosphere on the other side, he will observe, very distinctly, the minute corpuscles of air composing the "orb of atoms" by which the earth is surrounded. The paragraph just referred to stated that the alleged discovery had been referred to the investigation of one of the scientific societies of France; but not having heard the result, I should feel much obliged if one of your talented correspondents could furnish me with the required information; as, for my own part, having repeated the experiment, I very much doubt whether the molecules

thus observed are anything more than particles of dust floating in the atmosphere.—J. S.

171. I should also like to be informed if the "Pendulum experiment," which was so popular some time since, is based upon correct scientific principles? and if it is generally considered by the learned to afford an accurate illustration of the diurnal rotation of the earth?—J. S.

172. A friend of mine has lately informed me that he has established a geometrical demonstration, by which he is able to construct an ellipse by a geometrical continued motion. Am I correct in supposing that he is labouring under a mistake?—STANISLAUS.

173. Will some of your readers favour me with a fair and concise paraphrase of the following?—"So spake the prince of angels; to whom thus The adversary. Nor think thou with wind Of airy threats to awe whom yet with deeds Thou canst not. Hast thou turned the least of these

To flight, or if to fall, but that they rise Unvanquished, easier to transact with me That thou shouldst hope, imperious, and with threats,

To chase me hence? Err not, that so shall end The strife which thou call'st evil, but we style The strife of glory; which we mean to win, Or turn this heaven itself into the hell Thou fablest; here, however, to dwell free, If not to reign. Meanwhile, thy utmost force, And join him named Almighty to thy aid, I fly not, but have sought thee far and nigh."

Explain, also, the construction of the three first lines in the foregoing quotation.—STANISLAUS.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

140. *Logically True and Practically False.*—The instructions of "Homo" are sally called to account by your correspondent B. S. For my own part, I should have felt obliged to him if he had given us any assistance in our endeavours to solve the difficulty; but with all due deference to him as a man of superior learning to myself, I beg to state that he has made "confusion worse confounded." I still abide by my assertion, that "the logic by which 'Homo's' friend proves the 'monstrous absurdity' is founded upon the supposition that any given space can be divided into infinity, which is anything but logic." This can be plainly seen by consulting the statement as given by "Homo." After stating the method by which the hour hand still continues in advance

of the minute hand, he says, "and so we might go on for ever;" showing plainly that his idea was, that at *every step* there would still be a space between them over the twelfth part of which the hour hand would pass whilst the minute hand would pass over the whole, *and so on for ever*. If he had not an idea that space could be divided into infinity, how could he have said, "for ever?" Surely, *for ever* is equal to *infinity*! It is somewhat strange that B. S. should throw aside my statement, and then directly make the same in other words; thus,—that it is founded on the supposition "that a given space can be divided into an infinite number of infinitesimally small portions;" which B. S. says we "cannot deny." I, however, do deny it, and defy him to support it, either by reason or common sense. Here is about the same display of logic as is manifested by the original statement as given by "Homo's" friend; for, surely, if it can be divided into an *infinite number*, it can be divided into infinity? But these are unsound premises, and the inference drawn therefrom will prove unsound also. Look at the premises, "*infinite number*!" It is a manifest absurdity; one word annihilates the other. The infinite can have no finite predicate, and *vice versa*. Nor is the difficulty obviated by considering them to be "infinitesimally small portions," because an infinitesimal is something *infinitely small*, at which sound reason revolts. If we once admit the premises that a given space can be divided into "an infinite number of portions," and that the minute must have *time* and *space* in the same ratio, it follows as an unavoidable inference that the minute hand may travel on *for ever*, and will never be able to overtake the hour hand. (An *infinite number* of portions of time is *for ever*.) Thus the inference is false, which we all know, and the premises proved false also. Because it cannot be reduced to the form of a syllogism (by what I know of a syllogism I think, however, that it can), B. S. says, "at the very outset logic disowns and condemns it." I hold logic to be "the right use of our reason in search after truth." Thus it lays hold of everything, and either proves or disproves. If "school logic" requires so much indulgence, I am thankful that I was never "rolled in its dust."—A LABOURER.

If "Homo's" real object had been to amuse himself by throwing dust in the eyes of your correspondents, he would, methinks, have felt much gratified by his success, as he could not have read the replies to his query, without perceiving how beautifully most of his well meaning "instructors" have missed their way. Indeed the only reply which comes at all near the true point at issue, is that of your last correspondent, B. S.

Your first correspondent, E. S. J., begins correctly enough by saying, that "Homo" does *not* require proof that the two hands will come together, being satisfied that the swifter *will* overtake the slower. Yet he presently goes on to say, that the grand question is whether the hands *will* simultaneously attain a certain spot; and not content with thus losing sight of the question, he assumes this spot to be 1 o'clock, declaring the proof as positive as anything in geometry, that the hands will certainly meet there—an assertion which is palpably absurd.

Next comes "A Labourer," who, like the preceding correspondent, edifies "Homo" with sundry irrelevant remarks on logic in general, without

enlightening him at all as to the real nature of the fallacy in question.

H. J. R. also mistakes the question when he argues upon the mechanical properties of a clock. "Homo's" friend's argument is merely another form of the sophism of Zeno concerning Achilles and the tortoise; and H. J. R. might as well argue upon the "jumps" of Achilles, as upon the "jumps" of the minute hand. In either case, the simple consideration involved is, that of two unequal uniform motions, which may be assumed perfectly steady and continuous,—the question thus becoming abstract, without any essential alteration in the nature of the sophism.

From K. G.'s observations I understand him to say, that, setting aside certain mechanical considerations in the case proposed—such as "friction of machinery," "breadth of clock-hands," and "another circumstance or two,"—"the minute would never overtake the hour hand." K. G. here good naturedly concedes "Homo's" friend's position, and thus "ignores" the very fallacy which he ought to have pointed out.

J. B. rightly apprehends the question; but it may be doubted whether his attempt at syllogism will be accepted by "Homo's" friend as a fair representation of the argument.

B. S. clearly states the case in these words,—"*'Homo'* admits that the minute hand will overtake the hour hand, and wishes logic to be cleared of the imputation of proving the contrary." I think, however, that his explanation of the fallacy leaves room for a few further remarks, which I hope I may be permitted to make.

Let us now suppose it 1 o'clock, at which time the minute hand is exactly 5 minute spaces behind the hour hand. The question, as before observed, is not whether the minute hand *will* overtake the other; for this is a fact which "Homo's" friend himself admits, when he designates the contrary assertion a "monstrous absurdity," and selects it as the thing "practically false" to be established by his freak of logic. The point to be decided is, whether this "monstrous absurdity" does logically follow from the argument by which it is professed to be proved; and if not, wherein does the fallacy lie? The argument runs thus,—when the minute hand has travelled over the 5 minute spaces, the hour hand will have advanced $\frac{1}{12}$; while the minute hand travels over the $\frac{1}{12}$, the hour hand will advance $\frac{1}{144}$, &c. &c. "And so," says "Homo's" friend, "we might go on for ever, and still the minute hand would never overtake the hour hand." This reasoning has one merit at least, that we may assent to every part of it except the conclusion. It is quite true, that when the minute hand reaches 1, the hour hand will be $\frac{1}{12}$ in advance; that when the minute has gone over this, the hour hand will be $\frac{1}{144}$ in advance; and that this subdivision may be repeated as often as we please. Yet the conclusion by no means follows. The fallacy lies in reasoning upon the supposition that these successive diminutions of the original distance between the two hands require uniform times for their completion. Were this indeed the case, the inference would be true. If these successive diminutions (which are, in fact, merely subdivisions of the original distance) were each to occupy a definite uniform period of time, the repetition of such periods as often as there might be subdivision, namely, an infinite number of

times, would assuredly produce an infinity of time. It is here that "Homo's" friend outruns his data, as the following considerations will shew. First, the finite distance between the two hands, being equal to the sum of all its parts, necessarily comprehends the whole of those diminutory portions by which it is successively reduced, or, in other words, the whole of its subdivisions, which become infinite in number only by decreasing *ad infinitum*, or becoming infinitesimally small. Secondly, this finite distance and its subdivisions, being *measures of the times in which they are respectively performed*, occupy proportionally decreasing periods of time for their completion; from which it follows, that these periods, though infinite in number, like the spaces by which they are measured, are merely corresponding subdivisions of a finite period of time. "Homo" will thus perceive, that although it takes 5 minutes to diminish the original distance of 5 minute spaces to $\frac{1}{2}$, it does not require another 5 minutes to diminish this $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$, and another to reduce it again to $\frac{1}{8}$, &c. It is in the neglect of this simple fact that the fallacy consists. The supposition of uniform, or, at least, non-decreasing times for these successive diminutions, is precisely the data which is wanting in this redoubtable argument, and which is necessary to render its conclusion "logically true." At the same time it is evident that such data, if granted, would at once render the conclusion "practically" true—that is, true in point of fact; and hence, in either case, the hypothesis of its being "practically false" while "logically true," must fall to the ground.

I may be allowed to add, as some of your correspondents appear to think the point must be decided by formal logic, that I cannot agree with those who represent the argument as illogical merely on the ground of its being irreducible to syllogistic form. On the contrary, this spurious argument may be reduced to syllogism, and in this form its fallacy may be shown to consist in the false assumption above explained. The argument taken continuously forms a sorites: thus—

A is B.—The minute hand in endeavouring to overtake the other, has to perform an infinite number of successive journeys; viz., $5 \frac{1}{2}$, &c.

B is C.—The performance of an infinite number of successive journeys requires an infinite number of successive portions of time.

C is D.—An infinite number of successive portions of time (*supposing them non-decreasing, but not otherwise*) constitute a period of time which can never end.

A is D.—Therefore the minute hand in endeavouring to overtake the other requires a period of time which can never end.

From this we see, that while the conclusion is strictly legitimate as an *inference*, its *truth* fails by reason of the unsound predicate of the third proposition, which rests on suppositional data not granted in the question. Hence the conclusion is not "logically true;" for although logic insures syllogistic accuracy of inference, it nowhere declares that a conclusion thus obtained is true of itself, unless drawn from *certain* premises.

It only remains to obviate objection, by expanding the preceding sorites into two distinct syllogisms of the first figure: thus—

Major.—The performance of an infinite number

of successive journeys requires an infinite number of successive portions of time.

Minor.—The minute hand in endeavouring to overtake the hour hand, has to perform an infinite number of successive journeys.

Conclusion.—Therefore the minute hand in endeavouring, &c., requires an infinite number of successive portions of time.

Taking this conclusion as the minor premise of another syllogism, we have—

Major.—An infinite number of successive portions of time (*supposing them non-decreasing, but not otherwise*) constitute a period of time which can never end.

Minor.—The minute hand in endeavouring to overtake the hour hand requires an infinite number of successive portions of time.

Conclusion.—Therefore the minute hand in endeavouring, &c., requires a period of time which can never end.

The falsity of the conclusion is here again shown to be owing to the false predicate of the major premise.

With regard to the fact of the conjunction of the hands, as a subject of itself, I have here, of course, nothing to say; but it might be interesting to show, that the various arithmetical aspects under which it may be viewed, are strictly consistent with the preceding explanation.—ANTI-ZENO.—The discussion of this subject must now be brought to a close.—EDS.

142. *How to obtain Ease and Power in Debate.*—"Tantæ-ne animis cœlestibus iræ"?—or, has "Rolla" (like honest Dogberry) mistaken the "excommunication" of my person for the "examination" of my remarks?

"I am Sir Oracle,

And when I ope my lips, let no dog bark,"

seems to be the style in which *Rolla* views himself, as compared with those who may dispute his infallibility. This character is by no means suited to my own taste. I shall, therefore, neither brand his sentiments as being "common as street ballads among a despicable class," nor accuse him of "literary pride."* I leave "Timon" and those interested in the present topic to estimate the *controversial value* of the oft-repeated phrases, "height of dogmatism," "greatest assurance," &c., and to compare them with my own simple declaration that *Rolla* had fallen into "a grave error."

* In return, however, for "*Rolla's*" milder banter on my supposition that the compositor had possibly wronged him. I will ask who is answerable for the extraordinary apposition of "*synthetic* faculty on the one hand," and "*synthetical* faculty on the other"—(p. 233, bottom of col. 2)? One is reminded of Rip Van Winkle's perplexity,—"*I'm not myself—I'm somebody else,—that's me—no—that's somebody else got into my shoes.*" There is another remarkable passage, the glory of which certainly belongs solely to *Rolla*, viz.—where he tells us that "*either to confirm or explode a given theory, according to inductive philosophy, it is required that we examine the premises on which it stands, and first prove that they are erroneous!*" How proving the premises to be erroneous can *confirm* a theory, is certainly, as "*Rolla*" represents it, something "more than is dreamt of in my philosophy."

"Rolla's" remarks are so discursive that I think it necessary to state the origin and subject of the present discussion. If I mistake not, the practical answers to "Timon's" question are to be found in the remarks of "*Etna*," and in the last paragraph of my own reply. "Timon" complained of an "inability to reply to the arguments and objections brought forward in a debating society, in the specified time required." But "*Rolla*," passing by these points, read "Timon" a harsh lecture on his assumed "lack of logical continuity." In the first paragraph of my own remarks, I expressly left this delicate point to "Timon's" conscience, endorsing the truth of "*Rolla's*" practical advice in case the defect existed; and I then proceeded to oppose "*Rolla's*" theory, on the grounds that it was erroneous in itself, and at variance with his ultimate advice. The question, then, between "*Rolla*" and myself, was the relative value of analysis and synthesis.

"Rolla" declares that I have not attempted "to explode" his principles. Let the reader judge between us. I represent synthesis as "the highest power of the intellect;" while he terms analysis "the nobler" faculty. I trace the origin of analysis to the "feebleness" of man; while he declares synthesis to be "natural, easy, and pleasing to the mind." He claims the great reviews as analytical criticism: I claim them as synthetical "disquisitions."* It surely requires no Solon to perceive that the two lines of argument cannot co-exist; that *if one be true the other is false*. "*Rolla's*" remarks rest on "*Rolla's*" simple assertions, while my view of the relative value of analysis and synthesis is supported by a quotation from Whateley, and my observations on reviews are supported by examples; and yet "*Rolla*" represents my article as "point blank contradiction," and as "baseless as the fabric of a vision!" "*Rolla*" asserts that I "accidentally admit the premises of our (*Rolla's*) theory," and then strings together a series of contradictions as "the drift of" my "advice to 'Timon.'" This "accidental" admission I can nowhere discover in my remarks, and it certainly never existed in my thoughts. I appeal to any reader to say whether I ever allowed that "fiction, idealism, poetic flights, unconnected sentences, &c." were the results of the synthetic faculty; whether I ever represented synthesis as synonymous with mere "combing and producing."

There were two points in "*Rolla's*" original remarks which I did not controvert in *express words*; but as he complains that I did not sufficiently explode his premises, I will now attempt to do so. First then, I assert that "lack of ease and power" in oral debate (the only species to which "Timon" refers) does not necessarily arise from "defective mental tuition." In proof of this point, I will take two of those reviewers whom "*Rolla*" has chosen as representatives, *par excellence*, of the cultivated intellect of the present century:—John Foster, who could never succeed in the simplest departments of oral debate, and Sir J. Mackintosh, of whom Macaulay says, that

"Sir J. Mackintosh on his legs in the House of Commons was out of his proper element," "his speaking was a constant effort, a tug up hill." It would be easy to multiply instances. Secondly, I did not remark on "*Rolla's*" observations as to *fiction*, as I conceived that their one-sided character was sufficient to condemn them. The sweeping censure he has passed on fiction does him but little honour. Whatever be the precise value of *particular works*, fiction has its value. The exquisite and touching parables of the New Testament, and the almost divine productions of poetry, are not less fictional than the three-volumed works which encumber the shelves of our circulating libraries. The novel bears much the same relation to our own day that the drama did to the days of Elizabeth. Shakspeare and Scott belong to the same brotherhood, and their points of resemblance are neither few nor small. There are fictions which will as assuredly go down to posterity as those reviews which engross the whole of "*Rolla's*" sympathies. "*Rolla*" scorns the idea of Bacon being a novelist; does he know that Bacon embodied his gorgeous visions of his own philosophy and its results, in the shape of a fiction, in his "*New Atlantis*?" "*Rolla*" attributes the composition of novels to "the workings of the *synthetical faculty*;" but if I mistake not, this idea is based only on the confusion of the literal with the philosophical meaning of the term. *Analysis* gives the novelist a command over the "raw materials" of his art—the emotions and passions of man: the moment he commences his work he enters on a new sphere, and the words analysis and synthesis can no more be applied to the composition of a novel than to the painting of a portrait; both may (by a quibble) be termed synthetical, since they are, respectively, a *putting together* of sentences and of paint. A novel is an *analytical tableau* of the human passions and emotions, artistically arranged. The *synthetical faculty* is required by the novelist only in that *test of his powers*,—the construction of a *good plot*.

Rolla triumphantly inquires on what ground I declare Euclid's reasoning to be purely synthetical. I do so, because it exactly accords with the definition of synthesis, i. e. it "pursues a series of relations, commencing with what is given, and ending with what is sought." I admit that he who truly understands a given proposition in Euclid, and can see "through it from the beginning to the end," will also be able to see through it "back again from the end to the beginning." It is for *this reason* I say to "Timon" "Learn to synthesize—you may then analyze with safety." The reverse of this is not true: he who understands the *analytical* proof of an *absurd* demonstration is not thereby enabled to demonstrate the same proposition *synthetically*. "*Rolla*" has only illustrated the point for which I contend,—the superior value of synthesis. It is true that "Algebra and the Differential Calculus" are chiefly analytical; and who does not know that algebra could never explain the mystery of imaginary quantities (e. g. $\sqrt{-1}$) until geometry came to its aid? "*Rolla*" will, perhaps, bow to the opinions of Newton. "Newton used to speak with regret of his mistake, at the beginning of his mathematical studies, in having applied himself to the works of Des Cartes and other algebraical writers, before he had consi-

* "*Rolla*, instead of answering my remarks on reviews, has abused them. He will find an exact transcript of my sentiments in the first sixteen lines of page 80 of this magazine. Why, then, does he condescend to write in pages which give utterance to views 'common as street ballads?'"

dered the character of beauty with the manner they deserve. — (Pemberton's "View of Sir I. Newton's Discoveries.") Need I mention the inscription where Plato placed over the door of his house—"Whoso knows not geometry let him not enter here," or quote the opinions of Whewell, Hodgkin, Mill, Stewart, &c. &c. "Aristotle," in contradiction to my remarks, that "the main business of Dialectic is in purely analytic or synthetic, saying as a reason the undoubted truth that 'per se' is in the leading characteristics of all the attributes of Dialectic." How far the premises war with the conclusion may be seen by the definition, that "Analysis has its origin in the mere imperfection of our reason, and is only the art of the mind." — (Brown's "Philosophy of the Human Mind.")

What can be thought of a philosophical critic who tells us that Brown "enriched the European system of philosophy?" Surely the correct system of philosophy knows that *Dei* is not the author of Cartesian philosophy; flourished in years later than Brown; that when Brown died Descartes was a young man; "unknown or not to Fame." Spare beds are wanted. I have nothing to retract—nothing to amend—nothing in quality—or I would frankly and gladly do so. It is for the reader to say where there is error—where there is truth. Had "Aristotle" understood analysis for synthesis, and attempted to answer the plain and obvious remarks on analysis and synthesis quoted by me from Archbishop Whately instead of abusing and carping at my humble attempt to illustrate the same point, he would at least have shown better faith. Had he passed by my own remarks on Kant and on Descartes' metaphysics and overthrown the doctrine of the great logicians, I should have begun to doubt my own. As it is, I have to thank him for causing me to think more closely on the subject, to search for and to find the supporting testimony of Newton on one point, and of Dr. Brown on another. I now retire from the controversy and leave the opposite theories to the critical judgment of the readers of this magazine, only regretting that the darkness of that which I believe to be truth has not fallen into better hands. — D. B.

13th Solution of a Geographical Problem.—The mistake made by the travellers in our last paper in calling the same day by different names arises from their having perceived during their journey in calling different things by the same name.

Suppose yourself situated at Greenwich about noon on Tuesday at noon. Then Tuesday means the space of 24 hours 12 of which have just passed, and 12 are just commencing. The sun is on your meridian. In precisely 24 hours the sun will be again on your meridian, and in 24 minutes afterwards the sun will be on the meridian of the place at which the traveller will have arrived who was at Greenwich from seven with at noon on Tuesday. He will call the time he arrives there the noon of Wednesday at the same hour that on his meridian. But he is wrong (for the noon at Wednesday has passed) 12 months—, unless Wednesday is 12 months a different portion of time from what you at Greenwich call by that name. The next time the sun is on his meridian he will be further advanced in his journey,* and

will arrive, by the noon of Thursday, an instant 12 months after his noon of Tuesday at Greenwich.—And so on. The eastward traveller will make similar mistakes but will be too late with his noon. When the two meet, their mistakes will have each amounted to 12 hours, one in defect, the other in excess. A. B. asks what the intention of the plan will end the day on which they meet? To that I can only answer, that I do not know, and that if I did, it would probably be impossible for me to pronounce or write the answer. A. B. must mean, what is the right name of the day? The answer is,—only on a Saturday, for the travellers are supposed to be nearly 240 days in the journey, and they started on a Tuesday, but it would there be midnight.

It would clearly be inconvenient to make Greenwich time universal for reasons which I need not enumerate. Therefore I propose to answer the question—How shall days be named at different places so that the sun may be at the highest at the middle of the day, and so that neighbours may understand each other?

Let the instant between 12 p.m. Tuesday and 12 p.m. Wednesday at Greenwich, when the sun is on the meridian of that place, be called the noon of Wednesday at that place, and to distinguish the Wednesdays of different places the longitudes of the places should be added. Thus the 12 o'clock Tuesday must be called Tuesday (10 E.).

The following table will illustrate my meaning—

Greenwich	noon, Tuesday	9 p.m. Thursday
Calcutta	6 p.m. Tuesday	12 p.m. Thursday
New York	1 a.m. Tuesday	7 p.m. Thursday
St. Louis	10 p.m. Monday	12 p.m. Thursday
San Francisco	10 p.m. Monday	12 p.m. Thursday

The second and third columns show what noon of Tuesday and 9 p.m. Thursday, will be called at the places in the first column.

This plan would make it easy to determine the day and the hour at any place, when an longitude is known. For we need only add to or subtract from our own time an hour for every degree of east or west longitude respectively. In longitude 180 deg. (but not more) there would be two names for the same day, thus 3 p.m. Wednesday at Greenwich would be 1 a.m. Wednesday (180 W.), or 3 a.m. Thursday (180 E.), according to the rule. Fortunately for my plan, nobody lives on the line of that difficulty nor does it lie in a very gay neighbourhood. Of course it follows from this, that in crossing the meridian of 180 deg. long. from West to East we must add a day to the traveller's count, though the name of the day of his arrival from the meridian (180 W.) be Thursday (180 E.) and vice versa. — D. B.

14th The Nature of the Moon's Body.—If the sun were a body of fire, A. B. will perceive that the nearer he is situated to it the warmer he should become, and the further he went from it the colder he should get. Take for instance an ordinary fire, and set down a stick in front of it, and as close to it as you possibly can, and you feel the heat from it but gradually these your position back, and you gradually feel less and less of the influence of the fire. Now A. B. will perceive to

others to pass through the same longitude each day, this will make the number of miles travelled over in different days somewhat unequal.

* For convenience I suppose each of the two

transport this idea into "space," and imagine the sun to be a body of fire, and then answer the question, "Which part of our earth ought to be the warmest, the tops of the mountains or the plains beneath?" Why, according to this theory, it ought to be the mountain-tops; but so far from this being the case, very many of them are covered with a "winding-sheet" of "eternal snow." The plains are the warmest; they receive the most of the germinating influences of the sun; consequently, the sun cannot be a "body of fire." What, then, is the proper theory of heat? and to this question R. S. has himself furnished an answer; "the sensation of heat which is felt is produced by the action of the above atmosphere (sun's) upon the latent caloric of the bodies of animals." We think, also, that our atmosphere has something to do with the production of heat. The atmosphere, R. S. no doubt knows, decreases in density according to its distance from the earth; the highest part being the most rare, the lowest part, or the part next the earth, the most dense. On this ground then, we think, that the action of the sun's luminous atmosphere on the atmosphere of the earth increases or decreases, according to the density or rarity of the earth's atmosphere, because we find that where the atmosphere is rare, the heat is at its minimum; but where it is dense, the heat is at its maximum.

Again, most of the astronomers of the present day hold the theory of the "Nebular hypothesis."

This hypothesis (which was first introduced to the science of astronomy by the great Herschell, and was afterwards reduced to system by the equally great French astronomer, La Place) holds that all matter (that is, the sun, with all his planets and satellites, and all the stars that "inhabit our milky way," and all other parts of the universes, scattered through the "vast immensity of space") originally existed as a species of luminous nebulae, this nebulae had a motion similar to that which the earth has now, and the effect of that motion was to make the matter condense into its centre, but as the process of condensation was going on, luminous rings were occasionally detached from the rest, these luminous rings also maintaining the motion which the parent mass had, gradually condensed also; these luminous rings in course of time became planets, and the great central mass became a sun, thus forming a planetary system; and an immense number of these systems form the universe. R. S. will perceive by this theory what the nature of the sun is; he will perceive that it was not created posterior to the earth, nor yet anterior to it, but they were created simultaneously. For a fuller explanation of this theory, I would refer R. S. to "Mitchell's Planetary and Stellar Universe;" Collins' edition, price 2s. He will find "Hitchcock's Religion of Geology," also price 2s., to be an excellent expositor of the nature of the earth.—WALTER.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. VII., Vol. I.—What is it necessary that man should learn? By what has man purchased his superiority in physical science? Why do the laws and principles of the human mind exist? What is intuition? What is truth? What truths does intuition reveal? How does sensation operate? On what do we rely for the accuracy of sense-derived information? How do you prove that "the evidence of the senses" is worthy of dependence? How may the theory of "Necessary Truths" be made compatible with the sense-origin of knowledge? What is memory? How does it operate? What is analogy? Of what use is it in science? Define testimony, and mention in what it is useful. What are the principles on which we confide in testimony? What laws ought to regulate our belief in testimony? What

is probability, and by what law is reasoning from probability governed?

Protection.—Exercise No. VII., Vol. II.

Senior.—Imagination: its Nature and Office; its Dependence on Memory and Consciousness (see Rhetoric, "Imaginative Faculty," &c.; Alen-side's "Pleasures of Imagination;" Addison's "Essays," Spectator, Nos. 411—21; Brown; Stewart; Payne; Reid, Essay IV., &c.).

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XVI.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. VII., Vol. III. p. 316.

Senior Division.

Prepare a form like the one given, and arrange the irregular verbs in Exercise XVII., p. 196, and their inflexions under their proper heads.

VERBS.

IRREGULAR VERBS.

CLASS I.		CLASS II.		CLASS III.		
In which Present, Past, and Perfect Participle are alike.		In which Past and Perfect Participle are alike.		In which Present, Past, and Perfect Participle are different.		
		Present.	Past and Perfect Participle.	Present.	Past.	Perfect Participle.

MODEL EXERCISE No. IV.—*Vide* Vol. III. p. 199.

NOUNS.—1. GENDER.

Masculine.	Feminine.	Neuter.
George	Daughter	London
Author	Mistress	House
Poet	Spinster	Ink
Earl	Cow	Book
Father	Mother	Slate
Bull		Desk
Gander		Cupboard
Ram		
Horse		
Goose		
Cock		

2. Gender is the distinction of nouns answering to sex in persons or animals.

3. There are three methods adopted for the distinction of gender. 1. Different words; as, *boy*, *girl*; *horse*, *mare*. 2. Different prefixes; as, *man* servant, *maid* servant; *he* goat, *she* goat. 3. Different terminations; as, count, countess; mayor, mayoress.

4. Georgiana, Sultana, Czarina, Landgravine.

5. In figurative language we speak of the *sun* as *he*; the *moon*, the *earth*, a *ship*, the *church*, or a *country*, as *she*; and of a *little child*, or *small animal*, as *it*.

6. Friend, partner, bird, cat, sparrow, are nouns whose gender may be either masculine or feminine.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—IV.

Question 28. Here we have 250,000 sovereigns, and 500,000 half-sovereigns. Counted per day, $100 \times 8 \times 60 = 48000$.

$$\therefore \frac{250000 + 500000}{48000} = 15 \text{ days, 5 hours.} \text{—Ans.}$$

F. T.

Question 29. Interest of £500,000, at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., for 1 year,

$$= \frac{500000 \times 4\frac{1}{2}}{100} = £22,500$$

$$\therefore 15 \text{ years} = 22500 \times 15 = £337,500;$$

$$\text{and for 61 days, } \frac{22500 \times 61}{365} = £3,760 \text{ 5s. } 5\frac{1}{2}\text{d.}$$

$$\therefore \text{interest for 15 years, 61 days} = £337500 + £3,760 \text{ 5s. } 5\frac{1}{2}\text{d.} = £341,260 \text{ 5s. } 5\frac{1}{2}\text{d.}$$

W. C. D.

$$\text{Question 30. } \frac{62.5}{1728} = 0.03618 \text{ lbs.} \text{—Ans. R. M.}$$

Question 31. Let M = the amount of £1 at the end of 1,000 years. Then, according to the usual formulae, $M = P R^n = P(1+r)^n$.

$$\text{Here } P = 1 : r = .05 : n = 1000.$$

$$\therefore M = (1.05)^{1000}.$$

$$\therefore \text{the compound interest} = M - 1 = (1.05)^{1000} - 1.$$

J. B. M'C.

Question 32. Suppose S = the sum.

$$\text{Then } S = \frac{1}{12} + \frac{1}{12^2} + \frac{1}{12^3} + \dots \text{ (1)}$$

Multiply each side of the equation by 12, and we have $12S = 1 + \frac{1}{12} + \frac{1}{12^2} + \frac{1}{12^3} + \dots$ (2)

Subtract equation (1) from equation (2), and

$$11S = 1; \text{ wherefore, } S = \frac{1}{11}. \text{ SPES.}$$

Question 33. The general expression of the sum (S) of a geometrical progression, whose common ratio is r a proper fraction, is, $S = \frac{a - ar^n}{1 - r}$, (a)

representing the first term of the series, and (n) the number of the terms. Now, when n is indefinitely large, r (being a proper fraction) will become indefinitely small; and ar^n may be considered as nothing with respect to a in the numerator of the fraction $\frac{a - ar^n}{1 - r}$; and the expression

for the sum (S) will then become $S = \frac{a}{1 - r}$. In the question $a = 200$

$$r = \frac{1}{20}$$

$$\therefore S = \frac{200}{1 - \frac{1}{20}} = \frac{4000}{20 - 19} = 4000 \text{ feet.}$$

Question 34. $2.25^3 \times .5236 = 5.96413125$ feet = the solidity of the globe, and

$$\therefore 5.96413125 \times \frac{852}{16} = 317.5899890625 \text{ lbs.} \text{—Ans.}$$

SPES.

Question 35. The number of lbs. in one imperial gallon being 10, nearly, the number of gallons in 317.5899890625 lbs. will

$$\therefore = 31.75899890625, \text{ nearly.} \text{—Ans.}$$

SPES.

Second Solution.

317.5899890625 lbs. = 5081.439825 ounces, which at the rate of 1,000 ounces per foot,

$$= \frac{5081.439825}{1000} = 5.081439825 \text{ cubic feet;}$$

$$\text{or} = 8780.7280176 \text{ cubic inches;}$$

but there are 277.274 inches in a gallon,

$$\therefore \frac{8780.7280176}{277.274} = 31.668 \text{ gallons, the quantity displaced.}$$

J. S.

Question 36. Diameter of shot = .5 feet; content = $.5^3 \times .5236 = .06545$ feet. Now, according to the law of floating bodies, if a heavy body be weighed in water, the weight lost will be equal to the weight of water having the same bulk as the body; hence, on the weight of a cubic foot of the body weighed in water there will be the weight of a cubic foot of water lost; but the weight of a cubic foot of the body in question is 7.218 times heavier than a cubic foot of water, or a cubic foot of iron weighed in water = $7248 - 1000 = 6248$ oz. \therefore the weight required = $.06545 \times 6248 = 408.9313$ ounces.

$$\text{Question 37. } x^2 - xy = 84 \text{ (1)}$$

$$y^2 + xy = 176 \text{ (2)}$$

Substituting xy for x , we have $x^2 y^2 - x y^2 = 84$

$$\therefore y^2 = \frac{84}{x^2 - x} \text{ (3)}$$

$$y^2 + xy = 176 \therefore y^2 = \frac{176}{1 + x} \text{ (4)}$$

Substituting the values of y^2 in (3) and (4),

$$\frac{84}{x^2 - x} = \frac{176}{1 + x}, \text{ or } 44x^2 - 65x = 21$$

Solving this quadratic we find $x = \frac{7}{4}$ or $-\frac{3}{11}$; and 1.

substituting $\frac{7}{4}$ for x in equation (4), we find $y^2 = 54$

$$\therefore y = \pm 8$$

$$\text{But } x = xy = \frac{7}{4} \times \pm 8 = \pm 14. \text{—Ans.}$$

R. T.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—VI.

47. A debt of £1000 is to be discharged in five payments, viz., £200 in six months, £200 in eight months, £150 in ten months, £150 in eleven months, and the remainder in twelve months; the creditor, however, would prefer to receive it at one payment. At what time will it become due?

48. What is the present worth and discount of the above at 5 per cent. per annum?

49. What is the present worth of £60 yearly rent for seven years, allowing 6 per cent. per annum, compound interest, to the purchaser?

50. A can do a piece of work in 35 days, and, with the help of B, in 20 days. In what time will B do it by himself?

51. Reduce $\cdot 42871428714$, &c., to a vulgar fraction.

52. Standing at some distance from the foot of a hill, I took the elevation of a tower upon it,

$26^{\circ} 45'$: and, measuring on level ground 500 links towards the hill, I again took the elevation of the top and bottom of the tower, and found them to be $30^{\circ} 16'$ and $20^{\circ} 20'$. Required, the height of the tower.

53. A straight line, measured along the bank of a river, was 800 links, and at its extremities the angles contained by it and straight lines directed to a tree on an opposite bank were $60^{\circ} 35'$ and $70^{\circ} 18'$. What is the breadth of the river?

54. A horse is fastened upon a common with a tether 50 yards long. How much land will he be able to graze upon? And supposing that, after eating all the grass of this circle, the pin be removed to its circumference, how much ground will he be able to clear on removal?

55. Given $x + z = 2y$

$$x + y + z = 24$$

$$x^2 + y^2 + z^2 = 2304, \text{ to find } x, y \text{ and } z.$$

Notices of Books.

Religion and Education in Relation to the People.

By John Alfred Langford. London: John Chapman.

All thoughtful and earnest men must of necessity take deep interest in the movements and struggles of those who are striving to express the thought that seems at the heart of every true Englishman at the present day, whether in religion, education, or social reform. It matters not to what party we belong, our duty still remains the same—to watch with patience the unwearied exertions of the men who are at present striving to express the wants of the people at large; and, above all, to spare them the silly speeches which it is usual for people of vapid understandings to utter concerning them. That there should be much misunderstanding concerning present movements was to be expected; that *all* who talk of the matter are not willing to look its difficulties fairly in the face may also be conceived; and that charity should be at the heart of every man, though very desirable, is perhaps more than the most sanguine can hope. On the one hand, we hear the words “infidel, sceptic, unbeliever,” &c.; on the other, “bigot, fanatic, and impostor.” That men should stoop to such an undignified course is to be regretted; yet, leaving all these things to die of their own inanity, we turn to the more pleasant task of listening to those who are willing, without vituperation, to say what they believe—to give utterance to their hopes in a calm, dispassionate mood, not hoo-lwinking the truth even when it is unpleasant; “for in proportion to the importance of a discussion is the necessity for plain and honest speaking. If the welfare of a nation rests on the proper investigation of a subject, and the consequent practical results, silence is a moral cowardice, and fear a disgrace.” So far we think our author has given his reasons for appearing before the public. That he has spoken what many men think will readily be seen by those who may consider the book worthy of a perusal. The cause of religion and education will, assuredly, not suffer for its appearance; and we think many,

if not agreeing with the author, will thank him for having spoken out so plainly his own thoughts, as well as having brought into so small a compass the opinions of the different writers on the subjects here discussed.

As a specimen of the contents of the book, we beg to offer the following selections for the consideration of our thoughtful readers:—

“Believing firmly in the necessity of religion, and that man but half fulfils the purpose of his existence unless, after mature consideration of the evidence offered, and a full consciousness of his power to answer the great wants of the soul, he conscientiously and avowedly accept some form of faith, some solution of the great problem of being, its responsibilities and demands; it is of the most vital importance that we ascertain the nature of the faith which we accept.”

“For myself, it is absolutely necessary that I should answer the great and solemn problems of life and death, of time and eternity. Thus I would say that religion is a life, and not a dogma—a being, and not a theory.”

“What right have I to say to a man who differs from me, I tolerate you? Full recognition of his right so to differ, and not toleration of him under that difference, is the due of every man.”

“In a word, education is the preparing of man for all the relations of life, and the fulfilment of all the duties which he owes to society—the perfecting of the whole by the previous perfection of the individual.”

“Thus the condition of education in England—though exciting great attention, and calling forth the closest consideration and the most earnest advocacy of the most thoughtful of the community, and presenting more encouraging aspects to its friends than at any previous period in our history—is far from being in a satisfactory state; and the ignorance is deep, far-spread, and deplorable—at once a disgrace to our wealth, our usual practical character, and our national fame as a civilized and christian people.”

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XX.—FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION—*concluded.*

FIGURES OF IMAGINATION. *Species II.—Substitutive.*

It is very difficult, indeed, to demarcate clearly the several species and individuals which compose the usual catalogue of rhetorical tropes and figures; and this becomes especially difficult of attainment when but "thin partitions do the bounds divide." The substitutive figures do not express the real and intended idea at once and categorically, but are, in general, of an allusive character, and merely refer to it rather than give it complete and adequate expression. It will be perceived from this description, for it can hardly be called a definition, that metaphor and allegory might be, in a certain sense, included in this species; but as the idea of resemblance seemed to us to form their specific character, and their substitutive power to be more of an accidental property, we have placed them in that species which comprehends resemblant figures. In some of the members of the species of which we are now about to treat the idea of resemblance finds place also; but here the conditions are reversed, substitution being the specific property, and resemblance being merely an accidental peculiarity. The *rationale* of the substitutive figures may be found in many of the principles of the human mind. 1st. The mere allusion to a thing piques curiosity, and makes the mind more eager to follow out the thought. 2nd. Giving a clue to, or a hint of, a thought, and allowing the readers or hearers to show their acumen and discernment in discovering the *whole* meaning, flatters their vanity, and makes them invest the thought with greater importance than it would otherwise perhaps merit, or at least than it would, in all likelihood, receive. 3rd. Sometimes the mind cannot bear to talk coolly of things which affect it much, and hence it often substitutes a part of the thought only as allusive to the whole. 4th. Elliptical brevity occasionally commands us only to give such hints as shall suggest a given train of thought, but not exhaust it.

On these, amongst other grounds, we may maintain the perfect propriety and eligibility of the substitutive figures of speech; and brief characterization above given will, we hope, be found to contain all that is necessary to the comprehension of the use of these figures, except the subsequent definitions and examples of the individual members of this species, viz.:—

1. Metonymy substitutes the name of one object for that of another which is related to it, either by some degree of mutual dependence, or is otherwise naturally or accidentally connected with it, and capable of suggesting it; thus it uses, first, the cause for the effect, and *vice versâ*; secondly, the abstract for the concrete; thirdly, the form for the matter; fourthly, the instrument for the agent; fifthly, the container for the thing contained; sixthly, the sign for the thing signified; and, seventhly, the adjunct, or accessory, for the subject, or essential; as, 1st. "Every rood of ground maintained its man." 2nd. He

earned his bread by *the sweat of his brow*. 3rd. *Hope deferred* maketh the heart sick. 4th. *No coin* occupies my exchequer. 5th. He writes a beautiful *hand*. 6th. My *purse* is at your service. 7th.:—

“Lo, at the couch where infant *beauty* sleeps,
Her silent watch the mournful mother keeps.”

The following extract from Bryant's beautiful poem, “Thanatopsis,” will afford additional illustration:—

“So live, that when thy summons comes to join
The innumerable caravan that moves
To the *pale realms of shade*, where each shall take
His chamber in the *silent halls of Death*,
Thou go not like the quarry-slave, at night
Scourg'd to his dungeon; but, sustained and soothed
By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave
Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams.”

2. Synecdoche employs the whole for a part, and *vice versa*. There are, however, several sorts of wholes, and consequently several sorts of parts, viz.—1st, a formal whole, *i. e.*, the definition of a thing, or the indication of the genus and specific difference; 2nd, a physical whole, *i. e.*, the matter and form, or substance and essential properties, of objects; 3rd, an integral whole—that which consists of parts having a real existence in nature, when considered separately; 4th, a logical whole, *i. e.*, a genus including several species, or a species comprising several individuals: thus, when we say, “Intemperance destroys more than the *sword*,” we employ a part of an integral whole, if we employ “sword” as the representative of all warlike weapons; and when Pope says,

“Belinda smiled, and *all the world* was gay,”

he uses a term indicative of an integral whole to signify a part only. In “The Lord Chancellor has resigned *the seals*,” we employ a synecdoche—a physical whole—and express by the *formal signs* of office the matter, *i. e.*, the real duties implied by their possession.

“There leviathan—
Hugest of living creatures—on the deep,
Stretched like a promontory, sleeps or swims,
And seems a moving land; and at his gills
Draws in, and at his trunk spouts out—*a sea*.” Milton.

3. Antonomasia might almost be called a kind of synecdoche, for in it we employ an individual name as a cognomen for a whole class, or some remarkable circumstance connected with an individual for his name; *e. g.*, Thomson, in speaking of Bacon, says—

“In *one* rich soul
Plato, the *Stagyrite*, and Tully joined,”

where “Stagyrite” stands for Aristotle; and Byron, in the following line, employs the proper name, *Arion*, instead of *musician*:—

“Meantime some rude *Arion's* restless hand
Wakes the brisk harmony that sailors love.”

4. Metalepsis is a complication of figures of different kinds in one word or set of words.

It expresses not the very idea itself, but another, which either leads the mind forward to it as a consequent, or causes the mind to revert to it as an antecedent; *e. g.*, "He has forgotten me," intimates that he formerly *knew* me; and "England is in arms at the proposal," signifies that the people of England are dissatisfied with the proposal.

" He whose nod
Has tumbled feeble despots from their sway,
A moment pauseth ere he lifts the rod;
A little moment deigneth to delay;
Soon will his legions sweep through these his way;
The West must own the Scourger of the World."

5. Periphrasis, or circumlocution, is the expressing of an idea in more words than are necessary: thus, instead of saying, a man was twice married, we may express it as Turner, in his "History of the Anglo-Saxons," has done, *viz.*, "He was twice a candidate for that endearing felicity which the connubial union never fails to reciprocate between amiable hearts and well-instructed minds." Again:—"Open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my undefiled: for *my head is filled with dew, and my locks with the drops of the night.*"—*Song of Solomon*, v. 2.

Species III.—Amplificative.

The amplificative figures of speech result from several conditions of the mental faculties, *viz.*:—1st. Intellectual calculation. Important thoughts cannot receive due attention if expressed sententiously, and are passed through the mind as "rapid as the light." In order to attract attention and fittingly impress the intellect, such ideas must be frequently repeated, not in slightly-differing phraseology and with little change of manner, but in all the beauty which imagination, thought, and emotion can conjointly yield, when they

"Their magical variety diffuse."

By this union new forms of statement and illustration enter readily into the mind, and thus that felicitous pleasantness is communicated to style which causes the ideas to be received with ardour and remembered with delight. 2nd. Imaginative activity. When strongly prepossessed in favour of any particular range of thought, we cannot avoid looking upon it with complacency and pleasure; we love to look upon it in every varying phase, and gratify ourselves by adorning our thoughts with every grace compatible with their nature. 3rd. Emotional excitement. Affection delights to linger on pleasant thoughts, and intense anger or hate predisposes the mind to rattle the barb in the wound which it has made. From any one of these conditions, or all of them conjoined, amplification may result; and yet we consider that we have given the amplificative figures their proper place in our classification, inasmuch as the imagination furnishes the chief materials of which they are composed.

1. Anaphora extends a sentence by the repetition of the same word or words at the beginning of each of several clauses; *e. g.*:—

" And feel I, *Death!* no joy from thought of thee!
Death the great counsellor, who man inspires
With every nobler thought and fairer deed!
Death the deliverer, who rescues man!
Death the rewarder, who the rescued crowns!
Death that absolves my birth—a curse without it!

Rich *Death* that realizes all my cares,
 Toils, virtues, hopes—without it a chimera !
Death, of all pain the period." "Young's Night Thoughts," III.

2. Anadiplosis repeats at the commencement of a clause the word or phrase with which the preceding clause terminated; *e. g.*:—

" Hippomedon
 • • • • •
 Braced all his nerves, and every sinew strung,
 Then with a tempest's whirl and wary eye
 Pursued his cast, and hurl'd *the orb on high* ;
The orb on high, tenacious of its course,
 True to the mighty arm that gave it force,
 Far overleaps all bound, and joys to see
 Its ancient lord secure of victory."

Gray—"Translation from Statius."

3. Analepsis contains a grammatical redundancy; it is a means of recalling to recollection the construction of the prior portion of a sentence before proceeding to complete it: *e. g.*, Health, virtue, industry—these are the elements of happiness.

4. Apposition signifies the placing of an explaining or characterizing noun or phrase after a noun or phrase, when the explaining noun or phrase retains the same grammatical case as that which precedes it, and is not joined to the antecedent noun by a connecting word; *e. g.*, Music, poetry, painting, sculpture—the *æsthetic arts*—are the results of the conjoint operation of genius and industry.

5. Epanalepsis is the name given to the repetition of the same word at the end of a clause or sentence as that with which it begun; *e. g.*, *Sin* stains the soul; forsake ye, therefore, *sin*. Again:—*Ancestry* only ennobles the man who adds honour to his *ancestry*.

6. Epanaphora, or Symploce, is a figure in which several clauses or sentences have the same beginning and ending; *e. g.*, *Vice* may, for a moment, yield us *pleasure*; but *vice* will too surely ever afterwards destroy *pleasure*.

7. Epiphora is when several clauses or sentences have the same word or phrase for their terminations; *e. g.*, We must all encounter *death*; we need not all fear *death*; some of us may be made happy by *death*; but how many will be led into the depths of misery by *death*?

8. Climax is the gradual progression of the utterance of thought in intensity and force. One remark is made, another and another follow in succession, each more and more exactly approximating to the proper expression of the idea with which the mind is filled, and for which it can scarcely find adequate utterance.*

" But 'midst the crowd, the hum, the shock of men,
 To hear, to see, to feel, and to possess,
 And roam along, the world's tired denizen,
 With none who bless us, none whom we can bless;
 Minions of splendour shrinking from distress !
 None that, with kindred consciousness endued,
 If we were not, would seem to smile the less
 Of all that flatter'd, follow'd, sought, or sued;
 This is to be alone; *this, this is solitude.*" Byron.

* See a beautiful example of climax in the oration of Maro Antony, already referred to.

Again, from the same author we select the following example:—

“Look on its broken arch, its ruin'd wall,
Its chambers desolate, and portals foul :
Yes, this was once Ambition's airy hall,
The dome of Thought, the palace of the Soul.
Behold, through each lack-lustre, eyeless hole,
The gay recess of Wisdom and of Wit
And Passion's host, that never brook'd control :
Can *all* saint, sage, or sophist ever writ,
People this lonely tower, this tenement refit ? ”

9. Anticlimax is the opposite or reverse of the preceding figure; it is chiefly employed in depreciation, and descends from the less to the more minute or particular; *e. g.*, Pope's characterization of Lord Bacon—

“The greatest, wisest, *meanest* of mankind ;”

and Goldsmith's etching of Burke—

“Who, born for the universe, *narrowed his mind*,
And to party gave up what was meant for mankind.”

The “Letters of Junius” abound in instances of this figure.

10. Exergasia employs different phrases of the same meaning successively; *e. g.*, Who is to blame for this vile act?—against whom should the charge be brought?—whom should we accuse of having committed it?

11. Euphemismus is a delicate way of saying what might otherwise offend, and is employed to conceal the precise meaning when anything disagreeable requires to be spoken of; *e. g.*, a face bloated by intemperance is thus delicately hinted at by Akenside:—

“I see Anacreon laugh and sing ;
His silver tresses breathe perfume ;
His cheeks display a second spring
Of roses taught by wine to bloom.”

12. Pleonasm employs superfluous words, *i. e.*, words whose signification is implied in what has been or is to be said, to indicate strong and intense feeling; but it ought only to be used when the mind is desirous of placing excessive emphasis on the idea; *e. g.*:—

“*False* traitor, *avaunt* ! I have marshalled my clan.”

13. Polysyndeton, by an emphatic redundancy of connecting particles, detains the attention, in order that it may more clearly perceive all that is included in the sentence, and thus, as it were, calls upon the mind to “pause and be enlightened;” *e. g.*:—

“Thou kingly spirit throned among the hills,
Thou dread ambassador from earth to heaven,
Great Hierarch ! tell thou the silent sky,
And tell the stars, and tell yon rising sun,
Earth, with her ten thousand voices, praises God.” Coleridge.

14. Synonymy uses several different words in nearly the same meaning; *e. g.*:—“*Falstaff*. Away ! you *starveling*, you *eel-skin*, you *dried neat's tongue*, you *stockfish* ! Oh, for a *breath* to utter what is like thee ! You *tailor's yard*, you *sheath*, you *bow-case* !”

CLASS III.—FIGURES OF EMOTION.

"The emotional nature of man" has, on a previous occasion, received a considerable share of our attention. To our remarks on that subject we refer our readers now, as we intend to restrict our present observation on that class of "figures of speech" which seem to us to be the especial exponents of the emotions to a very few words. There is "a power and magic" in the emotional nature of man which powerfully excites the intellective and imaginative faculties, and induces intense energy of action in the mind. The power which they exert upon the will, too, is remarkably great, and hence a knowledge of the method by which the due regulation and management of man's emotional nature may be promoted is of the highest importance to every one, whether writer or reader. It is not our province, as we have already remarked, in the present series of papers, to ventilate that question, important as it is. We may, however, return to it again. We shall, as we have said, now confine our attention to the definition and exemplification of the "Figures of Emotion."

1. *Erotesis*, or *Interrogation*, is a rhetorical form of expression in which, while we only appear to be asking a question, we are, in reality, making an assertion, which receives additional weight from the fact that we ourselves firmly believe the categorical proposition *implied* in the interrogation. It inquires *semblably*, while truly it affirms strongly; *e. g.*:—

"Tyrants! in vain ye trace the wizard ring;
In vain ye limit mind's unwearied spring;
*What! can ye lull the winged winds asleep—
Arrest the rolling world, or chain the deep?*
No! the wild wave condemns your sceptred hand;—
It rolled not back when Canute gave command." *Campbell.*

2. *Ecphonesis*, or *Exclamation*, employs an interjectional abruptness of form, instead of a logical structure of sentence, to indicate that the contemplation of the ideas *implied* is fitted to excite the emotional nature; *e. g.*:—

"Awake ye from the dream
That earth was made for kings—mankind for slaughter—
Woman for lust—the People for the Palace!
Dark warnings have gone forth. * *
* * * The Present cries aloud—
A prophet to the Future—Wake! Beware!" *Bulwer.*

3. *Dissideration*, properly speaking, includes all possible forms of expressing hope, expectation, wish, desire, &c.; but is here specially employed to denote the use of what is usually called the imperative mood. It is clearly and indisputably an indicative and infinitive, constituting one sentence, which, under the impulse of emotion, we abridge to the utmost; *e. g.*, instead of saying, "I earnestly request you to take your leave," we say, "Leave me!" and the manner of utterance performs the rest.

4. *Irony* is more strictly an elocutional figure; at least, the whole *sting* of the sentence results from the intonation. The words themselves appear perfectly harmless until, by intonation, we are led to "see the arrow coming out" of them; *e. g.*, Job xii. 2, "No doubt but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die with you!"

5. *Sarcasm* is the result of intense hate, the verbal expression of which is softened by

the refining restraints of modern society;—a sentence which implies a gibe, a taunt, a mockery, or a defiance, carefully, guardedly, and wilyly expressed, so as not violently to outrage “the proprieties.” A specimen, too long for extract here, will be found in Byron’s “Childe Harold,” Canto IV., xxxiii.—xli. We must be sparing in quotation, and therefore select the following sarcastic saying, which we have heard attributed to Archbishop Whately, viz., while a friend and he were conversing regarding certain Irish orators, the former remarked, “They have a great command of language.” “You mistake, sir,” replied the archbishop; “language has a great command of them.”

6. Mimesis is a sarcasm embodied in mimicry. See “Rejected Addresses,” *passim*; *Mercutio*’s early conversations, in “Romeo and Juliet;” and *Hotspur*’s description of a fop, in “Henry IV.,” for illustrations.

7. Litotes, or Extenuation, comprises all those little elegancies of talk by which we endeavour to lessen the apparent expressiveness of our ideas; *e. g.*, when, instead of saying, “I accept your kind offer,” we use the words, “I do not reject your kindness,” we employ this figure. Dekker’s periphrasis for “Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ” is an excellent example of Litotes:—

“The best of men
That ere wore earth about him was a sufferer;
A soft, meek, patient, humble, tranquil spirit,
The first true gentleman that ever breathed.”

8. Auxesis is intentional exaggeration, very nearly bordering upon, if not altogether lying within, the province of falsehood. It is a rather frequent and favourite figure in our courts of law; and is pretty plenteously employed by strongly-biassed party politicians; and not unrarely, we fear, even among violently religious sectaries. “The Three Black Crows” is a satirical *exposé* of the readiness with which this figure is employed, even in private life. If any one of our readers is acquainted with any gossiping scandal-monger, let him only listen to him (or her?) for ten minutes, and he will find a greater number of instances than we could find convenience for printing. In a few words, it may be defined as Hyperbole without due moral restraint. We can only give the following example, also from Dekker:—

“Trust not a woman when she cries,
For she’ll pump water from her eyes
With a wet finger—ay! in faster showers
Than April when he rains down flowers.”

9. Tapinosis is the reverse of Auxesis, viz., an undue attempt at extenuation. Our self-love very frequently leads us to make use of this figure when engaged in self-examination, or on being called to account for our faults. In Coleridge’s “Remorse” we find the following example in the speech of *Ordonio*, when endeavouring to calm his conscience regarding the crime of fratricide:—

“What, if one reptile sting another reptile,
Where is the crime? The goodly face of Nature
Hath one disfiguring stain the less upon it.
Are we not *all* predestined Transiency
And cold Dishonour? Grant it that this hand
Had given a morsel to the hungry worms

Somewhat too early. Where is the crime of this?
That this must needs bring on the illiocy
Of moist-eyed Penitence?"

10. *Prolepsis* is the *anticipation* and answering of objections before they have been formally promulged by those who hold opposing opinions. It is frequently useful as indicative of a wide and impartial intellect looking upon a question from all points of view; it is, however, occasionally employed deceptively, in order to gain an apparent triumph, by taking into our own hand the statement of an objection rather than leaving it in the hands of the other party: this permits the introduction of *Tapinosis*, or the softening down of these objections. In all debate this figure is much employed.

11. *Synchoresis*, or *Concession*, is the apparent yielding up of an unimportant point only to entrench ourselves the more strongly in the opinion of our hearers or readers, by impressing them with an idea of our strict impartiality. This also finds illustration in ordinary discussions and law pleadings.

12. *Anacœnosis* is a figure by which a speaker or writer places himself in direct communication with those whom he addresses, in order that he may appeal to them regarding the truth or accuracy of his opinions, or ask them the state of their feelings on the topic of discourse. This recognition of the parties addressed as equals frequently leads to the admission of fallacies; for they, flattered by the seeming condescension, are often too ready to admit all that the speaker or writer says as true. See an excellent illustration of this figure in "*Henry IV.*," act v. scene 2.

13. *Aporia* is the simulation of a doubt only that interest may be excited, and the import of the few hints given heightened. It may occasionally be made exceedingly useful, and may be honestly enough employed by an honest man.

14. *Epanorthosis* expresses an idea in a weaker form, then hesitatingly seeks to amend the words employed, and substitutes stronger expressions than had been formerly used, or ingeniously revokes a slightly unfavourable view in order to supply an opportunity for the direct utterance of a more violently-passionate expression of thought.

CLASS IV.—EPITHETIC FIGURES.

To classify aright a great number of widely-divergent things is always a difficult task, and we do not hesitate to admit that, although at one period we presumed we had obtained a glimpse of a preferable arrangement, we have been unable to satisfy ourselves regarding its correctness, and hence have been compelled slightly to alter our intended classification of the "*Figures of Speech.*"

The general characteristic of the class of figures now under consideration is, that they employ single words peculiarly, as will be seen on a leisurely and thoughtful consideration of the subjoined definitions and examples, viz.:—

1. *Onomatopœia* is the manufacture of new words, which place the intended idea more vividly before the mind in consequence of an analogy, real or imaginary, between the sound and the sense; e. g., Rat-a-tat, ding-dong, slap-dash, &c.

2. *Antiphrasis* is the use of words in a sense opposed to their ordinary signification, as when Wordsworth says, "*Thou, Vengeance, art God's daughter,*" where he means "*just retribution.*"

3. *Polyptoton* introduces the same word, in different numbers, genders, or cases, into the same sentence; e. g.:—

"Troop after troop are disappearing;
Troop after troop their banners rearing
Upon the eastern bank you see." *Scott.*

4. Ploce uses a proper name, firstly as the name of an individual; and, secondly, as indicative of the qualities of that person; *e. g.*, "Howard will always be remembered as Howard."

5. Oxymoron is the saying of that which at a first look appears foolish—that which is wise while it *seems* foolish; *e. g.*, "That was *cruel kindness*." "Home is home."

"Withal she laughed, and she blushed withal:
That blushing to her laughter gave more grace,
And laughter to her blushing." *Spenser.*

6. Enallage is the use of one part of speech for another; *e. g.*:—

"They fall *successive*, and *successive* rise."

We have thus, hurriedly and imperfectly, considered in succession the various figures of speech enumerated by rhetoricians. Had we been entirely guided by our own opinions, we should certainly have been more likely to have treated the matter much more curtly, and have given more attention to the *rationalia* of figurative expression, than to the lexicography of such a multitude of terms; we have, however, chosen to combine these two methods of treatment in as equal proportions as possible, in order that our readers might not only understand the reasons why figures of speech are used, but also that they may be able, in reading the elder rhetoricians, to understand the phraseology of which they make use.

Our next paper will treat of "Wit and Humour."

Religion.

IS THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS A PRACTICE IN HARMONY WITH THE SCRIPTURES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN entering upon the discussion of any subject our object should be, not to triumph over our opponents, but the far more noble one of aiding the cause of truth by refuting their arguments by a plain and simple style of reasoning. Some Christians affirm that these *slight differences* of opinion, as they call them, respecting baptism, &c., are of so little importance, that the wiser course is to "let people enjoy their own opinions, and not waste time in controversy." With this we cannot agree. Whatever is not truth is error; and Christians ought to seek its overthrow, and aid truth in her endeavours to obtain universal dominion. "Truth is our

element of life." Shall we not strive to imbibe it unmixed with aught which may weaken its power? "God offers to every mind its choice between truth and repose. Take which you please; you can never have both." Shall we choose the latter; and, accepting the first creed which is presented to us, sit idly down well satisfied with our attainments, and caring not to search for ourselves whether that which we believe is true or false? Such conduct is most ignoble and ungodlike. Rather let us inquire as to the truth of every doctrine which presents itself for our acceptance, and when we are fully satisfied, lend our assistance, feeble though it

be, for the enlightenment of our fellow-man. This being our opinion, and as we are fully satisfied in our own mind that infant baptism is unscriptural, we have taken up our pen to show our reasons for rejecting it. To do this we do not feel it needful to bring forward the opinions of great and good men, or to appeal to the writings of the Fathers as authorities. These demand not our notice, the question before us being, "Is the baptism of infants a practice in accordance with scripture?" Taking, therefore, the New Testament for our guide, we open it, and have only to turn over a page or two to find the first notice of baptism, as practised by the forerunner of the Messiah:—"John did baptize in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins. Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, and were baptized of him in Jordan." Now, say some, if all went, children must be included. Do our friends intend to assert that *every inhabitant* of Jerusalem, Judea, and the country lying around the river Jordan, went out and were baptized of John? If this were the case, of course children must be included. But surely they will not make such an assertion; and if not, this argument fails them. We read that those who came were baptized, "confessing their sins." We may ask here, allowing that infants were present, what sins had they to repent of, or what power to confess them? We imagine this difficulty was perceived by those who appointed sponsors to confess for infants! As we proceed we come to a passage which is often quoted by Paedobaptists in support of their theory, Matt. xix. 13—15. To us it affords a proof against the supposition that children were brought to Christ for baptism; for, if it had been his practice to baptize infants, why did the disciples rebuke those that brought them? "He put his hands upon them, and blessed them." This he could do without baptizing them, therefore we have no proof here that infants were baptized.

"The Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John, though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples." This passage implies that great multitudes came both to Jesus and John for baptism, but affords no proof that any were infants. "Jesus made and baptized more

disciples than John, though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples." The disciples, then, of Jesus baptized *disciples* only. Can we make infants disciples? Surely not.

Jesus, previous to his ascension, enjoined his apostles to preach and baptize. Taking this commission as recorded by Matthew and Mark, we shall perceive that none are by it commanded to be baptized but disciples or believers: it cannot be supposed to include others. Are infants capable of believing? But, say some, you will not assert that: because an infant is incapable of believing he will not be saved? If, then, infants can be saved without believing, may they not be baptized? That the sacrifice of Jesus is available for those who die in infancy we firmly believe, though we profess not to know the means by which God receives them. They are saved through the death of Christ, but not by faith in the gospel; that only benefits those who hear and believe it. Neither have the ordinances of the gospel to do with any but those who are capable of understanding and fulfilling them. This commission, therefore, cannot apply to those who are not able either to understand or to believe. As none who have heard and understood the gospel can be saved without believing it, so none can be baptized with *gospel* baptism but such as believe the gospel.

As we proceed we come to the preaching of Peter. When many asked, being pricked in their hearts, what they should do, Peter said, "Repent, and be baptized for the remission of sins." We find that three thousand were added unto the church, but we know that none of these were infants, for the narrative plainly says of those who were baptized that they "gladly received the word." Some lay a stress upon the words, "For the promise is unto you, and to your children." But how few of those who refer to this promise of the Holy Spirit in support of their view are bold enough to affirm that children do actually receive the Holy Spirit upon baptism? The majority know too well that such an assertion would be most absurd, as there is abundant proof that baptism makes not the children submitted to it a whit more holy than others. Is the meaning of this promise difficult to be understood? Can language be plainer? Upon your repentance and baptism ye shall receive the

Holy Ghost. This promise is unto you and your children, and to all that are afar off. It is not, Upon your repentance your children shall receive the Holy Ghost. No; they must likewise repent, and those who are afar off; then shall the promise be fulfilled in them.

We now come to the preaching of Philip, and learn that he baptized both men and women, Acts viii. (notice, children are not mentioned), and they "believed" *first* the things which were preached "concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ." The baptism of the eunuch was performed on the same ground. From Paul's account of his own baptism we learn that it was significant of a washing away of sin. Next we have Peter's visit to Cornelius. There we learn that the Holy Ghost fell on all those who *heard* the word; and Peter asked, "Can any man forbid water, that these should not be baptized, who have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?" Here, again, there is no mention of infants. Those whom he wished to baptize were those who had received the Holy Ghost. We now read of "households" to which our opponents refer as unanswerable evidence on their side. If they were able to prove to us that the households which are recorded as being baptized contained infants, we would at once acknowledge ourselves convinced of the truth of their view. We know not that Lydia was a married woman. It is quite possible she was not. Her household might consist of servants; or, allowing she had children, might they not be of an age to understand and believe the gospel? As it regards the households of the gaoler and Stephanus, we have evidence that either there were no infants belonging to them, or that they were taken no account of by the historian; for we read that, after "the gaoler and *all his*" were baptized, he "*rejoiced, believing in God with all his house*;" and of the household of Stephanus, that "they addicted themselves unto the ministry of the saints," 1 Cor. xvi. 15. It is evident, then, that if these were baptized households, they were also believing households. In Rom. vi. baptism is explained as a being buried into the death of Christ, that those who by this symbol put off the dead body of sin might arise to newness of life. 1 Cor. xii. 13 shows us that Christ and his members are one body, and that the

disciples of Christ are baptized into that body, having previously "been all made to drink into one spirit." In Eph. v. 26, we read that Christ sanctifies and cleanses his church "with the washing of water by the word." Now, the washing by water is but the figure of that purification which the word has already accomplished. How, then, can we include infants? That which they have not heard cannot have sanctified them; therefore, to make use of the symbol would be out of place. Peter, in his first Epistle, iii. 21, speaks of those who are baptized as having a good conscience towards God. This language cannot apply to infants.

Before we conclude, we will briefly notice an argument which is often brought forward by Pædobaptists in support of their view, viz., that baptism was instituted in the stead of circumcision; and they plead that, as children were circumcised, they ought also to be baptized; further, that by refusing them this ordinance, we make the privileges of the Jewish dispensation greater than those of the Christian. In combating this argument, let us take a glance at the object of circumcision. We read that God made a covenant with Abraham. He promised him, first, a numerous posterity; secondly, to be a God to him, and to his seed after him; thirdly, he would give him the land of Canaan for an inheritance. The rite of circumcision was the sign or seal of this covenant. It was a seal of both temporal and spiritual benefits, not to each distinct individual who submitted to it, but to the seed of Abraham as a nation. Spiritually, it was emblematical of a putting off the sins of the flesh. In Col. ii. we learn, that when the circumcision of the law was abolished, there came in its stead "the circumcision made without hands"—the circumcision of the heart. The reality came in place of the type. The object of circumcision was to seal the covenant which God made with Abraham; a sign that his posterity were set apart as a peculiar nation—the chosen people of God—the type of the kingdom of Christ. We hear it asserted, that as circumcision was the sign of the Abrahamic covenant, so baptism is the seal of the new covenant. We cannot find a single text in the scriptures which bears such a meaning. The seal of the new covenant is "the Holy Spirit of promise," "which is the earnest of our in-

heritance," Eph. i. 13; iv. 30. That baptism did not come in the room of circumcision is evident from the fact that the former was practised by the Jews, on the reception of converts to their faith, previous to the christian dispensation. John came, bearing witness of the coming of the Christ, and preaching the baptism of repentance; he found this an established rite, adopted it, and, upon the confession of sin, baptized his converts, or disciples. Jesus appeared, gave his sanction to it by submitting unto it himself, and then laid his command upon all who believed in him to follow his example. Circumcision was a symbol of a reception into the Jewish nation, which was obtained by birth; baptism, of a reception into the christian church, which is obtained by faith. Circumcision was enjoined to be attended to by the Jews, upon the penalty of those who neglected it being cut off from their people. It marked them as a nation set apart for a peculiar purpose. Children who were Jews by birth were, therefore, circumcised. But Christianity is not a matter of natural birth, but of belief, or spiritual birth; the command, in consequence, extends not to infants; it applies only to those who have experienced the second birth, the regeneration of the spirit. One was a rite enjoined upon a nation as such; the other upon individuals, who separately, by their own free will, take upon them the name of Christ, and become members of his kingdom. Now, by refusing baptism to in-

fants, how do we make the privileges of the christian church less than those of the Jewish? As we have previously remarked, the rite of circumcision, after Abraham, had no particular personal application. It pointed out the Jewish nation as the chosen people of God, from whom should arise the Saviour, in whom all the nations of the earth should be blessed. It did not make the Jewish children heirs either of Canaan or heaven; it was merely the seal God had set upon his covenant—the part they were to fulfil. The female children profited by this covenant equally with the male, and yet they were not circumcised. Paul speaks of it as the *yoke of bondage*, from which Christ set them free, and says that neither circumcision nor uncircumcision availeth anything, but only *faith*, which worketh by love. Will not this as truly apply to baptism? *Prove* to us what benefit it confers upon the children, and we will yield. Those who submit to this rite do it not from expectation of its bestowing upon them any advantage, but as a token that they lay aside their sins, and, by obeying this command of Christ, shew that they are no longer of the world, but are new creatures in him.

Space forbids our saying more. In our opinion, the words of scripture are sufficient, without note or comment, to prove to an unbiassed mind that the baptism of infants is a practice not in accordance with scripture.

ANNETTE.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THERE is scarcely any question which has caused so much unseemly strife in the church of God as baptism. Not only has it rent the unity of the Church Universal, but it has even raised intestine feuds in its various sections. Rome herself is not unanimous; the English church is imperilled to the utmost, and its ecclesiastical head at this moment stands virtually excommunicated by a suffragan bishop, on the question of baptismal regeneration; the Pædobaptist Dissenters are divided in practice and opinion, some administering the ordinance to all infants, while others restrict it to the children of believers; and the Baptist community itself is divided (into "Particular" and "General") on a subsidiary point. In entering, therefore, on one part of this fierce

contest, we feel bound to express our sincere admiration of the tone of christian charity pervading the articles which have already appeared. It is, perhaps, more difficult to avoid all acrimony of speech and temper in religious controversy than in any other province of debate, politics alone excepted; yet there certainly can be no place so unsuitable for the exhibition of such feelings, and we hail their absence on this occasion, not only as a present good, but also as a hopeful pledge that the future result of our friendly conference will issue in permanent advantage to the cause of religious truth.

Before proceeding further, it will be well to define our position and the scope of our inquiry, in order to guard against any misapprehensions. The question at the head of

these pages, as argued by my predecessors, contains an assumption which is denied by one sect of professing Christians, viz., that baptism *per se* is "in harmony with the scriptures." To notice this point is not less an act of *policy* than of justice to our Quaker brethren; they have the rightful possession of the field, and we can only plead the want of space, and throw ourselves on their *indulgence*. We shall, therefore, treat the question solely as between the Pædobaptist and the Anti-Pædobaptist; and in so doing we shall, as far as possible, avoid touching on any of the other phases of the baptismal controversy, though we shall not refrain from indicating our own views on such points where they are available in support of our argument.

I. The origin of baptism, and the prevalence and "essential idea" or intention of Jewish proselyte-baptism, as "figuring to the candidate his past impurity, his present separation and death to idolatry, his preparation for, and adoption of" the true religion, are clearly and succinctly stated by "L'Ouvrier" (p. 249, col. 1). But while we adopt, with sincere pleasure, his remarks as far as they extend, we must add a most important fact. The Targums, and other writings of the Jewish rabbis, expressly state that *when a proselyte thus entered the Jewish church by baptism and circumcision, his infant children, if males, were baptized and circumcised, and if females, were baptized*. The declarations of Maimonides, Mishna, and other writers to this effect are so direct and unequivocal, that we deeply regret that "L'Ouvrier" should have overlooked them, and thus laid himself open to a charge of *suppressio veri*, in a case where the suppressed truth tells so directly against his own cause. We would fain believe that the omission was merely the result of inadvertence, and hope that in a future stage of the debate our friend will clear himself from the doubt.

The idea that the appearance of Christ would be signalized by a general baptizing or symbolic purifying of their nation, seems to have been widely spread among the Jews at the time of our Saviour's birth. Hence, when John the Baptist commenced his mission, the Jews sent "priests and Levites from Jerusalem" to inquire, "Who art thou?" and when John confessed that he was neither

the Messiah, nor any of those whom the Jews supposed to be the precursors of the Messiah, they immediately questioned him further, "Why baptizest thou, then?" In reply to this question, John declared the approach of Christ, and preached repentance and baptism. Now, whom would the Jews expect to be the subjects of this baptism? With the example of circumcision, and the custom of baptizing the Gentile proselyte and his children, they would naturally suppose that no individual would be excluded—that the rite would be administered, without any exception, to *all*. The idea that their children were to be excluded from this general purification could scarcely have suggested itself to a Jewish mind; those who were ever exclaiming, "We be Abraham's seed," and trusting in the blessings promised to him without any regard (in most cases) to personal holiness, would have shrunk with horror at the thought of cutting off the precious entail by refusing the ceremonial rite to their infants. This peculiar feature of Jewish character appears in every page of the Testament. Jesus himself was carried up to the temple when an unconscious infant; and in later life, under the idea that he was a prophet, little children were brought to receive his blessing. On these considerations, then, we cannot doubt that the Jews who flocked to the banks of Jordan would bring their children to be baptized (purified) with themselves, and that had John refused to baptize these little ones, we should have had evidence of the fact by the discussion it would have caused. Now let us test our supposition by the scriptures: "There went out to him *Jerusalem*, and *all Judea*, and *all* the region round about Jordan, and were baptized." "There went out to him *all* the land of Judea, and they of Jerusalem, and *were all baptized*." The literal language here exceeds possibility, and no man can believe that "all" is to be taken without any qualification, since the sick and the maimed could not have "gone forth;" and therefore the only way in which we can clear the evangelists from the charge of misrepresentation is, by supposing that *no class* of persons was excepted. If we deny that any children "went forth," we reduce the numbers one half, and thus convict the evangelic records of gross exaggeration;—if we admit that children went forth with their parents,

the question of infant baptism is settled, for those who went to John "were all baptized." "*L'Ouvrier*" asserts that John required "proofs of the sincerity of their repentance" before he baptized any one! Was "all Judea" then repentant? The narrative, it is true, tells us they "were baptized, confessing their sins;" but this phrase evidently must be explained as referring to their voluntarily submitting to a rite symbolising their past impurity, for auricular confession was impossible among such multitudes, while a general oral confession would have been a mere Babel of sounds. "Repentance" was the exhortation *at*, not the *condition of*, baptism. That John could have means of testing the sincerity of these multitudes was impossible,—that the majority of them never did repent in heart is certain. The baptism of John was indiscriminate; those who came to him "were *all* baptized," though some of them were branded as hypocrites at the same time, Matt. iii. 7.

We have dwelt thus extensively on the baptism of John, because we cannot regard it as in any way differing from the christian ordinance. Our Saviour was baptized by John, that he might "fulfil all righteousness;" and connecting this passage with the kindred declaration that "except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God," we are not a little astonished to find "*L'Ouvrier*" inferring, "many of the immediate followers of our Saviour were not baptized." Our Lord speaks of the Pharisees and lawyers who "rejected the counsel of God against themselves, *not being baptized of John*," from which passage we may surely conclude that his apostles, who were chosen by him, had undergone that symbolic rite. If John's baptism was not christian baptism, what was it? It certainly was no part of the Mosaic economy, and seems to be a perfectly anomalous rite, except we identify it with the christian dispensation. My opponents would, perhaps, urge the comparison which John draws between baptism by water and baptism by fire, but this comparison is merely between the sign and the thing signified; the difference remained after Christ's ascension, and it was probably to impress this difference on the minds of his followers, that he (during his earthly ministry) deputed the act of baptizing with water to his dis-

ciples, and "baptized not himself." There is only one plausible argument against the identification of John's baptism with the christian rite; I allude to the case of the twelve Jews who are generally supposed to have been re-baptized by Paul (Acts xix. 1—7). Now, the classical student who turns to verses 4 and 5, will find the principal verbs to be in the aorist or narrative tenses, the peculiarity of which consists in the absence of any idea of duration,—the momentary and *completed* character they impress on an action; hence they peculiarly contrast with the use of the imperfects (*ἤλαθον*, *ἔλαλουν*, &c.) in the next verse, as *descriptive* tenses, showing the duration or time occupied by the baptism by fire. I believe it will be strictly in accordance with philological principles to consider the 5th verse as a continuation of Paul's speech, showing to these Jews that since John preached Christ, they who had been baptized by him were, *in effect*, baptized "in the name of the Lord Jesus." There are other critical reasons (notice the opposition of *μέν* and *καί*) for adopting this view of the passage; and some distinct modes of explanation might be suggested, even if we yielded these grammatical considerations. The substance of our preceding argument we conceive, therefore, to be *one distinct* and satisfactory proof of Infant Baptism, which we may exhibit thus:—1. The baptism of John was not a believer's baptism, since we have proof that he "baptized all" who came to him; while the phraseology of the narrative, and the character and customs of the Jews, show that infants were brought to him. 2. The baptism of John is identical with the christian ordinance.

II. Space will not allow us to examine the baptisms recorded in John iii. 5; iv. 1. and it is scarcely needful, for we can hardly suppose that any one would be rash enough to assert that none but true converts were thus "initiated" into the kingdom of heaven; since the apostles themselves seem to have had no clear conception of Christ's character, at that early stage of his career. The positive institution of baptism is contained in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20. "*L'Ouvrier*" identifies this, rather hastily, with Mark xvi. 15, 16; though the latter was delivered as they "sat at meat," while the other was emphatically the "Great Commission" deli-

vered on a mountain in Galilee, from whence our Lord ascended. From the passage in Mark we can gather no conclusion; it contains no command to baptize; and in declaring the mystery of salvation by faith, and the condemnation of the unbeliever, merely alludes to the fact of baptism as necessarily accompanying belief. We turn, therefore, to consider the command, "Go ye (therefore) and disciple (*μαθητεύσατε*) all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." I may here, again, call the attention of the reader to the tenses of these verbs, the definite character and *want of duration* implied by the aorist in "discipling," indicating that there was to be *no delay* in admitting "all nations" to discipleship by the ordinance of baptism. Now, who are to be baptized? Is there any hint that the apostles were to wait until the effect of their teaching was known? Is not the clause "baptizing them" evidently an explanatory one, showing *how* "all nations" were to be "discipled"? The Baptist would read this passage—"Go ye, therefore, and disciple *all nations*, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and afterwards baptize those *few* who shall give you satisfactory evidence of conversion" What excuse can any one have for thus transposing and qualifying the words of our Lord? Does it not savour of dangerous audacity? But passing (for a moment) from the natural and *prima facie* interpretation of this only rule of our faith and practice, let us inquire what guides the apostles had in interpreting these words. Had they any examples of the exclusive system of the modern Baptists? They had had a Judas in their band, admitted to be an apostle by Christ himself, who knew that he was "a devil" in heart; they knew the custom of their countrymen in the case of proselyte-baptism; they had witnessed the indiscriminate baptism of John; they had even administered baptism to "more disciples than John," under the superintendence of their Master—to *thousands who, after thus professing discipleship to Jesus, had subsequently gone "back, and walked no more with him,"* Jno. vi. 66. With these precedents before them, with so many Jewish prejudices still clinging to

their minds, and remembering the rebuke they had received with reference to the children who were brought to receive the blessing of Christ, they could scarcely have conceived of a dogma which should narrow "all nations" to "true believers," and exclude from the initiatory rite of their faith those little ones whose "angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven."

We have pointed out the universality of our Saviour's command; if there be any restrictions, let them be stated. We know of none; and we believe that it was never within the power of man to *impose any bounds to that which God left unlimited*. When we recollect the fearful anathema pronounced by St. John on those who *tamper* with the words of scripture, we feel astonished and concerned to find that our Baptist brethren are responsible for *narrowing* down the last words of Christ to a mere shadow of their literal meaning. And what is the cherished doctrine they proclaim? Is not "believer-baptism" a mere phantom of the brain? Was Judas Iscariot a believer? Were Ananias and Sapphira, who were baptized with "a lie in their right hand," believers? Was Simon Magus, who offered money for the gift of the Holy Ghost, a believer? Peter seems to have been gifted with the power of perceiving the hidden falsehood of the heart in the former case; and in the latter, Philip must have been aware of the benighted condition of him whom he baptized. Were the Baptists gifted with apostolic inspiration, would they baptize those whom they perceive to be "in the bond of iniquity?" If they would not, they set at nought the example of the apostles;—if they would, their baptism is one of *unbelievers* as well as believers. There are two species of belief,—the assent of the head, and the assent of the heart. The former necessarily preceded (in the case of adults) baptism; since no man could be foolish enough to submit to a rite of religion if he totally disbelieved the honesty and veracity of the administrator. Men's acts are the result of motive, and can never be known fully to any but themselves; hence, unless those who administer baptism are gifted with supernatural powers, the "baptism of believers" (as understood by the Anti-Pædobaptists) is an impossible fiction; in other words, Christ (according to such theologians) has directed his servants to do that

which they *cannot* do. If, then, believer-baptism is impossible—on what grounds can we exclude “innocent” infants from a rite to which we admit a Simon Magus? To urge the incapacity of a child to understand the ordinance, is to condemn, by implication, the decree of Jehovah in the analogous case of circumcision. This reasoning, also, would lead to the most fearful conclusions; for instance—“He that believeth not, shall be damned;” children are incapable of belief, therefore—but we need not continue: we have surely shown the fatal results of such logic. Before we leave this topic, however, let us point out the absurdity of another species of argument adopted by our friends, viz., that Infant Baptism is wrong, because we have “no mention of infants being baptized.” Now, we will pass over the plain inferences which we have already seen may be drawn from the accounts of John’s baptism, and that of the disciples during our Saviour’s life, and will apply this reasoning to other points. Here, then, is a list of conclusions as valid as that against Infant Baptism:—1. No woman was ever baptized until Philip went to Samaria. 2. No woman ever partook of the Lord’s Supper during the apostolic age; and, therefore, none ought to be allowed to do so. 3. The Lord’s Supper was never administered, except by the apostles; and, therefore, the ordinance ceased with their death. 4. No one ever was baptized “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” for it “is nowhere mentioned, and there is no proof, direct or indirect,” while we are expressly told in several instances that converts were baptized “in the name of the Lord Jesus.” 5. No one but Peter, Paul, Ananias, and Philip ever administered baptism, for it is “nowhere” said so. We might continue the list of these conclusions for whole pages; but we will be content to ask “*L’Ouvrier*” to lay aside his negative argument, until he has either disproved or adopted the fourth conclusion given above.

We have now endeavoured to establish a second independent proof of the harmony of Infant Baptism “with the scriptures,” drawn from the consideration of our Saviour’s words in Matt. xxviii., and have shown the impossible and fictional character of our opponents’ doctrine, and the dangerous and absurd results of their two chief modes of argument.

We now proceed to examine the practice of the apostles, as recorded in the “Acts.”

III. On the day of Pentecost, when the miraculous gift of tongues was “noised abroad, the multitude came together,” and “were confounded” by the miracle; this state of excitement was naturally heightened, and changed into extreme terror, when accused by Peter of the murder of their promised Messiah; and in the agony of fear they exclaimed, “Men and brethren, what shall we do?” Peter answered, “Repent, and be baptized, *every one of you*. . . . Then they that gladly received the word were baptized.” Now, here were 3,000 people gathered together, to see “a great sight;” a sermon was preached to them under the most exciting circumstances, and they were all baptized the same day. We have no intimation that any one was refused, while “*every one*” was commanded to be baptized. Were there no fond parents who had brought their babes? no young children who had come to see this miraculous event? There was no possibility of selection or examination of these converts “of the instant,” who could scarcely have obtained a conception of Christianity, and yet they were baptized. Would “the late Dr. Carson” have consented to baptize a terrified sinner within an hour of his first conviction? The idea of comparing this with the delays, and “probations,” and “deacons’ visits,” &c., of the Baptist community, is enough to render one despairing of man’s openness to conviction. What “Baptist minister” would stand beside his baptistry, and after noticing the effect of a powerful sermon, invite “every one of” them that heard him to be baptized “the same day?” How simple and easy would it have been for Peter to have said, “Repent, every one of you; and those who give evidence of their repentance, must then be baptized for the remission of sins;” but that was not his meaning. Let us notice, too, the words “for the remission of sins.” The preposition here used is *eis*, the literal signification of which is “into,” implying motion towards; so that this very phrase, which at first sight seems to oppose our views, really strengthens them, by showing that baptism is only a step towards the remission of sins which accompanies saving faith. We might properly translate this passage—“With a view to the remission of

sins." We cannot, therefore, find the slightest intimation in favour of believer-baptism, but we think the right of infants is plainly stated. Peter gives, as a reason for baptism, that "the promise is unto you *and to your children.*" By what process can these words be explained away? If the promise to *him* was a reason for the adult's baptism, the promise to his children was an equal ground for the baptism of his infants. We cannot conceive the meaning or intention of these words in any other sense; and to the Jews, whom Peter addressed on another occasion as "the *children* of the prophets, and of the *covenant which God made with our fathers,*" the allusion would come with tenfold force.

The next instance is that of the Samaritans whom Philip baptized, Acts viii. 12—24, "When they (the Samaritans) believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized. . . ." Here, then, we have evidence of the nature of the belief which preceded baptism,—"*they believed Philip preaching*"! Is there any regular attendant at a place of worship who does less than these Samaritans? We think not; and yet we shall find that a Baptist church is but a small fraction of a Baptist congregation. "Simon himself believed," yet his ignorance of Christianity was most deplorable, and the wickedness of his heart so unchanged, that Peter rebuked him in the most awful language. According to the theology we oppose, Peter should have rebuked Philip for his laxity of discipline, and the historian of the Acts should have explained that "Simon himself did *not* believe," but was baptized by mistake! In the same chapter we find the account of the baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch, ver. 26—39. This eunuch, after hearing Philip expound a prophecy of the Old Testament, desired to be baptized, and his request was granted. That he probably *became* a sincere convert we do not doubt, but to adduce this passage, *even as it stands*, as an argument for believer-baptism, is mere quibbling. If the eunuch became a true believer in so short an interval, it was by a miraculous interposition of the Holy Spirit, and the inferences to be drawn from it cannot be applied to an era when those manifestations are withdrawn. It is sufficient for us that *he was baptized as soon as the means of baptism (water) were pre-*

sented. We have, however, here to complain of another inadvertence on the part of "*L'Ouvrier,*" which we deplore, as casting a shadow of unfairness upon him, which we hope is not merited. The 37th verse of this chapter is the only passage of the New Testament which can cause serious difficulty to the Pædobaptist; and since it cannot be supposed that every one who reads these debates is familiar with the original Greek, it becomes an act of injustice for an opponent to parade this passage without any warning as to its character. I have before me the edition of the Greek Testament by Scholtz, in which the verse in question is wanting; and from the marginal readings I find that it is condemned as *spurious* by Newcome, Matthiæ, Griesbach, Wetstein, and Mill; though it is adopted by Beza, Stephens, and the Elzevir editions, on which our translation is based. The verse is not to be found in the Alexandrine and Vatican codexes, nor in the Syriac and principal oriental versions; and of MSS. in the uncial (or most antique) form of letter, it is only to be found in one and that of a suspicious character. We may safely say, that there is not one passage in the range of ancient literature with such damning evidence against its authenticity. Its weight in the baptismal controversy is (to the critical reader) perfectly inappreciable.

The remaining cases of apostolic baptism must be examined in few words. Cornelius, "a devout man," sincerely worshipped God to the extent of his knowledge, and was miraculously directed to send for Peter. Had not that apostle been prepared by a vision, in which he was taught that he "should not call any man common or unclean," he would doubtless (through Jewish prejudice) have refused even to preach "to men uncircumcised." Now hear his own words:—"As I began to speak, the Holy Ghost fell on them;" so that unless he had baptized before they even knew the name of our Saviour, he could not have administered the rite before conversion. This case is another of those peculiar and miraculous events from which we can draw neither precedent nor inference. The two questions, "Can any man forbid water?" "What was I, that I could withstand God?" seem to indicate that Peter's prejudices would still have denied baptism, had not Cornelius been thus

visibly "baptized with the Holy Ghost," but that this event was considered as an evidence that the outward rite should have been *previously* administered. *When we have such strong evidence of the Judaizing tendency of the apostles, we cannot reasonably suppose that an exclusion of infants (who were so privileged in the Jewish church) from all participation in Christian ordinances would be tacitly allowed, without any vestige of opposition.* In the case of Lydia, who was baptized with her household, we have not the slightest evidence that any of the members of her family were converted persons; *she "attended to the things which were spoken of Paul;"* and then both she *and her household* were baptized. When she urged the apostle to abide in her house, we should scarcely expect to find her pleading, "If ye have judged *me* to be faithful," if the members of her household were all *adult converts*. At "midnight" the Philippian jailor was a heathen; and, probably, had never heard of any gods but those of Greece, and yet, before "it was day" he and his household were baptized. Can it be supposed, that amid the supernatural terrors of that night, sufficient to have driven reason from her throne, these individuals could be taught the great plan of divine wisdom, and obtain faith unto salvation? Rescued from suicide, this man took Paul and Silas "*the same hour of the night, and washed their stripes; and was baptized, he and all his, straightway.*" That this man and his house were thus instantaneously brought into a state of salvation transcends human possibility. He "*believed;*" but could any man have doubted the truth of Paul's word, when sealed by earthquake and by angelic presences? He "*rejoiced;*" and could any one "*snatched from the very jaws of death,*" and promised eternal happiness, do otherwise than rejoice?

To conclude these notices of apostolic baptism. We have not one instance of a refusal to any applicant. We have a command, addressed to "every one" of a mixed multitude; and we have proofs of notoriously wicked persons being baptized. The practice of the apostles agrees in every respect with the universality of the divine command. We challenge our Baptist brethren to produce one refusal, or even one delay of baptism,—*to instance one single case where the head of a household was baptized, and "they*

of his household" left unbaptized. Our opponents refer to 1 Cor. xvi. 15, as a proof that the household of Stephanus comprised no infants. Suppose we grant the inference, it only affects that particular case; and if, of four households it be proved that one contains no children, the probability that one or more of the other three do contain children is thereby *increased*; since (from the very nature of things) a childless household must be of comparatively rare occurrence. But, on referring to 1 Cor. i. 14—16, we find that Paul wrote at so long an interval of time afterwards, that he could not distinctly recollect whom he had baptized, and that the household of Stephanus was "*the first-fruits of Achaia.*" Remembering these facts, in connexion with the early age at which Timothy addicted himself to the ministry, the boasted inference of our opponents falls to the ground.

IV. Of the *many* subsidiary arguments in favour of Infant Baptism which may be derived from incidental allusions in the epistles, it must here suffice to indicate two. In 1 Cor. x. Paul draws a parallel between the early Jewish church and the Christian dispensation, and declares that "*all our fathers . . . were all baptized unto Moses under the cloud and in the sea.*" Now, what analogy can this baptism of the whole Jewish nation, from the most aged patriarch to the new-born infant (for the infants were certainly shrouded in the cloud, and carried through the Red Sea), bear to an exclusive ceremony of baptism "*unto Jesus,*" where adults and infants are alike excluded until they have produced evidence of conversion. The passage is an inexplicable blunder, unless we admit Infant Baptism. Again, in Gal. iii. 17, Paul argues that the covenant with Abraham still remains "*disannulled.*" The seal of that covenant was circumcision, which being abolished, the substituted seal of baptism must be co-extensive therewith, *i. e.*, must be extended to infants.

V. The testimony of the Fathers. Justin Martyr, on the very verge of the apostolic age, speaks (Apol. I.) of "*men and women amongst us, sixty and seventy years old, who were disciplined to Christ in their childhood,*" thus proving the existence of Infant Baptism in the lifetime of the apostles. Clemens Romanus says that "*original sin affects infants,*" and that therefore they

should be baptized. Polycarp, the disciple of St. John, when at martyrdom he was urged to deny Christ, replied, "Eighty-six years have I served him, and he never wronged me." To suppose this refers to conversion in the years of discretion is beyond all probability. Irenæus (Adv. Hæres. ii. c. 39) says, "Christ came to save all persons . . . who by him are regenerated to God,—*infants, and little ones, and young and old*;" and Neander (Hist. i. 361) remarks that in Irenæus we cannot understand "anything else than baptism as meant by regeneration." "*The church has received tradition from the apostles to give baptism to infants*" (Origen, Com. in Rom. lib. v.). "Infants are baptized, because by baptism the corruption of their birth is removed" (Origen, Hom. 14 in Luc. ii.). Tertullian, in the third century, admits (De Bapt. c. 13) Infant Baptism to be the general usage, though he opposes it; this we cannot wonder at, when we find that he denied the forgiveness of sins committed after baptism. If our Baptist friends adopt one of his dogmas, let them adopt both; and (like him) limit the divine mercy as well as the divine command. In A.D. 253 Cyprian, with sixty-six bishops, decided that baptism might be administered to the newly born (Cyp. Ep. 64); the only object of their conference was to decide whether, like circumcision, it ought to be delayed until the eighth day after birth.

The sum of our argument is this. Infant Baptism is grounded—1. On the example of John's baptism, which was identical with the Christian rite. 2. On the divine command of Christ to baptize "all nations." 3. On the teaching and practice of the apostles. 4. On the doctrinal allusions of the Epistles. 5. On the testimony of the Fathers. On the other hand, believer-baptism is an impossibility in the present age, and did not exist even in the days of the apostles, as we see by the examples of Simon Magnus, of Hymeneus and Alexander, of Phygellus and Harmogenes, of Demas, and of many other "false brethren" who thus entered the primitive church.

In conclusion, let us ask our Baptist friends, What is baptism? If it convey

divine grace by the agency of water, why deny it to infants? If it actually wash away sin, why refuse it to those helpless babes who are conceived in sin? If, notwithstanding their incapacity of actual sin, they are subject to the curse for Adam's transgression, how can they be excluded from the blessing? But if baptism has no divine efficacy, and is only the seal of the new covenant, why should infants be shut out, under the "liberty" of the gospel, from privileges enjoyed under the "bondage" of the law? Again,—if baptism be the visible sign of initiation into the kingdom of Christ, why refuse it to those whom he has declared to be members of that kingdom? If it be the dedication of the person to God, why despise the pattern afforded by that dedication of the "holy child Jesus," which cast a halo of glory round the second temple never possessed by the carved cherubim, the gold, and the gems of the first? If baptism be a symbolic observance, typifying the need of spiritual purification, it is as appropriate to the child as the adult, since all are "concluded under sin." And, lastly, if it be a mere meaningless sign, imposed as a test of obedience, there can be no reason for restricting the generality of the command. The man-child, whom his parents neglected to circumcise, "that soul shall be cut off from my people; he hath broken my covenant." These are the words of Deity, spoken to Abraham, and therefore, however strange to reason, we dare not plead against them that the infant was "unconscious," helpless, and incapable of avoiding the curse. To cast children out of the pale of the church visible, and to deny them the very name-sign of discipleship, is the practice of the Baptists. "Feed my lambs;" "Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not;" "Who-soever receiveth one such little child, receiveth me;" are the tender words of our divine Lord. We beseech our Baptist brethren to re-consider their opinions; and, with the affectionate earnestness of one who believes that they have no justification whatever for their creed, we conclude in the solemn words of warning uttered by Christ, "*Take heed that ye despise not these little ones*," Matt. xviii. 10.

B. S.

Philosophy.

WHICH WAS THE GREATEST POET, MILTON OR SHAKSPERE?

SHAKSPERE.—ARTICLE I.

"In poetry there is but *one supreme*,
Mighty and beauteous."

THE mind that has been engaged in the contemplation of the sublime works of genius is often led to refer to some grand feature, or beautiful scene in nature, in order to embody its conceptions and ideas. As the chamois hunter, standing on the plains below his native Alps, traces on a cloudy day some two of those colossal heights upward till their romantic summits, piercing "as with a wedge" the "ebon mass," are hidden from his view, would not know which was the loftier if he had not with dauntless foot scaled some superior point, from which he had learned their comparative altitudes; so is it with us. We do not profess to have risen to the summits of the sublime heights of Shakspeare's genius, but that we have gained certain *stand-points*, by *his aid*, from which we have been enabled to look upon all the poetic geniuses of the world, *ut qui infra sunt*. This spiritual elevation, arising from the study of Shakspeare, is the result of his profound research and deep insight into the mysteries of our own being, which may be classed as moral, spiritual, and metaphysical. It is the poetry of Shakspeare, considered under these three points, which claims pre-eminence over any found in the tomes of universal poetry.

The study of Shakspeare has the same result as the philosophy of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, giving a deep insight into moral, spiritual, and metaphysical truth, without the evil which arises from the negative character of the popular German philosophy. The superiority of the writings of Shakspeare thus considered, and contrasted with those of Milton, is manifest. We speak reverently. The highest poetry is "the most philosophical of all writing." The epic grandeur, the beautiful language, the classic power and perfect harmony of thought and symbol found in Milton are unsurpassed by any contemporary or other writer.

But these do not constitute poetry, the

greatest poetry; they are merely artistic. In order to set forth the greatness of Shakspeare's poetry, it is necessary to furnish a true definition of poetry of the highest order. Many and beautiful are the definitions found in the poets; but, were we required to give a perfect one *from* poesy, it could only be done by the judicious collection and association of many. Channing has, we think, in many splendid passages, shown what is the nature of the highest poetry. He answers the question, "What is poetry?" by penetrating into and unfolding its glorious effects. Of poetry we must judge, as we do of divinity, by its results.

"Poetry has a natural alliance with our *best* affections. It delights in the beauty and sublimity of the outward creation, *and of the soul*. It, indeed, portrays with terrible energy the excesses of the passions; but they are passions which show a mighty nature, which are full of power, which command awe, and excite a deep though shuddering sympathy. Its *great tendency* and purpose is, to carry the mind beyond and above the beaten, dusty, weary walks of ordinary life, to lift it into a purer element, and to breathe into it more profound and generous emotion. It reveals to us the loveliness of nature, brings back the freshness of early feeling, revives the relish of simple pleasures, keeps unquenched the enthusiasm which warmed the spring-time of our being, refines youthful love, strengthens our interest in human nature by vivid delineations of its tenderest and loftiest feelings, spreads our sympathies over all classes of society, knits us by new ties with universal being, and, through the brightness of its prophetic vision, *helps faith to lay hold on the future life*." If this is a true description of the effects of the highest poesy, we may safely conclude with Goëthe, Schlegel, Ulrici, Guizot, Coleridge, and other master minds, that Shakspeare is the greatest poet the world has seen, and that not till the sublime genius of his poetry has been fathomed and more fully

comprehended shall his equal appear. Every student of Shakspeare cannot but discern how Channing, in his general description of poetry, has shown the great features of Shakspeare's poetry, and its influence on his own profound mind.

The entire Shaksperian drama is the mighty product of the power which he sets before us by enumerating its actings, its influences, and its results. Shakspeare, in his highest efforts, is found delineating moral and spiritual character and truth, ever casting the penetrating light of his searching genius on the world-wide mystery of moral evil and man. He does not embrace a negative philosophy to avoid it; he does not soothe his spirit with the idea of ultimate restitution; neither does he treat it *in toto* as the inevitable concomitant of human existence. No. He studies man; and, finding his whole being associated with moral evil, he struggles with the terrible fact with a power superhuman and almost divine; and, though he finds not a solution to the dread mystery, he shows us by the radiance of his genius how true the assurance of a higher revelation is—that what we know not *now* we shall know *hereafter*. It is this which gives unity to his writings, and invests them with a profundity of truth, beauty, and wisdom, which, under the poetic and artistic power of his original mind, have become the most sublime embodiments of thought and feeling ever penned by man! The highest poetry is, we conceive, that which treats of *man* in his moral and spiritual natures, and their ever-varying phases; under the guidance of a sound philosophy and deep penetration divesting humanity of that which is not real, and of every false appearance which self, society, or habit has rendered permanent; in a word, the greatest poetry is that which teaches man most of man.

“Poets are, henceforth, the world's teachers.”

The poet has to do with man as he is, that he may show him his destiny; with the present, that he may reveal the future; with the past, that he may teach him wisdom. This is the most prominent characteristic of Shakspeare's poetry, and that which gives him, as a poet, pre-eminence. No modern poet has come nearer this standard than Goëthe. If this is the true standard of poetry, the dramatic is superior to the epic.

Milton was devoted to the epic, Shakspeare to the dramatic. The dramas of Greece and England contain the highest efforts of genius, and have exerted a greater influence on mind in all ages of their history than epics. Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Shakspeare, have exerted a mightier influence on the world than Homer and Milton, because they have embodied in their works the greatest genius, poetic and artistic.

The contrast between Milton and Shakspeare is remarkable, and shows the peculiar mental idiosyncracies of both.

Milton chose the epic, Shakspeare the dramatic; Milton the supernatural as his chief theme, Shakspeare the natural.

Milton made divinity, heaven and hell, holy and unholy, angels and their conflicts, the chief objects of his contemplation; Shakspeare made earth as it is, man as he is, and moral evil in its innumerable forms, and its struggles with moral good, the chief object of his. The one produced an epic poem which “is, perhaps, the noblest monument of human genius,” whose grandeur overpowers the reader, but leaves him as it found him; the mysteries of his nature unsolved, the great inquiries of his agitated spirit unanswered. The other produced a series of dramatic pieces, “not for an age, but for all time;” not for one nation, but for humanity; in which man is the great subject—his condition, his nature, his character, his powers, his passions, his virtues, his vices, his conflicts with the world and evil powers, his falls and triumphs, his joys and sorrows, hopes and fears—all set forth in the light of truth as great realities, in which every man may see much of himself, and learn the highest wisdom. The greatest poet is he who teaches man most of himself, by casting light on the dark phases of his being. That poet is Shakspeare. We have more interest and *faith* in him than in Milton, because he creates a sympathy between himself and his reader which a deeper acquaintance increases, until he lives again, and becomes his friend and Mentor.

His writings are the *synopsis* of humanity and the mirror of nature. In announcing the object of the drama he expressed the chief characteristic of his poetry: its “end, both at first and now, was, and is, to hold as ’twere the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image.”

Hence his writings possess that perfection of power which is the over-growth of the highest poetry—irresistible control over the mind of the reader. We feel his greatness in part, and our knowledge is far inferior to our feeling. This consciousness results in mental subjection. The study of Shakspeare leaves a vivid impress of his genius on the most original and profound minds; it gives an impulse and bias to intellectual life, which is seen in every intellectual effort; its influence blends itself with the most latent energies and feelings of the soul; hence the most profound student of his works exclaims, "Wonder-making heaven, what a man was this Shakspeare!"

Shakspeare's perception of external beauty was exquisite. His imagery was of the highest order and most impressive nature. We feel that he was "Nature's darling,"

"To whom the mother did unveil
Her awful face."

He uses the most common things with the most perfect and happy effect. His imagery is as perfect and artistic as his design. It is one of

"the chains that tie
The hidden soul of harmony."

Beauty is another prominent feature of his poetry, and this is the result of the perfection and harmony which pervades it.

Truly has Emerson said:—"He loves virtue, not for its obligation, but its grace; he delights in the world, in man, in woman, for the lovely light that sparkles from them. Beauty, the spirit of joy and hilarity, he sheds over the universe." He charms us as the first masters in painting do, by the harmony, uniqueness, and justness of his productions. Perfection is an attribute of his delineations. "He carried his powerful execution into minute details, to a hair point; finishes an eyelash or dimple as firmly as he draws a mountain; and yet these, like Nature's, will bear the scrutiny of the solar microscope."

We have yet one other feature of Shakspeare's poetic greatness to notice—the meta-

physical. Channing has said;—"The fictions of genius are often the vehicles of the sublimest verities, and its flashes often open new regions of thought, and throw new light on the mysteries of our being." Of the works of no poet or philosopher can this be affirmed with greater truth than Shakspeare's. His deep metaphysical philosophy pervades them, and is the one element of continuity. "He is inconceivably wise." The profound is as much the element of his intellectual action as it is the assumed background of other authors. He does not show us the limits of the unknown, but by his piercing insight throws us "fathoms deep" into it! He makes us feel that we are the "broken lights" of divinity, and that pure thought and truth, love and beauty, lead us back to the source of universal being. Wordsworth most, of all modern poets, resembles him in this aspect.

"Hamlet" is the impersonation of the moral problem of our spiritual nature; and who ever read his four great monologues without becoming a profounder student? The flashes of thought which they contain are as the vivid lightning which sometimes plays in the heavens enveloped in midnight darkness!

"The Midsummer Night's Dream" is full of the subtleties and beauties of profound and original thought.

The "Merchant of Venice" is a great design, whose end is the development of one great moral idea. In fact, the tendency of Shakspeare's genius was to make all things subservient to moral principle, truth, love, life, and beauty.

We have thus briefly glanced at the peculiar characteristics of Shakspeare as a poet which give him pre-eminence among this world's great ones; and we conclude with the words of one who has studied the genius of the immortal dramatist:—"It must even go into the world's history, that the best poet led an obscure and profane life, using his genius for the public amusement."

E. W. S.

MILTON.—ARTICLE I.

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth
to heaven;
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen

Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name."—*Shakspeare*.

"Poetry is itself a thing of God:
He made his prophets poets, and the more

We feel of poetry, do we become
Like God in love and power." *Dailey.*

" Blessings be with them, and eternal praise,
The poets, who on earth have made us heirs
Of truth, and pure delight, by heavenly lays."
Wordsworth.

ON entering upon the discussion of such a subject as the present, a thoughtful man must be deeply impressed with reverential humility. Being conscious of his own littleness in comparison with "the great and mighty dead," he feels that criticism upon their works, conducted with care however exact, may expose him both to self and social condemnation for that degree of hardihood and presumption which it seems necessary for him to possess.

Milton and Shakspeare! time-hallowed names, that fall upon our ears with echoes of thrilling interest, recalling with pleasurable emotion the time when our youthful imaginations were first led spell-bound by your fascinating lyres! The reminiscences of our early days give increased energy to our youthful devotion, and more sobriety to the praises we now render to your memory. May a pleasing fate ever preserve you from

"The noisy praise
Of giddy crowds, who, changeable as winds,
Praise and admire they know not what,
And know not whom, but as one leads the other;
Of whom to be dispraised were no small praise."

With feelings of extreme diffidence we venture upon a comparison of the poetic genius of England's greatest poets. We feel our need of the poet's inspiration, and would reverently utter the words of the learned Puritan himself:—

"And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer
Before all temples the upright heart and pure,
Instruct me; for thou knowest.
* * * * * What in me is dark
Illumine; what is low, raise and support;
'That to the height of this great argument
I may assert'—"

the claims of his own creations—the great and glorious Milton.

The latitude allowed to poets in the choice of their subjects far exceeds that conceded to other writers. The poet is considered equally at home in the unseen as in the visible world; his heroes are with equal propriety denizens of this terrestrial sphere, Pandemonium, Mount Olympus, or the heavenly world. But unlimited as may be the range of his choice,

however high on the eagle wings of imagination he may soar, or however low he may fall, still some rules must be observed in the productions of his genius, by which men may judge of the quality of his intellectual labour. Milton was a poet; he has left behind him the fruits of his genius in many admirable productions, but especially is his sublime genius manifested in his "Paradise Lost." Is there in this poem sufficient evidence to prove him a great genius? Will this evidence sustain a favourable comparison of its author's genius with that of the "Sweet Bard of Avon"?—in fact, will it place him in the exalted position of England's greatest poet? We venture to affirm that it will, and rely on an approving verdict from our readers.

There has been some little dispute among critics as to the particular name by which they shall designate with technical precision "Paradise Lost." We are not over fond of technicalities, nor of the discussions pertaining thereto; consequently we consider it of little importance whether it be called by one name or another; it is sufficient for our present purpose if it is shown to be of the highest kind of poetry—a divine poem. To sustain this character it must possess the following peculiar features:—The poem, considered as a fable, must have *unity, entirety, and greatness*, as constituent elements; its characters must be varied and consistent; the sentiments natural, sublime, elevated, and pure; and the language correct, clear, and worthy of the subject upon which it is employed.

The action to be celebrated in this poem is *the fall of man*. Our author introduces the reader, in the opening book, to the infernal council of Pandemonium, where Satan and his compeers in solemn conclave devise means to effect

"Man's first disobedience,"

whereby he

"Brought death into the world and all our woe."

To this is subordinated the following scenes: the war in heaven—the overthrow of the rebels—their fall into hell—the creation of the world—of Adam—the miraculous production of Eve, and her presentation to Adam, with the several episodial beauties running parallel with the great scope and design of the creating and directing genius. Respecting its entirety, we have to observe

its commencement in the council of fallen rebels, its progress in the temptation of man, and its completion on his expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Its greatness is manifest from the fact, that all the powers of hell are joined in solemn compact to effect the destruction, not of an individual, but of a whole species; not of a man only, but of the whole human race; but man finds a friend, who "sticketh closer than a brother," in the Messiah, and protection more than equal to the machinations of hell's dark conclave from the Almighty God. Thus the poem comprehends all that is great in heaven, earth, and hell. Can there be greatness greater than this? The characters are varied and consistent: perfect purity and love, implacable hatred and deepest guilt, spotless innocence and consummate subtlety, almighty power and infinite wisdom—all have their due embodiment and consistent expression. The sentiments uttered are so natural to each of the persons, that their removal in any case would be the annihilation of the person and the character sustained. Nothing low, mean, grovelling, or vulgar appears, to gratify the cravings of the hypercritical, but a sublimity and elevation apposite to perfection. In no one particular does our author so peculiarly excel as in the purity of his sentiment. No sensuality, no low vice, no impure scenes or conversations, are introduced; it is the high moral tone and purity of sentiment which sanctify the native genius and acquired learning of Milton, which will give to him lasting celebrity on earth, and an honourable position amid the angelic band, when,

"Lowly reverent,
Towards either throne they bow."

It now remains for us to offer a few remarks on the language of the poem. This should be clear without being too familiar; expressions frequently used in our daily discourse upon the ordinary affairs of life lose their fitness for the poet's use; he requires terms clearly expressing his thoughts in a dignified, noble manner, equal to the sentiment they body forth in sound, intelligible to all cultivated minds, but free from the pollution of the world's drudgery. To attain this Milton has used metaphors, bold but just, and truly picturing to the mind, in an elegant and pleasing manner, the idea in the mind of the writer. Another method he has adopted shows the extent of his erudition, without

the unpleasantness of the pedant, by the beautiful introduction of the idioms of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages (see book xi.), which he has naturalized, to give a sonorous and rich melody to the music of his verse. In the exercise of consummate skill and extreme delicacy, he has moulded them with the richness of our own language, and elaborated from his mighty intellect a poem which no improvement, however great, in poetic taste and talent, will ever bring into co-sensescence; hence the peculiar propriety of the remarks of Addison, that by the help of his extensive literary acquirements, and "the choice of the noblest words and phrases which our tongue would afford him," Milton "has carried our language to a greater height than any of the English poets have ever done before or after him, and made the sublimity of his style equal to that of his sentiments."

From the limited space allotted to this paper, we have spoken upon each of the foregoing topics in the most general terms the subject will admit, in order to avoid the necessity of numerous quotations. At some future period we may be permitted to resume our labours in a less generalized manner; in the mean time we refer our readers to the poem itself for farther confirmation of the views we have maintained.

In answering the question at the head of this article, and assigning to Milton the pinnacle of fame, we beg the candid friends of Shakspeare to receive our assurance that no detraction from the genius of their poet is intended. We are ardent admirers of the beauties of his poems, and admit but one to rank in precedence before him—the greater, because purer and more sublime, Milton. The thoughtful and considerate reader of some of Shakspeare's works will not fail to observe their moral unfitness for perusal by the youthful and virtuous in the condition the author left them. The gross impurities of speech and immoral tendencies of many scenes, and of several entire plays, place them almost beyond the pale of criticism: in evidence of this we need only refer to "Measure for Measure," "Much Ado about Nothing," "Antony and Cleopatra," "Pericles, King of Tyre," "Titus Andronicus," "The Rape of Lucrece," "Venus and Adonis," and some passages even in the most celebrated pieces, such as "Hamlet." Although in the plays referred to there may be many beauti-

ful passages, yet there is so much of the vicious, impure, and depraved, that they sacrifice all right to be considered great, consistent, elevated, or pure; hence we legitimately infer the inferiority of their author's genius in comparison with Milton's. We believe depraved genius, whether employed in poetry or prose—whether a poet, novelist, historian, or philosopher—to be but splendid guilt; we have, with Milton, an exalted idea of the true poet, for

* * * * * "the more
We feel of poesy, do we become
Like God" * * * *

We thus estimate true poetry "as being a work not to be raised from the heat of youth or the vapours of wine, like that which flows from the pen of some vulgar amourist, or the trencher fury of a rhyming parasite; nor to be obtained by the invocation of dame Memory and her syren daughters; but by devout prayer to that Eternal Spirit, who can enrich with all utterance and knowledge, and sends out his seraphim with the hallowed fire of his altar, to touch and purify the lips of whom he pleases. To this must be added industrious and select reading, steady observation, insight into all seemly and generous arts and affairs."*

We conclude, for the present, with an extract from the Hon. T. B. Macaulay's criticism on Milton, as exemplifying with great clearness and propriety the character of our poet. He says:—

* Milton's account of his own studies.—*Prose Works*, vol. i. p. 16.

"Like the Puritans, he lived

'As ever in his great Taskmaster's eye.'

Like them, he kept his mind continually fixed on an Almighty Judge and an eternal reward; and hence he acquired their contempt of external circumstances, their fortitude, their tranquillity, their inflexible resolution. But not the coolest sceptic or the most profane scoffer was more perfectly free from the contagion of their fanatic delusions, their savage manners, their ludicrous jargon, their scorn of science, and their aversion to pleasure. Hating tyranny with a perfect hatred, he had, nevertheless, all the estimable and ornamental qualities which were almost monopolized by the party of the tyrant. There was none who had a stronger sense of the value of literature, a finer relish for every elegant amusement, or a more chivalrous delicacy of honour and love. Like the hero of Homer, he enjoyed all the pleasures of fascination; but he was not fascinated. He listened to the song of the syrens; yet he glided by without being seduced to their fatal shore. He tasted the cup of Circe; but he bore about him a sure antidote against the effects of its bewitching sweetness. The illusions which captivated his imagination never impaired his reasoning powers."

Through the character of the man we look at his work; through the work we look at the character of the man; and from the combined advantages of this twofold study of his genius we are confirmed in our judgment that Milton is the greatest of English poets.

L'OUVRIER.

Politics.

JUDGING FROM THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF FRANCE, IS AN ATTEMPTED INVASION OF ENGLAND PROBABLE?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

NATURAL history informs us of a water-bird which, when seeking its prey, arises into the air above the sea, and by the use of its keen vision discovers its victim in the depths below, and in an instant descends into the waters, and as quickly ascends to the surface with it. To this wonderfully-

gifted bird we cannot compare the genius of J. C. M'C. or B. S. in philosophy; but rather to another of the feathered tribe, which is generally found in *shallow* places, either catching its prey on the surface or in the *mud* beneath. In this our final reply, we shall confine ourselves to the articles of

J. C. M'C. and B. S., our opponents; as W. G. S. H.'s is but the echo of what may be found in their articles.

For the sake of conciseness we shall examine them separately.

J. C. M'C. uses a superficial philosophy; and, consequently, his arguments are not only inadequate, *pro quo erat demonstrandum*, but incontinuous and incoherent. We will briefly elucidate our assertion; and far be it from us to judge in any other than a candid spirit. The application of the beautiful prophecy with which he opens his article is as inconsistent as his arguments are impotent. The flippant way in which he adverts to the Peace Society, and its "absurd theories," we pass by as unworthy of further consideration. Whatever be the defects of this society, it stands as a noble monument of the power and progress of Christianity amid ten thousand antagonistic elements, and is as far above all these underhand insinuations as are the celestial battlements of the empyrean above us. No one can, we think, candidly read the second chapter of Isaiah without coming to the conclusion that the words quoted by J. C. M'C. were used by the prophet to indicate a *period prior to the millennium*; the beating "of swords into ploughshares, and spears into pruning-hooks," and the universal abolition of war, would be only an evidence of the coming of Christ's spiritual kingdom. To us the millennium, or full reign of Christ, appears distant, very distant; but the period when war shall for ever cease—if history, if civilization, if education, if the mighty efforts of mind, teach us anything, it is that that period is not far distant when nations shall cast aside for ever the ignoble *relics* of barbarism, and appeal, in all questions of national *right*, to moral and intelligent power, not to brute, physical, mechanical force. Ere the full reign of the God-man come, the *abolition of war*, like the abolition of feudalism and slavery, or the worship of Moloch and Mahomet, shall have long become the facts of history, even ancient history.

We fully admit that France, as a nation, is "most distinguished for its military propensities" of any of the European nations; but we reject the conclusion *in toto* that, because we have enjoyed peace so long, we may expect "that when the war does break out it will be very severe." According to

this anomalous theory, peace is the forerunner of war, harmony of confusion, concord of anarchy; and the *longer* the peace, the *severer* will be the war. Does not J. C. M'C. intimate that war, until the dawn of the millennium, will be periodical, and a kind of *safety-valve* for the world? Is this not, to use his own words, an "absurd theory," in which the elements of his confused philosophy become "confusion worse confounded" every step he takes? Let it, then, be remembered that J. C. M'C. plainly makes the fact that *peace has been continued so long (!)* the foundation of his theory, the object of which is to prove that an attempted invasion of England is probable. According to this, would it not be as easy to prove that France would in all probability, ere long, invade the territories of the Hottentots or the Greenlanders? Because France is a military nation, and peace has been enjoyed some thirty-eight years between the powers that met in mighty conflict on the plains of Waterloo, we are to believe that an invasion is *now* probable? Is it possible? Statements in the *Controversialist* stand for facts as a matter of philosophy, or for nothing at all; facts with which we must plainly deal. If this be inductive philosophy, our readers may expect that, because certain nations have enjoyed peace so much longer than we have, the terrible time is drawing nigh when they shall be torn with more direful conflict than any chronicled in history!

J. C. M'C. having thus laid the foundation of his absurd theory, he proceeds to develop the theory itself. How? By advancing two reasons, not so valid and "conclusive" as he intimates they must be to every "unprejudiced mind."

First. That the "invasion of England *has always been* an object of desire and anticipation to the French soldier." Even admitting this assertion, it supplies no argument to prove the probability of an invasion. The only way to render it of any service at all would be to assert what is not true, and what our opponent is honest enough not to affirm, that the invasion of England has not only always been, but, *de facto*, is now, the desire of the French soldiery. This he does not advance, for good reasons; without it his argument is useless and his theory false. Whatever *may have been* the French soldier's desire on this subject, it has been not only

considerably modified, but *radically changed and reformed*. France has been long in the school of bitter experience, and her sons have learned "the 'moral lesson' dearly bought." It appears, then, that J. C. M'C.'s first great "conclusive" argument *pro*, when viewed in the light of actual fact, becomes an important argument *con* the point at issue. The superstructure of this theory is as defective and unsound as its premises, and is a lamentable specimen of false philosophy.

The second argument of J. C. M'C. is, that a "French invasion is probable from the present aspect of Popery on the Continent." Unfortunately for our friend's theory, his second argument is more absurd and impotent than his first, for it does not even admit of amendment at the expense of fact. From the tenor of our friend's remarks we can plainly discern that he is no anti-state-church advocate; that, in fact, he is much attached to the established state church; and that from within its pale, and through its distorted medium, he has been viewing European Catholicism, and trembling at it. To him it doubtless appears a terrible thing. He sees chariots and horsemen, fire and sword, England bound, &c. We should have been better satisfied if our opponent had defined the Protestantism of Britain, which he thinks is in such imminent peril. For our own part, true Protestantism appears the most stable and triumphant power under heaven; and were it possible for all the despots, all the priests of all false religions, all the arms and brute force in the world, with the powers of darkness, to be combined to crush it, we would not, dare not, in the sight of "high heaven," doubt concerning its eternal safety and ultimate triumphs. But if by the term "Protestantism" J. C. M'C. means our state church, he may well tremble for its safety; for there is not a great political agitation, or national struggle, or even coming change, which does not threaten to shake her tottering fabric to its foundation. True Protestantism has but little to do with state churches. History says they are the shrines of darkness and mammon; the same in England, virtually, as in France or Italy. Yes; all state churches—*Episcopacy* at home and *Papacy* abroad—are doomed, and their fate is sealed by the meekest words of the meekest One, "My kingdom is not of this world." They that shelter themselves beneath them

may well fear. The true Protestantism of Great Britain can smile at the cry of "No Popery!" at home, and all the threats from Papacy abroad. England has more to fear from the *Popery* of the *Episcopacy* than of the Vatican. Puseyism at home is a greater foe to her best interests than all the Papal powers of the Continent. There is something truly absurd in these words:—"Yes; let it never be forgotten, that if there be a war in Europe, it will probably be a war of *religion*." We read in history of Crusades, which mean holy wars; but they belong to ages of by-gone darkness and superstition: we never expected to hear of them in the nineteenth century. A *religious war*!—it is a contradiction. Every sane man now admits that war is one of the greatest evils found among men; and yet it, too, becomes religious! It would be just as consistent to talk about *good evils*, or *holy fiends*, as a *religious war*. True and divine religion according to Christ disowns war, and says to every warrior, "Put up thy sword into his place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." We recommend the theology of Isaiah and Christ to J. C. M'C., and ask him on what authority he designates any war "religious"? Christianity admits of no such paradox, if Papacy and Episcopacy do.

We take our leave of this friend by congratulating him that there "remains in England the elements" of what has been her glory for ages, the God-sent principles of Christianity, more powerful now than ever, and which preserves her unhurt amid the convulsions of revolutions, the crash of thrones, and the anathemas of popes and frowns of despots.

Our next opponent, B. S., refers to a former debate to establish a position which *neutralises the one he necessarily assumes*! If we understand B. S.'s language, he desires to qualify his position; and so, contrary to the just arrangements of this magazine, while professedly writing an affirmative article he is not, which is neither honest nor philosophic; for it is evident that, in reasoning, affirmative is the *vice versé* of negative. We cannot, then, but regard B. S.'s position as fallacious and inconsistent altogether; and justly may we denounce his article as neither "black nor white;" and, moreover, compare it to the chameleon, which, according to the poet, gave rise to so much *useless* contention.

In fact, it can stand for nothing touching an affirmative conclusion, though, strange to say, it appears for that express purpose. Why? Because of "the excessive vagueness and latitude of meaning which attaches to the word 'probable.'" This we are ready to admit, if B. S.'s statements and dogmatic assertions are true—if the true answer does not really lie "between 0 and 1." But we admit neither. Does not B. S. expose the fallacy of his position by attempting to demonstrate the worth of a "variable fraction," and that, too, in a so-called affirmative article? We are informed that "the imperfection of human language is so great (!) that it is scarcely possible to use it in debate without seriously endangering the interests of truth"! Had B. S. said, "without seriously exposing the fallacy of baseless theories," he had been nearer the truth. *Language* must, indeed, be *imperfect*, and *truth* *frail*, according to B. S.'s notions of them! A very grave conclusion *this*, withal, concerning that language which stands in glorious pre-eminence among all other languages. We might remind B. S. of many debates in the *Controversialist* in which our mother tongue has been used to admirable effect, and on points of far greater *logical minuteness* than are involved in this debate. But to the point. B. S.'s article presents many salient points, in which the probabilities of the case are palpably against his own position. Although B. S. takes neither the affirmative nor negative side of the debate, he evidently attempts a negative reply to not a few distinct points in our opening article. To these we direct our attention, and in so doing we must remind B. S., as we had occasion to do on another subject, that *theories must be based on facts, not suppositions; on pure induction, not dogmatic assertion, affirmation, or negation.*

If we consider B. S.'s article as what it professes to be, an affirmative one; or what it in reality is, a specious neutrality; it is a *perfect failure*. His anomalous theory stands on a pure and unwarrantable assumption, and forcibly reminds us of J. C. M'C.'s first argument. B. S., as the basis of his theory, says, "When war is resolved upon, the first question which occupies the governments of the concluding nations naturally and necessarily is, 'Where shall we commence hostilities?'" This is about as wonderful and profound a statement as though one should

ask the question in any daylight affair, "At which point shall I commence, the beginning or the end, the right or the wrong?" This is the grand basis of his theory. It is an attempt to lay down an assumption for a fact. B. S. indirectly sneers at Dr. Cornwell, Julius Cæsar, R. Hall, and Byron, as authorities; but we would ask him on what authority, historic, poetic, literary, or rational, he would have us receive his theory? In vain, we think, might he search history, poetry, or literature, to find anything so absurd. Is war resolved upon? is the question. This abstract inquiry, "When?" has no more to do with the point at issue than the mutations of this month's moon have to do with the military tactics of Hannibal, or the midnight dreams of B. S. There is no connexion, no logical continuity in this part of his article, that we can discover. Is it not an underhand assumption to show that *that really is or will be*, which *has been or possibly might be*? B. S. on this fallacy grounds all he has to say, and pompously, as *Sir Oracle*, asks the reader in effect, "Think you that France has learned anything by her past history—by the overwhelming anarchy—the terrible revolutions—the appalling bloodshed—the complete overthrow of ancient dynasties—the establishment, progress, and final ruin of a desperate despotism—the tragic enactments of 1789, 1815, and 1848? Thinkest thou, O sane man! that one of the greatest nations has learned anything from a history which contains such terrible things? If thou dost, thou art verily wrong; for I say, France hath oft in vain been taught; France is 'resolved on war,' and only waits the rise of the star of her destiny again to prove that she is reckless of the lives of her sons of valour. Believe me; I am *Sir Oracle*." This is the strain B. S. pursues, evidently to his own satisfaction, though not to ours, nor the reader's, we presume. We leave the intelligent reader to decide how far he compliments common sense by attempting to show that France has learned nothing as yet from her history; a history which has taught the world—yea, even the despot who now "bides his day"—that there is a God in the heavens, whose omnipotent arm is stretched forth in the cause of liberty, truth, and justice; not only against Napoleon, but against every man that tramples on his

brother's sacred rights. It would appear that B. S. believes in the mystic doctrine of destiny, or he would never deny the most evident truth, that a man *learns* by past experience; his present conduct is influenced by that experience; and thus it is, more or less, with nations, they being but the aggregate of individuals. If, then, B. S. would insinuate that "war is resolved upon" against England, we may deny it on the ground of his own admission concerning the French, for he says, the "*feeling of the bulk of the French nation is in favour of peace*"! How B. S. can make this admission concerning the French, and then contend that an invasion is highly probable, we know not. But he presently adds:—"The arguments to be drawn from considering the emperor's position with regard to the people I have already endeavoured to prove to be in favour of *my own side of the question*." Truly, it is but an endeavour, vain and futile. B. S. next labours to prove from the history of England (!) his position. He presents the patient reader with an index of about twenty different successful or unsuccessful attempts to invade our shores, beginning with the Roman invasion, and ending with "the gigantic plan commenced at Boulogne." We do not enter into the chronological and statistical accuracy of his statements, as he gives no historic authority whatever. The *ipse dicit* of B. S. in such matters is as questionable as his logic on probabilities or "variable fractions." How the invasion of this island by the Romans is to prove an attempt at the same by the Emperor in France, let the reader imagine. Our humble opinion is that history, on this point, goes to prove the improbability of such an event. Let us see. History attests that the mightiest, the best disciplined, the bravest and hardest army, under the command of the greatest general the world has known, *did*, with the greatest difficulty, conquer the *aborigines* of this land, whose only coat of mail was the skin of wild beasts, and whose chief weapon in war was the club, rough hewn by some means from the vast, unexplored forests around them. B. S. gravely concludes that this proves the truth of his position. Is not England the second Rome in the world's history? Does not the Emperor know this? Has he not weighed the *probabilities* of the case with sounder logic and deeper *discri-*

mination than B. S. here displays? His conduct speaks plainly enough; the cordial reception of the London citizens' deputation, to wit. Is he not aware that Englishmen in the nineteenth century are far mightier than their barbaric forefathers of the first, who so bravely resisted the Roman power? The gravity with which B. S. refers to the futile attempts in favour of the Pretender, &c. &c., is perfectly ridiculous. As well might he refer to the petty piracies to which some of our foreign possessions may be subject. He speaks of the amazing destruction of the Spanish armada; but what can we or the Emperor possibly learn from that memorable triumph over an invading foe? Surely not that because the Spanish despot, with his overwhelming army, was so signally defeated, the French despot should make a similar attempt? In fact, the evidence of history weakens B. S.'s position materially, and betrays the positive fallacy of his argument. Again; the mere assumption that England is more liable to injury from invasion than France, London than Paris, is contrary to experience, and reminds us of a child crying most piteously on hearing the lion roaring in its iron-bound den, seeing nothing but *danger* when its *safety* is an unquestionable fact. We think we can easily point out to what class of the community, as a politician, B. S. belongs. Doubtless he has had some serious thoughts about joining the "Royal Victoria Rifles," or some other phalanx of human machines, to butcher the Frenchman, or to be butchered by him, as the case may be. We wish him success should this "highly probable" invasion which he prophesies occur. Our opinion is, that this "sea-girt isle" of ours contains the mightiest defensive power in the world—a power that would crush a Roman army, baffle the military tactics of a Cæsar, and frustrate the craft of a Hanibal; much more, then, the attempt of a nineteenth-century-fettered despot; for all despots cannot now use their physical force as did tyrants in past ages of barbarism, ignorance, and superstition. If we may thus express our thought, the divinity and energy of *truth*, *justice*, and *liberty*, are more triumphant now than in the ages of the past, and, consequently, error, injustice, and tyranny, *less* powerful. This is the manifestation of God in history; and whoso attempts to carry out tyrannous projects, rushes headlong on the

thick bosses of the Almighty's buckler. We are accused of *dragging* in Lord Byron's poetry to prove what no one denies, and what "has nothing to do with the question." Indeed! Did we not quote Byron to show what was, in part, the cause of Bonaparte's military success?—that is, the fact that his army *was devoted to him*, and obeyed him implicitly; not for money, &c., &c., but from sincere attachment to their heroic general; and this we said was not the case with the present Emperor and French army; consequently he has less military power at command. What does B. S. think of J. N. C.'s article on the character of Wellington, for he, according to B. S., *drags in six poetic extracts* to illustrate his subject? For our own part, we think such extracts, when they apply to the question (and this much we claim in our case), are ornaments to our debates. The same empty objection he brings against an extract from Robert Hall, the application of which to the subject is evident enough, and the power, beauty, and thrilling truth of it B. S. cannot deny. We think the arguments contained in our opening article "quite sufficient," at least until some one proves them false, which B. S. has attempted to accomplish;—how?—by dogmatism, not logic; by mere negation, not clear argument; by quibbling about authorities, not meeting what they say. If, however, he wishes for more, though minor ones, let him turn to J. G. R.'s articles on the

subject; they are worthy of his perusal. What B. S. imagines about learning the history of a nation is a mistake. Let B. S. place Hume's or Goldsmith's "History of England" in the hands of an inquiring Turk, or any foreigner, and bid him learn the character of Englishmen therefrom, and know how far he does *that*, then he will understand our words, "*The character of all nations is original*;" then will he see that the key to written history is living character. Hume wrote the *notes*, while the English nation *was* and *is* the *text*.

In conclusion, we answer B. S.'s question concerning the revolution of 1815. It was on the plains of Waterloo that the "fierce Corsican" grappled with the allied powers of European monarchy. It was there he fell. But when we speak of the revolution of 1815 as a manifestation of the democratic element overwhelming the monarchic power, we refer to the transactions and effects of that mighty power emanating from the heart of *one* nation, shaking the monarchies of Europe, passing through the heart of Europe as a scourge to tyranny and corrupt *monarchies*, whose existence could only be secured by the union of many powers, and the assemblage of overwhelming numbers. Napoleon Bonaparte fell, but not before he had thus accomplished the work he had to do. The only destiny of those who abuse their power is to become unconsciously the instruments of a higher power and a diviner purpose. BOLLA.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY

I CANNOT allow the debate on the invasion question to come to a conclusion without saying a few words in vindication of my position. At the commencement of the discussion, I, not without due deliberation, assumed a position, and to that position I steadfastly adhere. When I used the expression, the "so-called Peace Society," I did not do it inadvertently; I did not, however, mean, as J. G. R. seems to insinuate, that "peace men" did not believe their principles; or, believing, did not practise them; but I meant that those who thought that they, by following those principles, would promote peace, were indirectly promoting the probability of war. The Peace Society is only such in name; nevertheless, its members believe their principles, and set up to

them; but, by so doing, augment the chances of war. I am fully persuaded that "the best method of preserving peace is to be prepared for war." But perhaps J. G. R. will dissent from this; I therefore undertake to prove it. Suppose I was living in a remote habitation, in the midst of a lonely solitude, and that I was daily in danger of being attacked by banditti, with which the country abounded; my property being in peril of being plundered, and my life in peril of being sacrificed; how should I act? How would J. G. R. himself act in similar circumstances? Would he go and leave his gates open, his doors unfastened, his safes unlocked? Would he not use every means in his power to prevent an easy entrance? Would he not have weapons in readiness,

and would he not arm his servants also? And what is this but being prepared for war? In all probability the robbers, *when they saw these preparations*, would abandon their design. *If all the world were governed by the principles of christian philanthropy—if all mankind were Cobdens, Brights, or Burhitts—the case would be far different; but, when the proportion of these is as one to a myriad, they are not to be trusted.* You may easily persuade a few in France, and a few in Austria, and a few in Russia, to become peace men; but are we on that account to abolish our standing armies, to level our fortresses, to raze our barracks, to melt our bullets into their primeval lead, and leave this mighty empire without even the shadow of defence? Is the military power of this country to commit deliberate suicide, by planting their artillery against their own castles and batteries? No! Long as continental Europe supports standing armies, so must we; long as continental Europe prepares for war, so must we. If we are not attacked, we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that we were prepared in case we had been; and, if we are attacked, then those preparations will not have been made in vain.

But why should not England be *the first* to lay down her weapons, and thus set a glorious example to the rest of Europe? Because Britain is the home of freedom, and the Continent is the dwelling-place of tyranny. Because Britain is the defender of that faith which the continental nations despise and trample under foot. The whole of Europe is banded against her. Tyranny and superstition have joined hand in hand to crush the liberty and the truth of Britain. Have they not? Let J. G. R. answer me. Have they not made an aggression on this country—an aggression so monstrous that it ought to have aroused the hearts and awakened the indignation of the most careless and indifferent? Think you Pius IX., unprompted, did this—a tyrant who had been hurled from his throne, from whose brow the crown had been torn, and in whose hand the sceptre had been broken? And what nation was it that restored the fallen monarch, and was propping up his throne with her bayonets, while he and his cardinals were writing that famous bull? *The French.*

What nation was it that drove our Protestant missionaries from the fairest island in the Pacific, and is still doing all she can to bring its inhabitants under the dominion of Popery? *The French.* Tahiti is England in miniature. The possession of that island could neither replenish an exhausted exchequer, nor promote commerce, nor benefit the French people; but (they hoped) it would extinguish the freedom of its inhabitants, crush the germs of its Protestantism, and deprive England of an arena on which to display its benevolent designs. And it is only our preparations for war that have kept them from attempting something of the kind with England. It is nonsense to talk about such a project being displeasing to the French people. The people were never asked whether they should restore the Pope to his dominions and destroy the liberty of Italy; nor whether they should rob Great Britain of one of her newly-gained dependencies.

As long as the Emperor of Russia will send, without a moment's warning, the highest of his nobility to the wastes of Siberia, or will crush the freedom of a Poland, or assist in crushing the liberty of a Hungary; as long as the French nation stifles the rising flame of freedom in Italy, and her Emperor acts the traitor to his country; as long as the French butcher one another in the streets of Paris; we must be prepared for war. Do the French hate the French? No. And yet they fight with them, murder them, and massacre them. They have set themselves up as the champions of the cross; they have assumed the imperial eagle, which lives but to devour; they have restored the Pope to his dominions, and resuscitated Popery. *France and Rome are one.* If an aggression is made on our rights and religion by the Pope, it is not the Pope, but the French, who have planned it. There are some who say, "Peace, peace! when there is no peace." May England never hearken to their voice; but, in spite of the sneer of the politician, in defiance of the clamours of the Peace Society, may she be ever prepared to defend the right; and, with the blessing of God resting upon her, she shall be so protected and preserved that "no weapon that is formed against her shall prosper."

J. C. McC., Jun.

The Societies' Section.

THE RIGHT USE OF BOOKS.

IN offering you a few hints as to the right use to be made of books, I may well attempt to meet a question which respects ways and means. I remember an anecdote of a band of German professors in a concert, in which loud music formed a prominent feature. The conductor of the band repeatedly exclaimed, "Louder! louder!" while the enduring players on flute, trombone, serpent, and other similar instruments, made vain endeavours to meet his request. At length, one of them in despair put down the trumpet from his mouth, and said, "It's very vell for you to cry, 'Louder;' but vere is de vind to come from?" So some of you may be ready to say, Where are the books to come from; and how are we to find the time to read them? To this I reply, Economise your money and redeem your time, and the thing can easily be done. Even with those who have limited means, a well-assorted collection of books may be obtained. Something may be redeemed from superfluous clothing, from excessive pleasure, from wasteful habits—as cigar-smoking and snuff-taking—to nourish, enrich, and beautify the mind with books. Where they cannot be bought, they may be borrowed, and returned with care. By economising time in the way of early rising, and by gathering up the fragments of the day, many a book may be advantageously read.

It has been well observed, that most of the men who have died enormously rich acquired their wealth not in huge windfalls, but by minute and careful accumulations. It was not one vast sum bequeathed to them after another which overwhelmed them with inevitable opulence; but it was the loose money which most men would lavish away, the little sums which many would not deem worth looking after, the pennies and half-crowns, of which you would keep no reckoning; these are the items which, year by year piled up, have reared their pyramid of fortune. From these money-makers let us learn the noble "avarice of time." You may not be able to secure an entire week, or even an uninterrupted day, for reading; but try what you can make of the broken fragments of time. Glean up its golden dust; those raspings and parings of precious duration; those leavings of days, and fragments of hours, which so many sweep into the waste of existence. Be a miser of moments, and you will become intellectually rich. As an illustration of this kind of economy, I may mention that a lengthy and elaborate translation of Lucretius was composed by Dr. Good, a physician, in the streets of London, when in busy practice, during brief snatches of time when passing from one patient's door to another; and Dr. Burney, the musician, with the help of pocket grammars, which he had written out, acquired the French and Italian languages when riding from place to place to give his professional instructions. On this principle I would recommend you always to have one or more books in course of reading. Have some portable work at hand, that you may read when you travel or walk into the country; not, indeed, having your eyes turned off from the works of nature, which are a most precious-book. Have a book within reach that you may read at your fireside. You can indulge in these habits better while you are young and unmarried, than when surrounded with the cares and claims of domestic life. A man

bookworm of a husband is a most uninteresting companion to a woman for life. It is recorded of Dryden, who married Lady Elizabeth Howard, that the match was most unhappy. On one occasion his wife complained of his seclusion, and wished that she were a book, that she might enjoy more of his company. The poet replied, "Be an almanack, then, that I may change you once a year." For you, gentlemen, I wish a happier lot, and advise you to read and remember now, that you may instruct and amuse hereafter.

In reading, allow me to advise that you choose the most valuable books on any subject to which you are directing attention. It is preposterous to read an inferior book on a given theme, when the best may as easily be secured. It was some time since predicted that cheap literature would soon drive sound literature out of the market. This, happily, has not been verified, for some of the most valuable books of the past and present age are printed in a very cheap form. Books that bear upon them the image and superscription of sterling gold should be preferred to spurious imitations. Who would feed on ashes when solid and nutritious food is at hand? Addict yourselves in reading, as far as possible, to the purest models of taste which the literature of your country can supply.

Avoid that kind of reading which would enervate the mind and pollute the imagination. A flood of books of all sorts, good and bad, is spreading over the whole land, and young and old will read them. We cannot stop that by law; we ought not if we could; it is God's ordinance. It is more; it is God's grace and mercy that we have a free press in England; liberty for every man, that if he have any of God's truth he may tell it out boldly in books, in speeches, in sermons, or otherwise. This blessing we should reverence and not abuse, for it was dearly bought by our forefathers, many of whom left house and home, or died on the scaffold, to secure liberty of thought and word. You must not silence bad books by act of parliament. You dare not thus root up the tares, lest you root up the wheat also. The men who died to buy us liberty knew it was better to let in a thousand bad books than to shut out a hundred good ones, for a grain of truth will outweigh a ton of lies. We cannot, then, silence evil books, but we can turn away our eyes from them; we can take care that what we read, or encourage others to read, is good and wholesome. Read no book that you would be ashamed for a mother or a sister to know you read.

And in passing I would say, works of imagination and fiction should only be read sparingly, and as a relaxation from graver studies. Much familiarity with them gives a distaste for the actual realities of time, and unfits the mind for the stern and earnest duties of life. The taste for comic literature, greatly fostered by that notable personage, "Punch," read by the bishop and the judge, the rector and the dissenting pastor—at least so it is reported—should be kept under control. We have "A Comic History of England," and "A Comic History of Rome;" and though they are well and truthfully written in the main, yet as they put, or try to put, every subject in a ludicrous light, they may induce a habit of treating with levity the most solemn and affecting themes, against the evil of which you cannot be too anxiously warned.

A profitable method of reading I will now endeavour to present to you. It is a mistake to suppose that all books should be read with equal attention and care, on the principle of the farmer who read his weekly paper through in order, beginning with its title, number, and date—working his way down through advertisements, leading articles, local, general news, births, marriages, and deaths—and never ending till he spelt out the printer's name

in the last line of the last column of the last page. Lord Bacon has well said on this subject, "Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence and attention." As a general rule I would say, strive to understand your author. It is a waste of time to look at a book and to dream over its pages without labouring to comprehend its argument, illustrations, and design. One good book, well mastered, will be of more advantage than a score imperfectly read, and of which no definite impression is retained; and yet some persons are content to read extensively without understanding what they read. I have heard of a lady who told a wag that she had read "Locke on the Understanding," and liked it much, only she could not tell the meaning of the word *idiaz* (idea) which was so often used in it. He replied, with more of wit than truth—with more of sarcasm than gallantry—"It is the feminine of idiot!" Toplady relates an anecdote of a conceited youth, who boasted that he had read Euclid through in a piece of an afternoon. On being asked, "Did you master all the demonstrations, and solve all the problems, as you went on?" he replied, "Demonstrations and problems! I suppose you means the *as* and the *bs*, and ones and twos, and the pictures of scratches and scrawls. Oh no! I skipt all those. But I did read Euclid himself, and found it pleasant reading, too." It is to be feared that many people read grave books as carelessly, and with as little profit.

It is a good plan to read with a pencil or pen at hand, with which to mark the more valuable or striking passages to which you would recur again; always supposing it is your own book, and not a borrowed one, with which you are taking this liberty. You will reap advantage from keeping a common-place book, in which to insert valuable scraps and larger pieces from books which you are not likely permanently to possess. Todd's "Index Rerum" contains a valuable and easy method of making an index of subjects on which you have read, and to which you may have occasion hereafter to refer. The use of this applies rather to books within your constant reach than to others. It is worth while to make a compendium of some good books. The facts of history, and their dates, thus epitomised by your own hand, will prove of great value, by impressing them on your memory, and by being of easy reference, as occasion may require.

Conversing with others on the books we read is an admirable method of deepening our own impression of what we have learnt, and of benefiting unostentatiously our fellow-men. I avail myself on this point of a brief statement of Bacon, who says, "Reading maketh a full man; conference, a ready man; and writing, an exact man." Gird up your minds to the attainment of this threefold excellence. Be at once full, ready, and exact.

You will suffer me to detain your attention a few minutes longer, while I speak of the pure, the varied, the lofty pleasure to be derived from reading. It enables us to converse with the wisest and best of men that ever lived. I remember to have visited the house of Southey, the poet-laureate, at Keswick—to have lingered in his library, and to have looked out from his window on the glorious lake and lofty mountains which there presented themselves to view, and to have dwelt on the pleasure he derived from his collection of books; but he has so beautifully and graphically described that pleasure in most harmonious verse, that I make no apology for reciting it in your hearing:—

"My days amongst the dead are past;
 Around me I behold,
 Where'er these casual eyes are cast,
 The mighty minds of old;
 My never-failing friends are they,
 With whom I converse day by day.
 "With them I take delight in weal,
 And seek relief in woe;
 And while I understand and feel

How much to them I owe,
 My cheeks have often been bedewed
 With tears of thoughtful gratitude.
 "My thoughts are with the dead—with them
 I live in long-past years,
 Their virtues love, their faults condemn,
 Partake their hopes and fears;
 And from their treasures seek and find
 Instruction with a humble mind."

And such pleasure and instruction are open to all men who have eyes to read, and hearts to feel, the contents of books. It is one of the cheapest and purest gratifications within the reach of men. It soothes the perturbed spirits, buries for a time the pressing cares of life, and fits the learner for the daily conflict with the world.—[These valuable remarks, and those contained in our number for February, under the head of "Books and Reading," have been extracted from a very interesting lecture delivered by the Rev. George Smith before the Devonport Young Men's Association, and published by Snow, London.]

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

174. Being desirous of studying the history of the ancient Britons, particularly their religion and their state before the Roman invasion, perhaps some of your correspondents will be kind enough to give me some information as to what books would be most suitable, with their prices. And likewise where I could obtain the "Cambrian Register," and the "Cambro Briton," with the prices and the publisher's name. An answer inserted in the *British Controversialist* would be esteemed a very great favour by—T. H. W.

175. Will any of your philosophical correspondents be kind enough to give me a clear, accurate, and concise statement of "Spinoza's Philosophical System," and why it was designated as Atheism?—J. J.

176. 1st. Will any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* be so kind as to inform "Solon" in what language the Vedas, Shasters, and Pauranias, or the religious books of the Hindoos, are written? 2nd. What works would be the best to acquire a thorough knowledge of that language, where may they be purchased, and what is the publishing price? 3rd. What was the language of ancient Egypt; can it be acquired now; if so, by what means; also what works are necessary in order to obtain a profound knowledge of the religion, philosophy, &c., of "old Egypt"? 4th. Which country is considered by competent judges to have been the seat of civilization, Egypt or India? 5th. In what language are the inscriptions of the Nineveh sculptures written, and is it possible for any one to acquire the ability to decipher them; if so, by what means?

177. 1. What is the force of the interrogative μέν in ὑποτίθεται μέν; and give some illustration of this use of the particle. 2. In Heb. xi 35, why does the apostle Paul use the subjunctive mood

τίχασιν, and not the optative τίχοισιν? If any of your talented correspondents would answer me the above questions, I should feel greatly indebted to them.—J. B. M'C.

178. Being desirous of gaining such information as will enable me to understand and classify the various species of grass and botanical specimens, I shall be greatly obliged if any friend would inform me what is the best course I can adopt to obtain the necessary information. I should also be very glad to obtain similar information with regard to shells, insects, &c. I sincerely thank you for the great assistance I have derived from your valuable publication, for which I most heartily wish all possible success.—PHONOG.

179. Will any of the readers of this periodical inform me of the best method of studying mathematics? I wish to become acquainted with the science in all its various branches of algebra, Euclid, plane and spherical trigonometry, differential and integral calculus, &c. &c. I should like to know the order in which I should commence each particular division, and the best work or works on each of such divisions. Should physics be studied in connexion with mathematics? If so, advice on this head will be required. To what extent should mathematical study be pursued, by one whose sole object is the discipline of the mind? A reply to all these queries will be thankfully received by—AN EARNEST STUDENT.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

135 and 136. *A Student's Library*.—If I may offer any suggestions upon this subject, I would recommend to "Edward" and "A Law Student" the following works, in the place of and in addition to some of those recommended by L. on page 75:—5, Kennedy's "Greek Verses of Shrewsbury School" (8s.); 9 and 10, Bohn's Edition of

Butler's "Analogy" and "Sermons" (together, only 3s. 6d.), with Analysis, Life, Notes, and much other valuable matter; 11, Jelf's "Greek Grammar" (30s.), if not too expensive; 26, The Cambridge "Greek and English Testament" (7s. 6d.); 27, Todhunter's "Calculus" (10s. 6d.); 46 and 47, These are very expensive works, together amounting to upwards of £7; for "Edward" and "A Law Student" Smith's "Classical Dictionary" (15s.), embracing mythology, biography, and geography, and Smith's "Smaller Dict. Ant." (7s. 6d.) will probably suffice; 54, Grote's "History of Greece" is more valuable, but very expensive; 59, Browne "On the Thirty-nine Articles" is a much better library book, 2 vols. (22s. 6d.); 61, Phear's "Mechanics" (10s. 6d.)

To these I would add—66, "History of Greek Literature" (7s. 6d.), and "History of Roman Literature" (10s. 6d.), in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana"; 67, Cox's "Biblical Antiquities" (7s. 6d.), in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana"; 68, Prideaux's "Connexion of the Old and New Testaments" (19s.); 69, Wheatley "On the Common Prayer" (3s. 6d.), in Bohn's "Standard Library"; 70, D'Aubigné's "History of the Reformation"; 71, Pearson "On the Creed," edited by Dr. Burton (10s.); 72, Robinson's "Greek Lexicon to the New Testament" (18s.); 73, Eadie's "Biblical Cyclopædia" (10s. 6d.); 74, Kitto's "Bible Lands and Atlas" (7s. 6d.), in Bohn's "Illustrated Library"; 75, Barnes' "Notes on the New and Old Testaments"; 76, Maunders' "Treasures"; 77, Blackie's "Imperial Dictionary"; 78, Latham's "English Language"; 79, Johnston's "Gazetteer" (36s.), or the "Cabinet Gazetteer" (10s. 6d.); 80, Russell's "History of Modern Europe"; 81, "The Cabinet Lawyer" (10s. 6d.) Of these, the most necessary for "Edward" are Nos. 67 to 75, and for "A Law Student" Nos. 77 to 81.—J. B. M'C.

139. *Arabic Orthography and Pronunciation.*—In that amusing storehouse of literary curiosities, "The Doctor," by the poet Southey, the following passage occurs at page 170 (edition of 1848):—"Let me here, on the competent authority of Major Edward Moore, inform the European reader who may be ignorant of Arabic, that the name of the Arabian false prophet is, in the language of his own country, written with four letters—M.H.M.D. a character called *teshdid* over the medial M. denoting that sound to be prolonged, or doubled; so that *Mahammad* would better than any other spelling represent the current vernacular pronunciation." In an interesting work (published in the "Library of Entertaining Knowledge," and subsequently in Knight's "Shilling Volumes for all Readers"), written, during a lengthened residence in Egypt, by a Mr. Lane, the name (if I recollect aright) is given as *Mohammad*, thus agreeing very nearly with the orthography of Major Moore. I have seen it stated (I think in Mr. Lane's work) that the word *Mamelukes* is derived from an Arabic word signifying slaves, and should be written and pronounced in the form—*Memlooks*. "Homo" will find in Mr. Lane's book, "The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians," several hints as to the orthography and pronunciation of Egyptian and Arabic words.—B. S.

143. *Greek Lexicons and Testaments.*—An "Itinerant" must remember that the cheapest is not always the best. Robinson's "Greek Lexi-

con," published by Longmans, seems to me to combine greater cheapness and goodness than any other. Bloomfield's is cheaper, but not nearly so good: it is published by Longmans. A very excellent Greek Testament is "The Cambridge Greek and English Testament," published by Parker. It has the great advantage of having the English version and the Greek in parallel columns. If "An Itinerant" requires a cheap one, with notes, there is none I can recommend strongly; Bloomfield's or Burton's (each 10s. 6d.) may suffice.

N.B. If "An Itinerant" be entirely ignorant of Greek, he should learn the rudiments in some small Greek grammar (such as Anthon's), and then get Bagster's "Lexicon," published by Bagster. But this is not so good as Robinson's. If "An Itinerant" possess a knowledge of the Greek letters and language—J. B. M'C.

155. *The Order of Studying the Sciences.*—Z. A. will derive much advantage from the remarks of F. J. L., on page 237; but a few words more may perhaps be allowed, *grace F. J. L. et Z. A.*

Let Z. A. first take up Sullivan's "English Grammar," and Colenzo's "Arithmetic," a key to which can be procured. When pretty well advanced in these, let him study carefully the first part of Sullivan's "Geography," and then treat the latter part with the study of the History (to a small degree, at any rate) of the several nations, as they come before him in the "Geography." I would recommend Milner's "History of England," White's "History of France;" and, for the other countries, Keightley's "Outlines of History." Let him take up (Cassell's) "Euclid," and along with it Lund's "Elementary Algebra." When he has studied these well, he cannot fail, with due attention, to make rapid progress in the higher Mathematics. To Z. A., I would strongly recommend Colenzo's "Trigonometry, Part I," Phear's "Mechanics," and Phear's "Hydrostatics;" and, as a mathematical companion, Gouwin's "Mathematical Problems" and "Key."

The above works are, I believe, the very best for Z. A., and are mostly very cheap; and the order will, in my opinion, greatly assist him.—J. B. M'C.

162. *Two American Orators.*—Chief Justice Marshall was born in Virginia, in 1755. At an early age he engaged in the war of independence, and became captain in 1777. Having, however, resigned his commission, and devoted himself to the study of the law, he was admitted to the bar in 1780, and rose rapidly to great distinction; and in 1801 was appointed Chief Justice of the United States of America, the duties of which office he discharged with great ability and integrity.

Alexander Hamilton was a distinguished American officer and statesman, born in 1757. He entered the American army in 1776, and was made a lieutenant-colonel in the following year, from which time he was the constant attendant of Washington. At the close of the war he resolved to qualify himself for the bar. In 1789, he was made secretary to the treasury; but was made commander-in-chief of the American forces in 1799, when a French invasion was expected. When the army was disbanded, he returned to the bar; and five years subsequently fell in a duel, to which he had been challenged by Colonel Burr.

I am not aware that their speeches can be procured at any library in England.—J. B. M'C.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XVII.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. VIII., Vol. III. p. 359.

Senior Division.

Prepare a form like the one given, and arrange the nominatives, objectives, and verbs under their proper heads, after the plan of the example given.

A good boy, who learns his lesson, deserves commendation. Fortune favours industrious men. Every person has just as much pride as he wants sense. We should never despise people for the want of natural powers, but for the abuse of them. A good conscience, and a contented mind, make a man happy. Philosophy teaches us to endure afflictions: Christianity converts them into blessings. Dissimulation degrades parts and learning, obscures the lustre of every accomplishment, and sinks us into universal contempt. Self-conceit, presumption, and obstinacy,

blast the prospects of many a youth. Old friends are preserved, and new ones procured, by a grateful disposition. That friend is to be highly respected whose friendship is chiefly distinguished in adversity. Greater virtue is required to bear good fortune than bad. Among the great blessings and wonders of creation may be classed the regularity of the seasons. There sat in a window a young man named Eutychus. Where is George? Is he at home? The man who retires to meditate mischief, and to exasperate his own rage—whose thoughts are employed only on means of distress, and contrivances of ruin—whose mind never passes from the remembrance of his own sufferings, but to indulge some hope of enjoying the calamities of others, may justly be numbered among the most miserable of mankind. He who does the most good has the most pleasure. Prudence, moderation, and religion, produce true peace and comfort. Gratitude and thanks are the least returns which children can make to their parents.

SYNTAX.

RULE I.—A verb must agree with its nominative in number and person; as, I command; thou readest; he writes.

RULE II.—Active or transitive verbs govern the objective case; as, I command you; he writes a letter.

The Nominative and its Adjuncts.	The Verb.	The Objective and its Adjuncts.
A good boy, who learns his lessons, Fortune	deserves favours	commendation. industrious men.

MODEL EXERCISE No. V.—Vide Vol. III. p. 239.

NOUNS.—GENDER.	
By different Terminations.	
By the addition of "ess," and contraction, when necessary.	
deacon	deaconess
host	hostess
conductor	conductress
duke	duchess
adulterer	adultrress
seamster	seamstress
marquis	marchioness
protector	protectress
emperor	empress
votary	votaress
tutor	tutress
actor	actress
caterer	cateress
arbiter	arbitress
governor	governess
director	directress
patron	patroness
chanter	chantress
ambassador	ambadressess
mayor	mayoress

By the addition of "ine," and contraction, when necessary.

hero margrave	heroine margravine
By different Correlative Words.	
nephew	niece
lad	lass
king	queen
dog	bitch
carl	countess
	roe
horse	mare
lord	lady
colt	filly
beau	belle
stag	hind
wizard	witch
bull	cow
a m	ewe

By Prefixing a Word.

man servant	maid servant
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LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. VIII., Vol. I.—What does induction mean? Why is it a source of evidence? What does the whole universe do? What does Morrell say regarding induction? Why has philosophy been always an object of pursuit? What are the necessary preliminaries to induction? What is required to the

By the addition of "ix," and contraction, when necessary.

administrator	administratrix
executor	executrix

right fulfilment of these requirements? How should we proceed when desirous of elucidating the truth regarding any series of phenomena? After having prepared a natural history, how should we proceed? What is the meaning of *latent* process, and what of latent schematism? Explain the doctrine of *instantiæ*. Describe the inductive laws of J. S. Mill. What is Herschell's opinion on this subject? How are syllogism and induction reconcilable?

Protection.—Vide Exercise No. VIII., Vol. II.

Senior.—Consciousness, imagination, memory and association, in their relation to an explanation of monomania, insanity, and idiocy.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—V.

Question 38. Number of pairs = $\frac{48 \times 8}{4\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{768}{9} = 85\frac{1}{3}$.—Ans. R. T.

Question 39. Length of ladder = $\sqrt{37^2 + 20^2} = \sqrt{1769} = 42.05940$ feet. R. T.

Question 40. By the common rule for discount we have,

As $112\frac{1}{2} : 12\frac{1}{2} :: £37 \text{ } 15s. \text{ } 9d. : £4 \text{ } 3s. \text{ } 11\frac{1}{2}d.$ —Ans. J. M.

Question 41. First, 124.25625 acres = 12425625 square links; then, $\sqrt{12425625} = 3525$ links, the length required.

Question 42. Since the depth of each tank is the same, the content of the two must be proportioned to the squares of their diameters. Hence, $1 : 3 :: 12^2 : 12^2 \times 3$, the square of the diameter of the new tank.

$\therefore \sqrt{12^2 \times 3} = 12 \times \sqrt{3} = 20.784$, &c. feet, the answer required. J. T., Bradford.

Question 43. Area of triangle =

$$\frac{53^2 \times \sqrt{3}}{4} = \frac{2809 \times 1.7320508}{4} = 1216.3326743.$$

\therefore cost of pavement = $\frac{55}{2} \times \frac{1216.3326743}{12 \times 20} = £139 \text{ } 7s. \text{ } 5d.$ —Ans. W. C. D.

Question 44. Let x = the greater number; and y = the less; then by the question,

$$(x-y)x = 3y(x+y)+1,$$

$$\text{or, } x^2 - xy = 3xy + 3y^2 + 1;$$

complete the square and transpose, and

$$x^2 - 4xy + 4y^2 = 7y^2 + 1;$$

$$\therefore x = 2y \pm \sqrt{7y^2 + 1}.$$

Now, as x and y are whole numbers, the expression $2y \pm \sqrt{7y^2 + 1}$ represents a whole number, and consequently $\sqrt{7y^2 + 1} = a$ whole number.

Let $\sqrt{x} =$ this whole number;

$$\text{then } \sqrt{7y^2 + 1} = \sqrt{z},$$

$$\text{or } 7y^2 + 1 = z(b)$$

$$\text{or } y^2 = \frac{z-1}{7}$$

Since $\frac{z-1}{7}$ is a square number and a whole number as well, it follows that $z-1$ may be represented by a series of square numbers having a multiple of 7; thus:—

$$z-1 = 1^2 + 7, \text{ or } 2^2 \times 7, \text{ or } 3^2 \times 7, \\ \text{or } 4^2 \times 7 = 7, \text{ or } 28, \text{ or } 63, \text{ or } 112, \text{ \&c.}$$

$$\therefore z = 8, \text{ or } 29, \text{ or } 64, \text{ or } 113, \text{ \&c.}$$

The lowest square is 64. Substituting this value in equation (b), we have,

$$7y^2 + 1 = 64,$$

$$\text{or } 7y^2 = 63$$

$$y^2 = \frac{63}{7} = 9$$

$$\therefore y = \pm 3$$

$$\text{and } x = 2y \pm \sqrt{7y^2 + 1} = 6 \pm 8 = 14 \text{ or } -2.$$

The lowest numbers answering the conditions of the question are 14 and 3. W. C. D.

Question 45. Let a, b, c , be the sides of the triangle; A, B, C , the angles subtending them; and d the perpendicular. Since the sides of a triangle are proportional to the sines of the angles which they respectively subtend,

$$b : c :: \sin. B : \sin. C \therefore b = \frac{c \sin. B}{\sin. C}$$

$$\text{but } \frac{d}{b} = \sin. A \therefore d = b, \sin. A = \frac{c \sin. B}{\sin. C} \cdot \sin. A$$

$$\text{whence, area} = c \frac{1}{2} d = \frac{c^2 \sin. B \cdot \sin. A}{2 \cdot \sin. C}$$

$$\therefore \log. \text{ of area, } 5.487445 = 307217 \text{ links} = 3 \text{ a. } 0 \text{ r. } 11 \text{ p. R. T.}$$

Question 46. Let x = the length of the cord; then $(2x)^2 \times .7856 = \frac{1}{4}$ of an acre = 1210 yards

$$\therefore x = \sqrt{\frac{1210}{3.1416}} = \sqrt{385.15406} = 19.625 \text{ yards.}$$

J. F. L.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—VII.

56. A gentleman, dying, left property of the annual value of £2,044 12s. 6d. for the support of forty men, thirty women, and seventy orphan children, to be divided in the following manner. viz., for every 4s. applied to the support of each man 2s. 6d. is to be applied for the support of each woman, and 1s. 3d. for the support of each child. The trustees desire to know what sum of money will be available for the support of each establishment, provided hospitals be erected &c. each, without entrenching upon this part of the property.

57. A gentleman left £20,000 to be divided among his children inversely as their ages. Now, their ages were, in arithmetical progression, 3, 18, 16, &c., and 2. Required each child's share.

58. Extract the square root of 831744.

59. Two spouts running at the same time, which convey 12 and 14 gallons per minute respectively, fill a vessel in ten minutes. In what time will each spout fill it by itself?

60. There are three whole numbers, which, if the first be taken with half the second and one-fourth of the third, = 50; the second, with half the third and one-fifth of the first, = 64; and the third, with one-half of the first and one-sixth of the second, = 75. What are those numbers?

61. Given two sides (674 and 1,298 links), and the included angle ($60^\circ 20'$) of a triangle, to find the other sides and angles.

62. Divide 17 into two such numbers that the sum of their squares shall equal 175.5.

63. How many cubic feet of cork, at a specific gravity of 240, would be required to float a ton of iron at a specific gravity of 7788, in water?

64. How many butts will a cistern contain whose height is 8 feet 10 inches; length, 12 feet 6 inches; and breadth, 9 feet 11 inches?

Notices of Books.

Poems. By Alexander Smith. London: Bogue, Fleet-street.

No one has more need than the aspirant to poetic honours to say sincerely, "Save me from my friends." The injudicious praise of friends is frequently as harmful as the open censure of the critic. We cannot too much deprecate the habit of scattering profuse and indiscriminating encomiums upon those who humbly accept him as their literary patron, which the Rev. George Gilfillan, of Dundee, has lately so glaringly introduced into our critical literature. In no case can we suppose this itching after the gratification of a vanity—which is ludicrous in a gentleman so well entitled in many points to praise as the author of "The Bards of the Bible"—to have been more prejudicial than in that of the author of the poems before us. He has been held up to the public view in such terms as are seldom, by other critics, showered on poets who have earned a name; expectation has been piqued, and desire been set on tiptoe, to welcome the advent of him whom Gilfillan had announced as "the coming man," who was to sit in the temple of Fame in a niche beside Bailey and Sidney Yendys. This was too bad. Mr. Smith had not the opportunities of self-culture which these men possessed; neither did his position afford him the same excitement to poetic feeling as theirs. His young years, we understand, were spent in toil. The advantages of an early and thorough education were not his. To bring him into comparison with such men was obviously unfair; and, even although apparently generous, was ungenerous in the extreme. That Mr. Smith is potentially a poet we unequivocally assert; this book will amply prove *that*; but that he is in very actuality so is doubtful. It seems to us that he has spent more time in the study of Bailey, Shelley, Keats, and Longfellow—assigning them in importance the order herein given—than in the study of the human heart. Such studies, as models, may and must aid poetic development; but they must not be "all in all his study." He must, to use his own words,

"Strive for the poet's crown, but ne'er forget
How poor are fancy's blooms to thoughtful
fruits."

There is too much of Gilfillan's own style—wild metaphors, strained similes, huge hyperboles, and vain attempts at wit and humour—observable in the work. We would advise a course of careful mental training—a series of critical readings of the classic poets, a closer and more minute study of the feelings and passions of men—to the author, as well as keen, clear-eyed criticism, and extensive pruning of his efforts, before he next ventures to solicit public favour. There is a luxuriance of weeds as well as flowers: he must not mistake the one for the other. The true poetic instinct dwells within him; let him engage in intellectual and æsthetic culture, and the world may look for much from him. We hope for much. When we consider his youth, his opportunities, his culture, what he has done is excellent; but the injudicious "heralding" to which he was subjected has raised an idea regarding him in the public mind which

these poems will not wholly substantiate. We know, of course, that "The Life-Drama" appeared in "The Critic;" but then it was in snatches; and consecutive reading is the test of a poem's power. Recurrence of figures of speech, sameness of idea, barrenness of incident, is not so vividly felt in the one case as in the other. It has all these faults; atoned for, we must say, however, by far greater beauties—beauties which should recommend it to every young man desirous of encouraging youthful genius.

We shall not here dwell on the faults of the poem farther than to point out to the author the sameness of idea running through the passages under the word *shore*, in the following pages, viz., 25, 38, 62, 73, 90, 111, 115, 120, 128, 161, 187, 231, &c. Under the words *ship* and *Anthony* other instances of similarity may be found. We shall now proceed to indicate some of the beauties:—

"Here is a *portrait* in the style of the old dramatists.

I'll show you one who might have been an abbot

In the old time; a large and portly man,
With merry eyes, and crown that shines like glass.

No thin-smiled April he, bedript with tears,
But appled-Autumn, golden-cheeked and tan;
A jest in his mouth feels sweet as crusted wine.
As if all eager for a merry thought,
The pits of laughter dimple in his cheeks.
His speech is flavoured; evermore he talks
In a warm, brown, autumnal sort of style.
A worthy man, sir, who shall stand at compt
With conscience white, save a few drops of wine."—P. 116.

Who can fail to admire *this*?—

"Yet more I love

Than this; the shrinking day, that sometimes comes

In Winter's front, so fair 'mong its dark peers,
It seems a straggler from the files of June,
Which in its wanderings had lost its wits,
And half its beauty; and, when it returned,
Finding its old companions gone away,
It joined November's troop, then marching past;

And so the frail thing comes, and greets the world

With a thin, crazy smile, then bursts in tears,
And all the while it holds within its hand
A few half-withered flowers."—P. 112.

Here, too, are strong words, fittingly bodying forth a mighty moral truth:—

"My soul breeds sins as a dead body worms.
They swarm and feed upon me. Hear me, God!
Sin met me and embraced me on my way;
Methought her cheeks were red, her lips had bloom;

I kissed her bold lips—dallied with her hair;—
She sang me into slumber. I awoke.
It was a putrid corpse that clung to me,
That *clings* to me, like memory to the damned,
And rots into my being. * * * * *
I soon will grow as corrupt as itself."—P. 170.

In the following extracts few will fail to find true poetry, i. e., Truth, Imagination, and Emotion, finding utterance in words —

"Man trusts in God

He is eternal. Women trusts in men;

And he is shifting sand. — P. 174.

"Books were his chiefest friends. In them he read

Of those great spirits who went down like ours,

And left upon the mountain-tops of Death

A light that made them lovely. — P. 124.

"He who conceals at any living hope

The aspiration of a human heart,

Is just as many stages less than God,

That universal and all-sided Love. — P. 101.

"Sorrowful Mops, seeming as drowned in war,

A queen whom some grand battle day has left

Unhaired and a widow, while the stars,

The hand-maidens, are standing back in awe,

Gazing in silence on thy mighty form. — P. 4.

"As much forgot as the rhymer

That crossed the bottom of a lonely lake

A thousand years ago. — P. 164.

"On an unhappy thought

Telling all is not well falls from his soul,

Like a disused feather from the wing

Of a sick eagle. — P. 104.

Here citations must cease. We were our readers that we have been quoting liberally. The whole is not equal to what we have exhibited but there is enough in it to prove that Mr. Smith must be a poet if he strive with earnestness after refinement of taste and lofty thoughts. We have great pleasure in attesting our faith in her that he is able to fulfil his youth's promise. The task of deprecation is at all times a painful one for us, and we should have shrank there. Points into the nature of our readers with loud voiced protest did we not feel that it was more justice to the author to undo the evil which every anxious life every pulsing was likely to do him. We protest against the handling of men's fame merely as gratification for our own vanity regardless of the injury which may be done thereby. When a man comes before the public for judgment, let him then be tried by the laws of a generous and enlightened criticism. Do not let the herald trumpet about his name in the world's ear before it is earned, but that a wild report move than it can pain. We hope the author will take our hints literally, as they are kindly meant, and that

"In the ripe full-blown moon of his soul,

He shall go forward in his spirit's strength,

And grapple with the questions of all time,

And bring forth from them their meanings.

The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin. By Harriet Beecher Stowe. London: Clarke, Bowen, and Co.

This volume will be sought for with avidity by the readers of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," as it presents the facts and documents on which that story is founded, together with corroborative statements to verify the truthfulness of the work. This volume is, of course, much less picturesque and absorbing than its predecessor, but it is of peculiar, more heart-rending and pain-exciting in many of its details. It is divided into four parts. Part I. is devoted to a narrative of the incidents by which

the various characters introduced in the "Cabin" were suggested; in Part II. the question of American slavery is considered, as "by law established"; in Part III. the relation of public opinion to the subject is treated upon, and a few most alarming incidents of "lawful trade" are given; and Part IV. is occupied with a discussion of the subject in its religious aspect, and the whole concludes with an attempted solution of that most important practical question, "What is to be done?"

Secular Traits. By the Rev. J. W. Hunter, M.A. London: Houlston and Sturges.

Mr. G. J. Holgoake Refused to say (here I forget) By Sandra J. Chew. London: Houlston and Sturges.

The above mentioned pamphlets have been sent to us for notice, and, having introduced the report of the discussion on Secularism to our readers, we can have no objection to draw attention to these minor productions, as they bear upon the very great question. They are, we consider, worthy of the perusal of every impartial inquirer.

Journal Atlas. Manchester: J. Heywood. This is a very cheap and trustworthy production, containing the following maps:—The Western Hemisphere, the Eastern, Europe, England, Scotland, Ireland, Asia, Africa, North and South America. These maps are well executed, and the whole may be had for sixpence.

Table Turning and Table Talking. London: Henry Vizetelly.

To say that "the present is an age of wonders," is to make a very commonplace remark, but it is as true as it is true. Of late years we have not only been continually surprised by new applications of the old mechanical powers, but even as we have been in danger of being "startled from our property" by the professed discovery of "a horse," and the manifestation of occult influences. The most recent, and certainly the most striking, example of this kind is to be found in connection with table turning and table talking, and a number of persons by ranging themselves round a table, and apparently by nerve's placing their hands upon it so as to form a circle (the left arm of the right hand of one resting on the little finger of the left hand of his neighbour; and possibly, by waving a coefficient thus cause the table revolve in any direction they may will it, as if to be a fact beyond dispute, but the philosophy of the fact has yet to be discovered, or, if it is established.

Wellington and the Pulpit: a reply to a Sermon on the "Life and Character of Wellington." London: W and F G. Cash.

Although this pamphlet is given to the world anonymously, the style and contents show its identity upon the writer of the neutral article: "Wellington" in our June number. But to our readers suppose that this is a more recent of that article it is far otherwise, containing, as professedly does, "startling facts relative to a late war with remarks on Napoleon the Third and the power of the mission the church and so on." We cordially recommend its perusal to all readers and trust that it will have a sale sufficiently large to materially increase the number of copies of the pamphlet.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XXI.—THE LUDICROUS; WIT AND HUMOUR.

It is not our intention to open the present paper with a pleasant prelude invocation, such as that which forms the introductory lines of "The Ballade of Adam Belle," viz.:—

"Now lythe and lysten, gentylmen,
That of myrth loveth to hear;"

neither do we purpose troubling our good friend, Mr. Extract, with many requests to favour us with the loan of a few of those thoughts and "sayings so fantastical" which he has "set in a note-book, learned and conned by rote," and which he so kindly imparts—at a small charge—to those small wits who, when invited to dine with Peregrine Portly, Esq., under the idea that

"They should pay for each glass with a pun if they're able,"
pour forth,

"Through the funnel of noses
Lengthened down into proboscis,"

torrents of verbiage out of their "*excerptæ*," under the denomination of "sparkling effervescences of genius," or other *et ceteras* of superlative and hyperbolical extravagance, though they are at best but "musty, fusty, worn-out" quilllets, which, through frequency of repetition, have become "stale, flat, and unprofitable." Such players and we are, luckily, no friends. We regard wit as

"Words
That leave upon the still susceptible sense
A message *undelivered*, till the mind
Awakes to apprehensiveness and takes it."

Those who retail witticisms frequently forget that the capacity of receiving and perceiving must be possessed by the party addressed, while the power of presenting ideas in ludicrous juxtaposition, and giving them utterance with gravity and solemnity of visage, is a necessary prerequisite of him who would be thought a wit. From the neglect of this almost self-evident proposition it often happens that the best jokes, in these reciters' hands, fail, and many of those parties feel inclined to exclaim in high dudgeon,

"This is true wit, and whoso likes it not,
Is blockhead, coxcomb, puppy, fool, or sot."

We intend to inquire into the *rationale* of the Ludicrous, and to discover the necessary elements in Wit and Humour. Few topics seem to be less understood, as few are more *difficult of explanation*. Wit is the subtile essence of the intellect the aroma of the mind;

hence it is that with its original utterance it loses, in a great measure, its freshness and piquancy, its liveliness and force*—

" Like some fair flower the early spring supplies,
That gaily blooms; but e'en in blooming dies."

The ludicrous is the essential element in wit and in humour, and hence it is fitting that an analysis of these forms of thought should be initiated by gaining a proper conception of what is meant by this term.

" Where'er the power of ridicule displays
Her quaint-eyed visage, some incongruous forms,
Some stubborn dissonance of things combined
Strikes on the quick observer."

This "incongruous dissonance" is called the ludicrous: let us endeavour to acquire a clear idea of what is implied therein. When we think or reason, we in general follow some mental form, and have some prior conception of the results which are to constitute the sequents of the thought, whether that thought is expressed or understood. Experience forms the *data* from which we calculate what these sequences may most probably be. This habit of preconstructing ideals of, and bestowing formal coherency, uniformity, and consecutiveness on, the future, in accordance with our prior experience, is ordinarily legitimated and justified by events; but occasionally thoughts, words, or events, as the case may be, receive an unexpected jerk, which destroys the continuity and congruency which we anticipated; and when that involves no serious counterbalancing drawback, or produces no antagonistic emotion, the seeming playful, sportive, wayward gamesomeness lively impresses the mind, and produces a feeling of mirthfulness and gaiety. The ordinary sequences of thought, in ourselves even, when suddenly interrupted in their course, and led to turn, consciously or unconsciously, to the consideration of some new thought, somewhat distantly related, produces a smile. When this incongruity of thought, either in ourselves or others, becomes expressed in words, it gains, by objectivization, greater prominence in our mind, and hence more readily causes mirth or laughter; so also, when in external events the sequence of expectation is suddenly and curiously snapped, we feel disposed to enjoy the mistake, unless some higher feeling be excited by the circumstance, in merriness and glee. Here, from Richter, is a passage exemplifying the ludicrous in thought. Speaking of our universal father, Adam, he says:—

"Just consider; here in this man and protoplast lie side by side, without quarrelling, all the faculties and the whole race of man—all the philosophic schools, sewing schools, and spinning schools; the best and most ancient princely houses, though not yet cleanly picked out from the common ships' companies; the whole free imperial order of knighthood, though still packed up with their vassals, cottiers, and tenantry; convents of nuns bound up with convents of monks; barracks and county-deputies; not to mention the ecclesiastical chapters, provosts, deacons, priors, sub-priors, and canons."

* It may not be amiss here to exemplify, by reference to Pope's "Essay on Criticism," the latitude with which the word wit (from Saxon *witan*, to know) may be, or at least has been, employed, viz.:—1st. Intellectual ability, i. e., knowing faculties, *e. g.*, lines 53, 61.—2nd. Men of talent, especially poets, *e. g.*, lines 36, 45, 159, 517.—3rd. Poetic genius; and, 4th, Its result, poetry, *e. g.*, lines 60, 302, 652.—5th. Judgment, *e. g.*, line 259.—6th. Conceits, floridness, and redundancy of figurative expression, *e. g.*, lines 292, 303.—7th. The unexpected and ludicrous association of ideas—the modern meaning of the term—*e. g.*, lines 421, 447, 449, 494—507.

Here, from Douglas Jerrold's "Sketches of the English" ("The Linendraper's Assistant"), is a specimen of the ludicrous in expression, which bears within it truth, though sarcastically told, more valuable than "apples of gold:"—

"Can Cato measure muslin? Can Aristides put in a bad article, and swear it to be first-rate? Why should a man whose doom is to tear calicoes attend a lecture on the solar system? What has 'The Quarterly Review' to do with 'lawn as white as driven snow?' What is there in common between ginghams and geometry? What in the study of *Malthus* and *fashionable checks*? . . . Cannot the assistant sweat under the gas without yearning to haunt the Mechanics' Institution, to learn the nature of the vapour which poisons him? Does he pant to die instructed? Can he not pledge his honour, in consideration of his wages, without *mischievously inquiring into the moral responsibilities of civilized man*?"

The ludicrous in action will be found exquisitely described in Leigh Hunt's "Companion," Essay IX., "On the Graces and Anxieties of Pig-Driving," a few sentences from which we subjoin:—

"We beheld a man once inducting a pig into the other end of Long-lane, Smithfield. . . . A gravity came upon him as he steered his touchy convoy into this his last thoroughfare. A dog moved him into a little agitation, darting along; but he resumed his course. . . . The pig still required care. It was evidently a pig with all the peculiar turn of mind of his species; a fellow that would not move faster than he could help; irritable, retrospective, *picking* objections, and prone to boggle; with a tendency to take every path but the proper one, and with a sidelong tact for alleys. He bolts! He's off! *Erasit! Erupit!* 'Oh, C——t!' exclaimed the man, dashing his hand against his head, lifting his knee in an agony, and screaming with all the weight of a prophecy, which the spectators felt to be too true, '*He'll go up all manner of streets.*'"

The above extracts are not themselves ludicrous, but contain illustrations of what would be ludicrous if it occurred in our every-day thoughts, words, or actions; the literary exposition of the "ludicrous side of life" constitutes Humour.* The ludicrous may, in itself, be defined as the accidental occurrence of dissonant, unexpected, incongruous contrasts and combinations, sufficient to excite the mind vivaciously, though not seriously. When this is the product of affectation—the unsuccess resulting from overstraining to attempt that for which the person is evidently incapable—it gets mingled with a feeling of contempt, and is denominated The Ridiculous; but when it is the result of deliberate aim and intention; when there is shown in it a consciousness of power; when skill is exhibited in so placing words, thoughts, things, or actions, that they appear ludicrous, Humour is the appropriate designation. Hence originates Comic Literature.

Humour denotes quick, ready, and delicate tact in observing inconsistencies between character and profession, position and power, station and capacity, the ideal and the real,

* It may, perhaps, be as well to state here the chief works, or portions of works, consulted or read prior to writing the present paper, viz.:—Aristotle's "Rhetoric" and "Poetic"; Quintillian's "Institutes of Eloquence," book vi. chap. iii.; Barrow's Works, Sermon XIV.; Locke's "Essay," book ii. chap. x.; Addison's "Spectator," No. LXII.; Hobbes' "Treatise on Human Nature," chap. ix.; Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric;" Kaimes' "Elements of Criticism;" Hunt's "Wit and Humour;" Hazlitt's "Lectures on the English Comic Poets;" Beattie's "Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition;" Samuel Bailey's "Discourses on Various Subjects," IX., "On the Theory of Wit;" Sidney Smith's "Moral Philosophy;" Whipple's "Lectures on Literature and Life;" Priestley "On Oratory and Criticism," Part III. chap. xxiv.; Brown's "Lectures," LVII.; all of which see for a completer study of the subject. We feel much inclined to apologise for not making a better use of them.

&c.; incongruities between circumstance and expectation, apparent and real character, aim and ability, intention and execution, &c.; contrasts between prepossessions, presuppositions, preparations, &c., and their various results; and the capacity of giving vivid embodiment to these irrelations and disparities by imitation and description—the mimetic representation of how much fancy's witchcraft in the brain belies the realities which impress "the intellectual eye," and often

"Thus sages win us to their truth;"

for cannot many of us say,

"Thy words do find me out, and parallels bring;
And in another make me understood?"

Humour, however, is not a mocking goblin, wearing on its face "the sneer of sensual scorn," but a genial, merry-hearted, kindly, loving companion, who delights to go about "expanding caution, relaxing dignity, unfreezing coldness—teaching age, and care, and pain to smile—extorting reluctant gleams of pleasure from melancholy, and charming even the pangs of grief." He is not Mephistophilic, but a sort of compound of Puck and Ariel. He is "merry and wise," not misanthropical, and given to the utterance of shallow oracularities. Capriciously imaginative and fantastic, he is intellectual withal, and handsomely benevolent.

"Though he be blunt, I know him passing wise;
Though he be merry, yet withal he's honest."

We meet him; he takes us by the hand jauntily and jollily—

"Mild in his mien as fits an honoured friend"—

looks earnestly in our face, perhaps bursts out into a very thunder-clap of laughter; then, kindly holding our hand the while, he invites us to walk with him a little space; his genial eye twinkles with mirth; we consent, and proceed.

"The pits of laughter dimple in his cheeks;
His speech is flavoured; evermore he talks
In a warm, brown, autumnal sort of style."

We have been listening with delighted ears to his discourse, and now we find that all the while he has been holding up a mirror to ourselves, and has gently and patiently been pointing out our personal defects, the extravagance of our aims, the absurdity of our hopes, the disproportionateness of our mental and moral physiognomy. We cannot deny the likeness, resist the implied admonition, or feel offended by the freedom; nay, rather, we laugh at our own folly, grieve at our want of real self-knowledge, resolve to add at least one virtue to our character—amendment; and, suddenly raising our head to say so, we find our good tutor has vanished to thin air, and we standing at the base of the statue of Minerva, the goddess of wisdom.

Sometimes humour is exhibited in the mere exemplification of the ludicrous—amusing peculiarities of manner or grotesqueness arising from accidental circumstances—and that either by delineation with the pencil or graver, verbal description, or dramatic representation. Sometimes fantastical reasoning upon serious subjects, or an appearance of seriousness in treating of trifles, indicates that capricious indulgence of good-natured fancy and voluntary singularity of imagination, which constitute the humorous. A Burlesque is the adoption of a low phraseology and style of illustration as the vehicle of important

ideas, when we wish to refute or discourage them. The Mock-Heroic consists in treating trivialities with all the apparent gravity and pomp which is due to noble and worthy topics. Parody is a species of the mock-heroic, and consists in closely retaining the style of the original, substituting mean, vulgar, and commonplace ideas for grave and imposing ones. Humour, then, we may regard as the intentional exhibition of the Ludicrous, either by words, actions, painting, or other signs, when that exhibition is made with the design of conducing to reformation and improvement, or, at least, when free from malice or ill nature. You will observe from this definition that we regard an essential characteristic of humour, as belonging to the moral region of the mind. We believe that no instance of indisputable humour can be quoted which violates the above definition. Fun, frolic, drollery, waggy, badinage, buffoonery, joviality, practical jokes, and junketting there may be, but not humour, although, under certain circumstances, all these may become impregnated with The Humorous. In some cases, too, wit itself may border upon humour so closely that there may be great difficulty in discriminating between them; but, even independent of this, we believe that one great differentiating feature between wit and humour will be found to be a moral one. This, however, will more clearly appear in the following paragraphs on Wit.

Wit is a peculiar exercise of the faculties of the intellect, the emotional nature, and the imaginative powers. Intellect furnishes the clear conception, the minute knowledge of remote relations, and the ready perception of the suggested analogy. Imagination supplies the analogy, and gives the requisite unexpected jerk or quirk to the thought. The Emotions contribute the necessary feelings, and then the intellect fixes upon the most suitable expression. We believe that, in all cases, wit is ill-natured, reckless, mischievous, and malicious. Hence it is that *The Wit* is always dreaded, even when most admired; fear mingles with the veneration just as a feeling of startled awe combines with our admiration of the beauty of an eruptive lightning flash. There has, hitherto, been no very clear line of demarcation drawn between wit and humour, and herein, as we suppose, will the most tenable differentiation be found. The gaiety, admiration, surprise, and vivacity which it occasions, are also educed by humorous exhibitions, and there seems no peculiar distinction yet settled upon between these. In this moral difference, viz., that humour has a fellow-feeling for our infirmities, but wit assumes a superiority to them, we think there lies a potential method of discrimination. We can, of course, only suggest this solution of the difficulty, not force it into acceptance. Should our readers, however, upon mature consideration, coincide with us, we shall be glad, as by this suggestion we shall have added clearness to a frequently excited conception.

The wit may defend himself from the accusation contained in the latter clause of the foregoing paragraphs by saying, with Shakspeare's Mennenius,

"What I think I utter, and spend my malice in my breath."

Or it may even be that the world deserves to be

"Speared with a jest;"

yet why does the honour, self-given, of ringing the world's faults in the world's ears fall so peculiarly on him whose sympathy vents itself in a cold smile, a sneering countenance, and a piercing eye?

The jester in Smith's "Athelwold" exclaims, "What a simpleton art thou to think that a king's jester ever makes a friend; 't would mar his calling—he could not strike on all heads alike!" and we suspect it is much the same with all wits, and hence it is that they, like critics, are "hated, yet caressed."

That intellectual dexterity denominated wit we should, then, define as the capacity of so adroitly combining ideas, as to produce a lively emotion of surprise at the unexpectedly ingenious turn given to the thoughts, and admiration at the readiness with which inconsistencies of thought are brought into apparent harmony, while there lurks beneath the words an implied undercurrent of ill-intention, which operates as spice to the quickening of the relish with which it is received.

Without pressing the distinction suggested in the concluding clause of our definition farther than we have done, let us proceed to examine whether the three topics which we are at present engaged in considering form a series, rising in complexity and ingeniousness, though primarily based on the one perception. The Ludicrous is a mere perception—the consequence of the incongruity and inconsonance of things or circumstances; Humour is an intellectual operation requiring vivid powers of perception, accuracy of memory, aptitude for imitative delineation, vigour and buoyancy of imagination, gaiety of manner, and benevolent feelings, prompting him to obey the injunction of the poet, "Scorn not the least"; Wit requires, however, a more finely-edged intellect, a more minute perception of resemblances and relations, a more rapid and ready, as well as, in general, a more refined imaginative power combined with greater ingenuity, more instantaneous and compressed exposition, a keener brevity and subtler unexpectedness, as well as an electrical epigramaticism—having the power of at once dashing forth a bright blaze of light, and darting an abruptly sudden wound. The distinction here drawn may be illustrated by reference to the works of Pope, in which "The Rape of the Lock" will represent humour, and "The Dunciad" wit.

Space will not afford room for quotations, but we refer to one or two passages in British literature, in which the same distinction may be observed. As examples of the humorous, read Butler's "Hudibras," King's "Art of Cookery," Green's "Spleen," and Goldsmith's "Retaliation," in verse; in prose, the following papers from Addison's "Spectator," viz., "On the Use of the Fan," No. 102; "The Dissection of a Beau's Head," No. 275; "The Dissection of a Coquette's Heart," No. 281, are worthy of more than one perusal. As instances of wit, we may mention the satires of Hall, Donne, Dryden, Pope, Swift, Gay, Churchill, and Gifford; and in prose we may refer to Swift's "Polite Conversation," "Tale of a Tub," &c., and "The Letters of Junius." The literature of the present day furnishes two authors, who in their characteristics seem to us to differ exactly in this peculiarity; both have a keen perception of the ludicrous in life and circumstance, rare gifts of exposition and excellent constructive minds—the one, however, is a wit, the other a humorist—Thackeray and Dickens. The synthesis of these may be found in Douglas Jerrold. "Punch" is dedicated to the development of both wit and humour.

The present paper is intended to be suggestive only, not completely illustrative. We anticipate, in a future and forthcoming essay in another part of this serial, to develop historically and critically the whole "Theory of Wit."

Religion.

IS THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS A PRACTICE IN HARMONY WITH THE SCRIPTURES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN a discussion of this nature it is equally important to answer those arguments our opponents may adduce as to hold up to view our own opinions. We commence, therefore, by showing the fallacy of some of the reasons which have been hitherto brought forward. It has been urged by B. S. that the baptism of John included children, because we are told, "There went out to him Jerusalem, and *all* Judea, and *all* the region round about Jordan." B. S. says, if we deny that children went, we "reduce the number one half, and convict the evangelist of gross exaggeration;" but surely no one will contend for so literal an acceptation of the word "*all*," or we might with the same reason demand it for the word "went;" for infants could not go, but must be taken. But we are not left to such "hair-splitting" niceties as these; for we are told, in the very next verse, that they "were all baptized of him in Jordan, *confessing* their sins." This settles the question at once; for no one will pretend that infants could "confess;" and we never before heard it denied that John's was a baptism of repentance. B. S. says he "cannot regard it as in any way differing from the christian ordinance." Surely, then, he must see there is some ground for making the "christian ordinance" a baptism of repentance.

"Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name," &c. B. S. contends that this verse does not bear any limit. We do not wish to limit it more than the words used oblige us to do. Teach all nations. Disciple them. Do not these words exclude infants? How are we to teach them? How are we to disciple them? This comes to, "Who are the Lord's disciples?" Surely not those who have had a few drops of water sprinkled upon them, and the sign of the cross made by a priest. The church of Christ is composed of those who are capable of judging and choosing between Christ and the world. Every believer and

follower of him will be saved. "If ye do whatsoever I command you, then are ye my disciples indeed." Are infants, then, disciples? If not, you have no authority for baptizing them, as we are told to "disciple all nations, baptizing them," &c. B. S. seems to think we can draw no conclusion from the words used by Mark. To us they seem to embody the text given above. "Go ye into all the world (all nations), and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth (is disciplined) and is baptized shall be saved: he that believeth not shall be damned." In the next verse we are told that signs and wonders shall follow those that believe and are thus disciplined to Christ. But did children ever cast out devils, heal the sick, or speak with tongues? No; because they cannot believe in Christ, and, consequently, cannot be disciplined to him. However much B. S. may tremble at the conclusion, children cannot be saved by the gospel, for that proclaims salvation only to them that believe. We do not attempt to say how God may save them. The blood of Jesus *may* be sufficient for them; but, however much we may deceive ourselves, it is a fact that Jesus has proclaimed salvation *only through faith*; and children cannot be partakers of faith. What are the means, if any, God has not revealed, and we can never know.

Next we are triumphantly asked if among the three thousand there "were no anxious mothers who had brought their babes?" The sacred historian answers this question a verse or two after:—"Then they that gladly received his word were baptized." Could infants receive the word gladly? I trow not. The narrative continues:—"They continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers. And fear came upon every soul. . . . And they had all things common; and sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need. And they, continuing daily with one

accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God, and having favour with all the people." Now we ask any unprejudiced reader if such language applies to infants? Are they not incapable of anything recorded of the disciples? They could not, then, have been disciples.

Then comes the baptism, by Philip, of the eunuch; and here, we are told, there is want of authority for the verse, "If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest." Not so great a lack of authority though, as our opponents suppose; for I see Griesbach does not omit the passage, but gives a slight difference as occurring in some of the manuscripts he had examined, which read, "If thou believest with all thine heart, thou shalt be saved." Now, granting this to be correct; or, since some would like it better, omit the verse; still the account supports our views. The eunuch asked Philip if anything hindered. Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart,

{ thou mayest. }
{ thou shalt be saved. }

The eunuch expressed his belief in Jesus as the Messiah, and then Philip baptized him. Which reading do you prefer? Even if you omit it altogether, you cannot deny that Philip baptized this eunuch *only* on a "profession of faith."

The last "stronghold" is the households. We are defied to prove there were no infants in them by those who *should* prove there were. We are at liberty to say there were not, till some proof is offered. Meanwhile we would remark, that we are told that one household believed. Nor is it impossible that there might have been infants in that family, and it might be called a believing family still, for no one could misunderstand such a statement. If it could be proved there were infants in the households that were baptized, we should say that the infants were omitted because Christ's commission was to baptize believers; and there would be no impropriety in calling them baptized families, because all would limit the words by the command.

It is a pity to have dragged the fathers into this controversy; but, as others have laid stress on them, a word in reply may not be out of place.

Justyn Martyr tells us of some persons, sixty or seventy years of age, who were "discipled" to Christ in childhood; whence it is concluded that infant baptism was practised in the time of the apostles. But how are people "discipled to Christ?" Not by baptism, but by faith. Their faith, then, shows that, though still "young persons," they were not infants.

Clemens Romanus said, "Original sin affects infants;" and so our opponents have said infants should be baptized. But we cannot subscribe to the opinion that baptism washes away sin, or else why need Christ die? The father himself never drew the conclusion which our modern friends have arrived at from his words. What could be more remote from his mind than deducing the practice of pædobaptism from his remarks on original sin?

Polycarp said, at martyrdom, "Eighty-six years have I served Christ, and he never wronged me." What does this show?—that Polycarp was baptized when an infant? No; not a word about baptism. I have served him eighty-six years. How? By being "discipled to him," and "continuing in his commands." How did he become a disciple? By faith. This quotation, then, merely shows that Polycarp lived to a good old age.

We have heard other things quoted from the fathers; but not till the time of Tertullian, in the third century, do we find any unequivocal mention of, or reference to, infant baptism. Tertullian writes a book against it, and tells us it was "just then springing up," along with several other innovations, such as "anointing previous to baptism," "consecrating the water of baptism," "offering prayers and oblations for the dead," &c. &c. May we judge of it from the company it keeps?

We have thus, in deference to our opponents' predilections for the fathers, answered their arguments from them, as if they really possessed divine authority; at the same time, we would express our dissent from any such opinion, our motto being, "The Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible."

The Bible, then, teaches us the words of Christ, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." Again:—"Go and teach all nations, baptizing them," &c. We maintain that this is

command to baptize believers, and as such cannot include infants. There is neither precept nor precedent for the practice. Supposing we had another command for the baptism of infants, it would not set aside believer-baptism as enjoined in the commission. Even after that ordinance it would be the bounden duty of every one, on his conversion, to be baptized, according to the requirement of Christ, which is, to be baptized on being discipled. But the inspired volume expressly informs us that there is but "*one baptism*," "*one Christ*," &c., which "*one*" must, then, be that for which the

command is so plainly seen in Christ's last "*commission*" to his disciples.

We have, surely, sufficiently shown that that "*commission*" must, from its very nature, exclude infants.

There is no mention of the ordinance in the scriptures which tends to alter this opinion; on the contrary, every one seems to corroborate it; and we think that our opponents will find great difficulty in reconciling *many* passages with their notions, and some they will find it impossible either to suppress or explain away.

J. M. P.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE will of God is made known to us in two different ways: first, by direct precepts and plainly stated doctrines; and, secondly, by doctrines and precepts implied or understood. And it is manifest to the attentive reader of the Bible that those doctrines and precepts upon which our salvation more immediately depends are delivered to us in so plain and positive a manner that "he who runs may read;" while others, that bear upon less momentous objects, are often so obscure that all our reasoning and reflective powers are required to comprehend them. Hence we find the orthodox church prizing and preserving many truths which she has obtained by inference from the deep mines of holy writ—jewels which cost more labour to discover than "the pearl of great price." How much that we believe respecting God, heaven, the soul, the duties and destinies of the people of God, &c., must we reject, and cease to act upon, if we are to believe only what is plainly declared, and obey only what is positively commanded. The Bible is adapted to the varied powers of the mind, its saving knowledge requiring scarcely more than simple intuition, or the understanding of a child, to comprehend it; while much that is calculated to edify and comfort us calls for the exercise of every power which God has given us. God has no more designed to instruct us without the aid of our rational powers, than to save us without the consent of the will.

Baptism appears to be one of those subjects in which we cannot altogether dispense with the reasoning powers; for, although *this rite has been instituted by a positive*

command, yet that command has not been made to include positive injunctions respecting either the mode of its administration or its fit and proper subjects. Hence these particulars, which must be determined before the ordinance can be brought into practice, have to be ascertained by inference largely drawn from the whole of the revealed will of God. The more extensively these inferences are drawn from the Bible, the more just and scriptural they are likely to be. Baptists, while they obstinately demand from us express and positive scriptural laws and precepts in proof of the institution of infant baptism, are quite as unable as we are to bring this kind of evidence in support of their own side of the question. If we cannot produce a single passage of scripture which plainly and positively institutes the baptism of infants, neither can they find a single passage which plainly and positively excludes infants from this ordinance, and confines it to adults; therefore their peculiar doctrines are, like ours, the result of inference; and if our inferences—embracing as they do the whole written word, its spirit as well as its letter, and its harmony with itself and with natural laws—shall be found to be made on a more extensive scale than those of our opponents, we anticipate the candid reader, who seeks for the most scriptural and reasonable view of the subject, will give his verdict in our favour.

We propose to consider, in the first place, from what we may understand of the nature and design of this institution, whether or not it *may* and *should* be applied to infants; and, secondly, whether scripture, in

its general tenor, does not bear us on to this conclusion.

First. Let us consider the nature and design of this ordinance, with its applicability to infants.

Upon the nature and design of baptism we believe we fully coincide with the Baptists. We freely grant that it signifies the state of grace into which the soul has passed through a saving faith in Christ; that the application of water to the body represents the cleansing of the soul by the blood of Christ, the washing of regeneration, and the sanctification of the Spirit; that it is a pledge of the dedication of the soul to God—a taking on of the yoke of Christ—the beginning of the profession of godliness, and the seal of acceptance which God has authorized the church to set upon those she approves and receives into her communion. Now, if this be allowed to be the nature and design of baptism, it is evident, and we would not for a moment deny, that the *adult* recipient must first believe; and that, unless we are assured that he does believe with all his heart, we should not baptize him. For, unless we first hear his confession of faith, and see that practical renunciation of sin which accompanies genuine belief, how can we be satisfied that he, after a life of alienation from God, is in that condition which the ordinance signifies? Hence we find that the first subjects of this ordinance, who were necessarily adults, were examined respecting their faith and conversion before their admission into the church by baptism. But how different is the case with infants! They have no sin to renounce, no conversion to prove, no profession to make. They are in that state of acceptance with God into which the adult sinner passes through repentance, faith, and the operations of the Spirit. They are what the believer will be when he stands before God in heaven, among “the spirits of just men made perfect;” “for of such is the kingdom of heaven.” They die, and death transfers them to that kingdom: they are received to blessedness by Him who received and blessed them on earth. “Can any forbid water, that these should be baptized?” If they are indubitably Christ’s, why withhold from them the seal which marks us for his own? If they are members of Christ’s invisible church, why refuse them the visible sign of membership? Why should we thus,

by withholding the baptismal rite, practically exclude from the church those whom Christ has included in his church universal?

Further. Christian parents have an interest in the baptism of their children. The Christian, when he becomes a parent, no longer feels as an individual—no longer acts as an individual. His hopes, his fears, his joys and sorrows, are multiplied with his children; he feels and acts towards them as if they were parts of himself. And, if parental solicitude would lead him to identify their temporal interests with his own, how much more would he naturally concern himself for their heavenly interests? Surely his anxiety for his own eternal safety can scarcely outweigh his solicitude for theirs! How much his peace depends on his entire freedom from all doubt respecting their eternal well-being! And would God allow a doubt on such a subject to invade his heavenly peace? Would He leave him anxiously to ask the tender question, “Should my little ones die in their infancy, would all be right between them and God; would they be fellow-heirs with me of the heavenly kingdom?” without an answer of peace? No. He has made provision in His word for every stage of the Christian’s experience. Here his fears are put to flight, and his anxious inquiries answered. He is encouraged to bring his dear offspring to Christ. By faith he sees the blessed Redeemer take them up in His arms, put his hands upon them, and bless them; hears him say, “Of such is the kingdom of heaven;” and, “Except ye become little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven;” “Their angels always behold the face of my father who is in heaven.” The God of all comfort has given him these assurances that his happiness, which is bound up in that of his offspring, may be unbroken. Assured, then, that there is no barrier between them and the church in heaven, he is sure there can be none between them and the church on earth. He has, accordingly, a right to expect, and he naturally would expect, that the church should be prepared to confirm and establish these peaceful assurances of the word of God; that it should be prepared to recognize by the appointed sign of recognition his infant child, with himself, as an inmate and fellow-member of the visible church. Therefore let us imagine him, under these impressions

appearing at the threshold of the church, and desiring the admission of his child by baptism. Let us imagine his surprise and disappointment when the church, forbidding the baptism of his infant, in effect declares that, though of such is the kingdom of heaven, Christ has not positively said, Of such is the church on earth; that Christ has left no positive command for the baptism of infants; and that he must, therefore, leave his babe without the pale of the church, and enter himself alone; thus receiving one who, having sinned, has passed by repentance, and the cleansing of the blood of Christ, into a state of acceptance with God, and rejecting another who is already in that state, and sleeps, unconsciously accepted, on the bosom of the Redeemer. Is there no place in the garden of the Lord for these tender plants, that he must carry them back into the wilderness, to receive their earliest culture in unhallowed ground? Can he feel entirely at peace respecting his child's fitness for the kingdom of Christ while the church thus seems to cast a doubt upon it? Thus is he left painfully vibrating between faith and doubt—hope and fear. On the one hand is Christ, whose words shall stand when heaven and earth shall pass away, receiving, blessing, and throwing wide the gates of the kingdom to his infant child; and on the other hand the church, whose decisions are ratified in heaven, apparently rejecting, alienating, and shutting the door against it. How inconsistent! How absurd! And to whom belongs this inconsistency? To Christ? No; he is infallible. Then it recoils upon the church.

Secondly. Inferences may be more largely drawn from the general tenor of scripture in favour of infant baptism.

We have endeavoured to show that the infant children of christian parents have a rightful claim to this ordinance, both for their own and for their parents' sakes. It now remains for us to show that this view of the subject is in perfect harmony with the Old and New Testaments, and that God has always connected the children with the parents in his covenants with his people. It is well known that God's ancient people regarded their children as the climax of all their temporal blessings. Hence this parental passion became a powerful instrument in the hands of God for the government of his people. When they departed from his

ways, and became hardened in their frequent rebellions, to this tender, this vulnerable part of their nature, were his threatenings constantly addressed; and when he thought to move them to obedience by his "great and precious promises," these promises were always extended to their children. And so "great" and comprehensive were his promises, that many of them made to his ancient church were to be fulfilled under the new dispensation, under the reign of the Messiah; and, however near or remote the period to which the promises refer, the connexion between his people and their children—that covenanted connexion which was originally sealed to them in the rite of circumcision—is constantly kept in remembrance. Thus God, speaking by the mouth of Jeremiah, says of the restoration of his people, "Behold, I will gather them out of all countries, whither I have driven them in mine anger, and in my fury, and in great wrath; and I will bring them again unto this place, and I will cause them to dwell safely: and they shall be my people, and I will be their God: and I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me for ever, for the good of them, and of their children after them," Jer. xxxii. 37—39. And again, by the mouth of Isaiah, in a glowing description of the Messiah's blessed reign, he says of his people, "They shall not labour in vain, nor bring forth for trouble; for they are the seed of the blessed of the Lord, and their offspring with them," Isa. lv. 23. These passages are sufficient to show that God had not forgotten the covenant he made with Abraham, and which he afterwards confirmed to his children in the rite of circumcision. And to show that they referred without doubt to the connexion which should still subsist between parents and children in his covenants of mercy under the gospel dispensation, we have the direct authority of Peter:—"Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call," Acts ii. 38, 39. This connexion was recognised by Christ when he declared, in the house of Zaccheus, "This day is salvation come to this house, forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham," Luke xix. 9. It is still more distinctly recognised

by the apostle Paul, who says, "The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband: else were your children unclean; but now are they holy," 1 Cor. vii. 14. And there is good moral demonstration that the connexion of children with the parents in the ancient covenant was recognised in the times of the apostles, not only in words, but in deeds; for they baptized *households*. Upon the reception of the faith by the head of a family, the whole family appears to have been baptized. "And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, of the city of Thyatira, which worshipped God, heard us: whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul. And when she was baptized, and her household, she besought us," &c., Acts xvi. 14, 15. "They said, Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house. And they spake unto him the word of the Lord, and to all that were in his house. And he took them the same hour of the night, and washed their stripes; and was baptized, he and all his, straightway," Acts xvi. 31—33. And St. Paul says, "And I baptized also the household of Stephanus," 1 Cor. i. 16. We have called this moral demonstration of the point in question, because these passages afford evidence, certainly not amounting to demonstration, but savouring so highly of the probable that we deem it sufficient to carry conviction to any unprejudiced mind. We are not sure that there were infants in these households; but it would be strange, and certainly worthy of remark on the part of our Baptist opponents, if they all happened to be without them.

Let it be remembered that it is not upon this, or upon any particular one of the evidences we have adduced, that we rest our argument, but upon the whole taken together; for though, as we have before said, we are as unable to bring direct proof in favour of infant baptism as Baptists are to bring direct proof against it; yet, by placing our inferences together, we form a broad, substantial basis, on which the argument may safely rest. Any of the stones of a magnificent structure, taken separately, would give but little idea of the general plan; but place them together, and their relation to each other and to the general plan will at once appear. So must we do

with our arguments for infant baptism. Let us, then, endeavour to take in at one view the evidences with which reason and revelation have supplied us on this question, and let their converging rays point the way to the truth.

Although infants are declared to be "born in sin," and inheritors of its curse; yet it appears that these helpless ones, of whom millions pass unconsciously into eternity, have not been left without a share in the benefits of Christ's mediation, or without a place in the universal church of the redeemed. Christ having received and blessed them, and testified that of such is the kingdom of heaven. Belonging, then, to the invisible and universal church, they are, in their own right, members of the visible church, and have a claim to the instituted form of admission. It naturally adds to the satisfaction and happiness of christian parents to see their children thus received and recognised by the church; their exclusion is calculated to bring doubt and fear upon the minds of parents, and it is improbable that God would leave any source of disquietude open, or any source of happiness sealed to His people. These views, which seem to us to be the first we should naturally take of the subject, are borne out by the general tenor of scripture. Here we find that children were included with their parents in the blessings and promises of the ancient covenant, and that they received the sign and seal of the covenant in their infancy, when only eight days old. We find that the connexion of parents and children in God's covenants with his ancient church was frequently alluded to by the prophets; that they predicted that this connexion should exist under the reign of the Messiah. We find, also, that when the church was restored and spiritualized under the new dispensation, there was no intimation of this connexion being broken off; on the contrary, we find that Peter was instructed by the Holy Ghost to remind them that the promise was to them and to their children; that Christ received and blessed their children, and that the apostles baptized their families with them. In the absence of a special institution of infant baptism, what further proof need we that the children of God's people had that place and those rights under the new dispensation which they held under the old?

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J. F.

Philosophy.

WHICH WAS THE GREATEST POET, MILTON OR SHAKSPERE?

SHAKSPERE.—ARTICLE II.

It appears to have been long since agreed that Shakspeare, Milton, and Bunyan are the representatives of our Imaginative Literature. The world has set them high amongst classics. They each trod in comparatively untried paths. Shakspeare, having exhausted worlds," boldly "imagined new;" Milton took up "themes unattempted yet in prose or numerous verse;" while Bunyan freely drew upon his imagination, and it gave him an allegory at once so full, clear, and perfect, that no one has had the hardihood to touch upon the same subject with hopes of improvement. They appeared in the midst of eventful times, and coeval with circumstances transpired favourable to the development of representative men. Amongst these must first be mentioned the recent Reformation, and the appearance, in a guise that all might read, of that wonderful book, the Bible. To the influence of this book Hazlitt ascribes the chief glory of the Elizabethan age. And its appearance, thus giving permanence to our crude tongue, was appropriately marked by an era in the history of letters. The Bible was, indeed, a precursor. It induced intelligence which, like itself, was asserted with freedom and effect. Its eloquence and poetry, its "moving narratives and marvellous history," and, above all, its high-toned philosophy, could not remain unheeded. It was impossible for the perusal of this production to excite a sympathetic action, or meet with no response. The divine philosophy now introduced pioneered a new and better philosophy of common things; the true poetry and striking delineations of character in no measure inspired and taught our best poets; while the truth, the claims of the divine upon the human, and the ideative imagery—these unmistakably produced John Bunyan. Circumstances, therefore, or the state of society at large, are the elements which chiefly give rise to representative men. If, then, it be allowed that Shakspeare and Milton were such, we shall therefrom claim an

inference which will advance the question one stage towards its termination. For we shall be in a position to see that practical superiority was clearly to be expected of Shakspeare, even on the hypothesis that his genius was but equal with that of Milton.

The historical epochs in which Shakspeare and Milton figured are the data of our inference. Now we find that Shakspeare appeared immediately after the dawn of that period which found English letters first established in power and honour. He was preceded by such men as Spencer, Chaucer, Green, Marlow. The people generally were rising above the barbarism of the middle ages, and were growing intelligent in their predilections. Ignorance and bigotry would be satisfied, even if justice did not burn the "spirit-mediums" of those times. Reformation opposed corruption; knowledge laughed at artifice and hypocrisy; the Bible was open to all; the art of printing was extensively employed; the public mind was awakened and aspiring. There was, thus, an universal, calm, equilibrions, and earnest "looking for" of the true and the beautiful. There was too much true aspiration to allow of factious division. It is rare, indeed, that so many harbingers have ushered in the coming man. All foretold "the poet;" the man for "all time." Such was Shakspeare! He is incomparable, universal, thousand-souled. There had been no leading idea, no strongly-marked division of the nation's habits and belief, no popular cry nor league—nothing, in fact, of a tendency to distort, to crib, cabin, or confine his faculties within a narrow or prejudiced circle. He had every inducement to fix his attention on essential principles, and to eschew the paltry, unworthy crotchets of vain ignorance, party feeling, or morbid egotism. And Shakspeare unmistakably was, as his destinies seem to have decreed, *the universal poet*.

With Milton it was otherwise. Neither his opportunities nor powers were like those of Shakspeare. Or if nature did give him

Shakspeare's poetic power, she gave him other powers also, while time denied him the auspices. This anomaly could not act otherwise than by neutralizing the mental elements which give rise to individuality of character; and thus we have Milton, the *great man*, instead of Milton, the *matchless poet*.

It is a law, that no man can excel all others in more than one particular. This is evidenced by all history, and in all biography. It is true that the successful merchant may be the successful man of letters too; but never has it happened, that the first of merchants has been also the first of literary men. Nothing short of extremes, it is obvious, will affect our question. We have two rivals; one must gain the prize, the other lose it. It is a fixed and undeviating law of our nature, that he who would be first in one thing must be beneath many in many things. And thus it was, we contend, with Shakspeare and Milton.

There were many better men than Shakspeare, and many better scholars; but there never was one who more fully embodied the poet's power. We freely admit that Milton had many merits which Shakspeare had not. But we deny him the merit in question. If *Paradise Lost* had never been written, he would occupy a place scarcely lower in literature than he now does. In the absence of that poem, his worth as an essayist and a patriot would stand out the more conspicuously. As it is, we hardly know which to admire most, his prose or verse.

We are actuated by a pure wish to appreciate Milton and Shakspeare thoroughly and intelligently, and we shall freely admit for Milton all that his truest friends will claim. To say that he had great and versatile genius, that he was the most learned of his time, a lover of his country who united capacity with sincerity, is but to give him niggardly justice. He was infinitely more than this. Possessed of the rarest combination of intellectual power, his writings are full of estimable qualities. To him also belonged the special merit of employing his abilities in what he conscientiously believed to be the best cause. But mark; it was this high moral purpose, this constant aim to be engaged in most important work, to see nothing worthy of serious thought in things having no strong human interest, that clearly has eclipsed his poetic power.

Milton attempted too many things to allow him a fair chance for any single triumph. He gathered to himself a large aggregate of worth; and we regret that his success in this feat should have led to his failure in the one in question. For his chief purpose, the changeless aim of his life, the one object for which he lived, and to which, as a matter of duty, he solemnly devoted himself, was purely of a moral character. For this he sacrificed sight, money, and caste. His life was an embodiment of high principles. He daily trod under foot his cherished love of luxuriating in the pleasures of imagination. He fancied that a great work had fallen to his lot, and he engaged in a life of self-imposed duties. Even his sublime poem was written with the laboured effort of vindicating the ways of the Creator to the created. And thus, throughout his life, this characteristic will be found. With him, self and things less than of divine origin were always subordinate.

But our question refers to no other greatness than that of the poet. We are not to determine which was the greatest man, but which was the greatest poet. Waiving all considerations of utility, however important; of moral intention, however sacred; and, indeed, of everything extraneous to "the poet," we are required to give precedence to an abstract quality. Now, Shakspeare, unlike Milton, was, as we have seen, exclusively a poet. He is celebrated for nothing else. As for Milton, he stood up, a type of high courage, in the midst of fierce faction, before malignant enemies,

"Like a pale martyr in his shirt of fire,"

defending his faith; while Shakspeare might be found at a common *Mitre*, engaged in the intellectual gymnastics of bandying witticisms and jotting off extempore epigrams. Glimpses of the occupation or pastime of poets often afford not less curious than correct indexes of their true character. Shakspeare, we thus find, was always true to himself. Whether working or idle, he was the poet; but not so Milton.

But we shall found Shakspeare's claim to superiority on other grounds than those which subtend the foregoing argument; not, however, from fear of inconclusiveness, but (as Shakspeare himself has it) "to thicken other proofs." And in thus giving the last

place to the "Bard of Avon," we would not be understood to educe a plea for under-rating Milton. Our case is this:—"Not that I love Cæsar less, but that I love Rome more." Nor is Shakspeare preferred because he is a dramatist, and Milton an epic poet. We have no sympathy with such distinctions as these. No true lover of poetry will attach much importance to the difference between having it presented to him by way of diorama, or by way of dramatic action. The excellence of either mode depends not upon abstract principles, but upon genius or artistic power. Virtually, there is no difference between dramatic and epic poetry. For what difference can there be, of fundamental principle, in two combinations of power which produce one and the same result? There may be a variation of detail; one may be more complicated or less efficient than the other; but it is contrary to our experience to believe that there is a radical antagonism of principles. And thus, although there is not perfect identity of means, yet it is evident that the dissimilitude lies entirely in the arrangement of parts. The difference is one of form, and nothing more.

But as a result is the criterion by which we judge of means, it follows that the present question does not necessitate the discussion of anything connected with the machinery which our rivals may employ to effect their purpose. We have simply to prove who was most successful in effect; with the causes of this we have nothing to do.

The drama, therefore, includes the highest poetry, because Shakspeare has raised it highest amongst the forms in which poets have learned to mould their intellectual gold. Leigh Hunt, however, affirms that the epic is undoubtedly the best vehicle for poetry, and his argument is, that it is so, "because it includes the drama, with narration besides." But is not the highest art that which effects a given purpose by the use of the simplest means? None will dispute this premise. How, then, is the epic the most perfect instrument, if, to attain a given purpose, it has to call in a more complicated machinery than the drama, as it does, by including the drama, with something else too?

Now, we have seen that a poet's superiority is wholly independent of the form in which he may cast his "things of beauty;" and that his perfection is in proportion to the

quantum of a pure intellectual element which he pours out. This element has been designated, "the beauty of truth, the spirit of imagination, the fire of passion, the inducer of all purest intellectual delight." The poet, says Wordsworth, "is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, endued with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness; who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighting to contemplate similar volitions and passions, as manifested in the goings on of the universe."

Leigh Hunt would have us thus distinguish the true from the false poetry:—"Wherever truth and beauty, whatever their amount, can be shaped into verse, and answer to some demand for it in our hearts, there poetry is to be found, whether in productions grand and beautiful as some great event, or some mighty leafy solitude, or no bigger and more pretending than a sweet face or a bunch of violets; whether in Homer's Epic or Gray's Elegy, in the enchanted gardens of Ariosto and Spenser, or the very pot-herbs of the 'Schoolmistress' of Shennstone, the balms of the simplicity of a cottage. Not to know and feel this, is to be deficient in the universality of Nature herself, who is a poetess in the smallest, as well as the largest scale, and who calls upon us to admire all her productions; not, indeed, with the same degree of admiration, but with no refusal of it, except to defect." In addition to this, he adds Milton's hypothesis:—"Milton, who has said that Poetry, in comparison with Science, 'is simple, sensuous, and passionate.' By simple, he means unperplexed and self-evident; by sensuous, genial and full of imagery; by passionate, excited and enthusiastic." Shelley's evidence is, that "Poetry lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar." Yet more fully than from anything else may we gather up an appreciation of the poet from this sublime revelation of Milton:—

"Oh! I seem to stand
Trembling, where foot of mortal ne'er hath been,
Wrapped in the radiance of Thy sinless hand,
Which eye hath never seen.

"Visions come and go—
Shapes of resplendent beauty round me throng—
From angel-lips I seem to hear the flow
Of soft and holy song.

"In a purer clime
My being fills with rapture—waves of thought
Roll in upon my spirit—strains divine
Break over me unsought.

"Give me now my lyre!
I feel the stirrings of a gift divine,
Within my bosom glows unearthly fire,
Lit by no skill of mine."

There is but one way, therefore, of perceiving this element, and of measuring it, namely, by cultivating an expansive and critical appreciation of the true and beautiful; by endeavouring to enter cordially into the spirit of the poet's pleasures and aspirations; by trying to see beauty and delightfulness where he has found them. For the things in which the poet rejoices are those which have moved him to ecstasies, and have thus become to him, in and of themselves, their own exceeding great reward. How much meaning, therefore, is there in the truism,

"A thing of beauty is a joy for ever."

This, then, we repeat, is the test for poetry; and the application of it is necessarily individual, "*Wherever truth and beauty can be shaped into verse,*" and find some response in our hearts, there is poetry. We have no other test—can have no other. Poesy is not distinguishable by anything logical, or by any key-note. Truth does not make it; verse does not make it; it is made by an unapprehensible combination of these: and this state never is found where poetry is absent.

All, therefore, that remains is, to establish Shakspeare's identity with that *beau-ideal* of "the poet" which may be gathered from what has already been advanced; and this will be a summary process. First, then:—Who shall judge in the matter? Who shall decide which of the rivals poured out the most copious stream of that truth and beauty to which our hearts respond? The decision does not rest with an individual or a class, for the poet speaks to all men; he will be heard when the factions of a time are no more. The world, consequently, must decide; for it is for the world—for all time—that he writes. He does not address an age, or a party. "The past, the present, and the future, are his." He utters the irrepressible stirrings of a soul which has seen Nature face to face, and which has

been moved to tears by the eloquence of dumb things. On affairs that are "familiar in our mouths as household words," he dashes an essence which makes them "be as if they were not familiar." He eschews everything which has the smutch of age upon it, and gathers inspiration from a source which is far from the fleeting and time-serving, and which is as inexhaustible as the Nile itself.

A poet, then (it will be urged), is never so highly esteemed in his own day as in after-time! Precisely so. And the same remark applies to imaginative prose-writers. We can find no exceptions. Any one who chooses to review the past will observe the fact for himself, and readily assign the cause of it. We are all aware of the hackneyed theory about Byron's success and Wordsworth's oblivion. Byron was the man for the age; Wordsworth was not. While it is evident that the first is now waning and setting, and the last rising. One has had his day; the other's day is at hand. Shakspeare and Milton stand alike in this respect. Neither were appreciated by their contemporaries. It is notorious that *Paradise Lost*, though issued by Milton in the height of his fame, was thought by the publisher to be cheap at five pounds! Shakspeare fared but little better. And although we have no undignified accounts of money having been mentioned in connexion with Hamlet, yet we well know how lowly born the "child of nature" was said to be. Ben Jonson, with all his praise of Shakspeare, was not a true worshipper; his own learned lore he valued much higher than the "gift divine." Looking far into the past, and noting the advance of the *Bard of Avon*, until he has become the poet of the world, we see that it was the intelligent readers who bore him on and prized him. Not that he was neglected by the erudite. But it was left for the utilitarian nineteenth century to read and wonder. This fact is suggestive; it shows that the voice of unfeigned approbation does not remain with a few blundering, bookful blockheads, who infect every age, but who were, unfortunately, the readers and thinkers of the past.

The question, therefore, is—Who is more widely known and read, Shakspeare or Milton? No statistics are required in reply. We have not known it asserted that Milton is generally read as Shakspeare. The fame of

Shakspeare is not only English—it is world-wide. Other nations have set aside their chief poets, and acknowledged Shakspeare—a foreigner—as supreme. Nothing but the most imperative justice could give rise to such a demonstration as this. It speaks well for Shakspeare. But where is Milton? Has not one nation pulled down its gods, and pedestalled the Muse who “rode sublime”? Not one. We, therefore, unhesitatingly give our voice for Shakspeare. On the grounds here indicated we willingly rest his superiority. Let it, however, be noted that this test of being most read is applicable, as we have shown, only to authors who have been tried by time. Many books which are eminently adapted for a particular phase or movement, are perused with avidity for a time; but they soon sink, by their own gravity, into the unknown. Merit and demerit will ultimately assert themselves. Literature has always recognised this law. On it all criticisms turn, and all worth is based. It is the common canon in letters; and is emphatically the touchstone of the permanent and the genuine. How, then, stands our case when laid on this basis? Evidently, that Shakspeare is the greatest poet.

We think that there can now be no doubt

as to the conclusion which must arise from a summing up of the argument. We have seen that Shakspeare fell in most propitious times for eliciting his power as a poet; but that Milton, during his whole life, was distracted by events which peculiarly unfitted him for pursuing the poet's avocation. If, therefore, we still hold to Milton, we do so on the assumption that his mental constitution was different from that of any known man; that he, an intelligent observer of human nature and of great men, gathered that glory which the world can give but to one, without even trying, and without knowing it. We must conceive him best versed in the most recondite of philosophy (for poesy, it is said, is the most philosophic of writing) without wishing so to be, and by having given the subject only so much attention as great men give to minor things. We must suppose, that while he gave his whole time and energies to one pursuit, and his moments of leisure and relaxation to another, that in these snatched minutes, and by this fitful attention, he did more work than any one else has done in a life of exertion; and more, also, than he himself did in his serious concentrated years of toil. Milton's superiority as a poet is, therefore, impossible.

EXCELSIOR.

MILTON.—ARTICLE II.

POETRY is truthful and beautiful imagery musically expressed. This imagery may be of such a varied character, such different styles, that you cannot compare one poem with another. We need only ask the reader to endeavour to compare a short, fanciful, airy piece, such as Tennyson's “Lillian,” being an address to a young maiden, with such a sublime piece as Hamlet's Soliloquy, for him to admit this fact. And much of this difficulty do we experience in comparing the great epic with the great dramatic poet; the great pourtrayer of ideal with the great pourtrayer of real life. How different the subjects, how different the styles of the two! Where in Milton's writings do we find that nice, that minute delineation of human nature, which is so pre-eminently the characteristic of Shakspeare's? Or, where in the works of the latter author do we meet with that sublimity of thought, that grandeur of conception, and that soul-elevating

power, which abound in the works of the author of “Paradise Lost”? Hence arises a difficulty in discovering the relative merits of each writer. In comparisons like must be compared with like, philosophy with philosophy, history with history, fiction with fiction. And we have as much difficulty in comparing the witty and affecting delineations of human nature with the lofty conceptions of angelic and fiendish natures, as we have in comparing a picture that is already executed with one that is only commenced; we have a standard by which to measure the merits of the former, but those of the latter exist only in embryo. In like manner we have the standard of our own nature, and of this our world, by which to measure the merits of Shakspeare; but in the conceptions of Milton that standard is often wanting; for we do not know the grand beauties, the ecstatic joys of heaven, the dark horrors, the deep-seated despairs of

hell; the methods of the manifestation of the benevolence of divine natures, or the deep-rooted malevolence of satanic ones. We are left to judge of the description of these things by our own unaided imagination. Truth, then, is the usual standard by which we judge of the merits of any author, or, indeed, of anything which appeals either to our reason or imagination. Is it not the truthfulness with which the object is depicted or delineated that gives the chief charm to a picture, or to a piece of sculpture? Is it not the truthfulness of the likeness by which we judge of the merits of a portrait? Is it not the truthfulness and sincerity which pervade conversation which make it pleasing and desirable? And is it not the truthfulness of a remark which, when it falls upon the soul, causes it to vibrate with pleasurable emotion? How much pleasure we receive when we meet with some observation to the truth of which our own experience testifies! Truth is beautiful, and the most truthful is the most beautiful.

But to return. We have said that the standard by which we, in a great measure, value a work is often wanting in the chief works of Milton, and that we judge of them by our own unassisted imagination. "Paradise Lost," that noble work, which has made Milton what he is, treats of things unknown: the scene is sometimes heaven, sometimes hell, sometimes the regions of space: the actors are Divinity, angels, devils — the powers of heaven and the powers of hell. How has Milton described these invisible spiritual beings and places? and what judgment do we pass upon such description? He uses language so sublime, that you are lost in wonder at the grandeur of the picture that rises before you, yet the impression conveyed by the words is not of a very definite character. There is but here and there an object in the picture boldly and skilfully outlined, the lights and shadows of which you have yourself to fill in. But it is this very indefiniteness which impresses the mind with sublimity. To fill up the picture with words would be to curtail it of much of its magnificent proportions; would be to bring it down to a level with reason; for the definite picture then offered to our view must be far less grand than that the soul can shadow forth. There is much of this indefiniteness, for instance, in the de-

scriptions of the things and places Satan passes on his way from hell to earth—

"Hanging in a golden chain,
This pendant world, in bigness as a star
Of smallest magnitude." * * *

When the gates of hell are opened the sight that presents itself is thus described:—

"Before their eyes in sudden view appear
The secrets of the hoary deep; a dark,
Illimitable ocean, without bound,
Without dimensions; where length, breadth,
and height,
And time, and place are lost; where eldest
Night
And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold
Eternal anarchy, amidst the noise
Of endless wars, and by Confusion stand:
For Hot, Cold, Moist, and Dry, four champions
fierce,
Strive here for mastery, and to battle bring
Their embryon atoms."

To picture this scene, how much is left to the imagination; and yet there is sufficient thrown out for you to realize somewhat of the dark and dismal scene that the author had stamped upon the retina of his mind's eye. Again, what lengthened description can present a more beautiful idea of the glory of the Almighty and of the angelic hosts, than is conveyed by the following short passage:—

"About him all the sanctities of Heaven
Stood thick as stars, and from his sight received
Beatitude past utterance."

How grand a conception is that of Satan, the arch-enemy of mankind! He is described as being of the most gigantic stature—

"He above the rest,
In shape and gesture proudly eminent,
Stood like a tower; his form had not yet lost
All her original brightness;"

"but his face
Deep scars of thunder had intrenched, and care
Sat on his faded cheek, but under brows
Of dauntless courage and considerate pride,
Waiting revenge: cruel, his eye but cast
Signs of remorse and passion, to behold
The fellows of his crime, the followers rather.—
Far other once beheld in bliss,—condemned
For ever now to have their lot in pain;
Millions of spirits, for his fault amerced
Of Heaven, and from eternal splendours flung
For his revolt: yet faithful how they stood,
Their glory withered; as when Heaven's fire
Hath scathed the forest oaks or mountain pine,
With singed top their stately growth, though
bare,
Stands on the blasted heath."

Ah, what a picture have we presented to our view here! Satan, hell's mighty king,

with giant frame firm as a tower; whose ponderous shield,

"Ethereal temper, massy, large, and round;"
whose spear,

"To equal which the tallest pine
Hewn in Norwegian hills, to be the mast
Of some great admiral, were but a wand;"

he, with his scarred and careworn cheek, with his dauntless courage, his insatiable ambition, his fell revenge, his fierce and burning pride; he, the mighty spirit, who thought to overthrow the sovereign King of heaven, and to vault into his lofty throne—he wept. Yes! the arch-enemy of mankind wept "tears such as angels weep." Tempestuous passions and mighty emotions stir his soul, and lead him on to daring, to destructive, to impious, to cruel deeds; and yet the sight of suffering, of degradation, caused by and for him, melted him to softness and to tears: he had some few dashes of a gentle nature left in him still. Again we discover this in him when, bent upon his cruel errand of tempting man to rebellion, he finds Eve in the garden alone—

"Her heavenly form
Angelic, but more soft and feminine,
Her graceful innocence, her every air
Of gesture, or least action, overawed
His malice, and with rapine sweet bereaved
His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought."

Again we catch a glimpse of the nature which had been his, before rebellion, in his address to the sun—that magnificent piece of poetry in the fourth book, commencing at line 32. "Wherefore," he is made to ask, did he war against heaven's matchless King?

"Ah, wherefore? He deserved no such return
From me, whom he created what I was
In that bright eminence, and with his good
Upbraided none."

Want of space forbids us to quote more largely, but we would refer our readers to the address itself, as that which, in our opinion, stands unrivalled by anything in the English language.

It is the character of a human being endowed with fierce and mighty passions that is, in the passages above referred to, and elsewhere in the poem, so graphically portrayed; of a being not made up of all evil, but with remorse for past offences in desperate antagonism, in fierce conflict with pride and revenge, urging him on to further evil. The passions may be too intense, per-

haps, for a poor mortal; they would shake and tear his puny frame to pieces. But they are of the same nature; their intensity only is in proportion to the frame of the gigantic adversary. It is a sublime picture, and yet we are not quite satisfied; we feel there is too much of humanity in it, corporeally and spiritually, for the arch-enemy, the fallen spirit. Milton accomplished all that man could do, and yet not even his surpassing genius could paint spiritual beings in other than human frames, endowed with human passions, human sentiments, human instincts, human feelings. It is the fault of the theme, not of the author. And yet what a theme! How lofty, how grand, how sublime! What a daring flight of genius, what a consciousness of power to attempt it! What a soaring imagination, what a depth of feeling, what a fund of knowledge, what an acquaintance with the intricacies of the human heart, what a conception and deep-seated conviction of the wisdom, the power, the mercy of God, was requisite to accomplish it, and to accomplish it as he has done! Yes, we are lost in wonder and admiration at the glorious execution of so grand a theme.

And then the language in which those sublime ideas are clothed. How well it harmonizes with the lofty character of the subject! If a stranger to the work were to meet with a few lines by themselves, we think he might smile at the apparent pedantry of the language. But were he to read the work itself, as he warmed with the subject, as he became aware of its high character, he could but admire the taste that had clothed it in language of such simple dignity. Oh! 'tis a noble work, the production of a gigantic genius, of a pure heart. And, whether we will or no, we turn away from the contemplation of it with an awe-filled mind, and with souls raised high above the petty strifes and puny impulses of this world.

Not so do we always rise from the perusal of Shakspeare's dramas. Too often, alas! we close his pages with passions inflamed; with minds filled with the images of a sordid, of a voluptuous, of a vicious nature; with tongues vibrating with some ribald jest. We would especially hold up "The Merry Wives of Windsor" as a work unworthy of any public teacher, much less of Shakspeare. The tendency of this play we conceive to be

most evil. The lustful desires of an old *rue* are there alluded to in the most familiar manner, and treated as a mere joke. Women, virtuous women, make themselves merry at the expense of this old voluptuary; and after having inflicted upon him a few laughably inadequate punishments, the play concludes by all the actors in it sitting down to a feast. Is this the punishment due to an adulterer? Is it so that woman should treat the insulter of her modesty? Is it as Ford treated Falstaff that a husband should treat the would-be seducer of his wife? Is this the morality we are to be taught to imitate? Do not tell us to remember the age in which Shakspeare wrote. Can time alter the morality of such an act as adultery? Can time alter the virtue of woman's purity or woman's constancy? Can time alter the rebuke due to injured modesty? No! and far other than the morality taught in "The Merry Wives of Windsor," must be that taught by him who aspires to be England's greatest poet.

But let us not be misunderstood. We acknowledge the genius of the great dramatic writer. As a delineator of human nature, as one who speaks to and touches the feelings, as a poetic philosopher, we admit him to stand unrivalled. We know and have felt the exquisite beauties, the affecting truths of

"Sweetest Shakspeare, Fancy's child."

We believe nothing can be found in the English language which speaks with greater force than the tragedy of "Julius Cæsar." Anthony's oration to the citizens of Rome is the perfection of eloquence.

Oh! yes, Shakspeare, thou wert indeed a great poet, and well mayest thou be called "divine."

But let not our admiration of the beauties of his verse close our eyes to its many faults. Alas! not his most ardent admirer can deny that we have in too many instances to wade through whole pages of rubbish, before we meet with one truly beautiful and poetic idea; and that but too many of his plays abound in ribaldry and low wit. How painfully this contrasts with the high moral tone, the lofty purity, that pervades all the writings of Milton!

But to conclude. We have expressed a sense of difficulty in comparing the writings of the two poets under consideration, owing to their different styles. The poetry of each has, in our opinion, reached the standard of perfection. How, then, can we say that the one is a greater poet than the other? By careful examination. If imagination be the quality most requisite in a poet; if that quality be the more called into action in contemplating things not of this world, rather than the things of this world; in writing concerning spiritual essences, rather than corporeal beings; if sublime, lofty, dignified, awe-inspiring beauty be of a higher order than elegant, mirth-inspiring, heart-rending beauty, then, believing, as we do, that the one of each of these two appositions, together with purity, belongs to Milton and to his poetry, whilst the other, with, alas! much impurity, belongs to Shakspeare and his poetry, we must conclude that the former is the more to be admired, is a greater poet, than the latter.

Φιλαλήθης.

Social Economy.

IS THE USE OF OATHS FOR CIVIL PURPOSES RIGHT AND EXPEDIENT?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN bringing this important debate to a close, we would express our approbation of the christian spirit, intelligence, and evident thoughtfulness which pervade the articles of the two J. F.s; while, on the other hand, we would as unmistakably manifest our unqua-

lified repugnance for the shallowness and impotence of C. E.'s, arising from the absence of both adequate investigation and thoughtfulness. What we thus denounce we shall proceed briefly to expose. C. E. inquires, "May not the commandment of our Saviour

be construed in the same manner?" i. e., to suit his purpose. This question requires that he who asks it in debate is prepared to take his position on the original gospel text. This C. E. does not do, but has resort in his difficulty to a strange expedient—to Barnes' Notes—whose critical acquaintance with the original text of the New Testament is as evident as is C. E.'s utter incompetence to sustain his assumed position. The intelligent reader is informed that most Bible commentators entertain this view, i. e., C. E.'s; and the supreme of this "most" is Barnes! Now, we are not in the habit of consulting the volumes of commentators, for it generally happens that when this is done the inquirer is no nearer the true conclusion; for such is the state of theology, that theologians, with their huge tomes, may be named or brought together to such an extent on the different sides of most questions, until we find ourselves surrounded with armies of divines and libraries of books. We would tell C. E., with all respect to all biblical expositors, from Dr. Clarke down to Barnes, who is the last to be mentioned of the host, that to resort to theological polemics, even on this subject, is but a very sorry expedient. For the better perception of C. E.'s position, or qualification of Christ's command, "Swear not at all," let us examine the Greek text. The words occur in Matt. v. 34:—Μὴ ὀμόσαι ὅλως. The word ὀμόσαι is used in the scriptures with various degrees of signification, the highest being to confirm by oath a given statement—a religious act. The same term is used in Heb. vi. 13, 17:—"He sware by himself." The word ὀμόσαι is used in scripture to denote the taking of an oath in a religious spirit. But our opponents direct us to the context, and say that the meaning, and the extent of the meaning, is there denoted. This we admit readily; but that it means the practice of taking oaths in a frivolous manner *merely*, we deny on the same ground. "But let your communication be," it is rendered in our version. The word "communication" does not express the meaning of the original word, λόγος. But on this hypothesis do our opponents build their theory. Every reader is aware that λόγος is a word of great and varied significance in scripture. In the first chapter of the Gospel by John it stands for the deity and humanity of Christ; in Acts xv. 15, for

prophecy; in John viii. 55, for precept—v. 38, for testimony; in Rom. ix. 6, for a promise; in Matt. xiii. 22, 23, for the gospel; in other parts for a cause, account, motive, business, argument, controversy, &c. &c. How this word, then, explains the universal christian axiom, "Swear not at all," we leave the candid reader to explain *pro se*. If it show anything, it is, doubtless, more than our opponents dare admit. There is no real authority to limit the word to our daily transactions, conversation, &c.; rather a manifest licence to apply it to all our transactions with mankind in this life.

C. E. says Christ himself did not refuse to take an oath in a court of law, Matt. xxvi. 63, 64. So the simple affirmation, "Thou hast said," is an oath at length! This is a very palpable admission in open-court transactions, by the God-man, that the command, "Let your communication be, Yea, yea; nay, nay," extended to courts of justice also. Christ's words, "Thou hast said," were not an oath, but an affirmation according to his own precepts. C. E. then asks, "May we not conclude, in the words of the last article of the Church of England," &c.! Is C. E. aware that the book from which he quotes contains not fewer than 240 contradictions; or has his affection for a corrupt and falling church so blinded his spiritual vision that he cannot find them, though he join the muttering host every seven days thrice? Verily, such logic and religion are kin, and without severance, for once. In our opening article we anticipated and answered C. E.'s second absolute supposition as to the expediency of oaths, setting the matter, beyond "doubt," in the region of actual fact.

We now turn to our friendly opponents' articles and arguments, and in doing so solicit the reader's thoughtful attention.

J. F., of Birmingham, admits that an oath is a religious act; and, moreover, that none but "a conscientious man can rightly perform" it. How J. F. can affirm this, and at the same time defend the expediency of oaths for civil purposes, knowing, as he must do, that numbers who do take oaths for civil purposes are, according to his own assertion, not capable of the act essentially, he does not explain, neither can we imagine. According to our opponent's arguments on the expediency of the custom, they amount to

about the *same thing* which we have elsewhere affirmed to be *nothing*.

The longer we examine the subject, the more firmly are we convinced that the anti-christian spirit of a state church is at the root of the custom, as performed in civil purposes. J. F., of the July number, wrongly supposes that we regard "the Bible as the depository of two kinds of religion." This we do not. The spirit of both Judaism and Christianity is one; but the manifestations are not. We believe that the "childhood" of Christianity was Judaism. But J. F. does not credit this, because we, in our opening article, affirmed that the use of oaths was in harmony with the religion of the Jews, and yet not with the spirit of Christianity. Now J. F. must be aware that there are many things in Judaism of the same character, on the very principle which J. F. embodies when he speaks of Judaism as the childhood of Christianity. The idea of opposition and superiority he confounds. Just as there are many things consistent with *childhood* that are not with *manhood*, so there are many things consistent with Judaism that are not with Christianity; for instance, the observance of those things which Paul forbids in Col. ii. 16. So we think it is with the use of oaths. "Perjury, however, we have reason to believe, is not so extensively practised as to weaken materially the value of an oath." Has J. F. studied the late crisis in France, and the bribery and corruption of our elections, and

even of the state church? Is he cognizant of the awful fact that thousands do this very thing to become spiritual teachers, *alias* burdens, and often disgraces, to society? Has he considered the nature of clerical subscription, or the words of the Bishop of Norwich, who declared in the House of Lords "that he never knew a clergyman who agreed entirely with every article he had subscribed," which was equal to saying he never knew a clergyman who had not been guilty of mental lying. And wherein does mental reservation, in the matter of an oath, differ from *perjury*? We, too, have reason to believe, though not with J. F., that such perjury prevails extensively in the social and political branches of society, and that this has been brought about in part by the use of oaths. J. F. says, "Christ himself sanctioned the use of oaths by his own example," Mark viii. 12. 'Ἀμήν λέγω ὑμῖν εἰ δοθήσεται τῇ γενεῇ ταύτῃ σημεῖον! reads the original. But "in the original there is an ellipsis of some such words as these, 'May I not live,' or it may be, 'So help me, God.'" It amounts to this, that Christ uttered no oath at all; simply an unqualified assertion; but an ellipse is made out, and that *ellipse* is the oath required. This is an advance on C. E.'s method, but a very poor expedient in so grave a matter. What saith the reader? The life of Christ accords with his own words, "Swear not at all."

E. W. S.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

E. W. S., the writer of the first negative article, admits that oaths or appeals "to the recognised deities or Deity in the presence of others" have been *common* amongst all *civilized* nations; and then, after describing the manner in which the Jews were accustomed to perform the ceremony, he attempts to prove, under his third division, that the use of oaths is not in harmony with scripture and the spirit of Christianity. Will our friend be good enough carefully to read the following passage from the nineteenth chapter of Deuteronomy:—"If a false witness rise up against any man to testify against him that which is wrong; then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the Lord, before the priests

and the judges, which shall be in those days; and the judges shall make diligent inquiry: and, behold, if the witness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother; then shall ye do unto him, as he had thought to have done unto his brother: so shalt thou put the evil away from among you;" and then to refer to the declaration of our Saviour contained in the fifth chapter of Matthew, that he did not come to destroy the "law or the prophets, but to fulfil it," thus assuring us that he had no design to abrogate any part of the *moral* law, or to loose mankind in the least measure from their duty to God and man; but that he came to fulfil the law, by yielding a personal obedience to it, and giving mankind in

after ages the benefit of his example. But we would more particularly direct the attention of the impartial reader to the conclusion of our friend's article, in which he professes to be shocked at the immoral tendency of the use of oaths for civil purposes. And why? Because, forsooth, a certain lawyer in Northamptonshire had a test-book (an indispensable requisite in a solicitor's office) which he did not read in the office, and died from the habitual use of brandy. Our friend cites this fact as an *argument* against the use of oaths, and pathetically bids "the reader beware how he complies with a custom which tends in the end to such levity and thoughtlessness of things eternal and divine." Need we ask, What had the *brandy* to do with the test-book or the use of oaths? Must not the negative side of the question be a defenceless one indeed, if its supporters cannot find arguments more to the point than this?

We now turn to the arguments of E. D., the writer of the second negative article, who first endeavours to explain the nature of an oath, and then asserts that oaths must be unnecessary, "as the obligation to speak the truth is universal, without limitation as to person, time, or circumstance; because, as the Deity takes *equal* cognizance of all human speech and conduct, his estimate of truth or untruth cannot be varied by any ceremonies or circumstances." When E. D. wrote his article he must have quite forgotten the third commandment; that oaths were sanctioned by God himself; and that, in the passage in Deuteronomy which we have before quoted, he commanded that the same punishment should be inflicted upon the perjurer as he, by his false testimony, had caused to be inflicted upon his innocent brother. As we are told that God seeth not as man seeth, but that he judgeth the very heart and reins, E. D.'s assertion, that he takes *equal* cognizance of *all* human actions, without regard to time or circumstance, cannot be supported. In the third place, our friend adduces as an argument *against* the use of oaths the frequent enforcement of the laws against perjury; we, on the other hand, are fully prepared to argue that this fact is a very strong reason why the use of oaths should be continued; for if the heart of man is so depraved that even the dread of transportation and ignominy will not prevent him

telling a lie, and solemnly calling upon his Maker to hear it, ought not the ceremonies for the taking, and the punishment for the breaking, of oaths, to be increased rather than abrogated?

Our friend, in the last place, argues that the habitual use of oaths in courts of justice has an evil effect, and that children, and persons who deny the existence of God, are not considered as competent witnesses. Is there anything unreasonable in this? Can a child call upon and invoke the presence of the God whose nature and attributes he cannot understand, or the Atheist upon a Being whose *very existence* he denies? The well-merited rebuke of the bankruptcy commissioner upon the Secular Socialist would-be witness, referred to by our friend, has been too much dwelt upon and approved by the newspaper press to need any comment here.

E. D., in his second article, in the July number, tries very hard, but without success, to prove that our Saviour did not answer the high priest upon oath, because the high priest is only represented as using the adjuration by St. Matthew, as though the testimony of one inspired writer to a fact was not sufficient. But here our friend is completely at fault; for, if he will turn to the fifty-third verse of the fourteenth chapter of Mark, and to the sixty-sixth verse of the twenty-second chapter of Luke, he will find that our Saviour was arraigned, and his testimony taken, according to the Mosaic law as instituted by God in the above-quoted passage from the nineteenth chapter of Deuteronomy, in the presence of *the Lord, the elders, the priests, and the judges*; and of course, as a witness, he would give his evidence in the usual manner, by calling upon God to witness its truth; for there cannot be the least doubt that the Jewish council, with their usual adherence to forms and ceremonies, would even then carry out to the very letter the instructions as to testimony given them in the wilderness by their great Lawgiver.

In conclusion, we think a better argument in favour of the use of oaths for certain civil purposes, when ordered by the legislature, cannot be found than the following explanation, given by the Rev. William Burkitt, in his "Commentary on the New Testament," of the thirty-third to the thirty-sixth verses of the fifth chapter of St. Matthew:—"The next commandment which our Saviour ex-

pounds and vindicates is the third, which requires a reverent use of God's name. Now the Pharisees taught that perjury was the only breach of the commandment, and that swearing was nothing, if they did not forswear themselves; and that persons were only obliged to swear by the name of God in public courts of justice, but in their ordinary and common discourse they might swear by any of the creatures. Now, in opposition to these wicked principles and practices, Christ says, 'Swear not at all;' that is, first, swear not profanely in your ordinary discourse; secondly, swear not unduly by any of God's creatures, for that is ascribing a deity to them; and, thirdly, swear not lightly upon any trifling or frivolous occasions, for oaths upon small occasions are great sins. So that an oath is not here forbidden by our Saviour, but retained; for though light and needless, common and ordinary, swearing be a great sin, yet to take an oath, when *lawfully* called thereunto, is a christian and necessary duty. Christ by his prohibition doth not forbid all assertory or promissory oaths in matters testimonial, when imposed by the magistrate, for he himself, when adjured by the high priest, did answer upon oath." It is absurd to think that God, who is described as "not a man, that he should lie; nor the son of man, that he should repent," would

first *institute* and *command* the use of oaths among his own peculiar people, the Jews, and even set them the example by swearing to Abraham by himself, and then change his mind and abrogate their use altogether. The very name of God, as used when oaths are administered in our courts of justice, must be a great inducement to a true Christian to speak the truth, and a strong preventative against perjury being committed by even the most hardened wretch.

We still hope that the time when the use of oaths for civil purposes will be abolished is far, far distant; but the increased facilities of education, and the rapid advancement of the noble art of printing, fostered by a free constitution, have wonderfully extended the knowledge of the masses of the people; but we are sorry to see that with these improvements there has arisen an unbounded love of change, coupled with a hatred of and a desire to abrogate the time-honoured institutions of our country. Though advocates of steady and proper reform, we fear that many innovators, by changing the laws and altering the principles of our glorious constitution, would pave the way for a democracy, which sooner or later, as in the case of France, would certainly be changed into an absolute despotism.

C. E.

OUGHT TRANSPORTATION TO BE ABOLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

As there is a law in nature to which all other natural agencies subserve—development; so is there, in civilized society, a law to which things in general tend—progression. As in nature the law of development may not always be manifested, being either suppressed *pro tempore* by some opposing agency, or so slow and gradual in its workings that it is not apparent, except under continued observation and investigation; so is it with the great law of progression in civilization, legislation, education, and religion. This remark furnishes us with a stand-point from which we shall consider this subject in its various aspects and bearings. The evidence of the existence and progress of this grand law in society may not

appear if we confine our attention to isolated and limited periods of history; but, if we take a wide survey of the history of a civilized nation, the evidences become numerous and palpable. In the legislation and administration of the British constitution during the last half century we have a remarkable instance of this in a comparatively short period; while, if we take the history of China, we must study that history for several centuries back in order to meet with similar, and even then less palpable, evidence. The desire which pervades the popular mind, and the manifest tendency on the part of the legislative and administrative powers in this country, to mitigate penal inflictions and penal laws without forfeiting

the claims of justice, are indicative of the gradual progress of society. The number of those persons who do not believe either in the positive justice or absolute necessity of punishment by death or transportation is large and rapidly increasing, and they have in many instances displayed the greatest genius in the defence of such belief. The popular mind, or *public opinion, which is the only true basis of human legislation*, is slowly but surely advancing in favour of the total abolition of capital punishments. When the *British Controversialist* throws open its impartial pages to such inquiries as, "Ought Capital Punishment to be abolished?" "Ought the State and Church to be united?" "Ought Transportation to be abolished?" it is not to satisfy the curiosity of the reader or speculative debater, but to give expression to public opinion, and indicate the progress of the national mind in religious, political, and social truths—a noble object, and one which must promote the highest good.

We propose to examine the law of transportation *in se*, and inquire,

I. Does it come up to the standard of law, or does it embody and express the principles of universal justice?

Transportation, considered as a penal law, is partial and imperfect. While, on the one hand, it is a means to preserve social and political peace at home; on the other hand, it is an act of gross injustice abroad. No law can be pronounced good in itself, if in its administration the rights of individuals or nations, or the principles of universal justice, are violated. This is the inevitable result of the transportation system. If we inquire into the origin of this penal law, we shall find that it was not the result of wise deliberation, and a broad survey of all those consequences which might attend or succeed its administration; but, *dictu mirabile!* the reverse. The positive and probable consequences were either not thought of, or, worse, they were totally disregarded. It was not "the result of experience, and the reasoning of the learned and the wise," but of "mere speculation and theory," fear and incapacity. It was impossible that a good law should be instituted under such circumstances and influences. The reader will remember the period and circumstances in which this law originated. The government at that crisis was in a dilemma of no ordinary character

concerning the nature and extent of punishment for the violation of national laws. Such was the imperfection of penal science (if such it could be then termed), that transportation, rather than death, for minor offences was gladly acceded to. "For fifty-seven years (1718—75) we sowed crime broadcast upon the great seaboard of North America, until the colonies themselves indignantly protested against, and put an end to, our insane policy." In the meantime the immortal Howard had commenced his illustrious and philanthropic career. The world had already echoed with his fame, and the sad hearts of the sons and daughters of crime and misfortune beat with joy as his name re-echoed from shore to shore—from dungeon to dungeon, from the prisons of England to the lazarettos of continental Europe—as their benefactor and deliverer. Till his day the administration of justice to the debtor or criminal was an awful tragic farce. For the slightest offences and most trifling debts men suffered punishments worse than death: miseries now unparalleled are chronicled in history. What a fearful revelation of all this did Howard, by his godlike goodness and fortitude, make to the wide world! With him "the history of prison science begins. Before his time there were no data on which to base a rule of criminal treatment." It cannot be wondered at, then, that the treatment was imperfect and bad. "The gallows and the penal settlement" were the chief features of this treatment. With the latter we have to do. We cannot better show the origin of transportation than by quoting the words of Judge Heath on the subject of criminal treatment, as it will intimate pretty clearly the wisdom, logic, and spirit of the age on the subject:—"If you imprison at home, the criminal is soon thrown back upon you hardened in guilt. *If you transport, you corrupt infant societies, and sow the seeds of atrocious crimes over the habitable globe.* There is no regenerating a felon in this life; and for his own sake, as well as for the sake of society, I think it better to hang him." The time had, however, arrived when men were no longer to be hanged for cutting hop-bands and other trivial offences. This being the case, transportation was resorted to, as, according to the wisdom of the legislature, the only possible means of suppressing the crime. England was only to be pre-

served "by corrupting infant societies, and sowing the seeds of atrocious crimes over the habitable globe." Thus admitted one who stood at the head of the penal administration. Transportation was resorted to; and not until America protested against it did the system meet with any great obstacle. But this was a *great one*; for it not only saved the American coast from a continual deluge of crime, disease, and misery, but opened the eyes of all civilized nations to the enormity and evil of the system. The mind and genius of Europe were then directed to the study of the social sciences and the philosophy of law. Blackstone and Paley in England, Voltaire and Montesquieu in France, Beccaria in Spain, and the immortal Howard, all came to the same task—the solution of the penal problem. Since the appearance of Beccaria's celebrated work on "Crimes and Punishment," and Howard on the "State of Prisons," the intelligence, patriotism, and wisdom of England have been gradually rising against transportation. Notwithstanding all this, the system was again carried out to as fearful an extent as ever. From 1788 to 1845 England polluted the Australian coast with an ever-encroaching tide of crime and wretchedness, until the evil assumed such an overwhelming aspect that *it was thought no longer judicious to send convicts there*. The reader need not be reminded of our present policy, and "the expensive, dangerous, and destructive scheme of transportation to Botany Bay." As was the evil in Beccaria's and Howard's day, so is it now. Transportation still prevails as the law of the land. So difficult is it to undermine evils which legislation has rendered permanent, the lapse of time customary, and the law apparently right. But the popular mind does not consider it an embodiment of justice, good policy, or wisdom, *ergo* it must soon cease; and the day is not far distant we hope. Truly has it been remarked of "the gallows and penal settlement," that they are both of them "unworthy of an age or country pretending to a high state of civilization; both of them repudiated, or nearly so, by every other enlightened nation."

II. What are the consequences of transportation?

We may decide whether a law is good by its results. The axiomatic words of

Christ, "By their fruits ye shall know them," hold true here. The evils which arise from transportation are many, great, and fearful. This none will deny, the facts are so palpable. These call loudly for its total abolition, in a voice that is terribly eloquent, the daylight teachings of which no legislative powers can disregard without incurring equally terrible responsibility. Our space will not allow us to do more than glance at the chief concomitant evils of this system.

1. That it is an act of injustice to foreign colonies, or wherever our convicts may be landed. This we have already shown; indeed, it is an inevitable result of the system. Is it no evil or injustice to export vice, disease, lunacy, physical degeneracy, and moral corruption, into the very heart of "infant societies"? Illogical Heath admitted that it was far better to hang convicts than thus demonize the world. Who would not abhor the man who would dare to pollute the minds of youth? Who, then, can do other than denounce that system of penal administration which does it with "infant colonies," from which nations may spring hereafter to control the world, and that, too, in the light of Christianity, under the sanction of human law? "If we will plant the storm, we must expect to have to reap the whirlwind." Terrible truth, this!

2. Beccaria teaches us, on philosophic principles, that transportation is unjust to the convict himself. This is evident. The removal of the criminal from the country whose laws he has violated tends to obliterate the enormity of his crime from his memory, and ultimately to frustrate the end of the law, by administering an inadequate punishment, providing in the first instance the crime was of such a nature as to call for banishment, which is not always the case.

3. It is truly, according to Howard's words, "an expensive, dangerous, and destructive scheme." The administration of justice is necessarily attended with considerable national expenditure; but even in this there ought to be economy. Transportation is one of the most, if not *the* most, expensive mode of penal treatment practised; to say nothing of the loss to society of individuals who might be reclaimed to virtuous life and social happiness under a different treatment, and the awful beggary to which children and

wives are oftentimes reduced. How few survive transportation, and how few of those who do see their native shores again!

It is a dangerous system. The final nature of transportation produces hardness of heart, remorse, despair, anything but that state of mind which justice administered ought to produce—repentance. It is often attended with great loss of life during the voyages, arising from many now somewhat mitigated evils.

Thus have we shown that the law of

transportation is not the embodiment of justice; that it was resorted to in a dilemma; that those who have examined it in practice as well as theory denounce it as essentially and irremediably bad *in se*; that it is a two-fold injustice; that it is “a profound mistake,” and has hitherto proved an utter failure; and, finally, that it is an *expensive, dangerous, disastrous, and cruel scheme*. Let the candid reader weigh the evidence in his own mind; we are satisfied as to his ultimate conviction. E. W. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE universality of sin is a doctrine maintained by most theologians, while the prevalence of crime is a fact which continually forces itself on the attention of the statesman and the philanthropist. The “origin of evil” may be a subject of dispute; but its widespread influence is a matter of every-day experience. Various are the forms in which this principle manifests itself; but not a few arise from man’s character as a social being, and are offences against the social compact. This being the case, society naturally takes cognizance of these offences, and visits the culprit with such punishments as it deems necessary for “prevention or cure.” These punishments have been various in kind and different in degree. The individuals upon whom they were inflicted were said to be placed under the *ban* of society, a word from which our term *banishment* is derived, being, as we know, denotive of the kind of punishment most frequent in gone-by days.

Banishment was known as a species of punishment to the ancient Romans; and we have a record of two famous instances of this in the time of Augustus, viz., the poet Ovid, who was banished to a small town on the Euxine, and Archelaus, the son of Herod the Great, who was banished for life to a city of Gaul. All Bible readers will remember the case of the writer of the “Revelation,” who for his religion was banished to the isle of Patmos. By the statute of 39 Eliz. cap. iv. banishment, which meant mere expulsion from the kingdom, was decreed as the punishment of “dangerous rogues and vagabonds.” James I., however, virtually converted it into an act for *transportation* to America, by ordering the treasurer and council of the colony of Virginia, in 1619,

“to send a hundred dissolute persons to Virginia, which the knight-marshal would deliver to them.” Transportation, thus introduced into Great Britain, was continued during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, until the breaking out of the American war of independence. During this war, and subsequently, various plans were suggested by different individuals, and, amongst others, one by John Howard, for providing another penal system. But all attempts at this failed; and transportation was resumed by an act passed in the twenty-fourth year of George III., “which empowered his majesty in council to appoint to what place beyond the seas, either within or without his majesty’s dominions, offenders should be transported; and by two orders in council, dated Dec. 6, 1786, the eastern coast of Australia and the adjacent islands were fixed upon. In the month of May, 1787, the first band of convicts left England, and in the succeeding year founded the colony of New South Wales.” Penal settlements were afterwards established at Van Diemen’s Land, Norfolk Island, Bermuda, &c.

Against this system of punishment numerous objections, as might have been expected, have been urged. A few great and good men have objected to it on various grounds; and some of the colonists—even some of the descendants of transports—have loudly clamoured against criminals being sent to pollute their pure atmosphere! Recent events, especially the discovery of the Australian gold-mines in the proximity of the penal settlements, have forced this subject upon the attention of our legislators, and led to the introduction of the present governments’ “Transportation Bill.” Upon the discussion

of that bill we shall not now presume to enter; but we may remark, in passing, that the unfavourable opinions respecting transportation generally, which have been uttered by many in "high places," seem to indicate that something more in this direction may be expected from the government, and that it is time for the people to consider the subject for themselves, so that they may be in a position to exert their influence beneficially upon their representatives. On these grounds we rejoice in the introduction of the subject to the attention of the intelligent readers of the *British Controversialist*, and conscientiously take up our pen to maintain that Transportation ought *not* to be abolished.

All punishments, to be effective, must have at least a three-fold tendency. 1st, To inflict a penalty upon the transgressor; 2ndly, To bring a reformatory influence to bear upon him; and 3rdly, To exhibit a preventative example to society at large.

Now, we maintain that in a well-directed system of transportation all these tendencies are to be found; and further, that this has been the case in our own system, notwithstanding its imperfect character, and the more imperfect manner in which it has been carried out.

I. With regard to the penalty which transportation is felt to be to the offender. Under any circumstances, the idea of leaving home and fatherland, family and friends, is painful; but it becomes ten-fold more so when the removal is by force—when the individual is torn from the embraces of friends, and is sent for a number of years and a hard course of servitude—

"To sigh his English breath in foreign clouds,
Eating the bitter bread of banishment."

When we try to realize all this, we wonder not at hearing of female convicts, in past years, under sentence of death, refusing their lives on the condition of being transported to Botany Bay! True, the increased facilities of transit, the spread of intelligence, and prevalence of voluntary emigration, have done much to deprive emigration of some of its terrors, but they have left many unmitigated. In proof of this we have the highest possible testimony—that of Lord Campbell, the Lord Chief Justice of England—who so recently as the 1st of March last stated, in the House of Lords, that "he took on himself to say,

as a judge, that if he pronounced sentence of imprisonment for life in England, the sentence produced no such effect as if he had said that the prisoner should be transported beyond seas;" and on another occasion "he declared to their lordships, from his experience as a judge, he was in a position to state that the sentence of transportation produced the deepest effect, not only upon those upon whom it was passed, but on all who heard it pronounced."

II. As regards the reformatory influence of a proper system of transportation, there cannot be two opinions. Antecedently to all experience "reason itself would teach us," to use the language of Filangieri, "that it is possible to transform a bad man into a good one, by removing him from the theatre of his crimes, of his infamy, and of his condemnation;" and Dr. Lang, a lengthened and well-known resident in Australia, adds, "Unfavourable as the circumstances of the Australian penal colonies have generally been for ensuring the reformation of criminals, I am enabled to state, from my own experience and observation, that this object of punishment has actually been attained in these colonies in many instances; and that such instances would, in all probability, have been ten-fold more numerous, but for the circumstances and events connected with the administration of penal discipline in the Australian colonies." This might suffice; but we cannot forbear giving the testimony of our noble colonial secretary, who says: "With regard to the beneficial effect of transportation upon the convicts who were sent to the colonies, he found the testimony of all those who had been in Van Diemen's Land—and the testimony was invariably to the same effect—was, that the great majority of the convicts, having been removed from temptation, had become, as might be expected, *orderly and industrious people, who were willing to conform themselves to the laws of society.*"

III. With respect to the preventative influence of transportation much need not be said, for this follows as a natural sequence to its punitive character; and the testimony of Lord Campbell, already adduced, will have its due weight here. It has been objected to transportation, that by removing criminals from this country, we lose the exemplary influence of their punishment; but this does not hold good, while their

absence constitutes one of the principal elements of their punishment, for the knowledge of the cause of that absence supplies preventative power. True, this power may work secretly—and this is its essential characteristic—but it works not a whit the less safely and surely.

Time and space forbid us to add more;

but these hasty notes will be sufficient to set forth our opinion on this question, and to indicate the grounds on which that opinion is based. We are happy to know that we shall have an opportunity, at the close of the debate, of returning to the question, and noticing the arguments of our opponents.

J. M. S.

The Societies' Section.

STUDIES FOR LAW STUDENTS.

SEVERAL inquiries from correspondents, on legal points, induce us to resume our remarks under the above heading.

The nature of the inquiries now made will lead us into a different course of remark from that previously taken. One of our correspondents asks for a list of works adapted for general reading by law students; another asks if an articled clerk can go up for examination at any time within the last year of his clerkship. A friend has kindly furnished the main information sought by the first inquiry; we shall, therefore, chiefly address ourselves to the second, adding such general information as we may deem likely to be of service to our legal readers generally.

It is not a little curious, yet no more curious than true, that there are few matters upon which law students, as a body, are less informed than the details incident to articled clerkship. Great inconvenience must sometimes arise from this fact. When our legal friends reflect upon the great care which it is necessary to exercise during the period of clerkship, in order that there may be no impediments to the compliance with the strict "standing orders" we shall presently have to refer to, they will see how desirable it is that correct information should be early sought by those who would avoid the trouble and annoyance which the want of such information will be almost certain to occasion.

It is not to be expected that we shall furnish all the details requisite for the complete guidance of the articled clerk from the date of his articles to the date of his admission as an attorney. Such extended details can only be supplied by works specially prepared for the purpose, and of which there are several extant. We shall content ourselves with furnishing such general information as should be known as well by those who *contemplate* the study of the law as those who have commenced it.

We stated on a previous occasion that the ordinary period of clerkship is *five* years, except where the pupil has taken a university degree, when three years' service only is requisite.

When the term of articles has nearly expired, and the pupil begins to think of taking the necessary steps to secure his "call" for examination, he generally procures a "guide," and then the real difficulties of his position present themselves. He finds himself called upon, as the preliminary step to the important task on which he is now entering, to answer the following (or similar) stringent questions:—

1. What was your age on the day of the date of your articles?

2. Have you served the whole of your articles at the office where the attorney or attorneys to whom you were articulated or assigned carried on his or their business? If not, state the reason.

3. Have you at any time during the term of your articles *been absent without the permission of the attorney or attorneys to whom you were articulated or assigned?* and if so, *state the length and occasion of such absence.*

4. Have you during the period of your articles been engaged or concerned in *any profession, business, or employment, other than your professional employment as clerk to the attorney or attorneys to whom you were articulated or assigned?*

5. Have you since the expiration of your articles been engaged or concerned, and for how long time, in any and what profession, trade, business, or employment, other than the profession of an attorney or solicitor?

The pupil's answers to these questions, together with those of his master to a corresponding series of inquiries, will most probably determine the chance of a "call" at the period desired. Various notices precede and follow these inquiries as further preliminary steps, all of which must be in strict conformity with the orders of the Master of the Rolls for the regulation of the examinations as from time to time in force.

The act of parliament now in force for the regulation of these matters is (we believe) the 6 and 7 Victoria, cap. 73 ("An Act for Consolidating and Amending the Laws relating to Attorneys and Solicitors"), which all law students will do well to consult.

We may here state (in reply to the question referred to in the earlier part of this paper) that we do not know of any regulation or order in existence entitling an articulated clerk to go up for examination before the term of his articles has *fully* expired; on the contrary, all the forms to be complied with, and the questions put, would seem to imply that it is essential that the term of clerkship should be *completed* before examination. It is necessary to give one term's notice of intention to go up for examination. This, we think, might fairly be given so as to enable the student to go up immediately on the completion of the period of clerkship; or, if the matter was *really* urgent, a special order might, perhaps, be obtained from the Master of the Rolls; but such a step would entail expense; and, as it is quite clear the *admission* could not take place until the term of clerkship was fully completed, we can see no object in hastening on the examination.

It may be remarked further, as to the period of clerkship, that of the *three years' term* one year may be served with a London agent, *but no part with a barrister*; while, of the *five years' term*, one year may be served with a London agent, and one year with a barrister, or special pleader.

The legal works really essential to be read by a law student are, Williams' "Principles of the Law of Real Property;" the second volume of Blackstone's (Stephens') "Commentaries;" and the careful perusal of Cruise's "Digest." He should also read a series of clever letters on "Conveyancing," now publishing in "The Law Student's Magazine." His acquaintance with the works named will prepare him for the reading of such further ones as "Platt on Leases," "Ferne on Contingent Remainders and Executory Devices," Williams's "Executors and Administrators," Sugden's "Vendors and Purchasers," and the elaborate treatise on "Powers" by the same author. We place these works in the order in which they should be consulted. It is one thing to read a book, and another to under-

stand it; hence care must be taken that the books read lead, step by step, to the point desired to be attained. The peculiar branch of the profession intended to be followed must determine the subsequent or additional course of reading.

With respect to readings in "general literature," we think the list of works furnished by B. S., in the June number, on the whole so well selected, that we have only one or two to add; these are, "Sir James Mackintosh's Speeches," "Lord Brougham's Speeches," and "Sheil's Speeches." From these may be gathered the essence or philosophy of the law in several branches not usually treated of in "law books proper," and yet of great service to the student.

We fully concur in the remarks of B. S. on the importance of a knowledge of HISTORY to the law student. It is admitted on all hands that *without* this "the lawyer will frequently be at a loss even in the practical details of his own department, and can have no pretensions to be considered accomplished in his profession."

We have already fully expressed our opinion on the advantages of properly constituted "debating societies" to law students. We are pleased to remark that one of the greatest of modern lawyers (Sir Samuel Romilly) says, "that some of the arguments on legal subjects which he composed for the debating society to which he was attached were afterwards of the greatest use to him at the bar, and were frequently referred to by him." We trust many of our readers may derive like benefit, and "shine as he shone." C. W., JUN.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Edinburgh Young Men's Literary Union.—The lectures referred to in a recent number have been delivered. The first lecture was by Dr. George Wilson, on "The Power of the Eye to discern Colour." Amongst other matters, Dr. Wilson showed, by a number of instances adduced, that great ignorance prevails regarding the different kinds and shades of colour, and this even amongst those whose trades require a knowledge of them; whilst females, from the woollen and other kinds of work which engage their attention, know much more of colours than the opposite sex. The chair was occupied by Adam Black, Esq., late Lord Provost. The second lecture was delivered by Hugh Millar, Esq., on "The Relations of Geology to Theology," and was a very eloquent and impressive one. The chair was occupied by Professor Swinton, who with much eloquence enforced the lecture of Mr. Millar, who, from the humble occupation of a journeyman mason, had raised himself to the ranks of the most distinguished geologists and leading writers of his time. The third lecture was delivered by the Rev. Dr. Robert Lee, professor in the university and one of the city ministers. The subject of Dr. Lee's lecture was, "The Cultivation of the Mental and Physical Powers." The chair was occupied by F. Maitland Heriot, Esq., Advocate, who expressed his interest in the society, and the desire of the town council, of which he is a member, to promote the elevation of the young men of the city. The lectures have been highly successful, and have been favourably noticed by the newspapers; and it is contemplated to have a similar course in the winter.

The Edinburgh Albion Mutual Improvement Society held their first annual soiree, in Sinclair's Temperance Hotel, St. David's Street, on the evening of Wednesday, 29th June, 1853, when the members entertained their friends with a substantial repast; Mr. Paul in the chair. After tea the meeting was eloquently addressed by the chairman, and Messrs. Ingram, Macpherson, MacNaughton, Walker, Stodart, and Usher.

The Wigan Discussion Society.—This society was established in April, 1852, by the exertions of four members of the Wigan Mechanics' Institution, and consisted of only fourteen members, but has since that time increased to nearly thirty. Previously Wigan had not, for a considerable number of years, possessed a society of this description, nor an institution worthy of notice. The first meeting was held on the 27th of April, 1852, and a code of rules suitable to the object of the society was agreed to. Meetings for discussion have since been held on alternate Friday evenings, each question being introduced by an essay written by the proposer of the subject. On Thursday evening, May 27, the members celebrated their first anniversary soiree, at Mr. Grant's Temperance Hotel, where upwards of seventy members and friends partook of "the cup which cheers but not inebriates." After tea the cloths were withdrawn, and Mr. E. Clarke was called to the chair. The secretary's report showed the society to be in a very flourishing and hopeful condition. The meeting was addressed by several members, and the evening's entertainment was enlivened with various pleasing recitations. During the evening several select pieces of music

cieties, occupied the chair. Mr. W. N. Watson presided at the pianoforte, and, by his high musical talent, both instrumentally and vocally, contributed largely to the enjoyment of the meeting. Mr. Lamb supplied a *recherche* repast, in the shape of tea and cake, supplemented at a later hour by the summer delicacy of "straw-

berries and cream," which having been discussed, the special business of the festival was gone on with. The young *litterati*, after the chairman's address, arranged the grave and the gay of their programme, and songs, recitations, and addresses followed each other in pleasing succession.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

180. Will any one who is acquainted with the leading features of the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, London, and Dublin, say which of the four he would advise a person to enter who is studying for the legal profession? The inquirer's object in going to college will not be, like that of many, merely to fritter away three or four years of his life, but really to labour in the pursuit of knowledge. What is the study (if there be one more than another) to which each respective college more especially directs attention? What are the expenses for lectures and other fees in each? What degrees are conferred, and what is the value of the scholarships offered in each? Is residence in college the rule of all the universities; and how many months in the year is the student required to attend? How many examinations are there yearly? These and any other particulars as to the general routine of college life, its duties, &c., will be very thankfully received by the inquirer, and, no doubt, many other readers of this periodical, who intend at some time to enter college, and to whom such information would be highly valuable.—D. H.

181. I am a draper, hosier, and haberdasher; and, in order to a scientific knowledge of the business, wish to become acquainted with the place and mode of manufacture of the principal articles in these branches of the trade. Could you or some of your readers furnish me with a list of books containing the desired information, with prices attached? I should feel very deeply obliged.—HALF-ELL.

182. It is usually stated by farmers that a cart or tumbrel with wooden axles goes much easier over soft or newly-disturbed soil than one having iron axles, though in the former case the axles are double those of the latter in diameter. When a cart, &c., with iron axles is caused to go over recently ploughed or harrowed land, the wheels, instead of turning regularly round, frequently slide along the soil; but with the wooden axle this is scarcely ever the case. Will some of your able and philosophic friends favour me with a solution showing the reason of these facts?—JAS. G. G.

183. I find, in a work on dialing, that on fixing a dial it should be placed 5' 57" too slow by the clock on the 1st of August; but it does not state whether that is to be taken for any particular part of the day, or whether it will be too slow at noon as well as before and after noon; if so, of course the sun cannot be plain south, and at its highest point at noon, which I have generally understood was the case. I should feel particu-

larly obliged by an answer explaining the above, if you or any of your readers will do me the favour.—J. B.

184. Perhaps some of your many intelligent readers might inform me on the following points. The earth's orbit is elliptical; when at the farthest distance from the sun, the parts to the north of the equator have summer, and when nearest to the sun the same parts have winter; the southern portions of the earth, on the other hand, have winter when we have summer, and summer when we have winter. Now, what I wish to know is, whether, from the earth's proximity to the sun in summer, and its remoteness in winter, the degrees of heat and cold south of the equator are not considerably greater than what is experienced north of it during the like seasons?—A. M. A.

185. I would feel much obliged if any of your correspondents could give me some information respecting the various *rhymed* versions of the Psalms of David, which had been made in Great Britain before the Revolution of 1688? If possible, I should like to ascertain which versions were in use during the civil wars, and also whether any editions are in print still, and where they may be obtained?—A. Z.

186. Being asked to scan the following lines,—
"Now air is hush'd, save where the weak-eyed bat,
With short, shrill shriek flits by on leathern wings;

(Or where the beetle winds
His small but sullen horn,"

and not being able to do it, would any of your readers inform me, through the pages of your magazine, how to scan English verse? By so doing they will oblige—JUVENIS.

187. Having a great desire to acquire a knowledge of the beautiful art of photography; and, unfortunately, residing too far from any one whom I could consult personally on the matter, I was induced to apply, through the medium of your journal, to some of your learned correspondents, who, I have no doubt, will furnish me with the necessary information. I mean to pursue the Collodion process, on which I have read some few short extracts, which, however, were not sufficiently instructive. I find the different articles are very expensive, and would like to be informed whether there is any means of procuring some of the articles (say the achromatic lens) without going to the expense of purchasing them.—CYMRO-BACH.

188. Will any gentleman kindly inform me in what the examination for B. D. consists, and if that degree can be obtained without previous connexion with the universities?—AN ASPIRANT.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

135, 136. *A Student's Library*.—The variety and number of books recommended to "Edward" and "A Law Student," is enough to bewilder them; to most, however, of the additions and substitutions suggested by "J. B. M'C." to the list on page 75, I have no objection; only I think it would be well for "A Law Student" and general readers to omit from both lists all works relating to Greek and Latin composition, in prose and verse, and likewise all those mathematical works which range higher than Euclid and the elements of algebra; the result of studying which is not worth the time and labour necessary to master them. The list given at page 75 is, as a correspondent has suggested, deficient in works of history. The following list, which may be considered as supplemental to the former, will remedy this defect, and has besides the advantage of containing nothing but books of the very highest character, each being probably, in its own particular department, second to none for the accuracy, ability, and impartiality of its author. I place them in, what appears to me, their order of importance:—Lingard's "History of England;" Stephen's "Commentary on the Laws of England" (incorporating great part of Blackstone's "Commentaries"); Hallam's "Constitutional History of England;" De Lolme on the "Constitution of England" (Bohn); Guizot's "Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe" (Bogue has published a translation in 3 volumes); Mallet's "Northern Antiquities," with preface by Bishop Percy (Bohn); Hallam's "History of the Middle Ages;" Michaud's "Histoire des Croisades;" G. C. Lewis "On the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics;" J. S. Mill's "System of Logic;" Barrow's "Theological Works" (Oxford edition); Whewell's "History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences;" Bacon's "Chief Works," edited by Markby (published by Parker). I would add, that a very splendid and elaborate edition of the Greek and Latin classics, under the title of "Bibliotheca Classica," is in course of publication, under the joint superintendence of two accomplished English scholars, Mr. Long and Mr. Maclean; two volumes only have, indeed, as yet appeared, viz., "The Verrius Orations of Cicero," and "The Works of Horace;" but if continued, the "Bibliotheca Classica" bids fair to supplant every other edition of the classics at present in use in this country. L.

159. *A Camera Obscura*.—As no answer has yet been given to "J. D. B.," who inquires for a cheap mode of making a camera obscura, I would observe, that I think he would find it cheaper in the end to purchase one; he may get one with brass sliding front, and miniscus lens for obtaining pictures on paper, 4 inches by 3, for £1 1s.; but if he wishes to make one, he may obtain the required information from a little work by Willats.—E. S. P.

160. *Photogenetic Paper*.—Your correspondent "J. H." would do well to purchase a book, entitled Willats's "Plain Directions for obtaining Photographic Pictures," &c., which would give him all necessary information concerning the preparing of the above paper; the price is 1s.; it may be had through any bookseller. I may, however, in the meantime, observe, that he should be par-

ticularly careful about the kind of paper he procures, as for want of sufficient caution in this respect many experimentors fail. Monier's pure white paper is considered the best.

Having selected paper of a close and even texture, and marked on one side with a pencil, wash this side over carefully with a solution, consisting of thirty grains of nitrate silver, dissolved in one ounce of distilled water, which apply plentifully with a brush, thoroughly wetting every part, but leaving no moisture unabsorbed; this should be done on a hard, smooth board, and thoroughly dried in the dark. Then take a solution of two hundred grains of iodide potassium in half a pint of water, to which fifty grains of salt have been added; draw the paper over the surface of the liquid, letting it repose upon it, when plastic, for a few seconds, never more than one minute. After dipping, drain it, and lay it flat until about half dry, then set it afloat in clean water for about ten minutes, drawing it now and then along the surface; hang it in a dark room to dry, and, when dry, smooth it by pressure. It is of the utmost importance that all the soluble salts should be removed from the paper, and this is readily effected by leaving it floating for a time in water: a rougher washing would loosen the inside of silver. This paper will keep some time if carefully laid by in a portfolio. If "J. H." wishes to know how to apply the paper, when prepared, also respecting placing it in the camera, I refer him to the book before named. I may inform him also that the paper, ready prepared, may be obtained at the said Willats's establishment, at the following prices:—Photogenic paper, in packets, 1s. and 2s. 6d.; energiotype paper, ditto, 1s. and 2s. 6d.; Monier's pure white paper, 1s. 6d. per quire, &c., &c. Superior paper may be had at higher prices.—E. S. P.

165. *The Laws of Heat*.—In continuation of the article by us in the July number of the *British Controversialist*, concerning the nature of the sun's body, we beg to call the attention of R. S. to the following on "the laws of heat," by Professor F. C. Calvert, F.C.S.L., in the August number of the "Literary and Scientific Lecturer":—

"There are three distinct theoretical views on the nature of heat. The first is that of undulation or vibration, which admits that heat is propagated, in space or in matter, by the vibrations of an imponderable fluid existing throughout the universe called ether, according to the rapidity and intensity of whose vibrations is the degree of heat produced. The second theory is due to Mr. J. P. Joule, who found that force was required to produce heat—by friction for solids, by compression for gases, and by agitation for fluids. For example: he found when he agitated water in a confined vessel by paddle-wheel, moved by machinery put in motion by a weight falling through a known space, that each pound of water would increase in temperature one degree Fahrenheit for every foot that a weight 778 lb. fell. Mr. Joule has therefore found the mechanical power equivalent to one degree of heat; or, in his own words, that heat and mechanical power are convertible one into the other, and that heat is either the vis viva of ponderable particles, or a state of attraction and repulsion, capable of generating vis viva. The third theory

is known by the name of the Newtonian, or radiating theory, in which it is admitted that an imponderable fluid, caloric, radiates from a hotter body, to penetrate between the particles of a colder one, until the temperature of both has attained an equilibrium, and that this fluid travels with the rapidity of light, namely, 192,000 miles per second. Thus radiation takes place, not only from hot and luminous bodies, but also from ice at thirty-two degrees, to solid mercury at thirty-nine degrees."

It is this last theory that explains the reason why an opaque body, surrounded with a luminous atmosphere (such as the sun), can produce the sensation of heat; the radiating caloric of the sun's atmosphere acts upon the telluric atmosphere, and penetrates betwixt the particles of which it is composed, and so producing to us the sensation of heat.—WALTER.

166. *Alford's Greek Testament*.—As Vol. I. is out of print and undergoing immediate revision, the same improvements will doubtless be introduced into the new edition; and as several important works bearing upon the harmony, composition, and mutual relation of the four Gospels (as Smith's "Dissertation on the Origin and Connection of the Gospels," Westcott's "Harmony of the Gospels," Birks' "Horæ Evangelicæ," and Stroud's "New Greek Harmony"), have appeared since its first publication, Mr. A. may probably be induced to modify or alter some of the opinions he has so decidedly maintained in the first edition, and to which his high and increasing reputation as a scholar has given, and probably will give, among the theologians of this country and America, a deep and lasting influence. And therefore it appears the more necessary that the student should not become conversant with his Greek Testament, without also knowing what may be urged against some of those conclusions upon which he has based the whole superstructure of his theology; that he should be warned beforehand that the rationalistic element pervades every part of Vol. I., to a degree which is likely to be injurious to those who have not already made up their minds as to the perfect truthfulness of holy scripture as a whole, and whose belief is not deep rooted in the heart as well as in the intellect. In addition, therefore, to one or other of the works just named, I would recommend W. C., if possible, to peruse the following reviews of Vol. I.—viz., those contained in the "Edinburgh Review," Vol. XCIV., pp. 1—46; Kitto's "Journal of Sacred Literature," New Series, No. III.; and "Christian Remembrancer," Vol. XXII.; especially the last, the writer of which is evidently a ripe scholar, and, though rather high as a churchman, is nevertheless a well-trained and earnest, though somewhat pugnacious theologian. Another critique upon Vol. II. has lately appeared in the same magazine ("Christian Remembrancer," No. LXXXI. for July), which I have not yet had an opportunity of reading myself, but have no doubt, if the reviewer is the same as in the former case, that Mr. A.'s errors are duly pointed out and commented upon in such a manner that the reader may at least see and avoid them if he will. The chief errors appear to me to be the rationalistic tendency alluded to, especially where it leads him, when two parallel passages contain some apparent discrepancies, to pronounce them irreconcilable, and his want of candour towards those who have

attempted to harmonise them. Suppose, now, that the *textus receptus* and authorised English version were to be displaced by Mr. A.'s adopted *textus*, and his English version of it, and that the passages which he pronounces contradictory were to be marked as such, or wholly expunged, in all our Bibles and New Testaments, what could be expected but that many thousands of simple-minded people who believe in a verbal inspiration would be reduced to a state of doubt, and that infidelity and irreligion would soon be rampant over the land? Still a change must undoubtedly before long be made. The authorised English version is in many respects faulty; it is a not very accurate translation from a very imperfect and corrupt Greek text, and were it only for his devoting himself in earnest to a task which has scarcely been attempted before by an English scholar, but which is evidently of paramount importance to a right understanding of Scripture,—viz., the settling of the Greek text upon a good basis and upon just grounds; or for his interpretation of that text and commentary upon it, which tends so much to its elucidation; or for the marginal references to verbal and idiomatic usage, collected and arranged as they must have been at the cost of immense labour; or for the prolegomena, in which are discussed, with great ability, many unsettled questions respecting the authorship, design, time, and place of writing, connexion, &c., of the several books of the New Testament; for any one of these, Mr. A. must be considered to have rendered good and lasting service to the biblical literature of his country. The following is all I am able to collect of Mr. A.'s personal history. He graduated at Cambridge in 1832, when he took a first class both in classics and mathematics. In 1841-2 he was Hulsean Lecturer, and subsequently held the office of examiner in logic and moral philosophy in the University of London. Those of his works which (previous to the appearance of his edition of the "Greek Testament") obtained most notice were: his "Poems," some of which, and especially the minor pieces, are very beautiful; his "Pro-gymnasmata; or, Greek and Latin Exercises;" and "Lectures on the Influence of the Fifth Commandment," delivered in the theatre of the City of London School. He has also published numerous volumes of sermons, as well as other works. But his edition of the Greek Testament is undoubtedly his masterpiece, and by that probably, more than by any thing else he has yet written, will his name be known to posterity.—F. J. L.

168. *Studies and Qualifications for the Scotch Bar*.—The corresponding term in English law to the Scotch "advocate" is "barrister." As to the studies and qualifications necessary for admission to the Scotch bar—1. With regard to Studies—there is no prescribed course. The students invariably attend the three law classes in the University of Edinburgh, viz., the civil law, law of Scotland, and conveyancing, for two or three courses, and nearly as invariably the classes of humanity, logic, and rhetoric. It is a custom of theirs also to devote a portion of their time to a law office. They thereby derive considerable advantage in observing the practical details of the profession, such as the forms of deeds, court and other papers, &c. To acquire an accurate knowledge of the conveyancing branch, attendance in an office where business of the kind is transacted

would be absolutely necessary. 2. Qualifications. The applicant for admission must be twenty years of age. He must be proficient in the Roman and Scottish laws, and a Latin scholar. He is first examined on the Roman, or, as it is called by way of pre-eminence, *the civil law*, as contained in Justinian's "Institutes." He undergoes a second examination at the expiry of a year on the law of Scotland, from the text in Erskine's "Principles." He has to compose a Latin thesis from a title in the "Pandects," and to defend it publicly before the faculty of advocates. The most encouraging, if it is not the most interesting, information to an aspirant is, perhaps, the fact that the judges of the supreme court, sheriffs-principal, and other judicial officers, are selected from the faculty. The highest official appointments are filled by members, while all occupations of a legal or mental nature are open to them. Scottish gentlemen often pass for the *status* membership confers upon them in society; but eldest sons of noblemen, and near relations of the aristocracy, have not considered practice or its emoluments to be beneath them. Lord Brougham is a member.—L. M. B.

An advocate is an individual who pleads at the bar of the supreme courts of Scotland. His services are required both in civil and criminal actions, and in debating cases to be decided by the judges of court, or by a jury. The Scotch advocate corresponds, generally, to the English barrister. In many instances advocates, or counsel, as they are otherwise called, prepare the written parts of a case, and give written opinions on memorials submitted to them, with the view of guiding parties either as to raising or defending actions, or regarding the terms or management of trusts committed to them. Whilst an advocate is permitted to plead in any court, although he seldom does so in the inferior courts, as these are called, in the latter the agents or attorneys usually conduct the oral pleading, besides the other departments of a case. One body of agents, namely, those of Aberdeen, are allowed, by long usage, to call themselves advocates, and are generally known as such.

The advocates form a society which had its origin shortly after the establishment of the Court of Session in Scotland, or, as it is called, the College of Justice, after the model of the parliament of Paris. At first the society did not consist of more than ten members, but it gradually increased, and now numbers between 400 and 500 members. The advocates, at one time, acted as attorneys as well as counsel; but they soon ceased to do so, and the attorneys were formed into societies distinct from the society or faculty of advocates. The faculty has the power of electing a president or dean, who is familiarly known as dean of faculty, and this office has been held, from time to time, by very eminent persons. Like all the other members of the College of Justice, advocates are under the control of the senators or judges, who can censure, suspend, or depose for any conduct derogatory to the character of the legal profession. The faculty has been adorned, since its origin in 1532, by many names distinguished in literature and politics. Individuals have frequently become members of the faculty for the sake of the severe training necessary, and for the knowledge of the civil law thereby acquired, a knowledge which is

sometimes considered a requisite of a polite education. Amongst the judges we need only refer to Jeffrey and Cockburn, of our own day, and amongst the members of the bar, to Professor Aytoun, Professor Ferrier, Sir Archibald Alison, Lord Brougham, Mr. J. G. Lockhart, and Professor Wilson, as distinguished in the world of literature. Mr. Christopher, Mr. Horsman, Colonel Mure, and Mr. W. F. Mackenzie, may be mentioned as members of the legislature who are enrolled as members of the faculty. We ought not, however, to forget in this periodical the name of Mr. James Simpson, so well known for his efforts for the elevation of the labouring classes, particularly as regards secular instruction, as one who reflects much honour upon the faculty.

Although not incorporated by act of parliament, the faculty of advocates possesses various important privileges given by the legislature, or assumed by custom. From the faculty are practically chosen the judges or senators of the Supreme Court, and the sheriffs (the word being derived from the Saxon *reeve*, magistrate, or ruler; and *sheer*, to cut divide), the local judges in the different divisions of the country called shires or counties; and the lord advocate, or public prosecutor, formerly called the king's advocate; the solicitor-general, and several other law officers. As has been already observed, an advocate has the power of pleading in any court of law within the kingdom. He does not require any written mandate or authority, his gown being understood to supply the place of a written mandate. Unlike other members of the legal profession, he is not responsible for any wrong opinion which he may give, although, of course, it is his interest to give advice capable of standing the test of judicial discussion.

The course of study requisite to become an advocate is long and laborious. He must possess a sound knowledge of the principles of the civil or Roman law, and of the law of Scotland, and must compose a satisfactory thesis on a title of the Pandects. Advocates are paid by honoraries or fees, the amount of which is optional with the employer. They are not presumed to be paid as if for work done; and the auditor or taxing officer of court is not held at liberty to strike off fees which have been paid to counsel. Such ideas as these circumstances imply regarding the dignity of the office, and the confidence reposed in them, contribute much to maintain the character of the men who practise at the Scotch bar. Whilst a considerable number of advocates are able to live comfortably, or attain wealth, "briefless barristers" are as numerous in Scotland as in England. The politics of the Scotch bar are mainly of the Tory kind. It has often been difficult for the liberal party to fill the law offices of the crown with men of ability, from the small number belonging to their own political party.—T. T. Edinburgh.

171. *The Pendulum Experiment.*—Experimental illustrations may be divided into two classes, according as they are intended to facilitate the conception of a proposition, or to give probable or certain proof of it. Of the latter class is the experiment of M. Foucault. It is not designed to aid us in understanding the revolution of the earth, but to augment its evidence. It has, however, several disadvantages when applied to this

end before a popular audience. The phenomenon which it offers for observation may arise from another cause than that assigned, namely, from an error of some sort in the conduct of the experiment; and, even if that be perfect, the connexion between the cause assigned and the phenomenon exhibited must always be very difficult to explain to such an audience. I will endeavour to make it as simple as I can, cautioning J. S. that he must not consider my explanation complete.

Let the line from *a* to *b* be vertical, and at *a* let a string be held, to which is hung a weight, resting at *b*. Raise the weight to *c*, and let it go *carefully*; it will, in falling, pass through *b*, rise to *d*, and continue to oscillate in the same plane; but if in letting it go any force be applied tending out of the plane of the paper, the weight will pass on one side of *b*, rise to *d* (not exactly), and return on the other side of *b*, thus describing a sort of elliptic curve about *b*. We will suppose this not to take place. If the experimenter, still holding the string at *a*, walk round it, he will find that the weight continues to oscillate in the same direction notwithstanding.

The same may be observed by suspending the weight within a carriage, and setting it to oscillate—say in the direction of the length of the carriage; on turning a corner, the oscillation will be across the carriage—that is, in the same direction as before.

(A).—If the same apparatus were suspended above one of the poles of the earth, and set to oscillate, the earth by its revolution would not alter the plane of oscillation, which would, therefore, coincide in turn with every meridian in the course of twenty-four hours; and, to an observer at the pole, will appear to have turned completely round in twenty-four hours.

(B).—If the same were done at the equator, where the line from the point of suspension to the centre of the earth is perpendicular to the axis of the earth's rotation, and therefore the earth does not twist at all about it, the plane of oscillation will not apparently change its position at all. If it be set to oscillate north and south, or east and west, it will continue to do so.

At any intermediate point we may, for convenience, consider the motion of the earth as composed of two motions; one about a vertical through the point of suspension, with a velocity proportional to the sine of the latitude; and another about an axis perpendicular to this, with a velocity proportional to the cosine. These two motions being supposed to co-exist, are equivalent to the one rotation about the line through the poles. With reference to the second of these motions, the pendulum is circumstanced as in B; and with reference to the first, as in A. The first, then, is the only one which will have any effect, and, as in A, the whole motion will appear to be transferred in an opposite direction to the plane of oscillation of the pendulum. So that the apparent revolution of the plane of oscillation in different latitudes will be as the sine of the latitude, and therefore, in England, about $11\frac{1}{2}$ degrees an hour. Accordingly, Mr. T. G. Bunt has given an account of some experiments made at Bristol, in June or July, 1851, exhibiting a rotation of $11\frac{1}{2}$ degrees, in exact conformity with the theory.

The difficulty of the experiment consists in the number of conditions to be satisfied to prevent the formation of the elongated ellipse before referred to. The bob must not be made of a metal sensibly magnetic, must be of equal density throughout, must be accurately turned and hung, must be let go without the application of any force, &c. If the first condition be not complied with the bob will be attracted out of the plane; a defect in the second or third will cause the resistance of the air to be greater on one side than on the other.

In most of the attempts to exhibit the phenomenon in London due care was by no means taken. Out of four which I witnessed, only one was of any value.—J. B.

172. *The Construction of an Ellipsis*.—It would be quite premature on our part to decide either for or against the friend, who asserts that he has established a geometrical demonstration by which he is able to construct an ellipsis by a geometrical continued motion. If we knew the whole of the evidence we should occupy a much better position.—G. N.

173. *Paraphrase of Milton*.—"Thus did the prince of angels speak; to whom the adversary thus replied:—Think thou not to awe me with wind of airy threats, whom yet thou canst not awe with thy deeds. Hast thou turned the least of these to flight, or caused them to fall, but that they rose again unvanquished; and shouldst thou, then, hope to deal easier with me; and thou, imperious being, chase me hence with threats? Think not, falsely, that thus shall end the strife, which thou callest evil, but which we style the strife of glory, and which we mean to win, or turn this heaven itself into the hell thou fablest; and to dwell here at least, if not to reign. Meanwhile, I do not fly thy utmost force (and join him named Almighty to thy aid), but have sought thee far and near."

The construction of the first three lines "Stanislaus" has quoted is a classical construction imitated in English. Milton's poetic soul was moulded in the ancient school, and consequently became saturated with classic images and classic style. He loved to introduce into English composition classical forms of expression and inversions, which, however, cannot be done without rendering the sense obscure, since the English language admits of no inflexions. In fact, it is next to an impossibility to read Milton with any degree of certainty or pleasure without a knowledge of the classics, so frequent are his allusions and so inverted his style of expression. "To whom thus the adversary" (*replied*, understood by ellipsis). *Vide* Virgil's "Æneid," lib. i. ver. 76, "Æolus hæc contra;" lib. i. ver. 335, "Turn Venus." Ovid's "Metamorphoses," lib. i. fab. 6, ver. 68, "Atque ita." Also frequently in the "Iliad," "Ὁς ἐφάρ"—"Ὁς φάτο."

"Nor think thou with wind of airy threats to awe whom with deeds thou canst not."

— "Quis magno melius succedat Achilli
Quam per quem magnus Danaïs successit
Achilles."

Ovid's "Metamorphoses," lib. xiii. fab. 1, ver. 134.

O'DELL.

Were we to paraphrase the lines you have given, we should do so somewhat as follows:—"The prince of angels having spoken thus, was answered by the adversary in the following man-

ner:—"Do not think with wind or empty threatenings to frighten one whom you cannot affright with deeds. Have you ever put one of the *least* of these my followers to flight? Perhaps you have; nay, you may now have caused one to fall before you; but it has been that he might rise again to prosecute with greater vigour the war. Do not err, then, by supposing that by your imperious threatenings you will be able to chase me from this place, and by this simple means to put an end to the strife, which *you* call the strife of evil, but which *we* designate the strife of glory, and which we mean to win, or turn this heaven itself into the hell which you have fabled; for we intend not only to retain our station, but to retain it free, if not to reign. In the interim I challenge thy utmost force; and not only thine, but, joined with thee, the force of him whom thou dost call Almighty, to drive me from my purpose; nor shall I fly before this double force, for I have always sought thy opposition."

Secondly. The lines are these:—

1. "So spake the prince of angels; to whom thus
2. The adversary. Nor think thou with wind
3. Of aery threats to awe whom yet with deeds
4. Thou canst not."

The difficulty appears to commence with "*adversary*," which is the nominative case to a verb (*replied*) understood. "*Nor think*," &c. "*Nor*" sometimes begins a sentence, with reference to some negative meaning implied."—*Smart*. It here stands for *do not*. "*Thou*" is the nominative case to "*think*." "*To awe*" is governed in the infinitive by "*think*," and governs *him*, understood, in the objective case. "*Whom*" is the objective case of "*canst*" *awe*; *awe* is understood. Many liberties are allowed in poetry which would not be tolerated in prose.—G. N.

175. "*Spinoza's Philosophical System*" is not so much designated Atheism as Pantheism, and is generally adopted in modern times by those who believe in the "eternity of matter." That theory maintains that there exists in the universe but one substance, variously modified, whose two principal attributes are, infinite extension and infinite intelligence. This substance Spinoza regarded as God, and hence his system is called *Pantheism*; or in other words, that *Nature is God*, and that all the various modifications of Nature are so many *parts of God*, and that *we* also are *parts likewise of God*: thus confounding the material universe with the Supreme Being; and, as a consequence of these views, "he denies," to use the language of Van Mildert, "a Providence, scoffs at the doctrine of heaven and hell, and of evil spirits, represents all divine worship as nugatory and ridiculous, as vain superstition the expectation of rewards or punishments in a future state; and, like all other unbelievers, he showed his baseness, by making a profession of Christianity at the very moment he was endeavouring to stab her to the heart."—WALTER.

176. *Ancient Languages*.—1st. The Vedas, &c. of the Hindoos are written in Sanscrit, the old language of Hindustan. 2nd. Dr. Yates' "*Grammar*" (18s.) and "*Dictionary*" (55s.) are considered very good works for the acquirement of the language, and may be obtained through order of any good bookseller. 3rd. "*The Coptic*," says Mr. Do ne, in Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Geog., s. v. *Ægyptus*, "the language of the native christi-

tian population of Egypt, is now universally acknowledged to be substantially the same as the *old Egyptian*. It is imperfectly understood, since it has long ceased to be a living speech. Yet the ultimate analysis of its elements shows it to have been akin to the Semitic, and derived from a common source." The Coptic of the present day is, then, materially the ancient Egyptian; but written in Greek characters, with some few old Egyptian ones retained, for which the Greek language had no equivalent. It is now preserved, and has to be studied in the christian liturgies of Egypt. Wilkinson's "*Ancient Egyptians*," or Kenrick's "*Ancient Egypt*," will supply "*Solon*" with all necessary information about "*Old Egypt*." Kenrick's work is highly valued. For a small work, "*Ancient Egypt*" (6d.), published by the Religious Tract Society, is very useful. 4th. *India*, in a wide extent of the name, was, it is thought, civilized somewhat earlier than Egypt, which probably derived its civilization from India when the descendants of Ham populated the country. 5th. The inscriptions of the Nineteenth sculptures are in the *cuneiform character*, but, as yet, it is not possible to tell in what *language* they are written. The results of Major Rawlinson's study of the cuneiform character are not as yet entirely published, but probably will be soon. For these "*Solon*" must patiently wait.—J. B. M. C.

179. *The Order in which to prosecute Mathematical Studies*.—"An Earnest Student should first make himself complete master of arithmetic, and then proceed with algebra and Euclid simultaneously. When he has mastered the *elements* of algebra, as far as the binomial theorem, he may take up plane trigonometry and the elements of mechanics. I would advise him to go no farther until he has thoroughly mastered the above subjects, constantly recurring to one while studying another; else he will keep forgetting much of what he has learnt, and waste much time and labour. He may next proceed with the subject in the following order,—spherical trigonometry, geometrical conic sections, elements of analytical geometry, elements of hydrostatics, Newton's Principia. He should then take up the elements of the differential and integral calculus, which will enable him to proceed, at once, in whatever order he please, to the higher parts of mechanics and hydrostatics, optics and astronomy, &c. The following works are, I believe, most approved, and most of them I can strongly recommend, from my own acquaintance with them:—Elementary Writers, Colenzo's "*Arithmetic*" and "*Key*," Colenzo's "*Algebra*," Part I., and "*Key*;" Potter (standard edition of) "*Euclid*;" Colenzo's "*Trigonometry*," Part II., and "*Key*;" Huxley's "*Geometrical Conics*;" Hymers' "*Analytical Geometry*;" Phears' "*Hydrostatics*;" Evans' "*Newton*;" Todhunter's "*Differential and Integral Calculus*." The higher works required would be:—Peacock's "*Algebra*;" Wilson's "*Trigonometry*;" Earnshaw's "*Statics*;" Wilson's "*Dynamics*;" Salmon's "*Analytical Conics*," and "*Higher Plane Curves*;" Miller's "*Hydrostatics and Hydrodynamics*;" Griffin's "*Optics*;" Hymers' "*Astronomy*."

Some of even these works are called elementary, and indeed, properly so, when we consider the vast extent of some of the subjects.

The following companions are almost indispensable:—Goodwin's "*Problems*," and "*Key*;"

Wrigley's "Examples;" Davidson's (6s.) or Hut-
ton's (18s.) "Mathematical Tables."

Physics need not be studied together with ma-
thematics; but they add greatly to the advantage
and delight obtained from the study of the mathe-
matics. Dr. Lardner's "Handbook of Natural
Philosophy and Astronomy," in 3 vols., of which
vol. III. is not yet published, is the most desirable.

In conclusion, mathematical study may be pur-
sued to the highest degree possible, and conti-
nually will it be discipline of the mind. If "An
Earnest Student" have health, time, and taste for
the study, he may pursue it till he arrive at the
learning of Newton, and still will he find ample
material for discipline of the mind, in further and
deeper researches.—J. B. M'C.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—What does Bacon term idols? What
are idols of the tribe? Describe their chief species.
What are idols of the cave? Describe their chief
species. What are idols of the forum? What are
idols of the theatre? Describe their chief species.

Provection.—Exercise No. IX., Vol. II.
Senior.—Whence arises our belief or knowledge
of the objective?

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XVIII.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. IX., Vol. III. p. 397.

Senior Division.

Make a form like the one given, and place the
verbs governed in the infinitive mood by verbs,

the verbs governing them, and the infinitives
and participles having case, in their respective
columns.

The rising of the sun was very glorious. To
get good and to communicate are the business of
life. My father's hearing is not so good as for-
merly. The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor
the ear with hearing. Before leaving town I am
to call at the office. Being from home at this
season of the year is very inconvenient. For me
to live is Christ, and to die is gain. To prepare
a perfect statement requires time. Doing justly,
loving mercy, and walking humbly with God, in-
cludes the whole duty of man. I thought to have
a long holiday, but my employer wishes me to
return on an early day. Obedience ought to be
prompt. The new world is said to have been
discovered by Columbus. It ought to have been
named after him. I ought to have been here yes-

SYNTAX.

RULE III.—One verb governs another in the infinitive mood.

RULE IV.—The infinitive mood and present participle are sometimes used as nouns; and, as
nouns, have case.

Infinitives.	Verbs governing them.	Infinitives and Participles having case.

MODEL EXERCISE No. VI.—Vide Vol. III. p. 278.

NOUNS.

PROPER.		COMMON.		
Nominative and Objective.	Possessive.	Nominative and Objective.		Possessive.
Farmer's Boy	Moses'	father	servant	bat's
Bloomfield	Cromwell's	children	prison	master's
Pilgrim's Progress	Wellington's	house	books	boy's
Bunyan	Cæsar's	dog	honour	monarch's
St. James's Church	Napoleon's	wings	sons	doctor's
Englishmen	Hanibal's	feathers	book	author's
St. Helena's Isle		books	lifeblood	
Britain		number	wintering	
Capua		actions	tyranny	
Italy		lightning	ruin	
		victories	principles	
		warrior	man	
		legislator	soul	
		history	heart	
		wars	footsteps	
		interest	strand	

terday, but circumstances prevented. To do that in the absence of your master will assuredly give offence. I have an invitation to go to Hampton Court on Saturday. You never need to ask him to do a kind action. He will do it without asking. I cannot think of proceeding without his permission. Reading is an invaluable acquisition. I like to sing and play on a musical instrument.

To pardon those absurdities in ourselves which we cannot suffer in others, is neither better nor worse than to be more willing to be fools ourselves than to have others so.

A large portion of the enormous quantity of salt annually consumed is obtained by allowing the water of the ocean to be evaporated from shallow pits or pans dug near the sea shore, and into which it is allowed to flow at stated intervals; the solid salt is thus left encrusting the bottom and sides, and is removed to sheds to drain and undergo subsequent purifications.

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—VI.

Question 47. The fifth instalment = £1,000—£700 = £300. ∴ Time =

$$\frac{200 \times 6 + 200 \times 8 + 150 \times 10 + 150 \times 11 + 300 \times 12}{1000} =$$

9.55 months.

ABERGWILI.

Question 48. By the question:—

Interest of £100 = £5 for one year.

∴ Interest of £100 for 9.55 months = £3 19s. 7d.

Then, as £103 19s. 7d. : £3 19s. 7d. ::

£1,000 : £38 5s. 4½d. = discount; and
£1,000—£38 5s. 4½d. = £961 14s. 7½d. = present worth.

ER RASCHID.

Question 49. $A = 60$, $r = .06$, and $n = 7$;

$$P = \frac{A}{r} \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{R^n} \right\} = \frac{60}{.06} \left\{ 1 - \frac{1}{1.06^7} \right\}$$

$$= 334.94288 = £334 18s. 10½d. \quad \text{W. C. D.}$$

Question 50. A's work per day =

$$\frac{1}{35} \text{ and } A + B = \frac{1}{20}$$

$$\therefore B's \text{ work per day} = \frac{1}{20} - \frac{1}{35} = \frac{3}{140}$$

$$\therefore \text{Time taken by } B = \frac{140}{3} = 46\frac{2}{3} \text{ days. — J. F. L.}$$

Question 51.* The greatest common measure of 428571 is 142857.

$$\therefore \frac{428571}{999999} \div \frac{142857}{7} = 7$$

Question 52. Let A be the first place of observation; B the second; C the top of the tower; and D the bottom.

∴ Angles:— $\angle BAC = 26^\circ 45'$, $\angle ACB = 3^\circ 31'$,
 $\angle ABC = 149^\circ 44'$, $\angle BCD = 59^\circ 44'$, $\angle CDB = 110^\circ 20'$, $\angle DCB = 9^\circ 56'$.

$$\therefore \text{As } \sin. 3^\circ 31' : 500 \text{ links} :: \sin. 26^\circ 45' : 3668.91 \text{ links} = BC.$$

Again. As $\sin. 110^\circ 20' : 3668.91 :: \sin. 9^\circ 56' : 674.96 \text{ links} = \text{height of the tower. SAPPER.}$

Question 53. As the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles ("Euclid," book i. p. 32),

$$\therefore 180^\circ - (60^\circ 35' + 70^\circ 18') = 49^\circ 7' = \text{third angle.}$$

$$\therefore \text{As } \sin. 49^\circ 7' : 800 \text{ links} :: \sin. 60^\circ 35' :$$

$$925.72 = \text{side opposite angle } 60^\circ 35'.$$

Then, letting fall a perpendicular from the third angle upon the given base, we have—

As $\sin. 90^\circ : 921.72 :: 70^\circ 18' : 867.77$, the perpendicular, or breadth of the river. SAPPER.

Question 54. Area of circle =

$$100^2 \times .7854 = 7854 \text{ square yards;}$$

area of lune = area of circle—area of segments;

height of segments = 25;

diameter of circle = 100;

$$\therefore \frac{25}{100} = .25 = \text{height of a similar segment of a circle whose diameter is 1.}$$

area of a segment whose height is .25 = 1535.46, which, multiplied by $100^2 = 1535.46 = \text{area of segment required, } 1535.46 \times 2 = 3070.92.$

∴ area of lune = $7854 - 3070.92 = 4783.08 \text{ sq. yds.}$
and total quantity = $7854 + 4783.08 = 12637.08 \text{ yds.}$
= 2.61096 acres. W. C. D.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—VIII.

65. What will a man save out of an income of £200 a year, whose household expenses are £10 per month of four weeks; rent and taxes, £50 per annum; personal expenses, 2s. 6d. per day; and incidentals, 5s. per week?

66. Received, £194 18s., in sovereigns, half-sovereigns, crowns, half-crowns, shillings, pence, and farthings, of each an equal number. What was that number?

67. Sold goods to the amount of £750 10s. 9d., payable as follows:—One-fourth at two months, one-seventh at three months, one-sixth at four months, three-eighths at nine months, and the rest at twelve months. What must be discounted for present payment, at 5 per cent. per annum?

68. The chord of an arc = 24 inches, and its height 6. What is the diameter of the circle?

69. Required, the weight of a copper pipe, the bore of which is half an inch, and the thickness of the copper one quarter, the specific gravity being 8878.

70. What is the sum of 243 terms of an arithmetical series, of which the first term is 7, and the common difference 5?

71. Required, the content in imperial gallons of a cylindrical vessel, whose depth is 70 inches and the diameter of the base 48 inches.

72. What is the content in cubic feet of an octagonal pyramid, the height of which is 2 feet, and the side of the base 20 inches?

73. A garden, 300 feet long by 200, which is surrounded by a wall, contains a walk six feet wide, which runs parallel with the wall, so as to enclose an area equal to that lying between the walk and the wall. The width of this latter part is required.

$$74. \text{ Given, } \begin{cases} x^2 + y + z = 69 \\ y^2 + x + z = 99 \\ z^2 + y + x = 127 \end{cases} \text{ to find } x, y \text{ and } z.$$

* From some unknown cause a figure was omitted in this question.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XXII.—METHOD.

METHOD is not an end, but a means. It is architectonic, schematic, legislative. It informs us *how* a purpose may be accomplished. Success is the result of the adoption of the best means, and the persevering employment of the most adequate instrumentalities. The best method is that which enables us most easily, certainly, and expeditiously, to realize the end in view. To have a clear and distinct conception of the end or purpose to be wrought out, is an essential requisite in the construction of a proper and advantageous method. Hence method is a reflective process—a process by which thought and its activities are concentrated on the attainment of some object, the execution of some design, the elaboration of some scheme spontaneously determined upon. The right method must limit itself by the bounds of *the possible* and *the knowable*—must restrain itself within the capacities and powers granted to the mind by which it is to be employed. The human intellect is encompassed by a vast wilderness; through *that* it must cut a pathway to the truth, or in some other manner establish a conductor through which the communications of truth may be received. Question and answer must be conveyable with fidelity, rapidity, and ease; and a facility in reading the cipher employed must be speedily attainable. "A Method is a *path of transit*;" but, to be a safe path, it must be specially adapted to lead to the desired end. So to adapt it requires discernment, discrimination, and knowledge. Rightly to employ it requires perseverance, regularity, and practice; a resolute and steady determination to proceed along unflinchingly towards the goal—to walk firmly and constantly forward till the destination has been reached.

Method is order—articulation or memberment, not coacervation; scientific cognition and arrangement, not irregular grouping and massing. It is the selecting, adapting, and assorting of all (or so many as is necessary of) the individuals which compose the whole aggregate mass of any peculiar kind of objectivities, in such a manner as shall present them to the mind in that particular series by which the most intelligible view of them, in relation to the predominating purpose, may be acquired. The difficulty of eliminating a method increases with the complication of individuals (in induction) and of ideas (in deduction), as the case may be. Method is a predetermination of parts—the imparting of coherency and system *à priori* to the elements (whether ideas or individuals) which compose a whole in comprehension or extension, and hence it is that we define "*Method*" to be "*the arrangement of our ideas, i. e., the results of our perceptivity, judgment, and ratiocination, in such a manner as shall best facilitate the acquisition, remembrance, and communication of knowledge.*"*

* Vide "The Art of Reasoning," chapters xix. and xx.

The power of arranging ideas clearly and distinctly, of expressing them with force, ease, and systematic coherency, and of avoiding obscurity, confusion, and misapprehension, is a most valuable endowment. In many cases there exists in minds a special aptitude for methodising and digesting thought, for exhibiting in proper sequence and accurate collocation the several ideas which relate to any given topic; while in others this power seems totally absent. While, however, we admit this fact, we unhesitatingly aver that no man can so adequately represent his thoughts as those who study the science of method. To the naturally endowed it adds the culture of art, while to the naturally deficient it imparts the regulative and legislative rules of the understanding. To the one it supplies, in a great measure, the mental deficiency, and to the other it gives the polish and dexterity of scientific practice. To either and to both its advantages must be great. Method is to the arrangement and communication of knowledge what instruments and machines are to the several arts, viz., a series of expedients to make amends for human weakness—a collection of assistants and auxiliaries. It is our intention, in the succeeding pages, to develop briefly the principles of Rhetorical Method—the *modus operandi* of thought-exposition.

The principles and laws of Method, so far as they concern themselves with the acquisition and knowledge of truth, have been, by universal consent, relegated to Logic.* Knowledge and truth are gained as the results of Reasoning—the active operation of thought, regulated by formal laws, to which, in thinking, the mental powers must necessarily conform. These laws form the primary philosophy; that from which, or through the agency of which, all the sciences and arts which issue from the just and true exercise of thought are evolved. Rhetoric supposes the possession of knowledge and truth, and the desire to communicate them; hence its proper province begins where that of Logic ends. They are distinct, though contiguous, territories. The primary purpose of Rhetoric is the exposition of thought, i. e., knowledge and truth, or what is supposed to be so. But communication depends on arrangement for success; for without arrangement the purposes of communication cannot be properly effectuated. There are, therefore, two parts of Rhetorical Method, viz., Arrangement and Communication.

Of *style*, which is an element of Method, we have already discoursed at some length.† it will not, therefore, be necessary for us at present to say much on that subject, although in the sequel it may be found advisable to supply one or two additional hints on the methodology of style. Meanwhile, we are desirous of confining our attention to the general and primary Laws of Method.

"Laws," says Montesquieu, "in their most general signification, are the necessary relations which arise out of the nature of things."‡ "Every process has laws, known or unknown, according to which it must take place," i. e., which preside over its development and regulate its manifestations. Laws may, therefore, be defined as the rules according to which actions are subordinated to the production of particular ends, and by which they

* "The Art of Reasoning," chapters xix. and xx.

† *Vide ante*, Nos. VII. to XII.

‡ "Les lois, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses."—"Esprit des Lois," liv. i. chap. i.

are regulated to the best means of accomplishing those ends. To survey objectivities of any kind in the light of the laws which they obey is the only true way in which man is enabled

“To look on truth, unbroken and entire;
Truth in the system—the full orb—where truths,
By truths enlightened and sustained, afford
An arch-like strong foundation, to support
The incumbent weight of absolute, complete
Conviction.”

Conviction or persuasion is the aim of the rhetorician. Let us proceed to review a few of those laws which must be attended to by the person who is desirous of affecting other minds by the exposition of his thoughts.

1st. Find a possible, sure, or granted starting point.

“In discourse, as in trigonometry,” says a French author, “the first operation must be to lay down a base.” Begin with statements, well-known and obvious, which may be readily comprehended, and are likely to be coincided in without dispute or hesitation. From the known or granted the origination of a pathway may be attempted, and progress is probable; but from the unknown or disputable no true advancement can result. A known quantity must be postulated and given to make an equation possible; and a known or granted truth is necessary as the point of origination in any debate, discourse, or other exposition of thought. A fixed and determinate point of departure must be settled or posited before two can walk together and agree. Conviction and persuasion imply movement; and, as the lever cannot operate without a fulcrum, so neither can conviction or persuasion work their ends without a possible, sure, or granted starting-point. Concurrence is an element of power, which gives to future operations the possibility of success. No exchange of thought can take place until a concurrence regarding what shall be considered as the standard of exchange can be mutually determined upon. This gained, negotiations are at once possible; the *postulata* of discourse are satisfied.

2nd. Have a fixed and determinate aim.

Aimlessness and random shot are never capable of producing calculable results. Purpose is the one thing on which success depends. To have a distinct intention, and to pursue that unflinchingly, is the only means of securing effectiveness of action. An aim signifies an effect foreseen, desired, and spontaneously determined upon, which we are desirous of producing. When we have secured our stand-point, and have determined our aim, we are in a position which renders effectual and proportionate efforts possible; we are then capable (potentially) of making the means concur, most directly and certainly, to the production of a given result. All aims ought, of course, to be proportioned to our power and means, otherwise we are guilty of foolishness; when, however, means and power are united in, and directed to, the effectuation of a given, fixed, and determinate aim, we have every reason to be filled with “the fixed persuasion of success.”

3rd. Employ causes adequate to the production of the intended effects.

The words “cause and effect” relate, in their signification, to a succession of facts connected with, and arising out of, each other. Hence it is that the poet says,—

“Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas;”*

* Happy is he who is able to know the causes of things.

for rightly to know causes and their effects imparts to man the lordship of nature; as Bacon says, "Nature cannot otherwise be commanded, except by obeying her laws." Fitness, proportion, design, and order, are the products of law operating with an aim to produce effects. The principle of causation is everywhere potent—not less in the realms of mind than those of matter. Intelligence and will are the motive powers of the speaker. To use these adequately to convince the intellect and persuade the will of the hearers is the grand problem given to the orator to work out. This cannot be accomplished without the employment of causes adequate to the production of that effect.

4th. Observe a proper concatenation in the exposition of thought.

All things of like kind are linked together. To observe these several links, and exhibit them—to keep them continually in view—is one great means of thinking correctly, and hence of presenting a clearly-connected notion of the ideas which we wish to impress upon other minds. Without this attention to the due and proper colligation of thought to thought,

"Connexion is no more;
Checked Reason halts, her next step wants support;
Striving to climb, she tumbles from her scheme;"

and must, consequently, fail in the attainment of her object.

5th. Observe proportion in the exposition of thought.

Each thought in each discourse ought to possess a certain and definite relation to the working out of the end or purpose for which we speak or write, and ought to have a relative degree of importance attached to it, varying in a ratio with its adaptation to the precise conveyance of our meaning, or its capacity to aid in the accomplishment of our design. This law alike reprimands an excessive overcrowding of thoughts in a sentence or paragraph, and a too minute dismemberment of thought therein. The great foreground thought must stand out prominently on the canvas, and the subordinate ones must be grouped with appropriate light, shade, colouring, and perspective, around it. Thus alone can proportionate coherency be imparted, and the mind be enabled to comprehend distinctly the true relations and correlations in which thoughts stand united to each other.

6th. Adopt a just medium—avoid extremes.

The neglect of this rule introduces disproportion, and disqualifies the mind for forming proper judgments regarding the matters presented to it. Pushing any idea into undue prominence, and arrogating to it an importance higher than it deserves, interferes prejudicially with the laws of mental vision, and yields a distorted, and consequently untrue, image of the thought. All things are related to each other; and the farther we depart from the truth regarding anything, the greater difficulty will be experienced in proving its accordance with the mutual coherencies which these relations introduce amongst things. A strict and rigid adherence to the truth is the secret by which the rhetorician may be able to turn to every eye "the happiest attitude of things."

7th. Synthesis and Analysis ought, in general, to be conjointly employed by the rhetorician.

It is gratifying to watch the processes of discovery, and to imagine that we are elaborating truths or eliminating principles from facts that are patent to our own observation; and hence, when a common starting-point is gained, it is generally advisable to lead up to

a higher truth from that lower, and then show how this higher truth reappplies to and incorporates that which was employed as the elementary condition of concurrence. For the mind of the hearer or reader feels gratified by being made a *confrère* in the elaboration of the truth or truths thus presented to his view. He feels as if each step were taken firmly, because his own eye has been employed in directing his own steps. The farther exposition of the reason of this rule, however, will be found in our articles "On Method," in the "Art of Reasoning."

8th. Difficulties ought not to intimidate.

Difficulties may exist in ourselves, *i. e.*, be internal, and then their proper name is weaknesses; or they may dwell in others, *i. e.*, be external, and then they are called obstacles. With regard to the former, we can only say, in the language of the poet,—

" Fail !—Fail ?
In the lexicon of youth, which Fate reserves
For a bright manhood, there is no such word
As *fail* ! "

If we determine bravely and labour assiduously—if we aspire and strive—there can be few difficulties in ourselves which we may not overmaster.


" Even as drink and food
Become our bone and flesh, the aliments
Nurturing our nobler part, the mind—thoughts, dreams,
Passions, and aims—in the revolving cycle
Of the great alchemy at length are made
Our mind itself."

The other-mind difficulties are not so readily overcome; they relate either to the intellect or passions of others. If we have truth, and study aright the best method of expounding it, we must ultimately gain the victory.

" Think not our passions from corruption sprung,
Though to corruption now they lend their wings.
All Reason justly seems divine. I see,
I feel a grandeur in the passions too,
Which speaks their high descent and glorious end,
Which speaks them rays of an eternal fire."

The foregoing are the predominating principles which ought to be borne in mind in affairs of Method. A more minute treatment of the means by which conviction and persuasion may be produced we reserve for a succeeding paper. The following tabular synopsis of the principles of proof will form the ground-plan of our next paper, and may be taken as an outline of the method and manner in which that topic will then be treated:—

SYNOPSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PROOF.



Religion.

IS THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS A PRACTICE IN HARMONY WITH THE SCRIPTURES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THIS interesting and important debate has now arrived at a point at which the reader will naturally inquire, Which side of the question am I to take as the right one? Which can produce the strongest scriptural evidence in its support? All we can do is, in an humble way, to aid his inquiry, hoping that the discussion will not lead to fruitless controversy, but to a satisfactory solution of the question; and this we deem the more important as the subject is a religious one. Regarding a point of history or politics, it is *comparatively* unimportant what view of the case we may take; but where the Bible is concerned, where divine truth is at stake, we must take our stand upon one side or the other, and therefore it behoves us, with the greatest carefulness, to see that the views we entertain are consistent with the high standard to which we refer. It is useless for people to say that this is a mere matter of ceremony, and so of no importance; for we find that in the present day this single question of baptism has been the means of introducing one of the most insidious and soul-destroying heresies that has ever been invented: we allude to the fallacious doctrine of baptismal regeneration. We ought then, as lovers of truth and enemies of error, to give the subject our best attention, taking as our touchstone of argument *nothing but the word of God*.

In giving, then, our opinion upon this subject, our only wish is to vindicate, as far as we are able, the character of the Bible, and to show that those who hold infant baptism hold it in defiance not only of the whole spirit of the New Testament, but in direct opposition to the example and command of our Lord. We feel the necessity of speaking plainly upon this point, seeing that in the present day there is too much of an opposite character. Error is smoothed down and connived at rather than exposed, because people are afraid of the truth. To listen to the truth would bring upon them too much sacrifice, so they are glad of any pretext to quiet their consciences and remain as they

are. It was the open avowal of the Rev. Baptist Noel, after he left the Church of England, that while in that communion he never examined the subject of baptism for fear he should be led to *unpleasant conclusions*. There is but too much reason to fear that this is the case with *very* many of those who practise and conform to infant sprinkling (for we do not hold it to be *baptism*, though for the sake of convenience we call it so). They do not examine the matter in the light of God's word, for fear their convictions should come in the way of some church appointment, or clash with some comfortable position in society.

In the present instance, however, an appeal is made to the Bible, and we rejoice that it is; though, in reading the preceding articles in favour of infant baptism, we were desiring to see what scriptural evidence could be produced, we must say that we have found none. We may be convicted of oversight; but we cannot help thinking that such evidence produced in a court of law, supposing the case about to be tried, would be considered ingenious, but as not to the point. It might be said, "Sir, your abstract reasoning may be very acute; but we want evidence to the fact. Here is an institution, called infant baptism, which you declare is one authorized by the Bible, founded by our Saviour, and practised by his apostles; of course you can give me chapter and verse where it is thus authorized,—the injunction of our Saviour, and instances where his disciples obeyed that injunction, and actually *did* sprinkle or baptize infants. Of course, sir, you cannot say that I ask too much, for I only require what you profess yourself able to give me, namely, a full and clear authorization from your Bible for the institution which you practise as being thus authorized." Now, I very much doubt whether any defender of infant baptism could give a satisfactory reply to this. The preceding writers defending it certainly could *not*, as their conclusions, with a few exceptions, are based

upon entire supposition. They *suppose* everything; they *prove* nothing. They think infants were baptized, because they *might* have been. That is the sum of their argument; but it is not sufficient for an honest opinion. We do not want probability, we want certainty, upon the question. Now, the *utmost* that can be shown is, that there is a *possibility* of infants having been baptized. Although we doubt it, we will just grant it for the sake of argument. Now, we are *certain* that adults were baptized, because *it is said, &c.* We will not speak, for the present, upon any qualifications; but we just say that they were individuals capable of knowing and judging of their own actions. Well, the question, for the present, is of *certainly* against mere *probability*. Which would a reasonable man take? If he wished to go right, he would, undoubtedly, take what was certain in preference to what was merely probable. And yet the defenders of infant baptism choose to take the probable, rather than the certain, course. They know, they confess, that adults were baptized in the primitive church; in fact, it is impossible to read the preceding articles without being convinced of it; and yet they now refuse to admit them to the rite. When they do *not* refuse, it is the exception, not the rule, and only when it has not been performed in their infancy.

The case stands thus:—The primitive church baptized adults; the English Church, with some of the dissenters, baptize infants. Any reasonable person must at once see that these two are contrary. What is there to justify the alteration? Ought not baptism *now* to be what it was *then*? Was it not intended for rational and responsible individuals as much as the Lord's supper? We never think of administering the communion to infants. Why should we baptism? Surely they have as much right to the one ordinance as the other. If we are to *suppose* infants were baptized, we might as well *suppose* they took the Lord's supper. If there being no mention of their having been baptized is no argument against them, we might as well admit them to the other ordinance, there being no mention that they were excluded. The defenders of infant baptism may laugh at the idea, but it would be quite as rational. As much as the Lord's supper was only intended for those who are capable of under-

standing religion, and of commemorating the death of Christ, so baptism was only meant for those who believe, or profess to believe, the truths of that same religion.

B. S. has the confidence to say that believers' baptism is an impossibility; and—what still more startled us—he affirms that “it did not exist even in the days of the apostles.” Then, does B. S. mean to set himself up as superior to scripture, or does he purposely overlook everything which might attack his prejudices in favour of infants? He does not think there ever existed such a thing as believers' baptism. What sort of thing does he imagine baptism was, then? A dumb show? A meaningless ceremony? We will let the Bible inform him. He dares, in the face of the following evidence, to say there was no such thing in the time of the apostles as believers' baptism. We do not, however, consider him in the least degree more culpable than the rest of those who defend infant baptism, for no one can conscientiously adopt that practice without *disbelieving* in believers' baptism. The following is to show that there *was* such a thing as believers' baptism:—

“Then said Paul, John verily baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people, that they should believe on him which should come after him, that is, on Christ Jesus,” Acts xix. 4. “But when they believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women” (no infants, observe), Acts viii. 12. “And Crispus, the chief ruler of the synagogue, believed on the Lord with all his house; and many of the Corinthians hearing believed, and were baptized,” Acts xviii. 8.

What can the defenders of infant baptism say to this? Here it is said—not in one isolated case, but in several, and I could mention more—that men and women, and *those believers, were* baptized. It is clear, then, from scriptural evidence, that it is a deliberate falsehood to affirm that believers were *not* baptized. It is nothing to the point, that some individuals who happened to be baptized did not turn out well. Because there happened to be a Simon Magnus amongst them, is no argument that there was no such thing as believers' baptism; for we have a Judas amongst the twelve disciples. Were there, then, no such persons as the twelve

disciples; or did the sin of Judas have anything to do with them? Besides, Simon himself was only baptized upon avowing his belief in the gospel: that he turned from it afterwards is quite another matter. In Acts viii. 13, it is said, "Then Simon himself believed also: and when he was baptized, he continued with Philip, and wondered, beholding the miracles and signs which were done."

"Glowr," in his article, even goes so far as to say that, although scripture is silent upon the subject of infant baptism, it is no reason why it should not be practised. Of course, we shall not presume to answer such an argument, as the whole question rests upon the scriptures giving evidence upon the point. But, not *altogether* satisfied with abstract notions and mere suppositions, both "Glowr" and B. S. *do* venture to quote scripture. Let us hear what it is. "Go and teach all nations, baptizing them," &c. Supposing this were given as evidence in favour of infant baptism in a court of law, one might naturally say, "Pardon me, sir; but it is against the rule to wander from the question. I understood you were to show us that *infants* only were the proper subjects for baptism; am I, then, to conclude that you consider 'all nations' to mean 'all infants,' and no one else? For while you baptize infants, remember you refuse to baptize adults; and you cannot say that this passage justifies such a construction. Now, in my opinion, the most important part of a nation consists in its men and women; and should I send you to-morrow to another nation on a mission of responsibility and importance, without specifying individuals, should you consider yourself a sane man if you delivered that mission to a multitude of infants, regardless of the rest of the rational community? Now, sir, this command of our Lord was not only to baptize,—that was quite secondary; it was to teach. Call it proselytizing, or what you like; we know their commission was to unfold the blessed doctrines of the gospel; for we have evidence that they did so; and finding, as we do here, that this injunction of our Lord to teach or preach the gospel is accompanied with one to baptize, is it not clear that those only who *could* understand and receive this sacred teaching were the proper subjects for baptism? Have we evidence that the apostles went and preached to infants, and then bap-

tized them? Show me this, and then, perhaps, I may listen to such an unreasonable inference; but if you cannot, it is very bad policy in you to adduce such a passage in favour of your argument, when it so clearly tends the other way. First. Because infants, being incapable of understanding the gospel which the apostles were sent to preach, and the preaching and the baptism being coupled in the same command, and thus both intended for the same individuals, only those capable of understanding the gospel are the fit subjects for baptism. Secondly. A grand mission to all nations having been given to the apostles by our Lord, one injunction of which was to baptize, it is quite natural to expect to see recorded the carrying out of that mission and the fulfilment of that command; and not finding that command fulfilled in the case of infants, but of adults, it is reasonable to conclude that the apostles fully understood our Lord, and that their mission was to sinful but intelligent men, and not to innocent and unconscious infants; and that as to the latter, not being able to commit actual sin, and thus far not needing repentance, or baptism, which is but a sign of repentance, they depend for their salvation upon the merits of Christ alone, and that totally irrespective of any outward act or ceremony whatever."

But another quotation—one frequently abused—has also been brought forward by the writers of the preceding articles; and really, when one comes to think of it, it seems marvellous that men in other respects so acute, should on the question of baptism appear so utterly devoid of reason as to adduce the following passage in order—mind, or you may not understand—to prove infant baptism:—"And Jesus said, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." It seems useless to ask what remote connexion such a text can have with the subject before us, unless it is the doctrine of the Pædobaptists whenever children are mentioned in the Bible to *understand baptism*! It would, certainly, be very convenient for them; but for my part, beautiful as this text is, and expressive of our Lord's tender love for children, I cannot see where a drop of water can be squeezed out of it sufficient even to sprinkle.

But the article of J. F. is of a character

which calls for especial remark, inasmuch as it takes quite a new ground of argument from its compeers in the debate, and is more calculated to lead the mind astray. Like a comet suddenly making its appearance in the heavens, it strikes the eye as having something peculiar about it—something, in fact, rather suspicious.

J. F. says:—"Upon the nature and design of baptism we believe we fully coincide with the Baptists (!). We freely grant that it signifies the state of grace into which the soul has passed through a saving faith in Christ; that the application of water to the body represents the cleansing of the soul by the blood of Christ, the washing of regeneration, and the sanctification of the Spirit; that it is a pledge of the dedication of the soul to God—a taking on of the yoke of Christ," &c. &c. What! And do you, then, fasten all this upon an infant? Do you mean to assert that all these solemn responsibilities are to be undertaken by an unconscious babe; and that that infant can have "saving faith," and become regenerate, and sanctified, merely upon its being sprinkled with water? Alas! I very much fear that is what you mean. If so, by all that is solemn and sacred I would warn you to beware of such a doctrine. It strikes at the very root of Christianity; it upsets the glorious fabric for which the apostles underwent persecution, and even death, and for which the reformers fought and conquered, namely, that we are justified by faith alone, that faith having as its only foundation the atonement of Christ. If the doctrine of baptismal regeneration be true, our salvation by the blood of Christ must be all a fiction, and consequently the Bible a mere fable. You are very much mistaken if you suppose "the Baptists" hold similar views with you. Allow me, on their behalf, to repudiate all such connexion. It is true they baptize only those who profess that they have repented and believed; but they allow no sanctity to the act of baptism by itself. It is merely a sign or profession of their faith, conformed to in obedience to the command and example of their heavenly Master; but it is *nothing more*.

Doubtless many, reading the article of J. F., would thus confound the salvation of infants with their baptism. Now baptism, *in itself*, is a thing quite apart from salva-

tion; that is, it is not actually *essential* to salvation. The whole tenor and declaration of the New Testament demonstrates that ceremonies and works, however good in their proper place, are not the basis of salvation. St. Paul says, "We conclude that a man is justified by faith, *without the deeds of the law*," Rom. iii. 28; also, Gal. ii. 16. In another place he says, "And circumcision is that of the heart; in the spirit, and not in the letter;" thus showing that, however justifiable ceremonies and works may be, they are not actually necessary to salvation. And then, again, it is said in St. Mark, xvi. 16, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned," excluding baptism, you see, in the punishment, although it is part of the blessing; so that a person *may* be saved without necessarily being baptized. What, then, is to become of infants? you will inquire. Obviously this passage has nothing to do with them, because they cannot *believe*. It follows, then, that *baptism* has nothing to do with them. If those who hold baptismal regeneration affirm that unless the infant is baptized it cannot be saved, they must also say that unless it *believes* it cannot be saved, for here it is said, "He that believeth not shall be damned." It is clear, then, that this passage, which enjoins faith and baptism together, only applies to those who *can* have faith,—a thing impossible to an infant.

And, secondly, since those who have not this faith are to be condemned, the whole text must necessarily exclude infants as having anything to do with it; for we have reason to believe that infants, dying such, are saved, though not capable of repentance or faith. This matter, however, we may leave. What the Bible has not explicitly revealed is not necessary for us to determine.

I hope, then, that it will be seen that J. F.'s speculative theory is quite untenable, and, moreover, has nothing to do with the subject. He has not given us *one actual proof* from scripture that infant baptism is an ordinance enjoined by our Lord or practised by his apostles. In fact, he openly avows himself unable to do this. How utterly absurd, then, and inconsistent to attempt to prove his point from scripture.

But, not satisfied with his own inability, he endeavours to bring the same charge against us in the following sentence:—"If

we cannot produce a single passage of scripture which plainly and positively institutes the baptism of infants, neither can *they* find a single passage which plainly and positively excludes infants from this ordinance, and confines it to adults." I think my friend is mistaken, and the reader who has followed me even thus far will have had sufficient evidence to refute such a charge. I will, however, give a passage out of his own article, which he has brought in, I suppose, to strengthen his argument, but it will do exceedingly well for mine:—"Then Peter said unto them (who? a multitude of infants?), Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ." What! infants repent and be baptized? Yes; for, according to J. F., this passage excludes rational individuals, and includes, of course, infants! Well, such reasoning being certainly infantine, we will leave it, and see what the context says. In Acts, chap. ii., it will be seen that individuals, "Parthians, Medes," &c., had come up to the feast at Jerusalem, and that, on the day of Pentecost, Peter addressed them, after which address it says, "Now when they heard this, they were pricked in their hearts, and said unto Peter and the rest of the apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do? Then Peter said unto them (these same strangers), Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ," &c. Now, these individuals were *seen*. Peter in addressing them said, "Repent, and be baptized." But, no; J. F. does not at all think this is in favour of adult baptism, for he brings it in to support infant baptism. Perhaps, then, these strangers brought their babes with them to Jerusalem? and perhaps they went hunting about for godfathers and godmothers for them amongst the Jews? and perhaps St. Peter's important address, beginning, "Men and brethren," was, after all, meant for *them*? and perhaps, to conclude, the apostle in a surplice sprinkled their faces with water, and made the sign of the cross? and perhaps, when it says, "*they that gladly received his word* were baptized," it referred to those little ones sub-

mitting to the ordinance with tearless eyes! There is no mention that St. Peter *did not* do all this; and it is just as clever to *infer* that it was done in this case as in any other.

Oh, away with such nonsense, and this in the nineteenth century. Talk of the seven sacraments of Rome! why, we have one in Protestant England that is not only quite as Popish, but, considering our additional enlightenment, more absurd. Reading this chapter in the Acts, the most simple reasoning in the world will show us—1st. That St. Peter fully understood our Lord's command to "go and teach all nations, baptizing them," &c., to mean that no nation, Jew or Gentile, was to be excluded (not necessarily *every individual* in that nation), for we find him preaching to Parthians, and Medes, and Ethiopians, &c. 2nd. That these individuals who were commanded to "*repent and be baptized*" were all adults; for they *heard* what Peter said, felt it, and inquired what they should do. 3rd. That the apostles only deemed these men fit subjects for baptism *if they repented*, another condition impossible to an infant. 4th. That all those who hold infant baptism as authorized by the New Testament are in grievous error, inasmuch as this whole chapter of the Acts, especially including verses 37, 38, and 41, *does* prove to a reasonable mind that adults only were the subjects of baptism as understood by the apostle Peter; and that infants were necessarily excluded, for they could neither understand, nor speak, nor repent; and also because it is said, "Then *they that gladly received his word* were baptized;"—as conclusive a mass of evidence, in my opinion, as the most scrupulous could require, to show that those who hold infant baptism are, in scripture estimation, grievously in the wrong.

In now leaving the matter with the reader, we may say that the discussion of the question, necessitating as it has done a reperusal of the scriptures bearing upon the subject, has greatly strengthened our conviction that *adults*, and those *believers*, are the only recipients of the ordinance of baptism authorized by the Bible.

J. W. W.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

ALL dispensations which have God for their author must be regarded as spiritual in relation to the *end* they are designed to promote,

namely, the salvation of man. But they are characterized by the quality of the *means* or appliances used for this end, since these

must needs be adapted to the particular genius and state of mankind, or that portion of mankind who sustain the functions of a church at any given period.

The advent of our Lord was made at a time when mankind were prepared for a more spiritual dispensation than that vouchsafed to the children of Israel; accordingly, the dispensation then founded was eminently spiritual; for in virtue of its essentials, which are charity, faith, and a life according, it is spiritual *par excellence*, and this in contradistinction to the Mosaic dispensation, which in its intrinsic nature was ceremonial and typical—typical of Christianity, and therefore was it superseded by its antitype.

We deem these preliminary remarks upon the essential nature of Christianity advisable, because it appears to us that a consideration of baptism, as an ordinance performed in connexion with the visible church of Christ, is necessary, since there is a difference of opinion in regard to its nature and use underlying this discussion, and requiring to be first settled, in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on the more immediate point at issue.

For our own part, we regard baptism as a mere ceremony, having its foundation on an ecclesiastical, rather than a theological, basis; as such we cannot concede it to be an essential part of Christianity, which, as a spiritual system, addresses itself to and affects man's spiritual nature.

But those who argue in favour of the negative side of the present question regard the ordinance of baptism in an assumed connexion with certain adjuncts, which affect, first, the nature of the ordinance,—secondly, the eligibility of the subject; the result is, that they come to regard baptism as an authoritatively-enjoined duty, to the performance of which advanced Christians alone are adequate. These conclusions being diametrically opposed to our own, we proceed to test the validity of those adjuncts whereby our opponents arrive at them.

First. That which affects the nature of the ordinance. "L'Ouvrier" alludes to baptism as a "positive precept," prescribing "the path of duty to the Christian;" subsequently he designates it a "divine precept," to the same effect; "Annette" speaks of submitting to the rite of baptism as "obeying this command of Christ;" and, lastly,

J. M. P. tells us "it is the bounden duty of every one" to be baptized.*

Now, the only passage in the four gospels which can with any propriety be regarded as establishing the external ordinance of baptism (Matt. xviii. 19) does not substantiate this view of its nature, for there the command to baptize is given not to the disciple or proselyte, but to the apostles. Now, the apostles assembled at the mountain in Galilee represented the church militant in all time, as is evident from the magnitude of the mission enjoined, "Go ye, therefore, and disciple *all nations*;" and from the extent of its duration, "Lo, I am with you *always*, even to the end." Thus it is the duty of the church to *bestow* baptism on the proselyte, who receives it as a sign or token of a privilege—church membership—*conferred*. As such, it may in some sort be likened to the diadem which adorns a monarch's brow, as the symbol of royalty, or to the sceptre he wields, as the symbol of kingly power; hence the propriety of using it, in its ceremonial capacity, as the initiatory rite on admission into the external christian church.

But the Baptists, according to "L'Ouvrier," regard baptism as a "pledge" on the part of the subject "that he believes;" or, according to "Annette," "as a token that they lay aside their sins." But we demand, to whom does it constitute such a token or "pledge?" To God? It is not needed, for he sees the heart. To man? It is unsatisfactory thus regarded, for it is notorious to every reader of church history that the peculiar sentiments of Baptists in regard to baptism have been held in connexion with heresies of the most pestilential nature—heresies which have excused, favoured, and even inculcated, an evil life. Baptist views of the use of baptism are, therefore, inadequate.

It is conceded by our opponents that baptism is a type and a ceremony. Now, it is in accordance with scriptural order and precedent, that a ceremonial type should be in use at a time anterior to the advent of its antitype. But "believer-baptism" implies the performance of the type in the very presence and ascendancy of its antitype; clearly, therefore, it is not in harmony with the scriptures.

* A sort of eleventh commandment, we presume, which might run thus:—"Thou shalt be baptized, in the name," &c.

B. S., in the course of his powerful article, has shown "believer-baptism" to be "impossible;" and we may add that the attempt to perform it consistently with the implied conditions is impious, since it attempts to judge of a man's spiritual state—a judgment to which the Lord alone is adequate, and which it is expressly forbidden man to attempt (Matt. vii. 1). Whatever conclusion, therefore, may be arrived at in regard to infant baptism, here is an overwhelming case against "believer-baptism," founded upon the intrinsic nature of the ordinance of baptism.

Our opponents, in their turn, would probably ask us to justify our sentiments in regard to baptism as they stand affected by the Lord's words, Mark xvi. 16, and John iii. 5, in which passages baptism appears to be made a condition of salvation. Our reply is, We hold the Lord's words to have a spiritual signification, according with the character which he himself has affixed to all his teachings. Thus he says (John vi. 63), "The words that I speak unto you are spirit and are life." Hence we are bound ever to look for a spiritual and life-giving sense in which to regard baptism; a sense which applies to the spiritual part of man's nature, and which can be supposed to be effective for eternal life. But the rite of baptism is performed on the perishable body of man; nor can external or bodily purification be regarded as in any way conducive to life eternal. We, therefore, repudiate the notion that the rite of baptism is the thing meant in the passage referred to, which, indeed, our opponents have no right to assume, even on the score of the bare literal sense, since there are other baptisms than that of water (as that of the "Holy Ghost" and of "fire") mentioned in the gospels, any of which might be the "baptism" intended.

The genuine or spiritual signification of the rite of baptism, as practised by John the Baptist and the disciples of our Lord, is to be gathered from a consideration of the component types which go to make up the concrete ceremony. These types are *water*, the *body* of man, and the *application* of the water, with a *cleansing* effect. We propose to arrive at the genuine sense of these particular types by the recognised rule of allowing scripture to interpret scripture.

In John iv. 10, our Lord speaks of "living

water"—"springing up unto everlasting life;" and again, John vi. 35, he says, "He that believeth on me shall never *thirst*." Now, bearing in mind the Lord's character as "the Word" and "the Truth," we at once conclude to the spiritual signification of water as being *truth*, and specifically *gospel* truth. That the body of man represents his soul, in ceremonial observance, is too evident to need any comment in its support. That the ceremonial application of water to the body for purificatory purposes signifies the application of the Lord's teachings to the soul, or life principle, is evident from the particular significations of water and of the body in such a ceremony; also from the Lord's performance, as detailed in John xiii. 5—10, and from his words (John xv. 3), "Ye are *clean* through the *word* which I have spoken unto you."

Thus, from the signification of those particular types involved in baptism, we conclude to the signification of the concrete ceremony as shadowing forth those essential things in order to salvation, repentance and reformation; for repentance is a necessary condition of genuine reformation, which is effected by the application of christian principles to life; repentance is also necessary to the remission of sins; and all these conditions together are necessary to salvation. Therefore baptism is called (Mark i. 4) "the baptism of repentance unto the remission of sins," and therefore the Lord said (Mark xvi. 16), "He that believeth and is baptized (*i. e.*, spiritually) shall be saved."

Secondly. We proceed to test the validity of that condition which, according to Baptist notions, should invest the subject of baptism, namely, the condition of "belief," or saving faith, which is of a spiritual nature. But we have already shown that a just consideration of the intrinsic nature of baptism, as a rite, directly militates against this notion of our opponents; and our able ally, B. S., has shown, in a manner which would be conclusive with an "unbiassed mind," that the genuine arguments to be derived from Matt. xxviii. 19, and the numerous examples our opponents have quoted of the practice of baptism by the apostles, are all in favour of proselyte-baptism, as contradistinguished from "believer-baptism." There is an obvious distinction between a proselyte or neophyte and a believer; yet J. M. P., while professedly

criticising the article of B. S., neglects either to deal with the argument, or to reconcile the obvious conclusions from it with Baptist notions. We can only account for the omission either on the ground of obtuseness or of an intense party spirit, which prompts him to blink a point of such importance in its bearings on the general discussion, but which tells against his own cherished system.

It remains for us to notice a piece of equivocal argumentation which pervades all the articles of our opponents. It exists in connexion with the term "disciple." It is certain that both *proselytes* and *believers* are in a certain sense disciples; but proselytes are not believers. Now, the argument of our opponents amounts to this,—our Lord commanded, and his apostles practised, disciple-proselyte-baptism. Believers are disciples; therefore our Lord commanded, and the apostles practised, disciple-believer-baptism. The fallacy is too transparent to need a more formal refutation.

But our opponents may exclaim, Admitting that the baptism which the Lord enjoined and the apostles practised was proselyte-baptism, still this does not prove the case of infant baptism. You cannot proselyte infants, and there is no "direct" evidence that the children of proselytes were baptized with them.

Now, this objection is a mere quibble. It was to be expected from the circumstances of a new dispensation, which was to be spread by proselytism, that the principal feature in its history would be the initiation of proselytes, in the present case by baptism, and that the subjects noticed personally in such a history would be adults; but the baptism of households—families—is recorded as being practised by the apostles; and nothing but a rampant party spirit would deny the extreme probability of such "households" containing both infants and children. Our opponents may be assured that, in the absence of any direct evidence to the contrary, this circumstance, so distinctly recorded, will always have its due weight in such a discussion as the present.

And now we come to face the impossibilities, which our opponents are so eager to point out as lying in our path to infant baptism. We are tauntingly asked if we can make "believers," "disciples," "proselytes," "of infants?" J. M. P. inquires, in the same sense and spirit, but in less equivocal

terms, "How are we to teach them?" "How are we to disciple them?" But let us see if there is not a sense in which children, or even infants, may be regarded as disciples, or learners. Thus, if we teach a child his alphabet, in order that he may be able to read the Bible, may we not be represented, with perfect propriety, as teaching him to read the Bible? So, if we educate a child, even from the first rudimentary instructions, which must be the foundation of his future acquirements, in view of his attaining to a full knowledge of the christian doctrine, may we not with equal propriety be represented as teaching him Christianity? Hence there is a sense in which infants and children are learners, or disciples, in relation to Christianity. The only difference between the infant disciple and the adult proselyte-disciple is in the matter of *will*, which must be supposed to actuate the proselyte; this, however, is bespoken on behalf of the child by his christian parents, and is valid to such an extent that he cannot at any subsequent period assume a negative aspect in regard to christian truth without incurring the moral guilt of infidelity. But there is really no essential difference between a child's belief and the belief of most of the first converts to Christianity, in whose cases a miraculous element had place. Now, the effect of miracles, or any other element, as prophecy, which astonishes or "confounds," is to take away the freedom of the will—to force it to adopt certain conclusions. The faith, therefore, of the first proselytes to Christianity was a *superinduced faith*, and altogether similar in its nature to that faith or belief in Christianity which christian parents *superinduce* by education on their offspring.

Having, on the one hand, disposed of those fictitious adjuncts with which Baptists would fain invest the rite of baptism, and the subject thereof; and, on the other hand, established and defended our own views on these fundamental points, we at length come to the immediate point at issue, "Is the practice of infant baptism in harmony with the scriptures?" This is, in effect, to ask, Do the scriptures sanction infants as the subjects of a ceremony? But the ceremony in question being the initiatory rite into the visible or external christian church, the question may be rendered, Is it in harmony with the scriptures to consider infants as eligible for

church membership? And the Mosaic rite of circumcision, which was the initiatory rite of the Israelitish church, and which was performed on infants of eight days old, at once occurs to dictate a conclusive affirmation.

"L'Ouvrier" and "Annette" both attempt to overrule the force of this precedent; "L'Ouvrier," however, deals with a proposition we do not affirm, namely, "that baptism and circumcision are interchangeable or substitutionary from the *Jewish* to the *Christian* dispensation." What we are concerned to maintain is, the *analogy* between the two rites—the similarity of the relations they bear to the respective dispensations to which they belong. Christianity was the "new covenant" in regard to Judaism, or the "old covenant." It was, therefore, both orderly and expedient to adopt a different initiatory rite, whose concurrent types should more truly represent the spiritual appliances of the system.

"Annette" attempts to evade the force of the precedent by arguing for a distinction between the posterity of Abraham as a nation and as a church; but we beg to submit that the children of Israel were representative of a church in their political as well as their social capacity, and thus as a nation; therefore there is no foundation for the distinction "Annette" contends for, and the argument which the precedent furnishes stands intact; indeed, this argument becomes an argument *à fortiori*, when the different geniuses of the two dispensations are taken into account.

The Mosaic dispensation was ceremonial and typical throughout, and as such the rite of circumcision was an essential part of its

requirements. It was appointed by God himself, and the penalty of being "cut off" attached to its non-observance; circumstances sufficient to demonstrate its relative importance. But the christian dispensation being antitypical, or spiritual, any merely ceremonial observance cannot be an essential part of its requirements. If, then, infants were eligible subjects for an essential of the Mosaic dispensation—which, however inferior as compared with the christian dispensation, was still the church of God at that time—how much more are they eligible as the subjects of a mere ceremonial appendage to Christianity?

In conclusion, we call the attention of our readers to the apposition of two remarkable precepts of our Lord: Mark x. 15, "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall not enter therein;" and John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." In each of these texts there is a condition attached to entrance into the "kingdom of God:" the one is birth "of water" (which phrase is generally allowed to allude to baptism by water); the other, an infantile character or nature. Now, in view of these conditions we would suggest the eminent propriety, beauty, fulness, and *scriptural harmony* of the ceremony of infant baptism, which unites these two remarkable types of spiritual conditions on that occasion, which of all others is most representative of admission into the kingdom of heaven, viz., initiation into the church, the Lord's kingdom on earth.

BENJAMIN.

Philosophy.

WHICH WAS THE GREATEST POET, MILTON OR SHAKSPERE?

SHAKSPERE.—ARTICLE III.

"What needs my Shakspeare?"

Thou, in our wonder and astonishment,
Hast built thyself a livelong monument.
For, whilst, to the shame of slow endeavouring
art,

Thy easy numbers flow; and that each heart
Hath, from the leaves of thy unvalued book,
Those Delphic lines with deep impression took;
Then thou, our fancy of itself bereaving,
Dost make us marble with too much conceiving;

And, so sepulchred, in such pomp dost lie,
That kings, for such a tomb, would wish to
die."

Milton.

"He was the man who, of all modern, and perhaps ancient poets, had the largest and most comprehensive soul."

Dryden.

"Shakspeare is a wonderful genius, a single instance of the force of nature, and the strength of wit. Nothing can be greater and more lively than his thoughts; nothing nobler and more

forcible than his expression. The fire of his fancy breaketh out into his words, and sets his reader on a flame: he maketh the blood run cold or warm, and is so admirable a master of the passions, that he raises your courage, your pity, and your fear, at his pleasure." *Dr. Felton.*

"COMPARISONS are odious;" and in the question whether Shakspeare or Milton, each superlatively great, be the greater, there appears something forbidding and ungenerous. The truth is, each is incomparable in his sphere: one as a dramatic poet, the other as an epic; one as the confidant and oracle of Nature, the other of Revelation. Thus viewed, a distinction is discernible, not of measure or capacity, but of divergency. Parnassus had two tops, and two only. Gladly would we place the fame of Shakspeare on Hyampea; that of Milton on Tythorea. But the query before us admits of no distinguishing epithets; we are shut up to the consideration, which of the omnific and glorious twain absorbs in his own character most of the quality or qualities comprehended in the simple and unqualified term, "poet;" and, while thus restricted, we must proceed as well as may be, albeit the proceeding bears some analogy to debating whether father or mother be the greater parent; or to a man, blear-eyed and at infinite distance, attempting to resolve how one star differs from another star in glory; or to a discussion as to whether the gleams of the sun, "the all-kissing Titan," are as effulgent in Great Britain as in her antipodes.

"L'Ouvrier," evidently coyed (who would not be?) at bringing such kingly spirits into compare, has certainly done little, save so far as bare utterance of opinion suffices, to place Milton "in the exalted position of England's greatest poet." After a careful study of his paper, we can detect nothing calculated to lead an unbiassed inquirer to such a conclusion. Much that is advanced either concerns a common possession of the two poets, or else the superiority discriminated is purely advenient—comes wholly from "the breath of outward circumstance"—from the theme, the form, the occasion-imposed necessity—or, above all, from profounder scholarship, and not, we ween, in anywise from affluence in any of the essentials of a poet. It were impertinent, however, to follow "L'Ouvrier" into detail in order to show his virtual neutrality. Better at once attempt to adduce what we deem positive

reason why for Shakspeare, considered purely as a poet, we should claim the highest rank.

"Unless a man be *born* a poet, he will never attain the true spirit of poetry," said good and learned John Wesley, well nigh a century ago. "We believe that Nature makes poets," lately wrote the excellent author of "The Art of Reasoning," in these pages. Now, divest Milton of all but his native purple (of which we proudly own he possessed no scanty measure); at least, reduce his culture, his acquisitions, to those of the rural swain of Warwick; strip him of much academical training—of much booklore—of Sophocles, Euripides, Virgil, Ovid, Ariosto, Dante, Tasso, of Spenser, of the "thousand-souled" himself, and of Cowley: place the twain on equal ground, and then pronounce which is the greater. Milton, bred a scholar, constantly environed by polished society, could hardly fail, with gifts even slightly above mediocrity, to make a figure in the world. On the other hand, it had been no marvel if, combined with a yet larger measure of natural endowment, it had been an unknown or forgotten name, that of a butcher's son, who, it is recorded, was, in early youth, "very much given to all unluckiness,"—to deer poaching, to indiscreet courtship and premature marriage at eighteen; wandering, subsequently, an adventurer to the metropolis; and, after rising by slow gradation from the meanest post, becoming even at last only the principal of a London theatre. But because his name does live, despite all drawback; because that in compositions framed primarily to please the auditory of a playhouse at the close of the sixteenth century, there is preserved and hoarded "an inexhaustible mine of virgin treasure," we concede to him the "highest pinnacle of poetical fame." That Shakspeare, destitute of the eminent erudition of Milton, and living two generations before him, should at this day sustain a comparison with the great Puritan; nay, that he should have on his side the majority (we believe) of those best fitted to judge of poetical excellence, seems to us a sufficient establishment of our position. "The name of Shakspeare," writes Hallam, "is the greatest in our literature: it is the greatest in all literature. No man ever came near to him in the creative powers of the mind; no man had ever such strength at once, and such variety of imagination."

Dryden says, "They who accuse him of wanting learning, give him the greatest commendation. He was *naturally* learned. He needed not the spectacles of books to read nature." This "natural learning" we take to be the fundamental and chief characteristic of a great poet; and we deem it abundantly clear that Shakspeare evinced more of it than Milton. Nor are the intuitive powers of the Bard of Avon superficial or circumscribed. They range with equal felicity over the whole extent of being; from "the poor beetle that we tread upon" to the "raven lion, when he roars with sharp constraint of hunger;" from the imperturbable sailor boy to the "uneasy head that wears a crown;" and from the brutal Bardolph to the philosophic duke; from the "pied daisy" to the "frosty Caucasus;" from the "gentle rain of heaven" to the "swift sulphureous bolt that splits the unwedgable and gnarled oak." Throughout all nature his insight is transcendent, his "creative power and intellectual energy wrestling as in a war-embrace," seeming to pierce all things. "The philosophy of Shakspeare (we again quote Hallam)—his intimate searching out of the human heart, whether in the gnostic form of sentence, or in the dramatic exhibition of character, is a gift peculiarly his own." "I know not," writes Carlyle, "such a power of vision, faculty of thought, if we take all the characters of it, in any other man. Such a calmness of depth, placid, joyous strength; all things imaged in that great soul of his so true and clear, as in a tranquil, unfathomable sea!" Coleridge, the greatest genius of his day—"logician, metaphysician, bard"—after fifty-five years' disciplined scholarship, thus writes:—"At every new accession of information, after every successful exercise of meditation, and every fresh presentation of experience, I have unfailingly discovered a proportionate increase of wisdom and intuition in Shakspeare."

The spontaneity, too, of Shakspeare is more manifest. Though—after the fashion of Moore in the production of "Lalla Rookh"—Milton enforced not upon himself for years a sort of formal incubation; it is, nevertheless, indubitable that, during a considerable portion of his life, his great work, "Paradise Lost," was gradually forming and exuding through the sublimating alembic of his transcendent mind. Shakspeare, contrariwise,

wrote all his works within some fifteen or sixteen years, and before his forty-eighth year.

Professor Aytoun, in his recent lectures, characterized the greatest poet as one whose works are the most widely apprehensible, most universally influential, recognised, and esteemed. In this regard Shakspeare stands incontestably foremost; for of Milton it has been justly remarked, that "he is more admired than read." Shakspeare, equally admired, is no less read and studied. He possesses a perennial fund of interest, alike for the meanest capacity and the highest; while yet none can say, "I have exhausted him." From the peasant to the prince; from the alien Kossuth, in his prison at Buda, to the compatriot De Quincey, in his study at Lasswade,—every mind "rejoiceth at his word, as one that findeth great spoil." His lessons of wisdom—of wistful instruction—are neither scant nor light; while his beauties, literary, artistic, intellectual, moral, are multitudinous as dew-drops in a morning. And then what writer is quoted, whether in oral or written discourse, as Shakspeare? His glittering and profound apophthegms pervade, with the cheer and freshness of sunshine, the eloquence of the senate, the forum, and the pulpit; familiar everywhere as household words, the rapt effluence of this diaphanous oracle. Few will fail to recollect the mention of the preacher who, while declaiming with pious fervour against all plays and playhouses, unwittingly cited an entire passage of "Othello!" The utterances of the butcher's son have become in large measure the texture and woof of the English tongue.

To the theme, no less than to the form, of his greatest work Milton owes much. "The subject of 'Paradise Lost' (says Hallam) is the finest that has ever been chosen." "Milton oweth his superiority in majesty of thought and splendour of expression to the scriptures: they are the fountain from which he derived his light; the sacred treasure that enriched his fancy, and furnished him with all the truth and wonders of God and his creation, of angels and men, which no mortal brain was able either to discover or conceive," wrote Dr. Henry Felton, in 1709. Furthermore:—"Milton drew, sometimes, out of other men's wells. . . . Shakspeare found, forsooth, his plots in Cynthio's novels, and the skeleton of some of his speeches in

Plutarch; but where (asks Gilfillan) found he his sentiment, his imagery, his language, the flesh and blood with which he clothed those dead bones, and the magic of the word of genius by which he made them living men?" The muse of Milton affects theocracy, hovers around whatever is revealed of the Eternal himself—of primeval man—Eden, his pristine abode, and the maleficent power which induced his fall—of the glory of heaven, and the diabolism of hell. In these, truly, is the culmination of greatness; but unfolded, we apprehend, by the inspired word, not by Milton. These have, we grant, shed around our poet a halo of majestic dignity and splendour wholly wanting in every other, but which, as a reflected lustre, can by no means be accounted to him an excellence in our estimate of him strictly as a poet. Yet, "Can there be greatness greater than this?" ejaculates "L'Ouvrier," as if the subject were the poet, the instrument the music, or as if the condor were the chiefest warbler because it towers as heavenward as the peak of Chimborazo. The muse of Shakspeare affects things of lesser moment, ranges a wider field, and is, in general, in nowise indebted to the theme. Yet Shakspeare, says Dryden, "is always great when some great occasion is presented to him." Poetry stands prominently out, whether he touches the minutest terrestrial object or the greatest, whether it be "the poor harmless fly, with its slender, gilded wings," or the mighty sun, "which fires the proud tops of the eastern pines." The breath of his genius calls forth from an apparent "wild of nothing" reality and beauty, and extracts jewels from reptile loathsomeness and insignificance. Milton reduces and transhapes; Shakspeare transmutes, and yields gold from granite.

We should naturally look for a more imposing presence in a well-born Londoner than in one born of a lower station, and bred amid

the rusticity of a midland county; and the feelings with which we should approach a secretary of the commonwealth would be far different from the feelings with which we should approach the proprietor of a play-house; an effect produced solely by virtue of accidental position, and not from any, even a cursory estimate of respective character or natural capacity. Such was the relative position of Milton and Shakspeare in life; and something analogous seems to obtain now in respect of their poetry. But in equity, in the furtherance of a meet and truthful solution to the question propounded at the head of this article, let any prepossession in favour of Milton, originating by the association of his name with all that is esteemed great among men, be specially canvassed and bounded. What more awing and august, considered in itself and its symbolic significance, than the diadem of Victoria? Yet have we unappealable—yea, sacred warranty—that in a flower of the field dwells more true poetry than in that! Shakspeare is as a rose, Milton as the crown.

But enough. In concluding these imperfect remarks we are desirous of intimating that we have spoken of these dazzling luminaries in the world's literature through feelings of much diffidence, because necessitated to speak in some sort to the disparagement of surpassing greatness. In unfeigned admiration of Milton as a poet, and especially as pre-eminently a Christian poet, we yield to none; and, had the two names been connected in any other way for discussion, we should, probably, have been found on the other side. Milton we know as a great man among great men; as an eminently learned man, a politician, a Christian; but chiefly as a poet. Of Shakspeare, as to his manhood, his acquisitions, his principles, his achievements in life, if aught can be told, there is surely nothing to boast of; he is, in sooth, ALL poet.

SAXON.

MILTON.—ARTICLE III.

FOR an ordinary intellect to sit in judgment on the relative merits of Shakspeare and Milton, seems to indicate a degree of intellectual assurance and pride, which argues but little fitness for the task it attempts; at the same time, no one who is conversant with the poetical works of these two master-

minds of the human race, can avoid forming an opinion of their comparative excellence, or, at least, feeling that degree of personal preference which he ought to have the manliness to avow and defend. Conscious of unfitness for so great a theme, and desiring to avoid the apparent hardihood of attempt-

ing to comprehend and weigh the powers of a Shakspeare and a Milton, I had intended to remain a silent, but deeply interested, spectator of the course of the present debate; hoping thereby to obtain clearer and more exact views for myself, before I ventured publicly to declare and defend them. Finding, however, that there is yet room for another defender of Milton's fame, I am induced to come forward and explain, as far as in me lies, the reasons which induce me to rank him above the "sweet bard of Avon," in the scale of poetic excellence; and in this resolve, I am further confirmed by the conviction that my predecessors, in their admirable articles, have rather wandered round than fairly approached the question. I hope I shall be understood as speaking the honest opinions of a friend, and not as either assuming the office of judge over my brethren, or deprecating their articles, when I say that they appear to me to be dazzled by the greatness of their theme, and to speak a panegyric, instead of asserting and establishing a claim. The articles that have appeared on the side of Milton appear more suited to promote a sudden enthusiasm, than a settled conviction; and I cannot but regret to find one writer, apparently resting much of his reasoning on the assumption, that the better man is the greater poet.

The character of the opening article of E. W. S., in favour of Shakspeare, seems to require prompt notice. We find him declaring, in his first paragraph, with a hardihood and intellectual presumption ill-befitting the theme, that he does "not profess to have risen" to a superior height to that on which Shakspeare stands; although, forsooth, he has gained a "stand-point," from which he is "enabled to look upon all the poetic geniuses of the world, *ut qui infra sunt*!" "This spiritual elevation," which enables E. W. S. to look down on Milton, we envy not, but rather despise; convinced, as we are, that it is but an airy altitude, as baseless and unsubstantial as a dream. I feel the less hesitation in speaking thus strongly of E. W. S., because he appears to carry the same degree of hauteur, and suppositions and self-constituted superiority into all his writings. In a closing article on another topic, he has travelled out of his course to attack and asperse the liturgy, constitution, and officers of a great religious community, in most un-

measured terms, and in a way that can only excite just indignation, or cause deep pain to every charitable reader, whether belonging to, or (like myself) dissenting from, the body in question. I neither expect, nor wish for, better treatment than he has accorded to other opponents; but I hope, by calling the attention of the readers of the *Controversialist* to the spirit manifested by this writer, to induce them to resist the attempts made to dictate and force opinions upon them by the means of dogmatic assertion and bold abuse. Those who tell us that they have gained an eminence from which they look down on Milton, have already decided the present question; we need not seek for arguments; the opening declaration is sufficient to awe us into acquiescence, or produce distrust of their intentions. In accordance with our expectations, we find nothing in the article of E. W. S. but uncompromising assertion. "The epic grandeur, the beautiful language, the classic power, and perfect harmony of thought and symbol, to be found in Milton," are acknowledged only to be summarily condemned as "not poetry," and "merely artistic." Let the reader substitute "dramatic beauty" for "epic grandeur," and the sentence will be as true and applicable to Shakspeare as it now is to Milton. I appeal to the reader, and fearlessly ask, Is he inclined to accept these auto-phatic decisions as of any value? Channing's description of the tendency and effects of poetry is quoted as a definition; and Shakspeare's poetry is forthwith asserted to agree with this test. We will not stop to show (as might easily be done) that the remarks of Channing are as applicable to the poetry of Milton as to that of Shakspeare; but we will call the reader's attention to the last sentence, which E. W. S. has marked in italics. Channing declares that poetry "helps faith to lay hold on future life." Now, we ask any sincere and simple-minded Christian, if such is the result of studying Shakspeare? Can any one read the gross impurities which so often disfigure the pages of Shakspeare,—can any one wade through the oaths and profanities of utterance of many of his characters, and then conscientiously speak of being taught thereby to lay hold on future life, or of receiving therefrom an "assurance" of the truth "of a higher revelation"?

Most of the writers on this debate have

laid so much stress on the moral and educational tendency of the works of the two poets on their readers, that I feel bound to notice this question, though I have great doubts of the propriety of raising it. The point to be decided is not the object of the writers as men, but the execution of their subjects as poets. On this topic, the tendency of their writings, we must of necessity yield the palm to Milton, in preference to Shakspeare, if we be true Christians. Blot out every book but Shakspeare's, and Christianity would be unintelligible, it could not be understood from his stray allusions; blot out every book but Paradise Lost, and you would still have a glorious epitome of our holy faith. I deny not that many admirable lessons may be drawn from the pages of Shakspeare; but I point to the fact that the general tendency of his plays on the mind would be to introduce laxity of morals, and to ignore pure religion. I speak not of those noble minds who can

"Find tongues in trees, books in the running
brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything."

Such men will find redeeming sentiments in the worst writers, and by the precious alchemy of virtue, will extract the pure gold of wisdom from the basest ores; much more then from the richly veined passages of Shakspeare. He was pre-eminently the poet of Nature, and she yet bears the impress of her great Creator in her face; fallen though she be, we can yet trace those lineaments of beauty which were once declared to be "very good." I speak of the effect of Shakspeare's plays on the uncultivated mind. There is perhaps no one play containing less objectionable features than Macbeth, which so strongly paints the power of conscience and certain punishment of guilt; but any of my readers who have watched its effect on a large audience, will (I imagine) hesitate to say much of its educational tendency. The contemplation of Adam and Eve in their state of innocence, will purify the mind, and lead it to higher views of female worth and excellence, than the Desdemonas and Imogenes of Shakspeare, beauteous and lovely as they are. The study of an archangel's character drawn by a Milton's pen, must have a more ennobling tendency than that of Caliban, or the ghosts of Hamlet's father, or of Banquo. The great philosophical effort

of Shakspeare is in Hamlet, and hence, E. W. S. has termed it "the impersonation of the great moral problem of our spiritual nature." What can we say of the moral teachings of this celebrated work of genius? It opens on a scene of murder and incest. Its progress shows guilt in power, gentleness stung into madness, nobility sunk in misery; while Hamlet himself declares the heartless, deadening doctrine of necessity as opposed to free will. It closes on an awful scene of treachery, bloodshed, murder, and suicide. Is this awful picture to be ranked higher, as to its moral tendency, than the pictures of Paradise with its Eden of innocence, and its hell of rebellion, where vice never gains more than a temporary advantage, and where the eye of faith is directed in the darkest hour to the sublime vision of the triune God guiding all things according to his immutable counsel. Let men *act* with reference to necessity and free will as Hamlet *speaks* of them, in the scene where he is waiting for the ghost, and this world will then become the stage on which the tragic crimes and miseries of this play will be daily acted. Hamlet is the lining of the darkest thunder-cloud that ever hung over helpless humanity; as a sublime conception of genius, we estimate it as highly as any one can; as a moral lesson, we shrink with horror from its terrible exhibition of Fate, Despair, and Death. No cheering ray appears to raise our hopes; and we sink slowly into the passive despair of the fatalist, until relieved by the soothing pictures of a Divine Supreme, and of a hereafter of righteous judgment, sung of in the sublime strains of Milton; but unheard among the "native wood-notes wild" of Shakspeare's music.

The moral tendency of *Lear* (perhaps Shakspeare's greatest effort as a poet) is almost as benumbing to our aspirations as *Hamlet*. The noble, though misjudging Lear, the gentle Cordelia, the faithful Kent, and high souled Edgar, are the victims of filial ingratitude, unnatural hatred, base treachery, and fiendish cruelty. And the curtain (after scenes of madness and anguish, too painful almost to contemplate) darkly falls on the lifeless bodies of the chief actors. In the same dark, hopeless manner, the scenes of *Othello* close. We do not send men to the field of carnage to learn humanity, or to the

gaming-table to learn honesty; nor should we advise any one to study innocence suffering in a Desdemona, passion raging in an Othello, and villany triumphing in an Iago, in order to raise his moral character. What is the tendency of *Antony and Cleopatra*? Is not the character of *Measure for Measure* so licentious as to want (even among the idolizers of its author) a hearty defender? Does not the *Merry Wives of Windsor* turn lust into a pleasant jest, and exhibit a woman trifling with her reputation, and tempting her husband to jealousy, for the sake of a few practical jokes? Is not the moral of the *Taming of the Shrew* disgraceful, and almost ominous of that brutality to women, which, to the disgrace of England, has necessitated legislative interference during the present session of parliament? As a comic sketch, the play is amusing; but its tendency condemns it as degrading to humanity. Compared with these, how lofty, how pure, is Milton's poetry. Where is the passage which can pain the most delicate, or offend the most censorious? Milton carries us back to the primeval state of happiness and innocence, when our first parents ranged through the bowers of Paradise, blessed in the enjoyment of all that heart could wish, happy in their pure and mutual love, conscious of the approving smile of Heaven, and conversing as obedient and favoured children with the great Father of their spirits; and as we read, we are led to think of Him from whom we have strayed, to yearn after that state of holiness from which we have fallen, and to resolve to live more Godlike and Christlike. Shakspeare, on the other hand, sketches fallen man, his fleeting joys, his feeble virtues, his heavy sorrows, and heavier crimes; we see him vainly struggling against, and frequently sinking under the gigantic powers of evil. One poet points us to our Creator, tells us what we once were, and again may be; the other only raises with magic power an airy picture of the gilded sunshine, of the short hour of our joy, or the dark shadows of our crimes and sorrows.

The relative merits of Shakspeare and Milton cannot be decided by popular suffrage. The "fit audience, *though few*," is rather the characteristic of the highest genius. That Shakspeare is the more popular poet, we admit; nor can we wonder, for he paints us as we are, and we feel a personal interest in

the exquisite limning. Like Eve at the fountain, we draw back only to gaze again "with answering looks of sympathy and love." Our self-love is gratified to behold its image, to find itself so thoroughly known and felt. But from the purity of Eden, we shrink with somewhat of awe. We feel our inferiority, and we draw back from before the empyrean throne of Deity; we dread to walk the holy groves of Paradise, the place is too sacred for us. The poet points out the discipline of the temper which we should exercise, the purity of pleasures after which we should aim, the expansive benevolence we should practice to our fellow men, and the devout communion we should hold with our God, and the unregenerate heart turns away to the more congenial themes of earth. The easy morality of Shakspeare attracts us, and suits our natural depravity and moral indolence; but our wounded self-pride rises against the stern morality and purity of Milton; we turn from his faithful pages, and neglect the poet because we dislike the teacher. We leave the groves of Paradise, albeit the "six-winged seraph" fills the garden with "the perfume of his wings," and in his glory.

" Seems another sun
Risen on mid-noon ;"

and we seek a more congenial haunt amid the human revelry and coarse merriment of Falstaff and his companions. The "Boar's Head," in East-cheap, is more suited to our taste than Eden; the flippant jests and flouts of Beatrice and Benedict please us more than the sweet converse and conjoint worship of Adam and Eve.

Queen Elizabeth and her courtiers laughed at the pranks of the *Merry Wives of Windsor*, and extended their favours to the poet of the stage; his art was exercised to please the throng of the pleasure-seeking multitude, and consequently his popularity has become unbounded. "He mingled with the crowd, and played the host, 'to make society the sweeter welcome.'" How different has been the fate of Milton. He spent health, strength and sight in the cause of truth and patriotism, but his efforts were unavailing. His works were burnt by the hangman; the prelacy he had opposed, sat supreme and intolerant in the temple of God; the commonwealth he had advocated, was changed into a despotism; the hated form of the licenser stood threaten-

ing mutilation to the immortal poem of the great author of "Areopagitica." Yet crushed in spirit, blind, and aged, in poverty and solitude, his mighty genius poured forth the sublime strains of "Paradise Lost." To contemplate that despised, sightless, obscure old man, is the sublimest spectacle of human might. Had Shakspeare been surrounded with such adverse circumstances, we can scarcely believe he would have left much "witness to" his fame. The consideration of their circumstances should lead every impartial judge to rank Milton as the greater poet, even if he esteemed his poetry inferior to that of Shakspeare. The might of a great man's genius is most seen in his power of overruling adverse circumstances.

The theme before us is so vast, that we unconsciously find our space almost occupied before our task is begun; we must therefore rather sketch out the plan of our reasoning than fairly follow it out. In determining the relative merits of two writers as poets, we ought, *first*, to define poetry; to point out wherein consist its highest attributes, and to measure the authors by this standard; and, *secondly*, to compare those passages where they touch on kindred themes. There is perhaps nothing more difficult to define than Poetry; and I fear that I shall not meet with much sympathy, unless I adopt some hyperbolical phrases, or fly off in rhapsodies. It is surprising to find how completely writers confound the subject-matter of poetry with poetry itself; so that we find them declaring that "all that is good and beautiful" is poetry, or that "fear is poetry, hope is poetry, love is poetry," &c. The poet simply unveils the beautiful and the sublime, but does not create it. Again, we frequently confound poetry with imagination. Now, if we carefully examine into the distinguishing features of the works of those writers who, by common consent, are denominated poets, I think we shall find that poetry may be defined as *a composition in elegant and decorated language of metrical construction, the intention and aim of which is to afford intellectual pleasure.* Those who reflect that poetry has always been the language of rejoicing triumph,—that in the far-off days of Greece, she sung those deeds of heroes which ever please the ear, and (as now) added a zest to the festive hour, or soothed in gentle strains the couch of sorrow, will

scarcely doubt that the object of poetry is simply to afford pleasure and not instruction. It comes to us as a friend and companion, not as a teacher. The necessity of metre to poetry has often been disputed, but I think without success. Milton speaks of poetry as consisting of

"Thoughts that voluntary move,
Harmonious numbers;"

and his authority must here suffice. Did space allow, I think it would be easy to establish that metre is an essential constituent of poetry; and I doubt not that those of my readers who fairly consider the question, will adopt this conclusion. Recollecting Milton wrote above half a century later than Shakspeare, I am content to allow an equality of merit between these two great poets as regards their use of language; and though I think that Milton has shown a more uniform and constant faultlessness of metre than Shakspeare, and am prepared to support that opinion by examples, yet I shall pass on to the consideration of the third part of my definition. The object of poetry is to give intellectual pleasure, by gratifying the imagination and exciting the emotions. The four principal qualities requisite for attaining these ends are beauty, grandeur, sublimity, and novelty. In comparing the poetry of Milton and Shakspeare on these heads, we think the superiority of Milton becomes at once apparent. His subject has a grandeur and sublimity the passions of humanity can lay no claim to, and he has risen up to that subject; he has surrounded it with every association of earthly beauty, grandeur, and passion, and has thus brought it within the grasp of our intellect; and yet, so excellently has he accomplished the task, that his theme never suffers from this intermingling of the spiritual with the physical, of heaven with earth. He formed himself on the herculean model proposed by Coleridge as necessary for a great epic poet; he studied all the science of his age; he mastered all the history, all the poetry, all the knowledge of his time. Loaded with the intellectual spoils of all ages, he commenced his great work. In the burning words of Hazlett we may say, that he "exhausted" all knowledge, both "sacred and profane." The power of his mind is stamped on every line. The fervour of his imagination melts down, as in a furnace, the most contradictory materials.

ing his works, we feel ourselves under the influence of a mighty intellect, that the nearer it approaches to others, becomes more distinct from them. *His learning has the effect of intuition.* He describes objects, of which he could have only read in books, with the vividness of actual observation. His imagination has the force of nature. He makes words tell as pictures." Proofs of the truth of these remarks occur continually in Milton's poetry, but where shall we find anything of this in Shakspeare? Shakspeare sets geography at defiance, and blunders in chronology; his allusions to ordinary learning are of such a doubtful character, that it is to this day unknown whether he ever received a tolerable education or not. Nor let it be supposed that this was a purposed omission of Shakspeare, for we find him lingering round a pun, and dwelling on a few "terms of art;" as some one has said, he "describes the ailments of Petruchio's horse as though he were bred a farrier." Independent of mere obsolete words, there are far more words in Shakspeare which would send an ordinary reader to his dictionary, than in *Paradise Lost*, with all its teeming allusions to ancient lore. The character of Milton's poetry is sublimity and intensity; of Shakspeare's simplicity and discursiveness. As a writer justly remarks, Shakspeare "never insists on anything as much as he might, except a quibble." How much would Shakspeare's poetry be reduced if we cut out those interminable and petty series of punning and trifling which continually occur. In passages of beauty we are inclined to admit that Shakspeare equalled Milton, but he did not surpass him; nothing can surpass the beauties so thickly strewn throughout the minor poems of *Lycidas*, *Penseroso*, and *Allegro*, to which we may apply the remarks

of Coleridge, and say, "they are speckless diamonds." Even in describing Nature, Milton has shown himself no way inferior to Shakspeare. Let the reader compare that exquisite passage in *Lycidas*, commencing, "Return, Alpheus; the dread voice," &c., with any description of flowers in Shakspeare, and his verdict will not be *against* Milton. In beauty, then, we think Milton equal with, and in grandeur and sublimity superior to Shakspeare. In that strangeness wherein the pleasure of novelty consists, Milton had advantages in his subject of which his genius took full advantage. In description Milton is undoubtedly superior; witness his painting of Adam and Eve, and of the angelic hosts; they are presented to us in all the exact and classic grandeur of sculpture; they "have all the elegance and precision of a Greek statue; glossy and impurpled, tinged with golden light, and musical as the strings of Memnon's harp."

But I must close these hasty sketches and imperfect reasonings, hoping that my readers will follow out for themselves that train of thought, that close inquiry into the nature and qualities of poetry, and that careful application of the results of such inquiry, which I have so crudely outlined. Of the result I have little doubt. The readers of this magazine belong to the class of truth seekers and thinkers, and they will, I believe, ever yield to Milton a higher praise and deeper admiration than they accord to the Bard of Avon, though, when compared with all other poets, they may share an undoubted supremacy. Of Milton, we may truly say,

"Yet not more sweet
Than pure was he, and not more pure than wise;
High Priest of all the Muses' mysteries."

H. B.

Politics.

OUGHT THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE TO BE REPEALED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

It has been truly remarked that if an Englishman "would understand the history of his country, the origin of its political constitution, the tenure of its landed property, and the general basis of its polity, he should make himself acquainted with" the feudal

system,—“the law of nations in our western world.” The truth of this is involved in the present inquiry, as it regards the subject of primogeniture. The origin of primogeniture belongs to the feudal system, although it was not a primordial feature of that system. It grew out of it. It was one of its numerous results. *Feoda*, fiefs, or fends, were portions of land—estates—given by the Conqueror to the different members of his army, according to their rank, exploits, or favour with the victor. These lands were held under the condition that such landholders should render proportionate military services in defence of the recognised lord. These “fiefs originally reverted to the grantor on the vassal’s death.” It was not till feudalism had lost much of its primitive character, that the law of primogeniture was introduced. Indeed, we are inclined to view it as one of those regulations which ultimately secured the abolition of feudalism. It tended to limit both the power and personal influence of the grantor, or recognised chief. Prior to the introduction of the law of primogeniture, the lord possessed a power which was, after that event, greatly limited, from the circumstances of the case. It would prove an interesting research to trace out the course of events, and various influences, which led to this radical change, during the first ages of feudalism. It was, doubtless, in its origin an encroachment on the leading power, which increased as generation after generation passed away, producing endless antagonism, until it became a recognised social law. Indeed, was it not *the democratic element overwhelming the monarchic power*, in a rude state of society? But we have other and more important branches of research, to which we proceed (having shown the origin of primogeniture), proving that it and its attendants ought to be repealed, on the principle that society and legislation are progressive.

We shall first consider it in the light of actual law, and learn whether it comes up to the high standard of law as the embodiment of justice. This is an important point; and we hesitate not to assert that it is contrary to justice and natural right, which claims an *equality* for the children of the *same* parents. That the succession should devolve on the first-born is an arbitrary arrangement, contrary to natural right, will be evident if we ask, What is it, in the first

place, that gives or institutes the claim itself? The only reply is—*birth*. If this is granted, the fact of birth naturally implies a right to succession. The *equality* of birth implies *equality* in succession, according to the simple dictate of natural right. The law of primogeniture, then, inasmuch as it gives to but *one* the prerogative of all, according to natural right, is in itself unjust and imperfect, and for this primal reason demands repeal.

Having learned the origin of the law, the reader will not be surprised that it should be thus unjust *in se*. It is but the embodiment of the principle which always prevails, more or less, in a rude state of society—that *right* is subordinate to *might*. The surprise will be, that the embodiment of such a principle should have been recognised for so many ages as law! But it stands in the same ignoble category as transportation, execution, &c.; things altogether incompatible with the first principles of justice, the progressive nature of law and society, experience, wisdom, and the noblest sentiments of humanity.

The fact that the law of primogeniture is unjust in itself is granted by the law, which limits it in one portion of the kingdom to such an extent, that *all* the sons of the same family enjoy their natural prerogative; that there is no right of primogeniture among females, the crown excepted, and which was not itself appropriated to the first-born, Maunde informs us, till the race of Hugh Capet. We do not, though we might, resort to history to furnish an antecedent.

II. It is a law repugnant to natural feeling and sentiment; and therefore ought to be repealed.

That all the children of a deceased parent should share equally in the parental possessions, is the dictate of the *heart* as well as of the reason. That one should monopolize to himself those possessions, and thus rob, it may be, the infant and unconscious members of the family, is, we think, a *crime*, not less odious than that which gives man possession of his fellow-man. Could it be proved that no first-born had ever robbed the younger children, it would be nothing in favour of the law; but rather a high compliment to the integrity and natural goodness of mankind, which, despite the sanction of human law, denied *self*, and obeyed the

higher dictates of nature! But this cannot be proved! The contrary may be; for there are very few old standing families in the land, except in Kent where gavel-kind still exists, whose history would not "many a tale unfold," harrowing to the tenderest feelings of the heart!

III. It is a law frequently productive of political discord and national misery. *Political*, we say, for what worse thing can befall a nation, than that the law should place on the throne an effeminate and unwise prince; a man of little mind, vile principles, uncontrollable passions; it may be, a wretch in every sense. And why? A weighty reason there ought to be, for thus endangering the best interests of a nation—for placing the regal diadem on the brow, and the potent sceptre in the hand of a spendthrift—Richard II., or a murderer—Richard III., or a human monster—Henry VIII., or a voluptuary—Charles II., or a bigot and hypocrite—James II.!

Can it be that law has sanctioned such things because such characters happened to be the next in the primogenial line of succession! History teaches some terrible lessons

on this subject! When will men learn wisdom?

IV. It is frequently productive of social misery.

The law protects the first-born; yea, sanctions his conduct, though he disregard the natural claims of the junior branches of his family, and bring upon them misery and poverty untold, by his inhuman conduct! There is no redress for them; they have only the wide world for a home, or the union for a shelter!

Thomas Carlyle says, "A man willing to work, and unable to find work, is perhaps the saddest sight that fortune's inequality exhibits under *this* sun." Perhaps! Had Thomas Carlyle cast the radiance of his keen, penetrating genius on this question, he had, though *horribile dictu*, seen many a *sadder sight* than that! A nation ruined, *pro tempore*, by law! An orphan family beggared, sorrow-stricken twice, dumb with grievous thought, cast upon the icy sympathies of a fallen world, *by law*! It is a sad thing to write about; but it is a veritable fact! Of primogeniture what sayest thou, O reader?

ROLLA.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE object of the discussions which appear from time to time in these pages, is not merely to draw forth the talents and to cultivate the intellectual powers of the writers; they are intended to exert an influence on the minds of readers, and thereby to subserve the interests of truth in religion and politics, to further the great cause of human happiness, and to aid in the development of social progress. When, therefore, it is proposed (as in the present instance) to discuss the propriety of abolishing an important part of the institutions and laws of this great nation, it becomes our duty to inquire what would be the effect of such abolition,—whether the institution in question is one which must necessarily and *immediately* be replaced by a more perfect substitute, or whether we may safely defer the consideration of that *substitute to a future period*, or dispense with it entirely. Now we believe that the law of primogeniture belongs to the former of these two classes; it would be almost impossible to repeal it, without at the same time providing a substitute for it. Governing, as a law of inhe-

ritance or succession, the devolution of the entire real property of the kingdom, the law of primogeniture comes into daily and hourly action. It forms part of the very framework of society; abolish it, and the whole nation would be thrown into a state of irretrievable confusion, and reduced to a state bordering on anarchy. If these remarks be true, those who defend the English law of primogeniture on the present occasion, might fairly claim the right to "rest upon their arms," and to reserve their defence, until their antagonists have fairly explained and fully developed their own substitute for the present law of inheritance; but, since the rules and practice of the *British Controversialist* necessitate the simultaneous appearance of opening articles on each side of the various questions in debate, we must necessarily waive, or at least modify, the claim, and content ourselves by enforcing on our opponents, that however cogent their arguments against primogeniture, it ought not, and *cannot*, be abolished until an efficient substitute has been provided to replace it.

We shall now proceed to point out some of the peculiar advantages of primogeniture as compared with any other form of the law of succession, and to offer a slight defence of it as a useful institution, though, for the reasons already stated, we shall speak more briefly and cursorily than is ordinarily desirable, at the opening of an important debate.

Primogeniture has now had undivided sway over the disposition of the real estate of intestates for upwards of 500 years. It has thus become a time-honoured institution, interwoven with the habits and affections of society; and has, therefore, a prescriptive right to our reverence. It has had a great share in forming the political character of our nation; and we have little to complain of its effects. To change it now, will be to discard an old and tried system—to exchange (in the words of Lord Bacon) “a custom which, though it be not good, at least is fit,” for novelties which “trouble by their inconformity.” Blackstone tells us that “the law of inheritance,” of which the institution in question forms an important part, “is a point of the highest importance, and indeed the principal object of all the laws of real property in England;” so that an abolition of the law of primogeniture would shake the whole system of English law to the very foundation. The whole system, therefore, of our laws and government would receive a severe shock. Now, to justify such dangerous innovations, the necessity should be extreme; does any such necessity exist? Has primogeniture worked any dire evils, or brought down any heavy calamities on our land? A few extreme politicians, jealous of our noble aristocracy, have raised their voice against it, and a few philosophical and economical writers have condemned it on theoretical grounds; but surely this is not sufficient to warrant so violent a change in our social polity. There are other writers, as eminent, who have defended it; there are other politicians, more worthy of our attention, who have declared in its favour. Let those who truly love England’s institutions, and prize her liberties, pause ere they intermeddle with a principle so thoroughly inwrought into her social existence, and remember the words of one of her greatest sons, “It is good not to try experiments in states, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility evident; and well to beware that it be the

reformation which draweth on the change, and not the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation.”

The right of property has been much disputed, and has been based on many different principles; perhaps no satisfactory proof of its origin and moral propriety has yet been given. At the same time it seems to form a necessary part of the moral discipline of man, and to rest on the innate principles of his nature. Without property, society could not exist; and the very inequalities in its distribution have a beneficial effect on society, by stimulating all the energies of mankind, and strengthening those powers of foresight and contrivance which especially distinguish man from the beasts. It has, however, been doubted, even by those who admit the right and necessity of property, whether all power ought not necessarily to cease with the death of its owner; and whether the state, or the children and other relatives of the late owner, ought not to have an indefeasible title to succeed him. It is not easy to decide these questions on moral or philosophical grounds. As a general rule, testamentary powers in early times seem to have been very slight, or entirely denied, but to have gradually increased with the progress of civilization.* In our own country, this onward progress has been continued, until we have at present an unlimited and free power of disposing and devising all kinds of property by will. This fact has a most important relation to primogeniture, in softening all its harsher effects, and even changing its very nature. Primogeniture as a *right* can no longer be said to exist; the owner of an estate may at any moment destroy the right by making his will. In the heyday of feudalism, before alienation by will was permitted, primogeniture was a *right* (possessed by the eldest son) to succeed to all the real estate, or, as it was then termed, to all the lands and tenements of his father, to the entire exclusion of his younger brothers. From this ancient *right* has arisen the modern custom of settling the landed estates of great families on the eldest son. Primogeniture, then, in this country is only a *custom*, not a *law*;—is suffered, and not established. Convince all

* The Roman law is a remarkable exception. The Roman citizens even before the laws of the twelve tables seem to have had the power of appointing a successor.

the landholders of the nation of the impolicy or immorality of primogeniture, and they have it in their power to abolish it by the simple process of making their wills. No legislative interference is required to secure its downfall; its fate is in the hands of the people. Are my opponents prepared to forbid the practice and continuance of this custom? Are they desirous of curtailing that free and full liberty of disposal which every Englishman now possesses? Unless they are willing thus to play tyrant, what more do they want than they now possess? They may (if they choose) divide their own property, after the fashion of gavel-kind, among all their sons equally, or, in imitation of Borough-English, they may devise it to their youngest son exclusively; and they are perfectly free and welcome to try the effect of their persuasive eloquence on their neighbours. What more can they desire?

We may now notice two peculiar advantages incident to primogeniture. The first of these is, that it is absolutely necessary as a means of maintaining the honours and dignity of a titled aristocracy like our own, where territorial power and aggrandisement form an indispensable part of their state. I imagine that there are but few, if any, readers of the *Controversialist*, who require that this branch of our "threefold bond of government" should here be vindicated as an essential and desirable element of the British constitution. Nothing would be a more serious injury to our "hereditary legislators" than the attempt to destroy the custom of primogeniture; and this one fact will, we believe, be a sufficient reason with the majority of our countrymen for supporting the negative side of the proposition now under debate.

The second great advantage of primogeniture is, that it checks the minute subdivision of land. "Though there can be little doubt of the injurious consequences that must always flow from every attempt to regulate the succession to property by means of compulsory regulations, there are good grounds for thinking that the custom of primogeniture, or the custom of leaving the whole, or the greater part, of the paternal estate to the eldest son, to the exclusion of his brothers and sisters, has been advantageous. The prejudices of most political philosophers against primogeniture seem to rest on no solid foundation. Dr. Smith says,

that it is custom which, 'in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children;' but, so far from agreeing in this opinion, we cannot help thinking, that to it may be fairly ascribed much of the industry, freedom, and civilization of modern Europe; and that were it abolished, and the custom of equally dividing landed property established in its stead, all the children of landlords, the youngest as well as the oldest, would be reduced to a state of comparative poverty, at the same time that the prosperity of the other classes would be greatly impaired." (Smith's "Wealth of Nation, Notes by M'Culloch," p. 564.) The editor continues the note by showing that in the case of *leaseholds* the custom of *gavelling* or dividing the paternal inheritance had prevailed in Ireland, while the opposite system of primogeniture had been adopted in Scotland. In the one case, agriculture had sunk progressively, while the farms had dwindled into "mere patches;" in the other case, the farms had become gradually larger, while the capital employed in, and the profits derived from, agriculture had risen continuously. The only mode of preventing a minute subdivision of land seems to be by adopting primogeniture as one of the "canons of descent." Of the desirability of preventing that subdivision, there can, on serious thought, be scarcely any doubt. The fatal effects of petty farming are the cause of the greater part of Ireland's woes; it has demoralised and pauperised the peasantry; it has ruined the landlords; it has reduced agriculture to the mere cultivation of the potato. In France, the subdivision of ownership has produced pauperism and wretchedness, and has been the fruitful source of continual convulsion, revolution, and anarchy. The French peasantry have become the helots and dependents of the towns' population. "Small properties much divided prove the greatest source of misery that can possibly be conceived; and this operated to an extent and degree in France, that a law undoubtedly ought to be passed, to render all division below a certain number of arpents illegal." ("Travels in France," vol. i. p. 414). Our safeguard against these evils is in the maintenance of our law of primogeniture. Reader! by the love you bear the land of liberty in which you dwell, we claim, on her behalf, and for her sake, your verdict. B. S.

Social Economy.

OUGHT TRANSPORTATION TO BE ABOLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"It is a shameful and unblessed thing to take the scum of people, and wicked, condemned men, to be the people with whom you plant; and not only so, but it spoileth the plantation; for they will ever live like rogues, and not fall to work, but be lazy, and do mischief, and spend victuals, and be quickly weary, and then certify over to their country to the discredit of the plantation."

Bacon.

IN turning over the pages of a late popular edition of the far-famed essays of Lord Bacon, for the purpose of transcribing the above emphatic condemnation of transportation, my attention was drawn to the following editorial apology for this part of our penal jurisprudence:—"Of course this censure would not apply to what is primarily and essentially a convict colony, the object of which is to drain the mother country of its impure superfluities." This extract contains so pithy an abridgment of the arguments *usually* urged in defence of transportation, that I think I cannot, at this early stage of the present debate, perform a more essential service than to expose the absolute fallacy and untruth of the assumptions on which the reasoning in question is based. If I can succeed in inducing my opponents *at once* to yield (in the spirit of truth-seeking candour) these indefensible outposts, from which they must *eventually* be driven to retract, much valuable time and space will be saved, and the controversy will be more speedily and thoroughly brought to a decisive and practical issue. The reader will perceive that the quotation contains two assumptions:—1. That we transport our convicts to countries "primarily and essentially" intended as convict colonies. 2. That transportation, as a punishment, is intended merely as a mode of draining this country of its criminal population. Let us examine these positions. With reference to the first assumption, a moment's consideration will suffice to satisfy every candid reader that it is a *direct* (though, probably, unintentional) *untruth*. With the petty exception of Norfolk Island, which is merely the condemned cell of un-

manageable miscreants transported there from the other penal settlements, and not from this country directly, we have not one colony in our wide empire which is "primarily and essentially a convict colony." No one ever dared to presume that we either intended, or even dreamt of appropriating the "fifth continent" of Australasia as a mere abode for "the scum of" our own little island; and in the case of the Cape of Good Hope, the colony was planted by the Dutch some hundred years before it came into our possession in 1795; and yet, in 1851, we endeavoured, at the risk of rebellion, to force our "refuse humanity" on its inhabitants! The second assumption noticed above has, at the first view, a somewhat plausible appearance; but I imagine that no one who has one spark of humanity in his breast, or the least sense of natural justice, social expediency, or national honour, can, on calm deliberation, adopt the sentiments it contains. If the mother country alone were to be considered, and if the fate of the offender were to be disregarded, this idea of "drainage" would still be but a sorry expedient for lessening crime. The criminals of this country are but the polluted *streams* which flow from *hidden fountains* of moral iniquity; so that the attempt to purify the nation by merely "draining" off the convicted offenders would be but a repetition, in effect, of the fabled labour of the Danaides—an attempt to fill "a tub full of holes." But this idea is not simply foolish; it embodies and disguises a most atrocious theory; it regards all criminals, without distinction, as mere refuse, or vermin, which are to be simply got rid of by any means. The hardened villain who has committed the most malignant crimes, and is sentenced to transportation for life, and the strongly-tempted and now repentant neophyte in crime, who is sentenced but to five years' banishment, are alike to be regarded (according to this theory) as "impure superfluities," to be drained off into some antipodean cesspool, in the hope that they will never return here.

Thus all idea of equity and natural justice is confounded, and our penal code becomes one of unmitigated and undistinguishing severity. We cannot but agree with Bentham in thinking it a pity for those who adopt such ideas that they cannot place their pet institutions (penal colonies) in the moon, where the improbability of a convict's return would be converted into an impossibility, and the expense of a military guard would be saved; or in suggesting to them that the code of Draco, by planting the penal colonies in the *grave-yard*, effectually prevented any regurgitation of the foul streams of iniquity that had once been drained off. I presume that no reader of the *Controversialist* will be found to approve of these legitimate *deductions* from the degrading theory as to the end of criminal punishments on which we have been remarking. Let no one, then, be uncandid enough to adopt the premises while he denies their conclusions.

But not only are the assumptions of which I have spoken untrue in fact, and degrading in theory and sentiment, but they are also purely *hypothetical*; they suppose a system which never existed, and lay down a theory of penal jurisprudence which was never adopted. It is to this point I especially desire to call the attention of my opponents. We are to discuss transportation as it *actually exists*, and not as they may choose to suppose that it might be. I beseech all who engage in this controversy, by the love they bear, and the allegiance they owe, to truth, to lay aside all model theories of what they may deem to be a perfect system of transportation, and to remember that we are not discussing what system of secondary punishments might be substituted for it, but simply whether we are to retain it in its present form. I have seen a suggestion for "transporting" all our criminals to the coal-mines, and making their daily supplies of food dependent on the produce of their labour, thus rendering escape impossible, and punishment real to the offender and profitable to the community. Now, with the merits of such theories we have, in the present debate, nothing to do; and the supposition of a perfect system of transportation is as purely gratuitous and irrelevant to the question before us. I hope that none of my supporters will encumber their arguments and embarrass their position by venturing to propose a sub-

stitute for the punishment they would abolish; but in case any writer should think otherwise, it will, nevertheless, be a mere vexatious waste of argument for our opponents to object to such plans, unless they can prove that their objections are stronger and more numerous than those urged against transportation. The most pitiful disputant may raise objections; for perfection is no attribute of human plans; and in the present case such a course can only result in merely desultory war of opinion on an irrelevant topic. The defects of Millbank Penitentiary are no defence of transportation; nor are the faults or mismanagement (if they exist) of Parkhurst or Pentonville any reason for sending convicts to the golden lands of South Australia.

The two great objects of punishment are to award *retribution* for crimes committed, and to secure *prevention* of future crimes. The first of these objects we believe to be out of man's province. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay," saith the Lord. Man has neither the right nor the power to apportion punishments exactly to the moral guilt of the offender; and *just* vengeance can only be determined by the great Searcher of hearts, to whom alone the degree of moral turpitude is in each case known. For man, who is (in the eye of moral justice) on a broad level of equality with all his fellow-men, to inflict evil for evil where no advantage is gained but that of ministering gratification to his own feelings of revenge, is not only forbidden expressly by the Founder of our holy religion, but is even plainly contrary to the law of nature, as discoverable by reason alone. Resentment is placed in the breast of man as a sentiment of *self-protection*, and not, as a judge, to award punishment to *others*. The same reasoning holds good of man in the social state—of the community at large; and penal jurisprudence should properly be directed to the security and protection of society against crime, and not in any degree to an attempt to repay the offender in kind. Prevention of crime, therefore, is the primary object of penal punishment. The other chief advantages which are to be desired are, *compensation* to be afforded by the criminal to society at large, or to the party specially injured, when there is one; and *economy* to the state in disposing of its criminal population. These two latter considerations may be passed over briefly. In the case of com-

penation, either to society or particular individuals, transportation has no claims to attention; the convict is as unprofitable to this country as though he were executed instead of transported; the only person who gains any advantage by this mode of punishment being the colonist who employs the convict in the penal colony, and thus obtains the pecuniary advantages of slave labour without either the odium or expense of slave-trading, and who has no claim to consideration on this question. Condemned, therefore, on the one subsidiary head of *compensation*, let us examine what advantages transportation offers in respect of *economy*. Bentham, in his letter to Lord Pelham, entitled "*Panopticon versus New South Wales*," enters into calculations, by which he shows the penitentiary system to be considerably cheaper than transportation; but as I am not aware whence he drew his *data*, and as the relative expense of the two systems may have greatly changed since the date at which he wrote, I do not feel justified in pressing his conclusions. Indeed, I find, from the papers on convicts and convict discipline presented to the houses of parliament in 1851, that in the preceding year (1850) only 5,716 convicts were maintained by government, out of a total of 21,437 then in exile in Van Diemen's Land. It is difficult to imagine that any system of prison discipline in this country can successfully compete, in respect of economy, with transportation, when the latter is so managed as to get rid alike of the care and expense of three out of every four convicts, as in the case of Van Diemen's Land. At the same time, in the absence of all authoritative evidence of the relative cost of our various systems of prison discipline, as compared with that of transportation, I presume that no one will venture to pronounce decidedly in favour of the latter, unless he is able to substantiate his judgment by the production of those statistical *data* which I have been unable to discover. If we grant, however, that in this respect transportation offers greater advantages than any other punishment (excepting death), it must still be remembered that pecuniary economy must not for a moment be allowed to weigh against the higher considerations of justice, humanity, and expediency.

I have pointed out that the chief and

primary object of penal punishment is the prevention of crime. This has a twofold relation:—1. The prevention of further offences by the particular individual punished, which is to be insured either by his *reformation*, i. e., by curing him of the *will* to offend, or by his *incapacitation*, i. e., by taking away from him the *power* of offending. 2. The prevention of crime generally, by making a particular individual an *example*, and thereby deterring others from the commission of similar crimes through the apprehension of similar sufferings. Let us first notice the action of transportation on the individual offender. In the first particular (reformation), it wholly and entirely fails. The bare necessities of life, the happiness and morality of the convict become the mere sport of circumstance. He may become the uncontrolled and riotous retainer of some settler but little higher than himself in the scale of civilization, or the bond-slave of a ferocious taskmaster; but is necessarily cast out from all influences that might act beneficially on his moral and spiritual nature. Like the aged and infirm among barbarian tribes, the convict is cast out from society—exposed to danger and death by a long sea-voyage, with all its risks of contagion and shipwreck, and is at length landed at the antipodes, where the uncertainty of the fate which awaits him must destroy every struggling aspiration to enter the paths of virtue, where fortune and wealth may possibly crown his villainy, or where the chain-gang, the fetters, and the lash, may stifle every sentiment of humanity, until he becomes "more fiend than man." The progress and result of transportation on those who undergo its horrors are thus described by an eye-witness and an *advocate*:—"Those who have the yoke of bondage still about their necks are a sort of half honest, half sober, half provident profligates, compared with those whose term is at an end." And the report of the select committee on transportation emphatically declares that transportation possesses a "*remarkable efficiency, not in reforming, but in still further corrupting those who undergo the punishment*." Such testimonies are decisive of the question as to the moral result of transportation on the offender; and it is at once a national disgrace and a national sin, that now (fifteen years after the report from which we have quoted

was issued) we are still engaged in "further corrupting" our criminals, and in outraging the feeling of our emigrants and colonists. With regard to the effect of transportation in incapacitating the offender from committing crime, it is only partially successful. If the sentence is short, the convict may return here more hardened in iniquity, and not unfrequently actually pays for his passage home by means of colonial plunder. If all convicts were transported for life, the punishment would work well as a means of incapacitating the offenders from future crimes; but under the present system the majority of the convicts are at liberty to return to this country after the expiration of the different terms for which they are sentenced; their "will" is corrupted and depraved, and then their "power" to do evil is restored,—so that the punishment really becomes a fruitful cause, instead of an efficient preventive, of crime.

The effect of transportation as an *example* in deterring others from the commission of crime is an absolute failure. We have instances of prisoners in Newgate even changing clothes with each other in order to get transported. It has again and again been stated that prisoners prefer transportation to imprisonment. The labouring classes of this country are largely imbued with the idea that transportation is a fortunate event, and a generally happy lot, from having heard of the few instances where convicts have succeeded in obtaining wealth and comfort in the antipodes. In fact, transportation is a mere lottery, with a few golden prizes amid its thousand blanks; and while cupidity forms so large an element of human character, numbers will stake their all upon the chance of success. They may not be discovered; and, if discovered and apprehended, they may not be convicted; and, if convicted, the result may be wealth and comfort they can never attain here. Through the long vista of uncertainties which attends the commission of a crime, they see only the successful, and neither know nor care for the thousands who have tasted the inhuman horrors which may fall to the lot of all or any convict. I believe there is scarcely a peasant in England, of the lower and more degraded and uneducated classes from which the bulk of criminals arise, who has ever heard of the existence of Norfolk Island, the

very establishment which would be the most effective example. The false ideas formed on the subject of transportation are strikingly illustrated by the correspondence between Earl Grey and the governors of our Australian colonies, published by order of the Houses of Parliament in 1851, from which we find that the convicts actually complain that, even in the *prisons of this country*, they were officially taught to expect a life of ease and freedom (!); and Sir William Denison, the governor of Van Diemen's Land, is compelled to urge strongly that some measures should be taken by the home government to spread among the people a true knowledge of the miseries of transportation. With such instances before us, and accustomed continually to find that persons actually commit crimes for the avowed purpose of receiving sentence of transportation, it seems needless to enter further into the value of this punishment as an example. All punishment, to act effectually as an example, must have at least three qualities; it must be *certain*, *real*, and *apparent*. Transportation is destitute of each one of these qualities. To suppose that a process carried on at our antipodes can have any sensible effect on the ignorant and degraded beings who most require to be warned by example, is a species of hallucination closely bordering on lunacy. The conclusions of the select committee of 1838 are thus expressed:—"The two main characteristics of transportation as a punishment are, *inefficiency in deterring from crime, and remarkable efficiency, not in reforming, but in still further corrupting, those who undergo the punishment; and that these qualities of inefficiency for good and efficiency for evil are inherent in the system, which is not, therefore, susceptible of any satisfactory improvement.*"

I have endeavoured to show that transportation wholly fails in accomplishing that which ought to be the sole object of punishment. Its economy has, probably, been the chief reason that it has been maintained so long. But now that intelligence has spread; now that we have swept away the remnants of feudal barbarism from our own criminal statutes, and have mitigated the fierce and Draconian severity of our punishments, transportation—long condemned at the bar of enlightened opinion—is, we rejoice, doomed to cease. Yet it seems a mournful spectacle,

that not until one colony has opposed the introduction of convicts by force, and not until threats of rebellion and resistance have been heard to mingle with the earnest petitions of Australia, have we resolved to put an end to this unrighteous system. What arguments my opponents will venture to adduce I cannot conceive; they will have to defend a system denounced by a Bentham and condemned by a Whately—a system practised by no nation but our own. Even Earl Grey gives the most decisive opinion against the whole system. In the House of Lords (March 5, 1847) he declared, that “when a system of this kind is carried on at the antipodes, it is utterly impossible that any other result should follow than that which had actually occurred. . . . *The system was frightful; and it is a disgrace to the British nation that such a system should ever have existed under the British flag. . . . He had no hesitation in saying that, had the same funds been expended in a well-considered system of employing convicts at home, the same number of convicts might have been effectually punished in this country. But, while to the mother country the system had been so expensive, to the colony it had been absolute ruin.*” The truth of these words is amply borne out by the numerous petitions which have poured in from Australia during the last five or six years. The colonists, with unwearied patience and almost unexampled temper, have sent their petitions to the Commons, the Lords, the Colonial Office, the Privy Council, and the Queen; they have used remonstrance and entreaty; they have pleaded broken pledges and solemn engagements; they have urged every argument that could be suggested—their own feebleness and approaching ruin, their relations to the mother country, and their position as the founders of future empires. It must require, therefore, no ordinary degree of courage to support this system, which has been corrupting in their infancy these noble dependencies. How fearful a state of things is revealed by the petition (see parliamentary papers for 1851) from the “parents and heads of families” in Van Diemen’s Land, dated June 7, 1848! We are there told that there were then in that island 30,846

convicts, and 37,088 free inhabitants, of whom 12,946 were under fourteen years of age; so that the free population of the island, above fourteen years old, only bears to the convicts the proportion of three to four! From another petition we learn, that out of 812 prosecutions, in the year 1844, no less than 713 were directed against convicts, the expense entirely falling on the revenue of the colony. Such conduct on the part of this country, boasting to be the most liberal and enlightened in the world, is an almost indelible stain on her annals. The wrong has long since been pointed out; so that we cannot plead ignorance. A total disregard of the ends of punishment, of the rights which still adhere to criminals as human beings, and of the claims of our emigrant brethren, has resulted from the apparently selfish resolve to dispose of our criminals as we could, without the least trouble to ourselves. Yet, from the parliamentary returns it appears that every successive year our plan has been giving way as insufficient, until in 1849, out of 2,813 in Great Britain, and 2,484 in Ireland, sentenced to transportation, only 1,391 and 636 respectively were actually sent abroad. It is vain, therefore, for any one to attempt to buttress this tottering system: it is shaken to its foundation, and must speedily be numbered with the past. The sentence of transportation has become a mere mockery, unexecuted in half the cases it is uttered: and thus (to quote the indignant words of Bentham) “the proportions of penal justice are confounded; the poison of perfidy is infused into the system of government; and still the obnoxious vermin remain unextirpated.” Let us not boast of having freed the negro from his bondage, but let us hide our heads with shame to think that we place our criminals in one common receptacle of moral pollution, beyond the reach or possibility of improvement; that we surround our brethren in the colonies with the off-scourings of our mighty empire; and that, despite of their entreaties, of justice, and of the voice of reason, we plant those infant communities, who are, perhaps, destined to be our memorial among the nations of the earth, with the vilest of our land—with “wicked condemned men.”

B. S.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"There are dreadful punishments enacted against thieves; but it were much better to make such good provisions, by which every man might be put in a method how to live, and so to be preserved from the fatal necessity of stealing and dying for it." *Sir Thomas More.*

"La société, en punissant, exerce moins un acte de souveraineté, qu'elle ne remplit un devoir, celui de réprimer le mal; faute de la faire, elle se verrait bientôt la victime de toutes les fureurs. La peine doit toujours être proportionnée au crime; pour être juste, il faut qu'elle soit strictement et évidemment nécessaire; le loi ne peut, sans crime, au établir d'autres."* *Encyclopédie des Gens du Monde*, vol. i. p. 185.

THE limits of the present paper will not permit of a complete discussion of the question of transportation in all its various aspects; we shall, therefore, confine our remarks to its more prominent and important points.

The circumstances of our colonies, and the condition of our prisons at home, have forced this question upon the public mind, and surrounded it with peculiar interest,—Is punishment by transportation sound in principle—efficacious in practice—and economical to the state? Although we are aware that our knowledge is limited, and that the science of punishment is yet in its infancy, we do feel called upon to affirm that the day has not yet arrived for England to lay aside the punishment of transportation. A knowledge of the origin and history of this punishment being so very imperfect and immature, it cannot affect the question at issue, either as to the soundness of the principle of transportation, or to the nature of the objects to be accomplished by the execution of penal laws—the punishment of the offender—the power of example in deterring others from the commission of crime—and the reformation of the criminal himself.

Transportation being a compulsory banishment from home, friends, and fatherland—with the ignominy of the convicted criminal, and the degrading labour to which he is subjected—is indeed a dreadful punishment, not only in the estimation of the criminal,

* Society, in inflicting punishment, exercises less an act of sovereignty than it fulfils a duty—that of repressing evil; by the omission of this duty society would soon become the victim of all the furies. Punishment ought always to be proportioned to the crime; and to be just, it must be strictly and evidently necessary. The law cannot establish crimes, without becoming itself criminal.

but of the general public. We need not refer to the opinions of judges, prison-keepers, and convict superintendents, in proof of the punitive and exemplary character of transportation; it has only to be suggested to the thoughtful mind and feeling heart, to become one of those social intuitions, instinctive in our nature, wherein argument and illustration serve rather to deaden our native sensibility than to quicken it. By removing the criminal from the scene of his crime—from the pernicious influence of old associations—and placing him in a new world of circumstances, and under new discipline, of a moral, industrial, and encouraging character, full scope is given for the development of the nobler feelings of his nature, while a constant restraint is exercised upon his old criminal habits, by the punitive condition in which he lives. The soundness of the principle of transportation is, then, proved by its punitive character, its exemplarity, and its reformatory tendencies. How far it has been efficacious in the prevention of crime, and the reformation of the criminal, is a question upon which conflicting opinions are found among the most enlightened and the best of men; but that *it has* prevented crime little or no doubt can be at all entertained. When we consider the dread expressed by prisoners previous to trial, and the horror of the punishment felt by persons of every age and class, it must necessarily have prevented crime to a great extent; but what is the particular measure of this crime must, from its very nature, be beyond the reach of human knowledge. Imperfectly as the system of transportation may have been carried out, there are numberless instances of men under it having become good citizens, good husbands, and good fathers; there are those occupying honourable positions, both at home and in the colonies, who have in time past served their term, in expiation of their crime against society. Experience has proved these remarks to be true, as evidenced by Dr. Lang (quoted by J. M. S.), and by M. Benjamin Constant, who says, in his "*Cours de Politique*," page 41, "Men transported to Botany Bay for criminal actions have recommenced the social life; and instead of continuing in their war against

society, have become peaceable, and even commendable members of society."

To judge of the economy of this system of punishment, it must be compared with that punishment inflicted in England which it most nearly approaches in severity. We find, by the transportation Report of 1836-7, that "the conveyance of each convict has cost about £28, and the various expenses of residence and punishment have been at least £54 per head, making in all more than £82" for each convict; and by the reports of J. H. Capper, superintendent of the hulks, printed 1842, we find that "the total expense per man in the hulks in England is £18 12s. 11d., the average value of labour per man is estimated at £10 18s. 9d., making the average annual expense per man £7 14s. 2d." "The average expense of each convict, kept in a house of correction on the silent system, is about £55 or £56 for four years." (Lord John Russell's "Notes on Transportation, &c.," 1839.) The same authority further observes: "At Millbank Penitentiary the net annual expense of each prisoner, deducting his earnings, is said to be £24 6s. 6d." The hulks are generally considered a part of the transport system, for by 24 Geo. III., sect. i. c. 12, and other and more recent acts, they were made temporary places of confinement for convicts, after sentence, and before the necessary arrangements could be made to carry the sentence into execution; and these acts generally subjected the convicts to hard labour and strict discipline during their stay at the hulks. This being the case, we will compare the two systems of punishment, viz., the silent or separate punishment in gaols, and the transport punishment, in their relative cost to the state. Considering the long terms of punishment inflicted upon transports, we cannot safely take a lower average for the duration of this punishment per man than *eight years*—this eight years of punishment, including conveyance, we have seen costs over £82, or a little more than £10 per year for each convict; while at the hulks the cost is only about £8 per year. We have also seen that the silent system costs about £56 for four years, or £14 per year for each prisoner; and in Millbank prison the cost is £24. In either case, there is an evident saving in favour of transportation, which, in the numbers convicted of offences

punishable with transportation, would make a considerable item in the annual judicial expenditure of the country. From these considerations we are constrained to affirm, with M. Constant, that "the establishment of colonies where criminals can be transported is, perhaps, of all the measures of severity the most conformed to justice—to the interests of society—and to the interest of those very individuals society is compelled to banish." (*Cours de Politique*, page 40.)

To the principle of transportation it has been objected, that in all the experiments made it has failed; to which we reply, It may have failed in particular instances, where the system has been badly or negligently carried out. Too frequently has our old system of punishment been applied—a system which was instituted when our *penal science* and our prisons were in the worst possible condition; but this system is not necessarily a part of transportation—it is only an imperfect method of carrying it into execution. Want of exemplarity is also urged as an objection. These terms are most certainly misapplied by the objectors; for in what respect is the prison discipline of this country possessed of exemplarity, which is not equally predicable of transportation? Do the objectors wish the convict to be constantly exposed to the public gaze? Do they long to hear the sweet music of the clanking chains? Why,

"The captive dog
Oft gnaws the rope that binds him to his clog;
Still, as a badge of slavery, there remains,
Trail'd at his neck, a remnant of his chains;"

and such might happen with degraded humanity, when the "badge of slavery" might, possibly, in his hands be made a formidable weapon, and become an unpleasant instance of exemplarity. Have the objectors ever seen the *forçats*—the *galley-slaves*? or visited the *prisoners* at the *hulks*? If not, we are inclined to think they had better witness the sad sight, before inflicting upon this country the painful exhibition of chains, convict badges, and all the signs of crime and chastisement, to distress the feeling heart, and harden the careless one.

In the state of Pennsylvania, in 1786, exposure during punishment was adopted; after four years it was discontinued, and during the four years following—the penal laws remaining the same—it was found that

crimes had decreased two-thirds, the population having in the meantime increased 2½ per cent. ("Report of Committee on Prison Discipline," &c.)

It is said that "transportation lays a pernicious social foundation" in infant colonies. We grant that so many transports, sent to a given colony, cannot be supposed to produce an equal number of honest and industrious citizens as the same number of honest, industrious, and clever emigrants. But the great question, underlying this objection, is this,—Is it a greater evil to keep a great number of criminals, exposed to the public eye while undergoing their punishment, in England—where competition has reduced the overstocked labour-market to its lowest equivalent, and raised all the necessities of life to the maximum—or to send them to suffer that punishment where labour is dear, necessities cheap, and competition favourable only to the development of industry and reformation? The candid mind will best judge in the matter: we think there is no doubt. In the choice of evils, few choose the greater. We presume no one will now object to transportation, on account of the abuses which have been attached to the system in its past development: equally great and flagrant abuses have to be recorded in the recent development of our prison arrangements in England. Were greater cruelties practised, or more tyrannical conduct observed at any stage in the history of our penal colonies, than is exhibited to the world by the commission of inquiry upon the Birmingham Borough Gaol discipline? Surely the use there made of the *crank*—the *strait jacket* and the *collar*—the *weakened* gruel—the *bread and water* and hard labour—the forcible administration of *salt*—the repeated drenchings with buckets of cold water during the winter months—and sundry other deviations from the proper discipline, are some proof that abuses do exist at home as well as abroad. We would, therefore, suggest

to the objector, that abuses are no part of the principles in either case.*

Has it occurred to our friends, advocating the abolition of transportation, to inquire and estimate the many difficulties by which the course they recommend is environed. We will not suppose them all to be desirous of the public exhibition of criminal punishment; but supposing they adopt the separate and silent systems, have they estimated the vast increase requisite in prison accommodation for lengthy punishments, such as are now inflicted by transportation? And if this is provided for, how will they, with the large increase in the number of prisoners, carry out their system of discipline? By separate cells? This produces insanity in many cases, if long persevered in. By a sufficiency of officers to secure separation and silence? This makes the expense enormous. By a system of monitorial watching among the prisoners? This destroys discipline, and makes officers of the prisoners themselves, and thus defeats the object of punishment. By the adoption of a military system? This destroys the punitive character of imprisonment, and annihilates all reformatory and industrial efficacy. These considerations tend to convince us that the time has not yet arrived for the abolition of transportation. We have taken part in the discussion of this subject rather with the spirit of inquirers than of combatants; and shall heartily rejoice if the present discussion contributes in any degree towards familiarizing the public mind with the difficulties attending the administration of punishment to criminals, being assured that the dissemination of knowledge upon this subject must result in some vigorous effort towards the prevention of crime, especially among those most susceptible of good influences—the rising race.

L'OUVRIER.

* See the local papers of the 3rd, 10th, and 17th of September, 1853.

The English language is composed of 15,734 words, of which 6,732 are from Latin, 4,312 from the French, 1,665 from the Saxon, 1,168 from the Greek, 691 from the Dutch, 211 from the Italian, 106 from the German (not including verbs), 90 from the Welch, 75 from the Danish, 56 from the Spanish, 50 from the Icelandic, 34 from the Swedish, 31 from the Gothic, 16 from the Hebrew, 15 from the Teutonic, and the remainder from the Arabic, Syriac, Turkish, Portuguese, Irish, Scotch, and other languages.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

189. Illustrate by appropriate quotations the following remark:—"There are various passages of the Old Testament capable of a twofold application, being *directly* applicable to circumstances then past or present, and *indirectly* to others which Divine Providence was about to develop under a future dispensation."—J. B. M'C.

190. I am desirous of becoming acquainted with the works of our best poets, and should be glad for any suggestions from your literary correspondents as to the order in which they should be taken up, and any other remarks conducive to their more profitable study.—SEPTIMUS.

191. I shall feel greatly obliged by any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* informing me through its medium what books are sufficient to be read in order to obtain a first, second, and third class government certificate. Also, I wish to have pointed out some good *pronouncing* gazetteers of the world, with their prices, and remarks on each.—R. T.

192. Will any of your numerous correspondents be kind enough to furnish me, through the medium of your valuable magazine, with a list of books on architecture and civil engineering, and the name of a good magazine devoted to architecture and civil engineering, with the publisher's name and its price?—W. D.

193. In Mr. Carlyle's admirable pamphlet on the "Nigger Question," referring to Jamaica, he says (page 40), "that a bit of the life that was Oliver Cromwell's was laid there." We are not aware of either the Protector, or any of his connexions or descendants, having been personally in that island. Can any of our readers inform us—1. Whether the allusion is metaphorical or not; 2. Whether there are any descendants of the Protector still alive; and if so, who these are? We believe that the Rev. Dr. Cromwell, Presbyterian minister, London, and author of a work on Shakspeare just published, claims such descent, though on what grounds we cannot say; and we remember of a reference made in the biography of some divine either to the same gentleman or some other clergyman of the same persuasion, as being a descendant of Oliver Cromwell. We shall feel obliged by being informed, moreover, how the controversy raised two or three years ago regarding the erection of a statue of Cromwell among those of the kings of England in the new houses of parliament was concluded.—T. U., Edinburgh.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

150. *Foreign Exchanges*.—Not having seen the articles on this subject which W. U. says appeared in the *Economist* for 1847, we did not attempt to answer his inquiry respecting the science of foreign exchanges, and the illustrations there given of it. However, as no other friend has come forward, we beg to offer the following hints on the subject, which are extracted principally from M'Culloch's "Dictionary of Commerce:—

The term exchange is used to designate that species of mercantile transactions by which the debts of individuals at a distance from their creditors are cancelled without the transmission of money.

Among countries having much intercourse together, the debts mutually due by each other frequently approach near to an equality. For example, there are at all times a considerable number of persons in London indebted to Hamburg, and *vice versa*. Hence: when A, of London, has a payment to make to B, of Hamburg, he buys a *bill* upon Hamburg, that is, he buys an order from C, of London, addressed to his debtor, D, of Hamburg, requesting him to pay the amount to A, or his order. A, having indorsed this bill, or order, sends it to B, who, to his convenience, receives payment from his neighbour, D. Bills drawn by the merchants of one country upon another are termed foreign bills of exchange, and it is to their negotiation that the following remarks apply:—

1. *Par of Exchange*.—This, in the words of *Fortune*, "signifies the equilibrium of a certain amount of the *standard* currency of the one country in the *standard* currency of the other." Thus, according to the mint regulations of Great Britain and France, £1 sterling is equal to 25 francs 20 cents, which is said to be the *par* between London and Paris. So, when a bill for £100, drawn on London, is worth 2,520 francs, and conversely, the exchange is said to be *at par*. When £100 in London buys a bill in Paris for more than 2,520 francs, the exchange is said to be in favour of London, and against Paris, and *vice versa*.

2. *Circumstances which determine the Course of Exchange*.—The exchange is made to diverge from *par*—first, by any discrepancy between the actual weight or fineness of the coins, or of the bullion for which the substitutes used in their place will exchange, and their weight or fineness as fixed by the mint regulations; and, secondly, by any sudden increase or diminution of the bills drawn in one country upon another.

We need not supply illustrations of these principles, but we would refer your correspondent for further information to Mr. M'Culloch's valuable work.—A. C.

170. *Phenomena of Light*.—Though I cannot furnish J. S. with the desired information, I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that there can be no difficulty in accounting for the appearances he describes. They present exactly the same aspect in a strong wind as in a calm; hence (setting aside the manifest improbability of the hypothesis) the molecules he refers to are not particles of air. J. S. supposes them to be dust floating in the atmosphere: this also I think very unlikely. For, if such were the case, ought they not to be opaque? I have tried J. S.'s experiment, and beg to suggest as the result that the appearances are merely the secretion on the surface of the eye, and that it is a delusion when apparently we perceive them on the opposite side of the card, which serves the purpose merely of admitting light. I offer this merely as a suggestion. How

conformable it is to the laws of optics I know not. Perhaps some of your scientific friends will step forward and say. That it is moisture of some sort I have no doubt; but whether it may be accounted for as I have pointed out, or to a gathering of particles of fluid round the aperture in the card, I leave those who know more of optics than myself to judge. Persons who have weak sight, among whom, unfortunately, I must reckon myself, frequently observe the same phenomenon without having recourse to the medium mentioned by J. S., especially when the weather is gloomy or the eyes have been tried by continued reading or study, by the sun or wind.—**URIS.**

For the information of J. S., and those readers of this magazine who are interested in the subject to which his question refers, I may be permitted to state that the Frenchman who professed to have discovered the visibility of the component particles of the air was M. Andraud, and that some time since he made a communication of his suppositional discovery to the *Académie des Sciences* of Paris. J. S.'s description of M. Andraud's experiment is correct, but the following is more full:—Take a card in which a very small aperture has been made, and hold it at the distance of one or two inches from the eye, and the following appearances will be visible—"1st. The minute hole, of whatever figure it be, assumes the aspect of a perfectly circular disc. 2nd. This luminous disc, viewed as if it were an object at the usual distance of distinct vision, appears traversed by a fibrous or reticulated texture, interspersed with small specks or spots, some darker, some lighter, than the general tone of the disc. 3rd. Whatever number of these apertures are applied successively to the same eye, the configuration or pattern of this texture is always identical; but on changing the eye, though the general appearance remains analogous, the pattern becomes entirely different. 4th. Besides these appearances, minute globules are occasionally seen to move across the disc. (On half closing the eye, the eyelashes become distinctly visible, so that they may be counted. Minute particles of dust on a plate of glass interposed between the eye and the aperture, with other similar objects, are readily and distinctly perceived."

Now, from the identity of pattern presented successively to the same eye by any number of these apertures, it appears evident that it is something belonging to the structural condition of the eye that is thus seen, and not particles of air, as M. Andraud supposes. Indeed, the visibility of the texture of the eye itself—of the minute globules of the lachrymal fluid on its surface—

possibly even of particles of dirt slowly floating in the neighbourhood of the pupil, seem quite sufficient to account for the phenomenon.—**A. C.**

173. *The Paraphrase of Paradise Lost.*—It appears to us that your correspondent, G. N., has made a mistake in his paraphrase of the quotation made by "Stanislaus." "O'Dell's" interpretation is much preferable, but we think he also has fallen into a slight error. The only part of the quotation at all difficult to understand is the passage

"Easier to transact with me

That thou shouldst hope, imperious, and with threats

To chase me hence." * * *

Now, G. N. has departed very widely from the words and meaning of the original, and has read the passage as though Satan's indignant interrogation stopped at the word "unvanquished." He has also altogether lost sight of the words "easier to transact with me," and has treated the line which follows them as though "err not" had reference to, and should be taken before, it. These are altogether mistakes. Satan puts two questions. First, he asks Michael whether "he has put the least—weakest—of these his hosts to flight; or, if he have smitten them to the ground, it was but that they might rise again unvanquished." Now, with simply a comma after the word unvanquished, as is the case in some editions of Milton, it would at first sight appear as though the word easier referred to the unvanquished host, and you might read the passage thus: "But that they might rise again unvanquished, the better,—more determined,—to transact—perform deeds—fight—with me;" and, were there a comma after the word me, we should be inclined to put this interpretation upon it, and make the remainder of the passage—"that thou shouldst hope, imperious and with threats, to chase me hence," have reference to the one interrogatory with regard to having "put the least of these to flight." But there is no such stop after the word "me," and consequently a second interrogation is commenced at the word "easier," and is, in fact, the very point of Satan's argument. "Is it easier," he asks, "to deal with—manage—me" (than it was to deal with the least of his followers, understood), "that you should hope, O imperious being" (or, imperiously, the adjective put for the adverb, as is often the case in Latin authors), "and, above all things, with threats, to chase me hence?"

Such we think to be the correct reading of the passage. "Odell" has put a second question at the word "easier," but in our opinion it is a wrong one.—**F. F.**

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. X., Vol. II.—On what does logic depend for its first principles? What sort of a science is logic? How is a knowledge of law attained? What is the difference between the manner and the matter of thought? What is the occasion of all knowledge? How can that be proven? Are there universal

truths or innate ideas? How does the experience—origin of knowledge affect the law of ratiocination? How can the law of syllogism be deduced from the principle of generalization? What important ends would, in the author's opinion, be gained, supposing the topics discussed in this paper were established?

Provection.—Exercise No. X., Vol. II.

Senior.—What are the *criteria* of the possible and the probable? See Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Discussions," Locke's "Essay," Mill's "Logic," Kant's "Critique," &c.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XIX.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. X., Vol. III. p. 439.

Senior Division.

Make six sentences to illustrate each of the following rules:—

1. Nouns, pronouns, and parts of a sentence,

when put in apposition, i.e., when they are employed to express the same thing, agree in case.

2. A noun or pronoun which answers a question, should be in the same case with that which asks it?

3. Personal pronouns agree in gender, number, and person, with the nouns of which they are substitutes?

4. A relative pronoun is the nominative to a verb, when no noun intervenes between the relative and the verb.

5. Adjective pronouns are used to qualify nouns.

6. Distributive pronouns require verbs and pronouns in the singular.

7. The demonstrative pronouns agree in number with the nouns they qualify.

MODEL EXERCISE No. VII.—*Vide* Vol. III. p. 316.

NOUNS.

POSSESSIVE CASE.

Terminational Possessive.

Simple.		
The "Pilgrim's Progress"	Night's starry robe	The "Arabian Nights' Entertainments"
The Christian's hope	Beauty's "virgin tear"	Homer's "Iliad"
The world's glory	The sun's bright circle	Cruikshank's "Bottle"
Evening's silent breath	Ocean's dark expanse	The pencil's mimic skill
A warrior's sword	Scotland's hero	
Compound.		
Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress"	Gibson's "Thomson's Seasons"	Lovell's "Wife's Secret"
Alliene's "Christian's Armoury"	Stewart's "Gray's Arithmetic"	Chambers' "Burns' Poems"
Burns' "Cotter's Saturday Night"	Wilkie's "Blind Man's Buff"	Tallis's Hume's "History of England"
Duncan's Cicero's "Orations"	Dilworth's "Schoolmaster's Assistant"	Green's "Barnes' Notes"
Haynes' Virgil's "Æneid"	Ainsworth's "Miser's Daughter"	
Jacob's children's children		

Prepositional Possessive.

Simple.		
The works of Newton	The wreck of Thebes	The love of God
The pride of glory	The law of our being	The style of Cicero
The laws of Moses	The caprice of fortune	The child of affliction
Spirits of the mighty dead	The last of the Roman kings	The horrors of the stormy deep
The conqueror of Darius	The apostle of the Gentiles	The dust of the earth
The words of the preacher	The rust of sloth	The breath of the morn
The son of David	The frowns of fate	The stroke of the hammer
Compound.		
The servant of the king of Israel	The speech of the hero of a hundred fights	The spirit of the religion of Christ
The mandates of the ministry of Britain	The history of the philosophy of Europe	The humour of the works of our early writers of comedy
The rights of the people of England	The educational scheme of the Church of Scotland	The reviews of Gilfillan's "Barb of the Bible"
The duties of the followers of Jesus Christ	The currents of the Straits of Gibraltar	A view of the works of God
The wealth of the merchants of Glasgow	Murray's edition of the Works of Lord Byron	The wreck of the wooden walls of old England
The progress of the pupils of this institution	The brilliancy of Macaulay's writings	The close of a day of pleasure
The sceptre of the Queen of England		Macnee's portrait of Dr. Heph of Glasgow

II.

Israel's children	For peace' sake	The ladies' school	Victory's sons
God's peace	Felix' character	The nation's voice	Conscience's voice
England's queen	The lady's seminary	The nations of the world's decision	The mouse's petition
The million's home	Man's rights		The children's training

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—VII.

Question 55. $x+z=2y$ (1)
 $x+y+z=24$ — (2)
 $x^2+y^2+z^2=2304$ (3)

subtracting (1) from (2) $y=24-2y=\frac{24}{3}=8$

substituting the value of y in (1), and cubing

$$x^2+3xz+z^2=4096$$

deducting (3) $-y^2=x^2+z^2=1792$

$$\therefore 3xz(x+z)=2304$$

but $x+z=16$ (1)

$$\therefore 48xz=2304, \text{ or } xz=48 \quad (4)$$

dividing (3) by $x+z$ and $\frac{x^2+z^2}{x+z} = x^2 - xz + z^2 =$
 $\frac{1792}{16} = 112$

subtract the value of xz from both terms of this equation, and we get $x^2-2xz+z^2=64$
 extracting square root, $x-z=\sqrt{64}=\pm 8$

$$x-z=8$$

then adding (1) $x+z=16$

$$2x = 24$$

$$24$$

$$x = \frac{24}{2} = 12$$

$$\text{and } z = \frac{48}{12} = 4$$

P. T.

Question 56. $40 \times 4 = 160$
 $30 \times 2\frac{1}{2} = 75$
 $70 \times 1\frac{1}{4} = 87\frac{1}{2}$
 $\underline{322\frac{1}{2}}$

Then— £ s. d. £ s. d.
 As 322½ : 2,044 12 6 :: 160 : 1,014 7 9 $\frac{20}{100}$
 as 322½ : 2,044 7 6 :: 75 : 475 9 10½ $\frac{119}{100}$
 as 322½ : 2,044 7 6 :: 87½ : 554 14 10½ $\frac{111}{100}$

Answers { $\frac{£}{s. d.}$
 $1,014 7 9 \frac{20}{100}$ = sum required for the men.
 $475 9 10\frac{1}{2} \frac{119}{100}$ = sum required for the women.
 $554 14 10\frac{1}{2} \frac{111}{100}$ = sum required for the children.

Proof - 2,044 12 6 R. M.

Question 57. $\frac{2+20}{2} \times 10 = 110$
 Sum of their ages =

£ £ Shares.
 $\therefore 110 : 20 :: 20,000 : 3,636\frac{4}{11}$ = of the youngest.
 $110 : 18 :: 20,000 : 3,272\frac{4}{11}$ = of the ninth.
 $110 : 16 :: 20,000 : 2,909\frac{4}{11}$ = of the eighth.
 $110 : 14 :: 20,000 : 2,545\frac{4}{11}$ = of the seventh.
 $110 : 12 :: 20,000 : 2,181\frac{4}{11}$ = of the sixth.
 $110 : 10 :: 20,000 : 1,818\frac{4}{11}$ = of the fifth.
 $110 : 8 :: 20,000 : 1,454\frac{4}{11}$ = of the fourth.
 $110 : 6 :: 20,000 : 1,090\frac{4}{11}$ = of the third.
 $110 : 4 :: 20,000 : 727\frac{4}{11}$ = of the second.
 $110 : 2 :: 20,000 : 363\frac{4}{11}$ = of the eldest.

Proof - 20,000 W. D.

Question 59. The two spouts together convey 26 gallons of water per minute; and, as they fill the whole vessel in 10 minutes, it contains 260

gallons. Therefore, the spout that conveys 12 gallons per minute will fill it in $\frac{260}{12}$, or $21\frac{2}{3}$ minutes, and the other in $\frac{260}{14}$, or $18\frac{2}{7}$ minutes.

T. B.

Question 60. Let x, y, z = the three numbers : then, by the question, $x+\frac{1}{2}y+\frac{1}{3}z=50$ (1)

$$\frac{1}{2}x+y+\frac{1}{3}z=64 \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{1}{3}x+\frac{1}{2}y+z=75 \quad (3)$$

From (3) we get $x+\frac{1}{3}y+2z=150$

and (1) $“ x+\frac{1}{2}y+\frac{1}{3}z=50$

subtract $\frac{1}{6}z-\frac{1}{6}y=100$ (4)

and again by (2) $\frac{1}{6}x+y+\frac{1}{3}z=64$

and from (1) $\frac{x}{5}+\frac{1}{10}y+\frac{1}{10}z=10$

subtracting these $\frac{1}{10}z+\frac{1}{10}y=42$ (5)

but from (4) $\frac{1}{10}z-\frac{1}{10}y=20$

\therefore subtracting $\frac{1}{10}y=22$

$$\therefore y=30$$

hence, from (4) $z=60$, and from (1) $x=20$.

Ans. $x=20, y=30, z=60$.

J. B. M'C.

Question 61. Let A B C be the given triangle, of which the side A B=674, and A C 1,298 links, and the angle A=60° 20'.

Here $1298+674=1972=(s)$

and $1298-674=624=(d)$

and, since the three angles of a triangle are equal to 180°, the sum of the angles at the base=180°-60° 20'=119° 40', or half the sum=59° 50'.

Then, as $s : d :: \tan. 59^\circ 50' : \tan. (\frac{1}{2} \text{ difference of angles})$

$$\log. \tan. 59^\circ 50' = 10.235648$$

$$\log. 624 = 2.795185$$

$$13.030833$$

$$\log. 1972 = 3.294907$$

$$\log. 28^\circ 33' 51'' = 9.735926$$

$$\therefore \text{diff. of angles} = 57^\circ 7' 42''$$

$$\text{sum} = 119^\circ 40' 0''$$

$$\therefore \text{angle B} = 88^\circ 23' 51'', \text{ and C, } 31^\circ 16' 9''$$

Again:—

$$\sin. 31^\circ 16' 9'' : 674 :: \sin. 60^\circ 20' : \text{base};$$

or, $\log. \sin. 60^\circ 20' = 9.938980$

$$\log. 674 = 2.828660$$

$$12.767640$$

$$\log. 31^\circ 16' 9'' = 9.715217$$

$$\text{Ans. } 1128.295 \text{ links} = 3.052423 - \text{J. F. L.}$$

Question 62. Let x = the greater;

then $17-x$ = the less (by question),

$$\text{and } x^2+(17-x)^2=1765$$

$$\therefore 2x^2-34x+289=1765$$

divide by 2, and $x^2-17x+144.5=88.25$

$$x^2-17x=-56.25$$

$$x^2-17x+\left(\frac{17}{2}\right)^2=-56.25+\left(\frac{17}{2}\right)^2=16$$

$$\therefore x-\frac{17}{2}=\pm\sqrt{16}=4$$

$$\therefore x=\pm 4+8.5=12.5 \text{ or } 4.5$$

but the sum of these two numbers = 17; hence 12.5, being the greater, = x , and $4.5 = 17-x$.

Question 63. $\frac{2240 \times 16}{7788} = 4.60195172$ cubic feet
in 1 ton of iron.

Let x = number of cubic feet of cork,
then $240x$ = weight of cork in ounces,
and $(2240 \times 16) + 240x$ = weight of floating body.

Again:—

$(4.60195172 + x)1000$ = weight of water displaced;
and, as the weight of the water displaced is equal
to the weight of the floating body, we have,

$$(2240 \times 16) + 240x = (4.60195172 + x) \times 1000$$

$$\text{or } 896 + 6x = 25x + 115.048793$$

$$\text{or } 19x = 780.951207$$

$$\therefore x = \frac{780.951207}{19} = 41.102695 \text{ cubic feet,}$$

whence the number of feet of cork requisite to
float 1 ton of iron = 41.102695. W. C. D.

Question 64.

$$\frac{(8\frac{1}{2} \times 12\frac{1}{2} \times 9\frac{1}{2}) 1728}{108 \times 277.274} = 63.185 \text{ butts, the content of}$$

the cistern.

X. F.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—IX.

75. Find the greatest common measure of 1,962,
2,269, 2,616, 2,943, 3,597, and 981?

76. Find the least common multiple of the
above?

77. A quantity of goods weighs 17 ozs. in one
scale, and $14\frac{1}{2}$ in the other, of an uneven balance.
What is its exact weight?

78. The difference of two numbers is 18; the
difference of their fourth powers 159,984. What
are the numbers?

79. The specific gravity of a globe of granite is
2,662, and its diameter 10 feet. Required the
units of work necessary to raise it to a height of
80 feet?

80. For what sum of money can I obtain an
annuity of £30 per annum for seven years, al-
lowing 6 per cent. compound interest for my
money?

81. How many cubic feet of cork will be neces-
sary to sustain a ton of iron above the surface of
the water?

82. The diameter of the inner circle of a circular
moat is 800 feet; its breadth, 80 feet at top, and
50 feet at the bottom. The outer slope measures
18 feet, and the inner 23 feet. Required its cubic
content in yards, the top and bottom being hori-
zontal?

83. The sides of a triangle are 376, 274, and
198. Required the angles?

Notices of Books.

The Phonographic Examiner, and Aspirant's Journal; a Monthly Repository of Original Articles on General and Controversial Subjects. Price 2d. London: Fred. Pitman.

We recommend this novel publication to the notice of our phonographic friends as being well worthy of a careful perusal for its literary, as well as phonographic merits; and especially, as it is really, as well as professedly, "devoted to youthful aspiration and truth progression." Each number contains sixteen pages of original and generally well-written articles, and sections headed "French Correspondence," "Vocabulary of the most frequently-recurring Foreign Words," "Gems of Poetry," "The Editor and his Friends," &c.; the whole is neatly and accurately lithographed in the corresponding and reporting styles of phonography.

The Museum of Classical Antiquities. No. VIII. With Supplement. London: T. Richards, Great Queen-street.

This is a quarterly journal, devoted to the consideration of ancient art. The number and the supplement before us are both occupied with an able and elaborate article on "The True Site of Calvary: with a restored plan of the ancient city of Jerusalem." A work like this has strong claims upon the scholar and the gentleman, and ought to receive a sufficiency of support to prevent the author speaking of loss on the past and uncertainty for the future. Its rate of subscription is one guinea per annum.

Home Thoughts. Price 2d. London: Kent and Co.

We do not know that it would have been possible for us to have brought together two periodicals of more diverse characters than "Home Thoughts"

and "The Museum of Classical Antiquities;" yet they both possess considerable merit, and are calculated to do good, although in opposite directions. "Home Thoughts" are published monthly in a cheap form, and devoted to "Literature, Science, and Domestic Economy." This magazine bears a strong "Family" likeness to other magazines that we have seen; but, although it is the youngest member of the "Domestic" circle, it is not the least interesting nor instructive.

The Pilgrim's Progress, Illustrated. Price 2s. 6d. London: Ingram, Cooke, and Co.

Let not our readers start; we are not going to review "The Pilgrim's Progress," only to draw attention to a new and beautiful edition; and for this purpose it will be enough to refer them to the publishers' names, and to state that it is brought out as one of the volumes of their "National Illustrated Library," and is fully equal in style to the preceding ones.

The Youth's Magazine. Vol. I. New Series. Price 3s. 6d. London: Houlston and Stoneman.

While this is the first volume of a "new series," it is the forty-eighth volume of the "Youth's Magazine." Our readers will thus perceive that this was one of the earliest periodicals for the young. At the close of the last year its editorship passed into other, and, we think we may add, abler hands, and various alterations were made in the size and character of the work. These changes were, we consider, improvements; and although the magazine does not now come up to our idea of what it might be made, still on the whole it is adapted to the class for which it was designed—viz., the young people of religious families—and to such we cordially recommend it.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XXIII.—METHOD.

THE end of the rhetorician is persuasion. To persuade is to excite or urge (*suadere*) to a course of action through (*per*) the agency of some inducing cause or causes. Intellect, Will, and Imagination are the three great classes into which we may divide the mental powers. The consentaneous direction of all these different capacities to one given course of thought and consequent action constitutes our idea of thorough and complete persuasion. To inform or convince the intellect, to please the imagination, and to move the will, are all, in our opinion, acts which, taken together, compose the most adequate ideal of practical rhetoric,—that exertion of thought-expression which employs itself in

"Setting endeavour in continual motion."

The intimate interrelations of all the powers of mind are specially evidenced in the requirements of a true rhetoric. It is not sufficient that the mind be fully informed of a given truth, or convinced of the accuracy of a given induction or deduction; it is not enough that the imagination be gratified, and the taste delighted; it is not sufficient that the emotions be called into lively exercise: no one of these effects can justly be called persuasion; but when all these are applied in fitting combination to the evolution of mental activity, how resistless is the energy which the rhetorician wields!

"Hence I infer

That many things having full reference
To one consent may work contrariously;
As many arrows, loosed several ways,
Fly to one mark;
As many several ways meet in one town;
As many fresh streams run to one self sea;
As many lines close in the dial's centre;
So many a thousand motions once afoot,
End in one purpose."

To expound, so far as we are competent, the modes in which these three groups of powers may be severally and unitedly excited to action, is the purport of the present paper, and to this we shall now address ourselves.

Conviction, *i. e.*, intellectual acquiescence, is, in general, producible—1st, by instruction; 2nd, by reasoning. The former is employed when addressing ourselves to those who are ignorant of the facts or grounds of any belief, and is of two kinds—(*a*) analytical and (*b*) synthetical. The latter is properly used when the parties whom we select for our audience consist of those who know and acknowledge the facts which form the basis of discourse, but who either draw different inferences from them, or are in doubt which inferences should be deduced. In the one case conviction must be produced by

refutatory or indirect reasoning; in the other, by direct and pertinent induction and syllogistic inference. It is very seldom indeed that the problem given to the practical rhetorician is presented in so pure a form as those which are outlined in the previous sentence; but, for the purpose of clear treatment, it is necessary for the teacher to present the simplest possible processes first, and afterwards to exhibit the most satisfactory method of treating those mixed questions which are most likely to be evolved in practice.

In casting a rough glance at the "Synopsis of the Principles of Proof" appended to our preceding paper, our readers will perceive that this general division of conviction into instructive and ratiocinative has been indicated, and they will readily conclude that induction is the best means of convincing any one instructively, while deduction is the best medium which can be employed in producing ratiocinative conviction.

We have so frequently and so fully detailed to our readers the opinions which we entertain regarding the genesis of knowledge* and the laws of evidence,† that a very brief outline of these may, for the present, suffice, viz.,—Consciousness is the power through which we primarily attain knowledge. It refers this knowledge to two differing sources,—self and not-self. All knowledge of self must be accepted on the evidence of consciousness; no other evidence is attainable. Our knowledge of those things comprised in the *non-ego*, however, reach us through different channels, and are entitled to trust only on the ground of the validity of the instruments of conveyance. These are the senses, which are not only the conveyors of a knowledge of the outward world, but also the conditions of our acquaintance with the inner world of thought and emotion. Through these channels the reason directs our experimental observations, and, by judicious prevision, determines upon the amount of proof which these must bring into the intellect, in order that the supposititious explanations which it constructs for phenomena may be sufficiently borne witness to by the not-self regarding which it is making inquiry. Through these same senses must testimonial evidence be received; and our credence is conditioned by the accuracy or inaccuracy of the organs through which the sensations impress the mentality. To produce conviction by the instructive method, therefore, it is necessary either to appeal to consciousness or sensation as the ultimate grounds of evidence, and if these cannot bear witness for us, we must use such means as are most likely to superinduce the conceptions regarding which a deficiency is noticeable. In these cases it is, in general, most advisable to lead the parties addressed along the pathway of discovery, calling attention as we proceed to the various facts as they arise; or, if merely narrating the method of investigation, detailing the various items which, as they arose, lead to or modified the general conceptions which we wish to urge upon the mind, and of the truth of which we desire to produce a conviction.

To effectuate ratiocinative conviction demands the employment of all the resources of the logician. Accepting given postulated truths or facts as true—that is, in this connexion, as mutually acquiesced in for the present by himself and the parties addressed—the rhetorician, by rigid and strict adherence to logical processes, is bound to eliminate, in due order, the various inferences which the laws of thought legitimate, and present them f-

* See "The Art of Reasoning," chapters ii. and xi. Refer also, for confirmation, to Merrell's "Elements of Psychology," chap. iii.; M'Vicar's "Enquiry into Human Nature," chap. ix.

† See "The Art of Reasoning," chapters vi.—viii. Refer also to Whately's "Rhetoric," part II.

acceptance by the intellect as the true and valid results of the *data* previously determined upon and accepted.

Thus far, however, expression has only become the exponent of conceptions in their respective wholes of discovery and reflection. There is yet a farther process which must be evolved in the mind before action can result, viz., Persuasion, i. e., emotive acquiescence, to which we must direct attention for a brief space. The intellect is capable of deciding upon the advisability of pursuing a certain course of procedure, or the truth or falsehood of a certain series of truths, but it is incapable of directly urging to action; this must be determined on by the will, although initiated by the intellect. "Will, properly so called, is the final state of desire, when mental deliberation has decided on the propriety of some predominant impulse. It is true the intellectual organs inspire special desires relative to their peculiar functions; but they are deficient in the energy necessary to induce action, which depends solely on the emotional impulse."* "Conviction is addressed to the understanding; persuasion to the passions. Conviction is the impression made upon the understanding by the force of arguments; persuasion is the impression made upon the passions by the exhibition of objects by which they may be agitated. Conviction denotes that the understanding is satisfied of the truth or rectitude of what has been advanced; persuasion implies a great deal more, viz., that the passions are engaged in behalf of what the understanding approves, and that the hearer will proceed to put in practice what he is convinced is right and true. The passions are the springs of action. Conviction does not always ensure action: in a thousand instances we acknowledge the reality and utility of action, and yet remain inactive. But let the passions be interested,—let them be roused by the prospect of some great good to the public or ourselves, or with the prevention of some formidable evil of which we apprehend the approach,—and it will be impossible for us not to proceed to act."† "Conviction is, however, one avenue to the inclination or heart; and it is that which an orator must first bend his strength to gain; for no persuasion is likely to be stable which is not founded on conviction. But, in order to persuade, the orator must go farther than merely producing conviction; he must consider man as a creature moved by different springs, and must act upon them all. He must address himself to the passions; he must paint to the fancy and touch the heart; and hence, besides solid argument and clear method, all the conciliating and interesting arts, both of composition and pronunciation, enter into the idea of eloquence."‡ "Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first, arguments—to prove the expediency (&c.) of the means proposed; and, secondly, what is usually called exhortation, i. e., the excitement of men to adopt these means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable."§

From all these various cumulative opinions, which we have rather adopted as expressed by the respective authors than lessened in expressiveness by any paraphrase of our own, it will seem evident that the science of Rhetoric is much more extensive than that of Logic. Rhetorical skill signifies the capacity of reasoning well united with grace and fluency of expression, attractiveness of exposition, and the art of calling into activity the

* Comte's "Philosophy of the Sciences," by G. H. Lewes, p. 226.

† Barron's "Lectures on Belles Lettres and Logic," xxv.

‡ Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres," xxv.

§ Whately's "Rhetoric," part ii. p. 112.

refutatory or indirect reasoning; in the other, by direct and pertinent induction and syllogistic inference. It is very seldom indeed that the problem given to the practical rhetorician is presented in so pure a form as those which are outlined in the previous sentence; but, for the purpose of clear treatment, it is necessary for the teacher to present the simplest possible processes first, and afterwards to exhibit the most satisfactory method of treating those mixed questions which are most likely to be evolved in practice.

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* See "The Art of Reasoning," chapters ii. and xi. Refer also, for confirmation, to Morrell's "Elements of Psychology," chap. iii.; M'Vicar's "Enquiry into Human Nature," chap. ix.

† See "The Art of Reasoning," chapters vi.—viii. Refer also to Whately's "Rhetoric," part II.

acceptance by the intellect as the true and valid results of the *data* previously determined upon and accepted.

Thus far, however, expression has only become the exponent of conceptions in their respective wholes of discovery and reflection. There is yet a farther process which must be evolved in the mind before action can result, viz., Persuasion, i. e., emotive acquiescence, to which we must direct attention for a brief space. The intellect is capable of deciding upon the advisability of pursuing a certain course of procedure, or the truth or falsehood of a certain series of truths, but it is incapable of directly urging to action; this must be determined on by the will, although initiated by the intellect. "Will, properly so called, is the final state of desire, when mental deliberation has decided on the propriety of some predominant impulse. It is true the intellectual organs inspire special desires relative to their peculiar functions; but they are deficient in the energy necessary to induce action, which depends solely on the emotional impulse."* "Conviction is addressed to the understanding; persuasion to the passions. Conviction is the impression made upon the understanding by the force of arguments; persuasion is the impression made upon the passions by the exhibition of objects by which they may be agitated. Conviction denotes that the understanding is satisfied of the truth or rectitude of what has been advanced; persuasion implies a great deal more, viz., that the passions are engaged in behalf of what the understanding approves, and that the hearer will proceed to put in practice what he is convinced is right and true. The passions are the springs of action. Conviction does not always ensure action: in a thousand instances we acknowledge the reality and utility of action, and yet remain inactive. But let the passions be interested,—let them be roused by the prospect of some great good to the public or ourselves, or with the prevention of some formidable evil of which we apprehend the approach,—and it will be impossible for us not to proceed to act."† "Conviction is, however, one avenue to the inclination or heart; and it is that which an orator must first bend his strength to gain; for no persuasion is likely to be stable which is not founded on conviction. But, in order to persuade, the orator must go farther than merely producing conviction; he must consider man as a creature moved by different springs, and must act upon them all. He must address himself to the passions; he must paint to the fancy and touch the heart; and hence, besides solid argument and clear method, all the conciliating and interesting arts, both of composition and pronunciation, enter into the idea of eloquence."‡ "Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first, arguments—to prove the expediency (&c.) of the means proposed; and, secondly, what is usually called exhortation, i. e., the excitement of men to adopt these means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable."§

From all these various cumulative opinions, which we have rather adopted as expressed by the respective authors than lessened in expressiveness by any paraphrase of our own, it will seem evident that the science of Rhetoric is much more extensive than that of Logic. Rhetorical skill signifies the capacity of reasoning well united with grace and fluency of expression, attractiveness of exposition, and the art of calling into activity the

* Comte's "Philosophy of the Sciences," by G. H. Lewes, p. 226.

† Barron's "Lectures on Belles Lettres and Logic," xxv.

‡ Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres," xxv.

§ Whately's "Rhetoric," part ii. p. 112.

whole energies of the human mind. Logic is demonstration. Divested of rhetorical ornament and delivery, it can only affect the intellect,—only exhibit truth in its plainest and simplest forms; thus it may, indeed, bring men to accept the truths which it expounds; but how will it induce actions appropriate to these truths? The logician anatomises the whole thought, exhibits its framework, and thus proves that, however much external appearance is against him, the inner truth of things bears witness in his favour; the rhetorician chooses the fair outward form, presents it in the most favourable view to the party addressed, enters into detail, attracts the attention, wins the affections, and when he has thus impressed the heart he can demonstrate to the intellect with much greater acceptability the truths which underlie appearances. There is another distinction also. Logic seeks demonstration—strict, valid, and scientific; but many of the most important inquiries which engage the attention of humanity do not admit of rigid, formal proof of such a nature; now, here Rhetoric has the advantage, for in probability its true and proper field lies. This opinion coincides with the Aristotelic notion of Rhetoric, viz., that it is a science which expounds “all the possible means of producing persuasion on any given subject,”—that science which deals with the *rationes probabiles*, i. e., those arguments which the understanding can receive as plausibly supporting any proposition, but to which it cannot yield a logical assent. All certain proofs at once ignore and set aside the possibility of opinion; they transcend the region of probability, and demand the instantaneous assent of the intellect. Certainty gives *knowledge*; probability yields *surmise*, *opinion*, *sentiment*, *belief*, *conviction*. The former is the domain of pure science; the latter is the territory of applied science, especially of the science of social life (*Πολιτικη*—sociology). The logician, therefore, most properly employs himself in those inquiries which belong to philosophical research; the rhetorician most properly exerts his powers upon those questions in which there is a chance of right or wrong, and consequently room for choice,—where there are *pros* and *cons.*, and the possibility of variations in the strength of belief or unbelief, or degrees in the interest which men are likely to feel in the ultimate effects of the reception or rejection of the opinion or truth presented. We do not make this distinction for the purpose of advocating the absolute restriction of all the efforts of the cultivators of these respective sciences within the special limits here assigned them. We believe this is impossible. The logician must think syllogistically, but express himself rhetorically; and the rhetorician must express himself rhetorically, although he must think logically: this is the necessity of the human mind. All that we contend for here is, that Logic, which deals primarily with the demonstrable, and which strives to reduce all thought to demonstrative and scientific formality, is transcended by Rhetoric, which not only homologates the scientific, and bases many of its reasonings thereon, but goes forth into the probable, and endeavours to conquer therefrom some portion of the hitherto uncertain, and make it, if not the certain, at least the believable. Every rhetorician must be a logician, but he must also be something more; every logician, however, so far forth as he is a logician, need not be a rhetorician.

Keeping in view, then, this distinction between the logical and the extra-logical functions of the rhetorician, let us endeavour to understand the laws of arrangement which may be advisably adopted in the treatment of any given subject in which there is ground for persuasion.

All the different kinds of prose compositions may, with regard to the end which the writer has in view, be classified under one or other of the following species, or some combination of these, viz.—I. Narrative or Descriptive; II. Didactic or Preceptive; III. Argumentative; IV. Persuasive.

I. NARRATIVE OR DESCRIPTIVE COMPOSITIONS are those which give an account of some event or events, and of the persons concerned in them, the places in which they occurred, or the objects among which they took place. They include (a) histories—natural, sacred, civil, and literary, including antiquities, laws, customs, arts, &c.; (b) biographies, including epistolary correspondence; (c) novels and other fictitious narratives, as tale, legend, apologue, parable, fable, &c.; (d) voyages and travels. They refer (1) to external objects; (2) to internal processes; (3) to the action and reaction of these two, i. e., extraordinary events; (4) to the actors in these events; and these ought, in general, to be exhibited in the order, first, of time; secondly, of place; thirdly, of causation; in short, they will follow the order exhibited in the inductive department of the “Synopsis of the Principles of Proof.”

II. DIDACTIC OR PRECEPTIVE COMPOSITIONS are those in which instruction is conveyed and rules are given for the regulation and orderly study of the subject regarding which the composition treats; such as expositions of the sciences and arts, treatises on etiquette, methods of study, &c. They also generally follow the process of explanation formally exhibited in that part of the “Synopsis” devoted to induction.

III. ARGUMENTATIVE COMPOSITIONS are those which contain regular trains of reasoning, or such arrangements of principles and facts already known and established, or accepted and assumed as known and established, as shall lead to the demonstration of the truth or utility of some proposition hitherto undetermined, or the ascertainment of some fact hitherto unknown. Of such a nature are philosophical treatises, critical essays, imaginary dialogues, dissertations, pleadings, speeches, &c.

In all argumentative discourse there must be a *subject*, regarding which the reasoning is held. When this subject requires explanation, there must be a *definition*. Then there must be some *judgment* which it is thought desirable to establish regarding the subject. This judgment is called a *predicate*. All the other parts of a discourse except the subject and predicate constitute *arguments*, i. e., *middle terms*. These are employed to prove the applicability of the predicate to the subject,—the necessary implication, in some form, of the one in the other. Arguments are either demonstrable or probable; the former do not admit of doubt or hesitation; the latter admits of all degrees of intellectual assent. All that is *possible* is, in a certain sense, *probable*; but the mind naturally and necessarily estimates the probability of anything presented for belief in proportion to its accordance with *known* co-ordinations and successions. Proof is the inferring of a conclusion from premises assumed or known. Proof cannot exist without belief in the premises; but the conclusion drawn may be true independent of the belief which it receives; for this want of belief may result from a deficiency in the mental acuteness necessary to comprehend the influence of the premises in determining the point at issue.

Proof may be strengthened in three ways: first, by limitation, i. e., by showing that the opposite opinion would necessitate the denial of some already acknowledged or proven truth, while yours only fills the vacant space which these leave; secondly, by accumulation, i. e.,

by the coincidence of your opinion with many other known or acknowledged truths, and its contradiction of none; thirdly, by systematization, i. e., by its forming an item toward presenting an harmonious view of all other previously known or acknowledged facts or truths, or its tendency to homologate with and increase the evidence which these already possess. The ready perception and accurate collocation of proofs constitutes the perfection of argumentation. A sound logic alone can fully equip the mind for thus dealing with the cogency of proof. Rhetoric, however, can inform us what laws ought to be followed in presenting the assemblage of proofs to the mind of the party addressed.

Some of the laws which ought, in general, to be observed in the presentation of truths to the mind in argumentative discourses are as follow, viz.:—

1. Never propose to prove self-evident propositions.

Proof is impossible. The attempt is irksome as well as displeasing to the parties addressed. Irksome, because they already acknowledge it; and displeasing, because it insinuates a want of capacity in them. It is, at the same time, a proof of want of ingenuity in the speaker or writer.

2. Begin with a clear statement of your subject, or with an introduction which will naturally lead to that.

If an introduction is used, it should be striking, appropriate, and proportionate.

3. Observe a regular sequence in your arguments, that each one may naturally lead to the other.

4. Let your chief arguments be few, cogent, and make them bear as directly on the point to be proven as possible.

Superfluous arguments efface stronger ones, exhaust patience, and encourage the idea that where weak arguments are used the point is weak. If the few are strong they will be effectual.

5. Express your arguments in as few words as possible, consistent with perspicuity.

6. Illustrations should be so intermingled with arguments as to relieve and please the mind, and thus produce variety without confusion.

7. Arguments should be arranged in the order of importance; the least important first, the strongest leading up the rear. They should form a climax.

8. Opposing arguments should be considered in the introduction or exordium; suasive ones in the conclusion or peroration.

9. Transitions from one argument to another ought to be managed in accordance with one or other of the laws of association.

Such compositions should, in general, follow the order laid down in "The Synopsis of the Principles of Proof," under the head "Deduction."

IV. **PERSUASIVE COMPOSITIONS** are those which have the excitement of the emotional nature of man as their chief aim,—such as are intended to excite affection, desire, or passion,—action directed by certain motives to a given end. "Passion is the mover to action,—reason the guide. Good is the object of the will. Truth is the object of the understanding. It is only through the passions, affections, and sentiments of the heart that the will is to be reached. It is not less necessary, therefore, in the orator, to awaken those affections in the hearers which can be made to co-operate most easily with his view, than it is to satisfy their understandings that the conduct to which he would persuade them tends to the gratification of the affections raised. But, though both are really purposed by the speaker, it is the last only that is formally presented to them as entering into

his plan. To express a formed purpose to work upon their passions, would be like giving them warning to be upon their guard, for that he has a design upon them. *Artis est celare artem.*"* Persuasion is of two kinds: first, that which appeals to the finer and less violent emotions (*Ηθος*); secondly, that which excites the boisterous and inflammatory passions (*Παθος*). Almost all kinds of composition admit of the former; few, however, admit of the latter. To apportion the due amount of persuasion requisite to produce a given action or course of action, with the proper sentiments from which such action or course of action should result, requires great good sense and careful self-management. The following are a few of the laws of Will, according to which the rhetorician must arrange the several items of persuasion, viz.:—

1st. Men are animated by a desire for self-preservation.

This desire naturally leads men to action for the purpose of procuring the means of subsistence, health, strength, happiness, &c., and to avoid any action which knowingly leads to their being deprived of these.

2nd. Men desire to better their condition.

This law gives rise to the progression of man; it gives rise to the race for riches, rank, honours, pleasures, &c., and is the foundation of the emulative spirit, as well as an excitative to the attainment of excellence, moral and mental.

3rd. Man is a being possessed of social desires.

Hence arise civic and political duties and rights, the necessity of justice, truth, &c., the tendency to charitable deeds, the restraints of law, &c.

4th. Man is a being who desires to possess knowledge.

Hence all the manifestations of curiosity, &c., which lead to the acquisition of science, &c.

We do not at present speak of the higher and nobler destinies for which man feels himself fitted, and of which he hopes hereafter to be a partaker; we have confined ourselves to the mere instinctive laws of his emotional nature, and have not attempted to elaborate all the *loci argumentorum* which the mental habits of the educated, and especially the christianized, man might afford. In them the above-named laws become purer and more refined, not essentially altered; and hence the general principles of persuasion are essentially the same in all. In all we must appeal to the human consciousness for the corroboration of the ultimate facts on which persuasion rests.

Although we have thus differentiated these several species of composition from each other, we do not wish to imply that, in practice, they are ever to be found in this strictly specific state; on the contrary, we wish it to be distinctly understood that they are generally, if not always, found in combination. These combinations may be very various, and may not be readily distinguishable from each other; yet there can be little doubt, from the unity of action which seems to be a law of mind, that one portion of the mentality very seldom, if ever, acts without exciting activity in some other range or group of faculties. The proper management of all the possible combinations of composition must be left to the tact and judgment of the individual; no system of general rules could be serviceable in effectuating those specific purposes which time and circumstance are always combining to eliminate in the human soul. A wide range of sympathies with the movements of "the age in which

* Campbell's "Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence," xii.

we live"—an extensive and thorough culture of our intellectual nature—a keen susceptibility for the perception of truth in its adaptation to popular necessities—a clear methodizing judgment—a careful and nice adjustment of the various logical processes implied in the topic engaging our attention—and a correct and fluent employment of the particular language in which we wish to utter our thoughts, are some of the chief requisites for a true rhetorician,—one who gives fitting utterance to fitting thoughts at fitting times.

Religion.

IS THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS A PRACTICE IN HARMONY WITH THE SCRIPTURES?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

"The Bible speaks not to the eye, but to the intellect; not to the ear, but to the soul. It yields its precious ores not to those who merely search the surface, but to those only who laboriously penetrate its mines. To extract the real spirit of any one passage, many passages must be studied. To become a scriptural interpreter, a man must have a scriptural mind, and be living a scriptural life. To those who approach this divine light in any temper less diligent or less devout than this, it opens innumerable sources of error. . . . The Syro-Chaldaic was the only articulate speech through which it was possible that Christ should reach and inform the understanding of his hearers. . . . If we had possessed in Greek or in Latin the very expressions of Him who spake as never man spake, what would have been the unavoidable result? What but this, that the *Scaligers* and the *Bentleys* of each successive age would have usurped over the minds of their illiterate fellow Christians an authority even more despotic than that which they have hitherto claimed and exercised? Our blessed Lord did not see fit that *linguists*, and *critics*, and *grammarians*, and *lexicographers*, should thus be able to interpose between himself and those whom, until the end of time, he condescended to instruct. . . . Would not such a transmission from one generation to another of the very words of our Great Teacher have caused them to be degraded, still more than they have hitherto been degraded, into themes of philological debate, for learned trifling, for arrogant criticism, and for the dogmatical interpretations of those who at all times aspire to a scholastic lordship over the heritage of Christ?"—*Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*, by the Right Hon. Sir James Stephen, vol. i.

We have previously treated this question historically, and have shown—from the practice of the Jews as early as the Babylonish captivity, from the history of John the Baptist, the history of our Saviour, and the practices of the apostles and early Christians—that infant baptism is not in harmony with

the scriptures, but was an invention of the doctors of the church, certainly not earlier than the latter part of the second century. We now proceed to show the *moral significance of the rite*, from its nature, the qualifications required of candidates, and the terms employed respecting it in the scriptures. We will, however, first endeavour to remove a few of the non-essentials; and, limiting the question to an absolute and definite form, thus concentrate our own and the reader's thoughts upon the real point at issue. Proselyte-baptism, arising from the traditional views of certain passages of scripture by the rabbins, and the ceremonial observances deduced by them therefrom, cannot be authoritative examples to us, the authors of these rites not being competent to make a law binding and imperative. In perfect apposition with these remarks are the words of Christ when he speaks of the rabbins "making the word of God of none effect by the traditions they had delivered," Mark vii. 13.

John's baptism, being a concomitant of his ministry and office, must partake of their ephemeral nature. This opinion is strengthened by considering the time of his ministry, the nature of his office, and the want of necessary knowledge, both in the person officiating and in the candidates observing the rite.

The baptism adopted and practised by our Saviour and his disciples during his ministry are to be classed with the initiatory and purificatory rites or customs of the Jews. The practice being at that time general to

receive all disciples into any school or society by an initiatory rite, in most instances this rite was peculiar to the school or society; the peculiar rites of the Jews being baptism, or circumcision, or both, according to circumstances. In the case of the disciples of Christ, as they were all circumcised Jews, the initiatory rite was baptism; hence, during the life of Christ, baptism must be considered as forming part of the Jewish system, then about to close (as forming part of that "righteousness" which it became Christ "to fulfil" as a Jew), preparatory to the christian dispensation, commencing with the sacrificial death of Christ.

Immediately preceding his ascension, our Saviour addresses these words to his disciples, "All power is given to me in heaven and upon earth. Go, therefore, throughout all the nations of the world; proclaim the good tidings to the whole creation; *disciple or convert* the people, teaching them to observe all things I have commanded you. He who shall believe and be baptized, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, shall be saved; but he who will not believe shall be condemned."—(See Dr. G. Campbell's Translation of the Gospels, Matt. xxviii. 18; Mark xvi. 15, 16.) *Here, then, is the institution of christian baptism.* From this point we must set out in all our positive inquiries. The existence of any practice previous to or contemporary with this commission may tend to throw light upon the question, as indicating the customs or usages of those times, but cannot in any way contravene or subvert the rite instituted by this precept. The question now opened to our consideration reads thus:—Is infant baptism, as practised at the present time by the christian church, a practice in harmony, or identical with, the christian baptism of the scriptures? It must be readily admitted by our Pædobaptist brethren, that *if it could be proved* that infants were baptized by the Jewish rabbins, by John the Baptist, or by Christ himself during his life, infant baptism could not be binding on us as christian baptism unless the terms of the commission include infants, and the practices of the apostles give examples of their so understanding the commission. Dr. Halley, in his "Lectures on the Sacraments"—Part I. "Baptism"—at page 7, calls baptism "*the initiatory rite of the christian church;*" and

at page 120 he speaks of it being regarded by the Jews, at the time of Christ's advent, as "*a badge or profession of discipleship.*" What is the scriptural import of the terms, "*a disciple*" (Μαθητής, "Mathētēs"), and "*to disciple*" (Μαθητεύω, "Mathētēuo"), it is, then, of considerable importance in the present debate that we should proceed to determine. A *disciple* is one who, convinced of the superiority of any master or teacher (Διδασκαλος, "Didaskalos"), places himself completely under his control, both in the acquisition and dissemination of the truths taught by the master, and rules his life in accordance therewith (Matt. viii. 19; x. 24). In this sense it is particularly applied to the twelve apostles in the following passages, Matt. x. 1; xi. 1; xx. 17; Luke ix. 1. At the last passover Jesus gives emphatic expressiveness to the term (John xiii. 35); and, as a proof of their *true discipleship*, he indicates the necessity of their continuance in the faith of the gospel, their dependence on him, and the duty of bearing fruit in his cause (John xv. 1—10). *To disciple* signifies to teach, to instruct, to train as a disciple (Acts xiv. 21; Matt. xxviii. 19); and in the passive form (see Matt. xiii. 52) "the sense is either 'instructed for the Messiah's kingdom,' so as to understand its nature, or 'discipled into the Messiah's kingdom,' i. e., converted to Christianity, or *admitted by discipleship into Christ's society.*"—(See Dr. Bloomfield in *loc.*, and his "Lexicon," page 313.)

The constituent elements of the christian church are thus portrayed by an eminent Pædobaptist divine:—"The materials composing a church are definite and peculiar. The only members properly belonging to it are such as give evidence of their obedience to the Lord Christ. The edifice is intended to be an holy habitation, and holy are the living stones of which it is composed. The regenerate alone should be admitted into fellowship. This is a cardinal point that ought never to be overlooked. . . . Nothing can compensate for the absence of piety in one desiring admission into a church. . . . No amount of religious knowledge, or familiarity with the doctrines of the Bible, or fluency of conversation on serious themes, should cover over the want of religion, and serve for introduction into the community. . . . If pastors have a sincere desire to act

according to the revealed will of Christ, to be faithful and conscientious in the oversight of a flock, and to preserve the minds of the disciples from contamination, they must be especially careful of purity of communion."—(See pages 58, 60—62, of Dr. Davidson's "Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament.")

We fully agree with Drs. Halley and Davidson on these points, and believe that our united opinion harmonizes with the sense and intention of the great commission. "Disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you;" that is, first disciple, then baptize them, on a profession of their faith in the triune Jehovah, and afterwards teach them the full detail of practical obedience in their daily walk and conversation. The classic student will receive fuller conviction of this view of the case by an examination of the grammatical construction of the commission. Here is the chief verb, *disciple*, followed by the participles *baptizing* and *teaching*,—three separate and distinct actions, the latter two dependent upon the former evidently in the order of succession indicated by their position in the sentence, in accordance with the rule, that "every action which admits of being considered as only accompanying another which is the main action, and may thus be represented as an accessory circumstance of another, the Greeks are fond of expressing by the participle; and even when two finite verbs are joined by 'and,' one of them is generally put in the participle and the copula is omitted. . . . Several participles frequently stand in one proposition without a connexion, where the conjunctive particle would represent these verbs as three separate actions."—(Matthæie—Participles.) So that when our Lord said, "Disciple all the nations, baptizing them, teaching them to obey," it is equal to his saying, "Disciple and baptize and teach." The three actions are necessarily consecutive in each individual, but with the whole body of apostles might be contemporaneous, because, while one apostle was in the act of discipling, another might be baptizing, and another teaching the detail of practical obedience; and, in the individual submitting to the rite, he is first discipled, then baptized, then taught the necessity of practical piety.

That repentance and faith were required of candidates for baptism, is evident, not only from the commission, but from the answer of Peter to the convicted sinners on the day of Pentecost, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins," Acts ii. 37. They were "pricked in their hearts." While he, obedient to the command of his Lord, was engaged in the act of discipling, they cried out, "What shall we do?" He having taught them how Jesus the Nazarene, whom they had cruelly crucified, was delivered into their hands for that purpose by "the determinate counsel of God," and had now become their anointed Saviour and glorified Lord, required immediate proof of penitence and faith by their willing obedience to, and public profession of his name in the act of baptism; baptism into the name of Jesus, or of the Trinity, implying the profession of a saving knowledge of Jesus, or a justifying faith in him. "Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ," Gal. iii. 26, 27. "Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead, even so we also should walk in newness of life," &c., Rom. vi. 3, 4. "Even baptism doth also now save us, not by the putting away the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God," 1 Pet. iii. 21. See also Col. ii. 10—12; 1 Cor. xii. 12—14. In these passages baptism is spoken of as putting on Christ—as evidencing the faith which constitutes the baptized a child of God—as declarative of faith in the sacrificial death of Christ, and of personal participation therein—as showing the necessary existence of newness of life equally with the necessity of Christ's resurrection to glory. We have seen that baptism is "the initiatory rite of the christian church," and "a badge or profession of discipleship;" we have also seen that the church of God is composed of them who are "called to be saints," the "sanctified" and "faithful brethren in Christ Jesus;" that "wherever a sinner believes he is a member of this spiritual household, and invested with the immunities of heavenly citizenship," that he is a disciple, whose mind is to be preserved

from contamination by the sincere pastor; *therefore baptism is rightly administered to those only who are duly qualified for church membership, viz., the believing, faithful, sanctified brethren in Christ Jesus; since "nothing can compensate for the absence of piety in one desiring admission into a church."*

We have, throughout the present debate, produced such arguments only as are furnished to the believer-Baptist in the writings of his Pædobaptist brethren, no quotation being made in support of our views but from the holy scriptures and the writings of eminent and honoured infant-Baptists. More might have been easily produced, and various contradictions pointed out, but space forbids; and we now hasten to the examination of some of the opposing arguments adduced during this debate. It is a matter of surprise to us that "Glowr," the appearance of whose signature in these pages shows him to be no inexperienced writer, should advocate the cause of infant baptism with such puerile and long-exploded arguments. Surely, if he be "free" from "wayward bias" and "intemperate zeal," which we cheerfully yield in his favour, we must affirm that he is not "free" from "fancy's influence." He asserts that "the true church of God is the same under all dispensations;" that "children were admitted members thereof under the Jewish dispensation by the rite of circumcision;" and that "the conduct of our Lord Jesus Christ towards children harmonizes with this;" therefore "the infants of believers are members of the (christian) church," whether baptized or not. The incorrectness of "Glowr's" thoughts and reasoning in these particulars are so apparent, the bare mention of them in juxtaposition renders farther comment unnecessary.

With respect to the analogy said to exist between the rite of circumcision among the Jews and the rite of christian baptism, as instituted by Christ and observed by the apostles, we are at a loss to know where our opponents find it; "Glowr's" remarks certainly do not show it, but the contrary, for he proves the coexistence* of the two rites in the Jewish dispensation and in the chris-

tian dispensation (see p. 256, col. 2); the latter is also proved by Acts xv. 1—11. Two rites observable by the same individual, for the same purpose, and at the same time, lose the power of analogy by the very circumstance of their coexistence.

At the institution of circumcision it was made the seal of the covenant between God and the descendants of Abraham as a nation, whereby a Jew was recognised in his political condition as a citizen of the Jewish commonwealth; his spiritual relationship to God was not secured thereby, for, in order to this, he must be "circumcised in heart," Gen. xvii. 14; Rom. ii. 25—29; Deut. x. 16; xxx. 6. The qualification for circumcision was Jewish descent; its effect, legalization as a Jew. The qualifications for christian baptism are repentance and faith; its effect, admission into the society of professing Christians. In the former, a physical qualification, and social or political effect: in the latter, a moral or spiritual qualification and effect; in both respects as widely different as possible; hence the absence of analogy. Moreover, circumcision was the *seal of the Abrahamic covenant*. This was its distinctive character. It was not a new rite, but an old rite, adopted from other nations, restricted in its application, and applied *as a seal* to the promise then made to Abraham of the possession by his seed of the promised Canaan. In vain do we look for an analogy to circumcision in the rite of christian baptism. The *seal of the new covenant* is the Spirit of God, "whereby (the believer) is sealed unto the day of redemption." When sinners believe in Christ they are "sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise," which is "the earnest of their inheritance until the redemption of the purchased possessions," Eph. i. 13, 14; iv. 30. *The seal, then, that comes in the room of circumcision, is the seal of the Spirit, and not baptism.*

The very patronising air with which friend B. S. remarks upon what he designates our "suppressions" and "inadvertencies" provokes our risibility, particularly as, in the performance of his task, he makes many ludicrous *additions to the truth*. For his information we beg to observe, that the Baptists are not divided on any subsidiary point connected with baptism. The division referred to is upon the doctrine of redemption, one section believing it to be particular, but

* "A stranger that is circumcised and not baptized, or baptized and not circumcised, he is not a proselyte till he be both circumcised and baptized." — See *Maimony in Miselma*, tom. ii. chap. 13.

the other believing it to be general. Both sections practise believer-baptism by immersion.

B. S. refers to "Maimonides" and to "Mishna" as Jewish *rabbis*, and *writers* of the Targuma. Shall we say that it is "merely the result of inadvertence," that B. S. produces as an authority a person who never had existence? Who ever heard of Mishna as a writer of a Targum, or any other rabbinical work? Why, the *Mischna* (which we suppose is intended by B. S.) is *the writing itself, and not the writer*, for "the Talmuds consist of the Mischna, or oral law, which is the text, and of the Gemara, which are the comments and decisions upon it by the Jewish doctors." We ourselves attach little importance to the evidence from the Talmuds upon this subject, although decisive in our favour, because so far removed from the time of our Saviour's advent. The earliest portion was not written until after the practice of infant baptism had been introduced into some portion of the church, that is, about 150 years after the destruction of Jerusalem; other portions were written so late as A.D. 230 and 500, and the portion ascribed to Maimonides about A.D. 1100; and, although action and reaction upon each other had caused many corruptions both in the Jewish and Christian doctrines, Maimonides makes it necessary that the children of proselytes, if circumcised in infancy, should delay baptism until able to understand the requirements of the law. *In our former paper* we have not made a parade of our learning, neither have we perplexed the reader with Greek quotations and criticisms upon any ancient texts of the holy scriptures, for the reason that such was not necessary to the subject, and we presumed the greater portion of our readers are not Greek scholars; for the same reason we regret that B. S. has adopted an opposite course in his treatment of Acts xix. 1—7. Yet it has led us to re-examine our own opinion upon this passage; and, after consulting every available authority, our opinion that John's baptism is distinct from christian baptism is thereby very much strengthened and confirmed. We wish to avoid harsh criticism, or we might speak strongly upon B. S.'s doctrine of *omissions* and *spurious texts*, a doctrine which he applies to his opponent, but forgets to apply it on the same authority to himself in the passage

now under consideration. The absurdity of his use of the transient and completed sense of the aorist tense is evidenced by the facts of the case, which are such that any English scholar of ordinary capacity would certainly refuse to put the construction B. S. has put upon them. Some years after the discourse and events here recorded, Luke gives a history of them, and very naturally (supposing him to have written in Greek) he speaks of the various actions and facts in the aorist tense, as having to him and his readers a past and, to some extent, a completed significance; but when he speaks of the connected events having reference to the future faith of John's disciples on the appearance of Him "who was coming," he uses the future tense (*pistensosi*), or the aorist participle of a verb having a future significance (*erhthomenon*). The conversation between Paul and the twelve Jews begins with the second verse and closes with the fourth. In the fifth verse Luke, in continuance of the narrative, describes the effect of Paul's words upon the Jews, and their ready obedience to the duty he enforces upon them:—"Therefore, hearing this, they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus." They were formerly baptized with the baptism of repentance; they are now "baptized into Christ"—"into his death." They were rebaptized. We are much pleased to find our views confirmed by that learned and pious man, the Rev. Albert Barnes, in his Notes (Acts xix. 5), who, as a Pædobaptist, certainly will not be accused of favouring the argument of the believer-Baptist:—"It is evident that these persons were rebaptized by the direction of Paul; for (1) this is the obvious interpretation of the passage—that which would strike all persons as correct, unless there were some previous theory to support. (2) It was not a matter of fact that John baptized in the name of Christ Jesus. His was the baptism of repentance; and there is not the slightest evidence that he ever used the name of Jesus in the form of baptism. (3) If this be the sense of the passage, that John baptized them in the name of Jesus, then this verse is a mere repetition of verse 4; a tautology of which the sacred writers would not be guilty. (4) It is evident that the persons on whom Paul laid his hands (verse 6), and those who were baptized, were the same. But these were the persons who

heard (verse 5) what was said. The narrative is *continuous*, all parts of it cohering together as relating to a transaction that occurred at the same time. If the *obvious* interpretation of the passage be the true one, it follows *that the baptism of John was not strictly christian baptism*. It was the baptism of repentance; a baptism designed to prepare the way for the introduction of the kingdom of the Messiah."

The confidence with which B. S. includes all the inhabitants of Judea in John's baptism at Jordan is well answered by J. M. P. In addition we would ask, if *all* in Judea, young and old, were baptized by John, what became of the Scribes and Pharisees whom he rejected? Where did those Jews come from who were baptized by Jesus? For we read that Christ "*baptized more disciples than John*." What! more than all the inhabitants of Judea? And, if "all nations" (Matt. xxviii. 19) were to be baptized before being discipled or converted, or before believing in Jesus, why did not the apostles act upon this view of the commission? Why did they invariably adopt an opposite practice? B. S. will find it difficult to answer these questions. We are fully aware that some critics reject the authorized version of Acts viii. 37; and while, as an isolated text, some doubt may attach to its authorship, we feel that the opinion of the many learned and good men who vindicate the retention of the passage, either as it stands in the authorized version or with some slight grammatical alteration, is worthy of some respect. We envy not the Christian who has temerity enough to *reject as spurious* any portion of God's word, especially when the passage contains doctrines in exact harmony with many other portions of scripture. Would B. S. admit his own argument of spurious texts against himself, in the doctrine of the Trinity, if 1 John v. 7 was objected to by the Unitarian, and denounced as spurious? He knows that the Trinity does not depend on this one passage. He will readily perceive the analogous position of baptism and the Trinity in these respects; and if he denies not the one, he must not deny the other. Dr. Whitby suggests the probability of this passage being omitted by some who approved of delaying baptism as long as possible. Beza and Doddridge think it too important to be omitted, while Griesbach and other

critics consider it as a marginal gloss brought into the text, and prefer a trifling variation in the reading. The position the text occupies in our former paper shows that we make no special use of it; all we claim for it is admission as evidence so far as it is corroborated by other passages; no farther. We would ask B. S. what sense he would make of the paragraph beginning at the twenty-ninth verse, if the thirty-seventh verse be omitted? What practical result was obtained by Philip in his divine mission to the eunuch, if he effected not the profession of faith? What was the writer's object, if not to show his reader the *connexion of teaching, understanding, believing, and obedience*? We invite the candid examination of text and context by the thoughtful Pædobaptist, being fully assured he will never think of applying B. S.'s doctrine of spurious texts and omissions, at least to this passage.

In page 295 B. S. designates believer-baptism "a mere phantom of the brain," and an impossibility. So we, by the same rule, simply substituting the words "faith," "saint," "apostle," "church," may say that these are mere phantoms, and impossibilities, too. We may be deceived by false professions, therefore true profession has no existence. Upon what conditions are persons admitted into Pædobaptist churches? Profession of faith and obedience to Christ. But some persons make false profession of faith, therefore Pædobaptist churches are impossibilities,—mere phantoms of the brain. We leave B. S. to follow out a few of the illustrations of his argument, which he is able to find in and around himself; and if he is diligent we shall soon hear that he has convinced himself his own existence is a mere phantom of his own brain,—a perfect impossibility!

The early fathers and modern divines whose opinions we produced as favouring our view of the question all practised infant baptism; so that the quotations made by B. S. from their works only show that his friends contradict themselves and each other, both in doctrine and practice.

The remarks of J. F. coincide so nearly with the arguments of "Glowr," that we refer the reader to our strictures on the latter, and proceed to review the production of our friend "Benjamin." In page 372 "Benjamin" observes, that "it is the duty of the

church to bestow baptism on the *proselyte*, who receives it as a *sign* or *token* of a *privilege*—*church membership*—*conferred*;" and not, as quoted by us from the Bishop of Norwich, page 254, that "baptism was, on the part of the redeemed, a pledge that he believed." By a reference to our quotation it will be perceived that it is considered a pledge of faith by an eminent divine of the Church of England. Dr. Halley, another learned Pædobaptist and a Dissenter, says "it is a badge of discipleship"—"the initiatory right of the christian church." These definitions are of a cognate character; and according to either, or the tenor of both conjoined, we ask, how can infants be proper subjects of baptism? Can they *receive* the token—*understand and appreciate* the privilege—*possess* the faith of which their act is a pledge? Have they the attributes of disciples? Are they capable of knowing and discharging the duties of church membership? If so, we shall feel obliged by "Benjamin" informing us where a church so composed is to be found.

"Benjamin" would wish us to understand there is *essential difference* between the terms "proselyte-disciple" and "believer." We can find nothing of the kind in the scriptures; but we may be "obtuse" and "party-spirited," and therefore may "blink at the point," as he insinuates. The only passages in which *proselytes* are mentioned in the New Testament are, Matt. xxiii. 15; Acts ii. 10; vi. 5; xiii. 43; and they distinctly show the proselyte to be a person converted from the heathen to the Jewish faith. So Bloomfield says:—"A proselyte, a convert from paganism to the Jewish religion"—"those who had become so (i. e., Jews) by conversion to the Jewish religion." Hence the term proselyte, in a christian sense, comes to mean one who has newly professed and adopted the christian faith, or who has recently forsaken one phase of faith and embraced another. From these views, therefore, we conclude that a proselyte is a

neophyte—a babe in Christ; not physically a babe, but spiritually—a *new or young believer*; and that a disciple is an *obedient believer*, desirous of guidance and instruction. Thus both are believers, and the terms "proselyte" and "disciple" designate their state as believers in the circumstances of time and progress. Hence the fallacy of "Benjamin's" argument on the baptism of infants, whom he pleases to designate as, "in some sense," proselytes and disciples.

We had marked for quotation several passages on the subject of this debate from "Hippolytus," by Chevalier Bunsen; and, although we have already trespassed too far beyond the space at our disposal, we cannot refrain from one extract:—"The church adhered rigidly to the principle, as constituting the true purport of the baptism ordained by Christ, that no one can be a member of the communion of saints but by his own free act and deed,—by his own solemn vow made in the presence of the church. It was with this understanding that the candidate for baptism was immersed in water, and admitted as a brother, upon his confession of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. It understood baptism, therefore, in the exact sense of 1 Peter iii. 21; not as being a mere bodily purification, but as a vow made to God with a good conscience, through faith in Jesus Christ. This vow was preceded by a profession of christian faith made in the face of the church, in which the catechumen expressed that faith in Christ, and in the sufficiency of salvation offered by him. It was a vow to live, for the time to come, to God and for his neighbour, not to the world and for self; a vow of his becoming a child of God through the communion of his only begotten Son in the Holy Ghost; a vow of the most solemn kind, for life and for death."

Reader! we have endeavoured to show the truth on christian baptism with affectionate sincerity: how far we have succeeded, it is for you to judge. L'OUVRIER.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

It is with great pleasure that we behold evidences of the intense desire which many young men now cherish to arrive at enlightened and intelligent conclusions on all questions which affect the foundations of our

religious opinions. They are no longer satisfied to abide by the dogmas of any sect, but they must ascertain for themselves, "What is truth?" This augurs well for the coming age. And since we have perfect liberty to

discuss freely and openly these matters, we look forward to a period not far distant, when truth shall conquer error, and reign without a rival.

Among the questions which as yet remain unsettled, is the one now under consideration; and as we had the pleasure of opening the debate, we have the privilege now of animadverting upon the arguments which have been brought forward by our opponents. At the onset we believed that the views we then entertained were in strict accordance with the tenor of the bible, and as yet we have had no reason to change or in anywise modify them. We believe ourselves to be vulnerable to arguments, but to arguments only. Bare assertions, empty declamations, and ingenious misrepresentations will never influence us in the least. And the refutation of a simple saying, without refuting the main arguments, certainly confirms us in our previous belief, while it gives us a somewhat lower opinion of our antagonist. With but few exceptions, however, we highly commend the spirit that has pervaded the articles that have appeared on this question: we could have wished that all the writers had exhibited things in their true light, instead of suppressing some, and misrepresenting others. J. W. W., for instance, instead of combating the arguments of his opponents, creates a few imaginary ones in their stead, and then triumphantly succeeds in showing their weakness; to the admiration, no doubt, of his friends!

Perhaps the best plan for us, in order to examine fairly the arguments of our opponents, will be to collect and classify them, rather than to go over the papers consecutively. And we think that the following enumeration contains all the arguments hitherto brought forward:—1st. The commission of our Lord. 2nd. Faith an essential requisite for baptism. 3rd. Ecclesiastical history opposed to the application of baptism to infants. 4th. Circumcision and baptism coexistent under the old dispensation, and therefore the latter could not be a substitute for the former; and 5th. If infants have a right to the ordinance of baptism, they have an equal right to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper. Here, we think, we have the whole of our opponents' arguments; at all events, we have not wilfully omitted one. And we rejoice that it is not necessary for us to

expatiate largely in opposition to any of them, as our talented allies have so ably done so.

I. The first argument that appears on our list is drawn from the commission of our Lord: "Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." It was in compliance with this command that the apostles set out upon the work of evangelization. Now, we think that we sufficiently showed, in our former article, that the apostles could not do otherwise than comprehend the children of believers among those to whom the rite of baptism should be applied; and B. S. subsequently proved its still more extended signification. If, however, we be not prepared to support his opinion, it is sufficient for the point at issue, that only the children of believers were comprehended. And it seems surprising to us, that any persons, acquainted with the religious privileges of children under the Jewish dispensation—the customs with which the disciples were necessarily familiar—the anxiety Christ evinced for the welfare of the young—and other collateral circumstances, can by any possibility arrive at a conclusion different from our own. Had infants not been baptized and circumcised previously, then the necessity for an express command for the application of baptism to them would be deemed more urgent and plausible; although, indeed, we cannot see why they should be mentioned more particularly than men and women, for men and women do not constitute "all nations." We are at a loss to conceive what sort of a command Anti-Pedobaptists consider as necessary, before infants could be comprehended among those to whom the rite should be applied. We presume it would be something like the following: "Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations and infants; and baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Unless it be something similar to this, we know not what they require. And, reader, if it had been worded in this manner, would it not have raised a smile upon your countenance? "All nations and infants!" We have no such anomalous expression in the command. The wording is clear, extensive, and decisive; and we are accustomed to accept the meaning which the words would convey to the disciples; and

from the circumstances in which they were situated, they could not do otherwise than understand that the rite was to be applied to infants as formerly.

Respecting the expression "all nations," J. M. P. says, in reply to B. S., that "we do not wish to limit it more than the words used oblige us to do. Disciple them." (We discard "Teach all nations," as the word teach is not in the original.) "Do not these words exclude infants? How are we to disciple them? This comes to, 'Who are the Lord's disciples?'" In reply to this we may say that we have several instances in scripture where children are called disciples as well as those of mature age. One example will suffice; and we refer to Acts xv. In that chapter, we find that dissension had arisen in the church respecting circumcision, "the Pharisees saying that it was needful to circumcise them, and to command them to keep the law of Moses." "And when there had been much disputing, Peter rose up and said unto them, Men and brethren, . . . why tempt ye God, to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples?" referring to circumcision and the law of Moses. Now, circumcision undoubtedly would be carried into effect on infants—on the infants of the church; and then the yoke necessarily would be on the neck of the infants, and infants therefore are by Peter called disciples. We would not say that all the disciples on whom the yoke would be were infants, as J. W. W. most likely would represent us as saying; but that the infants of believers, as well as their parents, are included under the term disciples. They are the lambs of His fold, and are committed to the care of the elder disciples, whose duty it is to instruct, admonish, and direct them. The commission of our Lord, then, does by no means exclude infants from the rite of baptism. Indeed, it appears to us that it would have been presumption in the apostles to refuse it them; a presumption of which the Jews would have complained, and resented with the greatest indignation.

II. Faith, it is said, is an essential requisite for baptism; and as infants cannot exercise faith, they evidently are not proper subjects for baptism. Certainly this is a strong argument, if the premise be good; but if, as we believe, it is unsound, the argument must be rejected as worthless.

The verse generally brought forward in support of this opinion is to be found in Mark xvi. 16: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." Now, for ourselves, we cannot see that this verse intimates in the least the qualification *for* baptism. It merely implies that those who have faith and have been baptized shall be saved; and that those who are deficient of faith, though they may be baptized, shall be condemned. That is the fact which it enunciates, and an important one it is, but it gives not the remotest intimation of the necessity of faith previous to baptism. The apostles were commanded to go and preach the gospel to every creature. And the gospel was, that all who believed on Jesus Christ, and were baptized, should be saved; and at the same time, they were to proclaim that those who refused to believe would be condemned. Now, what does that show in respect to the point at issue? Does it indicate the necessity of faith prior to baptism? By no means. It merely shows the necessity of faith and baptism to all those who are capable of believing—to those of mature understanding, who can comprehend the truths relating to their salvation—before they can entertain any hopes of salvation. It is but reasonable, however, that those who are capable of understanding the design of the rite of baptism should be required to make a profession of faith, whether they possess it or not, previous to its being applied to them; for the import of the rite demands it. It would be folly to baptize a man of mature age who disbelieved in Christ to be the Messiah—who would not promise to renounce his evil ways, and consecrate his life to the glory of God. But this requirement of mature age does not rest upon infants now, more than it did under the Jewish dispensation. Proselytes were required to make a profession under that economy; but it did not extend to infants, nor preclude them from being baptized and circumcised. So that we find the same necessity for faith in adults under both dispensations. But as this necessity for faith did not formerly preclude the infants of proselytes from being baptized, neither does it now.

Again. Faith evidently is no more necessary for the baptism of infants than for their salvation. And if faith is not necessary

for their salvation, and "Annette" and J. W. W. believe that it is not, much less is it necessary for their baptism. If the lack of faith does not prevent them being saved, much less should it prevent them being baptized. On this point Leonard Woods has a few very pertinent remarks:—

"If any one still thinks," says he, "that Christ's requiring men to believe and be baptized, implies that infants are not to be baptized because they cannot believe, I would ask him whether the same mode of interpreting scripture would not debar infants from salvation? 'He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be condemned,' is the grand principle of the New Testament. Faith is required in order to salvation, as much certainly as in order to *baptism*. And this requisition furnishes as much reason for excluding infants from *salvation*, as for excluding them from *baptism*. But all Christians are united in holding that the requisition of faith in order to salvation cannot be applied to children. And to be consistent, they must hold that the requisition of faith in order to *baptism* cannot be applied to children. The requisition most evidently has as much to do with salvation as with baptism. The two cases, then, are alike. Christ requires men to believe, in order to be *saved*. But when he requires this, he does not say *that infants are excluded from salvation, because they cannot believe*. So he requires faith in order to *baptism*. But he does not say, that infants are excluded from baptism, because they cannot believe. Thus, so far as the requisition of faith is concerned, there is no more propriety in excluding infants from baptism, than in excluding them from salvation. Now, if we admit that notwithstanding this requisition of faith infants may be *saved*; we must admit, also, that they may be baptized. The requisition of faith, which is intended solely for adults, proves nothing, one way or the other, as to children."

This reasoning cannot be otherwise than conclusive to every unbiassed mind, as to the futility of the objection, and indeed the chief objection, urged by anti-Pædobaptists against infant baptism—that they cannot believe. Nothing more conclusive can ever be had against any objection on any subject. The fact of their not being mentioned explicitly among those who were baptized is no

argument whatever. "Omission," said Bishop Watson to Tom Paine, "is no contradiction." And B. S. has already shown its futility. So that our opponents act inconsistently with themselves, in not considering infants as being excluded from salvation, because of their lack of faith; while, for that reason, they exclude them from the rite of baptism.

III. Ecclesiastical history has been also brought forward by our opponents in confirmation of their opinions, and "L'Ouvrier" refers to it with great pleasure. But we think that every candid person who has read the quotations of B. S., and has looked into the testimony of the Fathers, must unequivocally admit that not only is it not opposed to infant baptism, but that, on the contrary, it affords every reason to believe that it was generally practised in the post-apostolic churches. True, Tertullian—one of the first writers on baptism after the apostles—opposed its being practised; but his words by no means imply that it was not customary, but the contrary. They show that such a custom was in practice, because he opposes it; and it is also evident that it was not a recent innovation, or he would have referred to it as such. He was, individually, opposed to it, but with that we have nothing to do; the practice of the church is our criterion. His opinions on most things were very peculiar. He was equally, and for the same reasons, opposed to the baptism of unmarried persons as he was opposed to the baptism of infants; and if we rely on his opinion in the one instance, we ought also in the other. In the quotation of "L'Ouvrier" from Hagenbach, where he states the words of Tertullian, we regret to recognise the fact that he has there again "laid himself open to a charge of *suppressio veri*, in a case where the suppressed truth tells so directly against his own cause." In place of the omission dots, the following important remarks ought to have appeared: "It is for a reason of no less importance that unmarried persons, both those who were never married, and those who have been deprived of their partners, should, on account of their exposure to temptation, be kept waiting till they are either married, or confirmed in a habit of chaste single life." Had "L'Ouvrier" admitted these remarks in their proper place, it would have been immediately perceived by every reader, that Tertullian's zeal against

infant baptism was no proof against its apostolic origin, as he was equally zealous, and "for a reason of *no less* importance," against the baptism of grown-up persons, unless they were married.

It is unnecessary for us to animadvert further under this division; and B. S. has already quoted, briefly and succinctly, sufficient authorities to prove infant baptism to be a practice of the primitive churches. And what else is needed? J. M. P. may deride our predilection for the Fathers; but our argument remains the same. We do not *ground* our conclusion on their testimony, but we consider it corroborative.

IV. It has also been argued, that as circumcision and baptism coexisted prior to the institution of the latter by John the Baptist and our Saviour, that it could not be a substitute for the former; and therefore from infant circumcision no argument can be drawn in favour of infant baptism. The weakness, however, of such reasoning must be apparent to every reader; and we may remark that the grounds of it have but recently been introduced into the arguments of our opponents. Not long since, they deprecated the idea of baptism being practised on proselytes to the Jewish religion. Dr. Gill stoutly opposed it, as it afforded so forcible an argument in favour of infant baptism. He was fully aware that if it could be proved that "the origin of baptism is far anterior to the time of our Saviour and his precursor John"—"that immediately before the coming of John the Baptist, it became a general rule to circumcise and baptize all proselytes to the Jewish faith," and even their children, as B. S. has shown from "the Targum and other Jewish rabbis"—it would be subversive of exclusive adult baptism, and would substantiate one of our strongest arguments. But now, since our opponents cannot dispute the fact, they turn round and confess that such a practice did exist; but with that confession they adduce a new argument, and say that as both rites—circumcision and baptism—coexisted, that the latter could not be a substitute for the former. Now, if baptism under the present dispensation is significant of the same things as circumcision under the Jewish, it matters little that they both coexisted, for it is in their import that their importance lies. We find that baptism signifies the very same thing

now as circumcision did then, with the exception of that which was local; and that exception is not to be taken into account when the rite was applied to proselytes, for it was not the seal of the same temporal blessings to them as to the Jews. Whatever was implied in circumcision to proselytes is also implied in baptism; and what was implied in baptism under the Jewish dispensation is implied now. "Spiritually," says Annette, the former "was emblematical of a putting off the sins of the flesh." So also is baptism. The former was the seal of a consecration to God. So also is baptism. The former was the seal of spiritual and temporal blessings, if the circumcised would conform to the laws of the Lord. So also is baptism. "Circumcision," says Annette again, "was the symbol of a reception into the Jewish nation, which was obtained by birth." So also baptism is a symbol of a reception into the Christian church, which is obtained by birth, as in the case of believers' children. "Baptism," says the same writer, "is a reception into the Christian church which is obtained by faith." So also was circumcision a reception into the Jewish church which was obtained by faith, as in the case of adult proselytes. By these remarks, then, it must be evident to every candid reader that circumcision, under the old dispensation, was spiritually significant of the same blessings as baptism is now; and such being the case, is it not reasonable to believe that baptism is a substitute for circumcision? Again, as infants were circumcised, is it not reasonable to believe that infants should be baptized? The fact of their coexistence is nothing, for our Saviour might have commanded their continued coexistence; and that would not have restricted their continued application to infants. But he thought fit to discontinue the rite of circumcision, and to institute baptism as the only rite of initiation into his church, without hinting at its restriction or extension from what it was previously. And as it was previously applied to proselytes *and their children*, so also must it be scriptural to apply it to proselytes and their children now, and to the children of all those who believe in the Lord Jesus Christ.

V. If infants have a right to the ordinance of baptism, they have an equal right to the ordinance of the Lord's supper. This argu-

ment has a very plausible appearance. It is enforced by J. W. W., who says, "we never think of administering the communion to infants." With equal propriety and potency could he argue against the right of children to circumcision, for they had an equal right to the passover, with the exception of not being commanded to eat it; still we never heard that infants partook of the passover. The inference J. W. W. wishes us to deduce from his argument undoubtedly is, that infants have no right to baptism; but by the same logic he must conclude that infants had no right to circumcision. But supposing it be granted that infants had a right to the Lord's supper, there are reasons manifest to every man of sense why it is not administered to them. In the Lord's supper, unless the mind communes with Christ through the emblems, the ordinance will be useless—nay, sinful, and fall short of answering its great and important design; and for these reasons we refrain from administering it to infants. Not so baptism. Communion with Christ is not required in that ordinance, as it is merely the initiatory rite into the christian church, and signifies that "those to whom it is applied are the subjects of moral pollution, and need that spiritual cleansing, or purification from sin, which is effected through the Holy Spirit by the blood of Christ."

"Annette" asks us to "prove what benefit it confers upon the children," and then she will yield. And as her yielding depends on that point only, it would be unpardonable to leave her request uncomplished with. We may mention, that it gives them the benefit of church membership—a benefit that cannot be too highly estimated. Some of the purposes of infant church membership we noticed in our opening article; and we state them again here, and ask "Annette" if they are not of inappreciable worth?—1st. They are consecrated from infancy to the work of God. 2nd. They are instructed in the laws of their religion. 3rd. The principles of true religion are instilled into their minds. 4th. The interests and care of the church are secured for them. Can greater benefits than

these be conferred on infancy, childhood, and youth?

Our task is now done, so far as replying to the arguments of our opponents; what has been our success our readers are to judge. We have not evaded, to the best of our belief, anything of consequence that favours the belief of anti-Pædobaptists. And now, having attempted to refute their opinion in as candid and impartial a manner as truth would allow, we shall, in conclusion, present a summary of the arguments by which the baptism of the infants of believers is supported:—

1. As they are members of the church, they should be introduced by the initiatory rite.

2. The commission of our Lord fairly comprehends them.

3. The disciples could not do otherwise than so understand the commission.

4. The example of John's baptism, which was identical with the christian rite.

5. The teaching and practice of the apostles.

6. The doctrinal allusions of the epistles.

7. The testimony of the Fathers.

8. The nature and design of the rite is not incompatible with its application to infants.

9. Inferences may be drawn from the general tenor of scripture in favour of infant baptism.

10. Baptism is the substitute of the Mosaic rite of circumcision.

11. Although the profession of faith is necessary as a qualification for adult-baptism, still that qualification does not extend to infants.

Reader, these are the grounds on which we entertain Pædobaptist views. For evidence in their support we refer you to the articles in which they are advanced. Give them an impartial perusal, and we shall be satisfied. We ask no more; and truth will be satisfied with no less. They differ considerably in potency; but they are all subsidiary to the one great truth, that "the baptism of infants is a practice in harmony with scripture."

GLOWR.

Antiquity is worthless, except as a parent of experience; that which is virtuous is alone noble, and there is nothing so illustrious as the dedication of the intellect and the affections to the great end of human improvement and happiness.

Philosophy.

WHICH WAS THE GREATEST POET, MILTON OR SHAKSPERE?

SHAKSPERE.—ARTICLE IV.

MAN is a miniature representation of the universe—a more or less perfect embodiment and expression of every law and influence existing in nature. Bodily, he is the image of nature; spiritually, the image of God. By God we understand the illimitable, unchangeable essence; the pervading soul of all being, the unseen and eternal. By nature, a transitory and partial expression of the divine ideal. And such is man. Essentially he is the immortal, immutable offspring of the Eternal; outwardly he is a shadowy being, involved in inexplicable mystery,—coming from, and going to, the Unknown.

It is this analogy existing between man and external nature which explains the intimate sympathy existing between them. No part of God's universe is strange to the heart of man. Wherever he may be, or gaze, he recognises relationship. He comes forth at night and looks on the stars, and his immortal heart within him is stirred. They become to him an unutterable revelation,—founts of ineffable mystery, and glorious symbols of his own eternity. Deep calls unto deep; and this wondrous universe, apparently so diverse and wide-scattered, is seen to be one at heart.

This acting of the beautiful and sublime in nature upon the susceptibility of the human soul constitutes poetry. The degree of susceptibility to these divine influences is the true measure of a man's poetic stature. But he it is who, by means of expression, is the most successful in turning the tide of his emotions upon the hearts of his fellows, who is judged by them to be the greatest poet. Another and greater attribute of mind—which, owing to its intimate connexion with poetry, it will be expedient to take account of in the present discussion—is, "adversity's sweet milk,—philosophy." As poetry is refined and spiritual sensibility, so philosophy is mental or spiritual power. This is the lordly attribute of mind going forth in quest of wisdom, and by its aid gaining ascendancy over the adverse circumstances of life,—a

power whereby the soul emancipates itself from the slavery of sensual existence, and rises in its spiritual might to the dominion of life supreme. Poetry is the bride of philosophy: philosophy the lord of poetry. Though apparently distinct, they are intrinsically one, as inseparable as cause and effect. Thus philosophy invents a tool, or with might of mind brings down soul-ennobling doctrines to the apprehension of man; but the beauty or fitness of the tool, and the sublimity of the doctrines, re-act upon the mind as poetry.

We shall answer the question forming the present subject of discussion by determining, from an examination of their works, which of these illustrious individuals has embodied therein the preponderating amount of creating and feeling intellect. That Milton is one of the greatest poets who have appeared on the stage of human existence is a fact generally admitted. To an intellect highly cultivated, and richly stored with classic lore, he has united a considerable amount of poetic vigour, and a sublimity of conception but rarely exceeded. In "Paradise Lost" we have the work of a mind, though not remarkable for great philosophic insight into nature, yet peculiarly susceptible of receiving deep impressions from the grand and sublime, whether exhibited in physical or moral nature.

Milton has obtained the materials of his great work from three principal sources; these are the Hebrew scriptures, with the epics of Homer and Virgil; but it is evident that the power of the poem results from the peculiar moral grandeur, and bold and adventurous spirit, of Milton's age, with the effect which its imposing martial spectacles, and the magnanimity of its master spirits, had upon the poet's mind. Especially is this seen in his splendid descriptions of the infernal army, with their noble leader. We really should not have thought that the author of evil was such a fine fellow,—that his breast was the seat of so much native goodness and nobility of soul! What infinite

pity we feel when we read of the thunder-scars intrenched on his face, and the care sitting on his faded cheeks, under brows of dauntless courage, and of the irrepressible tears of compassion which he sheds over the ruin of his faithful and devoted followers. Milton's Satan commands in us more sympathy and admiration than his Supreme Being. He has invested the Deity with a pomp of words; but with little that can touch the heart, or evoke therefrom the emotions of awe, worship, and love. We cannot recognise this God of Milton's rhetoric as the Father of our spirits, as one with Him who sits enthroned in nature, and whose tender mercies are over all his works:—

“ Whose thunder rends the clouded air;
Who in the heaven of heavens hast fix'd his throne,
Supreme of gods! unbounded and alone!”

Milton, in conceiving this poem, aimed at making it the greatest production of human intellect. Homer and Virgil had based their creations on earthly scenes and incidents, and sang of human exploits, investing them with the light and spirituality which heathenism could afford. But the fabric of his creations should be on a grander scale; his theme should be divine, his theatre heaven, his heroes angels; while the sublimity and inspiration thereof should result from the superior splendour of christian truth. But this ambition, and these advantages, only serve to make the inferiority of his genius the more conspicuous: for, while Homer and Virgil have arrayed the popular beliefs of their times with a profusion of intellectual life and ideal beauty, and in imaginative might have soared superior thereto, Milton has failed to do justice to his theme. *His* Christianity is inferior in spiritual power to Homer's heathenism; and his attempted expositions of moral and religious truth totally unworthy of the source from which they are professedly derived.

This incapacity of Milton is to be traced primarily to the comparative deadness of the philosophic or truth-elucidating faculty, to a non-recognition of the deep moral significance of the scripture narratives, and a consequent dwelling on the literal and superficial,—a failing in him evidently destructive to spiritual power, productive of moral incongruities, and necessitating a resort to meretricious artifice to supply his want of nature. Analogous to this is much that is

indicative of a want of faith in the oneness of virtue. Milton, as a great poet, should have known, that for aught of nobility, majesty, or faith, to be at variance with the Supreme, is as impossible as for the Godhead to annihilate his own existence.

If a man would be a great poet,—a mediator between heaven and earth,—he must not look upon truth as she is distorted in the wave of conventional faiths and opinions; he must ascend the mountain-tops of intellect, and from thence gaze on her unclouded aspect, as in the immutability of her loveliness she reigns in lofty supremacy over the weak apprehension and unstable theologies of human society. For what is poetry, but the blushing forth of transcendent truth and beauty? And who is a great poet, but the man whose gaze is greatly fixed thereon? Milton, unfortunately, did not thus look upon truth. His great work,—ostensibly a vindication of the ways of God to man,—is, virtually, but an exposition of the crude Christianity of his time.

Shakspeare, unlike Milton, was but sparingly instructed in the ordinary branches of human learning; but, while his intellectual fare was simple, it was the more sublime. The stream of his intellect flowed but in one channel. It rolled at once deep, pellucid, and many-voiced, within the beautified and enlarged boundaries of his native tongue. His book was Nature, and he her earnest student. Deeply did he imbibe her living lore. His soul was transfused with her beauty, and his heart tuned in unison with the harmony evolved from her workings. He had an ear for the wild melody of her winds and waves, and the more exquisite music of her spheres:—

“ Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims:
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.”

Thus it was his at times, priest-like, to pierce beyond her outer sanctuary, and to bring from the shrine of the invisible the oracles of eternal Truth.

Milton wrote in accordance with his own premeditated design. Shakspeare's art lay in giving appropriate expression to the thoughts which welled up irresistibly within him. In

their utterance his own will was evidently overwhelmed beneath the tides of emotion which rolled from a profounder source. Milton wrote as he moved to write; Shakspeare, as he was moved. Shakspeare makes earth the pedestal of his thought, but builds thereon a superstructure whose lofty towers penetrate to the veritable heavens. Not so Milton's celestial empire, bounded by a wall; but the heavens of incorruptible existence, embracing the roots of nature, and expanding through all infinity of life. Shakspeare's heaven is not a locality, but a state of pure, insuperable being.

Shakspeare, both as philosopher and poet, stands unrivalled among the literary celebrities of all climes and ages. His philosophical supremacy is evinced by the penetrating glance sent by his intellect into all departments of nature,—by the stupendous spirit-stirring truths which he from thence elicits, and the strength of mind with which he grapples with the problems of life. His acquired position upon the pinnacle of poetic fame results from the exquisite sensibility of his spirit to the internal harmonies of nature, and the expressive body of words through which he pours the music of his soul upon the hearts of others. Shakspeare, among poets, is preeminent for naked, unmythological truthfulness, pure unsophisticated nature, strength and comprehensiveness of intellect, and picturesque grandeur and force of language.

We had collected a number of extracts from Shakspeare's writings to illustrate this and other points, but space forbids their insertion; we must, therefore, refer the reader to his works themselves.

The observant reader will perceive that in Shakspeare's writings there is an element of pure religious sublimity springing forth uncontaminated from the fountain of his heart. As we read we become conscious of a resistless tendency, drifting us as by an undercurrent from the quicksands of time into the deep waters of eternity. A light dawns upon our souls "above the brightness of the sun," blinding them to the illusions of sensual perception, and arousing them to a consciousness of the realities of the spiritual. Shakspeare's religion is where it ought to be—deep in his heart. It presides in the centre of his being, and becomes the animating spirit of his works. It is a gem which he values not

for display, but for its own intrinsic worth. He has no vicious desire of being thought religious; it is enough for him that he be so. He is so wise, that it becomes to him a matter of indifference though he be esteemed a fool; so great, that he sees nothing in the phantom-worlds of time and human opinions which he should either desire or fear.

An argument brought forward by the supporters of the opposite side of the question in defence of Milton's superiority, as contrasted with Shakspeare, is founded upon the assumption of Milton's greater purity. If their premises be admitted, their inference must be also; for true purity and true greatness are identical. But to us it appears that Shakspeare far exceeds Milton in the purity of his spirit and intellect. There may, possibly, be darker spots in the sun than there are in the moon; but we should by no means thence infer that the moon is the more glorious body. Shakspeare has, doubtless, dived deeper than Milton into the gross gulf of sin and sensuality; but he has also equally outsoared him in the regions of transcendent moral and religious purity; and, so precious is the transcendent to the mounting spirit of man, that a ray of divinity can more than atone for worlds of sin. Were there any validity in the argument referred to, it would prove vastly too much. Is Milton's production superior to God's boundless universe, because the sin and sensuality which may be found in a single world thereof immeasurably transcend aught of the kind to be met with in "Paradise Lost?" Is man inferior to all other terrestrial animals because he knows more of sin and evil? Or shall we measure the relative magnitude of the planets by the comparative size of their respective animalcules?

Another weapon with which our valiant opponents attempt to defend their insecure position is, the greatness of the subjects of which Milton treats. This argument, though apparently weighty, will be found, upon closer inspection, to be exceedingly hollow. Both reason and experience teach us that a man's greatness as a writer is manifested, not by the subject upon which he writes, but rather by writing greatly upon any subject. If "L'Ouvrier" can convince us that there is any truth in his surprising assertion, that Milton's "poem comprehends all that is great in heaven, earth, and hell," then we will

admit that "greatness greater than this" is impossible. But we hope and trust he is mistaken, else what a lie were Nature! How vain the groanings and labourings of creation! How hopeless the yearnings of the immortal spirit! And what a delusion—God! "*Φιλαλήθης*" has, in the former part of his article, some remarks about the absence of a standard by which to measure the merits of Milton; "for (says he) we do not know the grand beauties, the ecstatic joys of heaven—the dark horrors, the deep-seated despairs of hell. . . . We are left to judge of these things by our own unaided imagination." And again:—"Paradise Lost," that noble work, which has made Milton what he is, treats of things unknown," &c. Granting that we know nothing of the joys of heaven, &c., it by no means follows that we have no standard by which to judge of Milton's work. Before coming to such a conclusion, our friend should have proved, not only that Milton's subject transcended human knowledge, but likewise that Milton's faculties and method of treating his subject were superhuman,—that Milton's descriptions of heaven and hell were worthy representations of those states which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive. So far is it from being true that we have no standard by which to judge of the merits of Milton, that, on the contrary, every human being, whether he be conscious of it or not, has a standard of excellence within him infinitely surpassing any actual or possible production of human genius. Could we but fully embody in creation the ideal of excellence we possess, how easily we might dispense with

Homer, Plato, Shakspeare, Milton! If these names are dear to us, it is because they have conveyed human language a degree nearer to the expression of the unutterable—the heaven—the God!—enshrined within us. Is not all that is great in "Paradise Lost" the fruit of Milton's imagination? Why, then, we would ask, may not our imagination be competent to judge of that which Milton's has produced?

Shakspeare, being dead, yet speaketh,—speaketh home to the heart and dignified intellect of man, in language commanding reverential wonder and attention by the impetus of its thought. His language is more than English,—it is universal; its characters being the grand elements and features of nature, whose "line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world." A vast reflection of the departed Shakspeare yet floods with its radiance the philosophy, literature, and labouring intellects of these subsequent times. On these dark coasts of Time, with the pencil of his lucid thought, he has traced for himself the everlasting memento of an indelible renown.

Shakspeare, in the realms of intellect, is a fixed star—a light-yielding orb; Milton a planetary body, grand indeed, but with borrowed beams. While we are so near to Milton in age, country, and peculiarity of opinion, he rises on our contracted sight as the rival of Shakspeare; but when, in the vastness of time, he has become obscured to human view, Shakspeare shall remain in the fixedness of his glory, sublime and great, amid the constellations of genius and the expositors of nature. COSMOPOLITE.

MILTON.—ARTICLE IV.

It is natural to hesitate upon nearing greatness. We do not tread the precincts of a cathedral with that unflagging assurance with which we have passed fabric after fabric of minor build and history; nor would it scarcely be possible for us to enter a pyramid with the haste allowable upon ordinary thresholds. Books differ as well as buildings; and these and their authors have amongst them, in its most enlarged sense, the distinction which gives to some of them greatness, and with such greatness does the reverent bearing of man in general become a matter of necessity. Bustle is, of all things, the least

likely to be tolerated by Nature in the presence of her nobles.

The indisposition already expressed in this debate to enter upon a comparison of the two great poets, and so to unhallow, as it were, their works by free criticism, must be a feeling common to all who take part in this or any other like discussion. Could we fancy an exception, we might give him credit for a degree of competence beyond that possessed by any of his predecessors, though with these are numbered names themselves venerated by all of us; but it would be a competence which, in its turn, would be

judged by the opinion of sensible men, and, we fear, be pronounced to differ from the fulness of true genius, which may at times give authority and freedom to the critic's pen, even when employed upon the highest productions of intellect. And, not only would the exception be offensive to those whose talents and cultivation have fitted them best to appreciate, but also to the world at large, which, in the exercise of natural discrimination alone, has taken Milton and Shakspeare under its especial charge, and would guard their fame from undue familiarity with even less of ceremony than the former. Such unity cannot be the result of a mistaken reverence, since superstition is never universal. It evidences that the living power of truth, of love, and of beauty, which to man is a mysterious but sweet influence, operating in close communion with himself and all things, is identical with that gone forth from Milton and Shakspeare, and which had an utterance by them with a fulness unattainable by others; and for this reason, reaching the very heart of humanity, it has been recognised, responded to, and then treasured up by every man within whose observation it has come, as if the issue of his own emotions. Not that every one thinks alike of Milton, or of Shakspeare; or combines them to make a grand total; or imagines that each balances the other. There are degrees of enthusiasm, and there is partizanship; and in some cases,—we hope but few,—there is a doubt as to whether poets are, after all, of so much value in the world as they are held to be. But we never estimate poets by their opinions on matters of common disagreement. A man may, indeed—but with no better effect than just paying a decent compliment to theology, to the dictum of coterie, or to his own views of what things are, or ought to be—meet one sentiment after another with an anathema; but, having discharged this duty, it is his nature to seek repose as his heart would have him. True to himself, his sympathies revert to the poet. The social yearnings in this particular, as in those of their operations more sensibly dear to us, are not ruled by the circumstance of opinion, but by the law of necessity, or by some ordinance which we have no will to disobey. We love, for we cannot help loving; but, so far from our love being of a superstitious kind, it is just a

reciprocation of kindred emotion, whose excellence consists in intelligibility and simplicity. Poetry has no notion of the powers which systems have resorted to to gain influence over mankind. She does not speak in oracles, all things being of equal preciousness to her; she does not seek for some the veneration paid to relics; nor are there special circumstances in her mission calling for a counterfeiting of miracles. All mystery, in the sense of designed concealment, she is a stranger to. Her priests, as we sometimes term them, take us by the hand, and, lifting the veil of mysteriousness, deem their ministry most successful when most they can discern in us the simple trust which they have been taught from first hand to exercise themselves. It is thus that our souls have been knit to Milton and Shakspeare. They in us, and we in them, perfectly sincere and intelligible to each other, and the whole universe of things and thoughts in fellowship, give sufficient evidence of the genuine grounds of our love, and with it the reverence which a consciousness of superiority in the object always adds to our affections.

If, then, our reverence be not superstition, and it be allowed as inferrible therefrom that the greatness of the two poets is a fact which our nature recognises, and that, therefore, the impropriety of the thing, which would be alleged by society were it asked to establish this point by criticism, would be really just, because criticism were unnecessary, we think we may be spared all that disturbance of feeling which, for argument's sake, we had anticipated as the experience of every one when about to criticise the works of great men in order to make a comparison. If our hearts are admitted witnesses to the existence of greatness, it becomes clear that we are dealing with a matter so intimately connected in its operations with human nature, that a proper criterion to judge of the *rules* of greatness (which must be arrived at before a preponderance can be determined) will be the fidelity to purpose with which such operations have been fulfilled. We here premise that the poet is the teacher of men, and that, as such, the moral being, which he has asserted to be "the proper study," has been peculiarly the object of his investigations, to the end that the Muse may shape her resources into the most suitable form of instruction. Now, it appears to us that the

mode of procedure we have proposed is the only method at all calculated to insure a satisfactory result. We want an arena for every combat,—some common ground of mutual acknowledgment, which shall not be called in question hereafter, and whereon there shall be an actual meeting of parties. This ground we shall secure here; but criticism does not afford it; to say nothing of the immense difficulty, amounting with most of us to an impossibility, of taking a method requiring (if the process is to be in any way worthy of so dignified a subject) not only the closest intimacy with the works of the two poets, but also a power which suggests itself to us as similar to that which would be required to set two giants in juxtaposition, and compel their respective performances. Leaving our inadequacies in these respects out of the question, the main objection still remains, How shall we ensure a criterion? What shall be our gauge of merit? When every admirer has exercised *his* taste in the competition—every professional *his* taste; when every play and poem has had *its* excellencies displayed, and while either side is ready with a chaplet wherewith to crown its chief, who shall reduce rivalry to agreement, and bring the claims to a legal standard for trial? Here is one who, with all the pride of nationality and classic distinction, believes that his native tongue was never wrought into so rich an attire, or enfolded so beautiful a form of life, as when spoken by Shakspeare; another, whose belief has an equal amount of loyalty and correct taste to support it, holds the same of Milton. One loves to linger among the bowers of Eden, and to pay his tribute to grace and gentleness where their fair embodiment, revealed in loveliness incarnate, reposes on beds of roses; while the wild fancies of another are mingling with the wilder orgies of witches, who in their dark retreats are constraining the fates to declare the destinies of men. How shall the two be persuaded to concord and companionship? When each casket is filled with gems of countless value, in themselves considered, without reference to their use, who shall declare the *agio* between them? It is clear that no conclusion can be thus arrived at. But, if we will surrender our partialities for the honour of truth; and, in strict accordance with our confessed convictions, allow that *service* shall be the test

of value, we bring our cause to established canonical authority, which, though it disposes of the *jurisdiction* of taste, will not annihilate taste, nor prejudice it, as the sweet witching possession held by each one of us of his own right, and which authority will secure what we all profess to seek,—a disinterested verdict.

The question then comes, Which, as a poet, ministered most to the interests of humanity, Milton or Shakspeare? Which, having taught it its vast wants, supplied most of food and motive for the great attainment, with thought and hope of conquest, as well as expectation of strife and battle? Which, penetrating the depths of the human heart, and tracing there how mistakes and misery, self-preference and degradation, fancied joys and bitter reflections, succeeded oftentimes by despair and ruin, are inseparably united, and form but one labyrinth, though the connecting avenues are dark and hidden from the general gaze, has also seen and shown that this is not the whole of life, but that there are points of egress and escape,—paths leading out of the same nature (and therefore within the province of the poet, even if he were not to be held as a teacher), and which, like the old chartered highways we tread daily, are unexclusively free, and, like them, are directed to the best advantage. Which, in short, not only showed what man *is*, but also what he *might be*, unless our boasted freedom is to be taken as having no existence in fact? That Shakspeare knew human hearts, as far as we can conceive it possible for our fellow-man to be acquainted with them; and that, combined with this knowledge, there was commensurate ability to pourtray their divers manifestations, is the very foundation and fact of his greatness. As we have seen, it is because “he has told us all things that ever we did” that we have yielded without desire of resistance. And that life *as it is*, with all its seeming terrible anomalies,—might making right its prey, and vice deflowering virtue,—the consciences of men acknowledging eternal laws, and at the same time their passions bent upon gratification,—needs to be known, either from experience or from its truthful pourtrayal, before a starting-point shall be gained for a more exalted state of being. We see in it a necessary and proper material for a teacher's use. It is, therefore, with no pious horror we view the

creations of Shakspeare,—their characters, histories, and, it may be, their follies, detailed either without expression of disapprobation, or so doubtfully censured as to give little direct advantage to morality. Our belief being that human nature, if progressive at all, must taste more or less of the disappointment which forbidden sources afford,—that, to rise, it must first have some sense of degradation,—we recognise so far in Shakspeare a good teacher of mankind, however disfavouredly the admission may be viewed by many excellent persons. But here his work ceases. Beyond life, just as he found it, he had nothing to study, nor to recommend to the solemn consideration of his fellow-men. And herein lies the fatal charm that Shakspeare exercises over us, that, dazzled by the splendid equipage which he has lavished on this life, we prefer to be at ease amidst such luxury to the exercise of hope and determination towards things as yet unseen. It is thus that E. W. S. and "Excelsior," feeling that Shakspeare has halted on the journey, and unwilling to sever themselves from his company, are led even to acquiesce in the position, and to make it the citadel of their argument. "Shakspeare (says E. W. S.) studies man; and, finding his whole being associated with moral evil, he struggles with the terrible fact with a power superhuman and almost divine; and, though he finds not a solution to the dread mystery. . . ." "Excelsior" says:—"Our question refers to no other greatness than that of the poet. We are not to determine which was the greatest man, but which was the greatest poet. Waiving all considerations of utility, however important; of moral intention, however sacred; and, indeed, of everything extraneous to 'the poet,' we are required to give precedence to an abstract quality." What is the greatness of the poet, then? Are we to understand that it is his prerogative to exist as an abstraction—to do no service, and yet deserve homage, in a world where ability and neediness have made reciprocity a law, entailing the greatest obligations upon the greatest gifts? Why, it is an exemption which, in "its abstract quality," your own Shakspeare would repudiate with all the discernment of a man alive to his own honour. E. W. S. concludes the sentence we have partly quoted thus:—"He shows us by the radiance of his genius how true the

assurance of a higher revelation is—that what we know not now we shall know hereafter." We would, we think, allow more real value to Shakspeare's claim than either of our friends E. W. S. and "Excelsior." To say that his *genius* is evidence of something that it is in man's power to strive for (which we suppose is the meaning of E. W. S.; for a revelation can be of no use to us unless what it reveals is to be sought for), is to say very little indeed for Shakspeare's claim as a teacher of a higher life; and as a *teacher* E. W. S., with ourselves, holds the poet to be; while his responsibility to teach something of this higher life is clearly implied in the fact of his adverting to it. Now, over and above the advantage which the mere contemplation of Shakspeare's genius would afford us, we would set the more direct instruction to be gained from his many representations of the existence and supremacy of moral law, and of the human spirit's necessities for a something which it cannot as yet lay hold of. The fine language of disappointed ambition, and of soliloquies upon the vanities of this life and the possibilities of another; the omnipotence of virtue visible through all the tortuous and questionable windings through which Shakspeare passes it, must be, it appears to us, more impressing in their nature than the dim evidences which his genius as a poet, and that viewed abstractedly, would afford us of a higher revelation: and to this extent we allow Shakspeare to have served his race. This, besides being just to Shakspeare, and a thing we are agreed upon, is really the summing up of his claims, and is, we think, more to be regarded than the considerations of his "auspices" or his "supreme fame," as relied upon by "Excelsior," because these, if facts, are not what we should agree upon as proofs of superiority, since Time is fickle, and has not plighted her favours to one, and applause is often less indicative than censure of true desert; and because, as neither the "auspices" nor the "supreme fame" would exist but for that profound acquaintance with human nature characteristic of Shakspeare, and from which we gather his best claim, the difference of value as data is just that which lies between an original principle and its accessories, of which difference we give the advantage to "Excelsior," as he has not taken it.

Now, if human nature were so constituted

as to need only a consciousness of its moral weaknesses, combined with a conviction of the might and sure policy of virtue, to ensure the pursuit of a better condition, then might Shakspeare be said to have done all that was possible for the welfare of mankind, and his complete and noble manner of doing it might have favoured his claim to be considered a greater poet than Milton. But this is not found sufficient for the nature we inherit. Nothing can be clearer in the records of human existence—nothing clearer in everyday fact—than the necessity of a number of outward influences to act upon man, if he is to be bestirred from his natural supineness, and the degradation which accompanies it. The god whose counsel accomplished the extrication of the mud-bound wain knew the whole philosophy of the thing. He knew the capabilities of man; he knew also that precept and hope of success were needed to excite them. So did Milton. Therefore we have poetry which, while it takes in man in his lowest condition, anticipates a destiny for him; and, without dark doubts and surmises as to what that destiny shall be, is content to know that he has come of the Father of the universe, and that itself is among the instrumentalities designed to prepare him for a return. It shows him his task, awakens hope within him, promises him aid throughout, and then throws all the responsibility upon him, as though, in fact, it was wholly his. We do not, now, endorse Milton's theology, or say his influences fall into a perfect system. We think that less of severity in the moral government of the Deity might have been more just; but this quality is greatly remedied by the benignant and tender aspects in which he has placed the Divine character in other circumstances; and, if a defect, is a set-off against the notorious laxities of many of Shakspeare's writings, and which are the images of crimes so bad as to need, perhaps, the rule of a more rigid administration than at first sight we should be disposed to imagine. What we say of Milton is, that his poetry has in it all those appliances adapted to the nature of man as a being capable of progression, but needing outward *stimuli*. There is the illusion of forbidden gratification, and there is the hideousness of vice contrasted with the majesty of virtue, drawn with as much veracity as in Shakspeare's writings, though

it may be with less apparent power, inasmuch as the subjects are farther removed from our experience; but these, constituting but an inferior part of the work—which to be satisfied with were to leave the great future a blank, a void, which the man shrinks from, though feeling it must be some time encountered or answered to—every means and motive is added which long trial has proved most effective in influencing his nature. There are the ancient high precepts and standards which men must assay, though they should fail to reach; and penalties annexed to disobedience, and gentle persuasions to trial, and promise of sustentation, and hope enlarging into assurance of conquest, and at length the actual reward betokened by crowns, and palms, and songs of victory! And is not this poetry? Does it not "answer to some demand for it in our hearts," and thus commend itself to "Excelsior" as coming within the beautiful definition he has chosen? Will he brave the snow, the ice, the avalanche, and death, for the sake of triumph, and allow no poetry in it? No. Then he must not sacrifice, as he has done, "moral purpose," "important work," "high principles," at the shrine of "imagination." Nor must E. W. S., after demanding of poetry that it shall "help faith to lay hold of a future life," release it from obligation beyond the delineation of this life. We cannot, with E. W. S., extract from Shakspeare's representations of "the condition, nature, character, powers, passions, virtues, vices of man, his conflict with the world and evil powers, his falls and triumphs, hopes and fears," *sufficient* motive and nutriment for that full faith and effort which overcome the world. If we shall be charged with mistaking Shakspeare, we shall say that E. W. S. has mistaken Milton, when he says that "Milton leaves his reader as he finds him; the mysteries of his nature unsolved, the inquiries of his agitated spirit unanswered." Had we the counselling of such a spirit, we should, for its best interests, unhesitatingly prefer, of the two poets, that it sought solace and strength of Milton; and we crown his memory with unrivalled honour because that, estimating his mission above the mere purpose of public amusement or royal entertainment, he has made the undying power and beauty of poetry our harbingers to "glory, immortality, and eternal life." B. W. P.

Politics.

OUGHT THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE TO BE REPEALED?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It is confessedly always a hazardous undertaking for a mere civilian to venture to oppose a "man learned in the law" upon a topic peculiarly within his own province. And that your correspondent B. S. is such an one I have no doubt. The diffidence, however, which is naturally excited by this circumstance, is very much relieved by a perusal of the article itself. B. S. has treated the legal part of the subject in a manner which, in its results, ought to give entire satisfaction to all who, like myself, adopt the affirmative side in this debate. By taking our "law" from him, we are landed in a position the most advantageous possible for the advocacy of our particular views. B. S. battles stoutly for the reverence due to the law in question, and deals with this part of his subject with a shew of legal erudition calculated to make a plain opponent nervous; but he immediately shows, in a satisfactory manner, that the question of *law* is of no practical importance; and insists that primogeniture is practically but a time-honoured *custom*; and thus clears the way for deciding the question of its entire abolition according to the simple and straightforward methods of common sense.

The proof of these representations will be found in the 385th, 386th, and the first part of the column of the 387th pages, to which we ask the reader's careful attention. Now, there are important points involved in the passages indicated. We are told that B. S. believes "it would be almost impossible to repeal it, without at the same time providing a substitute for it." That "it forms part of the very framework of society; abolish it, and the whole nation would be thrown into a state of irretrievable confusion, and reduced to a state bordering on anarchy;" and then, that "primogeniture as a *right*, can no longer be said to exist; the owner of an estate, may, at any moment, destroy the right by making his will;" and again, "Primogeniture, then, in this country is only a *custom*, not a law; is suffered, and not established." Now, we notice these

points, not to remark upon their obvious inconsistency, but to show that, according to B. S.'s own statement, the law having been *practically* abolished without any of the predicted evils having ensued, we are absolved from the necessity of providing a substitute for it; and also, that in demanding its entire and formal abolition we can point to the past as an answer to all forebodings of "dangerous consequences."

In answer, then, to the question of B. S. "Are my opponents prepared to forbid the practice and continuance of this custom?" we offer a decided affirmative; and, in order to keep the matter of debate within as narrow limits as possible, we shall take as our grounds of objection two points brought forward by B. S., and which he calls "two peculiar advantages incident to primogeniture."

"The first of these," according to B. S. "is, that it is absolutely necessary as a means of maintaining the honours and dignity of a titled aristocracy like our own, where territorial power and aggrandizement forms an indispensable part of their state." This, then, is our first objection. Through the operation of this law, the eldest son inherits the whole estate; the younger members of the family are rendered dependent, and, as a matter of *fact*, the country is burdened with a host of noble and titled paupers. This it is which, more than all other causes combined, secures the maintenance of the wicked, injurious, and abominable connexion between Church and State. Many of our great landlords possess the patronage of church livings; and, when that is wanting, the political importance acquired by large territorial possessions is potent in procuring appointments from the minister of the day; which, being granted from political and essentially worldly motives, are seldom bestowed with any nice regard to "the fitness of the two things," the nominee and the duty to be discharged. It thus frequently happens that the holy offices of the church are profaned by

the ministrations of unclean hands; that the "cure of souls" becomes a gambling speculation; that a useful and sacred profession is injured, and degraded in public estimation by being regarded as a sort of lottery; and that the "house of God" is once again well-nigh become "a den of thieves." These evils are directly chargeable upon that law, which, for the crime of not having been all born at once, cheats the younger branches of a family of a natural share of the common inheritance. Lordly goslings evince the same natural aptitude for "picking up" a *living* as their feathered counterparts, and it is natural that a strong instinctive attachment should be evoked towards that institution which provides an unstinted supply of both food and feathers for the large and necessitous class under notice.

Upon the same law, and for the same substantial reasons, we charge the yearly increasing burden of taxation occasioned by the yearly increasing expenses connected with our armaments. The army in particular is overrun with lordly parasites. It is for their sakes that the commissioned ranks are kept carefully closed against deserving, if humble merit. "The true reason of our estimates being kept up, is to furnish comfortable, gentlemanly, and lucrative situations for our deserving aristocracy. Our standing army is officered by 5734 gentlemen, men who spurn an honest trade, or the profession of a merchant, but who, nevertheless, dabble in the commission market, for their own aggrandizement." * For the character, professional qualifications, &c., of these gentlemen soldiers, the reader is referred to the published opinions of Sir James Napier, and the Duke of Wellington. We assure our readers they are not flattering.

But B. S. proceeds to put in a claim for merciful consideration on behalf of the aristocracy in general as "an essential and desirable element of the British constitution." Now, what, we ask B. S., is there in the history or present conduct of our aristocracy to justify us in regarding them as a "desirable," still less an "essential" element of the British constitution? Have they not been the heartiest and most forward conservators of every political and social abuse? Who, as a class, threw the weight

of its influence and hatred into the scale against the unfortunate Queen Caroline? Who, in the same interest, supported the vilest of organs, and the vilest of personal instruments, in a weekly promulgation of the most heartless, impudent, and detestable calumnies? Who offered the most determined opposition to the progress of the Reform Bill? Who brought the country to the verge of civil war by refusing to concede the justice of the Catholic claims? Who obstinately opposed the sense of the country upon the question of the repeal of the corn laws? Who now constitute the sole barrier between the Jews and justice, in connexion with their entrance into parliament? And, who, in the pending struggle for further reform, are instinctively regarded as the only certain and dangerous obstacle to the realisation of a desirable re-distribution of political power? The English aristocracy a "*desirable* element in the British constitution"! It is an incubus and a curse. It has fastened a millstone of debt about the neck of honest industry; and has never ceased from its endeavours to increase the burden. It is sickly, sentimental, effeminate, and bigoted; too weak to dare the hazard of change; too imbecile to appreciate the reasons which may render it necessary and desirable. With the possession of the enormous power for good which wealth and station confer, what have they done for suffering humanity or national progress which should claim a nation's gratitude and praise? And if, therefore, "nothing would be a more serious injury to our 'hereditary legislators' than the attempt to destroy the custom of primogeniture," "this one fact" will, we confess, weigh with us as a strong reason "for supporting the" affirmative "side of the proposition now under debate."

"The second great advantage of primogeniture is, that it checks the minute subdivision of land." This, as in the former case, is our reason for opposing it. The possession of a county by a few great landholders—here is an instance: "Stretching from the sea, right across to the verge of the next county, and embracing great part of the parish in which I sit, are the estates of three proprietors, which extend in almost unbroken masses for upwards of twenty miles. The residence of one of them is surrounded with a walled park, ten miles in circum-

* Financial Reform Tracts, No. 4, p. 58.

ference,"*—is unnatural, and politically and socially injurious. The case of Scotland and Ireland, cited by B. S., is lamentably out of point. The superiority of Scotch farmers over the Irish must be due to something more potent and national than primogeniture and large farming, since it so happens, that in matters of farming the Scotch are nearly a century ahead even of the English, amongst whom both primogeniture and large farming prevail. And B. S. is even more unsuccessful in his French facts. "In France, the subdivision of ownership has produced pauperism and wretchedness, and has been the fruitful source of continual convulsion, revolution, and anarchy. The French peasantry have become the helots and dependents of the towns' population." Now, in this passage every statement is an error. The subdivision of ownership *has not* produced any of the effects here ascribed to it. The law of primogeniture was abolished in France by the Constituent Assembly of 1789, and if it has worked so badly, we may hope to find traces of it in popular French sentiment, and in the actual present condition of the rural population. The abolition of the law in question was one of the most characteristic reforms effected by the assembly. Now, the feeling in France, in favour of the revolution of 1789, amounts to an enthusiasm, and is spread through all society, embracing both extremes. Here are the sentiments of the higher and cultivated portion. "Where two men of such eminent authority (M. Thiers and Michael Chevalier), but of such opposite views upon economical principles, agree in their admiration of a particular policy, it is a proof that it must have irresistible claims upon public approbation. Men of the highest social position in France . . . admit that to the measures of 1789, which have elevated the millions of their countrymen, from a condition hardly superior to that of the Russian serf, to the rank of citizens and proprietors of the soil, France is indebted for a more rapid advance in civilization, wealth, and happiness than was ever previously made by any community of a similar extent, in the same period of time."† And again—"This feeling is confined to no class, as the following extract from a speech by M. Thiers,

&c., will shew." And again, on page 43—"When told that the present Emperor possesses absolute and irresponsible power, I answer by citing three things which he could not, if he would, accomplish;" one of these three being, "he could not create an hereditary peerage with estates entailed by law of primogeniture." Now, all this is conclusive I think, upon the point, that those most interested and best able to judge, are satisfied with the working of the system; and consequently, to that extent, also conclusive against the assertion that it has produced "pauperism, wretchedness," &c. In reference to the actual present condition of the French peasantry, we shall dismiss it with two short extracts from competent witnesses. Sir W. Molesworth, writing to the *Spectator*, January 17, 1848, asks this, amongst other questions—"Have you forgotten that they have passed through a great social revolution, which has equalized property, abolished privilege, and converted the mass of the people into thrifty and industrious men?" And Cobden, in page 44 of the work already alluded to, makes this emphatic statement:—"I can vouch from actual experience, that the intelligent natives of France, Italy, and other countries, where the code Napoleon is in force, and where, consequently, the land is divided amongst the people, are very much puzzled to understand how the English submit to the feudal customs which still find favour here. Tell the eight millions of landed proprietors in France that they shall exchange their lot with the English people, where the labourer who cultivates the farm has no more proprietary interest in the soil than the horses he drives, and they will be stricken with horror." We have said sufficient, we trust, to demonstrate the utter falsity of the charges against the "subdivision of ownership," and to show that that system works well; and had we space it would be easy to prove that this is not the case with the *opposite* system. By way of conclusion, however, we commend to the attention of B. S. the following morsels from the *Times* of September 16th, in reference to the Buckingham farce. It tells us that "the labourer in misfortune and age deserves to be paid the long arrears that have been mounting up in his favour from the gross inadequacy of his wages," and denounces "this distribution of petty largesses" as a

* "1793 and 1853," R. Cobden, p. 43.

† "1793 and 1853," p. 27.

device which salves over "the essential iniquity and cruelty of our social institutions." And as a concluding sentence points to the country where primogeniture is unknown:—"Let some one tell the British labourer what his opportunities really are; what amount of justice he really receives from society, and what comparison there is between the fruits of half a century at the plough in this country and in the United States."

IRENE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE law of primogeniture is one whose operation dates from remote antiquity. It cannot be doubted that it has powerfully affected, either for good or for evil, the condition of Great Britain, and that it is intimately interwoven with our political constitution. The question of the abolition of this law is one requiring, therefore, a grave consideration of the effects which the law has produced, both political and social, and the probable consequences which would result, sooner or later, from removing a law which, whatever may have been its origin or its general effects, has so long prevailed and powerfully operated.

At first sight it may appear unjust that the eldest son should receive the heritable property of his ancestor. But this injustice is only apparent. Even if the bestowal thus of the heritable property should appear an arbitrary act, the question must, we think, be viewed in connexion with a number of political and social considerations, which necessarily arise when man is placed in the circumstances of our highly artificial civilization. Educated men are known not to be influenced merely by those naked truisms of justice or equity which, severed from their connexion with the necessities of the times, become delusive though pleasant phantoms. It is idle to maintain that the law of primogeniture is unjust or arbitrary in character, as such an objection might be applied with much greater force to the whole question of the right of the present proprietors to the ownership of the land,—a right which, however forcibly condemned by the axioms of democracy, no wise man would attempt to disturb. The present owners are in possession of the land, and have greatly added to its value. It is a matter of public convenience that they should be retained in possession of their property. We think that, for reasons much the same, neither the statesman, nor the politician, whose vocation is, in these days, to instruct him, should

touch in any degree the law of primogeniture. If he did so he would interfere with that gradual development, founded on the basis of our political constitution, which wise men agree thankfully to accept as our safe guide to a yet higher position of national glory and prosperity, and he would introduce organic changes which would prove the inevitable cause of farther change,—change which would dislocate and convulse society in England as surely as the French revolutions have convulsed it in France, and would throw back, with the altered condition of England, the tide of human civilisation itself.

There is a prevalent mistake regarding the nature of the law of primogeniture, which may be at once dispelled by a simple statement of what the law really is. Many confound the law of primogeniture with the law of entail; but the operation of the latter is in a large measure different from that of the former. Whilst the decisions of the law courts discourage entails by judging of them by strict law, and the legislature has passed various measures for preventing them from keeping the land unimproved, the law of primogeniture is and must be regarded as of a different character from the law of entail, and be carefully maintained as having a deep foundation in nature, and as essential to the prosperity of the state. By the law of primogeniture the heritable owner has the absolute right of disposing of his property. He is not restricted to bequeathing his heritage to his eldest son. The law simply lays down that the property shall be disposed of in the particular manner which it points out—namely, to the eldest son and his heirs—in the case only where the owner does not leave it, by a regular deed, otherwise. It is clear that the law acts properly in prescribing to whom a man's heritable property shall belong after his death, if he has not chosen to leave a written expression of his will. In directing, in that case, that the eldest son shall inherit it, the legislature does what it considers right

in itself, and points out the general feeling of the nation. If the law of primogeniture were not in accordance with the national will, it could not long exist, as it would not have that moral support which mainly gives to the law of the land its efficiency and its authority. The law of primogeniture exists because it is considered as no mere piece of arbitrary legislation, which modern democracy might overthrow in order to carry out an arbitrary empiricism of its own; but because it springs from, and is maintained by, the convictions of the mass of the people, as well as those of the learned and enlightened. But, as B. S. has already shown, the voice of public opinion does not control a single individual in the disposal of his heritable property; it leaves him entirely free. Where a man, in the exercise of the right which law bestows on him, does make a settlement at variance with the law of primogeniture, the variation is often very slight; there is often little more than a ratification of the law. The law gives to a proprietor who fails to make a settlement an honourable assistance; it supplies to him the want of a settlement, with its consequent trouble and expense. Presuming his intentions from his silence, the law of primogeniture comes into operation.

The question is substantially this, Has a father a moral right to leave his heritable property to his eldest son alone? This question we have little hesitation in answering in the affirmative. What claim have children upon a father other than that they may be maintained in infancy, properly educated, and placed in the way of supporting themselves through life? We reply, they have none. A younger son, who has been treated in this manner, has no cause of complaint if, for satisfactory reasons, the heritage is left to the eldest son. In cases where the grandchildren of a proprietor, or his remoter descendants, or his collateral relatives, are in question, the matter is even clearer. There is no strong reason why he should be compelled to divide his heritable property amongst all the various individuals belonging to either of these two classes of connexions. But though the question be simply considered as this, Is it right in the legislature to continue the law of primogeniture? we are still disposed to reply in the affirmative.

One of the most common objects of am-

bition in this country, and one which affords a great stimulus to exertion, is the building up of an honourable house. For this purpose the individual acquires property in land, either as the means, or, as is more general, as the result of his exertion. He gives his family a good education, and sets up the younger branches in a respectable sphere with his floating capital. He wishes that the lands which he has acquired should not be exposed to frequent division and subdivision, into insignificant plots, among a large number of descendants, contributing little to their advantage, until all trace of the connexion of his name with the lands bought by him should disappear. On the contrary, he desires that these lands should be preserved, and be a substantial good to the party who may inherit them. For this purpose he naturally and properly selects his eldest son as the future owner; he who, in the course of events, would be most able on his succession to manage the land, and who would naturally feel pride in maintaining the dignity and the stability of the family. The abolition of the law of primogeniture would take away from many persons the desire of acquiring wealth in order to purchase land. It would prove detrimental to a person's ability of working, which should be encouraged, as by it wealth may not only be obtained, but the best powers of our nature developed.

The law appoints the order of succession to heritable property, and restricts this order in the first instance to the eldest son, for the purpose that land may be preserved in the hands of such a number of persons as are capable of its proper cultivation. Whilst the law of primogeniture does not fetter the liberty of the subject, or prevent a very general change of possession in land, it appears to us to have the tendency which the legislature desiderates, and of which we approve. True; there are cases where large quantities of land are held by single proprietors; but this arises from the law of entail, which we do not now defend. Such instances are rare, and they present an evil slight in comparison with those which would result from the abolition of the law of primogeniture.

On the other hand, the law of primogeniture does no injustice to the younger branches of a family. The wealth derived from land

is usually sufficiently great to afford a provision for them. The noble spheres of merchandise or political employment are opened up to them, and on them they may enter with every advantage which rank, family, or wealth can bestow. These in their turn acquire wealth, and also with a natural passion purchase land, which otherwise they could not do; and in many cases they come to dispossess the elder members of the family of their paternal inheritance; while, at the same time, the latter is kept entire, and preserved, it may be, for many generations.

We maintain also that the present system tends, more than the opposite would, to secure an efficient cultivation of the soil. This is a point of much importance; indeed, of much more importance than the question of the occupation of the land by a large or a small number of individuals. One or two French writers, it is true, assert that the happiness of a people is of greater moment than a vigorous cultivation of a country, thus absurdly seeking to bring the two questions into opposition. It is generally conceded that it is of advantage to the morals of a community that its agricultural produce should be plentiful and cheap; and, while it is proper to import foreign produce, it was not meant to be assumed that that of our country itself should not contribute largely, by the due cultivation of the land, to the attainment of plenty at low prices. Hearing people talk against the law of primogeniture, we might be led to conceive, did we not know better, that there are few or none deriving any good from the land. But it is divided into a number of farms, varying in size, occupied by a large class of tenant-farmers, who are generally well educated, and are men of intelligence. These are possessed of capital, which they devote entirely to the improvement of their farms; and they have, for the most part, a long tenure of occupancy, which enables them to derive the full benefits of their money and their industry. The reason why the proprietor does not let out his land in small portions obviously is, that he would get little or no rent, as such a plan would produce results altogether insignificant. If the law of primogeniture were abolished, land would necessarily undergo a process of subdivision, and would frequently change hands, and the class of tenant-farmers be destroyed. Instead of our

importations of guano, and our new discoveries of machinery, there would be introduced the merely vegetative and antiquated system of the French.

It may be objected that the law which we contend for tends to keep up a nobility. This we do not consider an evil; on the contrary, we approve of the maintenance of a strong conservative element in society and in the legislature in the form now referred to. If the peerage is to exist, it ought to have wealth derived from land. It should not be exposed to the vicissitudes and annoyances of trade-speculation. It is right that the peerage should be respected; and there are few men, however liberal in politics, who fail to respect noblemen of ancient family and large possessions, combined with personal worth and an average ability. But, in order that the peerage may have weight, its connexion must be kept up with certain localities and properties; in other words, with those palpable forms to which men usually attach importance. Deprived of a large stake in the land by the abolition of the law in question, the peerage would become a despicable thing, consisting of a few empty titles, and would gradually disappear; and in that event our political constitution would be destroyed; there would be no House of Lords to check the impetuosity of modern legislation; nothing between the people and the crown, which, in its turn, would be briefly interrogated as to its use, and then laid aside in some museum fitted up to receive the antiquated insignia of royalty. In destroying the peerage, the liberties of the people would soon themselves be swept away, unless the gloomy prisons of "king mob"—who, a third party altogether, ever watches the struggles of democracy—be considered a place dedicated to the balmy breath of liberty.

By the law of primogeniture a due adjustment is maintained between the conservative and the liberal elements of society.

As to the first point, we observe that, in countries which have no law of primogeniture, there is a conservatism existing,—but of what kind? Contemptible, tyrannical, and ignorant, and itself the ready tool and prey of single-handed despotism. This is the case in different parts of the Continent. The soil is in possession of the peasants. These sit down on small patches of land and vegetate, but do not live. This is but natural, when

men have no stimulus to acquire wealth themselves, and see nothing of the kind around them, and have not the advantages of literature. To expect from such a class improvements in agriculture is thoroughly preposterous. They become the enemies of freedom, which, while it may advance a nation, can do so only by affording a motive to exertion; and, as they care not to think, the yoke of despotism sits lightly upon them. Thus the abolition of the law of primogeniture would have most of the evil effects which Guizot, in his book on democracy in France, ascribes to Socialism, as taking away the stimulus to ambition, and the energy of trade-competition.

At the same time, remove the law of primogeniture, and the manufacturing interest, so eminently promotive of liberty, would be also taken away. Nothing would be left to counteract the despotic influences to which we have adverted. We do not say that this result would be immediate; but we feel little

doubt that trade would ultimately decline. Do not blame the Irish for their wretchedness, but rather the system of small allotments which some persons wish introduced into England. Such results as those in Ireland seem naturally to follow from a minute division of land.

There is one great fact in favour of the law in question which we may here notice. Great Britain has become, under the operation of such laws, the richest and most powerful nation in the world. Both her agriculture and commerce are rapidly improving. This should make men pause before encouraging organic changes which would materially affect our national condition. Several French writers argue against this law, and choose to point out to us its alleged evils; but such teaching comes with bad grace from them. We do not wish to exchange our laws for those which France has, or had lately, and which have sunk her so low among the nations.

T. U.

The Societies' Section.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Edinburgh Young Men's Association.—The session of this society was opened on the evening of the 7th of October, by a soiree, in Waterloo-place. Through the creditable exertions of the members, the attendance was very large, and the whole proceedings highly interesting. An eloquent and humorous address was delivered by Mr. Usher, the chairman, on friendship. A report drawn up by the committee of the association was read by Mr. J. Wilson, junior, from which it appeared, amongst a variety of matters noticed, that an increase of ten members had taken place during the last session, partly in consequence of public lectures, and partly in consequence of the reputation which the society had acquired for the ability of its essays and the spirit of its discussions. It also appeared that there had been a considerable improvement in the attendance, both as regards numbers and regularity. Reference was made to the fact that the proceedings had embraced the consideration of many of the most interesting, scientific, and philosophical questions of the age; and to the correspondence which had been carried on with members of parliament, for securing the extension of the Free Libraries' Act to Scotland. The report having been read, and ably commented on by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Finlay moved its adoption, in a spirited address. Admirable addresses were afterwards delivered by Mr. Adam Dickson and Mr. Andrew Marshall, and an interesting and affectionate letter was read, from one of the members who was prevented from attending by indisposition. Mr. Sinclair, late of

the Juvenile Abstiners' League, also addressed the meeting at considerable length. In order to supply the demand which is springing up for free libraries, Mr. Sinclair has appropriated a large room in his temperance hotel for the use of the members or any young men, where they may read at all proper hours, from a library collected by himself. In response to a suggestion of his to the Religious Tract Society, for a supply of books, &c., for this purpose to every temperance hotel in the kingdom, that society have generously put it in his power to commence the undertaking referred to. We earnestly trust that this excellent scheme may meet with public support.

A series of essays on ancient Greece, interspersed with miscellaneous essays, has been arranged for the winter months, in order to make the proceedings as instructive and consecutive as possible. We earnestly recommend the society (which meets every evening at half-past eight precisely, at 12, South St. David-street) to all young men seeking a weekly society, as one of a purely literary character, and of long standing; and also the Controversialist Society, with which it is in union, and which meets in the same place on the second Wednesday in each month.

At a numerous meeting of the members, held on the evening of the 8th ult., a testimonial, consisting of Goldsmith's and Sir Walter Scott's works, was presented to Mr. James Turner, as a mark of esteem, on the occasion of his leaving Edinburgh.—P. G. C.

Alresford Mutual Improvement Society.—This

society has been in existence about ten months, and owes its origin to the exertions of a few energetic young men, actuated by a strong desire for self-improvement. A preliminary meeting was held, and the above society instituted, with ten members, which number has since been nearly doubled. Lectures have been given on "Ancient Architecture," by Mr. Fowler; and on "The Chemistry of Food," by Mr. H. Moody. A French class has been proposed by the vice-president, and is now in course of formation. A manuscript magazine has also been commenced. The first number, just issued, containing six articles, is, on the whole, a very respectable production. The society is likely to be of great benefit to the young men of this town; and its future prospects appear to be encouraging. Its sphere of action might be very advantageously enlarged.—E. J.

Preston (Grimshaw-street) Mutual Improvement Society.—On the 31st of August the young men who form the above society held their first anniversary in the vestry of the Independent chapel, when about sixty members and friends were present. After tea, the president, Rev. R. Slate, took the chair and called upon the secretary, Mr. H. Anderton, to read the report for the past session, from which it appeared the society was formed in October, 1852 (by a few young men who were desirous of improving their minds), and was then in a prosperous condition. The meetings are held once a fortnight; a grammar class is in existence, and a manuscript magazine about to be commenced. After the reading of the

report, an essay, which displayed considerable literary talent, was read by Mr. J. H. Forshaw "On Mutual Improvement Societies." A few excellent remarks were made by Mr. Brewer on the acquisition of knowledge. The meeting was also addressed by Messrs. Jepson, Lawson, Newsham, and others. Several well-selected recitations were delivered by the members, which received considerable applause.—E. S. P.

Mold Mutual Improvement Society.—This society was established by a few young men in the year 1851. The members meet together once a week for discussions and lectures alternately, and have, besides, a special meeting fortnightly for reading from our best authors, and recitations. Much success has attended the operations of the society; but the want of a good library and reading-room is much felt. Some of the members subscribe to your most useful magazine, and have derived not a little benefit from it.—REUBEN.

Hull (George-street) Mutual Improvement Association.—The second annual tea meeting of this association was held in the vestry of George-street Baptist chapel, on Thursday evening, September 15th, when about sixty persons sat down to an excellent tea. After the tables were cleared, the Rev. W. Stuart took the chair, and called upon A. W. Barker, the secretary, to read the report. Mr. T. C. Eastwood, the president, read a paper on the formation of the earth. The Rev. Mr. Cookson, from Massachusetts, and Messrs. Carlill and Millhouse addressed the meeting.—A. W. B.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

194. Permit me to inquire, through the medium of your valuable periodical, what are the studies and qualifications requisite for the *English* bar? If any of your correspondents will kindly give advice on this subject, they will confer a great favour on—M.

195. Anxious to obtain a knowledge of composition, I should be obliged to any of your correspondents who would furnish a plan, by the adoption of which I might be enabled to write *what I think*, rather than *think what to write*.—RUS.

196. I should be glad if any of your readers could inform me of any books relating to the *principles* of benefit building associations, and should also be glad of any information as to their *history* and *progress*, or of the names and publishers of any work bearing on the subject.—A. T. M.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

105. *The Nature of the Sun's Body.*—This question has frequently occupied the attention of astronomical and scientific minds, without any fixed or evident conclusion being arrived at. "Walter," in his article in the July number of this magazine, attempts to prove that the sun cannot be a body of fire, and then gives what he

considers to be the proper theory of heat. In the continuation of his article in the September number, he develops a theory somewhat different from his first, and somewhat nearer the truth. After having endeavoured, in the July number, to establish the fact that the influence of fire diminishes in proportion to its distance, by taking an illustration from an ordinary fire; and then, transporting the idea into space, he finds the mountain tops, though nearest to the sun, covered with a winding-sheet of eternal snow, while the more distant plains and valleys are the warmest. This is "Walter's" only proof for his conclusion that the sun cannot be a body of fire. Let us, now, test this theory by example on a larger scale. Instead of a mountain not exceeding five miles, let us take the equator, which measures 3,962 miles from the line of the poles in the direction towards the sun. If there be, then, any truth in "Walter's" premises, the equator (or, more properly, the ecliptic), being nearest the sun, should be covered with eternal snow, and the warmth and germinating influences of the sun be mostly received at the distant poles. Where the density of the atmosphere is greatest, there, according to "Walter's" theory, the heat must, therefore, be at its maximum. But the reverse of all this is the case; consequently, this theory falls to the ground. Before any theory on this subject can be proved, we must draw our conclusions from two points where the atmosphere

is at the same density. This is not the case at the mountain tops and the plains beneath, but is nearly so at the poles and the ecliptic. When we consider the increase of heat that is experienced at the ecliptic, notwithstanding the greater rarity of the atmosphere, we must come to a conclusion the opposite of that which "Walter" has so unsuccessfully endeavoured to prove. Had "Walter" transported his fire, instead of his idea, into space, he would then have found the same effect as that produced by the sun,—that the nearer he approached it the heat would gradually become less. This does not arise from any deficiency of the principle of heat, but simply from the want of any medium or substance to receive or retain it. The atmosphere in the higher regions contains nearly the same amount of heat as it does at the sea's level, but as we ascend the atmosphere becomes more rare, and occupies a much larger space; so also must the heat that it contains. Hence any body that still occupies the same space must necessarily experience a diminution of heat in proportion as it ascends. The cold, then, that is felt at the tops of high mountains is owing to the atmosphere being there so thin, and incapable of forming a medium for the retention of the sun's rays: it is from the want of air, rather than from the nature of the air itself. But let us now see what "Walter" affirms to be the proper theory of heat: it is, the action of the sun's atmosphere upon the latent caloric of the bodies of animals. This certainly cannot be the case; for it is a well-known fact that the sun acts upon and affects every insulated substance, whether that substance be in the possession of latent caloric or not, or whether it be animated or inanimated; the sun affects them all not the less certainly, though the latter are unconscious of it. Heat, then, exists altogether independent of these conditions (enumerated by "Walter"), consequently they cannot be the cause of it. Not only so; but this theory is as much subject to the same difficulties as the one that "Walter" has tried to disprove. This influence, however it may be explained, must also be affected by the distance. If heat, on "Walter's" theory, be produced by the mutual action of the sun with other bodies, then the nearer the two bodies that mutually act upon each other approach, the more powerful must be the action. The argument, then, which "Walter" has taken from the plains and mountain tops is equally as effective against this theory as the one that he rejects. In his supplementary article, however, he seems to have discovered a more philosophic principle. He appears now to be aware of the fact that the sensation of heat is not produced by the latent caloric of animals being acted upon by the sun, but that caloric is radiated from the sun. Still he seems to entertain the following misapprehensions:—First, that light is an imponderable fluid; second, that the sun is not a body of fire. First, light cannot be an imponderable fluid, for this would be a contradiction; if it were a fluid, or a substance of any kind, it must possess the property of gravitation; and, consequently, could not be imponderable. Possessing this property, it could never leave the body of the sun; its radiation would, therefore, never take place. Newton, no doubt, believed that heat and light existed in particles; but this is evidently impossible, from the fact that they can pass through solid substances. If heat

or light existed in particles, however rare, glass (being a solid substance) must be a necessary obstruction to the passage of these particles; but, on the contrary, we know that it can be so concentrated as to produce ignition by passing through a convex lens. This fact is sufficient to establish the absolute immateriality of light and heat. Secondly. It has been very plausibly surmised, in consequence of the dark spots that have occasionally been seen on the sun's surface, when viewed through a telescope, that the sun is an opaque body enveloped in a luminous atmosphere, and therefore not a body of fire; and that these spots are slight openings in its luminous atmosphere, showing the dark mass within. But the fact that these spots are so transitory, and are, at times, observed to contract with great rapidity and disappear, like something melted and absorbed into a boiling fluid, is a strong presumption in favour of the hypothesis that the sun is a body of fire. It is more philosophical to look upon these spots as being peculiar elements, or portions of matter, that are less capable of existing in the incandescent state, than to imagine them to be openings occurring in its atmosphere, which would eventually be a violation of the physical laws of nature. Another argument may be derived from the intrinsic luminosity of the sun that it must be a body of fire, there not being any known substance (whether solid, liquid, or aeriform) that can possess the luminous appearance of the sun unless it be in a state of ignition. All substances become luminous when heated to 800 deg. in the dark, and 1,000 deg. in the light. We have strong probability, then, to believe that the sun is at an elevated temperature, otherwise its luminousness can on no other principle be accounted for. It affords no solution to the difficulty to suppose that the sun is surrounded with a luminous atmosphere adapted for giving out light and heat, as there is not sufficient evidence to prove that the sun has an atmosphere at all; and, were it otherwise, chemistry teaches us that there are no gaseous elements, simple or combined, that are luminous at an ordinary temperature. The Laplacian cosmogony affords another striking proof that the sun is a body of fire. The hypothesis, so admirably consistent with all astronomical data, assumes that the nebulous matter of space, previous to the formation of stellars and planetary bodies, existed in a very high temperature,—that it must have been a universal fire-mist, of which the sun is a pretty good specimen, though now in a more contracted state. Still its density is about four times less than that of our planet, which is in favour of the hypothesis that the sun is in an igneous diffused state. Again: We have strong proofs that the centre of our earth is also in this igneous condition, being the residue of that incandescent state in which it existed at the time of its formation,—a state analogous to the present condition of its primary. Thus, every thing considered tends to the conclusion that the sun is a body of fire. There is no other hypothesis so much in harmony with physical laws, and with the phenomenon of the solar system; and our present knowledge of the laws of heat authorizes us to suppose that the solar system could only be again restored to its supposed original nebulous state by the application of that amount of heat with which it has now parted; and, had it not done so,

this frame of things then had never come to pass, and we never could have existed to have formed any speculations concerning them.—W. H. T.

180. *The Universities.*—I shall be very pleased to afford your correspondent D. H. any information that I can regarding the University of Oxford. I cannot give the relative merits of the different systems taught in the four universities he mentions. My idea is, that for the matter of mere dry law, that of London would, most probably, be found the best. The University of Oxford does not profess to go far into the details of that study. Its chief aim is to form the mind of the student—to lay therein the foundation, on which a superstructure may afterwards be built up, by the student's applying himself to the peculiar studies of the profession he may select. The distinguishing characteristics of an Oxford education are, a sound knowledge of the classics and the study of logic. The examinations have lately been altered, and consist now, I believe, of one in each year, till the degree of B.A. is taken, at the end of the fourth year. Every student (except those in music) goes through the one same routine till that time, when he is at liberty to select some particular branch, and proceed to M.A. (Master of Arts), B.C.L. (Bachelor of Civil Laws), or M.B. (Bachelor of Medicine). There are several scholarships and fellowships open to the students of any college or hall, for the encouragement of law reading, such as "The Vinerian" and "The Eldon." These are of small emolument; but they confer great honour through life on the holders of them. I do not wish to recommend my own "Alma Mater" to D. H.; but I cannot help telling him that, in my opinion, an Oxford education (in the case of one who goes to Oxford to work hard for four years) is a most excellent preparation for any after-study. I should fancy this is peculiarly the case with law. The mind under classical study resembles a well, dug deep and walled up, and logic supplies it with a pump; so that, if naturally of a not inferior order, it is capable of anything within the reach of man. The Scotts (Lords Eldon and Stowell), and the present Solicitor General (Sir R. Bethel, who has been styled the first pleader in Europe), are instances of the way in which wells dug at Oxford may be supplied, at Lincoln's Inn or the Temple (by intense application during the years spent there), with overflowing and ever-flowing stores. D. H. is mistaken if he thinks that time need be "frittered away" at Oxford. To one going up there with a determination to work hard there is every inducement to study, as I can testify from my own experience. Should D. H. think of proceeding to Oxford, he must IMMEDIATELY have his name entered on the books of some college, as it generally requires some time to have them there before one can go into residence. There is an exception to this in the case of a hall, to which one may proceed at once. Should D. H. wish for any more information that I can afford him, I shall be happy to do so through your columns, or by his application to me by letter. For this latter purpose I enclose my name and address, and beg to subscribe myself, your interested reader,—F. S., M.A., *Salop.*

In answer to the questions of your correspondent D. H., I beg leave to submit the following for his perusal, trusting it will meet with his entire approbation:—Cambridge is, decidedly, the uni-

versity most suited for one (such as D. H.) who is desirous to study the law and become eminent in the legal profession, as its students are more skilled in the mathematics, and the sciences which immediately depend upon them, than those of the other universities, and are, at the same time, sound logicians and good classical scholars. The college at this university most suitable for D. H. to enter as a law student will be, either Trinity Hall or Downing College. The former has twelve fellowships in its gift, ten of which are to be held by students in the law. (Amongst the learned men who were students at this hall, Dr. Haddon, Master of Requests to Queen Elizabeth; Sir Robert Naunton, secretary to James I.; Philip, the celebrated Earl Chesterfield; and Sir William de Grey, may be mentioned; and also several eminent lawyers, who have recently filled distinguished offices in that profession.) The latter college has sixteen fellowships, and six scholarships. The object of the foundation of this college is stated in its charter to be, the study of law and physio. One or two of its scholarships are to be competed for annually. The value of the scholarships are from £80 to £8, and the fellowships from £300 or £400 to £50. The degrees conferred on the law students are, Bachelor of Civil Laws (B.C.L.), and Doctor of Civil Laws (D.C.L.). D. H. will be required to be a member of one of the colleges six years (of which he must keep nine terms) before he can obtain the degree of B.C.L., and five more to obtain that of D.C.L., which is usually considered as an honorary title. The academical year at Cambridge consists of seven months, and has three terms, Lent, Easter, and Michaelmas. The expenses of a student for tutors' fees, board and lodging, firing, candles, and a few other items, amount to from £60 to £150 per annum, according to his taste. His annual expenditure will be from £130 to £180, if he is economical. The examinations are yearly or half-yearly. For other information I should refer him to the "Cambridge University Calendar," price 5s., which can be ordered through any bookseller.—A QUONDAM STUDENT, *Somerset.*

181. *Works for Drapers.*—I have long been in search of such a work as "Half-ell" requires, which is, I think, a desideratum in our literature. Dodd's "Textile Manufactures of Great Britain" is a very interesting work, and contains much of the desired information. It is published in "Knight's Weekly Volume," at 1s. No. 22 of "Chambers' Information," price 1½d., will be useful to "Half-ell." There is, also, a magazine recently published by Watson, Aldine Chambers, 13, Paternoster-row,—"The Woollen, Worsted, and Cotton Journal,"—monthly, 1s.; but, as I have not seen it, I cannot speak of its merits.—J. C.

Being in the same occupation as "Half-ell," and having been often very anxious to obtain some scientific work on the subject, I have inquired at the principal booksellers, but could never hear of any, except a work entitled, "Perkins on Haberdashery." It gives a brief and lucid description of the principal articles in connexion with the business, with the general modes and places of manufacture, "when required." It also contains a superior course of book-keeping, with systems for mental calculation. It can be obtained by order of any bookseller, price 3s. 6d.—J. G. S.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

GRAMMAR CLASS.

Exercises in Grammar. No. XX.

Junior Division.

Perform Exercise No. XI., Vol. IV. p. 37.

Senior Division.

Parse the following sentences, and point out especially the agreement of the nominative and verb:—

"I love them that love me; and those that seek me early shall find me." "Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity." He leaves home at nine in the morning. We go to Boston next week, where we expect you will meet us. Thy brother was present last year. Benjamin works at the foundry. Henry and Thomas are in the office. From crag to crag leaps the live thunder. To err is human. The fear of possible evil often prevents the performance of certain good. Your bread and milk is ready. To write legibly, to speak correctly, and to compose readily, are useful arts. Either George or Henry is coming to-day. Neither Samuel nor his friends have arrived. Their party is too much divided to do any good. The clergy are not unanimous on the convocation question.

MODEL EXERCISE No. VIII.
Vide Vol. III. p. 359.

I.

Old men are not always wise. A soft answer turneth away wrath. Have no dealings with an angry man. Foolish conversation should be avoided. Sin is hurtful to the soul. Some have the art to make the worse appear the better reason. The severest strokes of Providence are generally healed by time. This man is wiser than his brother. The most faithful dealing, and the purest motives, are often misunderstood. The liberal devise generous things. The peacemaker is blessed in his deeds. The meek shall inherit the earth. Light is sown for the righteous.

II.—ADJECTIVES.

Old	older, or elder	oldest, or eldest
Wise	wiser	wisest
Soft	softer	softest
Angry	(more) angry	(most) angry
Foolish	(more) foolish	(most) foolish
Hurtful	(more) hurtful	(most) hurtful
(No positive form)	{ worse	worst
	{ better	best
Severe	severer, or	severest, or
	(more) severe	(most) severe
Faithful	(more) faithful	(most) faithful
Purer	purser	purest
Liberal	(more) liberal	(most) liberal
Generous	(more) generous	(most) generous
Meek	meeker	meekest
Righteous	(more) righteous	(most) righteous

III.

The English were sufficiently foolish to interfere with the French Revolution. The Scotch

Greys were very valiant at Waterloo. The Swiss people contended many years for liberty. Scriptural knowledge is the most valuable. The Welsh regard their language as the most beautiful spoken. The Bourbon family has been most unfortunate.

IV.

Wise; merciful.—A truly wise king will also be merciful. David was wiser than Saul, and therefore more merciful. Solomon was the wisest of kings, and perhaps the most merciful.

Good; honourable.—A good man will be honourable. The better a man is, the more honourable will he be. The best men are the most honourable.

Honest; brave.—If you will be honest, you must be brave. The more honest you are, the more brave you must be. The most honest are most brave.

Industrious; late.—Persons who are industrious should not be late. John is later than George, but not more industrious; Henry, however, is the latest at work that I know, and he is the most industrious.

Poor; respectable.—Because people are poor, it does not follow that they are not respectable. Diogenes was poorer than Alexander, and decidedly more respectable. Jesus was the poorest of men, and the most respectable.

Rich; luxurious.—A very rich man is often very luxurious. Daniel Dancer was richer than many, but not more luxurious; but Solomon was the richest of kings, and perhaps the most luxurious.

Chaste; sentimental.—A chaste writer is not always sentimental; nor is a writer more chaste as he becomes more sentimental; yet it is possible for the most chaste writer to be among the most sentimental.

LOGIC CLASS.

Junior.—Vide "Art of Reasoning," No. XI. Vol. II.—With what is the mind of man naturally filled? What is the office of observation in ratiocination? Of hypothesis? Of induction? What is theory? Describe some proofs of the co-ordination of observation, &c., in the investigation and discovery of truth.

Provection.—Vide Exercise No. X., Vol. II.

Senior.—What is causation? and how is the idea educed?

MATHEMATICAL CLASS.

SOLUTIONS.—VIII.

Question 65. Here 13 months and	£	s.	d.
1 day, at £5 per month =	65	3	6½
Rent and taxes =	50	0	0
365 days, at 2s. 6d., personal expenses =	45	12	6
And 52 weeks and 1 day, at 5s. per week =	13	0	4½
Total expenditure.....	173	16	4½

∴ £200—£173 16s. 9½d.=£26 3s. 2½d.—Ans
G. C. H.

Question 66.

$960 + 480 + 240 + 120 + 96 + 48 + 4 + 1 =$
 1949 farthings,
 and £194 18s. = 187104 farthings,
 $\therefore \frac{187104}{1949} = 96$, the number required.

Question 67.

The last instalment = $\frac{1}{2} - (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}) = \frac{1}{8}$
 Equated time for paying the whole amount =
 $\frac{1}{2} \times 2 + \frac{1}{2} \times 3 + \frac{1}{2} \times 4 + \frac{1}{2} \times 9 + \frac{1}{8} \times 12 = 5\frac{1}{4}$ months.

Interest on £100 for $5\frac{1}{4}$ months, at 5 per cent. = £2 7s. 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.

\therefore As £102 7s. 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. : £2 7s. 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. ::
 £750 10s. 9d. : £17 11s. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.,
 the discount required. J. S. D.

Question 68. By Euclid (book iii. prop. 35), the diameter of circle = $\frac{12^2}{6} + 6 = 30$.—Ans. R. T.

Question 69. Since the diameter of the bore is = half the whole diameter, W equals

$$\frac{\frac{1}{2} \times .7854 \times 8878 \times (\frac{1}{16})^2}{20918.0136} = \frac{.7854 \times 8878 \times 3}{4 \times 144} = 36.316 \text{ ounces per foot,}$$

or the entire weight = $36.316 \times 20 = 726.320$.—Ans. J. F. L.

Question 70.

$S = \frac{1}{2} n(2a + (n-1)d) = \frac{243}{2} (14 + 242 \times 5) = \frac{1224 \times 243}{2}$
 $= 148716$.—Ans. J. F. L.

Question 71. Area of base = $48^2 \times .7854$
 Content in inches of cylinder = $48^2 \times .7854 \times 70$
 \therefore Content in gallons = $\frac{48^2 \times .7854 \times 70}{277.274}$
 $= 456.838$.—Ans. W. C. D.

Question 72. When the side of an octagon is 1, the area = 4.8284271;

then, as $1^2 : 20^2 :: 4.8284271 : 1931.37084$.
 \therefore Solidity in cubic feet =
 $\frac{1931.37084 \times 28}{144 \times 3} = \frac{375.54433}{3} = 125.18144$ cubic feet.
 Ans. ABERGWILI.

Question 73. Let x = width between the walk and the wall;
 then $200 - 2(x+6)$ = width of enclosed part;
 $2(300 + 200)x - 4x^2 = 1000x - 4x^2$ = area of ground between the walk and the wall;
 and $[300 - 2(x+6)][200 - 2(x+6)]$ = area of enclosed part;
 then, by the question, $[300 - 2(x+6)][200 - 2(x+6)] = 1000x - 4x^2$.

Divide by 4 and $(144 - x)(94 - x) = 250x - x^2$;
 or $13536 - 238x + x^2 = 250x - x^2$
 $2x^2 - 488x = 13536$
 $x^2 - 244x = 6768$

Completing square and extracting root,
 $x - 122 = \pm 90.08884$, &c.

$\therefore x = 122 \pm 90.08884 = 31.91116$ feet.—Ans.

W. C. D.

Errata.—In question 74, instead of $s^2 + x + y = 127$; read, $s^2 + y + x = 137$. This question will lie open another month.

QUESTIONS FOR SOLUTION.—X.

84. A father left his estate of £20,000 among five children. For every sovereign which A gets, B gets £1 10s.; C, £2; D, £2 10s.; and E, £3. What was the share of each?

85. A merchant sold flour at 45s. per sack, by which he gained 10 per cent.; but, as it was growing scarce, he sold the remainder of his stock at 60s. per sack. What was his gain per cent. at the latter price?

$$86. \frac{3x+6}{2} - \left(x - \frac{8x}{9}\right) = 28.$$

87. A gentleman offered to give £150 per annum to a person to become his steward; but the steward declined, saying, "No, sir. If you will give me 4d. for the first month, 16d. for the second, and so increase my wages every month by a multiplier of 4, I will serve you." What amount did he require?

88. In how many relative positions can a family of six sit at table? Explain the process.

89. A piece of copper, weighing 17 lb., is to be beaten into a hemispherical bowl that will just float in water, and of uniform thickness. What will that thickness be, supposing the specific gravity to be 8788?

90. A man standing at the side of a river hears his voice reflected in four seconds. What is the breadth of the river?

91. Counting by my pulse (which I afterwards discovered to beat seventy-three times per minute), I found that between seeing a flash of lightning and hearing the thunder there were thirty-five pulsations. At what distance did the nearest part of the concussion take place?

92. Required, superficial content of the earth, supposing it to be a globe, whose diameter is 7912 miles.

93. What must be the diameter of a globe whose superficial content is twice that of the earth?

$$94. \text{ Given, } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} x^2 + y^2 = \frac{5xy}{2} \\ x + y = 9 \end{array} \right\} \text{ to find } x \text{ and } y.$$

Notices of Books.

The History of the Sunday School Union. By W. H. Watson. Price 3s. 6d. London: Sunday School Union.

This elegantly got up volume was published as a memorial of the Jubilee of the London Sunday School Union. It contains an interesting account of the establishment of Sunday schools, and a valuable compendium of important facts connected with their history. Mr. Watson, however, does not exhaust his subject; but leaves ample scope for one who shall hereafter aspire to be the historian of a great moral movement.

Elements of Psychology. Part I. J. D. Morrell. London: Pickering.

Greek and Roman Philosophy and Science. Encyclopedia Metropolitana, Vol. XXVII. London: Griffin and Co.

Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. Part II. By Rev. F. D. Maurice. Encyclopedia Metropolitana, Vol. XXVIII. London: Griffin and Co.

Aristotle's Organon. (Classical Library.) Translated by O. F. Owen, M.A. London: Bohn.

Bacon's Novum Organum and Advancement of Learning. By Joseph Devey, M.A. (Scientific Library.) London: Bohn.
The Meditations of Descartes. By John Veitch, A.M. Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox.
Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences. By G. H. Lewes. (Scientific Library.) London: Bohn.
An Outline of the Laws of Thought. By Rev. Wm. Thomson. Third edition. London: Pickering.
Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. (Standard Library.) London: Bohn.
The Art of Reasoning. By Samuel Neil. London: Walton and Maberly.

Within the last few months the above named publications and republications have made their appearance. Taken as a sign of the times, they afford pleasing evidence of the revived interest felt in philosophical pursuits by the thinking minds of our country and era. Here, upon the same publishers' shelves, and on the same booksellers' counter, the best thoughts of the olden times are placed alongside with the best utterances of the philosophical minds of the modern world; giving evidence, either that their war of opinion is not yet terminated, though a treaty of peace is to be signed between them. The eclectic spirit of our age is strikingly manifest in the ardour with which truth is sought, wheresoever it has, either in whole or in part, succeeded in developing itself. As an augury of the future, this is one of the most cheering signs. The wisdom of the past must not be ignored by the presumption of those who would assume the position of teachers in the present era; they must be prepared to

"Seize the truth, where'er 'tis found,
 On christian or on heathen ground."

A wise study of the progress of mind—of the various problems which the human mind has thought, or thinks, worthy of investigation—of the various answers which the thinkers of other ages or our own have given or are giving to those questionings, and of the relative importance of these specific thoughts, must be exceedingly beneficial to the inquirer after truth. We necessarily esteem the essentially controversial character of our times—nowhere more manifestly exhibited than in a glance at "The Publishers' Circular"—as one of its chief recommendations; and we rejoice to see the broad surface of our country's literature sown with the seeds of great thoughts, which necessitate the considerative spirit, the weighing and balancing process, the argumentative power which we are, in this serial, endeavouring to lead to good and beneficial results. In a brief space, such as our "confines" may permit us to bestow on "Notices of Books," it is quite impossible to do justice to the great minds whose intellectual fruits now grace our library table; and one or two words of characterization may well suffice for those illustrious immortals whose names have been borne along on the wings of fame through so many ages, and these not so much in reference to their intrinsic merits, as regarding the mode in which they are now introduced to our companionship. The modern names which appear in the above catalogue have all won themselves a right to respectful audience when they appeal to the reading public, with the exception, perhaps, of the youngest member of the

conclave—"our own contributor"—whose name, although not yet carved deeply on the pillars of "the temple of fame," will, we are confident, soon be acknowledged as worthy of enrolment there.

Morrell's work is an instalment of that which, we presume, its author intends to be his *magnam opus*. It displays a vast amount of reading—not yet, however, perfectly digested; considerable power of perspicuous exposition; his usual leaning towards the Germanic style of thought, and a rather remarkable combination of British common sense and transcendentalism. The work deserves the consideration of all minds inclined to philosophical pursuits. The treatises in "The Encyclopedia Metropolitana" are of standard excellence, and constitute valuable contributions to the history of philosophy from the English view-point, although they are not altogether emancipated from the German tendency to find modern thoughts permeating ancient minds. The Rev. Mr. Maurice's present work is, although of great value, scarcely up to the mark, in clear and unambiguous recital and explanation, of his last work: signs of hurry and immature condensation occasionally appear; but who, in the present age, could do better? Aristotle's "Organon" is exceedingly well translated, considering the difficulties of such a task; many of the foot-notes are very noticeable, both for merit and a tendency to appraise Oxford logic at a higher rate than it is at present thought worthy of. Bacon's "Novum Organum" is elegantly and cheaply got up; the notes form a sort of commentary, which constitutes this edition a "Bacon made easy." Descartes is fluently and elegantly translated: the preface is critical and appreciative. Comte's philosophy has found a well-qualified expounder in Mr. Lewes. All that he undertakes is executed with tact, ability, and liveliness. Deep-thinking, though not abstruse—thorough master of his subject, though not presuming in his style of treatment—there is a fascination in his mode of elaborating his thoughts which wins the reader on with eagerness. He speaks from conviction, and is therefore deserving of a hearing, particularly on a topic with which he is so remarkably conversant. Thomson's "Laws of Thought" is an elaborate and notice-worthy treatise on logic; the result of much clear thinking and acuteness of mind. Smith's "Moral Sentiments" is simply a reprint. We know not why this work was not put under the editorship of some one capable of unfolding the relation of Smith's theory to other moral systems, but we are sure that it deserved to have been so edited. Of "The Art of Reasoning" it scarcely becomes this magazine to speak, lest it should give expression to those feelings of admiration and respect with which its conductors have always looked upon the efforts of the author. We may simply state that the introductory matter and the appendix contain ample evidence of the vast erudition, and mastery in philosophical speculation, of its author. The system of logic which this author advocates is highly deserving of attention; while the popular style in which he has treated this abstruse subject proves that when high powers and genial culture are united in one mind, this subject is capable of being brought within the compass of ordinary thinkers. We hope no reader of our magazine will fail to purchase this book.

Rhetoric.

BY THE AUTHOR OF "THE ART OF REASONING."

No. XXIV.—ELOQUENCE.

"TRUE Eloquence," says Rochefoucault, "consists in saying all that is necessary, and nothing more." "To be truly eloquent is to speak to the purpose."* Eloquence is not a "knack or artifice by which the periods of a discourse are curiously and harmoniously strung together, decorated with many flowery images, the whole entirely calculated to set off the speaker's art, by pleasing the ear and amusing the fancy;"† but "it consists in conveying our opinions or our arguments to the minds of the hearers in the most effectual manner."‡ Rhetoric is not trickery; it is not an art by which men are enabled to express wearisome commonplaces in trite forms of speech; but an art which teaches us how to train the mind in such a manner as shall give the greatest compression, precision, energy, and beauty, to the thoughts which arise within it; and informs us in what way we shall best direct the impulses of the soul to ready, potent, and successful action. Eloquence is not a deceit, a delusion, and a snare; but an agency by which men's souls may be strongly stirred, and incited to the practical adoption of the ideas which the speaker utters; "it is the talent of rapidly conveying and forcibly impressing those sentiments with which we ourselves are deeply moved,"§ and casting the brilliancy of imagination athwart the path of profound thought.

Eloquence etymologically signifies *speaking out*,—the utterance of that which is within. To speak out effectively, however, it is needful that we acquaint ourselves with the precise processes by which thought evolves itself into the reality of truth,—the exact usage of the language in which we wish to speak,—the best arrangement to which our thoughts may be subjected,—and the likeliest means of impressing our hearers with the irresistible force of these thoughts. To all the resources of an accurate logic we must unite sincere thought, deep feeling, and an all-pervading intensity of purpose. As occasion demands, the orator must employ "winged words," which hiss and hurtle through the air like lightning through the collied sky, and tones as soft as if the immortal harmonies of heaven were breathing from his lips. A bewildering abundance of metaphors—a torrent of imagery, or a choice selection of vocables, expressed with smart crispness and mechanical precision, do not constitute eloquence; *that* demands animation, and reflective power resulting in thought uttered with lyrical fluency united to logical exactness. A well-developed consciousness, capable of taking a clear and accurate survey of the various ideas which occupy the mind—a capacity of uniting these with precision, and exhibiting them

* Blair's "Lectures," xxv.

† Campbell's "Pulpit Eloquence," p. 168.

‡ Barron's "Lectures," xxviii.

§ D'Alembert's "Reflections on Eloquence and Style."

with logical coherency—a perspicuous, rich, simple, and facile method of giving utterance to thought—a graceful, but natural, ornateness of diction, the result of a keenly-cultivated and refined imagination—a rare tact in the methodical adaptation of means to the achievement of the end or ends desired—are all combined in the idea symbolized by the term Eloquence. It is the sequent—"the bright consummate flower" of all rhetorical culture—the noblest manifestation of man as a *thinker*. It is because this is the case that Lord Bolingbroke is correct in saying, "Eloquence has charms to lead mankind, and gives a nobler superiority than power, which every dunce may use; or fraud, which every knave may employ." It is because this is the case that the orator is able to sway,

"Like a wizard, the world of the heart;
To call up its sunshine or draw down its showers."

We deem it of paramount importance at a time like the present, when a careless and meretricious wordiness so frequently passes current as oratory, to dwell at some length on the rhetorical characteristics of true and genuine Eloquence. Clumsy verbosity, an elaborately unnatural excess of ornament, violent and unwarrantable perversions of common forms of speech, uttered with slovenly fluency, are so easily and rapidly acquired by those who frequent debating societies and public meetings, that people are apt to mistake the power of expressing *words* extemporarily for oratorical talent. This is a mistake of a perilous and destructive nature,—an error which cannot be too soon unlearned. The great problem presented to the orator is—given an important truth or principle, to find that avenue to the mind in which the fewest obstacles are likely to be offered, and the means of entering thereby with irresistible force. Some men are chiefly accessible through the intellect; others through the imagination; and others, again, through the will and the emotions. So to measure and arrange the several items of an argument that each of these different sorts of people shall be kept actively and energetically reflective upon that given point, and yet be brought to an unanimous opinion regarding the accuracy of the speaker's thoughts on the given topic, is an immensely difficult task, only to be fittingly attempted by those who have sternly disciplined their minds in the processes of logic and the graces of imaginative literature. It is not sufficient that an orator should never feel the want of *a* thought or *a* word; it is *the* thought and *the* word, in fitting time, place, and collocation, that constitutes true Eloquence. All men are speakers; but how few are eloquent! All men express thought; how few express worthy thoughts worthily! *Matter* and *manner* fittingly wedded together—noble thoughts, correct reasoning, and worthy motives, energised by earnestness of purpose, harmonized by exquisite artistic skill, and beautified by a brilliant imagination—how irresistibly potent! Listen to the voice of Wilberforce pleading the cause of the slave, Chatham's speech on the American war, Burke's intense eloquence during the impeachment of Hastings—hear Masillon or Whitefield preaching, Luther defying the Diet of Worms—follow Peter the Hermit through the nations of Europe while he rouses the millions of its population to an almost frenzied enthusiasm, resulting in the Crusades—stand with Paul, the christian orator, in the palace-hall of Agrippa, and mark the effects produced there—enter the Roman senate when Cicero brands the infamous Cataline as a conspirator—breathe the air of Academe, and let the sounds of Plato's earnest discourse stir you to admiration of intellectual pursuits—or mingle with the crowd of Athens

when the eagerly impetuous eloquence of Demosthenes peals in the quivering ear, until each man, as if inspired, shouts wildly forth, "Let us march against Philip"—and then you will thoroughly feel the glory and the grandeur of that transcendent combination of genius and culture which is designated Eloquence—and then you will adequately appreciate the magnificence of the effects producible by words, when

"They live, they speak, they breathe,
Warm from the soul, and faithful to its fires."

Eloquence is the result of ardent feeling; the style of composition must, therefore, correspond to the state of mind from which it has its origin,—now rhythmical and ornate, again concise and abrupt, then irregular and loose—changing with the change of thought. It has, of course, many qualities in common with polite literature,—grace, liveliness, emotive power, and imaginative elegance; but it has also many peculiarities,—cadence, varying with the thought expressed, complex and sudden changes in style, diffusive prominence and brief abruptness, amplification, ornamentation, and conciseness. Its chief object being to impress the emotions, and by this means to persuade the will, it is more copious, rich, and forcible, less regular and systematic, more amplified and ornate, than other didactic prose. The thoughts must be of a nourishing quality, although the serving up must be *recherché*. Calmness and dignity, majestic energy of movement, grace and ornament, appeals to the passions and addresses to the understanding, delivered in an easy, fluent, unembarrassed way, are the true and essential elements of successful oratory.

The ancient rhetoricians, generally, adopted a classification of parts of which a good discourse should consist. In this we shall, to a certain extent, follow their example. We shall not, however, enunciate these as invariable component parts of an oration; but shall premise that these divisions, or any combination of the whole or a part of these, may be made available, at the discretion of the speaker, viz., Exordium or Introduction, Narration, Division, Argument, Refutation, and Peroration or Conclusion.

1. EXORDIUM OR INTRODUCTION.—Whatever is indefinite or indeterminate causes bewilderment; a clue must therefore be given to the purport of our discourse. We must endeavour to initiate our address in such a manner as shall at once please and excite, conciliate and interest, remove prejudice and secure favourable attention. These are the purposes of *exordia*. To release the mind from suspense, and intimate the subject, with the particular point of view about to be assumed, in order that the hearer may, in part, foresee the pathway to be taken, and be prepared for regarding with due attention the indications given—to excite an interest in the topic about to be discussed—to place the speaker on friendly terms with his hearers, and to remove prepossessions against one-self, are all legitimate purposes for which *exordia* may be employed. The mind must be prepared before it can usefully and pleasurably exercise its functions. According to the purpose in view, so must the preparation be; therefore the exordium ought to vary with the nature of the topic to be considered.

2. NARRATION.—A short statement of the facts which concern the question—a detail of the circumstances implied in the case, or of the occasions of the address, is generally necessary to convey to the mind a knowledge of the condition in which the topic is taken up. This should be simple, candid, orderly, and plausible,—skilful in arrangement, clear

and comprehensible in execution—based upon some easily-understood maxim, and conducted with deliberation, honesty, and care.

3. **DIVISION.**—To aid comprehension and assist the memory, a careful, distinct, and exhaustive division is highly advantageous. To indicate wherein we agree and wherein we differ from others, as well as to inform our hearers regarding the several propositions which we shall attempt to substantiate, division is highly necessary. Our division should be precise, methodical, and distinct, free from circumlocution and ambiguity on the one hand, and over-refinement and tediousness on the other. Each preceding observation should lead to the other as its natural sequent, and the transitions from one to another ought to be skillfully managed. Repetition ought to be avoided; and a complete, though perspicuous statement ought alone to be aimed at. To be accurate without stupid formality, and comprehensive without being dry, jejune, or overly minute, are matters requiring diligent attention and careful practical evolution. An exact logic is the best guide to distinctness of division.

4. **ARGUMENT.**—The science of argumentation is the study of the logician: the practical employment of argument is the business of the rhetorician. The laws of evidence are elaborated by the former; the presentation of any topic in such a manner as shall exhibit its relation to these laws is performed by the latter. Logic proves; rhetoric moves. An orator must be well learned in the various kinds of evidence, their several laws, and their respective value and importance,—what constitutes demonstration, what proof, and what subjects respectively require these,—what topics are amenable to the laws of testimony, and what to the rules derivable from experience,—which processes of nature are uniform, and which various,—and which of these, or which peculiar combination of these, shall best suit the purpose which he has in view while speaking; but he must know much more, viz., how to arrange these so as most efficiently to gain his point,—how to exhibit them in their most forcible aspects,—how to indicate most strongly their reference to the questions engaging his attention. Rhetoricians generally recommend that the arrangement of proofs should resemble the order of an army in the field of battle; the first charge should be made by the most vigorous and the bravest; the common herd should sustain the mid-fight, while the reserved corps ought to be held back till the most favourable moment arrives, when victory has to be definitively gained, or a retreat requires to be manfully covered. Good sense, logical skill, simplicity, and precision, ought to characterize the argument.

5. **REFUTATION.**—Few truths are so palpable as to be instantly receivable by the mind. Truth and error are commingled in the thoughts of men. Hence few truths exist without being opposed by the counter-statements of error. The orator must, therefore, not only establish and support his own cause, but must carry aggression into the camp of the enemy. Refutation must be employed to show the inconsistency, illogicality, erroneousness, or improbability of the opinions of our opponents. It requires coolness, dexterity, honesty, readiness, and a keen appreciation of the inconsistent.

6. **THE PERORATION.**—The quickly-shifting panorama of thought which the orator presents to the intellectual vision is apt to fade from the memory and lose its distinctness: hence the advisability of a brief recapitulation—summary yet complete. Here the *final charge* is to be made,—the laurels of triumph to be gained, or the contempt which accom-

panies defeat to be encountered. Here, then, the orator should rise to dignity of address, richness of diction, brilliancy of figure, boldness of conception,—to impassioned energy, earnest purpose, and potency of will. All the powers of thought, all the graces of fancy, all the stirring emotions, all the artifices of delivery, and all the most impressive elements of composition, must be actively, efficaciously, and combinedly employed; while appeals must, as occasion requires, be made to all that is capable of exciting emotional activity—to Love and Hatred,

“Fear and trembling Hope,
Silence and Foresight; Death the skeleton,
And Time the shadow.”

The ancients divided Eloquence into three kinds,—Demonstrative, Deliberative, and Judicial. The first has for its object praise or blame in reference to present time, and includes funeral orations, invectives, panegyrics, inaugural addresses, impeachments, &c.; the second exhorts or dissuades with reference to the future, and includes moral lectures, and all other instructive oratory; the third relates to accusation or defence with reference to time past, and includes all pleading, whether of or on account of plaintiff or defendant, and its objects are, either the attainment of justice, or the restraint of injustice. Although these three sorts of Eloquence are demarcated in theory, they are very seldom found strictly differentiated in practice. Praise, utility, and justice generally centre in the same point, and blame worthily reverts upon inutility and injustice. Hence these three forms of Eloquence are often practically unitable, and are frequently more efficacious when thus united.

Modern Eloquence is divisible into four sorts, viz., the Senate, the Bar, the Pulpit, and the Platform. Eloquence is modified in its characteristics by the modifications which take place in the circumstances of society. The extension of intellectual culture renders men less pervious to emotional excitation, and confines their oratorical displays more within the limits of business, fact, and reason.

1. **SENATORIAL ELOQUENCE.**—Deliberative eloquence, as exemplified in our parliamentary assemblies, has varied considerably with the changes of the times; at one period sententious, serious, and emotive; at another florid, imaginative, ornate, and speculative; now tame, frigid, commonplace, and conversational. Nowhere can greater opportunities arise for the display of copious information, clearness of exposition, the enunciation of general principles, gracefulness, enthusiasm and energy of style, elaborate argumentation, dignity and richness of diction, polished wit, satiric irony, impassioned plenteousness of imaginative illustration, and graceful delivery; yet nowhere is there less attention paid to the culture of the persuasive powers of Eloquence. Cogent reasoning, sprightly pointedness, ardent impetuosity, idiomatic though chaste and classical expression, a playful rather than rich imaginative tinge, subordinated to a business-like, mercantile formality, seems to be the highest aim of our senatorial orators.

2. **THE ELOQUENCE OF THE BAR.**—Legal disquisition is usually grave, sedate, precise, and argumentative. As the judicial eloquence of our country generally subserves the two-fold purpose of exhibiting to the judge the grounds of the several pleas, and the instructing of the jury regarding the facts and principles involved in the various cases, the style of speaking best adapted, in general, for those who are training themselves for the legal profession, seems to us to be one which combines simplicity with dignity, precision with

animation, learning with richly-energetic language, logical accuracy with animated ornament, and instructive clearness with conciliatory urbanity. It is true that in the present day judicial procedure demands greater attention to correctness and dispatch than to eloquence or taste; but we are of opinion that rhetorical skill is never really incompatible with precision and diligence in business, or that persistent activity which secures dispatch; while we are convinced that a tasteful, accurate, and moderately ornate pleading is much more likely to attain and sustain attention, than the fatiguing opreseness of an untrained speaker, or the somnific monotony of an unartistic elocution.

3. PULPIT ELOQUENCE.—The highest themes, the most solemn topics, the most momentous concerns of humanity, all combine to offer the eloquent divine the choicest opportunity and the freest scope for the employment of rhetorical skill. The sacredness of the subjects, the magnitude of the interests at stake, the impressive truths to be enforced, the sublime aims to be imparted, the awful warnings to be given—Time, Happiness, Eternity, Heaven, Hell, Christ, God—are not these ideas specially adapted, from their emotional relations, to elicit the loftiest, sublimest, most pathetic eloquence? “A lost soul.” Is there not in these words an agony beyond the most intense eloquence adequately to express? “A redeemed soul.” Is there not in these few syllables an eloquence, to give full efficacy to which words fail? What, then, shall we say of God and Eternity, or of that awful cry which ever must resound from the true preacher’s lips—“To judgment, ho”? What voice is potent enough to pierce the mammon-worshipper’s heart, “deaf as a dead adder’s ear” to all divine influences? What human tones are delicious enough to woo the licentious reveller in forbidden joys from the enticements of the hell-fay—pleasure? What sounds shall thunder efficaciously to the scoffer’s conscience, or the profligate’s seared heart, or the sensualist’s dead soul, or the drunkard’s paralyzed moral nature, or the gambler’s gangreened and cancerous spirit—“It is appointed unto all men once to die, and after death the judgment”? What light can be employed successfully in illuminating the darkened understanding of the ignorant, “the bloodshot blindness of heart” in the ambitious, the moral gloom of the liar, the hypocrite, and the pharisee? Human Eloquence may do much; but for these purposes “an unction from on high,” and the Holy One who dwelleth there, is specially needful. Gravity, vivid conception, a realizing imagination, a simple but polished style, unity of design, scriptural allusions, amplification, variety, and methodical exposition, seem to us to be the human requisites for a successful pulpit orator. The higher divine agencies lie beyond our present province, and the scope of our present prelections. Pulpit Eloquence may be didactic, hortatory, or critical, or a combination of all these.

4. THE ELOQUENCE OF THE PLATFORM.—New phases and developments of society require new appliances and forms. The right of public meeting which we enjoy has originated a form of Eloquence little known in ancient times, and little permitted in other lands; this we have denominated the Eloquence of the Platform. This demands neither the restraint of the Senate, the formality of the Bar, nor the gravity of the Pulpit. It retains the better qualities of each without their several disadvantages. It is more energetic, less regular, more emphatic, and less grave than these. It appeals more forcibly to the feelings, makes wilder incursions into the territories of imagination, is more ornate, vivid, picturesque, sketchy, and popularized. It has a wider range of

topics, a greater number of tones, a less harmonious and skilful structure, and a greater propensity to

"Touch the strings
Of that mysterious instrument, the soul,"

than the other species aforementioned. It can scarcely yet be said to have attained a distinctive character, although it might be roughly demarcated from the others by saying that it is the common-sense view of public affairs presented in a more emotional than intellectual aspect—an appeal from special culture to the large instincts of humanity.

We cannot better embody our parting admonition on Eloquence than by adopting the expressive language of Bailey's "Festus:"—

"Study the right; attempt the high; seek out
The soul's bright path; and since the soul is fire
Of heat intelligential, turn it eye
To the all-fatherly source of light and life.
. . . . Keep thy spirit pure
From worldly taint by the repellant strength
Of virtue. Think on noble thoughts and deeds
Ever. Count o'er the treasury of Truth;
And practise precepts which are proven wise.
It matters not then what thou fearest. Walk
Boldly and fearlessly in the light thou hast;—
There is a hand above will lead thee on."

The word "Farewell!" must linger on our lips a little. We cannot part with the last of this series of papers without a sigh. How many memories of the past rise up before us now! some

"Such as the heart delights in—and records
Within how silently—in more than words!"

and others at which the mind

"Turns but to start, and gazes but to grieve."

On these, however, we care not now to dwell, but would rather solace ourselves with the fond hope that in our past labours we have, in some measure, been successful in administering to the healthy intellectuality of our readers. We thank you, dear readers, for your patience and attention during the past; and, though we cannot see

"Through the dim curtains of Futurity,"

we hope to meet with you all again, and to be welcomed and encouraged then with the same kindly indulgence as we have heretofore received. Adieu! and may a happy new year be allotted to you all.

Philosophy.

WHICH WAS THE GREATEST POET, MILTON OR SHAKSPERE ?

SHAKSPERE.—REPLY.

"Of this Shakspeare of ours, perhaps the opinion one sometimes hears a little idolatrously expressed is, in fact, the right one; I think the best judgment, not of this country only, but of Europe at large, is slowly pointing to the conclusion, that Shakspeare is the chief of all poets hitherto; the greatest intellect who, in our recorded world, has left record of himself in the way of literature."—*T. Carlyle.*

"His characters are like watches with dial-plates of transparent crystal; they show you the hour like others, and the inward mechanism also is all visible."—*Goethe on Shakspeare.*

"The unique character, and apparently inexhaustible significance of Shakspeare's art, gives it a perennial and increasing interest to the critic; the longer he gazes, the vaster seems the expanse which he desires to measure; the more deeply he sounds, the farther does he appear to be from ascertaining the ultimate depths of that spirit whose plenary artistic inspiration makes it almost an irreverence to name the name of Shakspeare in the same sentence with that of another poet or artist."—"North British Review," No. 23, p. 115.

In our opening article we abridged much, and left out more, that we had to say on this question; not, however, without the hope of presenting to our readers, on some future occasion, this many-phased poet in other marked aspects of poetic supereminence to Milton. This has not fallen to our lot; we can but refer our readers to the above extracts as worthy of severest analysis and deepest thought, and proceed at once to the various topics of our reply. We have observed the progress of the debate with growing interest, and with diverse feelings and convictions. Much has been advanced by our opponents that we esteem invaluable truth, and much that appears to us grave error and meaningless eulogium upon Milton. Thus conscious, we care not that our hope has not been realized, not less so since we deem it our duty to enter the arena of debate, and meet our personal opponents, H. B. and B. W. P., on their own grounds of assumption or attack, assuring them that our only weapon shall be logic, and our spirit candid, though unsparing withal. We shall not hesitate also to characterize the defects, as they appear to us, of the other articles in favour of Milton.

The article signed H. B. deserves primary notice, as it presents several salient points of defect in logic and part truth. We give it; and in doing so would express our disgust at its prevailing characteristic, which we shall denominate *unqualified egotism*. The celebrated J. Foster, one of the ablest reviewers of his day, in his critique on Mudford's "Life of Cumberland," has many pertinent remarks on this literary egotism, or the great "I" and important "me," which we deem as strictly applicable to H. B.'s article as to the work which called them forth from his able pen. He prescribes a very likely plan to get rid of "this perpetual and offensive prominence of—myself—as the authority, the oracle, the Apollo, to be personally recognised, and reverently thought of, by all the readers and hearers of the sentence and the opinion." The first step of which is, to use his own words, "to get rid, as fast as possible, of the vanity and self-importance itself," and then to exercise great vigilance in the suppression of "the mighty pronoun, representative of *me*." Our readers will not consider us too severe, when they learn that this "mighty pronoun" occurs in H. B.'s article not less than thirty-two times!!! and in many instances in the most offensive prominence. He, apparently with great humility, thus compliments his predecessors on this subject:—"I am further confirmed by the conviction that my predecessors, in their admirable articles, have rather wandered round than fairly approached the question." The truth of this we do not deny, and suppose that our opponents "*Φιλαληθης*" and "*L'Ouvrier*" will be less likely to think themselves in the right, when both "friend" H. B., and opponents E. W. S. and others, think them decidedly wrong. But we have now to do with H. B., who has not improved his friends' position by this candid assertion, neither substantiated his own, since he has himself fallen into the same error of wandering!—to wit, he proceeds immediately to a *gross perversion* of our opening illustration. We are

accused of "intellectual presumption" for asserting that we had risen to a stand-point, aided by the sublime genius of Shakspeare (for this is the just interpretation of our words), from which we were enabled to look upon all the poetic geniuses of the world, *ut qui infra sunt!* H. B., in order to render his charge of intellectual presumption plausible, would convey the idea that we had professed to gain the stand-point by our own power, not Shakspeare's,—that the spiritual elevation was attained unaided by his genius. This is a gross perversion of our meaning. We trust H. B. did it honestly, through ignorance. If so, at whose door does the charge of "intellectual presumption" lie, at ours or H. B.'s? Not content with having, like his predecessors, "wandered," and to a great extent, he, like a tangent, having once touched the circle, or utmost limit of our subject, seems inclined to dart away indefinitely. Accordingly, we find him thus dealing with one of our articles on "Oaths," or "Invasion," in order to substantiate a still heavier charge than "intellectual presumption," viz., "dogmatic assertion and bold abuse." We leave the readers of our articles to decide this charge *pro se*, as it is quite foreign to our subject, assuring H. B., however, that we have nothing to recant on that subject; and further, that if he expects E. W. S. to treat him, after such gross misrepresentations or blunderings, as he does those who oppose him fairly, he is mistaken indeed.

H. B.'s next step is to assert that Channing's definition of poetry might by him (H. B.) be equally and easily shown to be applicable to Milton's; but he does not attempt this, even for our enlightenment. This appears somewhat like the dogmatic assertion against which he has just been cautioning the readers. Let theory and practice ever go together. He expresses his regret that one writer "should apparently rest much of his reasoning on the assumption that the better *man* is the greater *poet*;" and, to the reader's surprise, he devotes nearly half of his long article to the same moral question, with, as far as we can judge, no other object than to prove the same point! He dwells considerably on the moral tendency of Shakspeare, and illogically enough concludes, that because Milton wrote about covetousness, or self-aggrandizement, as carried on in heaven,

and Shakspeare about the same as carried on in the Danish court, the moral tendency of the one production must be pure and holy, and the moral tendency of the other impure and unholy. The position is as untenable as it is illogical and absurd. Milton is as open to abuse among men as Shakspeare. The murder, the incest, the treachery, the fatalism, the madness, the suicide, held up to our view in "Hamlet," could be put to no greater abuse than the sentiment expressed in those awful words,—

"Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven."

A depraved mind is just as likely to imbibe the sentiment of Milton's fiend as of any in "Hamlet." Is not the latter the deadlier of the two?

It were just as reasonable for H. B. to argue thus about the sacred scriptures, and to conclude that, because they contain so many awful accounts of war, of murder, of incest, of adultery, and of sin and guilt of every enormity, they must have a bad tendency on the reader's mind. H. B., we candidly think, sees as little into the merit of Shakspeare as he does into his philosophy, which teaches us to find "good in everything," in harmony with that profound moral axiom, "To the pure all things are pure," and *vice versa*.

Leaving the moral question, and H. B.'s impotent agitation of it, there is little else to read or answer of this article, which, in justice to his reproved friends, *ought* to have been to the point. It is in the literary life as it is in the moral; we oftentimes fall into or practice those things we are so ready to reprobate in others. Of the former, does not H. B. furnish a striking instance?

In a fact-defiant spirit he surmises, "Had Shakspeare been surrounded with such adverse circumstances (as Milton), we can scarcely believe he would have left much" witness to "his fame." If the history of Shakspeare demonstrates one thing palpably, it is the reverse of this, that no genius ever established such a fame in the midst of such opposing circumstances.

"The consideration of their circumstances should lead every impartial judge to rank Milton as the greater poet, even if he esteemed his poetry inferior to that of Shakspeare." This anomalous sentence demands analysis. What were the circumstances under which

Milton wrote "Paradise Lost," and Shakspeare his dramatic works?

It appears from the most authentic accounts that Milton conceived the idea of establishing his fame by writing an epic poem, and for the accomplishment of his great purpose he travelled to various parts of the Continent, learned many languages, and laboriously culled the beauties of each,—gave himself up for years to study, explored the vast fields of English, Roman, and Grecian literature; added to which, a devout observation of nature in her most magnificent aspects. Ultimately we find him devoted to his great work for years in solitude and unbroken thought. These were his circumstances. We know not that they could have been more favourable. His blindness, on the whole, advanced his purpose, for the great probability is that, had it not been for that affliction, he would have been so engaged in public life and political warfare that he would have never found time sufficient for his elaborate design.

In the circumstances which attended Shakspeare we find essentially the reverse of all this. "Alas! (says one who apprehended the poet's circumstances and mighty genius) Shakspeare had to write for the Globe play-house: his great soul had to crush itself, as it could, into that and no other mould." So lucid a passage, in contrast with our condensed view of Milton's circumstances, needs little comment. What does not rise out of it, suggestive of the greatness of that genius which, under such "cramping circumstances," emits through dramatic forms these "bursts of radiance," "that come upon you like splendour out of heaven?" Truly of Shakspeare we may say, *disjecta membra* are all that we find of him in literature; yet what fragments! of themselves worlds; heights, depths, of thought and beauty, that stand forth to our view like suns in the glowing concave of the empyrean!

Let the reader now reflect on H. B.'s deduction from all this circumstantial evidence, viz., that because Milton and Shakspeare wrote under the above-mentioned indisputable circumstances, every impartial judge, though convinced of Shakspeare's poetic superiority, ought not to admit it! If this is not the height of absurdity and un-reason, we know not what is.

Thus have we but briefly commented on

H. B.'s wanderings round or away from the subject to which he has devoted only *five* columns of his article, leaving scarcely *three* to the *actual point*, on which, as the reader might expect, we have little to say, from its consequent brevity and unavoidable *superficiality*. H. B.'s definition of poetry is true, as far as it goes; but it is only half truth, and hence error. "The object of poetry is simply to afford pleasure, and not instruction." Is he not aware that he denies the primary principle on which Milton's poetic fame stands, to which he gives the most marked prominence in the opening of his first book:—

"That to the height of this great argument
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to man."

If H. B.'s definition of poetry be correct, the fame of Milton is a myth, because based on a wrong principle. This we deny *in toto*. Milton's object was more to *instruct* than to *please*; and so far he apprehended the vocation of poetry, and made practical use of it in "Paradise Lost." Horace teaches us that the object of poets is twofold:—

"Aut prodesse volunt, aut delectare, poeta."

This palpable defect in H. B.'s estimate of poetry, particularly Milton's, we might, indeed, have used as a mighty weapon of attack taken from his own resources. With his definition of poetry, he claims for Milton poetic superiority to Shakspeare. We never yet met with a person who reduced the terrible magnificence of "Paradise Lost" to so mean a standard as to say, after perusing any part of it, "It has a very pleasing effect on the mind." Surely H. B. read it to very little service, by way of self-illumination, if such was the result of his perusal. *Ad* Milton of this resource, and he is no longer to be considered worthy of even comparison with the world's poet. Reduce "Paradise Lost" to H. B.'s standard, and it is no longer poetry. We are amazed to find Milton suffering such sacrilege at his professed friend's hands!

In the cases of our other opponents, we are happy to say that a milder treatment is required, and one, if space permitted, characterised with acknowledgments of merit and real literary insight. We admire sound thought and fair play; it exerts a healthy influence over the mind of every candid

reader. This we find in B. W. P.'s article for November. He opens with many remarks on criticism, and the true or false spirit of criticism, with which we perfectly agree; and displays throughout considerable tact and insight in the conduct of his defence of Milton. From the very conditions of our debate, on either side of the question we are set in comparative opposition to one of these master-spirits, an opposition altogether foreign and alien to our feelings. Though we assign the poetic superiority to Shakspeare, Milton is not depreciated in our estimation. He is dear to us beyond all utterance. He has infused into us much that is priceless and soul-precious,—much, we oftentimes think, that immortality itself may purify, but never obliterate. The reading of the former part of B. W. P.'s article called to mind this thought, and brought home yet again our sympathies with the great epicist with greater enthusiasm. That B. W. P. should devote so much of his space to this point we think not strictly right, considering his position; yet we cannot but exult under its happy influence, and exculpate him on that score. He proposes the question with admirable tact, we need scarcely say in palpable contradiction of H. B.'s definition of poetry. He moves on the broad principle that both Milton and Shakspeare were the benefactors of humanity. How? By being its best teachers. But here ends our harmony of thought. B. W. P. considers Milton the greater benefactor of the two.

As our reply must be brief, we will thus embody our objections:—First. The sphere of Milton's epic is too far removed from human experience. Secondly. His personages, or characters, have too much of the supernaturalism of evil or good spirits, or illustrate abstract qualities, rather than appear to the mind as free, isolated, rational, and intelligent members of the divine government. In fact, they appear rather subservient to a given scheme, than the direct objects of the scheme itself. In the Shaksperian drama we find the poet, as teacher, labouring under no such serious disadvantages. The sphere of his action lies within the circle of human experience. His personages are from our very midst; and when he passes beyond human limits into the supernatural, he fails of his object by so much. We see embodied in his characters our own

virtues or vices. If we are wise, we learn to cultivate the former and abhor the latter. We have a personal interest in all he brings before us. In this respect the dramatic will ever be superior to the epic. Notwithstanding all this, Shakspeare avails himself of the illustration of the divine attributes—justice, mercy, and goodness—in the furtherance of man's moral excellence. These are the grounds of our objection to B. W. P.'s position, and which we should further illustrate, did our space permit.

In conclusion, we shall briefly review the articles signed "L'Ouvrier" and "Φιλαλήτης." In the former of these we have a sad confounding of the two subjects, moral character and poetic power. This characterizes the entire production, and is a grand defect; for it seems to have had great weight in his decision. Let the reader expunge the question of morals from the article, and what remains but the bare assertion of Milton's superiority? There is an evident discrepancy between his definition of what "a divine poem" ought to be, and the one for which he claims the highest honours,—one which, as in H. B.'s, nullifies the claim altogether. The discrepancy is twofold:—First. "L'Ouvrier" affirms of this divine poem, "Its character must be varied and consistent." When our friend framed this model, he must have been conscious of what all criticism attests on the subject,—the inconsistency of one of Milton's characters, which is, doubtless, the greatest defect of the poem; we mean the *character of Satan*. Again, he adds:—"The sentiments must be varied and sublime, *elevated* and *pure*." Is not "L'Ouvrier" aware that the first book of "Paradise Lost" derives its grandeur from the oratory of fallen spirits, whose sentiments, however "varied and sublime," could not be "*elevated and pure*," since intensely indicative of fiercest hate towards the Highest? This *idea*, like his decision, we think sprang from the fatal error of confounding moral character and poetic power. Moral purity is not the standard of decision in this debate; it has nothing essentially to do with it. The question is not, Which was the best man? but, Which the greatest poet? So far from "L'Ouvrier" having proved Milton to be the greatest, he, like H. B., has nullified his claim by his own definition. The acme of his error stands forth in his con-

cluding sentence, the deduction of which is truly illogical.

The same error characterizes the article of "*Φιλαληθης*," though in a less evident degree. He does not even attempt to show Milton the greater poet by actual contrast; but, after considerable rhapsody ("ah!" and "oh!") on Milton, he abruptly turns to our Shakspeare, whom he thinks justly termed "divine," and, after agitating the moral question, concludes, because the Shaksperian drama is not so pure in some given instances as an epic which embodies the Bible revelations, its author cannot be the greater poet. Such sophistry is an anomaly, indeed, in the *British Controversialist*, the light of which it cannot bide.

It is folly, indeed, to subject an illogical deduction to the readers of, and debaters in, our magazine. "*Φιλαληθης*," in concluding, really begins the inquiry:—"How, then, can we say that the one (Milton) is a greater

poet than the other? By careful examination?" The result, however, of this examination is too unsatisfactory and brief (being put in nineteen lines, by way of climax!) to convince any impartial reader. It assumes that in Milton we find imagination and beauty in the highest perfection. Unfortunately, it is only an assumption, without the shadow of a proof, and as such requires not our time and space, as all assumptions, on the arena of debate, stand *pro nihilo*. Shakspeare has given us the shadow of his sublime and *unrivalled* genius in his own immortal words:—

"The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth
to heaven;
And, as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name."

Buckingham.

E. W. S.

MILTON.—REPLY.

"Rashly, nor oftimes truly, doth man pass judgment on his brother;
For he seeth not the springs of the heart, nor
heareth the reasons of the mind."
M. F. Twpper.

"How charming is divine philosophy!
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."
Milton.

WE have given precedence to Milton, because his poetry indicates a genius purer and more sublime than Shakspeare's. We love not the invidious comparison of great men; too often one is exalted at the expense of truth, and envious detraction mars the fair reputation of the other. It has been our care studiously to avoid the abuse of our privilege in the present debate, and we hope to have realized the happy discretion to

"Be calm in arguing; for fierceness makes
Error a fault, and truth discourtesy."

We presume not to follow our Shaksperian friends in all the airy flights of their many-winged imagination. Prudence and reason restrain us from the pursuit of their erratic vagaries, and limit us to the regions of common sense, while calmly inquiring *vis à vis* with the topic of debate, What is Poetry? Philosophy? Genius?

E. W. S. has quoted from Channing* a definition of poetry (p. 300), in which he says it "has a natural alliance with our best affections. It delights in the beauty and sublimity of the outward creation, and of the soul, and it helps faith to lay hold on the future life." "Cosmopolite" says (p. 421) that poetry is "the blushing forth of transcendent truth and beauty." We will categorize these definitions thus: Poetry is the expression of truth, beauty, and sublimity in melodious language, so as to excite the best affections of man. Philosophy is either the sum of general principles or knowledge attainable, or it is the system of rules by which those general principles, or that knowledge, is attained; thus we read of

"Divine philosophy! by whose pure light
We first distinguish, then pursue the right;
Thy power the breast from every error frees,
And weeds out all its vices by degrees."

Genius is that faculty of the mind by which man produces original works of art, or makes new discoveries in science, or by which either science or art is advanced or

* See Channing's "Essay on the Poetical Genius of Milton," p. 16.

perfected beyond the best efforts of his predecessors or contemporaries.

From the want of definite principles of judgment in the arguments of our opponents, we feel their criticisms upon Milton and Shakspeare are calculated to mislead and bewilder. It is our aim, therefore, to establish in the mind of the reader certain "stand-points," or intellectual points of distance, by which he shall be enabled to make an accurate survey of the poetical productions of the

"Dear son of memory, great heir of fame,"
and he who carried

. . . "Nature lengths unknown before."

We shall thus render a practical version of the figure produced by E. W. S., and become the "chamois hunter;" subtending from our little selves, by these helps, an angle which shall include within its extremities the mightiest geniuses of earth, and clearly indicate their relative position in the temple of fame.

The creative faculty of the mind may be employed upon various, and even opposite, qualities, and still be genius. Hence, men have made "familiar as household words" the phrases, pure and impure genius, low and noble genius, &c. General principles, too, may be founded upon truth or error; and hence the philosophy of which these principles are the constituent elements may be true or false philosophy; may have the physical and moral well-being of man for its ultimatum, or contrariwise. But we have seen that poetry is "the blushing forth of transcendent truth and beauty,—it delights in the beauty and sublimity of the soul;" therefore, the true genius of poetry, and the true philosophy of poetry, must be the creation and imitation of truthful, beautiful, amiable, and holy objects, such as elevate, ennoble, purify the soul, and fit it for a higher and a holier state of being. The distinctive characteristic of the greatest poetic genius must then be the preservation in his writings of the greatest measure of pure and holy truth and dignity, of high moral purpose, and the least measure, or entire absence, of low, mean, and vicious thoughts or actions: to these principles, the name, form, subject, and melody of the poetry must be subjected.

Whether our Shaksperian friends may be willing or not to adopt the self-evident in-

ferences to be drawn from these premises, we feel assured they cannot, with any degree of success, dispute the premises themselves; and we shall now proceed to show how, in our estimation, they may be applied to the works of our respective authors. Great stress has been laid upon the peerless power of Shakspeare

"To hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature,"

by which it is implied that Milton has not correctly drawn his persons, nor truly delineated their characters. Can the bold, daring, and masterly leader of the fallen—Satan himself—or his compeers,—the reckless, vindictive, and fierce Moloch; the insinuating, deceptive, and vicious Belial; the calculating, selfish, avaricious Mammon, be said to fall short of appropriateness in person or character. Adam in his unique majesty is perfectly and purely innocent; Eve, on her first waking into life, is intensely beautiful and artless; both, in their conjugal felicity, are full of the simplicity of innocence; and in their fall, are natural examples of feminine curiosity and frailty, and of masculine sorrow and sympathy.

And here we cannot avoid quoting from Milton a few lines on *Love*, pure and holy, as eminently contrasting with the loose morals of Shakspeare upon a similar topic (see "Venus and Adonis," pp. 32, 34, 40, 45, &c., and "The Passionate Pilgrim Sonnets," 2, 7, 9).

"Hail, wedded Love! mysterious law, true source
Of human offspring, sole propriety
In Paradise of all things common else.

Far be it that I should write thee sin or blame,
Or think thee unbecoming holiest place,
Perpetual fountain of domestic sweets!
Whose bed is undefiled and chaste pronounced,
Present or past, as saints and patriarchs used.
Here Love his golden shafts employs, here lights
His constant lamp, and waves his purple wings;
Reigns here, and revels."

"*Paradise Lost*," book iv., line 750, &c.

. . . "Love refines
The thoughts, and heart enlarges, hath his seat
In reason, and is judicious, is the scale
By which to heavenly love thou mayst ascend."
Ibid, book viii., line 589, &c.

The persons and characters of the heavenly visitors of our first parents are equally appropriate, and in exact unison with their nature and occupation. A few points are worthy of particular observation at this stage. Shakspeare described mankind as he

saw them in the world in which he lived; he insisted to perfection their whole character, shewing their merits and demerits. Milton, from a few indistinct hints in the sacred scriptures, creates a higher order of beings, and gives them a character and a nobler sphere of action. Shakspeare's characters represent a class, but Milton's a whole species; Shakspeare imitates a nature visible and known; Milton creates a nature, and endows it with a reality familiar to all who know the English tongue. Shakspeare has, doubtless, many fine passages, and may have far outdone all modern dramatic writers, and we gladly accord to him the poetic laurel of the English drama; but our present purpose is not to compare him with his associates upon the stage, but to adjudge between him and that man of whom *"it is the prerogative to stand at this hour foremost of all men in literary history, and so of all men, in the power to inspire. Virtue goes out of him into others."* Leaving out of the view the pretensions of our contemporaries, we think no man can be named, whose mind still acts on the cultivated intellect of England and America, with an energy comparable to that of Milton. As a poet, Shakspeare undoubtedly transcends, and far surpasses him in his popularity with foreign nations; but *Shakspeare is a voice merely; who and what he was that sang, that sings, we know not. Milton stands erect, commanding, still visible, as a man among men, and reads the laws of the moral sentiment to the new-born race. . . . He is identified in the mind with all select and holy images, with the supreme interests of the human race.** Sublimity, grandeur, majesty, and power, essential attributes of the poetic creation, are so profusely evident in all Milton's works, that the milder beauties of his poetic genius are too generally ignored; the overwhelming effect of the former incapacitates for the full perception of the latter. Sensibility in his poems has a grand and majestic calmness, and is free from that ecstatic wildness to be found in the works of less gifted bards: for example, read the passages in "Comus," beginning at lines 244 and 535. Then, amid multitudinous instances of his loving tenderness, we mention "Paradise Lost," book v. lines 1—25, and regret that space permits not of our

quoting these passages at length. We might multiply instances and thicken proof and testimony; but discretion suggests that the reader may find in the perusal of Milton like pleasure to that we have found, and therefore with joy we refer him to the

. . . "Perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns."

In our opinion, the literary world hath full many a day been Shaksperizing; the learned conceits, sharp turns of wit, and weighty sentences, are e'en at the tongue's end of every poor lettered wight, borrowed from their parent thinker, yet would not this age brook the full measure of their author; hence the oft-repeated disowning* of his worst pieces. The corrupt thoughts of his poems are more than realised in the corrupt manners, immodest actions, obscene expressions, base cunning and brutality of several dramatic pieces; e. g., "Pericles," "Measure for Measure," and "Titus Andronicus." The unnecessary exhibition of impure scenes in one, the badly-masked impurity of the chief action in the second, the brutal cunning and low depravity of the third, exemplified in the black-souled Aaron, the cool, deceptive villany of Tamora, and the jointure of these dark characters inherited by Chiron and Demetrius, with the cutting, maiming, mangling, and bloodshed of the whole plot; in all these violating the laws both of nature and art—ancient and modern. "Tragedy is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious and perfect action, possessing magnitude, delivered in pleasing language;" and "Comedy is an imitation of more depraved characters; yet it does not imitate them according to every vice, but according to those defects alone which excite laughter."—Aristotle's "Poetica." So we read in Horace's "Art of Poetry"—"You must not bring upon the stage things fit only to be acted behind the scenes; and you must take away from view many actions which elegant description may afterwards deliver in presence of the spectators. Let not Medea murder her sons before the people, nor the execrable Atreus openly dress human entrails." These may be considered the canons of ancient poetic art, invested with the highest authority; and we are happy to feel that

* "Characteristics of Men of Genius," vol. i. p. 197.

* See the authenticity of these pieces proved in "Knight's Cabinet Shakspeare."

our views are supported by *men* venerable as antiquity and learning can make them.

In conclusion, it may be interesting for us to cite a few opinions on our authors. And first we have Dr. Johnson, who says, "Shakspere, with his excellencies, has likewise faults, and faults sufficient to obscure and overwhelm any other merit. . . . He sacrifices virtue to convenience, and is so much more careful to please than to instruct, that he seems to write without any moral purpose. . . . He makes no just distribution of good or evil, nor is always careful to show in the virtuous a disapprobation of the wicked. . . . He had no regard to distinction of time or place, but gives to one age or nation, without scruple, the customs, institutions, and opinions of another, at the expense not only of likelihood but of possibility. . . . In tragedy . . . the effusions of passions which exigence forces out, are, for the most part, striking and energetic; but whenever he solicits his invention, or strains his faculties, the offspring of his throes is tumour, meanness, tediousness, and obscurity." Mrs. C. Lennox says, "The violation of poetical justice is not the only fault that arises from the death of Hamlet; . . . his revenge becomes interested, and he seems to punish his uncle rather for his own death than the murder of the king his father. . . . The whole conduct of the play ('Cymbeline') is absurd and ridiculous to the last degree; . . . his 'Winter's Tale' is greatly inferior to the old paltry story that furnished him with the subject of it." Respecting the poetic genius of Milton, Channing has many fine thoughts: we select at random:—"We would ask, in what age or country has the pastoral reed breathed such sweet strains as are borne to us on 'the odoriferous wings of gentle gales' from Milton's Paradise. . . . His numbers have the prime charm of expressiveness. They vary with, and answer to, the depth, or tenderness, or sublimity of his conceptions, and hold intimate alliance with the soul. . . . Milton's poetry, though habitually serious, is always healthful, and bright, and vigorous. It has no gloom. He took no pleasure in drawing dark pictures of life: for he knew

by experience that there is a power in the soul to transmute calamity into an occasion and nutriment of moral power and triumphant virtue. We find nowhere in his writings that whining sensibility and exaggeration of morbid feeling, which makes so much of modern poetry effeminizing." In "Characteristics of Men of Genius" we read: "As basis or fountain of his rare physical and intellectual accomplishments, the man Milton was just and devout. He is rightly dear to mankind, because in him—among so many perverse and partial men of genius,—in him humanity rights itself; the old eternal goodness finds a home in his breast, and for once shows itself beautiful. His gifts are subordinated to his moral sentiments; and his virtues are so graceful that they seem rather talents than labours. Among so many contrivances as the world has seen to make holiness ugly, in Milton, at least, it was so pure a flame, that the foremost impression his character makes is that of elegance."

We have not followed seriatim the remarks of our opponents through lack of courtesy or want of compliment to them. We have derived much pleasure ourselves from the course of reading and thought this debate has imposed upon us, and doubt not that they have done so likewise. We assure the reader our object has been to find the truth, and place it before him—our adjudicator—in an interesting manner; to vindicate the genius of our incomparable Milton from that slight which the tendencies of our age would cast upon his fair fame. The dilated translation of Germanisms has had a pernicious effect upon the standard of literary taste; but this fashion of thought having passed its culminating point, and the good sense of our countrymen having a practical tendency toward high moral sentiment, we may fairly expect, ere long, some gifted mind will give to the world a code of criticism and taste, in which *the purity of gospel perfection* will be acknowledged as the *primary element of true genius*. Then will Milton be placed on the pinnacle of fame by the acclamation of an admiring nation, who have drunk deep at the fount of his inspiration. L'OUVRIER.

In forming a judgment, lay your hearts void of foretaken opinions, else whatsoever is done or said will be measured by a wrong rule.—Sir P. Sidney.

Politics.

OUGHT THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE TO BE REPEALED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WE have no faith in B. S. as a politician. The principle he lays down, in his negative article on this question, is one that demands and obtains our unqualified dissent. Had our great reformers begun their respective religious or political reformatations with B. S.'s self-complaisance and primary principle of action, they had now but figured indifferently among this world's benefactors.

B. S. does not trouble himself with the question of universal justice, which all law *should* express, or with man's inalienable and natural rights, which are at *stake* in this question; but passing over these weightier matters, begins the discussion of the merits of his political "anise and cummin." This is not likely to advance "the interests of truth in politics," B. S.'s avowed object.

It is a great thing in religion and politics to see error, and recoil therefrom in the way of reform. Yea, is it not the first step towards improvement? B. S. seems not to admit this. "We must," says he, "necessarily *wave*, or, at least, *modify* the claim, and content ourselves by enforcing on our opponents, that however *cogent* their arguments against primogeniture, it ought not and *cannot* be abolished, until an efficient substitute has been provided to *replace* it." The conclusion we deny not, but the spirit of self-isolation from the vital point at issue we execrate. Is not B. S. morally bound to state the nature of the law, *good* or *bad*, rather than *wave* our arguments, however "cogent," or the claims of humanity, however *divine*? From such a sentence, is it not manifest, that if all the members of the British commonwealth were to follow B. S.'s principle out, that "an efficient substitute" would never be found, simply and justly because never sought. Such "resting upon their (B. S.'s) arms," we think, considering the question of national good, worthy of comparison only to the apostate contentment of ancient Israel, that called forth the prophetic "Woe!" B. S. defends the "law;" *waves* or *modifies* the most cogent argu-

ments purely on this ground. Were there nothing higher and diviner among men than feudalism, which was but the embodiment of that ignoble principle that physical might is superior to moral and eternal right,—were there no God-sent principles of truth, love, and universal benevolence,—were there no beauty and harmony in them,—in fact, were there no Christianity in the world, to redeem humanity from the trammels of all error, we might, perhaps, be found contending in miserable fellowship with B. S. for the non-abolition of the primogenial law. But believing, as we do, that the perfection of all human law consists in the embodying of heaven's own principle, as it regards one another, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," we seek not "to rest on our arms," while the opposite principle "forms part of the very framework of society," so fully manifest in *primogeniture*, and *transportation*: at home, or *slavery* abroad.

We deem it rather our duty to expose the fallacy in *fundamentis* of the first, and the folly of its defenders,—to point out its evil tendencies and results in our great social fabric; thereby to arouse our countrymen to acquiesce no longer in its existence, but, by sanctified exertion under heaven's given plan, to seek its erasure from our great and glorious national code, fully convinced that all history teaches that the abandonment of error is the first step towards finding the truth; that as the gloom of the one breaks, the radiance of the other dawns. To be brief, B. S. proceeds, with no small parade, to offer, as an opening negative article, "a slight defence"—a *slight* one indeed!—at which we are amazed the more, as proceeding from "so able a correspondent." B. S. forcibly brought to our recollection one of the great Foster's remarks, in his essays, we think as applicable to primogeniture and B. S., as to episcopacy and H. B. It was to the effect that some minds invest that which has antiquity on its side with a peculiar corresponding

sanctity. The absurdity of such illogical deductions we need not here expose. Hence B. S. calls primogeniture "a time-honoured institution, interwoven with the habits and affections of society." If we are to understand by "honoured," established merely; by "habits and affections," evil habits and depraved affections, B. S. is right, not otherwise. Such honour, however, is not worth parade, or such habits worthy of continuance,—such affections worth cultivation, but *vice versa*. The result of this advocacy comes rather unexpectedly by way of admission, that primogeniture is not a *good* institution, to calling it an evil one, morally and essentially, as there can be no neutral ground for it to stand upon. This "slight defence" begins with flagrant sophistry, and, if we are to follow out his own deductions, ends in gross absurdity. We would remind B. S. that his arguments are much the same, not one iota superior to those which have been advanced in favour of slavery, episcopacy, or popery; or that the same might have been, and doubtless were, used against the abolition of Suttee, or Hindoo infanticide; and that the weakness of his arguments is highly indicative of the defencelessness of his cause. B. S. denominates those who advocate the abolition of the law "extreme politicians,"—a term indefinite indeed! Did he mean red republicans or chartists? We like plain writing, but in the absence of that we must understand the appellation comparatively. Let us see. Some politicians go so far as to prove a given institution "not good," and straightway set about a "slight defence" to perpetuate its evil existence: this is one extreme. Other politicians, however, having shown the given institution to be radically wrong, straightway advocate its abolition to the best of their powers: this is another extreme. While we are sorry to find B. S. in the one, we may congratulate ourselves on being in the other, as the most consistent, and conclude that the greater the distance between us on this subject the better for our *honour* in the unmistakable meaning of the word.

B. S.'s next step is to impress on his readers that a great change in our laws would create a great national excitement. Every reader of history must know this to his content. Whenever truth enters the

dominions of error, we expect victory for the former, but never without a previous struggle. What! and if in such a glorious world-redemptive movement, a nation should tremble convulsed in the very heart of it, or the powers of darkness recoil for ever, is the advocate of divine truth to cease his advocacy, or the proclaimer of universal justice towards universal man to retire? yea, more, are both to say, We have come to the crisis, and now we will turn renegade, desert our posts, abandon our arms, because we fear the Divinity in truth and justice intends to make fallen man tremble? Verily, no, B. S.! We have a strong faith in but one conservatism, that of truth and justice, for we know that these shall hereafter knit together all nations in a glorious brotherhood: whereas, the conservatism that pervades this article, and sits enthroned among "a titled aristocracy," admits only just enough of these divine principles to excite ceaseless antagonism.

We have not space to answer B. S. on "the right of property," it is somewhat foreign to the point at issue—the disposal of individual possession by *law*. Does B. S. presume so on our ignorance, or glory in his own, as to think we shall acquiesce in his assertion that "primogeniture is only a *custom*, not a *law*." Is there no law in our code to the effect that the property of an intestate shall descend to his eldest son and heirs? Is there no *law* of primogeniture? Are not the terms of the debate, "Ought the *Law* of Primogeniture to be repealed?" B. S. has discovered that there is no *law* at all, "only a *custom*" at every one's disposal. We should have thought that any writer in the *British Controversialist* had sufficient confidence in the editors to distrust themselves, rather than to question the terms of debate, much more than to dogmatize upon them. If we are to decide how far B. S. is worthy of the compliment paid him by "Irene," as a "man learned in the law," we fear the real merit would excite laughter instead of eclat. The political digressions which characterize this "slight defence," "Irene" has taken up in his article.

The remaining space of our reply we devote to T. U.'s article. Here we meet a similar defect to that which is so manifest in B. S.'s article—an attempt to avoid the vital point involved. T. U. says, "It is idle to maintain that the law of primogeniture is

unjust or arbitrary in character, as such an objection might be applied with much greater force to the whole question of the right of the present proprietors to the ownership of the land." It were just as logical to assert the equity of slavery, on the ground of the justice or injustice of transportation.

If it is *idle* to maintain that that which is essentially unjust, is unjust, or arbitrary, is arbitrary, because anything else may be so, we shall soon cease to believe that our legislature is progressive. The right of proprietorship to which T. U. refers, is nothing to the point, or we might vindicate our belief, that as it regards the soil on which we tread, *no man has a right to more than he can and will cultivate well*. Wherever we find either waste land, or badly cultivated land, we have the primary principle of national decay at work. If primogeniture be unjust and arbitrary, which we hold true, it cannot be idle, it must be right and expedient to maintain the same without abatement, till it cease to be. For what is the object of law but to establish universal justice. When it fails of this, it is a negation of itself. With such a flippant comment as T. U. makes on the vital point in the opening of his article, the reader is quite prepared for what follows, as no one would expect a house to abide a storm, or the depredations of time, whose foundation was laid in the sand. He manifests the same horror at a great change as B. S., and concludes that were the law of primogeniture *repealed*, our great political institution must soon subside in darkness and chaos! It were idle indeed here to show that there is no possible connexion between the repeal of a bad law and fiendish revolutions. We would remind T. U. that the terrible French revolutions did not arise from repealing a bad law—quite otherwise,

from the oppression of bad laws and tyranny. To repeal a bad law is to vindicate truth and supreme justice—is indeed a great and good work, and "men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles."

Again: T. U. asks, in order to justify the law, "What claim have children upon a father other than that they may be maintained in infancy, properly educated, and placed in the way of supporting themselves through life?" If T. U. believes this much at heart, we may say he is better than his creed, and cannot therewith consistently hold his position. Is he not aware that the law of primogeniture stands opposed to this, and does not admit a claim so natural? If it did in the case of a father intestate, it would make some provision for the infancy, the education, and establishment in life, of the junior branches of the family. Surely the moral obligation involved is not to be disregarded. In the case supposed, the law evidently acts *for* the father; but morally considered, had it not ought to act as a father? According to T. U.'s definition of the children's claim on the father, the law is evidently *unjust* and *partial*, since it negatives the claim, or acts as though it had never existed. Thus have we shown from our opponent's assertion or admission of the essential point involved, that the existing law of primogeniture is the embodiment of *injustice*; and what greater argument, we may ask, can be adduced in favour of its abolition?

In conclusion, we may truly say, if B. S. and T. U. have advanced the best arguments in favour of primogeniture, we may pronounce it a *fallen cause*, and rest assured it only needs the continued advocacy of its repeal by those who love their nation, to secure its *ultimate* and *total* abolition.

Buckingham.

ROLLA.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

I OUGHT to be truly grateful to "Irene"! That gentleman having discovered that my former article on this topic (pp. 385—387) was an act of argumentative suicide, has buried me with funereal honours outvying all precedent. The army and navy of my country have been sacrificed as mighty hecatombs to appease my manes; and my mausoleum is "a starry-pointing pyramid" formed of the magnificent rains of the

English constitution, while "honest industry" kneels, with "a millstone of debt about her neck," weeping my untimely fate. Surely both friend and foe must envy me, and exclaim—

"Thou, so sepulchred, in such pomp dost lie,
That kings, for such a tomb, might wish to die."

Feeling, however, an uneasy sense of vitality, and doubting whether "Irene" has really

been as destructive as he intended to be, I shall now proceed to examine the arguments urged against primogeniture; but I wish it to be understood that I do so under protest, and as a mere act of courtesy towards my opponents. For reasons already stated at page 385 (to which I beg to refer the reader), I maintain that the present question is now settled in the negative. No substitute for our present law of inheritance has been proposed; and since it is utterly impossible that civilized society can be carried on, if the obsequies of every person who dies intestate are to be celebrated by a physical-force fight for the possession of his property, the law of primogeniture (which simply directs that, in such cases, real estate shall devolve upon the eldest son, to the exclusion of all others) must remain unrepealed. In parliamentary phraseology there is "no motion before the house;" *cadit questio*, the debate is at an end, and we are now simply engaged in a post-prandial discussion in the refreshment room.

As space is valuable, I shall occasionally comment rather by allusion than quotation, hoping that my readers will refer to my opponents' articles to see that I do no injustice. To facilitate this, I shall add numerical references to the portions criticised. My old friend "Rolla" claims my first attention. As he appears to be no great friend to conservative politics, I was somewhat astonished to find him declaring (p. 384, col. 1) that primogeniture was, "in its origin, an encroachment on the leading power;" while in the next column we are informed that "having learned the origin of the law, the reader will not be surprised that it should be unjust *in se*!" An encroachment on the leading power is unjust *in se*! This is a revival of the old doctrines of passive obedience and the divine right of despotism,—twin spectres of the past, at whose apparition in the pages of the *Controversialist* I beg to express my unfeigned "surprise." Again, on the same page, we are told (col. 1) that primogeniture is "*the democratic element overwhelming the monarchic power in a rude state of society*;" and (col. 2) that it is "the embodiment of the principle which always prevails more or less in a rude state of society—that *right* is subordinate to *might*." Whence it appears, that in a rude state of society the democratic element and monarchic power are, respectively, the personification of

"*might*" and "*right*;" two singular conclusions for a radical politician, and somewhat difficult to reconcile with history. Can any confidence be placed in a writer, or any weight be attached to his arguments, when they are based on such suicidal puerilities?

Having lighted my critical lantern, I now invite the reader to turn to page 384, and (passing over the introductory dissertation on feudalism) to accompany me, from the top of col. 2, in a rigorous search after a valid and honest argument against primogeniture. The first argument brought forward is contained in these words, "*Equality of birth implies equality in succession, according to the simple dictate of natural right.*" For "*equality*" read "*priority*," and the sentence will prove as potent logic in favour of primogeniture: the argument is an imposture. I must renew my search. As the next paragraph simply expresses "Rolla's" surprise at the long career of primogeniture, and his opinions on "transportation, execution, &c.," I pass on to the lengthy and singularly-constructed sentence which follows it. Instead of the law granting the injustice of primogeniture, by limiting "it in one portion of the kingdom," &c., the truth is identically the opposite; gavel-kind (the custom described by "Rolla") was an institution of our Saxon ancestors, and the law limited it by introducing primogeniture throughout the kingdom, except in Kent, where it either could not or dare not. If "Rolla's" inference be worth anything, it is in favour of primogeniture. I, however, respectfully decline encumbering myself with such sophistications. The statement that "there is no right of primogeniture among females, the crown excepted," is incorrect; the eldest daughter has a right to include the principal family mansion in her share.* With respect to the assertion quoted from Maunders, I may inform "Rolla" that it applies only to France. The hereditary succession to the crown of England has been governed by the law of primogeniture ever since A.D. 800, when the heptarchy was united under the sway of Egbert.

"II. It is a law repugnant to natural feeling," &c. Shade of Wilberforce! trem-

* I may here remark, that this objection as to females applies to all known laws of inheritance; females never inherit, except in default of male issue, an event naturally of rare occurrence.

ble in thy grave; Spirit of Freedom! resign thy island-throne; for hark—"Primogeniture is a *crime*, not less odious than that which gives man possession of his fellow-man!" Oh! for the pen of Mrs. Beecher Stowe, to paint the unmixed miseries of English hearths and homes! Better the dungeon and the fetter than to lose our share of the "paternal acres"! This transcendental oratory has one advantage. Nobody can pretend to *reason* against it. But really, friend "Rolla," do lay the blame on the right shoulders. It is the parent who "robs," and not the eldest son; he merely takes what his father (by omitting to divide it by will) has given to him. I think, however, that it will raise a smile to hear that English fathers are in the habit of robbing "the infant and unconscious members of their family."

"III. It is a law frequently productive of political discord," &c. (page 385, col. 1). In this paragraph, "Rolla" falls foul of the English monarchy. Primogeniture may give us a bad king; and so might universal suffrage, or any other possible mode of fixing the succession to the throne; but, surely, after the terrible warnings given by the fate of Charles I. and James II., and after living sixteen years under the gentle sway of Queen Victoria, we need not make a bugbear of these possibilities. Besides, parliament has the power (and has frequently used it) to make laws, in conjunction with the sovereign, which shall "bind the crown and the descent thereof;" and if "Rolla" "maliciously and advisedly" denies that fact "by writing or printing," he will become "guilty of high treason." With that peculiar historical skill for which "Rolla" is remarkable, "a murderer, Richard III.," and "a bigot and hypocrite, James II.," are adduced as instances of the evil effect of primogeniture. Perhaps my good friend will condescend to look into some abridgment of English history; he will then find that Richard III. was a usurper, and that James II. succeeded his *brother*,—so that the law of primogeniture is not answerable for their misdeeds.

"IV. It is frequently productive of social misery." This concluding head is supported by arguments completely beyond my comprehension. I find that younger sons, as a body, are consigned to "the union for a shelter." I hope "Rolla" is not amongst the unhappy crew. Possibly the scanty nature

of the workhouse library accounts for his novel readings in history. Carlyle is quoted for some inexplicable purpose, and the article closes with fragmentary sentences of a most awful appearance. "A nation ruined, *pro tempore, by law!*" What nation is meant? who ruined it? how long will its "*pro tempore*" ruin last? "An orphan family, beggared, sorrow-stricken twice . . . *by law*," which, being interpreted, signifieth, probably, a chancery suit, à la "Bleak House."

Diogenes-like, my search has been futile; I have been unable to find one honest argument, one valid syllogism in "Rolla's" article. Before entering upon an encounter with "Irene," I may make one or two remarks. 1. As to the moral justice of primogeniture, as a principle. From the days of Abraham downwards, the idea of *birthright* (i.e., a superiority of privilege appertaining to the *firstborn*, as such) has run through society, and is traceable in all ages, and among all nations. Esau "sold his *birthright*;" when Joseph feasted his brethren, they "sat before him, the *firstborn* according to his *birthright*;" when the dying patriarch blessed his twelve sons, he addressed Reuben as "my *firstborn*, my might, and the beginning of my strength;" the severest judgment against Pharaoh was, when God "smote all the *firstborn* of Egypt, the chief of all their strength;" the extremity of sorrow is typified by "one that is in bitterness for his *firstborn*;" Christ himself is described as "firstborn among many brethren;" and his followers are denominated "the church of the *firstborn*." In the Jewish state, whose laws were founded by our divine Creator, primogeniture figured largely; the eldest son received a double portion of the paternal inheritance (Deut. xxi. 17), and in the absence of his father, was priest and head of the family; the high priesthood was held by primogeniture; the kingdom descended by the same rule. I have purposely confined myself to illustrations from scripture, and on its authority I venture to ask, whether primogeniture is "repugnant to natural feeling and moral sentiment?" 2. As to its extent in the present day, primogeniture applies only, in England, to real estate, i.e., landed property. Personal estate (including the capital of our railways, canals, and of the whole mercantile and manufacturing industry of our nation—in

short, "the money-power of England") is divided equally amongst kindred of the same degree; the epithets, therefore, of "robbery," "beggary," &c., are mere misrepresentations of the truth. It must be recollected also, that where a man has not personality sufficient to satisfy the younger branches of his family, he is at liberty either to divide his real estate by will, or (as is frequently done) to transmit it to his heir, burdened with the payment of legacies, portions, annuities, &c., for their benefit.

"Irene" (page 428) opens his article by a series of paradoxes. He supposes that I am "a man learned in the law," and then endeavours to prove that I know nothing about it. He "takes his law" from me, and, adding that he is thereby "landed in a position the most advantageous possible," proceeds to remark on the "obvious inconsistency" of my statements. According to his own confession, therefore, his reasoning being built on the false foundation of "obvious inconsistency," is of necessity worthless. But I venture to say, that the inconsistency in question is entirely a fiction of his own mind, arising from a want of that "careful attention" which he recommends to others. For the purpose of showing this to be the case, I shall take a hasty review of the course of reasoning pursued in the first half of my opening article. In page 385, I argue that "the law of primogeniture," which simply comes into action in cases of intestacy, cannot (without the risk of convulsing society) be abolished, until a substitute has been provided; this fact is almost of an axiomatic character, and having been specifically reinforced at the commencement of the present article, needs no further vindication. In page 385, col. 1, I argue that primogeniture has "a prescriptive right to our reverence," as a time-honoured institution which has moulded the destiny of our nation; I call upon the reader to shun the love of change, and to judge the tree by its fruits—a powerful argument in favour of primogeniture, ably supported by "T. U.," in his concluding paragraph, and wisely, but not fairly, ignored by "Irene." In page 386, col. 2, I show that the English law allows an unlimited power of alienation by will; that therefore primogeniture, as a right, i. e., an advantage guaranteed to the eldest son by law, no longer exists, but is in

all cases placed at the discretion of the parent; and, consequently, that primogeniture owes its present position to the influence of custom, being in itself "a perfect law of liberty," holding out a model for the imitation of the community, but allowing each individual to follow his own inclinations. It is the custom of English landowners to follow the model thus held out; they do so by free choice, and I appealed to my opponents to know whether they wished to forbid this. "Irene" offers "a decided affirmative." He would abolish the model, forbid the custom, and circumscribe our freedom. He is a model politician of the French socialist and American democratic schools, hating primogeniture because it is an *English* institution, and far too jealous of liberty to spare any for his opponents. I now leave the reader to judge whether there is any "obvious inconsistency" in my former remarks; I am obtuse enough not to perceive it.

The remainder of "Irene's" article is a pure attack on what I termed "two peculiar advantages incident to primogeniture." If he is inclined to abolish the House of Lords, to uproot the aristocracy of the country, to disband its army and navy, and to parcel out the land into potato patches, I venture to believe that few will agree with him. His taste is singular; and on the principle, "*De gustibus non est disputandum*," I might here close; but, since his vituperation of "things as they are" derives its chief strength from misrepresentation, I may as well notice a few of his positions. The union of church and state has no earthly connexion with primogeniture. Advowsons (i. e., the right of presentation to ecclesiastical livings) are, unfortunately, become a species of private property. At the present day they are, comparatively, seldom held in connexion with any given estate; and where they are so held, they may be severed from all further connexion with the manors to which they are appendant, at the will of the owner. It is true, they are esteemed *real* property, and as such may be subject to the action of primogeniture; but the probability of an abuse of church patronage is as great, I imagine, in the hands of a younger brother as in those of the firstborn. The mischief consists in the fact that church patronage has become *secular* property. If primogeniture were

forbidden, and the aristocracy swept away, the only result in this respect would be, that, instead of certain livings being presented to "lordly goslings" by ducal ganders (to adopt for the nonce the elegant phraseology of "Irene"), the same transaction would take place between untitled bipeds of the same genus. The advantage of the change I am unable to perceive. As a specimen of the gross abuse of church influence by our aristocracy, I may remind "Irene" that the present primate has risen from the ranks of the people, and that, out of twenty-eight English bishops, only *one* is of noble family.

If "Irene" will turn to English history, he will, perhaps, learn a little about our army and navy. In the meantime I may inform him that there was once a naval commander named Nelson, who rose from "humble" rank (*i. e.*, in "Irene's" sense of "humble"), and gained the highest naval honours and a place in the peerage of this country. When "Irene" has studied that instance, I can give him further disproofs of his assertions about "the commissioned ranks." The sneers about "lordly parasites" and "gentlemanly soldiers" should have been reserved for a page where the name of Wellington did not appear, and for readers who never heard of Marlborough. Englishmen who have seen the battered form and scarred features of the late Sir Charles Napier, and have watched the Marquis of Anglesey hobbling on his cork leg, or Lord Fitzroy Somerset (Baron Raglan) making better use of his *one* arm than other persons are apt to do with two, will have more taste than to insult their heroes because they happened to be born of noble families. With regard to the military expenditure of the nation, it may be interesting to some readers to state, that in the year ending January 5, 1853, we paid more to government for the postage of our letters than the cost of the ordnance,—that the expense of the navy was covered by the excise duty on British spirits,—and that our "army estimates" were exceeded by the Custom-house duties on tobacco and foreign spirits.

The paragraph (page 429) on our aristocracy I shall not attempt to answer. When a writer, in spite of the fact that the House of Commons has the sole control of the national finances, describes the national debt as a work of the peerage, he must have re-

solved to disbelieve all evidence; when he declares the House of Lords to be a "dangerous obstacle" in one sentence, and a "sickly," "weak," and "imbecile" body in the next, and places sentiment and bigotry in the same category, he is evidently beyond the reach of argument. I do not pretend to reason against such expressions as "an incubus and a curse"! I commend to his notice, hopelessly, I confess, the admirable remarks of my coadjutor T. U. (page 433, col. 2), and I remind him that Magna Charta, the foundation of English freedom, was the work of the English barons.

In my former article, I endeavoured to illustrate the evil effects of a minute subdivision of land. "The case of Scotland and Ireland," which I cited, is declared "lamentably out of point;" the only reason vouchsafed is, that in "farming, the Scotch are nearly a century ahead of the English." Thank you, "Irene." I will not stop to explore the exaggeration of your statement; but, taking the grain of truth which it contains, I will inform you that primogeniture prevails to a much greater extent in Scotch law than with us. The strictness of Scotch entails is upheld by law; the possibility of a continuous entail is taken away by the English law. A Scotchman, in order to devise his lands, must have his will drawn with the formality and exactitude of a regular conveyance, and must execute it a certain time before his death, or the eldest son can defeat his wishes; an Englishman may scribble his wishes on a slip of paper the day before his death, and the law will enforce their fulfilment. You have exposed your ignorance, and have furnished an additional "case in point." My "French facts," it appears, are English "errors." I submit my defence of them:—"France is the most favourable country in Europe for agriculture. . . . The agriculture of France at present occupies the lowest rank in that of the northern states of Europe" (London's "Encyclopædia of Agriculture," p. 65). Mr. Low, professor of agriculture in the University of Edinburgh, speaking of the French law of succession, says, "It is to be trusted that no great European country will ever follow the example of France" (Low "On Landed Property," p. 4). "The agriculture of Britain is far superior to that of the Continent. . . . A wooden harrow is a refinement

in agriculture not known in the fertile plains of France. . . . The cattle are poor-looking, knock-kneed creatures of a very small size . . ." ("Journal of Agriculture," II., p. 185). "Less than one-third of the population of England, and more than two-thirds of the population of France, are engaged in the cultivation of the soil. . . . Notwithstanding this disproportion, the English labouring classes are better fed than the French. And there is no comparison between their respective enjoyment of clothing and other manufactures" ("Agriculture," in the "Encyclopædia Metropolitana"). "The diminutive possessions of the Swiss, and, more lately, of the French peasantry, afford no room for the employment of capital, and those inventions by which the charges of cultivation are diminished, and its products increased. . . ." ("Agriculture," in the "Encyclopædia Britannica"). The "Edinburgh Review" (vol. xl.), speaking of the French law, says, "It has rendered the children jealous of each other, and of their father. . . . It is easy to see what a wide door has been thus opened to every sort of fraud, perjury, litigation. . ." Perhaps these authors may be considered as trustworthy as "1793 and 1853." The popularity of the French law does not prove its political expediency, since the same mode of reasoning would lead us to infer the moral propriety of drunkenness from the fact of a general attachment to the brandy bottle.

The celebrated agricultural writer, Mr. Young, after enumerating many of the practices of large farmers, asks, "What mind can be so *perversely* framed as to imagine, for a single moment, that *such things* can be effected by *small farmers*?" Mr. Ricardo, speaking of the subdivision of land and its consequences, says, "The principle of gravitation is not more certain than the tendency of such a system to change wealth and power into misery and weakness; to call

away the exertion of labour from every object but that of providing mere subsistence; to confound all intellectual distinction; to busy the mind continually in supplying the body's wants; until, at last, all classes are infected with the plague of universal poverty." Another writer remarks, "The tendency of such a system is to approximate man to the state of the savage, obliged to supply himself, by his own labour, with everything his situation may require." The eminent political economists, Mr. Nassau, sen., and Mr. J. S. Mill, concur in the same opinions. Mr. McCulloch says, "Such are the ruinous effects produced by the small farming system. And such, too, would be the effects of having a country parcelled out into small freehold properties." "Irene" has referred to the United States; I therefore conclude by quoting an eminent American writer: "*There are very great evils, undoubtedly, in the subdivision of estates. . . . The policy of the measure will depend upon circumstances—the state of society, the genius of the government, the character of the people, the amount of cultivated land, the extent of territory, and the mean and inducement to emigrate from one part of the country to another. . . . It would be very unfounded to suppose that the evils of equal partition of estates have been seriously felt in these United States. . . . The extraordinary extent of our unsettled territories, and the abundance of uncultivated land in the market, operate sufficiently to keep paternal inheritances unbroken. The tendency of these causes is rather to enlarge than to abridge them*" (Kent's "Commentaries on American Law," iv. p. 384, 5). Proud, yet grateful, that I bear the name of a Briton, I lay my humble mite of service on the altar of my country's welfare;—readers! judge ye.

B. S.

He is never tired of listening who wishes to gain wisdom; and he is never tired of talking who thinks he has gained enough. He who has a rich memory is often contented with a poor judgment,—with having much of other men's, and little or nothing of his own. Bluntness of manners is decidedly a fault: it either shows a want of regard for another's feelings; an affectation of sincerity; a bad education; or the neglect and abuse of a good one.—*Gems of Wisdom.*

Social Economy.

OUGHT TRANSPORTATION TO BE ABOLISHED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

*"Adsit
Regula peccatis quæ pœnas irroget æquas;
Nec scutica dignum, horribili sectere flagello."*
Horace, Sat. I. 3.

THE celebrated Marquis Beccaria, in his "Treatise on Crimes and Punishments," attempted to reduce the proportion between offences and their penalties to the accuracy and precision of a mathematically graduated scale. From the infinite varieties of human character, and the wide differences of natural and acquired sensibility, such a scheme must necessarily fail; but, while we are compelled to refrain from attempting its full development, it ought, in the aphoristic form in

which the joyous old Sabine has clothed it, and which I have adopted as a motto, to form the basis and animating principle of all our penal legislation. Now, with this principle transportation is utterly irreconcilable; its only susceptibility of variation is in respect of time, and practically its gradations are very few in number. In illustration and proof of these remarks, I have extracted from the parliamentary returns the following figures, showing the numbers sentenced to the various terms of transportation, for crimes committed in England and Wales, during the years 1848-50:—

Term of Punishment.	1848.	1849.	1850.	Average—1848-50.
For life	67	60	84	2½ per cent.
Above fifteen years	28	31	39	1 "
For fifteen, and above ten years	291	255	281	9½ "
For ten, and above seven years	843	933	805	30 "
For seven years	2,022	1,565	1,369	57 "

It will be seen, from the calculations of the last column, that, in ninety-six and a half cases out of every hundred, the gradations of this punishment are confined within the compass of eight years,—that of these, in eighty-seven cases, the variations of the punishment are narrowed down to three years,—and that, in considerably more than half, the sentence of transportation is one uniform penalty, setting at defiance all notions of equality and proportion. But there is another light in which we may consider the inequality (and consequent unfitness) of transportation as a part of our penal system, viz., by observation of the different classes of crime to which the same sentence is awarded. The reprieved murderer; the cowardly and brutal perpetrator of a garotte robbery; the incendiary, who shall maliciously destroy a ship, or simply fire a stack of "straw, haulm, stubble, &c. &c." (7 Will. IV., and 1 Vic., cap. 89, sections 6, 10); the

author of a threatening letter (10 and 11 Vic., cap. 66); the ill-paid, hard-worked, and sorely-tempted letter-carrier, who shall "embezzle, secrete, or destroy" a letter containing "any chattel, money, or valuable security" (7 Will. IV., and 1 Vic., cap. 36, sec. 26); the forgery of a name; the attempt to receive a dividend by a false personation of the owner of the stock of an incorporated company (11 Geo. IV., and 1 Will. IV., cap. 66, sec. 7),—all these are liable to the one punishment of transportation for life. Nor is this monstrous disproportion between crime and punishment, in its outward measure, the sole, or even the greatest evil connected with these instances: the punishment itself will not be the same to the different individuals. The pains of transportation are more severe to the educated than the ignorant,—to the sensitive than the hardened; and hence, while many of its evils will be escaped, and all alleviated, in the case of

the murderer, they will press with redoubled weight on those who have committed the far lighter crimes last mentioned. Most of my readers will have seen the operation of a domestic punishment, which (*magna componere parvis*) bears a close analogy and resemblance to transportation,—I allude to the practice of putting a child “in a corner,” or “out of the room,” with the solemn injunction not to return again “until he is good.” A sensitive child, conscious of having done wrong, and overwhelmed with a sense of shame, probably suffers far more than is intended; while the obstinate or hardened one, after the first burst of passion is over, will generally pass the time very agreeably to himself in making grimaces in the corner, or playing outside the door. The origin of the domestic practice and of the social institution is one and the same,—a desire to get rid of the offender for a given period, and to save the trouble of an attempt at his reformation.

If the reader will connect the above observations with those which appeared in a former article, I think he will find a satisfactory series of arguments against transportation; I now, therefore, turn from argument to authority. The testimony of Beccaria and Howard have been adduced by E. W. S.; the decision of Bentham, the great master-mind of theoretical legislation, is thus given:—“England, before the independence of America, was in the habit of transporting a numerous class of delinquents to the colonies. This transportation was to some slavery,—to others, a pleasure. A vagabond (*un va-vrien*) who desired to travel was a fool, if, to obtain an outfit, he did not commit a crime. . . . Once condemned and transported, the fate of the criminals became unknown. Thus all the effects of example were lost; the principal end (of punishment) was neglected. The transportation which now takes place to Botany Bay fulfils its object no better; it has all the vices, and none of those qualities, which a punishment should possess. What absurdity, what madness it would be, if, in offering a settlement in a distant country, it was added that it must be merited by the commission of a crime! Transportation presents itself to the mind of most unfortunates as an advantageous offer, by which they can profit only by the commission of a crime. Thus the law, instead of counter-

balancing temptation, in most cases adds to its force.”*—(“*Traité de Législation Civile et Pénale*,” tom. ii. p. 425-6.) The great foreign jurist and professor, M. P. Rossi, in his “*Treatise on Penal Law*,” has opposed transportation as defective in the two most necessary particulars of reformatory and exemplary influence. Mr. Mill has condemned it; and Archbishop Whately has striven to overthrow it. The opinion of Earl Grey has been already quoted (p. 392), and the decision of the select committee, endorsed (amongst others) with the names of Russell and Molesworth, is registered in a previous article (p. 391). To conclude this marshalling of legislative and parliamentary talent, I may quote the author of “*Punishment*,” in the “*Encyclopædia Britannica*”:—“It fails especially in the great object of *example*; it neither deters others, nor corrects the offender himself. Instead of suppressing the power of commission, it is the fertile source of crimes. It does not supply the means of compensation to the party injured; it is not economical, but very costly to the state.” Truly, if we err, it is in goodly company.

The first negative article of the present debate appears to me of a most extraordinary character; it might fairly be summed up into the form of an advertisement:—“Wanted, an argument in favour of transportation; the smallest contributions thankfully received. Apply to J. M. S.” I had not expected to find any very formidable array of reasoning prepared to do battle in behalf of transportation; but I did suppose that it would have raised a more efficient body-guard than the ragged regiment of arguments commanded by J. M. S. The article in question barely occupying two pages, we might have expected that the author would have rushed at once “*medias in res*,” but instead of this, setting out from “a doctrine maintained by most theologians,” he wanders pleasantly along, touching on “the origin of evil,” discussing the derivation of “banishment,” and presenting us a summary of the history of transportation down to the year 1787, for

* Quotation marks should be held sacred, and applied only to a writer's own words, except under peculiar circumstances, like the present. The words given are a translation from the French of the original edition by Dumont.

which latter labour he is curtly but justly reproved by his coadjutor "L'Ouvrier." In his third and next paragraph, J. M. S. informs us that transportation is objected to "on various grounds," attributes our late legislation to "the discovery of the Australian gold mines," and (after prophesying further evil to the cause he supports) rejoices to take up his pen and "maintain that transportation ought *not* to be abolished." The italics are his own, wisely introduced in the very *middle* of his "hasty notes" to mark his *first* declaration of opinion!

For convenience sake, I shall venture to present a condensed summary of the remainder of the article of J. M. S. before proceeding to refute it; and, as my object is not to attack the writer, but to convince the readers, I hope that they will refer to his article, and see that I do not misrepresent in abridging it. The arguments of J. M. S. are:—1. Transportation "inflicts a penalty;" for it is painful to leave home and fatherland, to be torn by force from the embraces of friends, and "sent for a number of years and a hard course of servitude—

'To sigh his English breath in foreign clouds.'"

It is true the punishment has been stripped of some of its horrors; but many remain unmitigated, for Lord Campbell says so. 2. Transportation is "reformatory;" for Filangieri says "that it is possible to transform a bad man into a good one." Dr. Lang says that transportation has had that effect; and, as a makeweight to his testimony, we may add that of a nameless "under colonial secretary." 3. Transportation "exhibits a preventive example" on society; for this follows from its punitive character, which Lord Campbell's testimony has established. Such is the defence of transportation! Will my readers bear with me while I make a few remarks on this unique and microscopic argument? The first proposition is almost a truism, and yet J. M. S. blunders over it in a most amusing fashion. We are told that the convict sighs for "a hard course of servitude" (such, at least, is the grammatical meaning of the sentence); the beautiful climate, and almost cloudless skies of Australia, are denominated "foreign clouds;" and, to crown all, we are informed that "emigration" has many horrors still "unmitigated"! To represent the vicious cri-

iminal as suffering from pangs which only affect the refined sensibilities of our nature, is an unintentional satire on the punishment. What is "fatherland" to the wretched denizens of those squalid haunts of misery and vice where crimes are hatched like a serpent's brood? What are the ties of home to those whose dwelling is the noisome cellar or the "thieves' kitchen?" What is the firm grasp of the police to those whose life has been one round of drunken riot and ferocious brutality? What are friends to those whose associates are the drunkard and the burglar? Oh, it is sickening to find one who debates on "Social Economy" thus trifling with human wretchedness! With reference to the second head, of "reformatory influence," the assertions of the bellicose doctor amount to nothing. If convicts have reformed under its influence, it has been in spite of, and not through, transportation. Since, however, the celebrated declaration of war hurled at the Colonial Office, we have had a doubtful opinion of the Rev. J. D. Lang, and shall pass over his remarks by simply opposing to him the name of Dr. Whately. A moment's consideration will enable any one to perceive that a punishment may be eminently penal and yet destitute of all exemplarity. The case of secret torture is a striking proof of this position; the deduction of J. M. S., therefore, falls to the ground. The authority of Lord Campbell having been twice introduced, I may remind the reader that two governments, including the names of St. Leonard's, Cranworth, Kelly, Thesiger, Cockburn, and Bethel, have decreed the doom of transportation. Lord Campbell is neither the Themis nor the Minerva of English law.

The article of "L'Ouvrier" is an undoubted advance upon that of J. M. S.; if not logical, it is, at least, ingenious. Harping on "the chord of self," touching us in that tender part, the purse, and ingeniously shifting the subject to the abuses of Birmingham Gaol, it may, probably, exert an influence on the minds of some readers. Though frequently differing from him, I have generally felt a sympathy with this writer, from his apparent honesty of purpose and fairness of argument; it is, therefore, with some degree of hope as to his ultimate conversion, that I bespeak his attention in the character he has assumed of an inquirer. For reasons stated in a former article, I shall not challenge the

accuracy of "L'Ouvrier's" calculations; but I unequivocally demand that the reader still suspend his judgment on the relative expenses of transportation and imprisonment. According to "L'Ouvrier's" own statement, the punishment of the hulks is cheaper than transportation; and it is a mere evasion to assert that they are "part of the transport system." We might as well say that a metropolitan police station is a part of Newgate prison. The simple abolition of transportation would leave the hulks untouched. "L'Ouvrier" has struck a fatal blow at his own edifice. Again.—Almost all our acts of parliament, in awarding punishments, leave the judge the option of sentencing to so many years' transportation, or to a far inferior number of years' imprisonment with hard labour. They seem to lay down, as a general rule, that imprisonment with hard labour for three years is, in the eye of the law, equivalent to seven years' transportation. This will completely turn the tables on our friend "L'Ouvrier." But it is not until transportation has answered the heavy indictment brought against it on moral grounds that this question of expense can be allowed to have any weight. Till then, I can only remind "L'Ouvrier" that "dead men do no wrong," and that a grave within the prison precincts is of little cost; whispering, however, in his ear, "There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is good, but it tendeth to poverty."

With respect to the exemplarity of transportation, which "L'Ouvrier" somewhat roundly asserts, I respectfully request his consideration of the fact stated of the governor of Van Diemen's Land (see p. 391, col. 2). There is, probably, not one in twenty, or even fifty, of the lowest and most criminal classes in this country, who know in what way transportation differs from emigration; and, as we have already noticed, J. M. B., while professing to teach others, actually confounds the two. Now, if we rested here, it would surely be safe to infer that a punishment whose very nature is unknown can have no effect in deterring others from crime. But, to settle, if possible, this vexed question of exemplarity, let us trace the career of two criminals. Suppose they have committed, in concert, some crime in the suburbs of the metropolis; they are arrested, and eventually

committed to take their trial at the Central Criminal Court. Their associates may, probably, hear the sentence of seven years' transportation pronounced in court; and, as far, there is exemplarity; though the impudent, but I believe sincere, "Thank you, my lord," which not unfrequently greets the sentence, must often take away all sense of terror from the minds of the hearers. The convicts arrive at Sydney, and, after a short probation, obtain tickets of leave, and are assigned to different settlers. The one falls to the lot of some hard taskmaster, who, simply intent on gain, regards him as a bond-slave, out of whom he is privileged to get the utmost amount of labour. Depraved by the associations of the voyage, and oppressed by his master, every spark of moral feeling is extinguished, until, becoming unmanageable, he is thrown back on the hands of the convict government, and, descending through all the grades of penal punishment—the whip, the fetter, and the chain-gang—he attempts a desperate escape, is sent to Norfolk Island, and the gates of mercy are closed upon him for ever. I will not harrow the feelings by a recital of the inhuman horrors of his brief remaining career; his fate is known only to the convict authorities and the government; his former associates are ignorant of his lot. Where is the exemplarity? The other convict, perhaps of a more timid nature, and meeting with a better master, may, perhaps, be rewarded by slight wages, and at the close of his term is enabled, in a colony where a brawny arm is a mine of wealth, to rise gradually. His mind reverting to the past, he writes home, to induce his acquaintance to join him, and describes the comforts and competency of his position. What will be the result? Unable to raise the passage money, ignorant of the awful fate of the one, and dazzled by the success of the other, transportation will be looked upon by those to whom he writes as a free passage to success; and his punishment, instead of being a preventive example, will become a powerful inducement to crime! If any one doubts the colouring of my picture, let him refer to the evidence adduced before the select committee, and he will find that I am relating "stubborn facts." One case mentioned records that, on the receipt of a letter from a successful convict, the ignorant villagers to whom it was written immediately

began to inquire what they could do to be transported. When a convict does not return at the close of his sentence, his associates naturally infer that he is better off there than here; when he does return, it is either in comparative wealth, to be an evidence against the penal character of the punishment, or in distress, to fall back into his former practices, corrupted and corrupting.

The cruelties of Birmingham Gaol are arguments *against* transportation. The state is bound, by every consideration of morality and religion, to temper justice with mercy,—to avoid the infliction of unnecessary pain. If, then, in the very centre of England, cruelty has been practised in our gaols, it is, surely, a national sin to expose our criminals to the mercy of irresponsible taskmasters in the colonies. If secret torture maintain a hold for a time at home, what must be the condition of convicts at the antipodes? If abuses can creep in here, in spite of all the thousand safeguards which exist, what human system can ensure their correction in Bermuda and Van Diemen's Land?

The appeal of "L'Ouvrier" to those morbid sensibilities and false delicacies of the age, which would ignore the evils they dislike, will fall unheeded on every masculine mind. We would not exhibit the convict in his "chains" and badges to the eyes of our countrymen; there is no necessity for it; but, remembering that the convict is "bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh,"—remembering that he was born amongst us, and sinned against our laws,—we dare not outrage natural justice so far as to cast him forth to dwell amongst *others*. We have no more right to force our morally depraved criminals upon another community, than to compel our neighbours to harbour a raging lunatic or a helpless cripple born within our own house. I greatly regret to find that "L'Ouvrier" should thus appeal to the selfishness of our

nature,—should ask us to make the obscene ribaldry of crime, and the muttered curses of the chain-gang, the cradle-songs of future empires, because, forsooth, the clank of a prisoner's irons sounding from the walls of an English prison would grate too harshly on his delicate ear. It is not by indulging such feelings as these that crime is to be repressed and eradicated. We must stand face to face with our criminal population. We must go with the beaming face of benevolence and seek the outcasts of society; we must lure the criminal into the light of day; we must let him feel that he is neither forgotten nor uncared for; we must exert the potent influences of education, and the mighty leverage of "pure and undefiled religion" to raise him to a purer and healthier moral atmosphere. We must no longer consult "feeling;" we must no longer, like the priest and Levite of old, pass by the fallen with averted face; but must seek him as good Samaritans, pour "wine and oil into his wounds," and tend him till he is healed of his moral maladies. Above all, we must cease to brand the criminal with everlasting shame; we must learn to "forgive others," that we ourselves may be forgiven; and, stretching out the hand of pity, we must welcome the criminal's return to the path of virtue; we must receive the repentant prodigal into our midst, and treat him with love, instead of regarding him with suspicion. Transportation is but an attempt to avoid a great social responsibility,—the responsibility of caring for those whose sins are too often the result of the social injustice and selfish narrowness which abounds amongst us. It is conceived in the spirit of Cain,—*"Am I my brother's keeper?"*—and the doom of Cain is upon it; its existence now draws rapidly to a close. Its history will be a tale of sorrow and of guilt; its epitaph a curse; its memory "a by-word and a hissing."

B. S.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THIEVES may be arranged in two great classes,—those who from circumstances *can* hardly be anything else, and those who are so depraved that they *will* be nothing else.

I. There are some thieves who can hardly be anything else.

It has been remarked by a person con-

versant with one of the worst districts in England, that "the greater number of prostitutes are so because they can do nothing else. Their education does not fit them either for service or any other useful employment, and so they fall into sin." This remark, we think, may be fairly applied to a

very large number of the felons of the present day. They can do nothing useful, and so they fall into various kinds of sin, but most frequently into theft. These persons may be divided into two classes,—those who are trained to theft from infancy, and those who fall at other employments.

In order to form some kind of estimate of the number of persons who are trained from childhood to steal, it is only necessary to refer to the statement of a teacher in this line, as given in the last "Report of the London City Mission." When questioned by the missionary as to "how many lads he supposed he had trained to be thieves during the last twenty years?" he answered "that he could not exactly tell; but of this he was sure, it could not be less than five hundred." Suppose that there are twenty such teachers in London alone, and a proportionate number in every large town throughout the country; then add to these the number of children who, neglected by their parents, run the streets, and are taught to steal by one or other of these boys; not to say anything of those who are educated to this craft by their own parents,—and the state of things will appear appalling.

But these boys, as we have said, are unfit for any useful employment, from having not been trained for any. They can do nothing useful; and if they could, they are not inclined; and if they were inclined, no one would employ them who knew their history, for no one will employ a thief if he can get an honest individual to work for him.

To this class we think that no punishment could be more adapted than transportation, because, first, by being transported they are taught to work, and, consequently, are brought to be useful. This is an important step, inasmuch as, where there is any moral sense left, a human being feels that he is exalted when he can be of use. Secondly, Transportation puts it in the power of these persons to be useful to themselves.

This is a very important fact in favour of transportation. If the convict behave well during his probation, he may obtain his ticket of leave, and work on his own account. And here it must be remembered that his position is materially improved in two respects: he is able to work, and he is in a country where work can be obtained. He is able to work, for he has been taught during

his probation. He has undergone a training, passed through a course of education entirely different from his former education,—a course which enables him to work when he is able to obtain it; and he can obtain work, for there is not the number of honest and good workmen to compete with in the labour market, and there is plenty of work for those who are able and willing to do it.

To this class, at least, transportation is an equitable punishment. He has rendered himself unworthy of the privileges of the old country by his dishonesty, and deserves to lose them, and he is effectually barred of those privileges by banishment. He is rendered a blessing to the new country by the training he has received, and the new country receives him to its bosom.

But it may be said that there is too much mercy exhibited towards the offender by this kind of punishment, inasmuch as many felons have been placed in a better position by transportation than multitudes of honest men occupy at home. We answer, that transportation is not an unmixed boon, but contains within it quite enough of the nature of punishment. More emigration is repulsive to many minds; but transportation is horrifying to most. From this remark it will be perceived that we do not consider emigration and transportation synonymous terms, as a misprint in our opening article might lead our readers to suppose. The felon does not emigrate, but is transported; he does not go away voluntarily, but by compulsion, from friends as well as foes. If he have any relatives whom he holds dear, he must leave them; he has no choice whatever in the matter. Father, mother, brothers, sisters, friends, or associates in disgrace,—he must leave them all.

Then the training he has to undergo is of the most unpleasant description, and entirely involuntary. A guard of soldiers to prevent his escape, punishment for refractory conduct, and plenty of hard work,—such are the principal features of the punishment of transportation. Surely, even the injured persons themselves could not desire more.

The other class of persons, who are unable to obtain a living from any useful employment, consist principally of those who, though not educated in vice, are incapable, from various causes, of obtaining sustenance, and who are induced to steal from want. These

causes may generally be ranged under incompetence, indecision, want of economy, and indolence. This class of persons may be fairly considered to contain many individuals, who, under more favourable circumstances, will become useful members of society. If a man steal because he is in want, it is only fair to suppose that, other things being equal, when he ceases to want he will cease to steal; and if he wants because he cannot earn food, that he will cease to want when he can earn food. Now, a new colony is admirably adapted to such persons. There work is always to be had, and none can live without doing a portion of it.

The incompetent consist of such persons as, from various causes, are unfit for the particular department of labour in which they are placed; and this may have arisen from imperfect education, want of capacity, or inattention. Many young men have, after a long apprenticeship, found themselves unable to compete with other workmen in their own trade; so much so, that they have found themselves unable to obtain or to retain employment; and in an evil hour they have become dishonest, and rendered themselves amenable to the penalties of the law. To such persons transportation may be a blessing. With the opportunity of obtaining a ticket of leave, they may be able to earn an honest and good living. They cannot build the mansion, it may be; but they are not the less adapted to construct the cabin or the hut. Besides, such men are removed from the sphere of their degradation, and can breathe freely. They may again not only be respected, but *feel* that they are so. We say that the change of place and circumstances to such men is an advantage, for they are at once removed from the circumstances which induced the crime, and from the degradation attendant upon the punishment. But supposing the incompetency to arise from natural causes, even then the remarks applying to the incompetent from defective education will apply with still greater force to him. He cannot successfully compete with other men, and never will be able to do so. Well, by being transported he is removed from the necessity of trying. The kind of work which he has to perform is of so simple a character that it is next to impossible that he should fail to give satisfaction.

Then, as it respects those who fail to support themselves through indecision, want of economy, and indolence,—how admirably suited is a well-directed system of transportation to meet any or all of these cases! The evidently principal thing which such persons require is a severe course of physical and moral training; and a good system of transportation provides these. If a man is undecided, he has, whilst under training, no room to be so, for his work and hours of work are both prescribed by a rule which he is obliged to observe. If he is naturally wasteful, he has now no opportunity to be so, for he has no funds at his disposal; and should he be indolent, should his present discipline fail to cure him, it is to be feared that nothing will.

In every wise system of transportation, two things will be always prominent,—certain punishment to those who break the laws of their prison, and certain hope for all those who keep them. By these means a double motive is placed before the convict for improvement. He knows that while in a state of probation if he do wrong, or act disorderly, he must suffer for it; and he knows that if he do right the day will come when he will regain his liberty, together with the power to provide honestly for himself, and may be for his family; and he will be permitted to take his standing in society as an honourable and honest man. In this respect the position of the reclaimed transport is incomparably better than that of the prisoner who is “let loose” upon society after a few weeks’ or months’ imprisonment in a city prison. Few persons will so far sympathize with such a man as to assist him in obtaining employment; hence no resource is left him, after his imprisonment, but to fall back upon his old parents or die of starvation.

II. There is a class of thieves who are so hardened that it is almost hopeless that they will ever be anything else. They steal because they would rather live by stealing than by work. Ought these persons to be transported? We answer, Yes. First, Because, having wilfully violated the laws of their country, they do not deserve to be retained in or supported by it; and transportation effectually puts it out of their power to injure home society again. Secondly, Because transportation presents the only means of reclaiming them, short of the power of

religion, which latter it is not in the province of society to command.

We have thus, it will be perceived, considered transportation in its adaptation to the circumstances and prospects of the convict himself, and we felt the importance of doing so, as this phase of the subject had received so little previous attention in the course of the debate. It now only remains for us to briefly review the arguments of our opponents, and to suggest such refuting thoughts as we believe a just view of the subject will naturally prompt.

The first and most formidable objection to transportation is its alleged injustice to society in the penal settlements. This is what E. W. S. designates "an act of gross injustice abroad," and what B. S., under the authority of Lord Bacon, denounces as "a shameful and unblessed thing." But how do our friends arrive at this conclusion? E. W. S. does so by asserting that its origin, in the early part of the eighteenth century, was in the "fear and incapacity" of the government, and by referring to the fact that the inhabitants of some of the colonies have protested against the importation of more convicts among them. In reply, we need only say that the working of a measure, not the circumstances of its origin, must alone decide its character as good or bad. Yes, friend E. W. S., "the axiomatic words of Christ, 'By their fruits ye shall know them,' hold true here" also. With regard to the repugnance which the colonists manifest to receive convicts amongst them, we may say that this has not been always, nor generally the case, and that it has never been maintained that transportation to any colony, under any circumstances, is desirable. Society ought to be as much progressive in the colonies as in the mother country; and if this be so, the period will arrive in the history of every colony when not only more convicts ought not to be introduced, but when even penal settlements will be required for their convicts.

With respect to Lord Bacon's opinion, as quoted by our generally sagacious opponent B. S., we may remark, that it was not intended by its author to apply to our modern system of transportation, as he flourished long anterior to it, and that the transportation to which he objected was one that allowed men, to use his own words, to "be lazy," to "do mischief," and "live like

rogues;" and we need scarcely say that such a system would not be advocated by us.

That our own system of transportation has been properly carried out we have never heard asserted; and in maintaining that it ought not to be abolished, we would not be understood as implying that in our opinion it needs no reform. Experience will suggest defects in the best conceived system, and it is the province of wisdom to address itself to their removal.

Transportation has been objected to on account of its expense; but "L'Ouvrier" has satisfactorily shown that, as compared with imprisonment at home, there is "an evident saving in favour of transportation."

Again, it has been asserted that transportation has lost its terrors as a punishment, and that "the labouring classes of this country are largely imbued with the idea that transportation is a fortunate event." In opposition to this, the unsupported assertion of B. S., we place the testimony of the present Lord Chief Justice of England, as given in our opening article, together with the natural love of the human heart for home and fatherland. That there have been cases in which transportation has been coveted we do not deny; nor will B. S. deny that there are numerous cases in which crimes are committed for the sake of the imprisonment; and if from the former he concludes that transportation has lost its terrors to the majority of the people, and therefore ought to be abolished, he ought from the latter to conclude that imprisonment has lost its terrors, and ought likewise to be abolished! The one conclusion is as reasonable as the other.

But, if transportation is to be abolished, what substitute for it would our opponents suggest? Here, we fancy, they will find their ingenuity fail them, for the work of construction is a more difficult one than that of destruction. The accumulation of our criminals in prisons and penitentiaries, at the rate of some six or seven thousand annually, the enormous expense of their maintenance, and the contaminating influence of their society, would be no small evils to overcome. In the success of the newly-invented ticket-of-leave system we have no faith; but believe with Sir A. Alison, the historian of Europe, "that these tickets of leave will be tickets of leave for the convicts to return to their old haunts, and to commence their old habits again."

J. M. S.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

164. *Conversation*.—So "R. F. F.," the proposer of this question is anxious to obtain "influence and power of impression in company." As yet no one has advised him as to what course he should adopt to secure "so powerful a means of fascination," allow me, as *Christmas is approaching*, to direct his attention to a good and lively work on the subject, published under the title of "The Art of Conversation, with Remarks on Fashion and Dress," by Captain Orlando Sabertash. From a perusal of this little volume he will learn, if he has not learned before, that fluency of speech and smoothness of utterance are not the principal requisites to enable a man to shine in intelligent company. On this subject the captain says:—"Fluency of tongue, and a little modest assurance, though very well for imposing on the unwary, go but a very short way when you have to deal with those who are really worth pleasing. How can a person shine by conversation in elegant and educated society, whose thoughts have never ranged beyond the gratification of foolish vanity and mean selfishness; who has never reflected on life, men, and manners; whose mind has not turned to the contemplation of the works and wonders of nature; and who, in the events of his own time, has not seen the results of the many deeds of sorrow, shame, greatness, and glory, that crowd the pages of the world's variegated annals? Whoever would shine in polite discourse must at least be well versed in the philosophy of life, and possess a fair acquaintance with general and natural history, and the outlines of science. And though he need be neither a poet nor an artist, he must be well read in poetry, and acquainted with the fine arts; because it is only by their study that taste can be cultivated, and fancy guided. A familiarity with the fine arts is necessary, in fact, to give him a just perception of the sublime and beautiful, the very foundation whence our emotions of delight must arise. Any one attempting to shine in conversation without possessing the trifling acquirements here mentioned,—for I have said nothing of learning and science,—will most assuredly make an indifferent figure, and had better therefore content himself with simply pleasing by unaffected cheerfulness and good humour, which is within reach of all." S. G.

169. *Bomilcar, Ox of Melcarth*, appears to be a similar compound of the name of the god *Melcarth*, as the following are of the Hebrew—*El, God*; e.g. *Adriel*, 1 Sam. xviii. 19, *Flock of God*. *Ariel*, Ezra viii. 16, *Lion of God*. *Elika*, 2 Sam. xxiii. 25, *Pelican of God*. *Gamaliel*, Num. i. 10, *Camel of God*. Many similar compounds may be found in several Oriental languages, as the Persian *Aspatha*, the gift of the horse, i.e. *Bramah*, &c.

W. G. H.

174. *The Ancient Britons*.—Allow me to recommend to "T. H. W.," who is desirous of studying the history of the ancient Britons, J. A. Giles's "History of the Ancient Britons," 2 vols., price £1 10s. The work is published by Bell.

The "Cambrian Register," and the "Cambro Briton," are, I believe, old books, but might, perhaps, be obtained at second-hand book-shops.

A. C.

190. *How to study the Poets*.—The most philosophical method of studying the poetry of any nation is first *chronologically* to notice the progress of language and expression of poetic thought; and secondly, *æsthetically*, or with a critic's eye and pencil to mark all beautiful thoughts which are well conceived and well expressed; for frequent reference and contemplation. I would advise "Septimus" to read the English poets in the order of their appearance, and, if his taste be not yet fixed, to choose only those of the first-class, such as Spencer, Milton, Shakspeare, Pope, Cowper, Young, and Wordsworth; by this means, if he reads with attention, his taste will in all probability be a pure one; leave the minor poets for a more leisurely study. After having done this, he should review his work, and, relying on his own judgment, mark with marginal lines all such passages as strike him with their sublimity, beauty, or truth; when he has thus dissected an author, the labour of after-reviewing, which must be thorough and frequent, will be less tedious, since he already knows where the gems lie. Above all things the works of Shakspeare should absorb the attention of "Septimus;" they form in themselves a school of poetry of every description. Shakspeare cannot be read, he must be studied, studied like Virgil or Homer, with painful diligence, with deep thought, and the reward will exceed anticipation. Another exercise I must earnestly recommend to "Septimus," if he wishes his knowledge of English poetry to be thorough, that is parallel reading. Read Hamlet's soliloquy, "To be or not to be," side by side with Cato's soliloquy by Addison, "It must be so;" and whilst studying the penetrating analyzation of human character in Shakspeare's dramatic works, read Pope's "Essay on Man." Read Young's "Night Thoughts" with Milton; Campbell's "Pleasures of Hope" with Pollok's "Course of Time," and so on. If "Septimus" adopts this plan, strictly following it out to the very letter, he will acquire a perfect knowledge of English poetry, and moreover by the exercise his intellectual faculties will be strengthened, his mind elevated, his judgment fixed, and his soul being full of beautiful and sublime thoughts will stretch to their magnitude, and become fitted for higher and still greater exertions.

O'DELL.

196. *Building Societies*.—Having for some years past paid especial attention to all institutions having for their object the promotion of provident habits among the industrious classes, and of which institutions building societies, properly constituted and managed, stand foremost, I shall be very happy, on some early occasion, to furnish A. T. M., and the other readers of this valued periodical, with some authentic information relating to the origin, constitution, and past and present position of benefit building societies, freehold land societies, and other institutions of a similar character.

C. W., Jun.





